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The Role of the Everything But Arms Trade Preferences Regime in the EU Development Strategy

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences regime on exports from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to the European Union (EU). With this aim, an augmented gravity model is estimated for exports from the 79 ACP countries to the EU-15 for the time period 1995 to 2005 using panel data techniques. The model estimates are used to quantify the effect of the EBA preferences on the ACP LDCs' export performance and to compare it with the impact of official development assistance. In addition to their separate effects, the combined impact of EBA and aid flows is estimated. The main results show a negative effect of the EBA regime on exports. Otherwise, the combined effect of the EBA and aid on exports is positive, supporting an EU development strategy that includes both sorts of assistance, aid and trade preferences.

JEL Classification: O24; C23; F13; F35

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1. Introduction

Trade preferences were initially established in the development debate as a sort of aid to developing countries (DCs). The development debate turned its focus on trade as a more effective way of ensuring growth and economic and social prosperity in the DCs because of the mixed outcomes of aid programmes (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Morrissey, 2006). Hence, a special and differential treatment regime was introduced within the GATT/WTO framework in order to promote DCs' exports without exposing their home industries to higher competition.

This study will focus on trade preferences offered by the European Union (EU) and in particular on the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences regime, which is targeted exclusively at least developed countries (LDCs). The expectations about the EBA initiative have been very high, setting the hopes that this new scheme will deliver the breakthrough in the economic development of the poorest countries in the world. In contrast, this study will present arguments, which highlight the various threats of implementing trade preference regimes, not only to the beneficiary countries but also to the WTO framework.

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to examine the influence of the EBA preferences on the ACP LDCs' export performance and second, to compare the impact of the EBA scheme with the effect of official development assistance (ODA). In addition to their separate effects the combined impact of EBA and aid flows will also be analysed. To our knowledge, this is the first study that specifically evaluates the influence of the EBA regime and compares trade preferences and development aid as development tools within the framework of the gravity model of trade. With this aim, a gravity model augmented with aid and trade preferences variables is estimated for exports from the ACP countries to the EU-15 over the period 1995 to 2005 with the help of different econometric techniques – random- and fixed-effects, Hausman-Taylor estimator and Heckman regression method.

The main findings show that the EBA agreement seems to have exactly the opposite effect as its goals: instead of increasing the size of exports the arrangement actually reduces it. In contrast, the interaction effect between EBA and ODA turns out to be a significant determinant of exports from ACP LDCs to the EU-15, showing a small and positive effect on exports. The ODA variable has different sign and significance level in the estimations and the results are not robust to changes in the specification of the model. It appears that neither the EBA scheme nor the ODA achieve their goals on its own but a mixed strategy using both development approaches seems to have a significant positive effect on LDCs' exports to the EU.

The study is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the EBA initiative and its characteristics. Section 3 presents a literature review and Section 4 analyses the empirical effects of the EBA arrangement on trade. Finally, some conclusions are outlined in Section 5.

2. The EBA Initiative: A New Option for LDCs?

The EBA arrangement is part of the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) since it became effective on March 5th 2001. Compared to the eligibility criteria for the general GSP scheme, the EBA agreement is specifically targeted towards the LDCs defined on the basis of the UN definition for a LDC¹. The objective of this section is to outline the areas where the arrangement offers LDCs real possibilities to improve their situation and also to highlight the disadvantages linked with it.

The major advantage of the EBA agreement is the unlimited time period of its implementation (Brenton, 2003; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 2005; Inama, 2006). Due to the fact that the arrangement is not subject to periodical renewal, as the general EU GSP scheme, it offers higher certainty for exporters from LDCs and facilitates investment decisions. It is also an incentive to diversify the export structure and to invest in new

industries and products with the aim of promoting industrialisation. No other preference agreement so far has been so advanced in this aspect.

Other positive characteristics of the EBA arrangement concern product and country coverage, and tariff cuts (Inama, 2006). Meanwhile, all products are covered under the agreement², including additional 919 HS8³ product lines compared to the general GSP scheme, which makes EBA the most generous of all preferential agreements (EC No.980/2005; UNCTAD 2002). Indeed, the LDCs can specialize in the products in which they have comparative advantage and be ready to face future competition pressures when they will be no longer eligible for the EBA agreement. In addition, there are no more duties or quotas, which can hinder the take-off of the preferential scheme. It is also worth noting that the preferential access is available for all LDCs without any exclusion and hence the trade diversion effect is not supposed to outweigh the trade creation effect.

Although substantial steps have been made to improve the design of the EU trade preferences to LDCs, the EBA scheme is still far from perfect. While the inclusion of all LDCs without exceptions in the arrangement can be seen as a positive achievement, the majority of DCs are still disadvantaged because the LDCs are more preferred in comparison to them (Kennan and Stevens, 2001; Hewitt and Page, 2002; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 2005). This fact may lead to potential losses for the non-LDC DCs, which still face tariffs and quotas for their exports. It is assumed that especially for the non-LDC ACP countries this negative effect can be significant since all ACP countries directly compete in the same industries (Kennan and Stevens, 2001; Hewitt and Page, 2002; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 2005).

The increase of exports and diversification of the export structure are some of the main goals of the EBA agreement. However, neither of both objectives has been achieved. The LDC Report of UNCTAD (2008) shows that despite of high growth rates of exports, which are the main driver of the economic performance of LDCs, their export structure remains

concentrated on primary commodities and low-skilled, labour-intensive manufactures. Primary commodities including fuels comprised 77% of the LDCs' merchandise exports in the years 2005 and 2006 (UNCTAD, 2008). The report also underlines the significant difference between the African and the Asian LDCs. While the Asian ones are more specialized in the production of manufactured goods the exports of the African LDCs consist almost completely of primary products and fuels, which made 91.5% of their exports in the years 2005 and 2006.

The assumption that the EBA would have higher utilization rates than the other GSP schemes can be doubted on the basis of the available data. In the first place, the export share of the 919 products liberalized with the introduction of the EBA agreement has remained very low, 0.03% of total LDCs' exports to the EU in 2001 (Brenton, 2003). Second, the three products with delayed liberalization - bananas, rice and sugar - had an export share of 0.47% of total LDCs' exports to the EU in 2001. The figures show that the new liberalized products are not of much relevance for the LDCs and have had a very low share in the LDCs' exports, at least in the first year of implementation of EBA.

Total imports entering duty free under the EBA regime reached €5.8 billion in 2008, which represents only 23% of total imports into the EU from LDCs⁴. In contrast, for the Asian LDCs the EBA regime is a great opportunity to improve their export structure and revenues so they are actually the effective users of the arrangement (Kennan and Stevens, 2001; Brenton, 2003). For instance, Bangladesh managed to gradually increase its utilization of EBA preferences from about 60% in 2002 to almost 80% in 2008, and its imports under EBA have more than double since⁵.

In addition, the fact that in 2001 none of the ACP LDCs requested a preferential access under the EBA arrangement is striking (Brenton, 2003). Although there were goods exported from ACP LDCs to the EU, which were eligible for a preferential status, the latter was not requested. This situation has occurred because most of the ACP LDCs still export

mainly under the conditions of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (UNCTAD, 2007). Since 2001 the ACP LDCs are eligible to export to the EU under two different agreements: the Cotonou⁶ (at least until 2008) and the EBA. UNCTAD (2007) shows an extremely high utility ratio⁷ of the Cotonou Agreement, fluctuating between 65% and 80% in the period from 1998 to 2004. Apparently, for the ACP LDCs it has been more profitable to export under the Cotonou Agreement than under the EBA scheme.

The reasons lie in the different rules of origin and administrative requirements of both agreements. Compared to the Cotonou Agreement the rules of origin and the administrative requirements under the EBA regime are much stricter (UNCTAD, 2001; Brenton, 2003; Candau, Fontagne and Jean, 2004; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 2005). For the ACP LDCs using the EBA regime means additional documentation, new rules of origin and other regulations about cumulation. Under the Cotonou agreement the ACP countries enjoy the right of full cumulation, contrary to EBA. In this way all ACP countries together are regarded as one customs territory and therefore “manufacturing operations may be carried out in every beneficiary country” (UNCTAD, 2001).

Although the restrictive rules of origin and administrative requirements are often considered to be the main reasons for the underutilization of the EBA regime, there are also other possible explanations. The utilization of trade preferences depends on the national conditions and specifically on the supply capacity of the recipient country (Kennan and Stevens, 2001; Hewitt and Page, 2002). The EBA agreement is targeted at the poorest countries in the world. Hence, it is plausible to assume that they possess only a limited capacity to produce and export more goods. Transport, infrastructure and potential to adjust the production structure are some of the conditions for effective participation of the EBA regime. If these are not available it cannot be expected that the beneficiary countries will experience an increase in their exports. Preferential market access on its own is not sufficient to solve the supply-side constraints of the LDCs. Hence, it is essential that exporters have

simultaneously access to a functioning financial and credit market in order to afford restructuring of the production facilities (Jensen and Yu, 2005).

3. Overview of Empirical Studies Evaluating the EBA Scheme

There are two clearly differentiated strands in the empirical literature. The first strand of studies uses computable general equilibrium models to quantify the effect of implementing the EBA initiative. Usually such models are employed to forecast the future impact of given policies on the exports and welfare of DCs and on the EU. In the second strand we find studies that use the gravity model of trade to estimate the effects of the initiatives on bilateral trade flows, taking into account that this regime may result not only in greater imports from beneficiary countries but may also divert trade away from non-beneficiary countries.

Evenett (2009) presents a comprehensive survey of studies based on the general equilibrium model. Three studies are closely related to our paper and consider in particular the EBA agreement: Somwaru and Trueblood (2002); Cernat, Laird, Monge-Raffarello and Turrini (2003) and Jensen and Yu (2005). According to these studies the gains to LDCs from the EBA scheme lie between US\$300-400 million, whereas it is found the EU to have cost between US\$200-300 million. Since some of the effects for third DCs are negative and all kind of non-tariff barriers have been neglected, the world net-welfare effect of this initiative could be close to zero.

In the second strand of the literature, there are a number of very recent studies that use the gravity model to estimate the effects on trade of different preference schemes (Evenett, 2009). We focus on the main findings of three of them that are closely related to our work: Persson and Wilhemsson (2006); Verdeja (2007) and Gamberoni (2007). Persson and Wilhemsson (2006) estimate a gravity model using panel data techniques (fixed effects) on a large sample of EU importers and developing country exporters over the period 1960-2002. The main findings are that certain preference schemes have had large effects on DCs exports—

the largest are found for the ACP countries, where the preferences increase exports by about 30 %. Verdeja (2007) estimates cross-sectional and panel data gravity model for ten different periods between 1973 and 2000, using several estimation techniques. They obtain a negative and significant effect of the EU GSP when using a two-stage fixed effect estimator proposed by Martínez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003), which might result from the low utilization rate of GSP preferences. A slightly different approach is followed by Gamberoni (2007). The author decomposes the total value of trade into the extensive margin (number of products traded) and the intensive margin (average value traded) and then estimates the effects of trade preferences on each margin. It is the only paper within the gravity model framework that specifically considers the EBA regime, together with another three unilateral preference programs. Interestingly, the main findings indicate that the ACP and the EBA regimes decrease trade (conditional on trade being present) by 11% and 19% respectively and also both regimes decrease the number of products traded (extensive margin of trade). This later effect implies an anti-diversification bias effect of these preferences.

4. Empirical Estimations of the Effect of the EBA Initiative

4.1 Model Specification, Data and Main Results

The effect of the EBA initiative on the ACP countries' exports will be estimated with the use of the gravity model. The use of the gravity equation to explain bilateral trade flows was pioneered by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) and meanwhile theoretically justified (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1989; Deardoff, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The gravity model is today often used in explaining bilateral trade flows between different countries or examining trade creation and diversion effects of free trade areas (e.g. Oguledo and Macphee, 1994; Carrère, 2006). However, in the field of trade preferences and especially with respect to the EBA initiative there are, to our knowledge, only a few empirical studies that use this method (Evenett, 2009). The gravity equation has the advantage that it takes into

account the supply changes in the DCs and respectively the demand changes in the developed countries. It considers also a long-run equilibrium view of trade patterns between two countries (Nilsson, 1997). A similar method as in this analysis is applied by Nilsson (2002) who examined the effect of EU's GSP and the Lomé Convention and by the abovementioned studies (Persson and Wilhemsson, 2006; Verdeja, 2007 and Gamberoni, 2007). The most important differences between these studies and the gravity model estimated in this paper is that whereas those mainly examined the effect of different GSP regimes, we focus specifically on the effect of the EBA regime and we also consider the effect of development assistance on trade and the combined effect of both development strategies -EBA and ODA- on exports.

The gravity equation is estimated for bilateral trade flows between the 79 ACP countries and the EU-15 for the time period between 1995 and 2005. 41 out of the 79 ACP countries were during the time period also LDCs, with Senegal and Timor-Leste being added from the UN to the LDC list in 2000 and 2003 respectively⁸. A list of the exporter (ACP) and importer (EU-15) countries is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The data is taken from different databases: the figures for distance, colonial history and common language are from the CEPII database⁹. The GDP and population values for the ACP countries are extracted from the UNCTAD database¹⁰, the population size of the EU-15 countries and trade figures from EUROSTAT¹¹ and the GDP for the EU-15 countries and ODA disbursements are from the OECD database¹².

We focus on ACP countries for two reasons. First, all ACP countries have a very similar export structure and are direct competitors in some industries so it will be interesting to see whether the EBA scheme gives an advantage for the ACP LDCs compared to the non-LDC ACP countries. Second, it is of special interest to examine whether the EBA introduction has had an impact exactly on the ACP LDCs' exports because before the EBA scheme they have already had greater preferential market access to the EU compared to the other DCs.

The gravity equation in its log-linear form, which is applied in this investigation, is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln X_{jit} = & \beta_{ji} + \beta_1 \ln GDP_{jt} + \beta_2 \ln GDP_{it} + \beta_3 \ln POP_{jt} + \beta_4 \ln POP_{it} + \beta_5 \ln DIST_{ji} + \\ & \beta_6 \ln ODA_{jit} + \beta_7 COL_j + \beta_8 ISLAND_j + \beta_9 LANDLOCKED_j + \beta_{10} COMMONLANG_j + \\ & \beta_{11} EBA_{jt} + \beta_{12} \ln ODA_{jit} * EBA_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jit} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where:

$\ln X_{jit}$ stands for the logarithmic exports from ACP country j to EU-15 country i in year t , in current US dollars.

$\ln GDP_{jt}$ and $\ln GDP_{it}$ are respectively the logarithmic gross domestic products of the exporter and importer country, both in current US dollars.

$\ln POP_{jt}$ and $\ln POP_{it}$ present the logarithmic population size of countries j and i .

$\ln DIST_{ji}$ is the logarithmic distance in kilometres between the most important cities in terms of population in each country calculated following the great circle formula.

$\ln ODA_{jit}$ is the first lag of the logarithmic of official development assistance received by ACP country j from EU-15 country i in US dollars.

COL_j and $COMMONLANG_j$ are binary variables indicating whether the exporting country has a colonial link or a common official language with the importing country.

$ISLAND_j$ and $LANDLOCKED_j$ are dummy variables, taking the value of one when the exporting country j is respective an island or landlocked.

EBA_{jt} is a dummy variable indicating eligibility for the EBA scheme.

$\ln ODA_{jit} * EBA_{jt}$ is an interaction term between the EBA dummy variable and the $\ln ODA$ variable showing their joint influence.

β_{ji} are country-pair effects and ε_{jit} is the error term, which is assumed to be iid.

The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary statistics

Expectations about the sign and effect of the independent variables on exports can be drawn from theory and from the simple correlation statistics. Since higher GDP indicates higher supply capacity in the exporting country and higher import demand in the importing country it is expected that both GDP variables shall have a positive sign. The sign of the population variables is ambiguous. On the one side, a bigger country could export more than a smaller country because economies of scale can be better employed and import more because consumers demand a wider variety of goods. On the other side, large population leads to a large domestic market and hence higher self-sufficiency and higher absorption effect within the country. Since distance is used as a measure for transport and transaction costs it is expected that its coefficient will have a negative effect on bilateral trade flows. The two dummy variables for colonial history and common language are assumed to induce exports from the ACP countries to the EU-15. A negative impact of the binary variables for being an island or landlocked could be expected due to higher transport costs associated to a more difficult market access in these cases. For the EBA coefficient a positive sign is expected although it may be insignificant because of its underutilization on the side of the ACP LDCs. The expectations for the ODA coefficient are mixed. Earlier studies find that development assistance could have both negative and positive effects on exports.

Table 2 presents the simple correlation statistics.

Table 2. Simple Correlations

Our expectations about the sign of the explanatory variables can be confirmed except for one. Contrary to our assumption the simple correlation between EBA and exports,

presented in Table 2, is negative. In contrast, EBA and ODA together seem to have a positive influence on exports from the ACP LDCs to the EU-15.

The gravity model is estimated using different econometric methods. First, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity three panel-data models have been estimated: a random effects model, a fixed effects model and a Hausman-Taylor model. Second, to account for zero export values in the dependent variable a two-step Heckman model is also estimated taking into account the panel-data structure of our dataset. Time dummies have been added to all regressions and in addition, an interaction term between them and the EBA dummy has been included. The model is estimated first including only the EBA dummy and afterwards adding ODA and the interaction term between both as a first robustness check. As the results show, there are no significant differences in the estimated coefficients using the same econometric method. Table 3 offers a summary of the estimation outcomes of the fixed and random effects, and Hausman-Taylor model.

Table 3. Estimation Results

Comparing the outcome of the random and fixed effects regressions offers some interesting results. The GDP variables have the same sign in both regressions but, surprisingly, the GDP of the importer country turns out to have a negative effect on the bilateral exports that is significant only in one specification using fixed and random effects. A substantial difference is found between both estimation methods concerning the signs and significance levels of the population variables. While in the random effects regression both population variables turn out to be significantly positive the fixed effects estimation shows the opposite influence. This indicates that the population variables are probably correlated with the random effects. Since distance, colonial history, common language, landlocked and island are time-invariant dummies only the random effects regression provides estimation of their

effects. As assumed, distance has a negative influence on exports implying that transport costs are still a significant obstacle to trade. Having a colonial history or a common language amplifies as suggested significantly the size of the trade flows. The dummy for island has a positive sign but it is not statistically significant. Being a landlocked country is plausibly a barrier to trade flows. Taking a look at the time dummies and the interaction effects between them and the EBA dummy indicates that barely one of them is significant.

Turning to the variables of most relevance for this study shows some interesting results. The most surprising outcome is the highly significant and very strong negative impact of the EBA dummy on exports in both regressions, irrespective of whether ODA is included in the regression equation or not. The EBA agreement does not seem to foster exports; it actually decreases their value in the absence of additional aid. In contrast, the interaction effect between EBA and ODA turns out to be positive and highly significant as a determinant of exports from the ACP LDCs to the EU-15. The ODA variable performs differently in both regressions (fixed effects, random effects) but it is always insignificant. It appears that neither the EBA scheme nor the ODA achieve their goals on its own but a mixed strategy using both development approaches seems to have a significant positive effect on LDCs' exports.

The Hausman-Taylor technique allows for some but not all of the regressors to be correlated with the individual effects (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). In this way it solves the “all or nothing choice” between the fixed and random effects concerning the endogeneity between the regressors and the individual effects (Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte, 2003). The variables are divided into three groups¹³: endogenous (population and ODA), time-variant exogenous (GDP, EBA and interaction term between EBA and ODA, time dummies and interaction effect between time dummies and EBA) and time-invariant exogenous (distance, colonial history, common language, and island and landlocked). The results from the Hausman-Taylor regression can be found in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3. Alternatively, the

model is estimated with fixed country-pair effects and without the time-invariant dummies. The results concerning the variables of interest are unchanged¹⁴.

As in the previous two regressions the GDP of the exporting country has a significant positive influence on exports while the GDP of the importing country affects negatively the bilateral trade flows. Again the population of the importing country has a remarkable strong significant positive effect on exports. This outcome may be explained by the fact that the importing countries, in this case the EU-15, offer many opportunities through their big market for the ACP exporters. The sign of distance is not robust to specifications but insignificant. Only the dummy for common language is significant and affects exports positively. The EBA dummy has, as in the previous estimations, a significant, strong and robust negative influence on exports. ODA is insignificant and the interaction term between them positively significant. Almost none of the time dummies and the interaction effects between them and the EBA dummy is significant, except for the case including only the EBA dummy in the regression equation when the time dummies for the years 2001 to 2005 and the interaction term $EBA*2005$ become significantly positive.

A log-linear form of the gravity equation, which has been used, drops out all zero bilateral flows (almost 20% in our sample). However, through dropping out these flows relevant information about the bilateral trade patterns of the pair of countries is lost. Therefore, as many authors argue, leaving out the zero flows can lead to a possible sample selection bias (de Groot and Linders, 2006; Heckman, 1979; Helpman, Melitz and Rubenstein, 2008). For that reason, Heckman (1979) considers the sample selection bias as a specification error and suggests a two-stage model where at the first stage the probability of existence of trade flows is estimated (the selection equation). In the second stage, the influence of the variables on the volume of trade flows is measured conditional on the fact that the flows are positive. The Heckman selection model is specified as follows:

1. Selection equation, where π_{jit} represents the probability of export from country j to country i in year t:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{jit} = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \ln GDP_{jt} + \gamma_2 \ln GDP_{it} + \gamma_3 \ln POP_{jt} + \gamma_4 \ln POP_{it} + \gamma_5 \ln DIST_{ji} + \gamma_6 \ln ODA_{jit} + \\ & \gamma_7 COL_j + \gamma_8 ISLAND_j + \gamma_9 LANDLOCKED_j + \gamma_{10} COMMONLANG_j + \gamma_{11} EBA_{jt} + \\ & \gamma_{12} \ln ODA_{jit} * EBA_{jt} + \mu_{jit} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

2. Gravity equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln X_{jit} = & \beta_{ij} + \beta_1 \ln GDP_{jt} + \beta_2 \ln GDP_{it} + \beta_3 \ln POP_{jt} + \beta_4 \ln POP_{it} + \beta_5 \ln DIST_{ji} + \\ & \beta_6 \ln ODA_{jit} + \beta_7 COL_j + \beta_8 ISLAND_j + \beta_9 LANDLOCKED_j + \beta_{10} EBA_{jt} + \\ & \beta_{11} \ln ODA_{jit} * EBA_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jit} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The variable, which is used as a “selection rule” and is therefore included only in the selection equation, is the common language dummy. Using other variables (island or landlocked) delivers similar results. The estimation results of the Heckman model are presented in Table 4, including again first only the EBA dummy, in the second step EBA and ODA and finally introducing also the interaction term between both. Since there is only one significant difference in the estimated coefficients (the significance level of the exporter population in the second stage) we refer in the following discussion to the Heckman model with all three variables.

The results of the Heckman model illustrate a more detailed picture of how the regressors influence bilateral exports. Some variables change either their sign or significance level between the two stages of the model. Such examples are the GDP of the importing country, which influences positively the probability of exports to take place but negatively their value. The same can be monitored for the population of the exporting country whereas the variable changes also its significance level. The most important difference between the Heckman model and the previous regressions lies in the significance level of the ODA

variable. ODA is significant at the one percent level in both equations. It appears that development assistance has a small positive influence on the probability of trade flows to take place and a slightly higher effect on their volume: a 10% increase in ODA increases exports from ACP countries to EU countries by 1.6%. In comparison, the EBA dummy shows still a strong negative effect on exports: an ACP country exports 84% ($[\exp(-1.83)-1]*100$) less when it is eligible for the EBA scheme than when it is not. Important is also the outcome of the interaction term between both variables. It is in both stages positive but only in the selection regression significant, indicating that the probability of exporting to the EU increases for ACP LDCs eligible for the EBA scheme with higher levels of aid. Interpreting the results would lead to the conclusion that ODA is an effective development strategy also on its own while the EBA scheme leads rather to the opposite effect. A mixed approach, including both strategies, has a small positive effect on the probability to export. Looking at the time dummies, those for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 affect positively the exports development from the ACP countries to the EU-15, similar to the results from the Hausman-Taylor model including only EBA. These results can be interpreted as an increase of ACP exports over time due to external factors. In contrast, none of the interaction effects between the time dummies and the EBA variable are significant, pointing towards the ineffectiveness of the introduction of the EBA scheme in 2001.

4.2 Robustness

In this sub-section a number of robustness checks are considered in order to validate our results. First, we investigate whether our estimation suffers from sample selection due to the important amount of zero values in the ODA variable (44%). Since the model is estimated in logarithms, the observations with zero values are dropped from the estimation and that prevent us from using the full sample (12615 observations). We re-estimated the model with the ODA variable in levels (in thousand million US dollar). The results from the estimations

using the Heckman procedure show that the effect of ODA is still positive and significant and the effect of EBA is negative and significant, although smaller in magnitude¹⁵. The results for the gravity and the selection equations are shown in the first and second columns of Table 5.

Table 5. Robustness

Second, the gravity model is estimated with a different set of fixed effects, namely exporter-and-time and importer-and-time fixed effects, in addition to the dyadic fixed effects, as suggested by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). The outcome of the estimation is shown in the last column of Table 5. The main difference encountered with respect to the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 is that the EBA coefficient is not statistically significant; otherwise the results are almost the same concerning the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction between ODA and EBA, which magnitude is the same. To combine this methodology with the Heckman model we also estimated a two-step model with a selection equation and a gravity equation with the abovementioned set of fixed effects obtaining similar results¹⁶.

Third, we deal with the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and correct for both allowing for a more flexible structure in the error terms and using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for coefficients estimated by fixed-effects (within) regression. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to three lags and possibly correlated between panels. These standard errors are robust to general forms of cross-sectional (spatial) and temporal dependence. The main results remain unchanged.

Next, the model is estimated separately for countries receiving aid and for countries not receiving aid and the results concerning the negative and significant effect of the EBA regime are unchanged¹⁷. Finally, we estimate the effect of EBA and ODA on export flows only for the restricted sample of LDCs using the Heckman selection model. Results are

presented in Table 5 (columns 3-4 only with EBA and columns 5-6 also with EBA, ODA and their combined effect). The EBA dummy maintains its negative and significant sign in both specifications, with and without ODA and the interaction term. Development assistance still has a positive effect on the probability and the volume of exports from the ACP LDCs to the EU-15. Compared with the results from the Heckman estimation using the full sample of countries the interaction term between EBA and ODA turns out to have in this case significant influence on the magnitude and not on the probability to export.

4.3 Policy Implications

A number of conclusions can be drawn for political actions concerning the questions which were examined through the estimation: Is the EBA initiative promoting exports of ACP LDCs and what is its effect compared to ODA?

With respect to the first question and regarding the Heckman selection model as the most reliable model, the estimation results point out that the EBA initiative fell short of the success, which was expected. In contrast to these results, the empirical studies which were presented at first in the empirical part showed a modest but throughout a constant positive influence of the EBA scheme on the exports of LDCs. This difference may be attributed to the fact that the results from the general equilibrium models are overestimated, as they do not regard rules of origin or other administrative requirements, which act as non-tariff barriers. Our results are however in accordance with the evidence found by Gamberoni (2007) who also considered the existence of zero trade flows and found a negative effect of the EBA regime on LDCs exports.

It is possible that after the full liberalization of rice, sugar and bananas the EBA agreement might be more effective. Two of the empirical studies describe that these sectors are very valuable for some of the LDCs, in particular the sugar sector (Cernat, Laird, Monge-Raffarello and Turrini, 2003; Jensen and Yu, 2005). Another point worth mentioning is that

the presented empirical studies take into account all LDCs, inclusive the Asian LDCs. As previously pointed out, it was expected that these countries will enjoy the greatest benefits from the introduction of the EBA scheme because unlike the ACP LDCs they do not have any other special or more privileged access to the EU market. In contrast, the ACP LDCs still possess the right to export under the Cotonou Agreement, which offers them more flexible rules of origin. So, the positive results from the empirical studies can be mainly the result of the increase of exports from the Asian LDCs to the EU and not from the ACP LDCs. This situation can be explained with the difficulties these countries might be experiencing in reorganising their export industries quickly. Using the EBA trade preferences instead of those from the Cotonou Agreement means new rules of origins and regulations, which are complex and demand some time to be introduced. It is possible that in the long-run more and more ACP LDCs will utilise the EBA scheme depending on how much additional costs they will have to bear from the change. Hence, an implication for the further trade policy of the EU will be to make the rules of origin and cumulation regulations of the EBA arrangement more flexible.

Still, it is striking that the EBA dummy has a negative impact on the ACP LDCs' exports. One may explain the lack of substantial influence of the EBA arrangement on the export performance of the LDCs with the low supply capacity, poor infrastructure, necessity of technical assistance and other "inside the border" problems. It was already earlier pointed out the supply-side problems are perhaps the biggest obstacle for LDCs to take up the granted preferences.

On the second question, compared to EBA, ODA shows better performance results, although not robust to different model specifications. The results of the Heckman regression are considered as the most reliable and according to them aid flows perform better than the EBA initiative in relation to the export performance of the ACP LDCs. Despite the various critiques about the possible negative effect of aid on the economic performance of the

receiving country, in this particular case it seems to have a positive impact on the export performance of the ACP countries. Considering this argument it should be taken into account that the ACP countries receive on average more ODA from the EU-15 than other DCs because of their long-term close economic and political relationship. In addition, some of the aid flows are targeted exactly at trade-related problems in the ACP countries, which is perhaps one of the reasons for the positive effect of ODA on exports. This finding corresponds to the problem discussed - many of the LDCs need not only trade preferences but, in the first place, more targeted aid to overcome their initial production situation and lack of appropriate infrastructure. Only when they are able to produce and export more goods the preferential market access becomes valuable.

The third variable of special interest for this study – the interaction term between EBA and ODA - has a rather stable coefficient throughout all regressions. The interaction term indicating the effect when a country eligible for the EBA scheme received additional aid in the previous year has a small but positive effect on export performance. This outcome leads to the conclusion that the development strategy of the developed countries, in this case of the EU, needs to include both sorts of assistance, aid and trade preferences. The two development tools act rather as complements than as substitutes to each other. In this sense one can think of a dual development strategy with two interrelated pillars: one representing aid and the second trade preferences. More direct aid or technical assistance can be targeted at infrastructure or production facilities projects enabling the LDCs to improve their supply side conditions, which then would give them the chance to take greater advantage of the trade policy. This could be a way to make the EBA preference scheme work better and to contribute significantly to the improvement of the LDCs' export performance.

Finally, the negative result about the effectiveness of the EBA scheme on its own brings back the question about the problematic effects of trade preferences in the long-run concerning the development of the world trading system and the trade policy of the LDCs.

Similar to the infant-industry protection, once introduced it is very difficult to be removed because the beneficiaries will always try to keep the protection. Additionally exists the threat of pushing LDCs to specialize in the production of certain products only on the basis of the highest preference margin and not according to their comparative advantages (Borrell and Stoeckel, 2001; Reinhardt and Özden, 2005). In such cases the beneficiary countries would be dependent on the existence of trade preferences because in their absence the exports would be not competitive on the world market. To avoid such problems it is perhaps better to advise against such trade preference schemes or at least make them more conform to the WTO rules.

5. Conclusion

The objective of this study was to examine the influence of the EBA preferences on the ACP LDCs' export performance and to compare the impact of the EBA scheme with the effect of official development assistance. The economic and political effects of preferential access for DCs to developed countries' markets and particularly the EU have been of controversial nature. These effects refer to the situation inside the beneficiary country such as supply constraints and "behind the border" problems as well as impacts on third countries and on the development of the multilateral trade negotiations. Many arguments can be made against the implementation of trade preferences as a development strategy because of its possible slowing-down and deforming influence in the long-run. Besides, it is doubtful whether DCs and especially LDCs can benefit from the granted preferential access at all. As shown in the case of ACP LDCs, which enjoy the broadest and preferable access to the EU market, there were none, at least until now, substantial increases or improvements in their export performance. The only group of countries, which has benefited from the introduction of the EBA scheme so far, is perhaps the group of the Asian LDCs.

The main conclusion, which can be drawn from the empirical analysis, is that eligibility for the EBA scheme alone does not contribute to the increase of the exports of the

ACP LDCs. Therefore, it is questionable whether non-reciprocal preference schemes should be used as a replacement to aid flows in this particular case. It is possible that with additional aid flows the infrastructure and supply capacity in the LDCs can be advanced and in this way the exports of LDCs will be enhanced. But the negative effects on third countries, such as trade diversion, and on the multilateral trade liberalization will remain. Especially, when the eligible countries succeed to increase their exports, the trade diversion effect will become even bigger. This raises the question whether it is worth threatening the development of the developing region as a whole and also the objectives and principles of the WTO. The focus of the solution should lie not only in the short-run results but mainly in the sustainability in the long-run. In this sense the development strategy should be conform to all core principles of the WTO and contribute to the economic development of DCs with the least possible losses for other countries.

NOTES

¹ A developing country is determined as a LDC according to three criteria, which take into account the general national income of the country, the indicators of the Human Assets Index and the Economic Vulnerability Index (<http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrrls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm>).

² Initially, an exception for rice, sugar and fresh bananas has been introduced. The liberalization of these products has followed a gradual process, starting in 2001 and ending in September 2009 (Art. 12 EC No.980/2005).

³ HS8 denotes Harmonized System Classification with products disaggregated at 8-digits level.

⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/index_en.htm.

⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/index_en.htm.

⁶ After 2008 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are meant to replace the existing trade regime by reciprocal agreements that are fully compatible with WTO rules.

⁷ The utility ratio is the ratio of imports that really enter under the preference regime to all dutiable imports.

⁸ Timor-Leste gained official independence in 2002. During 2003 the country became member of the ACP group and with it accessed the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. Therefore, Timor-Leste is added in the dataset as ACP and LDC country from 2003 onwards.

⁹ <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm>.

¹⁰ <http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/>.

¹¹ We use mirror statistics, namely imports reported by each EU country in current Euros converted into dollars using the bilateral exchange rate \$/€.

¹² <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids>.

¹³ The division is made according to the results obtained from single t-test to compare the coefficients obtained in the fixed effects and random effects models. When the difference between the coefficients is statistically significant, the variable is classified as endogenous. See Wooldridge (2002), *Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data*, page 290.

¹⁴ Results are available upon request.

¹⁵ Alternatively, we replace the ODA variable by a dummy variable that takes the value of one when aid is positive and zero otherwise. Also in this way we are able to estimate the model with all the observations. The results are similar and show that countries that receive aid export more and that countries receiving aid that are eligible for the EBA regime have a higher possibility to have positive exports.

¹⁶ Results are available upon request.

¹⁷ Results are available upon request.

TABLES

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Exports	10435	13.86279	3.584209	0.067659	22.62336
GDPj	12750	21.13228	1.747081	16.28049	26.21239
GDPi	12915	26.52476	1.231008	23.49279	28.55258
POPj	12915	14.24148	2.397114	7.397562	18.76679
POPi	12915	16.36403	1.337698	12.91325	18.22875
Distance	12915	8.903302	0.418459	7.776782	9.805546
ODA	7234	13.98434	2.479209	9.21034	21.51213

Note: Exports denotes bilateral exports from the ACP countries to the EU, GDPj and GDPi denote GDP in the exporter and importer countries, respectively, POPj and POPi denote population in the exporter and importer countries respectively, Distance is the distance between countries j and i, ODA is official development aid (disbursements) given by each EU donor to each ACP recipient country.

Table 2. Simple Correlations

	Exports	GDPj	GDPi	POPj	POPi	Distance	ODA	Colony	Island	Landlocked	Commonlang	EBA
Exports	1											
GDPj	0.431	1										
GDPi	0.436	-0.147	1									
POPj	0.267	0.760	-0.196	1								
POPi	0.451	-0.154	0.985	-0.197	1							
Distance	-0.029	0.038	-0.048	-0.188	-0.062	1						
ODA	0.335	0.251	0.235	0.409	0.214	-0.095	1					
Colony	0.233	-0.082	0.258	-0.133	0.264	0.005	0.294	1				
Island	-0.077	-0.264	0.107	-0.517	0.107	0.371	-0.311	0.068	1			
Landlocked	-0.075	-0.043	-0.038	0.195	-0.041	-0.086	0.138	-0.031	-0.303	1		
Commonlang	0.095	-0.057	-0.037	-0.080	-0.047	-0.009	0.226	0.604	0.025	0.022	1	
EBA	-0.201	-0.119	0.021	0.135	-0.047	-0.185	0.117	-0.030	-0.124	0.137	-0.014	1

Note: Exports denotes bilateral exports from the ACP countries to the EU, GDPj and GDPi denote GDP of the exporter and importer countries, respectively, POPj and POPi denote population in the exporter and importer countries respectively, Distance is the distance between countries j and i, ODA is development aid given by each EU donor to each ACP recipient country, Colony is a dummy that takes the value of one when the countries j and i have had a colonial relationship in the past, Island is a dummy that takes the value of one when country j is an island, Landlocked is a dummy that takes the value of one when country j is a landlocked country, Commonlang is a dummy that takes the value of one when the countries j and i have a common official language and EBA is a dummy that takes the value of one when country j is eligible for the EBA regime.

Table 3: Estimation Results

	Random EBA	Random EBA and ODA	Fixed EBA	Fixed EBA and ODA	Hausman- Taylor EBA	Hausman-Taylor EBA and ODA
Exporter GDP	0.889*** (14.031)	0.996*** (13.128)	0.765*** (6.786)	0.809*** (6.082)	0.803*** (11.153)	0.848*** (10.338)
Importer GDP	-0.888** (-2.553)	-0.598 (-1.293)	-1.117 (-1.511)	-0.279 (-0.323)	-1.901*** (-5.576)	-0.921** (-2.149)
Exporter POP	0.274*** (4.716)	0.133* (1.708)	0.274 (0.581)	-0.721 (-0.779)	0.408*** (2.794)	0.473*** (2.951)
Importer POP	2.263*** (6.942)	1.994*** (4.585)	-2.196 (-0.618)	-1.178 (-0.298)	3.395*** (8.800)	2.711*** (5.684)
Distance	-0.529*** (-2.833)	-0.591** (-2.353)	-	-	-0.002 (-0.002)	1.110 (1.442)
Colonial	1.084*** (3.457)	0.945*** (2.765)	-	-	0.635 (0.645)	0.229 (0.268)
Island	0.111 (0.646)	0.151 (0.635)	-	-	0.093 (0.184)	0.068 (0.129)
Landlocked	-0.398** (-2.185)	-0.351* (-1.800)	-	-	-0.478 (-0.938)	-0.447 (-1.030)
Common	0.769*** (3.382)	0.803*** (3.150)	-	-	1.142* (1.729)	1.363** (2.263)
EBA	-0.315*** (-2.934)	-1.612*** (-3.776)	-0.265** (-2.461)	-1.577*** (-3.591)	-0.279*** (-2.786)	-1.587*** (-6.154)
ODA		0.002 (0.115)		-0.022 (-1.074)		-0.021 (-1.260)
ODA*EBA		0.086*** (3.115)		0.090*** (3.154)		0.087*** (5.306)
1997	0.004 (0.078)	-0.021 (-0.362)	0.050 (0.742)	0.017 (0.243)	0.074 (1.182)	0.008 (0.108)
1998	0.069 (1.025)	0.094 (1.295)	0.142 (1.579)	0.142 (1.424)	0.186*** (2.620)	0.124 (1.581)
1999	-0.100 (-1.218)	-0.183** (-2.004)	-0.004 (-0.030)	-0.119 (-0.891)	0.056 (0.706)	-0.148* (-1.669)
2000	-0.111 (-1.105)	-0.170 (-1.449)	0.015 (0.094)	-0.099 (-0.525)	0.108 (1.105)	-0.126 (-1.133)
2001	0.073 (0.573)	0.042 (0.285)	0.210 (1.075)	0.069 (0.302)	0.317*** (2.603)	0.059 (0.414)
2002	0.021 (0.154)	-0.093 (-0.570)	0.209 (0.958)	-0.041 (-0.154)	0.317** (2.379)	-0.061 (-0.387)
2003	0.105 (0.719)	-0.093 (-0.565)	0.339 (1.466)	0.002 (0.007)	0.427*** (3.049)	-0.046 (-0.280)
2004	0.088 (0.541)	-0.049 (-0.260)	0.375 (1.427)	0.103 (0.334)	0.467*** (3.008)	0.043 (0.232)
2005	0.175 (0.992)	0.015 (0.071)	0.511* (1.776)	0.184 (0.542)	0.593*** (3.565)	0.110 (0.564)
EBA*2002	0.030 (0.261)	0.119 (0.998)	0.027 (0.239)	0.134 (1.115)	0.025 (0.194)	0.117 (0.860)
EBA*2003	-0.054 (-0.447)	0.087 (0.703)	-0.065 (-0.535)	0.115 (0.918)	-0.068 (-0.528)	0.083 (0.614)
EBA*2004	-0.075 (-0.529)	-0.036 (-0.247)	-0.055 (-0.386)	0.011 (0.073)	-0.067 (-0.522)	-0.041 (-0.298)
EBA*2005	-0.251* (-1.739)	-0.207 (-1.378)	-0.229 (-1.562)	-0.121 (-0.784)	-0.243* (-1.876)	-0.195 (-1.436)
Constant	-18.645*** (-4.412)	-21.436*** (-3.860)	59.727 (1.244)	35.773 (0.670)	-15.324 (-1.389)	-41.318*** (-3.880)
R-squared	0.504	0.497	0.029	0.085		
N	10419	6097	10419	6097	10419	6097

Note: *** Denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.

Table 4: Heckman Results

	EBA		EBA and ODA		EBA, ODA and ODA*EBA	
	Exports	Select	Exports	Select	Exports	Select
Exporter GDP	0.949*** (29.538)	0.281*** (13.233)	1.036*** (25.551)	0.375*** (8.571)	1.032*** (25.451)	0.374*** (8.543)
Importer GDP	-0.395*** (-2.843)	0.561*** (6.626)	-0.968*** (-4.145)	0.387* (1.803)	-0.956*** (-4.094)	0.369* (1.716)
Exporter POP	0.279*** (10.039)	0.174*** (9.586)	-0.023 (-0.608)	0.096** (2.287)	-0.018 (-0.484)	0.098** (2.330)
Importer POP	1.890*** (14.018)	0.195*** (2.713)	2.172*** (9.635)	0.440** (2.524)	2.162*** (9.597)	0.457*** (2.614)
Distance	-0.708*** (-8.738)	-0.555*** (-11.301)	-0.454*** (-4.363)	-0.477*** (-4.478)	-0.462*** (-4.434)	-0.496*** (-4.616)
Colonial History	1.657*** (17.091)	0.095 (0.747)	1.156*** (10.359)	0.249 (0.761)	1.159*** (10.394)	0.237 (0.728)
Island	0.061 (0.826)	0.447*** (10.814)	0.117 (1.190)	0.709*** (6.695)	0.113 (1.151)	0.717*** (6.748)
Landlocked	-0.292*** (-4.319)	0.030 (0.580)	-0.179** (-2.385)	0.034 (0.439)	-0.182** (-2.434)	0.038 (0.486)
EBA	-0.929*** (-5.420)	-0.604*** (-5.111)	-1.279*** (-6.196)	-0.712** (-2.498)	-1.833*** (-4.106)	-1.611*** (-3.227)
ODA			0.176*** (10.665)	0.092*** (5.320)	0.164*** (8.833)	0.067*** (3.205)
ODA*EBA					0.039 (1.408)	0.071** (2.188)
1997	-0.015 (-0.147)	0.004 (0.068)	-0.099 (-0.728)	0.102 (0.802)	-0.099 (-0.726)	0.103 (0.820)
1998	0.022 (0.211)	0.012 (0.186)	0.082 (0.599)	0.141 (1.087)	0.080 (0.578)	0.140 (1.087)
1999	-0.149 (-1.420)	0.210*** (3.009)	-0.233* (-1.660)	0.334** (2.397)	-0.236* (-1.680)	0.335** (2.414)
2000	-0.172 (-1.592)	0.132* (1.868)	-0.138 (-0.941)	0.274* (1.909)	-0.144 (-0.980)	0.277* (1.936)
2001	0.306** (2.166)	0.439*** (4.439)	0.665*** (3.382)	0.709** (2.550)	0.656*** (3.339)	0.696** (2.510)
2002	0.228 (1.605)	0.565*** (5.419)	0.523*** (2.615)	1.445*** (3.314)	0.514** (2.572)	1.428*** (3.288)
2003	0.290** (2.016)	0.517*** (4.940)	0.568*** (2.831)	1.133*** (3.157)	0.561*** (2.797)	1.127*** (3.144)
2004	0.235 (1.594)	0.385*** (3.662)	0.488** (2.319)	0.943*** (2.934)	0.479** (2.278)	0.930*** (2.901)
2005	0.304** (2.038)	0.235** (2.233)	0.611*** (2.963)	0.432* (1.687)	0.605*** (2.931)	0.422* (1.653)
EBA*2002	-0.002 (-0.007)	0.030 (0.184)	0.130 (0.469)	-0.383 (-0.738)	0.128 (0.463)	-0.377 (-0.729)
EBA*2003	-0.039 (-0.171)	-0.062 (-0.378)	0.095 (0.347)	-0.207 (-0.460)	0.091 (0.329)	-0.207 (-0.459)
EBA*2004	-0.158 (-0.685)	0.110 (0.672)	-0.051 (-0.183)	0.119 (0.285)	-0.058 (-0.210)	0.121 (0.288)
EBA*2005	-0.341 (-1.479)	0.173 (1.065)	-0.273 (-0.994)	0.166 (0.453)	-0.289 (-1.052)	0.161 (0.439)
Common language		0.390*** (7.045)		0.417*** (4.438)		0.411*** (4.366)
Constant	-25.255*** (-14.384)	-20.377*** (-16.703)	-16.296*** (-6.040)	-22.435*** (-7.173)	-16.190*** (-5.998)	-21.765*** (-6.927)
N	10419	12750	6097	6548	6097	6548

Note: *** Denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.

Table 5. Robustness

	ODA in million \$		LDCs				FE	
	Exports	Select	Exports	Select	Exports	Select	ODA	-0.015
Exporter GDP	0.896*** (27.015)	0.288*** (12.769)	0.650*** (10.404)	0.053 (1.416)	0.695*** (9.195)	0.171*** (2.740)	EBA	0.915 (0.477)
Importer GDP	-0.407*** (-2.625)	0.640*** (6.984)	-0.674*** (-3.335)	0.938*** (7.928)	-1.465*** (-4.607)	1.041*** (4.049)	ODA*EBA	0.075*** (3.348)
Exporter POP	0.251*** (8.653)	0.149*** (7.671)	0.375*** (6.463)	0.277*** (8.371)	0.228*** (3.207)	0.249*** (4.056)	Constant	14.249*** (22.246)
Importer POP	1.806*** (12.120)	0.105 (1.376)	2.056*** (10.461)	-0.112 (-1.128)	2.651*** (8.559)	-0.105 (-0.507)	R-squared	0.00106
Distance	-0.627*** (-7.702)	-0.568*** (-10.825)	-0.550*** (-4.854)	-0.397*** (-5.817)	-0.417*** (-2.961)	-0.392*** (-3.221)	N	6097
Colonial History	1.504*** (16.157)	-0.025 (-0.171)	1.482*** (10.523)	0.913*** (3.349)	1.003*** (6.304)	4.416 (0.043)	ll	-8634.236
Island	0.011 (0.147)	0.450*** (10.135)	0.013 (0.101)	0.160** (2.062)	0.192 (1.297)	0.514*** (3.854)	rmse	1.163208
Landlocked	-0.286*** (-4.094)	0.001 (0.025)	-0.242*** (-2.882)	-0.038 (-0.636)	-0.085 (-0.912)	0.025 (0.298)		
EBA	-0.880*** (-5.096)	-0.638*** (-5.178)	-0.400** (-2.354)	-0.269** (-2.459)	-1.598*** (-2.841)	-0.984** (-2.000)		
ODA	0.005*** (4.294)	0.034** (2.115)			0.128*** (4.362)	0.053** (2.107)		
ODA*EBA	-0.002 (1.037)	0.050* (1.958)			0.089** (2.544)	0.058 (1.636)		
1997	0.000 (0.000)	0.025 (0.339)	0.073 (0.488)	-0.058 (-0.635)	-0.089 (-0.474)	0.119 (0.787)		
1998	0.035 (0.296)	0.040 (0.543)	0.044 (0.292)	-0.047 (-0.505)	0.057 (0.300)	0.127 (0.825)		
1999	-0.155 (-1.311)	0.228*** (2.952)	-0.211 (-1.399)	0.012 (0.123)	-0.261 (-1.350)	0.151 (0.944)		
2000	-0.173 (-1.432)	0.153* (1.905)	-0.142 (-0.922)	-0.143 (-1.492)	-0.138 (-0.683)	0.073 (0.440)		
2001	0.290** (1.968)	0.445*** (4.258)	0.200 (1.188)	0.021 (0.189)	0.164 (0.879)	0.166 (1.021)		
2002	0.193 (1.295)	0.565*** (5.239)	0.127 (0.765)	0.160 (1.445)	0.180 (0.985)	0.467*** (2.680)		
2003	0.256* (1.707)	0.515*** (4.706)	0.194 (1.181)	0.039 (0.368)	0.235 (1.308)	0.367** (2.222)		
2004	0.214 (1.367)	0.381*** (3.471)	0.074 (0.455)	0.076 (0.700)	0.063 (0.355)	0.455*** (2.684)		
2005	0.295* (1.884)	0.227** (2.128)						
EBA*2002	-0.006 (-0.024)	0.039 (0.233)						
EBA*2003	-0.015 (-0.066)	-0.057 (-0.334)						
EBA*2004	-0.189 (-0.807)	0.098 (0.587)						
EBA*2005	-0.371 (-1.572)	0.160 (0.967)						
Common Language		0.347*** (6.232)		0.402*** (5.082)		0.349*** (3.190)		
Constant	-22.593*** (-12.447)	-20.752*** (-15.683)	-17.461*** (-6.783)	-23.393*** (-13.695)	-7.705** (-2.095)	-29.082*** (-7.654)		
N	9510	11566	5367	6570	3676	4050		

Note: Heckman estimation with ODA in million US dollars and only for LDCs. Fixed Effects (FE) estimation with exporter-and-time and importer-and-time fixed effects. *** Denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1. List of Exporter and Importer Countries

Exporter (ACP) Country	Exporter (ACP) Country	Importer (EU-15) Country
Angola (LDC)	Malawi (LDC)	Austria
Antigua & Barbuda	Mali (LDC)	Belgium
Bahamas	Marshall Islands	Denmark
Barbados	Mauritania (LDC)	Finland
Belize	Mauritius	France
Benin (LDC)	Federal States of Micronesia	Germany
Botswana	Mozambique (LDC)	Greece
Burkina Faso (LDC)	Namibia	Ireland
Burundi (LDC)	Nauru	Italy
Cameroon	Niger (LDC)	Luxembourg
Cape Verde (LDC) ¹⁸	Nigeria	The Netherlands
Central African Republic (LDC)	Niue	Portugal
Chad (LDC)	Palau	Spain
Comoros (LDC)	Papua New-Guinea	Sweden
Congo	Rwanda (LDC)	United Kingdom
Cook Islands	Samoa (LDC)	
Cote d'Ivoire	Sao Tome and Principe (LDC)	
Cuba	Senegal (LDC) ¹⁹	
Democratic Republic of Congo (LDC)	Seychelles	
Djibouti (LDC)	Sierra Leone (LDC)	
Dominica	Solomon Islands (LDC)	
Dominican Republic	Somalia (LDC)	
Equatorial Guinea (LDC)	South Africa	
Eritrea (LDC)	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	
Ethiopia (LDC)	St. Kitts and Nevis	
Fiji	St. Lucia	
Gabon	Sudan (LDC)	
Gambia (LDC)	Suriname	
Ghana	Swaziland	
Grenada	Tanzania (LDC)	
Guinea (LDC)	Timor-Leste (LDC) ²⁰	
Guinea-Bissau (LDC)	Togo (LDC)	
Guyana	Tonga	
Haiti (LDC)	Trinidad and Tobago	
Jamaica	Tuvalu (LDC)	
Kenya	Uganda (LDC)	
Kiribati (LDC)	Vanuatu (LDC)	
Lesotho (LDC)	Zambia (LDC)	
Liberia (LDC)	Zimbabwe	
Madagascar (LDC)		

¹⁸ Cape Verde graduated from the LDC list in December 2007.

¹⁹ Senegal has been added to the LDC list in 2000.

²⁰ Timor-Leste has been added to the ACP countries and LDC list in 2003.