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ABSTRACT

Identifying Sorting: In Theory*

We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative Matching between worker and firm types is positive or negative. In standard competitive matching models the wages are determined by the marginal contribution of a worker, and the marginal contribution might be higher or lower for low productivity firms depending on the production function. For every production function that induces positive sorting we can find a production function that induces negative sorting but generates identical wages. This arises even when we allow for non-competitive mismatch, for example due to search frictions. Even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting, we can identify the strength, i.e., the magnitude of the cross-partial, and the associated welfare loss. While we show analytically that standard fixed effects regressions are not suitable to recover the strength of sorting, we propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of search frictions independent of the sign of the sorting.

JEL Classification: J31, C78

Keywords: sorting, assortative matching, identification, linked employer-employee data, interpretation of fixed-effects

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1 Introduction

Sorting of workers to jobs matters for the efficient production of output in the economy. If there are strong complementarities or substitutes between workers and jobs, the exact allocation has large efficiency implications. In contrast, when complementarities are nearly absent, not much output is lost from the random allocation of workers to jobs. This is important for policy, for example whether we want to design an unemployment insurance program that provides incentives for workers to look for the “right” job instead of accepting the first offer (see for example Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). There are also profound implications for redistribution policies. In the presence of strong sorting, redistribution through mismatching leads to substantial distortions whereas the distortions are minimal when sorting is weak. And subsidies to education will in the presence of strong sorting lead to increased competition between workers, thus transferring some of the subsidy rents from workers to firms.

Given the importance of sorting, a large body of recent empirical literature has estimated whether sorting is positive or negative. In part, this renewed interest has been catalyzed by the availability of worker-firm match data. Several empirical papers (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann, and Perez-Duarte (2004)) find an insignificant or even negative correlation in fixed effects between worker and firm types. This result has been replicated for a number of countries such as France, US, Denmark and Brazil. The result is taken as indication that Positive Assortative Matching between workers and firms does not play a role in the labor market.

On the other hand, recent work reveals that a structural labor search model that has strong complementarities and thus induces Positive Assortative Matching in equilibrium can nevertheless generate smaller and even negative correlations in the fixed effects of workers and firms (Gautier and Teulings (2006), Lise, Meghir and Robin (2008), Lopes de Melo (2008) and Lentz (2008)). In some cases this is attributed to the non-linear structure of the wage setting that is not picked up in the regression specification. Other work by Gabaix and Landier (2008) argues that sorting of CEOs has become more important as is reflected in the increased wages.

In this paper we address the issue of identification of sorting in a simple theoretical framework and obtain the following results. First, in the frictionless matching model (Becker 1973), we show that identifying whether sorting is positive or negative is impossible using wage data alone. To see this, note that in this model more productive workers always earn higher wages and more productive firms always make more profits. Under Positive Assortative Matching (PAM), the more productive firm also has the highest marginal product from labor, i.e. the cross-partial is positive. This implies that high type firms hire high type workers and they pay high wages. Under Negative Assortative Matching (NAM) instead, low productive firms have a comparative advantage from hiring more productive workers, i.e.
the cross-partial is negative.\(^1\) As a result, high type firms pay lower wages. By ranking firms according to the wages they pay, we do not identify the most productive firm. Without any additional data on the profitability of each job, it is impossible to identify whether sorting is positive or negative. This is true even if we consider wages off the equilibrium path.

Second, we explicitly allow for mismatch to occur in equilibrium due to search frictions. We find that the first-order effect is that wages of a given worker have an inverse U-shape around the optimal allocation, the “bliss point”. Under mismatch with a relatively bad firm, wages increase as the firm type increases because the firm moves closer to the bliss-point, whereas wages decrease once the worker is mismatched with too good a firm because better firms move further from the bliss-point. Higher productivity firms have to be compensated for their willingness to match with a “bad” worker because it destroys their opportunity to match with a “good” worker. This leads to the bliss-point in the pattern of compensation if a worker meets the “right” firm, rather then a wage schedule that is increasing everywhere in the type of firm. The net effect on a given worker’s wages from increasing the firm type is therefore ambiguous and second-order. For the simplest, type-independent cost of delay, we explicitly show that the net effect is exactly equal to zero under some common specification. This version, also studied in Atakan (2006), is a close reformulation of Becker (1973). When search costs are type-dependent (as in Shimer and Smith (2000) for example), the net effect may still be either positive or negative. The additional component induced through type-dependence is proportional to the magnitude of the friction and, compared to the inverted U-shape, the net effect of firm type on wages is likely to be second-order and difficult to isolate in the data.

Third, and in spite of the fact that we cannot identify the sign, we develop a method that in theory allows for identification of the strength of sorting. Ultimately, efficiency properties depend on how big the complementarities/substitutes are. Identification derives from the distinct features of the range of wages a worker receives who has been observed repeatedly. First, the highest wage corresponds to her bliss-point. We use this to order the workers and obtain the type distribution. Likewise, we can obtain an order of the firms by the level of wages that they pay (this identifies those firms with the highest willingness to hire better workers - which is positively related to type under positive sorting and negatively under negative sorting). Second, the difference between the highest and the lowest wage is equivalent to the cost of search. Third, we calculate the loss due to mismatch over the range of wages, which from the theory can be expressed in terms of the absolute value of the cross-partial of the production function. Given that we know the cost of search, we can now obtain the strength of the cross-partial, or equivalently, the strength of sorting.

\(^1\)We use the term comparative advantage to denote a larger absolute gain in output from matching with a better worker, rather than the stronger concept of a larger percentage gain as used e.g. in Sattinger (1975).
Before proceeding to the model, we briefly lay out the empirical issue. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) use a simple empirical measure of sorting that can be obtained by estimating a log-wage equation in which wages are a function of a worker fixed effect, a firm fixed effect, and an orthogonal error term

$$\log w_{it} = a_{it} \beta + \delta_i + \psi_j(i,t) + \epsilon_{it}$$  

where $w_{it}$ denotes the wage, $a_{it}$ are time varying observables of workers, $\delta_i$ is a worker fixed effect, $\psi_j$ is the fixed effect of the firm $j$ at which worker $i$ is employed at time $t$, and $\epsilon_{it}$ is an orthogonal residual. That is, $\psi_j$ captures the average effect that a firm has on the wages of the workers that are willing to match with it. The correlation between $\alpha_i$ and $\psi_j$ in a given match is taken as an estimate of the degree of sorting. Abowd et al (2004) propose a bargaining procedure in which higher firms pay higher wages in line with (1) as a test of Becker’s (1973) idea of matching.

We argue here that such a pay schedule is inconsistent with Becker’s theory because every worker would like to match with the best firm. Becker’s theory is inseparably linked to a theory of wages which prevents such overcrowding of workers at top firms. We point out the distinctive features of the underlying theory of wages, and extend them to a simple and tractable model with search frictions. We show in our theoretical exercise that the assumption that the firm effect is independent of the worker’s type is theoretically not justified in this setting. In particular, for those workers who are matched with a firm that has a lower rank than their own, the wage increases when the firm type increases because the worker-firm “fit” improves. In contrast, workers who are matched with a lower ranked firm see a decrease in the wage when the firm becomes better because the worker-firm “fit” deteriorates.

A similar logic holds in the context of matching with frictions. With wage bargaining in a model with search frictions, the set of eligible partners is bounded by those matches where the match surplus is zero relative to continue searching. For all acceptable partners the surplus is positive. For a given worker type, the surplus goes to zero for a match both with too bad a firm and too good a firm. Any bargaining procedure that pays wages that are monotonic in the surplus will therefore result in wages being non-monotonic in firm type.

The goal of our analysis is to lay out this logic in the simplest possible environment. First, we consider the frictionless benchmark, and then we extend it in a straight-forward way to a model with frictions that allows worker and firm mismatch. Frictions are modeled in a two-stage set up: a stage of random matching is followed by a frictionless matching stage. The benefit of our modeling approach is that the main effects that drive the wage determination become clearly visible and highlights the forces, limitations, and possibilities that arise in estimations that are based solely on wage data. As such, it informs our understanding of the results obtained in more complicated infinite horizon steady-state models that preclude closed-form theoretical analysis but are often used for structural estimation.
2 The Frictionless Model

In order to make our point we start with the following very simple matching model following Becker (1973). There is a unit mass of worker and a unit mass of firms. Workers and firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity. Workers draw their type \( x \) from distribution \( \Gamma(x) \) with smooth density \( \gamma(x) \) on \([0,1]\). Firms draw their type \( y \) from distribution \( \Upsilon(y) \) with smooth density \( \upsilon(y) \) on \([0,1]\).

When types \( x \) and \( y \) form a match, they produce positive output \( f(x,y) > 0 \) whilst having an outside option of remaining unmatched. We assume that workers and firms can be ranked in terms of their productivity, i.e. \( f_x > 0 \) and \( f_y > 0 \). Then it is without loss of generality to index a worker by his rank in terms of productivity, i.e. by the fraction of workers that are less productive than him. Similarly, we can identify each firm by its rank in the distribution of firm productivities. This means that \( \Gamma(.) = \Upsilon(.) = x \), i.e. the distributions are uniform.\(^2\) Assume that workers who do not get matched obtain a payoff of zero, and since output is non-negative, all agents will prefer to match. If output of all matches is strictly positive, there will be a continuum of wage schedules that can support the same allocation, and we will assume that an exogenous bargaining procedure determines which split of surplus is implemented. We will denote this payoff by the constant \( w_0 \geq 0 \) that pins down the wage of the lowest worker type.

For the assignment of workers to firms the cross-partial of the production function is important. We do not restrict the sign of the cross-partial since this will be instrumental in determining whether there is positive or negative assortative matching. Denote by \( F \) be the class of all functions \( f \) that are monotonic: \( f_x, f_y > 0 \); and that have a monotonic marginal product: \( f_{xy}(x,y) \) is either always positive or always negative.\(^3\) The assumption that the cross-partial does not change sign allows us to unambiguously talk about positive or negative sorting. Production functions for which higher worker types always have a comparative advantage at better firms \( (f_{xy} > 0) \) are in set \( F^+ \subset F \). Production functions for which higher worker types always have a comparative advantage at lower firms \( (f_{xy} < 0) \) are in set \( F^- \subset F \).

To illustrate the implications of our analysis we will derive our results for the following examples of production functions

\[
\begin{align*}
f^+(x,y) & = \alpha x^\theta y^\theta + h(x) + g(y), \\
f^-(x,y) & = \alpha x^\theta (1 - y)^\theta + h(x) + g(y),
\end{align*}
\]

\(^2\)The uniformity assumption is without loss of generality since the production function can be identified only up to a normalization: For a general \( \Gamma(.) \) and \( \Upsilon(.) \) and \( f(\cdot, \cdot) \) we can alternatively consider a uniform type space in which only the ranking matters and an alternative production function \( \tilde{f}(x,y) = f(\Gamma(x), \Upsilon(y)) \).

\(^3\)Later, in section 5 we discuss the virtues of relaxing this assumption.
where \( g(.) \) and \( h(.) \) are increasing functions and \( \alpha \geq 0 \) and \( \theta > 0 \) are parameters that indicate the strength of the complementarities. We assume that \( g(y) \) is such that higher firms produce higher output even under the second specification. It is obvious that \( f^+ \in F^+ \) and \( f^- \in F^- \).

An assignment of workers \( x \) to firms \( y \) is denoted by \( \mu \), i.e., the partner \( y \) of worker \( x \) is \( \mu(x) \). In this part of the paper we assume a competitive matching market. A market equilibrium specifies an assignment between \( x \)'s and \( y \)'s and some wage schedule \( w(x, y) \geq w_0 \) that determines the split of output between the worker and the firm. The payoff to the worker is \( w(x, y) \) and the payoff to the firm is \( \pi(x, y) = f(x, y) - w(x, y) \geq 0 \). Both workers and firms take the wage schedule as given. The tuple of functions \( (\mu, w) \) is an equilibrium if no worker wants to switch to a different firm at the market wages, i.e.

\[
w(x, \mu(x)) \geq w(x, y) \text{ for all } x \text{ and } y;
\]

and no firm wishes to employ a different worker, i.e.

\[
\pi(\mu^{-1}(y), y) \geq \pi(x, y) \text{ for all } x \text{ and } y. \quad (4)
\]

We derive the main prediction of Becker’s (1973) model concerning the wages in the economy. In equilibrium, each firm \( y \) maximizes profits, taking the wage schedule as given:

\[
\max_x f(x, y) - w(x, y).
\]

This yields the first order condition

\[
f_x(x, y) - \frac{dw(x, y)}{dx} = 0.
\]

Let \( w^*(x) \) be the equilibrium wage of worker \( x \). Integrating (4) along the equilibrium path yields

\[
w^*(x) = \int_0^x f_x(\tilde{x}, \mu(\tilde{x}))d\tilde{x} + w_0, \quad (5)
\]

where the constant of integration is pinned down by \( w_0 \). Observe that the worker obtains exactly his marginal product along the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, equilibrium profits of type \( y \) are given by output minus the wage \( w^* \) with the optimal worker \( \mu^{-1}(y) \). This can be re-written as

\[
\pi^*(y) = \int_0^y f_y(\mu^{-1}(\tilde{y}), \tilde{y})d\tilde{y} + f(0, 0) - w_0 \quad (6)
\]

Furthermore, we know from Becker’s analysis that matching is positive assortative when the production function is supermodular \( (f_{xy} > 0) \), in which case \( \mu(x) = x \). Under submodularity \( (f_{xy} < 0) \) in

\footnote{It is well-known that a strict cross-partial yields a one-to-one mapping \( \mu(.) \) in equilibrium. In general \( \mu(.) \) is a correspondence, with the equilibrium definition extended to all pairs in that correspondence.}
equilibrium the matching is negative assortative and \( \mu(x) = 1 - x \). With this in mind, we show that in this simple competitive model the direction of sorting - i.e. the sign of the cross-partial - cannot be identified from wage data. We first show this result on the equilibrium path, then we show it off the equilibrium path. In the next section we build an extended model with search frictions where the wages off the equilibrium path actually arise.

2.1 On the equilibrium path

We will first illustrate the result by considering our restricted class of production functions outlined above and then present the general theorem. Suppose the underlying production technology is not known and the true technology is either one of the two example technologies \( f^+ \) given in (2) or \( f^- \) given in (3). By (5) the wages under \( f^+ \) are

\[
 w^*(x) = \int_0^x f^+_x(\tilde{x}, \tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} + w_0 = \int_0^x \left( \alpha \theta \tilde{x}^{2\theta-1} + h_x(\tilde{x}) \right) d\tilde{x} + w_0 = \frac{\alpha}{2} x^{2\theta} + h(x) - h(0) + w_0.
\]

Under \( f^- \), the equilibrium wages are

\[
 w^*(x) = \int_0^x f^-_x(\tilde{x}, 1 - \tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} + w_0 = \int_0^x \left( \alpha \theta \tilde{x}^{2\theta-1} + h_x(\tilde{x}) \right) d\tilde{x} + w_0 = \frac{\alpha}{2} x^{2\theta} + h(x) - h(0) + w_0.
\]

Under both functions the wages on the equilibrium path are exactly identical, and from wage data alone one cannot distinguish between positive and negative sorting. The problem is obtaining the order of the firms. If we only have wage data and no profit data, and we derive the order on the firms by ranking them by increasing wages, we will obtain two different orders depending on whether we have complements or substitutes. To see this, observe that under positive assortative matching (henceforth PAM) higher type firms pay higher wages along the equilibrium path whereas under negative assortative matching (NAM) higher type firms pay lower wages. In the former \( w(y, y) = \frac{\alpha y^{2\theta}}{2} \) is increasing in \( y \), in the latter \( w(1 - y, y) = \frac{\alpha(1-y)^{2\theta}}{2} \) is decreasing in \( y \). This result is true for any general production technology as summarized in the proposition that follows below.

Figure 1 has an example with the profits, wages and total output when \( f^+ = xy + y \) and \( f^- = x(1 - y) + y \). Observe that wages are identical in both cases (blue), but that profits are decreasing in worker type \( x \) under \( f^+ \). While higher \( y \) firms have higher profits, higher \( x \) workers are matched with lower \( y \) firms who obtain lower profits. In the example, with \( w_0 = 0 \), we obtain

\[
 w^+(x, \mu(x)) = \frac{x^2}{2}, \pi^+(x, \mu(x)) = \frac{x^2}{2} + x, f^+(x, \mu(x)) = x + x^2 \quad \text{and} \quad w^-(x, \mu(x)) = \frac{x^2}{2}, \pi^-(x, \mu(x)) = \frac{x^2}{2} + 1 - x, f^+(x, \mu(x)) = 1 - x + x^2.
\]
Figure 1: Equilibrium Wages $w(x, \mu(x))$ [blue lines], Profits $\pi(x, \mu(x))$ [green lines], Total Output $f(x, \mu(x))$ [red lines] under $f^+ = xy + y$ [left] and $f^- = x(1 - y) + y$ [right] with $w_0 = 0$.

Of course, under NAM $\pi^-(y) = y + \frac{(1-y)^2}{2}$ is increasing in $y$ even though $\pi^-(x, \mu(x))$ is decreasing in $x$. Profits will not be the same under both production functions.

**Proposition 1** For any production function $f \in \mathcal{F}^+$ that induces positive sorting there exists a production function $f \in \mathcal{F}^-$ that induces negative sorting and the equilibrium wages $w^*(x)$ are identical under both production functions.

**Proof.** From equation (5) we obtain the wage schedule. When generated by an underlying production process that is supermodular $f^+$ this is

$$w^{*,+}(x) = \int_0^x f^+_{x}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{x})d\tilde{x} + w_0^+,$$

and for a submodular process $f^-$ it is

$$w^{*,-}(x) = \int_0^x f^-_{x}(\tilde{x}, 1 - \tilde{x})d\tilde{x} + w_0^-.$$

Observe that since $w^{*,+}(0) = w_0^+$ and $w^{*,-}(0) = w_0^-$, both wage schedules are identical when the free bargaining parameter satisfies $w_0^+ = w_0^- = w_0$ as we assumed. Then for $w^{*,+}(x) = w^{*,-}(x)$ for all $x$, it is sufficient that $f^+_{x}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{x}) = f^-_{x}(\tilde{x}, 1 - \tilde{x})$. For any $f^+(x, y)$ on $[0, 1]^2$ we can define $f^-(x, y) = f^+(x, 1 - y)$ on $[0, 1]^2$. The only restriction is that this function may not be increasing in $y$, so we may need to “augment” the function to ensure that $f_y$ is positive. If $f_x, f_y$ are bounded, it is sufficient to add a term $\tau \cdot y$ where $\tau > 0$ is large enough to ensure $f_y > 0$ everywhere. If $f_y$ is not bounded and negative, we need to add a function $g(y)$ that increases faster than the decrease of $f^+(x, 1 - y)$ in $y$. ■
2.2 Off the equilibrium path

Identification needs variation. Identification of sorting from equilibrium wages may be difficult simply because there is no independent variation across firms and workers. In the frictionless case workers sort perfectly in the sense that each type of firm attracts exactly one worker type. Even if workers became unemployed and could match again later without frictions, the panel dimension would not allow us to identify a separate effect for firms and workers, because workers will always end up in the same type of firm. There would not be any wage variation, and it cannot be identified whether a high wage is due to the worker ability or the firm productivity.

Here we entertain the idea that worker “tremble” to off-the-equilibrium firms and obtain the associated off-equilibrium wages. If workers tremble, we would be able to see wage variation for workers and firms of the same type. In the next section, we extend our environment to include search frictions such that those deviations actually arise in equilibrium. Here we argue that off-equilibrium wages are still not informative about the sorting in the market. Take the same example technologies $f^+$ and $f^-$. We will show that any procedure that identifies firm types $y$ from wages alone in the $f^+$ technology will misidentify firm types in the technology $f^-$ as $\hat{y} = 1 - y$. This is the case since observed wages under this misinterpretation are exactly equal to the wages in the first setting.

The wage schedule off equilibrium in the frictionless model is such that neither firms nor workers would want to deviate to such matches. Off the equilibrium path this wage schedule is not uniquely pinned down and wages range between the lowest wage that is just high enough to prevent firms from deviating and the highest wage that is just high enough to prevent workers from deviating. While the matched agents’ wages $w(x, \mu(x))$ are determined as above, the wages of the mismatched agents $w(x, y)$ must satisfy:

$$f(x, y) - w(x, y) \leq \pi(\mu(x), y)$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

$$w(x, y) \leq w(x, \mu(x))$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

where $\mu(x) = y$ in the case of PAM and $\mu(x) = 1 - y$ in the case of NAM. For a given $(x, y)$ combination, call the set of wages that are consistent with (7) and (8) $W(x, y)$. It is easily verified that in the case of the technology $f^+(x, y)$ any wage $w(x, y)$ in $W(x, y)$ satisfies

$$\alpha (xy)^{\theta} - \frac{\alpha}{2} y^{2\theta} \leq w(x, y) - h(x) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2} x^{2\theta}. \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

In the case of $f^-(x, y)$ any wage $w(x, y)$ in $W(x, y)$ satisfies

$$\alpha x^{\theta} (1 - y)^{\theta} - \frac{\alpha}{2} (1 - y)^{2\theta} \leq w(x, y) - h(x) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2} x^{2\theta}, \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

which is identical to (9) if we misinterpret the types as $\hat{y} = 1 - y$. If we have no information on profits, as before we cannot derive the order on $y$ simply from wage data. What is more, even after observing
off-the-equilibrium path wages, the bounds on the wages under PAM and NAM are identical if we use
the order on wages to derive the order on \( y \) (in which case under NAM we assign the order \( 1 - y \) to the
firms). The static Beckerian model will therefore not allow for identification of assortative matching
based on wage data alone.

**Proposition 2** For any production function \( f \in \mathcal{F}^+ \) that induces positive sorting there exists a pro-
duction function \( f \in \mathcal{F}^- \) that induces negative sorting and the equilibrium wage sets \( W(x, y) \) in the
former are identical to equilibrium wage set \( W(x, 1 - y) \) in the latter.

**Proof.** The proof follows the same argument as in Proposition 1. ■

### 3 Mismatch due to Search Frictions

We now consider an extended model with mismatch due to frictions caused by delay. Unlike the static
Beckerian model, search frictions may induce different behavior in the acceptance decision of matches.
First, assuming that the technology is generated by a supermodular production technology, we derive
the equilibrium allocation in the presence of a type-independent search cost. We address the issue
of identification of positive/negative sorting in this model, and whether we can identify sorting from
wage data alone. Second, for this model we derive from the theory the firm-fixed-effect. The case of
type-independent search costs considerably simplifies the analysis, but the gist of the argument carries
over for a more general search cost. Below in section 5 we consider a model with type-dependent search
cost.

#### 3.1 Type-Independent Search Costs Under Supermodularity

Our model has hiring in two stages. In stage one, each worker is randomly paired with one firm. The
pairings are random. One can think of this part of the hiring process as standing in for some connections
that workers have to the labor market prior to engaging in an extensive search for labor. The pair can
either agree to stay together at some wage, or search for a better partner. Those who decide not to
stay together and those who did not get paired each incur a search cost \( c \) due to the delay. In the
second stage, all remaining agents are matched according to the competitive, frictionless allocation as
outlined above.\(^5\) After the search process has ended production starts. To allow for a panel dimension

\(^5\)Here we need to worry about the possibility that when the acceptance sets span the entire type space (e.g. because of
high search costs or low complementarities), no agents are left in the second stage, in which case the continuation payoff is
not determined. Without modeling this explicitly, we think of a tremble that ensures that there are always some agents
who end up in the next period. For many parameters each worker and firm type rejects some agents on the other side of
the market, and these agents will indeed move to the second stage.
in the observations (i.e. each worker matched over time to more than one firm, and each firm matched over time with more than one worker) we assume that each agent goes through this two-stages hiring process several times in his life.\(^6\)

We consider the same class of production functions \(\mathcal{F}\). For exposition it will be convenient to restrict the supermodular function in \(\mathcal{F}^+\) to functions with symmetric cross-partial such that \(f_{xy}(x, y) = f_{xy}(y, x)\). For submodular functions in \(\mathcal{F}^-\) which induce negative sorting it will be convenient to restrict attention to symmetry of the form \(f_{xy}(x, y) = f_{xy}(1-y, 1-x)\).

We assume that the transfer in the first period is determined by Nash bargaining with equal bargaining weights. We illustrate this with our example production function \(f^+\) in (2). When a worker \(x\) meets a firm \(y\), the payoff from matching is \(f(x, y)\). Waiting until next period and matching in the perfectly competitive labor market yields payoff \(w(x, \mu(x)) - c\) to the worker and \(\pi(\mu^{-1}(y), y) - c\) to the firm. A first-period match will therefore be accepted provided that the current match surplus over waiting is positive\(^7\), i.e.

\[
f(x, y) - (w^*(x) + \pi^*(y) - 2c) \geq 0. \tag{11}
\]

For a given firm \(y\) we call the set of worker types that fulfill (11) his acceptance set and denote it by \(a(y)\).\(^8\) Similar to the work by Atakan (2006) we can show that the bounds of this set are increasing if the production function is in \(\mathcal{F}^+\) and decreasing if it is in \(\mathcal{F}^-\), which naturally extends the notion of sorting to sets.

For our example production function \(f^+\) in (2) it is easy to verify that (11) reduces to

\[
\alpha(xy)^\theta - \frac{\alpha}{2} x^{2\theta} - \frac{\alpha}{2} y^{2\theta} \geq -2c. \tag{12}
\]

and therefore the acceptance set becomes

\[
a(y) = \left[ (y^\theta - 2\sqrt{c/\alpha})^{1/\theta}, (y^\theta + 2\sqrt{c/\alpha})^{1/\theta} \right]. \tag{13}
\]

\(^6\)One can think of termination of all jobs after a specified time period, with a new period of matching that follows. More generally one may think of this as standing in for exogeneous separations into a steady state matching model.

\(^7\)It may well be that for low types the surplus in the next period does not exceed the total waiting cost of \(2c\). In order to avoid keeping track of endogenous entry, we assume that people will search even if that is the case. This may be due to the fact that the outside option (e.g. unemployment benefits) are contingent on searching. This issue never arises when \(f(0, 0) > c\) and \(w_0 > c\), as all agents than have an incentive to search, or when search costs are proportional as in Section 5.

\(^8\)Note that for supermodular functions in \(\mathcal{F}^+\) this acceptance set is identical for workers and firms of the same type types, which is a general consequence of the symmetry of \(f_{xy}\). Therefore the distribution of types in the second stage is identical for workers and firms, and therefore the equilibrium assignment is still \(\mu(x) = x\). Similarly, for submodular functions in \(\mathcal{F}^-\) is can be shown that under our symmetry condition when \(x\) accepts \(y\) then \(1-x\) accepts \(1-y\), which leads to distributions that are symmetric around \(1/2 \) (\(1-\Gamma(x) = \Gamma(1-x), 1-\Upsilon(y) = \Upsilon(1-y)\)) and the equilibrium assignment indeed remains \(\mu(x) = 1-x\).
Figure 2: Acceptance sets with type-independent search costs for $\theta = 1$.

The matching sets are illustrated in Figure 2 for the case $\theta = 1$.

Because the surplus is divided equally, the worker obtains half of this surplus on top of his outside option that is given by his value of waiting. Therefore, his wage is

$$w(x, y) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ f(x, y) - w(x, \mu(x)) - \pi(\mu^{-1}(y), y) + 2c \right] + w(x, \mu(x)) - c$$

(14)

$$= \frac{1}{2} \left[ f(x, y) + w(x, \mu(x)) - \pi(\mu^{-1}(y), y) \right].$$

(15)

It is straightforward to see that this wage is exactly in the middle of the acceptance set $W(x, y)$ outlined in (7) and (8) for off-equilibrium-wages of the frictionless model. This makes this model very attractive to work with. It translates the insights from Becker’s (1973) assignment model to a model of mismatch. It immediately implies that positive and negative sorting cannot be identified by observed wage data, because the wages under supermodular production functions coincide with those under submodular production functions (under misinterpretation of the unobserved firm type). Since the wage distributions coincide, the identification cannot come from the acceptance decisions (i.e. the speed of matching) between first and second period, either, because identical wages imply identical acceptance decisions (again under the misinterpretation of firm types).\(^9\)

\(^9\)Bargaining weights different from $1/2$ or different costs for workers and firms will change the bargaining sets and the wages, but it can be shown that they will not affect our results on identification as long as search costs are identical for all workers and for all firms.
Figure 3: First period wages for under mismatch with a type $y = x + k$ that is $k$ away from the bliss point. [Graph for $x = .5$, $c = .25$, $\alpha = \theta = 1$, $h(x) = 0$.]

**Proposition 3** For every supermodular production function $f^+ \in \mathcal{F}^+$ that induces positive sorting there is a submodular production function $f^- \in \mathcal{F}^-$ that induces exactly the same wages for workers when we reinterpret firm types as $\hat{y} = 1 - y$.

**Proof.** Wages in the second period coincide by Proposition 1. Wages in the first period coincide because they are in the exact arithmetic middle of the wage set $W(.,.)$ which by Proposition (2) coincide under the re-interpretation. ■

For our example production technology $f^+$ we get as wages

$$w(x, y) = \frac{\alpha}{2} (xy)^\theta + \frac{\alpha}{4} x^{2\theta} - \frac{\alpha}{4} y^{2\theta} + h(x).$$

For some of the results it will be instructive to rewrite the wages as a function of the distance $k$ between the worker and the firm, which for the special case of $\theta = 1$ becomes particularly tractable:

$$w(x, x - k) = w(x, x + k) = \frac{\alpha}{2} x^2 - \frac{\alpha}{4} k^2 + h(x).$$

This shows that a worker has a bliss point when matching with a firm with identical type, and looses quadratically with the distance to the firm. The reason is that a worker who matches with a
firm that has too low a type does not produce a lot of output. On the other hand, a worker who wants
to induce a much better firm to match with him has to compensate the firm for not matching with
a more appropriate worker. Therefore it is not necessarily better for a given worker to match with a
higher type firm. In a large region – i.e., whenever the firm is better than the worker – wages fall by
matching with even better firms. Figure 3 illustrates the wage schedule of a worker as a function of the
distance to the firm he matches with, and highlights the fact that the wage falls in firm type in part of
the region. This result holds more generally

**Proposition 4 (Bliss Point).** For each \( x \in (0, 1) \) wages \( w(x, y) \) are non-monotone in \( y \).

**Proof.** Wages \( w(x, y) \) are in the exact arithmetic middle of the wage set \( W(x, y) \). Since worker type
\( x \) chooses the optimal wage, by (8) any wage in \( W(x, y') \) is lower than the wage \( w(x, \mu(x)) \) under
the optimal assignment. Since \( W(x, \mu(x)) = w(x, \mu(x)) \) these wages arise in the first stage. Because search
costs are positive, all firm types close to \( \mu(x) \) have a positive surplus and thus will form a match with
\( x \) in the first stage. Therefore, wages are non-monotone around the optimum wage \( w(x, \mu(x)) \).

Note that none of the results depend on an equal split of the surplus or identical search costs for
workers and firms. While this specification makes the exposition especially tractable because we can
immediately rely on the results of the previous section, a bargaining power \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \) for the workers
and a search cost \( c_w \) for workers and \( c_f \) for firms would only linearly rescale the wages without affecting
the results further.\(^{10}\)

In the following we show that this non-monotonicity of the wage schedule limits a fixed effect estimator
to detect the direction and the magnitude of sorting.

### 3.2 Inconclusive Firm-Fixed-Effects

In this section we assess the ability of fixed effects approach that we discussed in the introduction to
detect the degree of sorting. We only consider the degree of sorting because we know from the previous
analysis that the direction of sorting (good workers with good firms or good workers with bad firms,
depending on the sign of the cross-partial) cannot be distinguished. We show that the decreasing part
of the wage schedule translates into ambiguous fixed effects.

We will illustrate our point with our example production functions (2) and (3). While for some of
our analysis it has been useful to focus on a uniform type distribution where the workers type is his
rank, here it will be more convenient to derive our results for the case of \( \theta = 1 \). Any other \( \theta \) (even
a type-dependent exponent \( \theta(x) \) as long as \( \theta'(x) > 0 \)) can be obtained by allowing a flexible form of

\(^{10}\)The wage equation in (15) would simply change to 

\[ w(x, y) = \gamma \left[ f(x, y) + w(x, \mu(x)) - \pi(\mu^{-1}(y), y) \right] - (1 - \gamma) c_w + \gamma c_f. \]
the distribution $\Gamma(.)$ for worker and firm types.\textsuperscript{11} We can therefore restrict attention to the production function

$$f(x, y) = \alpha xy + h(x) + g(y),$$

where the sign of alpha can be either positive or negative.\textsuperscript{12} Assume it is positive, so that the exercise is to detect the strength of sorting and not the sign. It is easy to see from (13) that the acceptance set $a(y) = [y - K, y + K]$ where $K = 2\sqrt{c/\alpha}$.

Fixed effect estimation relies on the panel dimension of modern data sets. We assume that the 2-stage hiring process outlined above repeats $T$ times for each agent.\textsuperscript{13} We allow the observer to distinguish between first and second-period wages of the search process of each agent. Since second stage wages are perfectly aligned, it is not possible to back out worker and firm effects independently. The first stage does have mismatch and we look at the ability of the firm-fixed effect here. This effect is the wage that a firm pays its worker net of the average wage that worker’s obtain. We assume that the panel is long enough such that we can abstract from the stochastic nature of the average wage. That is, the fixed effect of a firm of type $y \in [2K, 1 - 2K]$ is\textsuperscript{14}

$$\Psi(y) = \int_{y-K}^{y+K} [w(x, y) - w_{av}(x)] d\Gamma(x|y).$$

The term $\Gamma(x|y) = \Gamma(x)/[\Gamma(y + K) - \Gamma(y - K)]$ reflects the distribution of the worker types conditional on being willing to match with type $y$ and in the following $\gamma(x|y)$ will denote its density. The restriction to $y \in [2K, 1 - 2K]$ ensures exactly that there is no boundary problem to consider here, nor in the following derivation of the workers average wage. The average wage of a worker is

$$w_{av}(x) = \int_{x-K}^{x+K} w(x, y) d\Upsilon(y|x) = h(x) + \frac{\alpha}{2} x^2 - \frac{\alpha}{4} \int_{-K}^{K} k^2 v(x + k|x) dk$$

This term is particularly easy under the uniform distribution, where $w_{av}(x) = h(x) + \alpha x^2/2 - \alpha K^2/12$.

We are interested if this fixed effect is increasing in the type of the firm. That is, we are interested whether higher productivity firms on average pay higher wages once we control for the average wage.

\textsuperscript{11}When $x$ is uniformly distributed, then $\Gamma(x) = x$. For any strictly increasing transformation $v(x)$ [such as $v(x) = x^{\theta(x)}$ with $\theta'(x) > 0$] and production function $f(v(x), v(y))$ we can without loss of generality specify $f(x, y)$ but change the distributions to $\Gamma(\cdot) = \Gamma(v^{-1}(\cdot))$ and $\Upsilon(\cdot) = \Upsilon(v^{-1}(\cdot))$. For this exercise we retain symmetric type distributions.

\textsuperscript{12}To caputre (3) the term $\alpha x (1 - y)$ can be split in $-\alpha xy$ and $\alpha x$, where we can attribute the latter to $h(x)$.

\textsuperscript{13}Since the worker’s static problem is identical under negative or positive sorting, the panel dimension does not add to the identification of the sign of the cross-partial. It does allow for identification of the absolute value of the cross-partial, which is a measure for the loss from mismatch.

\textsuperscript{14}We exclude the types close to the edges of the type space as their matching set is constrained. Analyzing this case is not difficult, but burdensome in notation as the matching set is $a(y) = [\max\{0, y - K\}, \min\{1, y + K\}]$. Neglecting this part neglects only a small part of the type space when $c$ and thus $K$ is small.
that the workers in this firm are getting. Controlling for the workers’ average wage is a feature of the fixed effects approach outlined in (1). Without controlling for workers average wage it is trivially true that under supermodularity higher productivity firms pay higher wages (while under submodularity lower productivity firms pay higher wages). In the range $y \in [2K, 1 - 2K]$ we get

$$
\Psi'(y) = \int_{y-K}^{y+K} \frac{\partial w(x, y)}{\partial y} \gamma(x|y) dx + (w(y + K, y) - w_{av}(y + K)) \gamma(y + K|y) - (w(y - K, y) - w_{av}(y - K)) \gamma(y - K|y).
$$

(19)

Call the term in the first line $\Psi'_1(y)$ and the terms in the second and third line $\Psi'_2(y)$ so that $\Psi'(y) = \Psi'_1(y) + \Psi'_2(y)$. The first effect $\Psi'_1(y)$ accounts for the wage change across those workers with which this firm type matches. The second effect $\Psi'_2(y)$ reflects that the set of workers that match with a firm is slightly changing when the firm type changes.

We will focus initially on the first effect. The wage change induced by a firm is

$$
\frac{\partial w(x, y)}{\partial y} = \frac{\alpha}{2} x - \frac{\alpha}{2} y.
$$

That is, the low ability workers $x < y$ loose when the firm gets better, while the workers with relatively high ability $x > y$ gains when the firm gets better. This happens because in the first case the distance between the worker and the firm grows and the match becomes less efficient, while in the latter case the distance shrink closer to the optimal assignment. How does this effect turn out?

For a uniform distribution the positive effect that a slightly better firm type has on the high worker types that it is willing to employ exactly offsets the negative effect on the lower worker types that it employs.\(^{15}\) It is easy to see that distributions that lead to more weight on high worker types lend more weight to the positive aspect, while a distribution that lends more weight to negative worker types leads to a negative effect:

$$
\begin{align*}
\Psi'_1(y) > 0 & \quad \text{if} \quad \gamma'(x|y) > 0 \quad \text{for all} \ y \\
\Psi'_1(y) = 0 & \quad \text{if} \quad \gamma'(x|y) = 0 \quad \text{for all} \ y \\
\Psi'_1(y) < 0 & \quad \text{if} \quad \gamma'(x|y) < 0 \quad \text{for all} \ y.
\end{align*}
$$

(20)

This illustrates that the effect that higher firm types have on those workers they have in common with lower firm types. It is ambiguous, and could go up or down depending on whether the economy exhibits relatively more high type workers or vice versa.

\(^{15}\)For the uniform distribution we have

$$
\Psi'_1(y) = \frac{1}{2K} \int_{y-K}^{y+K} \left( \frac{\alpha}{2} x - \frac{\alpha}{2} y \right) dx = \frac{1}{2K} \int_{-K}^{K} \left( \frac{\alpha}{2} (y + k) - \frac{\alpha}{2} y \right) dk = 0.
$$

16
For completeness we consider also the second effect that comes through the changing matching set. This effect is complicated in general, but becomes tractable when we consider the case where the firm’s type density is linear. For constant $v'(y|x)$ we obtain in the appendix that\textsuperscript{16}

\[
\Psi_2'(y) < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \gamma'(x|y) > 0 \text{ for all } y \\
\Psi_2'(y) = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \gamma'(x|y) = 0 \text{ for all } y \\
\Psi_2'(y) > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \gamma'(x|y) < 0 \text{ for all } y.
\] (21)

For this case the effects $\Psi_1'(y)$ and $\Psi_2'(y)$ run therefore in opposite directions, again reducing the overall effect even when the distribution is not uniform. It is not difficult to construct type distributions for which the overall effect is always negative or always positive for all types $y \in [2K, 1 - 2K]$.

One main conclusion is that the ranking of firms even when we know that we have assortative matching cannot be backed out from the firm-fixed-effects when the distribution is uniform (at least for interior types $y \in [2K, 1 - 2K]$). The reason is not that workers are actually sorting randomly. The matching sets can be arbitrarily small so that workers focus on a very narrow band of firms with whom they are willing to match. The reason is that the increased wages for some workers are offset by decreased wages on other (worse) workers.

4 Identifying the Strength of Sorting

We have shown that it is not possible to distinguish negative from positive sorting when only wage and acceptance data is available (Proposition 3). Moreover, in our environment current fixed effects estimation not only fails at the direction but also at estimating the strength of sorting. This raises the question whether anything about the strength of sorting can be identified from the data. In economic terms this might be more interesting than the direction of sorting (positive or negative) since the welfare depends on matching the right types, not on who these types are. Identifying some information about the strength of sorting reveals whether welfare depends to a large degree or a small degree on the right assignment of workers to firms.

In this section we argue that the strength of the sorting will be identifiable if a worker goes through this hiring process several times - i.e. if a panel dimension is available. It is possible to determine how much is gained in terms of welfare from matching agents perfectly. The cross-partial can only be determined within the bounds of the matching sets, though. For firm-worker-pairs that will not match this cross-partial cannot be determined. Under parametric forms as in our leading example the

\textsuperscript{16}For symmetric distributions $\Gamma(\cdot) = \Upsilon(\cdot)$ this means that $v'(y|x) = \gamma'(x|y) = r$ and therefore $\Psi_2'(y) < 0$ if $r > 0$, $\Psi_2'(y) = 0$ if $r = 0$ and $\Psi_2'(y) > 0$ if $r < 0.$
cross-partial can be extended to all matches, which makes it possible to evaluate the overall efficiency loss between perfect sorting and completely random matching.

Since we cannot identify the productivity of a firm, for this section we will rank firms differently. If the production function is indeed supermodular, we will learn about the cross-partial of \( f(x, y) \). If the cross-partial is negative, we will learn about the cross-partial of misspecified production function \( \tilde{f}(x, y) = f(x, 1 - y) \) because we will misinterpret bad firms as good firms. Since \( \tilde{f}_{xy} = |f_{xy}| \) we will nevertheless learn about the gain from better sorting.

For the empirical implementation two ingredients will be important. First, we rely on the panel dimension of available data sets. Again we think that the hiring process outlined above repeats \( T \) times, so that we observe \( T \) wages \( \{w_{i1}, w_{i2}, ..., w_{iT}\} \) for worker \( i \) and \( T \) wages \( \{w_{j1}, w_{j2}, ..., w_{jT}\} \) for firm \( j \). Identical numbers of draws are not important, it just simplifies the exposition. Second, we restrict attention to workers in a particular occupation and assume that within this occupation a firm of type \( y \) produces \( f(x, y) \) with each worker that it hires. That is, a firm \( y \) that has three jobs in a specific profession such as technicians and hires them at skills \( x_1, x_2 \) and \( x_3 \) obtains output \( \sum_{i=1}^{3} f(x_i, y) \). This allows us to interpret a multi-worker firm as a firm with a single vacancy that interacts with a sequence of different workers.\(^{17}\) The identification works along three steps.

First, we will exploit the maximum wage of workers and firms to identify their type. For an agent \( k \) (could be a worker or a firm) we consider the maximum wage

\[
\bar{w}_k = \max_{t \in \{1, ..., T\}} w_{kt}^t
\]

If the panel dimension is long enough this wage is arbitrarily close to the optimal wage. That is, if \( k \) is a worker than this wage is close to his theoretical optimum \( w(k, \mu(k)) \). For the current exposition we neglect the finite sample difference and assume that maximum wage in the panel exactly coincides with the theoretical optimum. We can observe the distribution of these wages across workers. This yields the cumulative distribution \( \Omega_W(\bar{w}) \) over the maximum wages across workers. Since good workers achieve high wages, a worker’s rank can be recovered by the relationship

\[
x_k = \Omega_W(\bar{w}_k).
\]

\(^{17}\)We mention the focus on a particular occupation only because it seems hard to argue that the production function has such a simple separable form across occupations, while within an occupation this might be less objectionable.
Similarly, we can consider firms. Let \( \Omega_F(w) \) be the cumulative distribution across firms over the maximum wages paid by those firms. We attribute the following rank to a firm

\[
y_k = \Omega_F(w_k).
\]

We can now directly refer to firms by their rank \( y \). This type correctly identifies the firms rank when we order firms by their eagerness of having a good workers (i.e. by their improvement in output from increasing the workers type). Again, a more robust ranking might be the ranking of firms by their average wages. It is important that these are ”raw” wages that are not adjusted for the type of worker. The reason we do not condition is because we want to identify the firms that are more eager to have higher workers (rank \( y \) under PAM, rank \( 1 - y \) under NAM) without a concern of identifying whether the firm is truly more productive.

We can identify for each worker \( x \) the lowest firm \( y \) that it matches with. We call that firm \( y(x) \). If the panel dimension in the data is long enough, \( y(x) \) is arbitrarily close to the lower bound of the workers acceptance range.

Second, we will exploit the spread between the maximum wage and the minimum wage that workers accept to identify the waiting costs. Again we assume that the minimum wage

\[
\overline{w}_x = \min_{t \in \{1, \ldots, T\}} w^t_x
\]

of the worker with type \( x \) coincides with the theoretical minimum that the worker is willing to accept in the first period of the search process. The costs of waiting are given by the difference between the maximum and the minimum wage of a worker\(^{18}\)

\[
c = \overline{w}_x - \overline{w}_x,
\]

or we can determine it in aggregate by the average range of wages across workers.

Third, we use the relation between the matching set and the cost of waiting to learn about the strength of the cross-partial. The loss \( L(x, y) \) due to mismatch is the value that is created by pair \((x, y)\) minus their marginal contribution under perfect sorting

\[
L(x, y) = f(x, y) - \int_0^x f_x(\tilde{x}, \tilde{x})d\tilde{x} - \int_0^y f_y(\tilde{y}, \tilde{y})d\tilde{y} - f(0, 0). \tag{22}
\]

We derive in the appendix the following more concise expression

\[
L(x, y) = -\int_0^x \int_0^y f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y})d\tilde{x}d\tilde{y} \tag{23}
\]

\(^{18}\)We have assumed identical costs for all workers. The theory can be extended to type-dependent costs \( c(x) \). See the Discussion Section.
This is gives the loss when matching is indeed positive assortative. If matching is negative assortative, we misidentified a worker type as \( y = 1 - \hat{y} \) when \( \hat{y} \) is the true type. Nevertheless the loss can be written exactly as in (23) for the misidentified production function \( \tilde{f}(x, y) = f(x, \hat{y}) \), and so the cross-partial \( \tilde{f}_{xy}(x, y) = -f_{xy}(x, 1 - y) \) can be identify correctly except for the sign.

Workers and firms internalize this in their matching decision. If the lowest trading partner of worker \( x \) is in the interior, i.e. \( \underline{y}(x) > 0 \), then this partner’s type is determined by the indifference condition that the loss from matching equals the joint cost from waiting, i.e.

\[
-\int_{\underline{y}(x)}^{x} \int_{\underline{y}}^{\hat{y}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} = -2c.
\]

This is a functional equation that identifies \( f_{xy} \) evaluated at \((x, \underline{y}(x))\), for all \( x \in [0, 1] \).

The condition identifies the cross-partial because it compares the noise in the matching sets \((x - \underline{y}(x))\) to the noise in the wage data \((2c)\). If the wages vary substantially but matching sets are small, there must be a large loss in matching by slightly deviating from the optimal type, i.e. the cross-partial must be large.

Obviously this approach gives an idea about the cross-partial only for some parts of the \((x, y)\) space. Especially, this does not allow for the inference on the cross-partial for pairs of workers and firms that do not match. We can extend the analysis to the entire type space if we are willing to make more stringent parametric assumptions on the cross-partials that we assume to hold on the entire parameter space. Under our leading example \( f^+ \) the loss due to miscoordination in abolut terms is given by

\[
|L(x, y)| = \frac{|\alpha|}{2} (x^\theta - y^\theta)^2.
\]

By (24) we can identify the strength of sorting via equation

\[
|\alpha|(x^\theta - \underline{y}(x)^\theta)^2 = 4c
\]

or equivalently

\[
x = \left(2\left(c/|\alpha|\right)^{1/2} - \underline{y}(x)^\theta\right)^{1/\theta}
\]

as long as \( \underline{y}(x) > 0 \). Parameters \( |\alpha| \) and \( \theta \) can be identified by the joint behavior of \( x \) and \( \underline{y}(x) \). Simple non-linear regression techniques can assess these parameters if one is willing to attribute the noise in the process to measurement error. The gain measured in the dollar amount that perfect matching generates in excess of complete mismatch can then be assessed simply as

\[
\mathcal{G} = \int_{0}^{1} \int_{0}^{1} |L(x, y)| dxdy
\]

\[
= \frac{|\alpha|}{2} \int_{0}^{1} \int_{0}^{1} (x^\theta - y^\theta)^2 dxdy = |\alpha| \frac{\theta^2}{(2\theta + 1)(\theta + 1)^2}.
\]

20
Clearly one can also use the computed acceptance bounds (12) to integrate up the loss under the current mismatch compared to the frictionless optimal assignment, or to compare the current mismatch to complete randomness.

5 Discussion and Extensions

In this paper we pursue two goals. First, we use the most well-known model of sorting by Becker (1973) to gain insights into the wage setting process. We extend the model in the smallest possible way to allow for mismatch while retaining the basic idea underlying the assortative matching model. This allows us to provide analytical expressions for the mismatched wages in the model, to characterize their bliss point property, and to provide an explicit version of a fixed effects method used in the empirical literature. We show that the latter is neither well-suited to identify the sign nor the strength of sorting. Identification of the direction of sorting is in general impossible because firms pay wages based on the gain they have from employing a higher worker, not because they themselves are productive. Even under positive sorting the fixed effects approach is not able to identify the strength of sorting because wages are non-monotone in firm type. This non-monotonicity is at odds with the basic fixed-effects idea, and we show that the net effect may be zero.

Second, we propose to abandon the attempt to identify from wage data the sign of sorting. The mere fact that wages are determined mainly by the need for having a better worker (which is based on the cross-partial and not the first derivatives) makes such identification difficult. Under submodularity it is the low productivity firms that especially need good workers to increase their (in terms of levels) meager profits, while under submodularity it is the productive firms that need more productive workers most. In both cases the firms that need the productive workers most have an incentive to pay high wages, which makes identification without profit (per job) data difficult. Yet in economic terms the sign of sorting may be less important than the gain that is achieved by sorting workers into the “right” job. We show that some information about this gain can be identified from wage data. We propose a specific method of backing out this strength locally around the equilibrium path. The identification comes from determining some notion of the size of the set of firms with which a worker matches. If a worker is only willing to match with a small fraction of firms, for a given level of frictions (which we can identify from the data) the complementarities must be large. Similarly, when a worker is willing to match with many firm types the complementarities must be weak. This gives a well-defined notion of the dollar-value of the gain from sorting in the market.

Our method may well not be the only one that identifies the strength of sorting. Since existing attempts have mainly considered the sign of sorting, this area is not well-developed. We believe that
other methods that compare the noise in the accepted matches of a worker (i.e. the range of the type space or the range of wages) with the total noise in the market as a whole are promising in shedding light on this issue. Similarly, one can look at the problem from the firm side. When within-firm variation of worker types (or their salaries – depending on the model) is low relative to the overall variation in the data, for given level of frictions complementarities must be large for agents to focus on a narrow band of matches. For example, Lopes de Melo (2008) considers the within-firm correlation of wages as a measure. Comparisons with the variation overall might capture something about the strength of sorting. Evaluating the strength of sorting this way is important in order to assess the welfare-consequences of matching agents better. The main difficulty is to distinguish the cause of the relative noise levels. It could be that frictions are high and therefore workers accept nearly all matches, or complementarities are low. The challenge is to propose procedures that separate the source of frictions from the complementarity, and the procedure in the previous section presents one approach to do this.

We now briefly discuss some of the other issues that may be of importance in identifying sorting.

**On-the-job-search.** On-the-Job-Search (OJS) is a likely candidate for identifying sorting using equilibrium mismatch (see also Bagger and Lentz (2008) and Lopes de Melo (2008)). As long as a job is scarce, matched pairs face a trade-off between matching early and waiting. Like in our models with friction, this induces a trade-off between accepting some degree of mismatch and waiting. With OJS, this happens simultaneously.

**Using Data on Profits: the Attribution Problem.** One obvious observation is that with data on profits we can identify both the strength and the sign of sorting. And while there are good data on firm profits, there are no data on job profits. In multi-worker firms, we need to attribute the share of each worker’s contribution to the overall firm profits. Even in the simplest economy we need to decide what the contribution of very different individuals (CEO, secretary and janitor) is to the firm profit. Since this decomposition seems difficult across occupations, we propose to focus on the economically important and manageable problem of the identifying the strength of sorting.

Being aware of the shortcomings of the wage data in fixed effects estimates, Mendes, van den Berg, and Lindeboom (2007) use productivity data instead. They choose average firm-specific productivity to attribute output from the firm to an individual worker. They find that average firm-specific productivity and worker skill exhibit strong positive sorting.

**More General Technologies.** Above, we have shown that the strength of the sorting can be identified, but not the sign. This suggests that our analysis extends to an even broader class of preferences.

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19In Bagger and Lentz (2008) jobs are not scarce since firms can open as many jobs as they want. The sorting effect in their model derives from differences in the intensity by which workers search for a new job.
Suppose output is maximized when “similar” agents match, then there is no ranking of better jobs, but we can still identify how strong the complementarity is between workers with our approach. Observe that this does include more realistic cases of production technologies where types are multi-dimensional. All the information that we use to identify the sorting effect is embedded in the wages, thus giving us a monetary value (and therefore one-dimensional order) of sorting.

**Type-Dependent Search Costs.** We analyzed a model of matching that replicates the payoffs of the model by Becker (1973). While in Becker sorting is perfect and matches lie only on the diagonal of the type distribution, we extend his setting to allow for matches also off that diagonal, while retaining the payoffs that Becker’s competitive model predicts for such matches by following the basic methodology of Atakan (2006).

The introduction of waiting costs can be done in ways that deliver wages that do not coincide with those predicted in Becker’s theory. For example, introducing waiting costs through time discounting with factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$ along a methodology similar to Shimer and Smith (2000) leads to different payoffs. The reason is that waiting costs are now different for different types, with higher types suffering a higher loss when they don’t trade immediately. This allows workers to gain from trading with higher types. While this potentially makes identification possible (in contrast to Section 3), the variability that is introduced is small when discounting is large because wages are still mainly determined by the need of hiring better workers. More severely, even under differential waiting costs in the current empirical approach via fixed effects it is not guaranteed that higher productivity firms on average pay higher wages after controlling for worker types (similar to Section 4).

We conclude by briefly sketching the analysis with discounting. Under a simplified version of our production function $f^+(x, y) = xy$ second period payoffs for worker type $x$ is still $x^2/2$ and for firm type $y$ it is $y^2/2$. When discounting replaces fixed waiting costs the workers wage in a match $(x, y)$ in the first period becomes

$$w(x, y) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ xy - \beta \frac{x^2}{2} - \beta \frac{y^2}{2} \right] + \frac{1}{2} \beta \frac{x^2}{2}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} xy + \beta \frac{x^2}{4} - \beta \frac{y^2}{4}$$

where the first term in square brackets is the surplus from matching now rather than waiting, which is split between the agents, while the second term is the amount that the worker can assure himself by waiting. Workers are willing to match with firm $y$ if the surplus in the square bracket in (25) is positive. That is, the matching set is $a(y) = [K_y, \bar{K}y]$ where $K = \beta^{-1} \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \beta^2} \right)$ and $\bar{K} = \beta^{-1} \left( 1 + \sqrt{1 - \beta^2} \right)$.

The bargaining allows the worker to partially profit from better firms, which means that under the
submodular specification \( f^{-}(x,y) = (1-y)x + y \) the wage will be as in (25) when we replace \( y \) by its transform \( \tilde{y} = 1 - y \), plus an added term \( \frac{1}{2}(1 - \beta)(1 - \tilde{y}) \). This added term is small when \( \beta \) is close to one relative to the other terms in the wage equation, and therefore potentially difficult to detect with statistical significance when job finding rates are high (i.e., when the associated time difference between first and second period is low). Nevertheless, the term is not coincidental in the sense that identical second period wages will require differences in first period wages induced by bargaining, and sufficient data quantities might allow it to be backed out in a structural estimation.\(^{20}\)

The current fixed effect estimators are still not well suited to detect this effect. While now workers benefit in the bargaining stage from higher types, this effect is linear, while the opportunity cost of occupying the “wrong” job is increasing more than linear whenever the production function is supermodular. This is reflected by the quadratic negative term in the wage equation and is also reflected in the lower bound of the acceptance set \( a(y) \). The reason why very low workers are not willing to match with this firm is that their wage would be too bad because they would have to compensate the firm for forgoing very profitable production opportunities in the future.

That the wage in (25) is hump-shaped can be seen by considering the derivative of the wage with respect to the firm type for a given worker

\[
\frac{\partial w(x,y)}{\partial y} = x - \beta \frac{y}{2}
\]

which is negative when \( x < \beta y \). Therefore, the wage is decreasing for all worker types in \([K_y, \beta y]\), i.e. that have decreasing derivative and are within the acceptance set \( a(y) \). This set is non-empty for any discount factor.\(^{21}\) Figure 4 illustrates the wage pattern as the function of the distance \( k \) between the worker and the firm. The wages at the boundaries reflect the value from waiting and therefore have to have same level. In the middle the distribution is single-peaked, only that the peak is shifted to higher wages compared to the previous section. Still roughly for half of the acceptance set the wage is decreasing in the productivity of the firm and falls to the value of waiting at the boundary. Again this induces ambiguous fixed effects for firms, depending if there are relatively many or relatively few bad workers in the economy. Looking again at the fixed effect for firm \( y \) yields an expression identical to (17) only with the area of integration adjusted to \([K_y, K]\) and the conditional distribution adjusted

\(^{20}\)Bagger and Lentz (2008) have a search intensity margin, which also allows them to recover identification of the sign of sorting.

\(^{21}\)It is straightforward to show that \( K = \beta^{-1}\left(1 - \sqrt{1 - \beta^2}\right) y < \beta y \) if and only if \( 1 - \beta^2 > (1 - \beta^2)^2 \), which is true for all \( \beta \in (0, 1) \).
Figure 4: First period wages for under mismatch with a type that is $k$ away from the bliss point. [Graph for $x = .5, \beta = .98$]

to $\Gamma(x|y) = \Gamma(x)/[\Gamma(Ky) - \Gamma(Ky)]$. Analogous to (19) this leads to a change in the fixed effect of

$$
\Psi'(y) = \int_{K_y}^{K_y} \left( \frac{1}{2}x - \frac{1}{2}\beta y \right) \gamma(x|y) dx
$$

$$
+ K \left( \beta \frac{K^2 y^2}{2} - w_{av}(K_y) \right) \gamma(K_y|y)
$$

$$
- K \left( \beta \frac{K^2 y^2}{2} - w_{av}(K_y) \right) \gamma(K_y|y).
$$

While this fixed effect is harder to analyze than expression (19) for type-independent search costs, it is still easy to see that this expression is not in general positive. The first line is negative if $\gamma$ is sufficiently decreasing, because then $\gamma(x|y)$ is sufficiently decreasing and the type space gives more weight to low worker types. On average the workers suffer from an improvement in the firm quality because the firm moves further from the bliss point of the low worker types which are more predominant. Also, the third line is larger than the second when $\gamma(x|y)$ is sufficiently decreasing. Both effects together clearly induce an effect in which better firms have lower fixed effects because most workers in the economy have a type lower than them. Again we believe that an approach based on the bounds of the acceptance set relative to the entire type space similar to Section 4 will be useful in considering the strength of sorting.

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22 The second line in the following expression only arises for $K_y < 1$, otherwise the upper bound is 1 and is not affected by a change in $y$. 
6 Concluding Remarks

We argue that identifying the sign of sorting from wage data alone is difficult, if not impossible. The main reason is that the wages reflect at least in part the marginal contribution to the value that the firm generates, and it can be either the more productive or the less productive firms that have a higher marginal benefit from employing a better worker. The empirical question whether or not there is evidence of sorting remains to be answered. In many settings we expect more able workers to have a higher marginal contribution to more productive firms, but in some industries more productive firms have invested in automatization that allows workers with lower skills to perform the high productivity jobs (e.g. retail trade). We argue that it is possible to identify the strength of sorting, though the commonly used fixed effect methods are not suitable for the task. With estimates of the strength of sorting in hand, the objective is to be able to assess the efficiency implications.
7 Appendix

**Derivation of (21):** Observe that both \( w(y + K, y) \) and \( w(y - K, y) \) are wages for workers that are exactly indifferent between matching now and not matching. This indifference implies \( w(y + K, y) = h(y + K) + \frac{\alpha (y + K)^2}{2} - c \) and \( w(y - K, y) = h(y - K) + \frac{\alpha (y - K)^2}{2} - c \). Since the average wage than a worker gets when matching in the first stage is better than not matching, the difference between these wages and the average wage is negative. Using these expressions and the term for the average wage in (18) we obtain

\[
\Psi_2(y) = -\left[ c - \frac{\alpha}{4} \int_{-K}^{K} k^2 v(y + K + k|y + K) dk \right] \gamma(y + K|y) + \left[ c - \frac{\alpha}{4} \int_{-K}^{K} k^2 v(y - K + k|y - K) dk \right] \gamma(y - K|y).
\]

This effect depends on \( y \) only through the effect on the distribution. Therefore, again this effect is zero under a uniform distribution. For other distributions the effect is ambiguous because it relies on the density at the endpoints as well as on the integral over the density. In the special case where \( v'(y|x) = r \) is constant the density is linear, and so are the conditional densities. In such a case symmetry around zero of \( k^2 \) ensures that \(-\frac{1}{4} \int_{-K}^{K} k^2 v(Y + k|Y) dk \) is independent of \( Y \) and the terms in square brackets are identical, which directly leads to the inequalities in (21).

**Derivation of (23):** Equation (23) can be expanded to

\[
L(x, y) = \int_{0}^{y} f_y(x, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} + f(x, 0) - \int_{0}^{x} f_x(\tilde{x}, x) d\tilde{x} - \int_{0}^{y} f_y(\tilde{y}, y) d\tilde{y} - f(0, 0)
\]

\[
= \int_{0}^{y} \int_{0}^{x} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} + \int_{0}^{y} f_y(0, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} + f(x, 0)
\]

\[
- \int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} d\tilde{x} - \int_{0}^{y} f_x(\tilde{x}, 0) d\tilde{x} - \int_{0}^{y} \int_{0}^{\tilde{y}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} - \int_{0}^{y} f_y(\tilde{y}, 0) d\tilde{y} - f(0, 0)
\]

\[
= \int_{0}^{y} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} - \int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} d\tilde{x}
\]

Let \( x \geq y \). (The derivation under the opposite follows analogous steps.) Then we have

\[
L(x, y) = \int_{0}^{y} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} - \int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} d\tilde{x}
\]

(27)

Note that \( \int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} d\tilde{x} \) integrates for each \( \tilde{x} \) over all \( \tilde{y} \leq \tilde{x} \). Similarly, one can for each \( \tilde{y} \) integrate over all \( \tilde{y} \geq \tilde{x} \). That is

\[
\int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\tilde{x}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{y} d\tilde{x} = \int_{0}^{x} \int_{\tilde{y}}^{x} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y}.
\]

Therefore, (27) becomes

\[
L(x, y) = \int_{0}^{y} \int_{\tilde{y}}^{x} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} - \int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\tilde{y}} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y} = -\int_{y}^{x} \int_{0}^{x} f_{xy}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) d\tilde{x} d\tilde{y}.
\]
References


