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Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent’s Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests*

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Abstract. This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent’s performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage of the overconfident agent in absolute terms.

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1 Introduction

Recent empirical evidence shows that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments than unbiased agents (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006; Bartling et al., 2009). At first sight, this may seem puzzling as overconfidence in contests commonly is found to reduce individual welfare due to sub-optimally high effort choices, which – if at all – are beneficial for the principal (cf. Santos-Pinto, forthcoming; Ando, 2004).\(^1\)

However, an effect that seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature on overconfidence in contests is that the high effort of the overconfident agent may also lead to a comparative payoff-advantage of the biased agent due to an increased probability of success. In fact, although both Ando (2004) and Santos-Pinto (forthcoming) touch on individual welfare effects of overconfidence in contests, neither of them considers relative payoff effects in their analysis (and we are not aware of any other paper that does so). Yet, as shown below, the induced increase in the probability of success of an overconfident agent may not only reverse the relative performance of the agents. It may even overcompensate the biased agent for his additional effort and, thereby, increase his payoff above the rational benchmark (if the bias is sufficiently small). Thus, overconfident agents may actually be correct in believing that they have a comparative advantage in more competitive environments such as economic contests.

In the sequel, we demonstrate these positive effects of overconfidence in a simple model of imperfectly discriminating contests in the tradition of Tullock (1980).

2 Model and Results

The Model. Consider a standard two agent Tullock contest with linear effort costs where agents compete for a winner-price \( w_H \) (the loser gets \( w_L \), with \( \Delta w = w_H - w_L \)).\(^2\) In order to simplify the exposition, we restrict attention to a contest success function with a discriminatory power of 1. While not affecting the general thrust of the argument, the assumption, for example, guarantees the existence of equilibrium. Moreover, assume that one agent (agent 1) is overconfident while the other (agent 2)

\(^1\)See, e.g., Yates (1990) for some background on the discussion of overconfidence in psychology.

\(^2\)Assuming effort costs to be linear essentially simplifies the subsequent exposition but is not crucial for the qualitative results to be derived.
is rational. In particular, to capture agent 1’s overly optimistic view on his abilities, assume that he has a biased perception of his effort cost, i.e. \( \tilde{c}_1 = c_1 - b \) where \( c_1 \) is agent 1’s true cost of effort and \( 0 < b < c_1 \). The rational agent 2, by contrast, has a correct view about his effort cost, i.e. \( \tilde{c}_2 = c_2 > 0 \). The resulting maximisation problem of agent \( i \), then, is given by:

\[
\max_{e_i} \frac{e_i}{e_i + e_{-i}} \Delta w + w_L - \tilde{c}_i e_i .
\]

(1)

For the case of \( e_1 = e_2 = 0 \), we assume that each agent wins the contest with probability 0.5. Again, the assumption is not restrictive as in equilibrium both agents will exert strictly positive effort.

Finally, assuming both agents to be informed about the perceived cost \( \tilde{c}_{-i} \) of their opponent, a standard argument shows that the corresponding Nash equilibrium effort levels are:

\[
e_1^* = \frac{\Delta wc_2}{(\tilde{c}_1 + c_2)^2} = \frac{\Delta wc_2}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2}
\]

(2)

and

\[
e_2^* = \frac{\Delta w\tilde{c}_1}{(\tilde{c}_1 + c_2)^2} = \frac{\Delta w(c_1 - b)}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2}.
\]

(3)

Thus, if both agents are rational, i.e. \( b = 0 \), equilibrium effort levels are:

\[
e_1^{BM} = \frac{\Delta wc_2}{(c_1 + c_2)^2} \quad \text{and} \quad e_2^{BM} = \frac{\Delta wc_1}{(c_1 + c_2)^2},
\]

(4)

which we will consider as the benchmark for our analysis.

**Aggregate Effects.** To begin with, note that irrespective of agent 2’s effort cost, agent 1’s effort increases in his bias because \( \frac{\partial e_1^*}{\partial b} = \frac{2\Delta wc_2}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^3} > 0 \) (as \( b < c_1 \)). The effort of the rational agent 2, by contrast, decreases in agent 1’s overconfidence if agent 1’s perceived effort cost is smaller than agent 2’s true cost, i.e. if \( \tilde{c}_1 < c_2 \) it holds that \( \frac{\partial e_2^*}{\partial b} = \frac{\Delta w(c_1 - c_2 - b)}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^3} < 0 \) (as \( b < c_1 \)); it increases otherwise. Similar to previous results (e.g. Santos-Pinto, forthcoming), combining these two effects yields that overconfidence is beneficial for the principal (who wants to maximise aggregate efforts) as the sum of the efforts in the case with overconfidence (equations (2) and (3)) is greater than the sum of the efforts in the rational benchmark (equations (4) and (5)): \( e_1^* + e_2^* > e_1^{BM} + e_2^{BM} \).

\( ^3 \)Similarly, underconfidence (i.e. \( b < 0 \) and agent 1 overestimates his effort cost) is detrimental for the principal.
**Individual Effects.** In order to assess the relative individual payoff effects, consider the agents’ expected equilibrium payoffs. These are given by:

\[
U^*_i = \frac{e^*_i}{e^*_i + e^*_{i'}} \Delta w + w_L - c_i e^*_i,
\]

where the true effort cost has to be taken into account. Accordingly, the payoff difference between the overconfident agent 1 and the rational agent 2 is:

\[
\Delta U^* := U^*_1 - U^*_2 = \frac{e^*_1 - e^*_2}{e^*_1 + e^*_2} \Delta w - c_1 e^*_1 + c_2 e^*_2.
\]

Inserting equations (2) and (3) into (6) gives:

\[
\Delta U^* = \frac{\Delta w}{(c_1 + c_2)^2} \left[ c_2(c_2 + \hat{c}_1 - c_1) - \hat{c}_1^2 \right] = \frac{\Delta w}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2} \left[ c_2(c_2 - b) - (c_1 - b)^2 \right]. \tag{7}
\]

Calculating the first derivative with respect to \(b\) shows that becoming more overconfident increases agent 1’s relative performance compared to agent 2 if the bias is moderate, \(b < \frac{c_1 + c_2}{3}\):

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta U^*}{\partial b} = \frac{\Delta w}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^3} \left[ (c_1 + c_2 - b)(-c_2 + 2(c_1 - b)) + 2(c_2(c_2 - b) - (c_1 - b)^2) \right] = \frac{\Delta w c_2}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^3}(c_1 + c_2 - 3b). \tag{8}
\]

Furthermore, it follows from (7) that

\[
\Delta U^* \geq 0, \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} \hat{c}_1 < c_1 \leq c_2, \\ \hat{c}_1 < c_2 < c_1 \quad \text{and} \quad c_2 \geq \frac{4}{5}c_1 \quad \text{and} \quad b \in [b_1, b_2], \end{cases}
\]

where \(b_1 = \frac{2c_1 - c_2 - \sqrt{c_2(5c_2 - 4c_1)}}{2}\) and \(b_2 = \frac{2c_1 - c_2 + \sqrt{c_2(5c_2 - 4c_1)}}{2}\). Hence, a necessary condition for \(U^*_2 > U^*_1\) to hold, i.e. for \(\Delta U^* < 0\), is that \(c_2 < c_1\). In particular, \(U^*_2 > U^*_1\) holds irrespective of the size of \(b\) if agent 2 is sufficiently more skilled than agent 1, i.e. if \(c_2 < \frac{4}{5}c_1\), otherwise, i.e. if \(\frac{4}{5}c_1 \leq c_2 < c_1\), \(U^*_2 > U^*_1\) holds only if

---

4The derivative is also positive if \(b > c_1 + c_2\) but this can never hold as \(b < c_1\) and \(c_i > 0\).

5When \(\hat{c}_1 < c_2 < c_1\), we solve \(c_2(c_2 - b) - (c_1 - b)^2 \geq 0\) for \(b\) (cf. equation (7)). The inequality is quadratic in \(b\), and \(b_1\) and \(b_2\) are the two existing zeros for \(c_2 \geq \frac{4}{5}c_1\). Both \(b_1\) and \(b_2\) are in the feasible range, i.e. \(0 < b_1 < b_2 < c_1\). Moreover, the inequality holds (implying that \(\Delta U^*\) is positive) if \(b \in [b_1, b_2]\); otherwise the inequality is violated.
\( b \not\in [b_1, b_2] \). Put differently, if agent 1 is at least as skilled as agent 2, \( \Delta U^* \) is positive irrespective of the level of overconfidence; see Figure 1 for an illustration.

Figure 1: Expected equilibrium payoffs as a function of \( b \) for parameters: \( c_1 = c_2 = 0.5; \Delta w = 1 \) and \( b \in [0, 0.45] \). The continuous line shows an agent’s expected payoff in equilibrium if both agents are rational. The other lines refer to the expected payoffs of the overconfident agent (dotted line) and the rational agent (dashed line) in the contest with one rational and one overconfident agent.

Moreover, the comparative advantage of agent 1 can persist even if agent 2 is the more skilled agent (cf. equation (9)). Accordingly, overconfidence can lead to a situation where the biased agent 1 has a greater chance of winning the contest despite being the less able one. In this case, the induced increase in agent 1’s effort leads to an increase in the winning probability that outweighs agent 1’s higher cost; thus agent 1 is better off than his opponent, although he exerts the higher effort and has the higher effort cost per unit of effort.\(^6\) Furthermore, it is noteworthy that such an effect is likely to also reassure agent 1 of his overly optimistic self-perception and, thus, to reassure or even reinforce him of his bias.\(^7\)

\(^{6}\)This result may, for example, be interpreted as a theoretical rationale for a Peter-principle type of situation in which a less skilled agent is promoted with greater probability than the more skilled agent (cf. Peter and Hull (1969)).

\(^{7}\)If agent 1 is instead underconfident, i.e. \( b < 0 \), all effects are reversed: Becoming less underconfident increases agent 1’s effort and his performance relative to agent 2, and \( \Delta U^* > 0 \) is only possible if agent 1 is the more able agent.
Finally, a comparison of agent 1’s payoff for the case of \( b > 0 \) with that of the benchmark scenario, \( b = 0 \), shows that being overconfident may indeed even improve agent 1’s absolute payoff as

\[
U_1^*(b > 0) - U_1^{BM}(b = 0) > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{c_2^2 - c_1^2}{c_2} > b,
\]

i.e. if agent 1 is the more skilled agent \((c_2 > c_1)\) and the bias is sufficiently small.

To see that (10) holds, note that:

\[
U_1^* - U_1^{BM} = \frac{\Delta wc_2(c_1 + c_2 - b) - \Delta wc_1c_2}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2} + \frac{\Delta wc_1c_2 - \Delta wc_2(c_1 + c_2)}{(c_1 + c_2)^2} \]

\[
= \frac{(\Delta wc_2^2 - \Delta wc_2b)(c_1 + c_2)^2 - \Delta wc_2^2(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2}{(c_1 + c_2)^2(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2} \]

\[
= \frac{b \Delta wc_2}{(c_1 + c_2)^2(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2}[c_2^2 - c_1^2 - c_2b]
\]

which is positive if \( \frac{c_2^2 - c_1^2}{c_2} > b \).

By contrast, compared to the benchmark situation with \( b = 0 \), the rational agent 2 is always worse off when paired with an overconfident agent 1 \((b > 0)\), i.e.

\[
U_2^*(b > 0) - U_2^{BM}(b = 0) < 0,
\]

because

\[
U_2^* - U_2^{BM} = \frac{(\Delta wc_1 - \Delta b)(c_1 + c_2 - b) - \Delta wc_2(c_1 - b)}{(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2} \]

\[
+ \frac{\Delta wc_1c_2 - \Delta wc_1(c_1 + c_2)}{(c_1 + c_2)^2} \]

\[
= \frac{\Delta wc_2b}{(c_1 + c_2)^2(c_1 + c_2 - b)^2}[2c_1b + c_2b - 2c_1c_2 - 2c_1^2]
\]

is always smaller than zero as \( b < c_1 \).

Proposition 1 below briefly summarises the main points of the above analysis.
Proposition 1 For the above described Tullock-contest between an overconfident agent 1 with a strictly positive bias \( b > 0 \) and a rational agent 2, it holds that:

1. The principal is strictly better off than in case without overconfidence \( (b = 0) \) as \( e_1^* + e_2^* > e_1^R + e_2^R \).

2. Agent 1 overexerts effort with respect to his ability, i.e. \( \frac{\partial e_1^*}{\partial b} > 0 \).

3. Agent 2 reduces his effort compared to the rational benchmark \( (b = 0) \), i.e. \( \frac{\partial e_2^*}{\partial b} < 0 \), if \( c_1 - c_2 < b \).

4. Agent 2 is always worse off if agent 1 is overconfident than if he is not, i.e. \( U_2^* < U_2^{BM} \).

5. For small biases \( (b < \frac{c_1 + c_2}{3}) \), agent 1’s relative performance as measured by the difference in equilibrium payoffs \( \Delta U^* = U_1^* - U_2^* \) is increasing in \( b \).

6. Agent 1’s equilibrium payoff is larger than that of agent 2, i.e. \( \Delta U^* > 0 \), if \( c_1 \leq c_2 \), or if \( c_1 > c_2 \geq \frac{4}{3} c_1 \) and \( b \in [b_1, b_2] \).

7. Agent 1 has an absolute payoff advantage from being overconfident if his true cost of effort is smaller than that of agent 2 and if his bias is small, i.e. \( U_1^* > U_1^{BM} \) for \( c_1 < c_2 \) and \( 0 < b < \frac{c_2 - c_1}{c_2} \).
References


