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Emissions Trading, CDM, JI, and More –
The Climate Strategy of the EU

by
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February 2005

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Emissions Trading, CDM, JI, and More – The Climate Strategy of the EU

Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to assess the likely allocation effects of the current climate protection strategy as it is laid out in the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The multi-regional, multi-sectoral CGE-model DART is used to simulate the effects of the current policies in the year 2012 when the Kyoto targets need to be met. Different scenarios are simulated in order to highlight the effects of the grandfathering of permits to energy-intensive installations, the use of the project-based mechanisms (CDM and JI), and the restriction imposed by the supplementarity criterion.

Keywords: Kyoto targets, EU, EU emissions trading scheme, National Allocation Plans, CDM and JI, computable general equilibrium model, DART

JEL classification: D58, F18, Q48, Q54

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1. Introduction

One of the major components of the European climate strategy aimed at reaching the European Kyoto targets is the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for CO$_2$. The ETS that started in January 2005, covers facilities in energy activities, the production, and processing of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, the mineral industry and the pulp, paper and board production, which are responsible for around 45% of European CO$_2$-emissions. Besides trading emission allowances within the trading scheme, a linking between the ETS and the two flexible project mechanisms “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) and “Joint Implementation” (JI) has been established. This allows European facilities covered by the ETS to carry out emission-curbing projects in other Annex I countries (JI) and non-Annex I countries (CDM) and to convert the credits earned into emission allowances under the ETS.

While the ETS guarantees that the emission targets of the ETS sectors are achieved at minimal costs, the efficiency of the overall climate strategy of the EU respectively the different European Member States depends crucially on the policies introduced outside the ETS. There are broadly three areas in which greenhouse gas emissions in the single Member States can be implemented in order to meet the Kyoto-targets:

1. Domestic CO$_2$-emission reductions in the ETS sectors

2. Domestic reductions of CO$_2$-emissions in the sectors not covered by the ETS and reductions of other greenhouse gases (domestic reductions outside the ETS)

3. Emission reductions abroad – mainly via CDM and JI since it is unclear whether international emissions trading in the first Kyoto commitment period from 2008-2012 will take place.

The third option can be used by firms covered by the ETS as well as by governments, which like to set less stringent domestic targets by avoiding emissions abroad.
The allocation of permits to the ETS is subject of the so-called National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which each member state has to prepare before the beginning of an ETS trading period. For the first trading period from 2005-2007, the final NAPs or at least drafts are now made public for all of the EU25 countries. In addition, the NAPs as well as some government programs contain information on the planned government purchase of CDM and JI credits. Some NAPs also indicate the targets for the ETS sectors until 2012. Given this information it is possible to determine how the different EU member states plan to achieve their Kyoto targets in terms of domestic reductions in and outside the ETS and reductions abroad.

While existing simulation studies are based on hypothetical allowance allocation to the ETS and also ignore the possibility of using CDM and JI credits within the ETS and by European governments, the objective of this paper is to examine the implications of the current NAPs under different assumptions about the use and availability of CDM and JI credits using the DART model (Klepper et al. 2003). DART is a computable general equilibrium model designed for the analysis of international climate policies and calibrated for the enlarged EU. With the help of simulations with DART, it will be possible to simulate the ETS, the CDM and JI market and the domestic action under different assumptions about the functioning of these three markets. Since the Kyoto targets are not binding for the former accession countries, except Slovenia, due to the economic recession in the 1990ies, the focus will be on the EU15.

This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we derive the current climate strategy towards the Kyoto targets of the different EU Member States and give some background information on the role of the ETS and the market potential of CDM and JI. Section 3 and 4 present the DART model, our simulation studies and interprets the simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Reaching the European Kyoto Targets

In this section, we derive from the NAPs and other sources how the former EU15-countries plan to achieve the Kyoto targets by making use of the three options described in the introduction. In addition, we summarize past findings on the implications of the ETS, give an overview over the potential market for CDM and JI credits and finally discuss the issue of hot-air. The information gathered in this section can then be used to design the policy simulations and to interpret the results.

2.1. Distance to the European Kyoto Targets

In the Kyoto Protocol from 1997, the EU agreed to cut their overall GHG-emissions relative to the 1990 level by 8% in the period from 2008-2012. In 1998, this target was differentiated between the different member states in the so-called Burden Sharing Agreement giving cohesion member states, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, a lighter burden, compared to richer member states. The (former) accession countries that joined the EU in May 2004 and those that are scheduled to join in 2007 are not part of the Burden Sharing Agreement but have their own individual Kyoto targets.

Since then, greenhouse gas emissions have risen in most of the EU15-countries, and only few of the countries are on track to fulfill their commitments. Figure 1 shows the Kyoto targets for the EU15-countries as well as the change in GHG-emission from 1990 to 2002. As one can see, the gaps to the Kyoto targets are quite substantial in most countries. Only in Sweden, Great Britain and France, the 2002 GHG-emissions are below the Kyoto target and in Germany only minor reductions are missing.

With the exception of Slovenia, all of the (former) accession countries, where emission fell drastically since 1990 due to the economic break down of their economies, do not face any problems to reach their Kyoto targets. For these countries, the question is thus not how much to reduce in which sectors, but rather, how much of the excess emission rights (hot-air) to use.
2.2. The European Climate Strategies

The national climate strategies of the EU member states are summarized in the different National Allocation Plans (NAP). The NAPs contain information in different detail and with differing time horizons. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the information contained in the NAPs concerning the allocation to the ETS sectors, the emissions of these sectors and the use of CDM and JI\(^1\). With the help of official data on GHG-emissions, it is possible to derive or estimate for all EU15-countries the emissions of the ETS and non-ETS sectors in 2002, the planned allocation to the ETS in 2007, the planned use of CDM and JI and the remaining reductions that have to be achieved to reach the Kyoto targets. Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands and the UK have also indicated the allocation to the ETS in 2012. Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands plan to reduce the ETS-emissions by 1.5 to 2.5%. Denmark is a special

\(^{1}\) The numbers on CDM and JI are taken from Lückge and Peterson (2004).
case since emissions in the ETS sectors can grow by about 10% between 2002 and 2007 and then they need to be reduced by 26% between 2008 and 2012.

Figure 2 shows for each of the EU15 states in megatons of CO₂ those reductions relative to 2002 emissions that are necessary to reach the Kyoto target. The dark part of the bars shows the reduction (or increase) of the CO₂-emissions of the ETS sectors associated with the allowance allocation of the NAPs. Where available, these data are for the period 2008-12. In most cases, though, information is only available for 2005-07. The striped bars show the planned reductions via CDM and JI. These reductions will only be relevant for the first Kyoto commitment period from 2008-12. Given the Kyoto targets, the light bars show the necessary reductions in the sectors and gases not covered by the ETS. This residual can be influenced, of course, if the allocation of allowances in the second commitment period or the CDM and JI credits are adjusted accordingly.

In line with Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that only France, the UK and Sweden already meet their Kyoto target in 2002. Nevertheless, the UK plans to reduce emissions in the ETS, which leaves room for rising emissions in the non-ETS sectors.

Even though most countries have to reduce emissions considerably for meeting their Kyoto targets, Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands and especially Italy allocate allowances to ETS sectors that surpass emissions in 2002. In the remaining countries, emission reductions in the ETS sector also play a minor role given the overall Kyoto target. Only Belgium plans to achieve a major part (about one third) of the reductions necessary for the Kyoto target within the ETS. CDM and JI are also of relatively little importance in most countries. In absolute numbers, the Netherlands and Spain plan to make use of these mechanisms most strongly. Each country plans to acquire credits for around 20 MtCO₂e per year in 2008 to 2012. CDM and JI are also part of the climate strategy in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Italy. Given
these reduction plans, the major burden for domestic reductions falls on the sectors outside the ETS in almost all countries. Only in the UK, Sweden and France, which are on track to fulfill their commitments, emissions outside the ETS, are allowed to rise.

Figure 2: Climate Strategies in the EU15 According to the NAPs

2.3. The Role of the European Emissions Trading Scheme

The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is intended to contribute to meeting the European Kyoto commitments in an economically efficient way. There is now some evidence that the ETS can indeed generate considerable cost savings.

Klepper and Peterson (2004) show that the gains of the ETS compared to unilateral efficient action of all EU countries depend on how much CO₂ is re-
duced within the ETS compared to GHG reductions outside the ETS – that is in sectors and gases not covered by the ETS. Optimally designed, the ETS can reduce the welfare losses associated with the Kyoto Protocol by around 20%. The resulting permit price is in this case around 11€/tCO₂. Svendson and Vesterdal (2003) estimate that the ETS could reduce the total abatement costs by 32% compared to a system with no trading between member states.

Estimates about permit prices in the ETS without accounting for the potential use of CDM and JI credits usually vary between 5 and 20€/tCO₂. The so-called linking directive allows to convert CDM and JI credits into emission allowances under the ETS. Even though the first proposal of the directive envisaged to limit the use of CDM and JI credits to 6% of the total quantity of allowances allocated to the ETS, there are no limitations set in the final version. Governments though are required to consider the issue of supplementarity (see section 2.4) in their twice-yearly reports and can set a limit for CDM and JI credits for each single installation.

In January 2005 the trading price for allowances in the ETS was around 8.5€/tCO₂. On the other hand, there are estimates for the shadow taxes needed to achieve the necessary reductions outside the ETS, ignoring international emission trading or CDM and JI. In Klepper and Peterson (2004) these taxes are on average 22€/tCO₂ but can reach almost 40€/tCO₂ under a more generous allocation of allowances to the ETS sector.

Existing studies have the shortcoming that they only analyze potential allowance allocation since the NAPs were not known when the studies were undertaken. More importantly, the studies ignore the possibility of using CDM and JI credits – by ETS firms and national governments.

2.4. Some Background on CDM and JI

The project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) have been designed to help countries to accomplish their Kyoto targets in an economically efficient and environmentally effective
way. JI allows Annex I Parties of the Kyoto Protocol to implement projects that reduce emissions in the territories of other Annex I parties and use the generated carbon credits to fulfill their Kyoto commitments. CDM gives the possibility for emission reductions in developing (non-Annex I) countries which themselves have no reduction target.

In the EU, it is possible to make use of CDM and JI on both the private and on the governmental level. Governments can use CDM and JI credits to comply with their national Kyoto reduction target. The Linking-Directive allows private entities that are covered by the EU ETS to convert credits from CDM and JI into allowances that can be used in the EU ETS.

In the last years, the global market for carbon credits from project-based mechanisms has been steadily growing. The latest CDM & JI Monitor (2005) reports that 1306 proposed CDM and JI projects have so far been registered in Point Carbon’s project Database. Out of these, 271 Projects, potentially yielding 420 MtCO$_2$e of emission reductions towards 2012, have reached the level of a Project Design Document (PDD). The latest World Bank report on the carbon market (Lecocq 2004) shows that since 1996 sales have doubled from around 40 MtCO$_2$e to around 80 MtCO$_2$e in 2003. In 2004, 64 MtCO$_2$e have been exchanged through projects from January to May 2004 only, suggesting that the market has doubled again by the end of the year 2004.

A study for the World Bank (Haites and Seres 2004) summarizes information on the demand and supply of CDM and JI credits. Mainly based on modeling studies, the average annual demand from 2008 to 2012 for Kyoto units, excluding Australia and the US, is estimated to lie in the range of 600 to 1150 MtCO$_2$e. This includes AAU$^2$ transfers as well as credits from CDM & JI.

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$^2$ AAUs are the „Assigned Amount Units“ under the Kyoto Protocol – the amount of CO$_2$ each Annex B country is allowed to emit in the first commitment period. The credits for CDM projects are denoted „Certified Emission Reductions“ (CERs) while the credits originating from JI projects are denoted „Emission Reduction Units“ (ERUs).
According to Natsource (2003)\(^3\) the total demand for CDM and JI credits from industry will be 200 ± 100 MtCO\(_2\)e and the demand from the European ETS 110 ± 65 MtCO\(_2\)e. Governments are estimated to buy 84 to 762 MtCO\(_2\)e p.a. from which the EU25 will demand 54 to 463 MtCO\(_2\)e. Announced plans for government purchases amount to 70 MtCO\(_2\)e p.a. in the EU25 (Lückge and Peterson 2004), 50 MtCO\(_2\)e (including AAUs) in Canada, 95 MtCO\(_2\)e in Japan and 5 to 18 MtCO\(_2\)e in the EFTA countries.

Haites and Seres (2004) also review studies on the supply of CDM and JI credits. Some studies use simulation models, which result in very flat marginal abatement cost curves and thus in a large supply of CDM and JI credits at low prices. Other curves are differentiated between project type and region and derived from the technical potentials. Haites and Seres conclude that the most conservative estimates yield annual reductions in 2010 in the range of 215 to 405 MtCO\(_2\)e at a price of 11 $/tCO\(_2\)e ±- 50%. Accounting for pre 2008 reductions that can be used for the 2008-12 period, Haites and Seres see the most likely annual supply at 420 MtCO\(_2\)e (range 270 to 505 MtCO\(_2\)e) at a price of 11 $/tCO\(_2\)e ±- 50%.

Taking the trade volumes from the World Bank (Lecocq 2004) and assuming that the market trend continues and that it needs four years to bring a project on the market (see Haites and Seres 2004), there is a potential of around 220 MtCO\(_2\) per year. Since September 2004 the CDM & JI Monitor from Point Carbon also reports on a bi-weekly basis the proposed CDM and JI projects registered in the Point Carbons database, the number of projects that have reached the level of a project design document (PDD) and the resulting emission reductions. Assuming that all PDD projects are actually validated so far 84 MtCO\(_2\)e p.a. are available for 2008-2012. How many credits for 2008-2012 will be available in the end depends very much on the kind of market trend that is assumed. Under a linear trend, around 300 to 400 MtCO\(_2\) p.a. will be available while under an exponential trend it may well be twice as much. Two

\(^3\) This study is reported in Haites and Seres (2004) but not available for the authors of this paper.
simple calculations also show the range of possible supply. Assuming that as in the past four month, every month around 6.5 MtCO$_2$ are validated and that it takes again four years until a project is running, there is a potential supply of around 290 MtCO$_2$ p.a. Assuming that all proposed projects will be validated and continue to gain an average of 1.5 MtCO$_2$ and that continuously 50 projects are proposed and validated every month, there is a potential supply of 700 MtCO$_2$. In summary, evidence suggests that the minimum supply of CDM and JI credits is around 200 MtCO$_2$ p.a. and that it seems unlikely that it will be far above 600 MtCO$_2$ p.a.

When making assumptions about the supply of CDM and JI credits, it has to be taken into account that institutional issues constitute significant barriers to a more widespread use. Currently institutional capacities are unevenly distributed among potential CDM host countries, and this is likely to remain so. While there is significant capacity in many Asian and South American countries, many African countries still lack behind (Ellis et al. 2004).

Concerning the prices for credits, the World Bank and the OECD see prices in the range of 2.5 to 6 €/tCO$_2$e (Lecocq 2004, Ellis et al. 2004). Some EU tenders contracted CDM and JI credits for 2.5 to 8.5 €/tCO$_2$e (Lückge and Peterson 2004). The CDM and JI Monitor of Point Carbon reports 5 to 15 €/tCO$_2$e.

One problem for deriving prices, e.g. from a simulation model, is the existence of transaction costs for CDM and JI projects. In a survey Michaelowa et al. (2003) report transaction cost ranging from a few €-cent per tCO$_2$e up to more than 1000 €/tCO$_2$e depending on the project size and type. There is evidence that transaction costs should not be more than 25% of proceeds from permit sales in order to make a project viable. At current prices this would give a cost threshold of about 1 €/tCO$_2$e.

Another important issue that influences the demand for CDM and JI credits is the so-called supplementarity requirement. As laid out in the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol “the use of the mechanisms [International Emis-
sions Trading, CDM, JI) shall be supplemental to domestic action and that do-
mestic action shall thus constitute a significant effort made by each Party in-
cluded in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments under Article 3, Paragraph 1.” It was in fact the EU that insisted
on the inclusion of this requirement and also unsuccessfully pressed for a limit
requiring that not more than roughly 50% of the reduction should be imported
(see Langrock and Sterk 2004 for the discussion on the supplementarity
issue). In principle, the supplementarity requirement holds for each of the
EU25 member states as well as for the former EU15. Table A1 in the appendix
includes the calculations of the EU for the maximum amount of credits that are
allowed under the above mentioned supplementarity criterion.

2.5. The Role of Hot-Air

So far, the possibility of obtaining carbon credits from CDM and JI projects has
been introduced. In addition, the Kyoto-Protocol allows the transfer of AAUs
between Annex B countries. As far as trade in AAUs between countries with a
binding cap is concerned, this option is of minor importance since the project
credits are perfect substitutes and can in many cases be obtained at lower
prices. This is not the case for countries, which do have a cap that is above
their expected business-as-usual emissions in 2012. These excess emission
rights are called hot-air. The countries with hot-air are mainly the countries of
the Former Soviet Union and to a smaller degree the Eastern European coun-
tries. In an extreme scenario where these countries sell all their hot-air, most
models, including DART (Klepper and Peterson 2003) predict that the excess
supply of allowances is so large that the carbon price falls to zero and the
Kyoto targets can be reached at zero cost, however without an emission re-
duction. Such a scenario is not very likely though. Different studies have es-
timated that it is optimal for the hot-air countries to restrict their sales of hot-air
to around 40% (Haites and Seres 2004, Klepper and Peterson 2003). If some
of the hot-air is supplied on the market, the use of CDM and JI credits will be
reduced and international carbon prices will fall.
The role of this Kyoto-trading for the ETS is rather limited since the AAUs cannot be used by installations inside the ETS. In addition, the governments of the member states have committed themselves to a strict definition of supplementarity and have opposed the use of hot-air for achieving the Kyoto-targets. Hot-air is therefore not considered in this paper.

3. Simulating the ETS and the Role of CDM and JI

To assess the effects of the current NAPs and the potential role of CDM and JI credit for the European Union, we use the DART-model (Klepper et al. 2003). Below, we first shortly characterize the model and then derive the policy scenarios for the simulation study.

3.1. The DART Model

The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive dynamic CGE-model of the world economy. For the simulation of the European ETS, it is calibrated to an aggregation of 26 regions. Table 1 lists the 17 countries or group of countries of the EU including the accession countries of Eastern Europe and nine other world regions that represent the rest of the world.

In each region or country, the economy is disaggregated into 12 sectors (Table 2). Four of these sectors participate in the ETS. Although there is no perfect match between the installations subject to the ETS and the sectoral structure of DART, the deviations are relatively small.

The economy in each region is modeled as a competitive economy with flexible prices and market clearing. There exist three types of agents: a representative consumer, a representative producer in each sector, and regional governments. All regions are connected through bilateral trade flows. The DART-model has a recursive-dynamic structure solving for a sequence of static one-period equilibria. The major exogenous drivers are the rate of productivity growth, the savings rate, the rate of change of the population, and the change in human capital.
Table 1: Regions in DART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUT Austria</td>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEN Belgium, Luxembourg</td>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU Germany</td>
<td>NED</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK Denmark</td>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP Spain</td>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN Finland</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA France</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC Greece</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCE* Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Annex B Countries</th>
<th>Non-Annex B Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA United States of America</td>
<td>MEA Middle East, North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS Australia</td>
<td>LAM Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU* Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>CPA China, Hong-Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAB Rest Annex B (Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland)</td>
<td>IND India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XCE includes Bulgaria and Romania for which the accession in 2007 is planned. It excludes the Baltic Countries, which are aggregated in region FSU, as well as Malta and Cyprus, which are aggregated in region ROW. This is due to the regional disaggregation of the GTAP5 data set. This inconsistency has only a small effect since it distorts CO2-emissions of ACC by less than 5%.

Table 2: Sector Structure of the Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETS-sectors</th>
<th>Other sectors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OIL Refined Oil Products</td>
<td>COL Coal Extraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGW Electricity</td>
<td>GAS Natural Gas Production &amp; Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS Iron, Metal, Steel</td>
<td>CRU Crude Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP Pulp &amp; Paper Products</td>
<td>CEP Chemical Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR Agricultural Products</td>
<td>TRN Transport Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRN Transport Industries</td>
<td>MOB Transportation Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH Other Manufactures &amp; Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The model is calibrated to the GTAP5 database that represents production and trade data for 1997. The elasticities of substitution for the energy goods coal, gas, and crude oil are calibrated in such a way as to reproduce the emission projections of the EIA (EIA 2002). For a more detailed description of the DART model, see Springer (2002) or Klepper et al. (2003).

3.2. Policy Scenarios for the ETS

For assessing the likely impact of the recently introduced emissions trading scheme and project-based mechanisms, a “business-as-usual” (BAU) reference scenario is determined. This BAU scenario includes the climate policy measures introduced until the year 2002. Hence, it includes the impact of policies such as the German eco-tax or the national emissions trading schemes. From 2003 on, BAU keeps these policies in place but does not include any new climate policies. The implications of the BAU scenario for the NAP targets are discussed in section 4.1.

The BAU scenario is then compared to several policy scenarios with which an assessment of the mix of current policies can be made. The first scenario consists of simulating the impact of the NAPs and the European ETS without the use of CDM and JI projects. The targets in the non-ETS sectors are reached by a uniform, but regionally differentiated CO$_2$-tax. This scenario is called NoCDM. It helps to illustrate how the burden of the Kyoto targets is distributed between the ETS and the non-ETS in the different national NAPs. It also serves as a reference for the impact of the project based mechanisms. The results of scenario NoCDM are discussed in section 4.2.

The second scenario is designed to capture the national climate policies with respect to CO$_2$ on the basis of both the ETS and the project-based mechanisms. It is denoted LimCDM and incorporates all the national policy plans made public so far. Thus, there is no restriction for the use of CDM and JI in the ETS, while the national governments only import limited amounts of CDM and JI credits. We furthermore assume that all CDM and JI credits are associ-
ated with transaction cost of 3 €/tCO₂, which is above the estimated long run transaction costs of around 1€/tCO₂ but far below the transaction cost in some of the smaller projects. Further assumptions, e.g. concerning the CDM and JI demand from the remaining Annex B countries, are described in the Appendix. Scenario LimCDM illustrates the contribution of the project-based mechanism to the Kyoto targets given the ETS within the EU. The results are discussed in section 4.3.

The third scenario derives the optimal solution by letting the ETS work without restrictions and by allowing all sectors the use of CDM and JI to the degree they wish. This scenario OPT differs from LimCDM in that the national restrictions on the use of project based emission credits are withdrawn. It is discussed in section 4.4. Finally, the last scenario is SUP where the optimal emission reductions and CDM/JI purchases for the non-ETS and ETS sectors are restricted by the supplementarity requirements in each region.

All scenarios are explained in detail in the Appendix.

4. Simulation Results

The simulation results of the different scenarios are derived from running the DART-model over the entire period from 1997 to 2012 when the Kyoto targets will be binding. Therefore, only the final results for 2012 are reported in the subsequent figures and tables. All prices are denoted in EUROS of the year 2000.

4.1. Implications of the BAU Scenario

Whereas in Figure 2 above the necessary reductions of CO₂-emissions relative to the emissions in 2002 are indicated, the reduction requirements should actually be determined by computing the difference between the BAU-emissions in 2012 and the emission caps of that year as given by the Burden Sharing Agreement of the EU. Figure 3 illustrates the results. For each country/region the necessary reduction relative to BAU are decomposed into those
Within the ETS and those outside the ETS. In addition, the overall reduction requirements are presented.

Figure 3: CO₂-Reduction Necessary to Meet the Kyoto Targets Relative to BAU in 2012

Since the emissions of the ETS sectors grow faster than the emissions of the non-ETS sectors in the BAU scenario, the targets from the NAPs imply that considerable reduction efforts in the ETS sectors are needed in order to meet the targets in 2012. Nevertheless, the reduction requirements in the non-ETS sectors are in most cases larger than in the ETS. It is therefore likely that the NAPs do not minimize the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets. This is analyzed in the following sections.

4.2. The ETS without CDM and JI

The first scenario looks at the outcome of the climate policy measures laid out in the National Allocation Plans (NAP) but leaves the project-based mechanism outside the system. This NoCDM scenario has emissions trading
within the ETS according to the caps as they are defined in the NAPs. It is assumed that each government imposes an emission tax on all emissions outside the ETS at a level that makes sure that the Kyoto target is met.

Whereas the ETS equalizes marginal abatement costs across countries in the energy intensive sectors, the distortions between the ETS-sectors and the rest of the economy within each country remain untouched. The degree of that distortion, of course, depends on the amount of allowances allocated to the ETS relative to the Kyoto target. This is illustrated in Figure 4 where the permit price in the ETS is compared to the tax that needs to be imposed outside the ETS for meeting the Kyoto target. In order to illustrate the distortions imposed by the generous allocation of allowances to the ETS, Figure 4 also shows the tax that would emerge without the ETS. In this case, the international efficiency gains from the ETS cannot be realized but the intersectoral marginal abatement costs in each economy are equalized. The light gray bars denoted UNI indicate the marginal abatement costs if each country were to meet its Kyoto target unilaterally.

It turns out that in the unilateral scenario the implicit taxes vary between 5 €/t CO₂ in France and Greece and around 60 €/tCO₂ in Denmark and Ireland. The emission weighted average tax in the EU15 is around 20 €/tCO₂. This indicates both strongly varying reduction requirements in the EU15 member countries and a significant potential for welfare gains through emissions trading.

In the NoCDM scenario the ETS with the official NAP targets is simulated and results in an equilibrium allowance price of 8.6 €/tCO₂. This low permit price is partly due to the efficiency gains from trading but also due to the generous allocation of allowances to the ETS. It is therefore not surprising that the implicit taxes outside the ETS rise far above the unilateral scenario UNI. In fact, the emission weighted average tax outside the ETS is 57 €/tCO₂, but reaches extremely high levels in countries like Austria, Denmark, Spain, and Italy.
The welfare effects of the two scenarios illustrate the trade off between efficiency gains through trading and the intersectoral distortions within each country. Whereas the emissions trading scheme provides efficiency gains, these are apparently netted out for many countries by the additional distortions imposed by the inefficient internal caps on the ETS and non-ETS-sectors. A comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 5 supports this. Countries with a large divergence between allowance price and implicit tax in the non-ETS sectors, such as Austria, Spain, and Italy experience a strong negative welfare effect through the ETS. On the opposite side, in France, Greece and the UK, the ETS-sectors are more restricted than the non-ETS sectors, leading to negligible welfare effects.
However, there is one country where the efficiency gains from the ETS outweigh the distortions from different marginal abatement costs, that is Denmark. The implicit tax in the unilateral scenario is 60 €/t CO₂ whereas the ETS has less than 10 €/t CO₂. These gains seem to outweigh the distortions between sectors. The welfare costs in the NoCDM scenario are therefore lower than in the unilateral case (see Figure 5).

Turning to the trade with emission allowances in the ETS, the picture has changed compared to the allocation rules that were proposed by the EU Commission and that have been analyzed in Klepper and Peterson (2004)\(^4\). While under the least-cost orientated emission targets the ETS turned out to be a rather lopsided affair in the sense that the accession countries would be

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\(^4\) Some differences also stem from the fact that in Klepper and Peterson (2004) some EU regions were aggregated. Also, in this paper the targets account for reductions in other greenhouse gases, which was not the case in Klepper and Peterson (2004).
the only exporters of allowances, Figure 6 shows that under the current NAPs seven of the EU15-countries become exporters as well.

Figure 6: Trade in Allowances (Scenario NoCDM)

While the exports of Spain, Finland, Portugal and Sweden are negligible, France, Greece, the Netherlands and especially Italy export 5 to 17 MtCO₂ in 2012. This is partly the case because these countries are close to meeting their Kyoto targets (France, Greece), but partly because of the generous allocation of allowances in the NAPs of Netherlands and Italy that allow emissions in the ETS sectors to rise. It is worth mentioning that the Italian NAP has not been accepted by the EU commission and is under revision. Nevertheless, the main exporters of allowances are still the Eastern European countries.

As Figure 6 shows the trade in allowances in absolute quantities, the size of a country dominates trade flows. For example, Germany’s ETS sectors account for almost one quarter of the total European trading scheme. Hence, Germany is the largest importer with imports of around 45 MtCO₂ in 2012.
This picture changes when one looks at the import shares of allowances relative to total emissions. Countries with high marginal abatement costs like Denmark and Ireland rely strongly on imports. Relative to their emissions the largest importers are Denmark and Ireland where 60% and 23% of the emission of the ETS sectors are covered by imported allowances. The ETS sectors in Germany and the UK import allowances for around 11% of their emissions.

4.3. The Current Climate Strategy of the EU

The previous section has illustrated how the separation of the energy intensive installations in the ETS from the other sectors can lead to significant distortions, especially if the ETS sectors become endowed with a large share of CO₂-emissions allowed under the Kyoto-protocol. Some of these distortions can be alleviated through CDM and JI activities. The project-based mechanisms allow governments to relieve the pressure that is imposed on the non-ETS sectors by the generous allocation of emission allowances to the energy intensive installations. They also lower the allowance prices within the ETS since cheap CDM and JI credits can be bought from companies in the ETS as well. The amount of project credits that governments will buy is restricted by the supplementarity criterion to which all member states have subscribed. In this section the scenario LimCDM is computed. It allows installations in the ETS to buy any quantity of credits they wish while the governments buy only the amount of credits they have announced. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the amounts of CDM and JI credits which the different governments want to acquire.

The results of scenario LimCDM are summarized in Figure 7, which also documents as a reference the results of the scenario NoCDM without project-based mechanisms. In LimCDM the import of project credits reduces the permit prices in the ETS to 5.7 €/tCO₂. At the same time, the implicit carbon prices in the sectors outside the ETS fall because the government purchases of credits reduce the emission restriction in these sectors.
Figure 7 shows that these purchases reduce the inefficiencies imposed by the NAPs that were discussed in the last section and reduce the gap between the allowance price in the ETS and the implicit taxes in the non-ETS sectors. This is especially true for those countries that plan to make considerable use of CDM and JI credits. Austria, Denmark, Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands can reduce the marginal abatement cost in the non-ETS sectors by 40 to 60% compared to the NoCDM scenario. In Italy and Belgium, the implicit taxes fall by around 20%. In Germany, Finland and Portugal, where the governments only plan minor (or even zero) purchases of CDM and JI credits, the implicit taxes are not much affected. Altogether, the limited use of the project-based mechanisms still leaves implicit taxes in the non-ETS sectors at levels between 30 and 110 €/tCO₂, compared to an allowance price that has dropped to 5.7 €/tCO₂. In addition, substantial differences in marginal abatement costs between countries remain in the non-ETS sectors.
Turning now to the likely welfare effects of the current climate strategies of the EU member states, in Figure 8 the welfare costs of the LimCDM scenario are compared to the situation without the ETS (i.e. scenario UNI) and with ETS but without CDM and JI projects (i.e. scenario NoCDM). Whereas a unilateral achievement of the Kyoto targets would lead to an average welfare loss of 0.7% in the EU15, this loss rises to 1.7% when the ETS is introduced. The addition of CDM and JI projects lowers it again to 0.9%. Hence, some but not all of the distortions of the ETS can be compensated. Those countries that plan to acquire the largest amounts of CDM and JI credits can decrease their negative welfare effects most strongly. This is most obvious in Spain and the Netherlands that both plan to acquire 20 MtCO₂ from CDM and JI projects p.a. As a result, the negative welfare effects are in these countries at least reduced to the level of unilateral efficient action.

Figure 8: Welfare Effects of the ETS with CDM /JI (relative to BAU in 2012)
Figure 9 shows the trade flows of CDM and JI credits worldwide. For better readability, the CDM and JI purchases of the EU15 are aggregated. Altogether, the EU15-countries acquire 226 MtCO$_2$ through CDM and JI. The region OAB (other Annex B countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol) are restricted to a maximum of purchases of another 200 MtCO$_2$. This is a little more then 50% of the reductions relative to the BAU-emission in 2012 that are necessary to reach the Kyoto target and thus an upper estimate of the complementarity requirement.

Concerning the host-countries of CDM projects, about 65% of the CDM allowances are covered by emission reductions in China, followed by the FSU, India and MEA, responsible for around 8 to 15%. Altogether, the size of the CDM and JI market is within the range of estimates presented in section 2.4. However, the distribution of CDM projects across developing countries does not reflect the currently planned projects that are mainly located in Latin America, while only few projects are hosted by China and India (Lückge and Peterson 2004).
Figure 10 shows the allowance flows in the EU in more detail. Negative bars for the ETS sectors indicate that these sectors would sell allowances within the ETS. This is true only for the ETS sectors in the Rest of Eastern Europe (XCE) and Italy. Positive bars for the ETS sectors indicate that these sectors buy allowances, either within the ETS or as credits from CDM and JI projects. The sales inside the ETS are rather small (around 36 MtCO₂), most of the allowances (around 150 MtCO₂) originate from CDM and JI projects. The ranking of buyers remains quite the same as in the scenario NoCDM without CDM and JI, only that due to cheap CDM and JI credits some countries who have formerly been allowances sellers now become buyers.

Figure 10: JI, CDM and ETS Credit Flows in the EU in LimCDM

Negative bars for the non-ETS sectors stand for JI projects in Annex B countries. Only 0.3 MtCO₂ JI reductions would be undertaken in Eastern Europe. This is due to the cheap abatement opportunities in the developing countries and sensitive to the level of transaction cost associated with the project-based mechanisms. The positive non-ETS bars finally show the governmental purchases of CDM and JI credits as announced in the NAPs (altogether around 76 MtCO₂).
As discussed in section 2.4, the Kyoto Protocol requires that the use of CDM and JI shall be supplemental to domestic action. The EU has voted for a strict definition of this supplementarity criterion, and continues to stress its importance. It is thus an interesting question how the CDM and JI purchases shown in Figure 10 compare to the limits set by the supplementarity requirement. For this reason, estimates of these limits (as calculated by the EU, see section 2.4) are added as horizontal lines.

Figure 10 shows that there is little need to further restrict the CDM and JI purchases in the ETS in order to stay within the limits of the supplementarity criterion in most countries. In the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and Denmark where the government plans to acquire the largest amount of CDM and JI credits the limits are slightly exceeded. The only countries that might have to rigorously restrict their ETS sectors in the use of CDM and JI are Germany and the UK. On the other hand, there is in some countries such as Austria, Finland and Italy the potential for larger government purchases of CDM and JI credits, which would further reduce the welfare costs of meeting the Kyoto targets. Overall, most countries come close to the supplementarity limit with the given plans to purchase CDM and JI credits and without controlling their ETS-sectors.

Altogether there are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the scenario LimCDM. First, the project-based mechanism lead to some cost savings compared to a situation without emission reductions abroad. Second, the current European climate strategy is not efficient since it leads to a large wedge between the marginal abatement cost in the ETS sectors (the allowance price) and the marginal abatement costs (the implicit tax necessary to reach the overall Kyoto targets) in the non-ETS sectors. Third, in most countries the supplementarity criterion does not allow to close this wedge by further governmental purchases of CDM and JI credits at least not without restricting the use of those credits for the ETS sectors.
4.4. Making Optimal Use of CDM and JI

In the last section, it was illustrated that even a restricted use of CDM and JI can reduce the costs of meeting the European Kyoto targets considerably. In this section we remove the restriction on the governmental use of the project based mechanisms and also ignore the supplementarity requirements to analyze the cost minimizing use of CDM and JI in the scenario denoted OPT.

In this case, the unrestricted use of CDM and JI throughout Europe leads to an equalization of the carbon prices worldwide. Thus, the wedge between the implicit tax in the non-ETS sectors and the allowance price in the EU ETS is closed. The only exceptions are those countries that do not need to reduce emissions in the non-ETS sectors, which are the UK, France, Greece, Sweden and the Eastern European countries. Here, the implicit carbon tax is zero. The international carbon price would be 6.8 €/tCO₂. It turns out that the unrestricted use of the project-based mechanisms implies that the European Kyoto targets can be reached basically without any negative welfare effects. In fact, in almost all countries the welfare changes relative to a business-as-usual are close to zero. The welfare effects for the different countries are shown in Figure 13, where the welfare effects of all different scenarios are compared.

Figure 11 shows the international allowance flows under the OPT scenario. Again, the EU15 is for better readability aggregated to one region. Compared to the LimCDM scenario, the European purchases of CDM and JI credits have increased by more than 60% to 400 MtCO₂. The other Annex B countries have more than doubled their demand. Altogether, the project-based mechanisms now have a volume of around 880 MtCO₂. China remains the single largest host country of CDM and JI projects as before in the LimCDM scenario.

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Footnote:

5 Theoretically, the countries with a zero implicit carbon tax could supply JI credits. This possibility is excluded for the EU15 countries, since there is no empirical evidence for this to take place. In addition, the amounts supplied would be negligible. In Eastern Europe, the model allows for JI (see Figure 11).
Figure 12 shows the allowance flows in the EU25. Since the higher demand for CDM and JI credits has driven up the price of CDM and JI allowances, the purchases of the ETS sectors have overall decreased by 40% compared to the LimCDM scenario. They now sum up to 94 MtCO₂. In contrast, the sales of allowances within the ETS have increased by 45% to 52 MtCO₂. The governmental purchases to be used in the non-ETS sectors are on average 2.5 times larger than in scenario LimCDM and reach 270 MtCO₂. The largest relative increases can be seen in Germany, followed with some distance by Finland, Italy and Ireland. The Eastern European countries now sell 7.7 MtCO₂ JI credits.

Except for France, Greece and Sweden, no country meets the supplementarity requirement in this scenario. It turns out to be optimal to buy 1.4 to 2.5 times as much CDM and JI credits than allowed by the supplementarity criterion. This implies that only minor emission reductions (2 to 5% relative to BAU in 2012) are undertaken domestically.
The optimality of the NAPs is not an issue if there is an unrestricted use of CDM and JI credits. In this case, the same single international price will emerge independent of the allocation to the ETS, and from an allocational point of view, the NAPs are irrelevant. The allocation to the ETS sectors determines though, how much CDM and JI credits are bought by governments and how many enter the ETS. Thus, it is a question of how the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets are distributed between the governments and thus tax payers on one side and the industry on the other side.

Instead of searching for an optimum through unrestricted CDM and JI activities given the allocation of allowances to ETS and non-ETS sectors, one can seek the optimal allocation of allowances to the ETS sector given the supplementarity requirement. In this scenario, SUP, there is full European emissions trading in all sectors and limited purchases of CDM and JI credits to stay within the limit of the supplementarity requirement. This results in cost minimizing emissions in the non-ETS and ETS sectors, which can then be compared to
the current targets. This is done in Table 3. Table 3 reports in the first three columns the composition of emissions between ETS and non-ETS sectors and the allocation of project credits to these sectors. The numbers are derived from the LimCDM scenario for 2012 that projects current policy objectives as outlined in the NAPs. Columns 4 to 6 show the same numbers for the SUP scenario where emissions can be freely traded between all sectors but the supplementarity restrictions on project credits are kept economy wide.

Table 3: Comparison of Current Policies to Optimal Policies (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Emissions in LimCDM rel. to Kyoto target</th>
<th>Optimal emissions rel. to Kyoto target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) ETS = target +CDM/JI</td>
<td>(2) Non-ETS = target + CDM/JI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>58.1= 55.1 + 3.0</td>
<td>53.0= 44.9 + 8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEN</td>
<td>36.1= 29.8 + 6.2</td>
<td>73.2= 70.2 + 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>53.1= 44.5 + 8.6</td>
<td>55.6= 55.5 + 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK</td>
<td>90.6= 50.9 + 39.7</td>
<td>57.7= 49.1 + 8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>56.7= 52.7 + 4.0</td>
<td>55.9= 47.3 + 8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>67.8= 65.7 + 2.1</td>
<td>34.8= 34.3 + 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>22.8= 22.5 + 0.2</td>
<td>77.5= 77.5 + 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>52.3= 51.4 + 0.9</td>
<td>48.6= 48.6 + 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>62.5= 49.0 + 13.9</td>
<td>62.9= 51.0 + 11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>52.5= 54.3 - 1.7</td>
<td>48.4= 45.7 + 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>42.6= 41.7 + 0.9</td>
<td>66.8= 58.3 + 8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>56.2= 52.2 + 4.0</td>
<td>47.8= 47.8 + 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>30.2= 28.5 + 1.8</td>
<td>71.5= 71.5 + 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>41.8= 34.5 + 6.3</td>
<td>65.5= 65.5 + 0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1)+(2)-(3) = 100%.
(4)+(5)-(6) = 100% (Sweden overcomplies with Kyoto).
For Sweden, UK and France the suppl. criterion is non-binding.
A comparison of columns 1 and 4 reveals that most countries have endowed the ETS sectors too generously with emission permits. In addition, according to the announced government purchases for CDM and JI credits to many project credits go into the ETS sectors. Only France, Greece, Sweden, and the UK did not oversupply their ETS sectors. An extreme case is Denmark where because of a relatively small endowment with allowances the ETS sectors would buy large amounts of project credits. The maximum share of CDM and JI credits under the supplementarity restriction is shown in column 6. Compared to the expected purchases of credits (column 3) Denmark, Ireland, and the UK would have difficulties to meet these targets because of large purchases of ETS installations. Countries like Austria and Italy that have given generous endowments of allowances to the ETS sectors will stay well under the supplementarity limit because of little demand from these sectors.

Figure 13 finally shows the welfare implications of the optimal strategy under supplementarity (SUP) compared to the current situation (LimCDM). It includes also the welfare effects of an unrestricted use of CDM and JI (OPT).

The optimal allocation of allowances and CDM/JI purchases in the SUP scenario leads only to minor welfare effects relative to a BAU scenario (-0.2% in the EU15) and comes very close to the minimal welfare losses under a scenario without any restrictions on the CDM/JI purchases. Thus, even though the supplementarity requirement slightly increases the welfare costs associated with meeting the European Kyoto targets, it is more important to get an optimal allocation of reduction targets between ETS and non-ETS sectors that can avoid the large welfare losses associated with the current allocation.
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to Transaction Costs of CDM and JI

One critical assumption in this study is the level of transaction costs associated with CDM and JI projects. It was assumed that the level is 3€/tCO₂. For a sensitivity analysis the LimCDM scenario has been run with different levels of transaction cost ranging from 0 to 6€/tCO₂.

Since different transaction costs primarily show up in the international allowance markets, Figure 14 shows the CDM and JI purchases of the EU as well as the allowance price in the ETS. The CDM and JI purchases are shown on the left axis. They fall linearly with rising transaction costs. The allowance price in the ETS is shown on the right axis. It rises almost linearly with rising transaction cost.
The amount of CDM and JI purchases decreases by 60% when the transaction costs are raised from zero to 6 €/tCO₂. The allowance prices increase by only 5.2 €/tCO₂ even though the transaction cost rise by 6.0 €, since the reduced CDM and JI demand offsets some of the increase.

5. Summary and Conclusions

In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of the current National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for the European emissions trading scheme (ETS) by focusing on the allocation effects of meeting the European Kyoto targets in 2012. Special attention is given to the role of CDM and JI projects within the national climate strategies.

The current NAPs generously endow the ETS sectors with emission rights and thus require large emission reductions outside the ETS sectors – either domestically in the non-ETS sectors or abroad making use of CDM and JI credits. In the first simulation without the use of CDM and JI credits it becomes apparent that the NAPs drive a large wedge between the allowance price in the ETS and the implicit tax necessary for reaching the Kyoto targets in the
non-ETS sectors. This inefficiency is important enough to make the welfare costs of meeting the Kyoto targets even larger than under an efficient unilaterally action. All gains through international emissions trading are netted out by the distortions created between the ETS and the non-ETS sectors within each economy.

Making use of the option to buy CDM and JI credits, both by ETS sectors and by governments indeed reduces the cost of meeting the European Kyoto targets. We have analyzed a scenario where the use of CDM and JI credits is unrestricted for the ETS sectors, but were the government purchases are restricted to the official plans. In this scenario, there still remains in most countries a large difference between the allowance price in the ETS of 5.7 €/tCO₂ and the implicit tax necessary to achieve the necessary reductions in the non-ETS sectors of 30 to 110 €/tCO₂.

Thus, while the use of CDM and JI drives down the allowance price in the ETS by one third and reduces the wedge between implicit tax outside the ETS and the allowance price, and thus reduces the costs of meeting the European Kyoto targets compared to a situation without the project-based mechanism, the distortions created by the uneven NAPs can not be eliminated. The welfare cost of the current emission targets and policies is larger than under a situation of unilaterally efficient action.

The supplementarity requirement of the Kyoto Protocol to achieve major parts of the emission reductions domestically, negatively affects the cost of reaching the Kyoto targets. Whereas the current policies will have a welfare loss of close to 1% in 2012 relative to “business-as-usual” policy an unrestricted trading in project credits and allowances would result in an allocation where the Kyoto targets can be met with hardly any welfare costs. Altogether, given the current NAPs, the European ETS sectors buy around 150 MtCO₂ of CDM and JI credits and the governments add another 75 MtCO₂. On the other side, only minor amounts of allowances (36 MtCO₂) are traded within the ETS. The
only sellers of allowances are in this case some Eastern European countries and Italy.

The best strategy to reduce the costs of the current European climate strategies is to reduce the burden for the non-ETS sectors. This can be achieved by setting stricter targets for the ETS installations and by restricting the use of CDM and JI for the ETS installations. The first measure directly reduces the necessary emission reductions outside the ETS and can be implemented by setting stricter targets in the NAPs for the second trading period from 2008-2012. The second measure allows governments to reduce the burden of the non-ETS sectors by purchasing larger amounts of CDM and JI credits while staying within the limits of the supplementarity criterion. For this reason, the provision for restrictions is already made in the EU linking directive that governs the use of CDM and JI credits within the ETS. The simulations showed that a more efficient climate strategy – even given the supplementarity requirement – can achieve the European Kyoto targets at low costs. Compared to a “business-as-usual” scenario the welfare in the EU15 is only reduced by 0.2% compared to 0.9% under the current plans. Finally, even under an optimal allocation of allowances there are distributional issues that need to be resolved. Basically, the decision of who is allowed to use the restricted amount of CDM and JI credits determines how the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets are distributed between the governments and thus tax payers on one side and industry on the other side.
6. References


7. Appendix

7.1. Assumptions to Implement the Kyoto and the EU-ETS Targets

- Since DART only includes CO\textsubscript{2}-emissions, we used official emission data from the EIA and IEA to calculate the Kyoto target as the CO\textsubscript{2} target that has to be achieved after planned reductions (see below) in non-CO\textsubscript{2} GHG are taken into account. The resulting CO\textsubscript{2} target is calculated relative to 2002 CO\textsubscript{2}-emissions and also implemented in DART relative to 2002 emissions.

- Reductions in non-CO\textsubscript{2} GHG were taken from NAP were available (Germany -6.9%, UK -40.9%, Netherlands -26.5%, Denmark -6.1%, Finland -10% relative to 2002 levels). In the remaining EU15-countries as well as in Hungary and Poland and OAB a 10% reduction relative to 2002 was assumed, which is the median of the available plans.

- The allocation of permits to the ETS sectors and the reported historical ETS-emissions were used to derive for each country the ETS targets for 2005-2007 resp. 2012 relative to ETS-emissions in 2002. These targets relative to 2002 ETS-emission were implemented in DART, since there is not always a perfect match between the DART ETS-emissions and those reported in the NAPs.

- For the region XCE that does not match the former accession countries without Poland and Hungry exactly, it was assumed that emissions in the ETS follow the BAU path.

- Where available we used targets for 2012 (DEU, DNK, GBR, IRL, NLD). In the remaining regions, we assume a reduction of 3% relative to the 2007 target, which is the median reduction of those plans having a 2012 target.

- Data on plans for CDM and JI are taken from Lückge and Peterson (2004).
7.2. Scenarios that were Run with the DART Model

Except for the BAU scenario, emission reductions resp. emissions trading always starts in 2005. The model is run until the year 2012, the end of the first commitment period.

**BAU**
- business-as-usual

**NoCDM**
- European ETS with targets as indicated above
- Uniform, regionally differentiated CO$_2$-taxes in non-ETS sectors in EU25 to reach individual Kyoto targets
- No use of CDM and JI
- BAU in all other regions except the EU25.

**LimCDM**
- Same as NoCDM but use of CDM and JI: full use in ETS and governmental use as indicated in NAPs
- For the region OAB the use of CDM and JI is limited to 200 MtCO$_2$ p.a.
- For CDM and JI credits transaction cost of 3 €/tCO$_2$ are assumed.

**OPT**
- Same as LimCDM but unrestricted use of CDM and JI both in the ETS and on governmental level in the EU25 and the other Annex B regions.

**SUP**
- Inclusion of all sectors in the European ETS.
- The use of CDM and JI is restricted to the supplementarity requirement
- For CDM and JI credits transaction cost of 3 €/tCO$_2$ are assumed.

**Sensitivity Analysis**
- Scenario LimCDM with transaction cost of 0 and 6 €/tCO$_2$. 
Table A1: Emissions and Emission Targets in the EU15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Emissions 2002 in MtCO₂e</th>
<th>Emissions in ETS in MtCO₂</th>
<th>Allocation to ETS sectors</th>
<th>CDM/JI in 2008-12; MtCO₂e p.a.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CO₂</td>
<td>All GHG</td>
<td>Kyoto target</td>
<td>Information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>31.7 in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>146.3</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>134.3</td>
<td>70.22 in 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>30.9 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>40.9 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>407.3</td>
<td>554.0</td>
<td>565.0</td>
<td>156.96 in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>838.3</td>
<td>1116.0</td>
<td>986.7</td>
<td>506.5 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>70.2 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>29.4 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>32% of total GHG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>448.7</td>
<td>554.0</td>
<td>470.6</td>
<td>51% of total GHG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.5 in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>256.2</td>
<td>241.0</td>
<td>199.0</td>
<td>84.5 in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>268.4</td>
<td>358.5</td>
<td>530.6</td>
<td>264.2 in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>36.5 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>341.5</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>327.75</td>
<td>164.3 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>74.88</td>
<td>20.2 in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>552.8</td>
<td>635.0</td>
<td>653.0</td>
<td>252.8 in 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ᵃ Assuming same CO₂-emission growth in ETS sectors than in whole economy
ᵇ Assuming CO₂-emissions growth in ETS sectors from 2002-07 is the same as CO₂-emission growth in whole economy from 1997-2002.
ᶜ Assuming that this share holds for 2002.