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THE IMPACT OF RISING OIL PRICES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE SEVENTIES

PETER NUNNENKAMP*

I. INTRODUCTION

According to a widespread impression it is especially in the non-oil developing countries\(^1\) where economic prospects have been negatively affected by the two oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979/80. Though the oil import bill, in absolute terms, is still considerably smaller for most NOPECs than for the developed world, the hypothesis of severe impediments to further growth in NOPECs caused by sharply increased oil prices seems plausible for the following reasons\(^2\):

- Within two years, the share of fuel imports in total imports doubled to more than 17 percent (1974). While energy conservation measures seem most promising in developed economies, the growth prospects of NOPECs heavily depend on increasing oil imports\(^3\).
- Apart from some newly industrializing NOPECs which could take advantage of their favourable credit standing on international capital markets, the Third World countries in many cases have faced strong balance of payments constraints. In case of cutting

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1. Non-oil developing countries (NOPECs) comprise those Third World economies which are either net oil importers or whose oil exports constitute only a minor share in their external trade.

2. In this paper, the emphasis lies on the effects of the first oil price shock because the period to analyse the second one is still too short. For a short qualification of the oil price rise in 1979/80 see the concluding remarks.

imports, not only the foreign supply of consumer goods was threatened to be reduced but also imports of intermediates and capital goods, actually urgently requested for further economic development.

Although the situation of the early seventies was rather unfavourable for NOPECs confronted with quadrupling oil prices and other external shocks, their growth performance hardly worsened. For net oil importing NOPECs it was only in 1975 (4.3 percent) and 1979 (4.1 percent) that real GDP increases were considerably smaller than the average growth rate of nearly 6 percent in the 1967–1972 period\textsuperscript{4}. For the industrial countries, on the contrary, the average GDP increase of 2.5 percent following the first oil price shock was only half the growth rate experienced in the sixties and early seventies.

On this background the question is raised whether the continuous growth record of NOPECs implies that—contrary to the above hypothesis—the impact of higher oil prices on economic growth was rather modest\textsuperscript{5} or whether growth performance would even have been more impressive without the first oil price shock. For this purpose a group of 31 NOPECs is analysed which covers quite different economies with regard to development level, dependency on energy imports and trade policies performed\textsuperscript{6}. This group representing the variety of NOPECs is then split into different subgroups in order to identify some factors which may determine the growth effects of the oil price rise. For means of comparison additional estimates are run for the most important developed economies\textsuperscript{7}.

II. A FIRST TEST

The hypothesis of significant negative growth effects caused by increasing oil prices may be tested applying trend analysis\textsuperscript{8}. Two effects

\textsuperscript{4} See IMF [1980, Appendix C].
\textsuperscript{5} This view is to be found in World Bank [1981, p. 42].
\textsuperscript{6} The NOPEC group consists of Brazil, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Haiti, Hongkong, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

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of the oil price rise are to be expected: First, an once-for-all GDP loss in 1974 because of paying considerably more for oil imports than before and, second, a reduction in economic growth rates in the years following the oil shock. The estimated function runs as follows:

\[ \ln GDP = A + a \cdot D + b \cdot T + c \cdot DT \]  

(1)

where

\( GDP \) = Gross domestic product in constant prices of 54 NOPECs converted into $^\text{\textdagger}$;
\( A \) = Constant term;
\( T \) = Time (the estimation period was 1962–1979);

According to our hypothesis, both the coefficients of the shift dummy \( (a) \) and the slope dummy \( (c) \) are supposed to be significantly negative. Actually, however, the estimated parameters point to an only limited impact of the oil price shock\(^{10}\). The growth rate remained nearly unchanged as indicated by the extremely small negative coefficient of the slope dummy which, moreover, is significant at the 12.5 percent level only. The shift dummy, accounting for an once-for-all reduction in GDP, has even been dropped because of an insufficient tolerance level.

Nevertheless, the above hypothesis cannot be rejected as yet. In analysing trends different growth factors are treated as a whole. Only if all other influences would have remained unchanged after 1973, the impact of the oil price rise is reflected correctly. Since this assumption is rather restrictive, growth performance of NOPECs might have been significantly better without the oil price shock than actually experienced.

7. Included are Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
9. Because of data limitations this group later had to be reduced to the already mentioned 31 NOPECs.
10. The estimated parameters inserted, the trend function reads as:

\[ \ln GDP = 4.52 + 0.0594 \cdot T - 0.00027 \cdot DT; R^2 = 0.99 \]  

(33.06)  

(−1.67)
III. THE MEASUREMENT OF OIL PRICE EFFECTS

In order to isolate the oil price effect on economic growth, production analysis may be applied adding the relative price of oil as an independent variable\(^\text{11}\). Focusing on developing countries, some modifications are required because of data limitations\(^\text{12}\). Pooling the data for 1967–1973 and 1973–1979 — that is, two observations for each country — the following regression was run for different country groups:

\[
\ln Y = A + \alpha \ln L + \beta \ln C + \delta \ln EP
\]

where

\[
Y = \text{Growth rate of gross domestic product in constant prices}\(^\text{13}\);
\]

\[
L = \text{Growth rate of employment} ;
\]

\[
C = \text{Growth rate of gross fixed capital formation in constant prices (} C_1 \text{) or average share of gross fixed capital formation in gross domestic product (} C_2 \text{) respectively}\(^\text{14}\);
\]

\[
EP = \text{Average relative price of oil (} 1973 = 100)\(^\text{15}\).
\]

According to the hypothesis that GDP growth is reduced if the relative price of oil increases, a significantly negative value of \(\delta\) is to be expected.

Besides the direct growth impact of the oil price shock indicated by \(\delta\), indirect effects may occur if higher energy prices give rise to an intensified substitution between different factors of production. Capital and energy being rather complementary inputs, growth may be negatively influenced by a slackening capital formation; on the other hand, this may be offset, at least in part, by an extended use

\(^{11}\) See for example TATOM [1981]; RASCHE, TATOM [1981]; COOPER [1980].

\(^{12}\) Above all, the information on capital stocks is very limited for most developing countries.

\(^{13}\) All growth rates are expressed as annual average rates.

\(^{14}\) For using \(C_1\) as a proxy of the increase in capital stocks see TYLER [1981], for the second variant see BALASSA [1978]. In the case of \(C_2\) the second observation is calculated for the period 1974–1979.


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of labour. In the following such indirect effects are left out of account.
This seems appropriate without affecting results for the seventies too much as the process of substitution, probably, takes a rather long time.

Concentrating on direct growth effects of oil price increases, a first type of the above equation is estimated where GDP growth rates in the post-oil shock period are calculated by using data for 1973–1979 (type I); in other words, no differentiation is made between the growth effect and the once-for-all reduction in national income resulting from the increase in oil import bills in 1974. In order to exclude the once-for-all effect at least approximately, a second type of the equation is estimated where the dependent variable GDP is calculated for the period 1974–1979 instead of 1973–1979. Finally, for type III the GDP growth rates of 1975–1979 are taken to distinguish between limited losses in economic growth which might be caused by short-term adjustment problems and longer lasting growth effects.

To begin with, cross country estimates are run for both all 31 NOPECs and the reference group of 9 developed countries. In a second step the NOPECs are grouped according to five criteria which may be responsible for different degrees of being affected by the oil price shock.

- With respect to the deterioration in terms of trade for NOPECs caused by OPEC price policies the degree of dependency on energy imports expressed as the share of net imports of commercial energy in domestic energy consumption in 1973 is supposed to be important. Three groups were formed regarding energy import dependency, the first comprising countries with more than 50 percent import shares, the second with less than 50 percent shares; some net energy exporting NOPECs form a third group.
- Probably, the growth impact of higher oil prices will be most pronounced in relatively advanced NOPECs as commercial energy has already become a crucial factor in their economies having

16. This view is backed by regressions run for industrial sectors of seven NOPECs by the author. Applying time series analysis for the sixties and seventies it is only for two countries that capital input is negatively affected by higher oil prices. With respect to labour input the impact of oil prices varies very much from country to country.
displaced traditional fuels to a great extent. Two criteria are considered: the level of per capita income (high if more than 800 $, medium from 300 to 800 $ and low if less than 300 $\textsuperscript{17}) and the degree of industrialization expressed as the share of industry in gross domestic product, regarded as high (low) if greater (less or equal) 30 percent.

Finally, a high degree of world market orientation may help the NOPECs to adjust to the oil price shock, either by expanding export volumes or by taking advantage of higher world market prices for their products. For each of two criteria two subgroups of NOPECs are formed: A strong world market orientation is characterized by a share of exports in \(\text{GDP}\) greater than 25 percent and a share of manufactured goods in total exports greater than 30 percent respectively; a low degree of world market orientation is reflected by smaller shares.

IV. THE ESTIMATION RESULTS

Examining first the regression of type I run for the pooled data of all 31 NOPECs, the impact of rising oil prices on economic growth seems to be negative, though the level of significance is rather low (\textit{Table 1}). No matter how capital inputs are specified, both estimates indicate a decrease in \(\text{GDP}\) growth rates of about 2 percent if relative oil prices go up by 10 percent. The years following the oil shock, NOPECs actually faced an increase in relative oil prices of 250 percent compared to the average price in the period 1967–1973. Consequently, economic growth would have been reduced by 50 percent, referred to the annual average growth rate of about 6 percent in 1967–1973, a loss of 3 percentage points; instead of 5 percent as experienced on an average in 1973–79, the annual increase in \(\text{GDP}\) could have reached 8 percent in the case of constant relative oil prices\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{17} As in the case of the following criteria the NOPECs are classified using data for the mid-seventies.

\textsuperscript{18} This reasoning is subject to the qualification that the elasticity of \(EP\) remains constant in the case of drastic changes in \(EP\) as experienced in 1973/74; the growth impact is overstated if the elasticity declines in case of changes greater than marginal.
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Table 1
Regression results for developing and developed countries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Typeb</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>C_1</th>
<th>C_2</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>D.W.</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
<td>0.406***</td>
<td>-0.185+</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.133*</td>
<td>0.327***</td>
<td>-0.134+</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.151*</td>
<td>0.277***</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.109*</td>
<td>0.283**</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>-2.23</td>
<td>0.087+</td>
<td>0.226+</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.207+</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For specification of the estimated functions and for countries included see the text. The numbers in parentheses beneath the regression coefficients are the t-values.

*** Indicates significance at the 0.5 percent level; ** 2.5 percent level; * 5 percent level; + 12.5 percent level (one-tailed t-test).

b In the case of type I the average annual percentage change in GDP for the period 1973–1979 is taken, in the case of type II and III that one of 1974–1979 and 1975–1979 respectively.
Though slightly reduced, the impact of relative oil prices on economic growth remains negative if type II is considered. By this estimate it is attempted to separate the growth effect from the once-for-all loss in gross domestic product caused by higher oil import bills. However, as compared to the reference group of developed countries the negative coefficient of $EP$ is rather small for NOPECs, most evidently if the share of investments in GDP ($C_2$) is taken as a proxy for capital inputs; this result conflicts with the hypothesis according to which the oil price rise would be detrimental especially to growth in NOPECs. The second type estimates indicate that the oil price shock of 1973/74 reduced growth rates in NOPECs by 2–3 percentage points whereas the developed world suffered a loss of 2.5–5 percentage points.

For both developing and developed countries it has to be considered that short-term problems in adjusting the economy to the quadrupled oil prices may bias the regression results. In order to exclude short-term distortions, regression type III is run where annual average GDP growth rates for the period of high oil prices are calculated using data for the second half of the seventies only. In three of four cases the coefficient of the oil price variable is insignificant. At least for NOPECs, there was no persistent negative impact of the oil price rise on economic growth. In contrast to the group of developed countries for which results are rather ambiguous, the analysis of NOPECs quite clearly leads to the rejection of the hypothesis of lasting oil price induced growth impediments. Apart from the once-for-all loss in gross domestic product in 1974, the oil price shock rather brought about some adjustment problems which affected growth only for short.

Since the NOPEC group consists of quite different countries with respect to their dependency on energy imports, their development level or trade policies performed, it still has to be assessed if the results yielded for the 31 NOPECs as a whole also hold for various sub-groups. Table 2 presents estimates run for country groups charac-

19. There was no room for presenting estimation results of all types I–III in the following tables concerned with different country groups. Although tables are restricted to equation type III, i.e. the longer-term impact of rising oil prices, results of estimations I and II are considered in the text where necessary. Complete estimation results are available from the author upon request.
### Table 2
Regression results for developing countries classified by dependency on energy imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>$A$</th>
<th>$L$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$EP$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>D.W.</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High dependency on energy imports</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.148+</td>
<td>0.433***</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(4.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low dependency on energy imports</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.43)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net energy exports</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>0.675+</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.68)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* For specification of the estimated functions and for countries included see the text. The numbers in parentheses beneath the regression coefficients are the t-values.

*** Indicates significance at the 0.5 percent level; ** 2.5 percent level; * 5 percent level; + 12.5 percent level (one-tailed t-test).

*b* In case of type III the average annual percentage change in GDP for the period 1975–1979 is taken. Estimation results for types I and II which are not presented in the tables concerning different country groups because of lack of room can be obtained from the author.

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Terminated by different import shares in domestic consumption of commercial energy. Although overall results are rather shaky for the small group of net oil exporting NOPECs, their growth, apparently, was not affected significantly in either way. This was to be expected: On the one hand, their domestic energy resources safeguarded them a good deal against being hit by external oil price shocks; on the other hand, their energy exports were not as extensive as to take advantage of higher world market prices in a significant degree. As concerns the two net oil importing NOPEC groups, the coefficient of
### Regression results for developing countries classified by level of development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Typeb</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>C1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>D.W.</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.462***</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(-0.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>0.570***</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.50)</td>
<td>(4.35)</td>
<td>(-0.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.144*</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High share of industry in GDP</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.397***</td>
<td>0.206*</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.02)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(-0.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low share of industry in GDP</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.266***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.45)</td>
<td>(2.70)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>1.003***</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.78)</td>
<td>(3.31)</td>
<td>(-0.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For footnotes see Table 2.

the oil price variable is insignificant, too. Hence, the degree of dependency on energy imports cannot be regarded as the dominant factor in determining the magnitude of losses in gross domestic product caused by the oil price shock.

With regard to the longer-term implications, if **NOPECs** are differentiated according to their level of development, it seems that it is mainly the already advanced **NOPECs** which were hit by the oil price rise. Although the value of the oil price coefficient declined if
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adjustments were made for the once-for-all effect and short-term distortions, the impact remained significantly negative in two cases (Table 3). On the other hand, growth was not affected to any significant degree in both the low income group and those NOPECs characterized by low shares of industry in gross domestic product. This contrast is most evident with respect to different degrees of industrialization, whereas for different income groups results are somewhat ambiguous. Probably, the share of industry was the most important factor in determining the growth effects of the oil price rise of 1973/74 in the seventies. This view is backed by striking similarities between the results yielded for highly industrialized NOPECs and those for developed countries.

Differences between NOPEC subgroups are less pronounced if countries are grouped according to the degree of world market orientation (for type III see Table 4), a further indication that it is mainly the level of development and especially the degree of industrialization which crucially influences the magnitude of oil price induced growth effects. Notwithstanding, it is quite remarkable, that for countries with high shares of exports in GDP coefficients of EP are insignificant not only in the longer run but also for equation types I and II; for the group characterized by low exports shares, however, there is a negative impact in the short run. This indicates that world market

20. Coefficients of EP were insignificant, too, for both equation types I and II concerning the two least developed country groups; however, the short-term impact of rising oil prices was clearly negative for the more advanced Third World economies.

21. Surprisingly, results in Table 3 are indicative of a persistent negative growth impact for the middle income group only, whereas the corresponding coefficient is insignificant in equation type III for high income NOPECs. However, the reliability of the former result may be questioned because of a small $R^2$ and an insignificant labour elasticity.

22. In this case, the less pronounced results concerning different income groups may be explained by the observation that besides all 15 highly industrialized NOPECs also 6 of 14 less industrialized NOPECs belong to the high or medium income group.

23. The average share of industry in gross domestic product reached 40 percent in the NOPEC subgroup (1976) and was only slightly higher for the reference group (43 percent).

24. For the latter group all coefficients of EP are significantly negative in cases of equation types I and II (at the 5 percent level of confidence or better).
### Table 4

Regression results for developing countries classified by export shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>( A )</th>
<th>( L )</th>
<th>( C_1 )</th>
<th>( C_2 )</th>
<th>( EP )</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
<th>D.W.</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High share of exports in GDP</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.194*</td>
<td>0.278**</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low share of exports in GDP</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.158*</td>
<td>0.168*</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High share of manufactured exports in total exports</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.344***</td>
<td>0.225***</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low share of manufactured exports in total exports</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For footnotes see Table 2.

oriented NOPECs had better opportunities to prevent losses in gross domestic product following the oil price shock. In trying to expand exports they possessed an additional instrument to reduce balance of payments problems without affecting growth. Furthermore, export-oriented NOPECs were in a better position to offset the oil price induced deterioration in terms of trade by raising their own export prices.

The last mentioned alleviation was of only minor importance, at least in 1974, for those NOPECs whose exports to a high degree consisted of manufactured goods (estimated coefficients of \( EP \) were significantly negative in equation type I, though, at the 12.5 percent level of confidence only); probably, most favoured were countries export-
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ing raw materials whose prices still increased considerably in the mid-seventies (for example cacao, coffee, phosphates, rubber and tin). But later on, i.e. adjusting for 1974, growth was no longer affected significantly by rising oil prices in the former group.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Concerned with the seventies, our results indicate that negative growth effects of rising oil prices were rather limited in time for non-oil developing countries or even restricted to an once-for-all loss in gross domestic product caused by the deterioration in terms of trade in 1974. Contrary to the stated hypothesis, the impact of the oil crisis of 1973/74 was insignificant in the longer run. At most, it is the already industrialized NOPECs which have to be exempted from this statement. As the importance of industry in Third World economies will further increase, in a growing number of countries reaching a level comparable to those prevailing in developed countries, the influence of relative oil prices may become more distinct in the future, though depending on the patterns of industrialization and, above all, the chosen factor intensities.

This may become evident already in the eighties after NOPECs have been hit by the second oil price shock. Some other factors point to the same direction. Unlike the seventies when relative oil prices declined in the years following the first oil shock, a continuous rise in relative prices is predicted for the future. This may contribute to complicate the reduction of seriously enlarged balance of payments deficits. Probably, a growing number of NOPECs will face balance of payments constraints, as difficulties increase to finance higher oil bills by borrowing on international capital markets. It may be added that prospects to reduce deficits by expanding exports are rather gloomy, too, in view of only low economic growth rates in developed countries and an intensified recourse to protectionist measures. To sum up, it may become increasingly difficult for NOPECs to adjust their economies to rising oil prices without affecting growth.

25. See for example World Bank [1980, p. 3].
PETER NUNNENKAMP

REFERENCES


SUMMARY

According to a widespread impression it is especially in the non-oil developing countries where economic growth has been negatively affected by the drastic rise in oil prices during the seventies. This hypothesis is tested for 31 Third World economies in a cross section approach applying production function analysis and considering relative oil prices as an independent variable; for means of comparison a group of developed countries is analysed. Estimation results indicate that the rise in oil prices did not reduce economic growth for developing countries in the longer run. The negative impact of the first oil price shock of 1973/74 was rather limited in time. At most, those developing economies characterized by relatively high levels of industrialization have to be exempted from this statement.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Nach verbreiteter Auffassung haben die drahttichen Ölpreiserhöhungen der siebziger Jahre vor allem in den Nicht-Öl-Entwicklungsländern gesamtwirtschaftliche Wachstumsseinbussen verursacht. Diese Hypothese wird auf productionstheoretisch
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RÉSUMÉ

D'après une opinion très propagée les augmentations graves en prix pétrolier pendant les années soixante-dix ont causé des pertes de croissance économique particulièrement dans les pays en voie de développement sans pétrole. Dans cet article l'auteur teste cette hypothèse pour 31 pays en voie de développement à l'aide d'une approche transversale en appliquant une analyse de la fonction de production et en considérant les prix pétroliers relatifs comme variable indépendante; pour des raisons de comparaison l'auteur analyse un groupe des pays d'industrie. Les résultats d'estimation indiquent que l'augmentation des prix pétroliers ne réduisait pas la croissance économique des pays en voie de développement à long terme. L'effet négatif du premier choc de prix pétrolier en 1973/74 était temporellement assez limité. Tout au plus, il faut exempter les pays en voie de développement caractérisés par des relativement hauts niveaux d'industrialisation de cette conclusion.