

A Service of



Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre

Traistaru, Iulia; von Hagen, Jürgen

### **Working Paper**

South-East Europe: Economic performance, perspectives and policy challenges

ZEI Working Paper, No. B 16-2003

### **Provided in Cooperation with:**

ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn

Suggested Citation: Traistaru, Iulia; von Hagen, Jürgen (2003): South-East Europe: Economic performance, perspectives and policy challenges, ZEI Working Paper, No. B 16-2003, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bonn

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39621

### Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

### Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



## Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Center for European Integration Studies Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn



Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen

South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and Policy Challenges

B 16 2003

## South-East Europe: Economic Performance,

## **Perspectives and Policy Challenges**

Ву

Iulia Traistaru

ZEI, University of Bonn

and

Jürgen von Hagen

ZEI, University of Bonn, Indiana University, and CEPR

May 2003

Correspondence:

Walter Flex Strasse 3

D - 53113 Bonn

Tel. +49-228-731886

Fax.+49-228-731809

traistar@united.econ.uni-bonn.de

vonhagen@uni-bonn.de

### Acknowledgements

This paper was originally written for the World Economic Forum's South-East Europe Summit held in Athens on 23-24 May 2003. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Economic Forum. We gratefully acknowledge the support from the World Economic Forum. We thank Ann Mettler, Jennifer Blanke, and Peter Sanfey for helpful comments and Eva Frede for research assistance.

## I. Introduction

The past decade has witnessed sweeping changes east of what once was the *iron curtain*. For most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, these changes have yielded the emergence of viable democracies and market economies and culminated in their membership in NATO and, soon, in the European Union. With few exceptions, the economic and political changes in South East Europe have so far had much less positive results. Only Slovenia and Cyprus are included in the upcoming enlargement of the EU in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania can hope for attaining EU membership by the end of this decade. Turkey's status as an EU candidate country has been officially recognized, but no date has been set for its accession. The remaining countries of the region, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro are today even less integrated into the network of European economic and political integration. Thus, South East Europe remains a region in search of its economic orientation and geography.

In this study, we present an overview of the economic and social developments in the region in recent years. We focus on a comparative perspective, and we use Greece as a benchmark for the region throughout this study. In section II, we report the basic economic and social facts and trends. In section III, we turn to the quality of institutions in South East European countries. Section IV looks at recent macro economic developments. In Section V we discuss recent trade and foreign direct investment patterns and performance.

Our analysis identifies the following four main areas where policies should be pushed further to promote competitiveness, economic growth and stability in South East Europe:

Openness to trade and foreign direct investment. Given the small size of regional markets, sustained growth depends on trade expansion primarily with the EU and the rest of the world. Attracting foreign investment is key to modernize the production sector. The region should focus on improving its production structure to increase its export capacities in more growth-promising industries. Liberalizing international capital flows will contribute to the improvement of national financial systems.

Regional cooperation. Countries in the region should coordinate their development policies to avoid wasteful competition for foreign investment.

Strengthen governance. Good public institutions are key factors to secure sustainable growth and attract FDI. Strengthening democracy, improving government effectiveness and the quality of market regulations and competitive environments, and controlling corruption have positive pay-offs in terms of growth and attracting FDI.

EU leadership. As in the case of the current EU accession countries, the prospect of future EU membership can play a decisive role in overcoming internal resistance to reform and facilitating institutional improvements. The EU should realize its responsibility for providing such a perspective and exerting leadership in the region, which otherwise could remain a weak and unstable part of Europe for too long.

# II. Economic Conditions and Perspectives: Disparities and Catch - up Prospects

South East Europe is a very diverse region. Consider Table 1. Cyprus will soon be one of the smallest countries in the EU, while Turkey's population exceeds those of France and Italy. Romania is twice the size of Greece in terms of population size, while Bulgaria and Serbia and Montenegro are roughly of the same size as Greece. The remaining states have populations between two and four million people, comparable in size to Ireland. Over the past decade, population dynamics were very diverse, too. Turkey's and Cyprus's populations grew at strong rates of 1.5 – 1.7 percent annually. In stark contrast, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Romania have suffered population losses over the past decade, partly due to emigration. Population densities are lowest in Bulgaria and Croatia, and highest in Albania and Serbia and Montenegro.

Table 1 indicates that Turkey has the largest GDP in the region, almost USD 200 billions. The Greek economy amounts to 56 percent of that. All other countries in the region are much smaller than these two. In 2000, Albania and FYR Macedonia were of almost equal economic size, reaching less than 3.5 percent of the Greek economy. Croatia and Slovenia were both of about 16 percent of the Greek economy, Romania of about one third. These relations are quite different, however, when we look at per-capita GDPs. To improve comparability, we use per-capita GDPs calculated in US dollars at purchasing power parity rates rather than market exchange rates. Table 1 shows that, in terms of this basic indicator, Slovenia and Greece have the highest standards of living in the region, with per-capita GDPs of almost 18000 dollars annually. Slovenia with 17788 dollars, exceeds the Greek level of 17653 dollars. At the other end of the scale, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the poorest country in the region, reaching no more than 2715 dollars, or 15 percent of the Greek level. Turkey's per capita GDP reaches no more than 34 percent of per-capita GDP in Greece.

Table 1 also reports the shares of agriculture and industry in GDP. Albania is still a largely agricultural country, with almost half of its output produced in this sector. Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey are more comparable on this account, with shares of agriculture between 12 and 15 percent. Slovenia and Cyprus, in contrast, have only 2.7 and 5.0 percent of GDP produced in this sector, much less than Greece. Serbia and Montenegro have the largest share of industry in GDP. There is a middle group of countries, led by Romania and Croatia, with shares of industry ranging between 31 and 37 percent, while Cyprus has only 20 percent of GDP originating in industry.

Table 2 adds further development indicators to this picture. The low shares of urban in total populations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro underscore the importance of the agricultural sector in these countries. Life expectancy remains low except in Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia. Adult literacy is quite high, the only exceptions being Albania and Turkey, where it reaches only 85%. However, school enrolment is low in several countries. Only Greece and Slovenia have enrolment rates above 80 percent; Turkey has the lowest rate with merely 62 percent, while the other countries reach enrolment rates around 70 percent. Despite the relatively high literacy rates, the

enrolment rates indicate a rather poor level of education in most countries of the region. A low level of education of the workforce thus remains an obstacle to sustained growth.

Finally, this table also reports the human development index published by the UN Development Program (UNDP), a summary statistic of human development including economic, social, health, and environmental conditions. Greece, Cyprus, and Slovenia have practically the same scores on this index; as a result, they rank numbers 24, 26, and 29 respectively on a world-wide scale. At the lower end of the spectrum, Albania has the lowest index value and ranks number 92 worldwide. Turkey is the next lowest on this measure, ranking number 85 worldwide. Again, the table underscores the diversity of economic development conditions in the region, reaching from middle-income countries such as Greece, Cyprus, and Slovenia, to low-income countries like Albania and Turkey.

Explaining the differences in levels of economic development gives a hint at the economic policies countries in the region should pursue for sustained growth. A first suggestion might be that economic development hinges on moving factors of production from agriculture to industry. As it turns out, the correlation between the share of agriculture in GDP and per-capita income in the region is indeed strongly negative, as expected; see Chart 1.<sup>2</sup> Yet, the correlation between the share of industry in GDP and per-capita GDP is also negative.. This probably indicates the legacy of outdated industrial structures in many countries in the region, which we also find reflected in the trade structure of several countries, as will be discussed below. **Thus, expanding industry per se is not a promising strategy for the region, what matters as much is to develop a more modern and internationally competitive industrial sector.** At the same time, we find that there is a significant positive correlation between the levels of per-capita GDP and the share of the remaining sectors (services, construction, etc) in GDP. This again hints at the importance of developing more modern production structures to achieve higher levels of economic welfare.

Table 2 reports the EBRD indicators of infrastructure reform for the South East European countries.<sup>3</sup> The high scores for Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia clearly reflect the results of a decade of pre-accession assistance from the EU. These countries have reached infrastructure endowments that are not far from EU levels and quality. Croatia equals Bulgaria, although it is not among the candidates for EU membership. The other countries are marked by much lower infrastructure quality, which can be an impediment to economic development and trade in particular. Low levels of infrastructure quality thus contribute to the low level of economic development in most countries in the region. This indicates a need for significant public sector investments in these countries in future years.

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> HDI scores are between 0 and 1. According to UNDP (2002), South East Asia and the Pacific Region have scores of 0.69, and Latin America and the Caribbean have scores of 0.76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In this and the following charts, the R<sup>2</sup> gives the statistical coefficient of determination of the trend line shown in the graphs. As the squared correlation coefficient, it indicates the strength of the correlation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> These data are not available for Turkey, Cyprus, nor Greece. Higher values indicate better infrastructure development, the maximum score is 4+, a value assigned to a fully functioning market economy.

Openness to the international economy is another important factor in explaining the differences in economic development in the region. Chart 2 makes the point by plotting the share of exports in GDP together with the level of per-capita GDP. Bulgaria is a bit exceptional in this graph given its very large export share and its yet less advanced level of economic development. Nevertheless, the graph illustrates the importance of an outward-orientation to achieve economic improvement for the countries of the region. Below, we show that the predominant trade orientation of the regional economies is towards the EU. A noteworthy corollary of this is that the region never developed much of an internal market in the past 50 years, although several of the countries belonged to the same state. The reason for this is that domestic demand was not sufficiently large for sustained growth. Today, the implication is that a regional development strategy must be one based on trade with the rest of Europe rather than developing a regional market of its own. Given the small size of most of the economies, counting on the regional market development for growth prospects bears the risk of detrimental competition of national development policies. One example for this would be the duplication of infrastructure projects. Another example is that countries might engage in tax competition - or competition in tax relieves - trying to attract the same international investors to build new production facilities. Such competition is useful to the extent that it promotes public sector discipline and effectiveness, but it can be economically wasteful. If potential investors from abroad have bargaining power over governments in the region, they can demand that infrastructure supporting their investments be put in place as part of the bidding process. This can lead to excess infrastructure investment at the regional level, since only one country wins the bid for the investor. Similarly, competition can induce a race to the bottom in the taxation of international investors. To promote efficiency and avoid waste of public resources, a balance ought to be struck between these two opposing forces. One way to achieve this - practiced, for example, by the states bordering the Great Lakes in the US – is to establish a common development council for the region, through which governments exchange information about their dealing with foreign investors and arrange cooperation in specific infrastructure and development projects to coordinate and avoid costly duplication. If, as in the case of the Great Lakes, such cooperation is strictly voluntary in the sense that no government can be forced by others to invest resources in common projects, the risk of wasteful public investments is minimized.

Greater economic openness and international integration can also contribute to mitigating ethnic tensions in the region. To reduce and eliminate the risk of ethnic conflicts, countries in South East Europe need unambiguous prospects for economic and political integration in European and trans-Atlantic institutions conditioned on respecting human rights including those of ethnic minorities. This integration policy has worked well in the cases of two EU accession countries, Estonia and Latvia, where ethnic discrimination and tensions were high at the beginning of the last decade.

Tensions resulting from ethnic divisions can impede democratic and economic development in the region, for example, if ethnic discrimination in the labor markets keeps countries from making full use of their labor forces. But it is important to recognize that this is not necessarily the case. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, three of the countries with the most positive transition experiences in the past decade are characterized by very strong ethnic divisions that were regarded as potentially damaging

for their development in the early 1990s. All three are today front-running EU acceding countries. One of the most important lessons that can be learned by the South East European countries from the Baltic experiences is probably that a determined political and economic orientation towards Western Europe can be helpful in mitigating conflicts from ethnic divisions. Overcoming problems with ethnic discrimination in the labor market and other social institutions was an explicit condition for these countries to be considered as serious applicants for EU membership. At the same time, this suggests a role for the EU in attaining peaceful development in the region by providing assistance and, perhaps most importantly, a perspective for the countries' economic and political future

## III. Institutional Development and Economic Performance

In recent years, economists and policy makers have increasingly recognized the importance of good government institutions, governance for short, for strong and sustainable economic development. Governance determines the conditions under which economic transactions evolve, business contracts are made, and commitments to invest capital are entered into. Institutions determine the "rules of the game" for economic actors and for political actors dividing solutions to economic and social conflicts. Good institutions reduce economic uncertainty, increase the predictability of the outcomes of economic choices such as saving and investment, and generally increase efficiency. In doing so, good institutions can increase the willingness of businesses and workers to accept structural reforms instead of defending their positions and privileges inherited from the past. Strong political participation and accountability assure that government provides the services that the citizens need. Government effectiveness and good quality regulation increase the transparency of markets and improve and intensify competition in the economy. Keeping a check on corruption assures greater transparency of policy choices and a more level playing field for all competitors. Kaufmann et al. (2002) present an extensive database that allows international comparisons in this regard. They look at governance in six dimensions, voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.4 The data are based on surveys and polls conducted in 1997-98 and in 2000-01. Governance indicators are defined for values between -2.5 and 2.5, higher values indicate better institutions. Table 3 reports these data for the South-East European countries. Here, too, Cyprus, Greece, and Slovenia are the leading countries. They stand out for relatively strong democratic institutions, relatively high political stability, effective government and good quality of regulations. Slovenia and Cyprus both reach considerably higher scores even than Greece in terms of rule of law and corruption control. In the remaining countries, lack of government effectiveness, low quality of economic regulations, weak rule of law and high levels of corruption indicate a situation of poor governance, that renders business conditions unfavorable and works against the emergence of a

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Voice and accountability refers to the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of their governments. Political stability indicates perceptions of the likelihood that a government will be overthrown by unconstitutional means. Government effectiveness refers to the perceptions of the quality of the bureaucracy and public service provision, while regulatory quality measures the quality of regulatory policies in terms of market friendliness and regulatory burden. Rule of law indicates the extent to which agents have confidence in the rules of society and control of corruption measures the perception of how prevalent corruption is in society. See Kaufmann et al (2002).

market economy. Democratic institutions have improved over the past five years, but remain weak compared with advanced economies. Between 1997/98 and 2000/01, political stability has improved in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey, but weakened in Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In the latter three countries, political stability has improved since 2001. Apart from the leading group, all countries in the region still face the need for strong efforts to build the institutional foundations of modern economies and societies. The importance of developing better institutions of governance in the South East European region is illustrated by linking the development and the institutional data from the countries. In chart 3, we show the correlation between the level of economic development, measured in terms of per capita GDP, and institutional quality in terms of the measure for voice and accountability. The correlation is strongly positive, showing that better institutions are typically paired with higher per-capita incomes. As noted above, the simple correlation can be interpreted in both directions. Still, the experience of the institutional improvements in the EU candidate countries and their economic performance during the 1990s suggest that it is likely that developing good institutions improves economic performance, and this conclusion is supported by much of the recent research in the area.<sup>6</sup> Charts 4 and 5 corroborate that view. Here, we show the correlation between the average growth rate of real GDP during 1997 - 2001 together with two important aspects of institutional development, i.e., the quality of regulatory regimes and the effectiveness of corruption control. Since Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina had exceptionally high growth rates in some of these years due to the post-war recoveries, we do not include these two. <sup>7</sup> The figures show strong positive associations of economic growth and institutional quality in the region.

This indicates that efforts to improve the quality of the public sector including legislation and administration is another important element of a sustainable economic development strategy for South East Europe. Here, it is important to point to a potential role for the EU. The political acceptability of institutional reform is likely to be greater when those who give up significant powers can expect to be compensated and rewarded, be it by greater political support in other areas, be it by greater overall economic success of the country. In both aspects, a realistic perspective for achieving closer links with, and, ultimately, membership in the EU could be an important stimulus for institutional reforms in the region. Clearly, the region's interest in obtaining such a perspective must be balanced by the EU's legitimate interest in avoiding economic turmoil that could result from admitting economies which are not yet mature for full membership. But the experience of the 1990s suggests that the process and speed of maturing depends itself on the expectation that membership can be attained. Setting clear targets and procedures for achieving membership, and involving the countries in visible forms of dialogue with the EU in the same way as the EU did for the current candidates is indispensable to speed up institutional and economic improvements in the region.

Table 4 reports a number of indicators of the development of financial institutions in the region. Monetization of the economy, measured in terms of the ratio of broad money to GDP is still very low,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See the assessments in the country reports by the European Commission (2002, 2003a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See IMF, World Economic Outlook 2003 for a survey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The correlations vanish when these two are included.

Cyprus being the only exception. Serbia and Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Turkey show particularly low levels of monetization, with the ratio of broad money to GDP 17, 19, 24 and 25 percent, respectively. To compare, the average ratio for the euro area is 70 percent. The low value indicates that banking institutions remain severely underdeveloped. In many countries, the government still owns significant parts of the banking system indicating a lack of competition in this sector. At the same time, banking systems are plagued with large shares of non-performing loans. This is a problem especially in FYR Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, but also in Croatia and Turkey. The EBRD index of financial banking reform reaches satisfactory values only in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bulgaria. It remains particularly low in Serbia and Montenegro. A significant result of the weakness of the banking sectors is the low level of financial intermediation, indicated by the low ratios of credit to the private sector. It indicates that the lack of access to financial resources is an important impediment to the development of the private sector. The corresponding number for the euro area is 110 percent. Similarly, non-banking financial institutions remain weak. Where such data exist, the stock market capitalization points to the fact that equity markets are small. Apart from Croatia, the EBRD index of non-bank financial institutions is generally low in the region.

Apart from Turkey, the South - East European economies are likely to be too small to develop efficient financial institutions and markets on their own. Access to and supply of foreign capital is a viable alternative to improve the economy's provision with financial resources. Following the example of several EU accession countries in recent years, governments in the region should consider allowing foreign financial institutions to enter their domestic markets by buying domestic banks and their subsidiaries. This can help increase the efficiency of financial intermediation by bringing in know-how. At the same time, it gives domestic institutions greater financial stability. For foreign banks, entering markets in this way can be attractive as it saves the costs of building up customer relations especially on the depositor side. Obviously, opening up the financial system to international participation requires the removal of capital controls and the introduction of modern, market friendly financial regulation. Foreign investors have contributed positively to intensifying competition and improving efficiency in the financial sector in Central European countries where they own more than two thirds of the banking system ( Caviglia, Krause, and Thimann; Ickes, von Hagen, and Traistaru, 2002).

## IV. Macroeconomic Stability: Successes and Risks

Macro economic performance has been very disparate in the region in recent years, as some countries struggled through post-war periods and others like Turkey suffered currency crises. Table 5 gives an overview. A striking impression from that table is that the region today falls into two groups, one, for which successful macro economic stabilization could become an asset in attracting foreign investment in the future, and one which still suffers from more severe macro economic instability.

As shown in Table 5, seven of the 10 South East European countries achieved single-digit average inflation rates in the period from 1999 – 2001, four of them had inflation rates below five percent on average. This group contains Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Cyprus. Note that Slovenia, though most advanced in terms of EU membership, had the

highest average inflation rate in this group. Inflation picked up somewhat in Albania during 2002, but remained stable or came down in the other countries of this group. These data indicate a strong commitment to monetary stability in these countries.

The other group of countries, consisting of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey, shows the effects of large macro economic imbalances during this period. Between 1997 and 2001, average inflation was 42 percent, 61 percent and 58 percent annually, respectively. All three countries achieved significant stabilization by 2002, but inflation remain well in the double-digits. Thus, stabilization remains a principal policy concern in these countries.

The commitment to macro economic stability seems to have had some positive pay-off in terms of stable and healthy economic growth. During the period 1997-2001, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest real growth rate, 6.5 percent annual average, which may be upward biased by the effects of a post-war recovery. Slovenia, Albania, Cyprus, and Croatia had the strongest growth performance among the other countries, 4.5, 4.4, 4.2, and 3.4 percent annual averages respectively. In contrast, the more unstable countries, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey, had much lower average growth during this period. Chart 6 makes the point. It shows the strong, negative relationship between the average rate of inflation (1999-2001) and the average real growth rate (1997-2001).

Table 5 also indicates that the region's growth performance was quite robust in 2002, despite the economic slowdown in the world economy. Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Slovenia experienced somewhat lower real growth in 2002 compared to the average of the preceding five years, but Turkey and Romania improved considerably.

Successful macro economic stability has largely been achieved by stabilizing exchange rates. Official exchange rate regimes vary across countries in the region. Albania, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, and Slovenia apply managed floats, FYR Macedonia has a fixed exchange rate tied to the euro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria both maintain currency boards with the euro as anchor currency. As indicated in Table 6, however, exchange rate variability has been very low among the countries that achieved high degrees of macro economic stability, even if their official exchange rate regimes admit more flexibility. Average rates of change in euro exchange rates were very small in this group, as were the standard deviations of exchange rates. This is in line with the common perception that the exchange rate is the best nominal anchor for small, open economies. Note, however, Bulgaria and Slovenia, both countries with very stable exchange rates had among the highest inflation rates in that group. For fast-growing Slovenia in particular, this might be prima facie evidence of the Balassa Samuelson effect that predicts higher CPI inflation for countries pegging their exchange rates while enjoying faster productivity growth in their tradables industries than for the country whose currency they peg to. The policy implication is that the macro economic goals of low inflation and high productivity growth can be conflicting under fixed-exchange regimes. This could become a relevant point in a future choice of monetary strategy for joining the euro area. Since countries joining the euro area must not have inflation rates that are too high compared to the euro, they could be forced to give

up the fixed exchange rate to hold inflation down.<sup>8</sup> Alternatively, they might move to full-blown currency boards with the euro, to preserve the improve of the fixed exchange rate.

Adopting currency boards with the euro is an attractive option, for the small countries in the region at least, for another consideration. Above, we have pointed out that the countries should consider opening their banking systems to foreign banks to improve their economies' access to credit. Such a move would require liberalizing international capital flows, which in turn, endangers the sustainability of pegged exchange rate systems. When fixed exchange rates come under speculative attacks, capital controls are often the only defense the central banks have left to avoid currency crises. Since exposure of traditional managed floats to speculative attacks is particularly large, moving to a currency board can be a viable strategy to reduce the risk of currency crises. Of course, moving to a currency board forces a country to virtually give up its monetary policy autonomy. But the value of such autonomy is small for small open economies, anyway, since domestic monetary policy has little control over domestic output and prices (Begg et al., 2003). Thus, currency boards should be attractive arrangements for those countries in the region which do not already practice them today, as they combine greater macro economic stability with the opportunity to attract foreign banks and capital.

A number of risks to macro economic stability lurk behind this broader picture. One is the persistent and high level of unemployment in the region (see Table 5). Official unemployment rates are extremely high Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. But even where official rates are lower, the employment index, which compares employment in 2001 to employment in 1989 and, thus, illustrates the extent of job destruction in the transition process, shows that employment is generally low in the region. In fact, Cyprus is the only country that enjoyed significant job creation over the last decade. Employment growth was low even in Greece and Turkey, which are not transition economies. Creating new jobs must be a priority of economic policies in these countries in particular. Political pressures might arise otherwise that turn governments to using inflationary policies in efforts to overcome the problem.

A second risk to macro economic stability arises from the external sector in some countries. Table 6 shows that several countries in the region experienced very sizeable current account deficits recently. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro received very sizeable remittances from emigrant workers and significant amounts of international financial aid in recent years, which offset part of these deficits. In 2000, **some of the economies in South East Europe show a large aid dependence**. Thus, Albania received international assistance amounting to 8.5 percent of GDP, FYR Macedonia 7.6 percent of GDP, Serbia and Montenegro 13.4 percent of GDP, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 17.6 percent of GDP. But these sources of financing are not sustainable in the long run. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia and Montenegro have very heavy burdens of external debt, making their external performance more precarious.

A third risk factor comes from the lack of fiscal discipline in some countries, see Table 7. Turkey stands out for its huge fiscal deficit in 2001 and the years before, and its high public debt. Both add to

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Begg et al. (2003) for a discussion.

the macro economic instability of the country. Though much smaller, large fiscal deficits are also a reason for concern in Albania, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. In the first two of these, the problem has been going on for some time, as indicated by the averages for 1999-2001 shown in Table 7. Public debt burdens seem rather large already in Albania, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, indicating that there is not much room left for allowing deficits to persist. Achieving greater fiscal discipline is a principal policy requirement in these countries. The experience from other countries suggests that improving fiscal institutions, i.e. the rules of budget making and administration, and increasing fiscal transparency is one important approach to achieve this goal (von Hagen and Harden, 1995; Gleich, 2002).

Public services including welfare systems are not yet developed according to modern standards in these countries. Public spending on education and health is generally low, amounting to no more and often much less than six percent of GDP in the region. Only Croatia (9.5 percent of GDP) and Slovenia (6.7 percent of GDP) had higher health expenditures in 2001. Education and social reforms that are necessary to promote the development of sustainable market economies will put additional pressures on future budgets and force governments to cut spending elsewhere to avoid expansions of public spending to unsustainable levels. During the 1990s, the ratio of government spending to GDP has converged to rates around 40 percent in most EU accession states (von Hagen and Gleich, 2001). Taking this rate as a benchmark suggests that there is considerable room for reducing expenditures in Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, which would help assuring macro economic stability and free public resources for the required spending adjustments. Other countries will have to rely more on finding additional and new sources of tax revenues both to secure fiscal stability and to finance new demands on the public sector.

## V. Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Performance

The recent improvement of the economic climate in the region following the stabilization and reform process has contributed to the expansion of trade and foreign direct investment although it has been uneven across countries. In most South East European countries export growth has been the main engine for GDP growth in recent years. Chart 7 shows the positive correlation between export growth and real GDP growth.

### Trade Liberalization

South East European countries have generally liberal and open trade systems (see Table 8). Nine of these countries are members of the WTO while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro have requested WTO membership in 1999 and 2001 respectively. All countries have preferential trade agreements with the European Union (EU) and a network of intra-regional bilateral free trade agreements. Cyprus and Turkey have had custom unions with the EU since 1973 and 1996 respectively. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia have gradually liberalized their trade with the EU via

the Europe Agreements<sup>9</sup>. Cyprus and Slovenia are to become EU members in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join the EU in 2007. Croatia applied formally for EU membership in February 2003. The five countries of the Western Balkans group<sup>10</sup> have been benefiting from duty free access to EU market for almost all goods (with particular conditions for certain textile and agricultural products) via a set of autonomous trade measures (ATMs) granted unilaterally by the EU in September 2000<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, the EU has signed Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with FYR Macedonia and Croatia providing for progressive reciprocal free trade of goods. SAA negotiations have started with Albania at the beginning of 2003 and are under examination in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.

Intra-regional trade liberalization and trade cooperation have been facilitated through regional free trade agreements such as CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement)<sup>12</sup> and bilateral free trade agreements concluded in the framework of the Stability Pact<sup>13</sup>. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia are members of CEFTA. A network of 21 bilateral free trade agreements have been negotiated as part of the Trade Initiative of the Stability Pact<sup>14</sup> amongst Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro<sup>15</sup>. A free trade area in South East Europe is planned to be fully in force starting with July 2003. Yet, the experience with CEFTA, and the existing trade and specialization patterns suggest that its potential in generating intra-regional trade will be limited given the small size of the regional market and very similar comparative advantages, as will be shown below. One important implication of the progressive trade liberalization is that it will diminish the governments' customs revenues. This loss will require compensation through the widening of the tax base and the development of new taxes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Europe Agreements established a framework for bilateral political dialog and economic co-operation between Central and Eastern European countries and the European Union. They include measures for the progressive trade liberalization with industrial products. Protocols on rules of origin provide for a diagonal cumulation of origin on industrial products between the EU, the EFTA countries, the CEECs and Turkey. Protocols on reciprocal tariff concessions on agricultural products entered into force on 1 July 2000 with all CEECs except Poland with whom it entered into force on 1 January 2001(World Trade Organisation , European Union Trade Policy Review 2002).

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Since 1999 Kosovo is under the special mandate of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Applicable until 31 December 2005 based on Council Regulation No.2007/2000 (European Commission, 2003a)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> CEFTA was initially signed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on 21 December 1992. Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia subsequently joined.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The Stability Pact was launched in June 1999 by an EU initiative. It is a political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international co-operation to develop a long term strategy for stability and growth in South East Europe. Information about the activities of the Stability Pact can be found at <a href="http://www.stabilitypact.org">http://www.stabilitypact.org</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> the basis for these free trade agreements is the Memorandum on Trade Liberalization and Facilitation signed on 27 June 2001 in the framework of the Stability Pact

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> 10 agreements are in force and 11 agreements are in the process of ratification. Moldova has associated itself to the Pact with an extended timetable

### Trade Performance

Overall, the region accounts for a small share of world total trade. In 2001, the region's exports of goods represented 1.2 percent and imports 2.0 percent of the world totals respectively. The largest trading countries in the region are Turkey, Romania, Slovenia and Greece. These four countries in 2001 accounted for 79 percent of the region's total exports (see Chart 8).

The EU is the main destination of exports from South East European countries (see Chart 9.) In 2001, the share of exports to the EU in total exports was above two thirds in Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. The share of exports to the other countries in the region was relatively high, 44 percent, in FYR Macedonia and around one quarter in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. Intra – regional exports accounted for smaller shares in the total exports of the remaining countries. The dependence on the EU markets for exports could negatively affect the prospects for export growth should the EU continue to grow slowly. To keep exports growing, South East European countries must rely on improving competitiveness or regional diversification.

The EU is also the main origin of imports with the exceptions of Cyprus and Turkey where the share of imports from the rest of the world is higher (see Chart 10). Intra-regional imports account for a small share in the total imports of South East European countries. Only three countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro have imports from the other countries in the region above one quarter.

Labor-intensive products make up the largest part of exports for all countries with the exception of Slovenia (Chart 11). Slovenia and Croatia have relatively high shares of capital intensive product exports. Capital intensive and labor intensive products represent the bulk of imports in South East European countries with capital intensive products more than one third of imports. This trade structure reflects inter-industry specialization patterns typical for developing countries in their exchanges with more advanced economies. The examples of Slovenia and Croatia suggest that switching to more advanced specialization structures requires product quality upgrading in technologically more advanced branches<sup>16</sup>.

The comparative advantages of countries in South East Europe are to a large extent overlapping (see Table 9). The same three sectors ranked by the revealed comparative advantage index (RCA)<sup>17</sup> appear among the five highest ranked sectors in eight out of the eleven countries: *Leather products* (all countries, except Slovenia, Turkey, Greece); *Clothing* (in all countries, except, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia); and *Basic manufactures* (in all countries, except Croatia, Cyprus, Slovenia). *Chemicals* are among the five sectors with the highest RCA in six countries (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovenia, Greece), as well as *Wood products* (in all five countries of the Western Balkans). Another three sectors from the labour intensive

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> see Landesmann and Stehrer (2002) for a more detailed discussion on the potential for switching to more advanced specialization patterns in catching –up economies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The revealed comparative advantage is calculated as the ratio of the product group share in national exports to its share in the world exports.

category are present in four countries: *Miscellaneous manufacturing* (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, and Slovenia), *Textiles* (Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Turkey and Greece), and *Processed food* (FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Cyprus, Greece). Capital intensive products are among the five sectors with the highest RCA only in a few countries: *Non-electronic machinery* ( Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania), *IT & Consumer electronics* (Romania and Turkey), *Transport equipment* (Croatia, and Turkey), *Electronic components* (Slovenia).

This analysis indicates that the South East European countries compete in the same external markets and do so with developing countries having similar comparative advantages. Given the low growth potential of those external markets due to low income elasticities of demand in the export markets, development strategies should focus on better production structures and differentiated products.

### Foreign Direct Investment

FDI inflows in South East Europe in 2001 represented 1.3 percent of the world's inward FDI. The UNCTAD FDI performance index<sup>18</sup> and Inward FDI Potential Index<sup>19</sup> (Table 11), suggest that Bulgaria and Croatia are performing best in terms of their FDI performance while Slovenia, Cyprus, and Greece are the best placed in terms of inward FDI potential. **In recent years, FDI inflows were stimulated by privatization, so they could slow down if economic reforms do not continue.** Per capita FDI inflows were particularly high in Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus, and were comparable with the size of per capita FDI inflows in two advanced transition economies, Hungary and Poland. Greece and Bulgaria performed better than the regional average while Albania, Turkey, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro fell below the region's average (Chart 12). FDI inflows were also positively related to the inward FDI stocks in 2001 (see Chart 13) suggesting that initial conditions and previous performance matter for future FDI inflows. This result implies a successful "demonstration effect" of first movers in attracting subsequent investors in the region.

The macro economic importance of FDI for the region is underscored by the fact that FDI inflows are positively correlated with export growth, see Chart 14. Countries with high levels of FDI inflows are those with relatively high per-capita exports, while low per-capita exports come with low FDI inflows. This suggests that foreign investors are particularly attracted by opportunities to produce export goods in South East Europe, i.e. to use the relative production cost advantages of the region. Given the importance of export growth for real GDP growth in the region, this means that attracting FDI is an important element of a strategy for sustained growth.

Foreign investors entering a country to produce export goods are likely to take the institutional quality of the host country as a particularly important factor in their decisions. As indicated above, institutional

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The inward FDI performance index is calculated as the ratio of a country's share in global FDI flows to its share in global GDP (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2002)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The inward FDI potential index is an unweighted average of the scores of eight normalized economic and social variables including: the rate of growth of GDP; per capita GDP; share of exports in GDP; telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants; commercial energy use per capita; share of R&D expenditures in gross national income; share of tertiary students in the population; country risk (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2002)

quality determines the quality of the business environment and reduces the uncertainty of economic choices. This makes the institutional quality of the host country an important element in the competition for foreign direct investment. Charts 15-17 corroborate this reasoning. Here, we use three institutional indexes from Table 3: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and corruption control. FDI stocks show strong positive correlations with all three. This again points to the importance of improving the institutional environment of the South East European countries to support and promote their economic development. An example of improved institutional quality and superior economic performance is Estonia which has achieved a regulatory quality similar to more advanced economies such as Denmark and Germany and has been recently successful in attracting foreign investment and achieving high growth rates.

### References

- Begg, D., B. Eichengreen, J. von Hagen, L. Halpern, and C. Wyplosz. 2003. <u>"Sustainable Regimes of Capital Movements in Accession Countries"</u> CEPR Policy Paper No. 10. London: CEPR
- Caviglia, G., G. Krause, and C. Thimann. 2002. "Key Features of the Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries". In C. Thimann, ed., *Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries*. Frankfurt: European Central Bank
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2001. *Transition report 2001*, London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2002. *Transition report 2002*, London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2003. *Transition report update 2003*, London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- European Commission. 2002. "Update of the Report on Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Stability Development in Candidate Countries". Enlargement Papers No. 11-November 2002, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels: European Commission
- European Commission. 2003a. "The western Balkans in transition". Occasional Papers No. 1-January 2003, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels: European Commission
- European Commission. 2003b. "The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe. Second Annual Report", Brussels: Commission of the European Communities
- Fraser Institute. 2002. Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 World Annual Report On line http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/economicfreedom
- Gleich, H. 2002. "Budgetary Processes and Fiscal Performance in 10 Central and East European Countries." Working Paper, European Central Bank, Frankfurt.
- von Hagen, J.and H. Gleich. 2001. "Fiscal Policy in Transition" in:Sylvester Eijffinger, Kees Koedijk, and Stephen Yeo (eds.), *Vivent les Differences? Heterogeneous Europe*. London: CEPR
- von Hagen, J. and I.Harden .1995. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline" *European Economic Review* 39, 771-79
- Ickes, B., J. Von Hagen, I. Traistaru. 2002. "Central and Eastern Europe: Economic Developments, Reforms and Geography", in P. Cornelius, ed., The Global Competitiveness Report, 2002-2003, New York: Oxford University Press, 163-188
- Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobatón. 2002. "Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000-01", World Bank Working Paper. Washington. DC: World Bank
- International Monetary Fund. 2002a. "Turkey: Statistical Appendix", IMF Country Paper No. 02/138, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund
- International Monetary Fund. 2002b. "Direction of Trade Statistics", Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
- International Monetary Fund. 2003a. "Cyprus: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix", IMF Country Report No. 03/31, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund
- International Monetary Fund. 2003b. The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003. Online http://www.imf.org
- International Trade Center (ITC). Online <a href="http://www.intracen.org">http://www.intracen.org</a>
- Landesmann, M. And R. Stehrer. 2002. The CEECs in the Enlarged Europe: Convergence Patterns, Specialization and Labour Market Implications, WIIW Research Report No. 286, Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
- United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2002a. UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2002, New York and Geneva: United Nations
- United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2002b. World Investment Report, 2002. New York and Geneva: United Nations
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2002. "Human Development Report 2002" Online http://www.undp.org

World Bank. "World Development Indicators 2002" Online http://www.worldbank.org World Trade Organization. Online http://www.wto.org

## **Annex: Tables and Graphs**

**Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators** 

	Population (mill., 2001)	Average Population Growth (%)	Population Density (persons per sq.km)	GDP (mill. USD)	GDP Per capita	Shares in GDP (%, 2001)			
		1991-2000		2000	(USD at PPP rates) 2001	Agriculture	Industry	Others	
Albania	3.4	- 0.6	120	3752	3720	49.1	27.3	23.6	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.1	- 0,1	79	4394	2715	14.8 <sup>a)</sup>	30.6 <sup>a)</sup>	54.6 <sup>a</sup> )	
Bulgaria	8.1	- 0.9	73	11995	5607	13.7	28.4	57.9	
Croatia	4.4	0.3	77	19031	7854	8.3	32.3	59.5	
Cyprus	8.0	1.5	82	8698	11543	5.0	20.0	75.0	
FYR Macedonia	2.0	0.6	79	3579	4913	10.9 b)	31.2 b)	58.0 b)	
Serbia and Montenegro	10.6	0.4	104	8449	3532	25.1	38.2	36.7	
Romania	22.4	- 0.4	94	36719	6973	12.4	37.1	50.6	
Slovenia	2.0	0.4	98	18129	17788	2.7	27.4	59.1	
Turkey	66.2	1.7	85	199937	6021	15.2	26.6	58.3	
Greece	10.6	0.4	80	112646	17653	7.9 b)	23.6 b)	68.5 b)	

Notes: a) 1998; b) 1999


Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002)

Table 2: Development Indices (2002)

	Urban	Life Expectancy at	Adult Literacy	School	Human	EBRD
	Population	Birth	(%) <sup>a)</sup>	Enrolment b)	Development	Indicator of
	(% of total)			(%)	Index	Infrastructure Reform
Albania	42.9	74.0	84.7	71.0	0.73	2.0
Bosnia and	43.4	74.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.0
Herzegovina						
Bulgaria	67.5	71.6	98.4	72.0	0.78	2.7
Croatia	58.1	73.3.	98.3	68.0	0.81	2.7
Cyprus	69.9	77.9	97.1	68.0	0.88	n.a.
FYR Macedonia	59.5	72.8	94.0	70.0	0.77	2.0
Serbia and Montenegro	51.7	72.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.0
Romania	55.3	69.9	98.1	69.0	0.78	3.0
Slovenia	49.2	75.3	99.6	83.0	0.88	3.0
Turkey	65.8	69.8	85.1	62.0	0.74	n.a.
Greece	60.6	78.2	97.2	81.0	0.89	n.a.


Notes: a) percent of population age 15 and above b) Combined gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment (1999) Source: EBRD (2001, 2002); World Bank; UNDP Human Development Report (2002)

Chart 1: Economic Structure and Per-capita GDP in South-East Europe



Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002)

Chart 2: Economic Openness and Per-capita GDP in South-East Europe




Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe(2002)

**Table 3: Institutional Indicators** 

	Voice, accountability		Political stability		Government effectiveness		Regulatory quality		Rule of Law		Corruption	
	2000/01	19997/9	2000/01	1997/98	2000/01	1997/98	2000/01	1997/98	2000/01	1997/98	2000/01	1997/98
Albania	0.01	- 0.13	- 0.60	- 1.00	- 0.89	- 0.65	- 0.21	- 0.70	- 0.71	- 0.92	- 0.60	- 0.99
Bosnia and Herzegovina	- 0.29	- 1.00	- 0.01	- 1.16	- 0.92	- 1.11	- 1.18	- 1.26	- 0.75	-1.11	- 0.49	- 0.35
Bulgaria	0.59	0.47	0.37	0.43	- 0.26	- 0.81	0.16	0.52	0.02	- 0.15	- 0.16	- 0.56
Croatia	0.48	- 0.23	0.18	0.41	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.24	0.29	0.15	0.02	- 0.46
Cyprus	1.28	1.11	0.48	0.38	0.91	1.04	0.83	0.84	0.96	0.93	1.24	1.81
FYR Macedonia	0.03	0.09	- 1.45	- 0.4	- 0.63	- 0.58	- 0.23	- 0.31	- 0.33	- 0.26	- 0.51	- 0.52
Serbia and Montenegro	- 0.09	- 0.71	- 0.48	- 1.42	- 0.97	- 0.95	- 0.70	- 1.54	- 0.94	- 0.81	- 1.04	- 0.99
Romania	0.50	0.29	- 0.08	0.02	- 0.54	- 0.57	- 0.28	0.20	- 0.02	- 0.09	- 0.51	- 0.46
Slovenia	1.07	1.03	0.87	1.09	0.70	0.57	0.52	0.53	0.89	0.83	1.09	1.02
Turkey	- 0.55	- 0.88	- 0.75	- 0.94	- 0.15	- 0.41	0.04	0.59	- 0.16	- 0.01	- 0.48	- 0.35
Greece	1.12	1.05	0.79	0.21	0.65	0.56	0.71	0.60	0.62	0.50	0.73	0.82


Source: Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002)

Chart 3: Voice and Accountability and Per-capita GDP in South- East Europe




Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002)

Chart 4: Corruption Control and Average Annual Real Growth in South-East Europe



Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002); European Commission (2002, 2003); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002, 2003); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations

Chart 5: Regulatory Quality and Average Annual real Growth in South-East Europe



Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2002); Fraser Institute (2002); European Commission (2002, 2003); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations

Table 4: Monetary and Financial Sector Indicators, 2001

	Broad money	Domestic credit to	Share of majority	Stock market	Non-performing	EBRD	EBRD index
	(M2 end-year)	private sector	state-owned banks	capitalisation	bank loans	Index of	of non-
	% of GDP	% of GDP	in total bank assets	% of GDP	% of total loans	banking	banking
			(%)			sector	financial
						reform	institutions
Albania	62.1	4.0	59.2	n.a.	6.9	2.3	2.0
Bosnia and	47.0	2.2	8.9	n.a.	7.0	2.3	1.0
Herzegovina							
Bulgaria	40.9	14.6	19.9	3.7	7.9	3.0	2.0
Croatia	76.9	24.5	3.8	15.4	13.7	3.7	3.0
Cyprus	125.2	125.0	4.2	n.a.	9.4		
FYR Macedonia	19.0	12.5	1.3	0.4	24.7	3.0	1.7
Serbia and	16.9	6.0	68.0		24.4	1.0	1.0
Montenegro							
Romania	24.0	8.0	45.4	6.0	3.4	2.7	2.0
Slovenia	63.0	40.4	48.4	15.3	9.2	3.3	2.7
Turkey	25.0	16.9	31.6		12.9		
Greece	73.1 <sup>a),.b)</sup>	38.4 b)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Note: a) M3; b) 2000

Source: EBRD (2002); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); European Commission (2002); IMF (2002); authors' calculations


**Table 5: Macroeconomic Performance** 

	CPI Inflation	Average CPI Inflation,	Real GDP Growth	Average Real	Unemployment	Total
	(%, 2002)	1999-2001	(%, 2002)	GDP	Rate	Employment
		(%)		Growth Rate	(%, 2002)	(1989 =
				(1997-2001)		100, 2001)
Albania	5.4	1.2	4.7	4.4	14.6	80.3
Bosnia and	0.0	0.7	3.8	6.5	40.4	74.2
Herzegovina						
Bulgaria	5.9	5.9	4.5	2.0	19.5	37.9
Croatia	2.4	5.1	5.2	3.4	15.8	67.4
Cyprus	2.8	2.7	2.0	4.2	4.0	114.5
FYR Macedonia	2.4	3.4	0.0	1.8	30.5	60.3
Serbia and	21.4	61.4	4.0	1.2	27.5	80.2
Montenegro						
Romania	22.5	42.3	4.9	- 1.0	8.6	78.8 <sup>a)</sup>
Slovenia	7.5	7.8	2.9	4.5	5.9	83.9
Turkey	54.4	58.0	6.7	1.0	8.5	108.7
Greece	3.9	3.1	4.0	3.7	10.5	106.9

Note: a) 2000

Source: European Commission (2002,2003a); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002), UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations

Chart 6: Average Annual Inflation and Real Growth in South-East Europe



Sources: European Commission (2002, 2003); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); EBRD (2002); UN Economic Commission for Europe (2002); authors' calculations

**Table 6: External Stability** 

	Average Change in Euro Exchange Rate <sup>a)</sup> (Annual Rate 1998 – 2002) %	Standard Deviation of Euro Exchange Rate <sup>b)</sup> (%, 1997 – 2002)	Current Account Balance (% of GDP, 2001)
Albania	- 4.8	12.8	- 6.3
Bosnia and	- 2.4	4.6	- 22.3
Herzegovina			
Bulgaria	0.7	1.4	- 6.2
Croatia	1.2	3.3	- 3.1
Cyprus	- 0.2		- 4.3
FYR Macedonia	1.0	3.0	- 10.6
Serbia and	56.8	83.4	- 5.5
Montenegro			
Romania	30.9	48.4	- 5.9
Slovenia	4.6	8.9	- 0.4
Turkey	52.7	73.4	2.3
			_
Greece	- 0.4	4.4	- 4.0 <sup>a)</sup>

Note: a) 1999, b) based on annual average rates

Source: European Commission (2002, 2003a); EBRD (2003); IMF, World Economic Outlook (2003); author's calculations

**Table 7: Fiscal Indicators** 

	General	General Government	General	General
	Government	Balance (% of GDP)	Government Debt	Government
	Balance (% of GDP)	Average 1999 – 2001	(% of GDP) 2002	Expenditure (%
	2002			of GDP)
				2002
Albania	- 7.5	- 9.7	64.4	31.0
Bosnia and	- 4.1	- 8.3	46.8 <sup>a)</sup>	56.0
Herzegovina				
Bulgaria	- 0.8	- 0.3	54.5	38.9
Croatia	- 6.2	- 6.7	57.5	51.5
Cyprus	- 3.5	- 3.2	54.6 <sup>c)</sup>	38.2 <sup>d)</sup>
FYR Macedonia	- 3.5	- 1.1	37.4 <sup>a)</sup>	37.8
Serbia and	- 5.7	- 1.1 <sup>b)</sup>	77.0 <sup>a)</sup>	48.7
Montenegro				
Romania	- 2.7	- 3.6	29.8	33.6
Slovenia	- 2.9	- 1.1	29.0	43.5
Turkey	- 28.4 <sup>c)</sup>	- 17.7	102.5 <sup>c)</sup>	43.2 <sup>d)</sup>
Greece	- 1.3	- 1.6	105.8	47.7

Note: a) external debt b) 200-2001 c) 2001 d) Central Government, 2001


Source: EBRD (2003); European Commission (2003a); European Commission (2002), IMF (2003a)

Table 8: Free Trade Agreements in South - East Europe, as of January 2003

	WTO accession and Status	EU relations	Free Trade Agreements(FTAs)
Albania	2000	ATMs September 2000 SAA negotiations started 2003	FTAs under the Stability Pact
Bosnia and			
Herzegovina	accession requested 1999	ATMs 1997 and September 2000 Road Map for SAA	FTAs under the Stability Pact
Croatia	2000	ATMs September 2000 SAA signed October 2001	CEFTA, 1 January 2003, FTA with EFTA FTAs under the Stability Pact
		Interim agreement in force 2002 Applied for EU membership in February 2003	FTA with Slovenia
FYR Macedonia	2003	ATMs September 2000 SAA, signed April 2001 Interim agreement in force June 2001	FTAs under the Stability Pact FTAs with Turkey, Ukraine, EFTA
Serbia and Montenegro	accession requested 2001	ATMs September 2000 Working groups of experts to assess the progress on reforms aiming at proposing a SAA	FTAs under the Stability Pact FTAs with Hungary, Slovenia, Russia
Bulgaria	1996	Europe Agreement, 31 December 1993 EU accession expected 2007	CEFTA, 1 January 1999, FTA with EFTA FTAs under the Stability Pact FTAs with Turkey
Cyprus	1963	Association Agreement (CU, 1 June1973) EU accession Treaty signed April 2003	
Romania	1971	Europe Agreement, 1 May 1993 EU Accession expected 2007	CEFTA, 1 July 1997, FTA with EFTA FTAs under the Stability Pact FTAs with Moldova, Turkey
Slovenia	1994	Europe Agreement,1 January 1997 EU accession Treaty signed April 2003	CEFTA, 1 January 1996, FTA with EFTA FTAs with Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Israel, Croatia
Гurkey	1951	Association Agreement (CU, 1 January 1996)	FTAs with EFTA, Israel, Romania, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Rep., Slovak Rep., Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, FYR Macedonia Lithuania
Greece	1950	EU accession 1 January 1981 EMU member, 1 January 2002	

ATMs: Autonomous Trade Measures; CU: Customs Union; FTA: Free Trade Agreement; SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement; CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Agreement
Source: World Trade Organization data bases, <a href="https://www.wto.org">www.wto.org</a>, European Commission (2003)


Chart 7: Exports and GDP Growth in South - East Europe



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); EBRD (2003); IMF The World Economic Outlook Database (2003)


Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey

Chart 8: Exports of South - East Europe, by Country, 2001




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002)

Chart 9: Exports of South - East European Countries by Destination, 2001




Note: Greece is included in the EU group and it is not included in the SEE group Sources: Authors' calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); IMF Direction of Trade (2002) Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, ROW = the rest of the world

Chart 10: Imports of South- East European Countries by Origin, 2001



Note: Greece is included in the EU group and it is not included in the SEE group Source: Authors' calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); IMF Direction of Trade (2002) Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, ROW = the rest of the world

Chart 11: Composition of Exports by Factor Intensity, South - East European Countries, 2001



Source: Authors' calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002)

Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenero, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey

Table 9: Export performance and specialization in South - East Europe, 2001

Country	Share in national	Share in world	RCA	RCA Rank	Country	Share in national	Share in world	RCA	RCA Rank
	export %	market %				export %	market %		
Albania					Bulgaria				
Leather products	32.00	0.14	24.62	2	Basic manufactures	23.00	0.20	3.11	14
Clothing	36.00	0.06	10.86	16	Clothing	16.00	0.32	4.91	26
Wood products	3.00	0.01	1.04	55	Leather products	4.00	0.19	2.80	27
Basic manufactures	7.00	0.00	0.93	61	Chemicals	12.00	0.07	1.08	30
Miscellaneous manufacturing	4.00	0.00	0.48	68	Non-electronic machinery	6.00	0.04	0.61	33
Bosnia and Herzegovina					Cyprus				
Leather products	9.00	0.12	7.06	7	Chemicals	20.00	0.01	1.80	9
Wood products	17.00	0.09	5.37	9	Processed food	16.00	0.03	3.90	24
Basic manufactures	24.00	0.05	3.27	11	Miscellaneous manufacturing	8.00	0.01	0.99	32
Textiles	4.00	0.03	1.56	27	Leather products	2.00	0.01	1.28	47
Miscellaneous manufacturing	9.00	0.02	1.12	27	Clothing	8.00	0.02	2.38	48
Croatia					Romania				
Transport equipment	17.00	0.11	1.32	16	Leather products	9.00	1.53	7.24	6
Leather products	4.00	0.28	3.24	22	Basic manufactures	14.00	0.37	1.82	22
Wood products	6.00	0.17	2.03	34	Clothing	25.00	1.48	7.36	22
Chemicals	11.00	0.08	0.95	36	Non-electronic machinery	6.00	0.12	0.59	35
Clothing	11.00	0.26	3.16	38	IT & Consumer electronics	4.00	0.07	0.36	36
FRY Macedonia					Slovenia				
Basic manufactures	29.00	0.08	3.83	9	Miscellaneous manufacturing	14.00	0.29	1.74	8
Clothing	28.00	0.17	8.41	20	Non-electronic machinery	11.00	0.17	1.02	18
Leather products	3.00	0.06	2.68	28	Electronic components	11.00	0.20	1.22	19
Textiles	3.00	0.03	1.26	33	Chemicals	14.00	0.20	1.24	21
Processed food	9.00	0.04	2.21	44	Basic manufactures	14.00	0.30	1.82	23
Serbia and Montenegro					Turkey				
Basic manufactures	29.00	0.09	3.84	8	Textiles	13.00	2.75	4.94	5
Chemicals	15.00	0.03	1.31	19	Basic manufactures	15.00	1.11	2.02	20
Leather products	4.00	0.07	3.01	23	Clothing	21.00	3.56	6.44	23
Processed food	14.00	0.08	3.48	27	Transport equipment	10.00	0.44	0.79	29
Wood products	6.00	0.04	1.89	36	IT & Consumer electronics	3.00	0.18	0.32	38
	•				Greece				
Source: International Trade Center					Basic manufactures	15.00	0.35	2.06	19
www.intracen.org					Processed food	14.00	0.56	3.28	29
3					Textiles	4.00	0.27	1.54	29
					Clothina	14.00	0.71	4.11	32


Clothing Chemicals 14.00 10.00 4.11 32 0.89 39

Table 10: Rankings and values of the UNCTAD inward FDI Performance Index and Inward FDI Potential Index, South-East Europe, 1998-2000

	Inward FDI Performance Index		Inward FDI Potential Index	
	Value	Rank	Value	Rank
Albania	0.6	81	0.207	100
Croatia	1.7	27	0.343	46
FYROM	0.9	66	0.25	86
Bulgaria	1.8	24	0.321	53
Cyprus	0.4	102	0.414	34
Romania	1	57	0.248	87
Slovenia	0.3	110	0.429	31
Turkey	0.1	123	0.275	72
Greece	0.1	125	0.414	35
Hungary	1.1	49	0.274	42

Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002)


Chart 12: Per- capita Inward FDI Flows in South - East Europe, 2001



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002)

Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, SEE = South-East Europe


Chart 13: Per - capita Inward FDI Stocks and FDI Inflows in South - East Europe



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002)

Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, SEE = South-East Europe


Chart 14: Per - capita FDI Inflows and Exports in South - East Europe, 2001



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002)


Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, SEE = South-East Europe

Chart 15: Voice and Accountability and Per - capita Inward FDI Stock in South - East Europe



Source: Authors' calculations based on UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002); Kaufmann et al (2002) Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey


Chart 16: Regulatory Quality and Per Capita Inward FDI Stock in South - East Europe



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002); Kaufmann et al (2002)

Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey

Chart 17: Control of Corruption and Per Capita Inward FDI Stock in South - East Europe, 2001



Source: Authors' calculations based from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002); UNDP Human Development Report (2002); Kaufmann et al (2002)

Country codes: AL = Albania, BiH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria, HR = Croatia, CY = Cyprus, EL = Greece, FYROM = FYR Macedonia, SM = Serbia and Montenegro, RO = Romania, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey

2008		
B01-08	Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame "Wirtschaftsregierung"	Martin Seidel
2007		
B03-07	Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten	Martin Seidel
	der Europäischen Union	
B02-07	Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union	Martin Seidel
B01-07	The Ratification of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-	Martin Seidel
	nal Basis of a European Referendum.	
2006		
B03-06	Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-	Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06	tuations Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility	lüngan van Hagan Haining 7hang
B02-00 B01-06	A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization	Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005	A Wellare Alialysis of Capital Account Liberalization	Jurgen von Hagen, Halping Zhang
B11-05	Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von	Martin Seidel
	Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung	
B10-05	Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge	Martin Seidel
B09-05	Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe	Guntram B. Wolff
B08-05	Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism	Gabriel González-König
B07-05	Economic Integration in a Multicone World?	Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
		fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05	Banking Sector (Under?) Development in Central and Eastern	Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
B05-05	Europe Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation	ger Stefan Lutz
B03-05 B04-05	Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik	Martin Seidel
B03-05	Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate	Panu Poutvaara
D05 05	and Teaching to Stay?	Tana Toutvaara
B02-05	Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior	Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05	Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States	Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004		
B33-04	The Effects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign	Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
	Direct Investment Inflows: Central Europe and the Balkans	ner M. Yigit
B32-04	The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-	Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04	tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Analysis of	Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
D31-04	De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries	Jurgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04	Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten	Martin Seidel
200 01	und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess	Wartin Scien
B29-04	Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-	Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
	keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem	
B28-04	Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-	Guntram B. Wolff
	ses	
B27-04	Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine	Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04	Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Effects of a Customs Uni-	Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04	on with the EU  Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro	Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-04 B24-04	The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem	Otto Steiger
B23-04	Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem?	Otto Steiger
B22-04	Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition	Elham-Mafi Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
	Economies?	,
B21-04	The Effectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage	Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
	and Employment Effects in Business R+D	Wolff
B20-04	Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-	Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
D10.0:	ses	<b>M</b> C
B19-04	Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-	Martin Seidel
	sungsvertrag	

B18-04	Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in an Enlarged EMU	Iulia Traistaru
B17-04	Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey	Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04	Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-traded Goods, and Sector Specific Employment	Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B15-04	Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Explain Local Patterns?	Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04	Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion?	Jiri Jonas
B13-04	The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of	Sami Yläoutinen
	Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-	
D10.04	tries	lannifor Dáduggal Mu
B12-04	Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Integration	Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04	Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activities: Evidence from MERCOSUR	Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04	Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition	Laura Resmini
	Countries	
B09-04	Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A Unified Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence	Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04	European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Convergence	Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04	The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to	Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
D06.04	Human Well-being in Africa	Lutz
B06-04	Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Effects of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening	Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H. Lutz
B05-04	Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries	Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04	Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for	Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
20.0.	EU Membership in the Candidate Countries' Referenda	0.1.a 2 sy.te, sa.t. 1.aas
B03-04	Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender	Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04	Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications	Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
	for EU Enlargement	Yang
B01-04	Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-	Martin Seidel
	trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen	
2002	durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten	
<b>2003</b> B29-03	Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inflation in the Euro Area	Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03	The Effects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign	Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
	Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans	ner M. Yigit
B27-03	The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Efficiency and	Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
	the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version of International Finance)	gen
B26-03	Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond	Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
D20 03	Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)	gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03	How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries?	Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03	Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank	Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03	Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Patterns: Evidence from Mercosur	Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe Martincus
B22-03	Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung	Martin Seidel
B21-03	Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for Inter-Firm Communication	William Pyle
B20-03	Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence from Asia and the Americas	Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed A. Alwosabi
B19-03	An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-	Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
215 00	macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas	A. Alwosabi

B18-03		
	The Effects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on	Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
D17.00	Export of Ukrainian Firms	ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03	Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States	Mihails Hazans
B16-03	South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and Policy Challenges	Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03	Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness	Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
_	to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands	
B14-03	FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence	Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03	The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there	Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
_	a Puzzle?	
B12-03	What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The	Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
	Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography	
B11-03	Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-	Martin Seidel
	tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine	
	rechtliche Analyse	
B10-03	Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to	Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
	Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies	
B09-03	The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-	Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
D09-03	sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European	Guillai Hellisollii, Otto Steigei
5	Monetary Union	
B08-03	The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-	Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
	change Rate Regimes Play?	
B07-03	Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und	Martin Seidel
	Prioritäten für die Zukunft	
B06-03	Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the	Jürgen von Hagen
	Stability and Growth Pact	
B05-03	Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles	Michael Massmann, James Mit-
D03 03	Converging?	chell
D04 02	Do Ukrainian Firms Benefit from FDI?	
B04-03	DO OKRAINIAN FIRMS Denent from FDI!	Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
D00.00	E 1 C. 1 1 1 1	ra
B03-03	Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz	Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03	Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and	Mihails Hazans
	Gains	
B01-03	Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-	Martin Seidel
		martin sciaci
	tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union	martin coluci
2002	tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union	martin delder
<b>2002</b> B30-02	tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union  An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-	
	-	
B30-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel
B30-02 B29B-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02 B23-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz Martin Seidel
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02 B23-02 B22-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse des Eurosystems	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz Martin Seidel Otto Steiger
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02 B23-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse des Eurosystems Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz Martin Seidel
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02 B23-02 B22-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse des Eurosystems Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Transition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz Martin Seidel Otto Steiger
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02 B23-02 B22-02 B21-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse des Eurosystems Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Transition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from Panel Data	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz Martin Seidel Otto Steiger Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B30-02 B29B-02 B29A-02 B28-02 B27-02 B26-02 B25-02 B24-02 B23-02 B22-02	An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Assurance Trade Agreements as Self-protection Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time Preference Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candidate Countries Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse des Eurosystems Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Transition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from	Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel Jennifer Pédussel Wu Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Debajyoti Chakrabarty Lucjan T. Orlowski Stefan Lutz Stefan Lutz Martin Seidel Otto Steiger

B19-02	East Germany: Transition with Unification, Experiments and Experiences	Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch, Guntram B. Wolff
B18-02	Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transition Countries	Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolff
B17-02	Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Accession Countries	Laura Resmini
B16-02	Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity in Accession Countries	Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nijkamp, Si- monetta Longhi
B15-02	Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy?	Matthias Brückner, Andreas Schaber
B14-02	The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and Inequality	Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02	De Facto and Official Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition Economies	Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02	Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis	Jiri Jonas
B11-02	The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking	Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02	National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous System of European Law?	Martin Seidel
B09-02 B08-02	Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates	Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
	Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests	
B07-02	Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union	Martin Seidel
B06-02	Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-Country Evidence	Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02	Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A Rolling Cointegration Approach	Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B04-02	Asymmetric Monetary Policy Effects in EMU	Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02	The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis for Transition Economies	Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02	The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared: Facts and Challenges	Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02	Does Inflation Targeting Matter?	Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen von Hagen
2001		
B29-01	Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease?	Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku- tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01	Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt- schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01	Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Returns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation	Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01	Regional Effects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three Mediterranean Countries	Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku- tan
B25-01	Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications	Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01	Disintegration and Trade	Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01	Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies	Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01	Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation	Matthias Brückner
B21-01	Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With	Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01	That of the Europaen Central Bank An Empirical Inquiry of the Efficiency of Intergovernmental Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data	Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01	Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evidence	R.W. Hafer, Ali M. Kutan

B18-01	Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central Bank in the Early Years	Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias Brückner
B17-01	Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Carribean Countries	Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01	Sources of Inflation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European Union	Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 B14-01	Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to a Deficit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experience and Possible Lessons for EMU	Christian E. Weller Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01	German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Challenges	Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01	The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets. Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt- schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01	Inflationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wage Setters	Lilia Cavallar
B10-01	Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and Empirical Evidence	Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01	Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the Wheels of Growth?	Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01	The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination	Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne Mundschenk
B07-01	The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate Countries and the European Union	Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01	Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial Markets	Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku- tan
B05-01 B04-01	Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda. The Future of Banking. The Determination of Unemployment Benefits	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt- schaftspolitisches Forum Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac- Culloch
B03-01	Preferences Over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness	Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac- Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01	The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thirty	Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Hagen
B01-01	Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Policy	Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000		
B20-00	Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside	Etienne Farvaque
B19-00	Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, general Reflections applied to the Czech Republic	Jens Hölscher
B18-00	Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence	Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner, Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00	Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Gemeinschaftsrechts	Martin Seidel
B16-00	The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability	Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00	Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Federation	Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00	Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Economies: The Case of Poland and Hungary	Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00	Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Economies Reconsidered	Nauro F. Campos

B12-00	Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitlichen Europäischen Währung	Martin Seidel
B11-00	A Dynamic Approach to Inflation Targeting in Transition Eco-	Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00	nomies The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and	Marc Hallerberg
B09-00	How Belgium Qualified for EMU Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis	Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac- Culloch
B08-00	The Effectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding Emerging Market Economies from Crises	Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00	Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt- schaftspolitisches Forum
D06.00	TI D 16 M 1 M 1	•
B06-00	The Demand for Money in Austria	Bernd Hayo
B05-00	Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during Transition	Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00	A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability of the ECB	Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00	Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of Trade Relations during the 1990's	Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00	Inflation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies: The Case of the Czech Republic	Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali M. Kutan
B01-00	Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism	Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Hagen
1999		
B26-99	Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Differentiated Industries: A General Equilibrium Analysis	Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99	Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market Reforms in Eastern Europe	Bernd Hayo
D04.00	·	D. L. M. C. II. I
B24-99	What Makes a Revolution?	Robert MacCulloch
B23-99	Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State	Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac- Culloch
B22-99	Partisan Social Happiness	Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac- Culloch
B21-99	The End of Moderate Inflation in Three Transition Economies?	Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99	Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany	Helmut Seitz
B19-99	The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies	Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99	Why are Eastern Europe's Banks not failing when everybody else's are?	Christian E. Weller, Bernard Morzuch
B17-99	Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia	Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99	Multinational Banks and Development Finance	Christian E.Weller and Mark J. Scher
B15-99	Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Circumstances or Structural Weakness?	Christian E. Weller
B14-99	Industry Effects of Monetary Policy in Germany	Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99	Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go	Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
D10-33		
_	Wrong in Central European Banking?	Hagen
B12 -99	Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity: Evidence and Implications for Applied Work	Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99	Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt- schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99	Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Supply: The Case of Poland	Christian Weller
B09-99	Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning	Volker Wieland
B08-99	The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less Real Credit in Transition Economies	Christian Weller

B07-99	Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evidence from the OECD	Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens- Uwe Wächter
B06-99	Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier Production Function Approach	Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens- Uwe Wächter
B05-99	Tumbling Giant: Germany's Experience with the Maastricht	Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf Strauch
B04-99	Fiscal Criteria The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-	Christian Weller
B03-99	dence for Poland from Panel Data The Macroeconomics of Happiness	Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
B02-99	The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence	Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
B01-99	Based on Survey Data The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical	Culloch Robert B.H. Hauswald
1000	Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?	
<b>1998</b> B16-98	Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
D10-90	Labour Warket + Tax Folicy III the Livio	schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98	Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry?	Stefan Lutz
B14-98	Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-	Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
	Russian Trade	-
B13-98	Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing	Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98	Price Stability and Monetary Policy Effectiveness when Nomi-	Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
B11A-98	nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öffentlichen Finanz-	Wieland Rolf Strauch
D11A-90	lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe	Kon Strauch
	der EWWU	
B11-98	<b>Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-</b>	Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
_	dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997	
B10-98	Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der Europäischen Union	Martin Seidel
B09-98	U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB	Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98	Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-	Bernd Hayo
	lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)	
B07-98	Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: Some Lessons from the U.S. EPA's 33/50 Program	John W. Maxwell
B06-98	Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal	Kenneth Kletzer
	Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues	
B05-98	Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)	Bernd Hayo
B04-98	The EMU's Exchange Rate Policy	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
		schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98	Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System	Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98	Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality	Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98	Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline	Jürgen von Hagen
1997		
B04-97	Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does	Kenneth Kletzer
	European Monetary Unification Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-	
	urance or Federalism?	
B-03-97	Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-	Tom Lyon / John Mayo
D00.07	tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry	Doutsch Francischer 147
B02-97	Employment and EMU	Deutsch-Französisches Wirt- schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97	A Stability Pact for Europe	(a Forum organized by ZEI)
D01-31	A Stability I det for Europe	(a rorum organized by ZEI)

## ISSN 1436 - 6053

Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Center for European Integration Studies Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

 $\begin{array}{lll} \text{Walter-Flex-Strasse 3} & \text{Tel.: } +49\text{-}228\text{-}73\text{-}1732 \\ \text{D-53113 Bonn} & \text{Fax: } +49\text{-}228\text{-}73\text{-}1809 \\ \end{array}$ 

Germany www.zei.de