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Book Part — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)
Cultural Thought and its Origins

Suggested Citation: Jackson, William A. (2009) : Cultural Thought and its Origins, In: Jackson, William A. (Ed.): Economics, Culture and Social Theory, ISBN 9781849802116, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 3-14,
<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849802116.00007> ,
<https://www.elgaronline.com/monochap/9781845427108.00007.xml>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/343037>

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CULTURAL THOUGHT AND ITS ORIGINS

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Abstract

The modern academic concept of culture arose in response to the Enlightenment and its universalist claims about knowledge and scientific method. Cultural thought denied the universal relevance of rationalism and empiricism, asserting the importance of customs, tradition, local knowledge, historical specificity, pluralism and interpretative understanding, especially for the study of society. This chapter examines the origins of cultural thought in the critique of the Enlightenment and considers the main ideas and implications. It then discusses the neglect of culture in the economics discipline, propelled by the long-standing desire to imitate natural science and keep a distance from the humanities. The resulting economics/culture divide has narrowed the perspective of economics and obscured the cultural context of economic activity.

Keywords: culture, rationalism, empiricism, historical specificity, interpretative methods, pluralism

JEL codes: A12, A13, B41, B50, Z10

(This is an accepted manuscript of a book chapter published by Edward Elgar in *Economics, Culture and Social Theory*, available online: <https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/economics-culture-and-social-theory-9781845427108.html>)

Introduction

Ever since the dawn of man, people have been born into a pre-existing society, however primitive, and raised according to its customs. Each generation has learnt the prevailing way of life and then, in turn, passed this on to the next generation. Culture can be traced back over hundreds of thousands of years, a period much greater than recorded history: human societies already had elaborate cultures long before farming, towns, markets and organised economies first appeared. An established culture has been fundamental to all economic activity, and major cultural changes have accompanied each stage of economic development.

Culture as an academic concept is far more recent. Ideas related to culture occurred in ancient and medieval philosophy but were never brought together into a coherent tradition of cultural thought, which emerged only in response to the Enlightenment. During the eighteenth century, after triumphs in the natural sciences, Enlightenment philosophers attempted to investigate society by similar rationalist and empiricist methods. Detailed study of this kind would, they believed, uncover the principles behind social behaviour. Sceptics about the Enlightenment were unhappy with its methods when applied to the social sphere. Sensitive to human diversity and complexity, they felt that such a mechanical, ahistorical stance was inappropriate for social studies. The concept of culture derived from a desire to break away from the methods of the Enlightenment (if not from its aims) and find alternative methods better suited to the humanities.

Modern economic thought was also a product of the Enlightenment but had fewer methodological scruples: the classical economists identified unconditionally with Enlightenment methods and were keen to use them. The wish to emulate natural sciences has been ever present in orthodox economics, from classical to neoclassical to current mainstream theory. Increased reliance on mathematics and econometrics during the late twentieth century merely confirmed the ambition to attain scientific rigour and keep a distance from the ‘unscientific’ humanities. Cultural thought, overtly critical of natural-

science emulation, was never likely to appeal to orthodox economists – the subsequent course of the economics discipline has amply demonstrated this.

In orthodox, neoclassical economics the word ‘culture’ seldom comes to the fore, and cultural ideas are missing. Rational agents have fixed, exogenous preferences whose cultural basis goes unexplained, while the individualistic method plays down social structure and institutions. Historically unspecific theory seems universal, as if the same models and theories pertain everywhere, and historical or cultural differences are overlooked. Priority lies with the generic ‘economic’ behaviour of the instrumentally rational individual. The notion that all economics is cultural and requires cultural thought is alien to orthodox economics, which views culture as being somehow separable from economics and beyond the remit of economists. By default, cultural approaches to economics are left to heterodox economists or to authors in other disciplines such as anthropology, sociology or history.

Economists’ neglect of culture led to cultural criticism of economics from outside the discipline. Few orthodox economists have heeded it; most have ignored it. Modern mainstream economists show little interest even in the history of economic thought, let alone in the broader expanses of cultural thought. Although heterodox economists have been aware of culture and sought to take account of it, their views have had limited effect on the economic mainstream. The scope for a culturally informed economics remains extensive, as this book will argue.

Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) sets the scene by examining the origins of cultural thought and how the various definitions of culture have changed. Part II (Chapters 3 to 6) considers the cultural critique of economics, from the classical age to the age of modern mainstream theory. Part III (Chapters 7 to 11) looks at the implications of the cultural critique, placing particular emphasis on relativism, idealism, structure and agency, interpretative methods and social evolution. Finally, Part IV (Chapter 12) evaluates the prospects for introducing cultural ideas into economic theorising and moving towards a culturally informed economics.

Critical responses to the Enlightenment

The Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the birth of formal scientific methods and laid the foundations for academic work in natural and social sciences (Hampson, 1968; Outram, 1995). Its values of rationality and pursuit of objective, disinterested knowledge are at the heart of academic study and normally presupposed without explicit statement. Anyone employed as an academic and involved in teaching or research is partaking in the Enlightenment project and at least tacitly endorsing its aims. The authors of the Enlightenment went beyond a statement of aims, however, and advocated supposedly universal methods founded on rationalism and empiricism. Attempts to use the same methods everywhere led to a critical reaction from those who felt that other methods were needed when studying human societies. Criticism was directed not at the ends of the Enlightenment but at the chosen means of achieving them.

Having begun in the natural sciences, the Enlightenment has always been associated with naturalism: it aspired to replace religion with nature and appeal to natural rather than supernatural causes. Reason became paramount, and non-rational and transcendental sources of knowledge were rejected. Metaphysics, being inaccessible to reason or observation, were abandoned in favour of the study of material nature. The recommended methods started with a combination of rationalism in the Cartesian mode and inductive empiricism based on writers like Francis Bacon, but observation was later accepted as the ultimate fount of knowledge. Newtonian mechanics exemplified a successful theory, as it was rationalist, universal and backed by empirical evidence. The Newtonian system that dominated physics became a template for other sciences.

Studying human societies was not seen as being different from studying material nature. If everything obeyed a single set of natural laws, then human behaviour must follow the same laws as any other object of study and be open to the same methods. The outlook was naturalistic, proclaiming the unity of the sciences and denying any special quality to the humanities. All people were regarded as possessing a common human nature, in so far that they had the same physical make-up, material needs, ends in life and fundamental

values. This human nature might not yet be understood, but it was subject to real and knowable laws that scientific research could unveil. The drive for omniscience was spearheaded by the French Enlightenment and the Encyclopaedists, whose declared aim was to produce an all-embracing compendium of knowledge. Naturalistic materialism reached an extreme in La Mettrie, who compared men with machines and argued that all psychic functioning is reducible to a material level, and Holbach, who incorporated human activity into a materialist natural system. The zeal of Enlightenment thinkers provoked a reaction against their disposal of psychic, social or spiritual phenomena – this critical response has been termed the Counter-Enlightenment (Berlin, 1979; Garrard, 2006). Among its innovations was the modern notion of culture.

The first formal cultural methods are often credited to the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, who worked obscurely in Naples during the early eighteenth century (Berlin, 1976b; Burke, 1985). Although committed to Enlightenment ideals, Vico was disturbed by the way that the Enlightenment had ridiculed historical study and replaced it with rationalism and empiricism. For Vico, ahistorical methods could never be a reliable source of knowledge in the humanities. His major work was the *New Science*, in which he sought to introduce methods relevant to the study of human societies but distinct from existing Enlightenment methods (Vico, 1744). A desire for a scientific approach is evident in the title, yet Vico's perspective contrasts with the natural sciences and comes closer to the humanities. Three main novelties stand out.

First, Vico revived the old maxim that human beings can understand only that which they have created. In medieval times this had reinforced Christian humility by reminding us of our inability to comprehend the God-created universe. Vico deployed it positively by arguing that we can understand human societies because we created them and reproduce them in our everyday lives. The natural world, which was not created by human beings, is not susceptible to the same level of knowledge. According to Vico, we should distinguish between the human sciences and the natural sciences, and only the former can yield full understanding. His anti-naturalism implies a dichotomy between the subject matter and methods of the natural and social sciences; it differs from the supernaturalism of medieval philosophy and the naturalism of the Enlightenment.

Vico's second new argument was for the interpretative character of social studies: the reason why we can understand human societies is our capacity to interpret human behaviour. In the study of present-day societies this capacity stems from direct personal experience or from empathy with the motives and experiences of others; in the study of past societies it stems from imaginative reconstruction of the values, attitudes and social context of earlier periods. The method rests not on external observation but on internal understanding or interpretation. For Vico, rationalism could shed no light on human behaviour or social relations and did little more than build logical theories or systems. Empiricism could only describe the surface of observed events without penetrating down to a deeper understanding. The standard Enlightenment techniques were flawed in their application to human societies and should, Vico argued, be replaced by interpretative methods.

The third novelty of Vico was his case for historical specificity. If social sciences are to be interpretative, then researchers must understand the ideas, goals and social relations of past societies. Since behaviour and institutions vary over time, explanations for one period differ from those for other periods; interpretative methods are historically specific and tailored to the particular era under investigation. The contrast with the Enlightenment yearning for universal principles is stark. Many Enlightenment writers had dismissed historical studies as outmoded and irrelevant, whereas Vico lifted them to the summit of his methodology. His ideas, too radical to have much effect in his lifetime, were later rediscovered and appreciated as a forerunner of cultural thought. Though Vico's historical studies are now obsolete, his arguments about method retain much value and underlie subsequent work in the humanities and social sciences.

Ideas resembling Vico's became widespread and influential only towards the end of the eighteenth century, chiefly through the German reaction against the French Enlightenment. Philosophers of the French Enlightenment had mocked German society as being tainted with medievalism and inferior to the civilised heights of Classical Greece, Renaissance Italy or contemporary France. This provoked a defensive reaction from German scholars and a resolve to forge an alternative world view. The literary *Sturm und Drang* movement, associated with writers such as Goethe and Schiller, resisted ahistorical and mechanical views of human nature: its attitudes fed into the Romantic Movement and

called forth a tradition of German cultural discourse. The clearest account of the cultural perspective can be found in the literary historian and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, who sought a coherent critical response to the French Enlightenment (Herder, 1784-91; Barnard, 1965; Berlin, 1976a). Together with Vico, he is frequently identified as having inspired many later cultural thinkers.

Herder rejected the belief that all societies can be judged by common criteria. Since each national or regional culture is unique, any attempt to assess them by a single yardstick would be inappropriate, illiberal and misleading. For Herder, the contempt shown by Enlightenment writers towards non-European societies or medieval Europe was the result of prejudice and narrow-minded commitment to present and localised ideals. A better understanding of other cultures and times could be obtained by engaging imaginatively with other beliefs and values. Despite their high-minded claims, Enlightenment philosophers were blinkered in their determination to impose their own values in all cases, without making any effort to investigate alternatives. Ranking societies by degree of civilisation had no significance other than exhibiting one's personal opinions or biases. Likewise, any assumptions that later societies are superior to earlier ones, as if part of some grand evolutionary design, were erroneous and damaging. Studies in the humanities should avoid applying current values to cases where they are inapplicable.

The uniqueness of each society is, in Herder's view, enshrined in its language, beliefs, values, traditions and history. Collective experiences accumulated over many generations are passed on to succeeding generations through culture, which shapes and moulds the behaviour of each member of society. All individuals belong to a society and depend on it for their identity and personal capabilities; transferred to a different society, they would be unable to function in the same way. Understanding individual behaviour requires recognising the cultural background and social environment. Within a given culture, people are free to exercise their creative potential and benefit from their inherited cultural resources. The artistic and linguistic content of a culture results from countless creative acts by individuals whose abilities rely on their social context. As each society develops and evolves, it follows a path distinct from other societies – there are no grounds to assume that societies will converge and arrive at the same destination.

Herder argued for pluralism, as against universalism, and ascribed to each culture an intrinsic worth. To judge one society by the values of another would be impossible and attempts to do so would be misguided and perilous if acted upon. Enlightenment philosophy represented one style of thinking, in a specific time and place, but had no warrant as a yardstick for all human societies. Enlightenment thinkers were guilty of imposing their beliefs and values on societies where these were unsuitable. Pursuit of uniformity would destroy valuable cultures and close down avenues of human self-expression – the boundless variety of cultures observed in human history would be flattened into a staid monotony. Each culture, according to Herder, should be allowed to grow and develop without interference from others; the temptation to merge cultures or impose one on another should be resisted. Multiple cultures should be left to develop in parallel, not competing with each other but cooperating.

Herder's pluralism did not imply a wholesale relativism that would prevent mutual understanding between cultures. Beneath the many cultural differences was a common humanity rooted in human biology and the capacity for critical reflection. Even if the values of two societies were incompatible, it was still possible for a member of one society to enter imaginatively into the life of a member of another. Differences of culture, religion, language, lifestyle, climate and physical constitution could all be overcome by interpretative understanding. Every person might have been born in another time and place and, if so, would have been raised in a different physical and social context and by different values – our common humanity should permit us to consider how we might feel and act under varied social circumstances. As with Vico, Herder's approved method for social study was to seek an interpretative understanding of those living in different surroundings. Only in this way could the diversity and complexity of human social behaviour be grasped.

Vico and Herder distilled the essence of a cultural approach, offering an alternative to the culturally frigid methods of the French Enlightenment. As the eighteenth century progressed, cultural thought became more vociferous and attacked exaggerated claims of universality. The Counter-Enlightenment did not negate Enlightenment philosophy, but it propagated methods other than rationalism and empiricism, especially in the humanities.

The contrasts between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment underlie much later criticism of economic theory, and it is worth discussing them at greater length.

The Counter-Enlightenment

Unlike the Enlightenment, the Counter-Enlightenment was never organised as a movement with an intellectual programme and axiomatic beliefs. It emerged through disparate individual reactions to the Enlightenment and bloomed as the common elements in these reactions became apparent. The writings of Vico and Rousseau were important early influences, but much of the impetus came from German thinkers such as Hamann, Herder, Goethe, Fichte and Schelling (Berlin, 1979, 1999, Chapter 3). By the early nineteenth century the Counter-Enlightenment and its main arguments had become widely known internationally. Its sensitivity to cultural differences meant that it did not put forward a single method or theory – it was suspicious of principles claiming universal relevance. One can, nevertheless, identify core ideas that give advice on how social studies should be conducted.

The Counter-Enlightenment supported a pluralistic attitude: each society was seen as having its own distinctive character irreducible to any external checklist. Applying a universal template to all societies would deprive them of their uniqueness and overlook their defining qualities. The Enlightenment was criticised as being overgeneralised and oversimplified, based on blanket theorising and false analogies with the natural sciences. Instead of clumsy generalisation, the alternative was to respect local circumstances. Each society had a collective spirit plain to its members and to outside interpreters but distinct from the characteristics of the individuals involved. Only by acknowledging this could social studies make progress. Differences among societies were not insurmountable barriers that precluded mutual understanding, or else social studies would be impossible. The case for pluralism never went to a relativistic extreme whereby each society had a hermetic reality sealed off by an unbreakable wall. It remained feasible for members of one society to appreciate the customs, behaviour and beliefs of another. The

Counter-Enlightenment held aloft the possibility of fruitful social studies, albeit by methods other than those of the Enlightenment.

When comparisons are made over time, pluralism translates into a historical specificity that treats each period as unique. From the Counter-Enlightenment perspective, human behaviour depends on the prevailing culture and institutions, which have evolved continuously during the course of history. Any attempt to discover universal behaviour and embody it in global theories would distort the humanities and underestimate the diversity of beliefs, values and institutions. Rather than building timeless theoretical systems, scholars should dedicate their investigations to particular historical periods. Societies separated by large stretches of time, even if they have the same physical location, should be treated as distinct. Studying historical societies would require an effort to understand the values, attitudes, customs and institutions behind individual behaviour and social interactions. Theorising should be careful about its historical limits.

Crucial to the Counter-Enlightenment was the place of the individual within society. Protests against the Enlightenment deplored the way it portrayed human beings as passive, mechanical automatons isolated from social relationships, emotions and feelings. The general theories and systems of the Enlightenment shackled the human will and saw people as material objects unable to act freely and subjectively. Abstract thought had supplanted our soul and robbed us of our character and identity. Cultural methods would devote greater attention to the complexity and diversity of human beings, with their capacities for emotions, empathy and creativity. This implied a stress on the individual, although our expressive potential could be realised only within society, not alone. Cultures and institutions were due to past creative acts by individuals and would in turn nurture the creativeness of future generations. People reached fulfilment within society and could be understood only through familiarity with their social circumstances.

For the Counter-Enlightenment, rationalism and empiricism were inadequate to explain human behaviour. Whatever their successes in the natural sciences, they would never be a sound basis for social sciences and, if adopted, would yield stunted, misleading outcomes. In place of rationalism and empiricism, the appropriate method for social subject matter was to seek an interpretative understanding of behaviour resting on an

empathy with human agents in their social context. By making an interpretative effort, scholars could cross the historical and geographical boundaries between individuals and communities without claiming to have discovered universal principles. Many Counter-Enlightenment authors restricted themselves to commenting on social matters, so that (by default or otherwise) they allowed rationalism and empiricism to hold sway in the natural sciences. This yielded an anti-naturalism that kept natural and social sciences separate. Later in the nineteenth century, Wilhelm Dilthey formalised the division by identifying separate realms of natural science (*Naturwissenschaft*) and social science (*Geisteswissenschaft*). The differences were another example of diversity and pluralism – social sciences were not inferior to natural sciences, and the two branches of knowledge were merely adopting methods appropriate to their subject matter.

In the eyes of Enlightenment philosophers, the natural and social worlds followed a single, ordered pattern explicable through rational thought and observation. As reality was vast and science still in its infancy, a complete scientific account of reality had not yet been accomplished. Rigorous scientific method would ensure continuous progress, though, and knowledge was gradually accumulating towards completeness. Eventually science should reach the ultimate goal of universal knowledge. Counter-Enlightenment authors viewed this attitude as mistaken and deluded. For them, social reality was far too intricate and diverse ever to be uncovered by rationalist and empiricist methods alone, and study by these methods would be futile. The best way to proceed would be through pluralism, including interpretative methods, with a clear distinction between natural and social sciences. Table 1 summarises the differences between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment.

Table 1 Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment thought

	Enlightenment	Counter-Enlightenment
Naturalism	Natural and social sciences are unified	Natural and social sciences are separate (anti-naturalism)
Method	Rationalist and empiricist methods apply universally	Social sciences require interpretative methods
Pluralism	Knowledge pertains to all societies	Knowledge is specific to a particular society
Historicism	Knowledge pertains to all periods	Knowledge is specific to a particular period
Values	Values are universal and set apart from factual knowledge	Values are plural and knowledge is not value-free
Causality	Causes are at a material or physical level	Causes can rely on motives or reasons ('reasons can be causes')
Evolution	Societies progress along a common, convergent path	No universal progress or convergence
Behaviour	Human behaviour is rational and predictable	Human behaviour may be creative and unpredictable

Because it raised doubts about science, the Counter-Enlightenment has acquired an image as regressive and conservative (Mannheim, 1953). Its interest in historical societies seems backward looking, by contrast with forward gaze of the natural sciences, and its sympathy with metaphysics and religion seems pre-scientific. Some aspects of the Counter-Enlightenment were indeed conservative, but it would be wrong to depict it

as attempting to block political reform and scientific progress. The issue of political conservatism is complex and varies with individuals: many Enlightenment writers were linked with the *ancien régime* in France and politically conservative, whereas radicalism often drew upon Counter-Enlightenment sources (especially Rousseau). One cannot safely generalise here. Likewise, Counter-Enlightenment thought does not have to resist progress. If one looks at Table 1, the items in the right-hand column are a long way from enforcing a static, unchanging world view. In fact, the argument could be reversed by contrasting the pluralism, diversity and creativity of the Counter-Enlightenment with the monism, universality and closure of the Enlightenment. One should not attach labels and regard the Counter-Enlightenment as intellectually regressive and hostile to progress.

Another unfortunate connotation acquired by the Counter-Enlightenment is its apparent irrationalism. The querying of rationalist methods can easily be construed as a case for a wayward, emotive and anti-scientific approach. In the nineteenth century some offshoots of the Counter-Enlightenment did promote irrationality and nihilism (for example, the strand of German idealist philosophy that culminated in Nietzsche), but these views were not inherent in the Counter-Enlightenment. Its core arguments were to reject a universal, rationalist scientific method, rather than to abandon rationality. Advocacy of interpretative methods was a reasoned response to the nature of social studies, as distinct from the unthinking dogmatism of the Enlightenment. Rationalist theorising, in its proper context, could add to human knowledge but only as one method among others – it should be downgraded without being eliminated from all study. The Counter-Enlightenment did not repudiate Enlightenment goals and was still concerned with understanding social reality.

As the natural sciences grew in prestige during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Enlightenment methods became established at the expense of alternatives. When social sciences were set up on a formal footing in the late nineteenth century, they mimicked the natural sciences and left little space for interpretative methods. Alternative views were commonest in history, anthropology and sociology but were scarce in economics, which provided barren soil for Counter-Enlightenment thought. The upshot was a long-standing cultural critique of economics that started over two hundred years ago with classical economics and has lasted until the present.

The economics/culture divide

Economics as a discipline dates largely from the eighteenth century, a period that witnessed the later stages of the Enlightenment, the continuing development of capitalist economic relations, and the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. Economic thought fitted in with the academic climate and became the purest expression of Enlightenment methods in their social application. Economists were eager to ally themselves with natural sciences. Francois Quesnay, who led the French physiocratic school, was a doctor by profession and based his economics on biological and mechanical analogies; in his view the best way to understand an economy was to dissect and analyse it as if it were a natural organism or a machine – his taste for mechanical analogies went as far as to plan an artificial human being (Schaffer, 1999). Adam Smith, acclaimed as the first modern economist, was a major figure in the Scottish Enlightenment, corresponded with French Enlightenment scholars and spent a period in France (Campbell and Skinner, 1982, Chapter 11; Ross, 1995, Chapter 13.). The pioneer economists had a close personal and intellectual involvement with the Enlightenment, which shows through in their methods and theories.

Early contributions to the Counter-Enlightenment, such as the work of Vico, preceded modern economic theory. Once formal economics appeared in the later eighteenth century, it soon became obvious that general critiques of Enlightenment methods were germane to the new discipline. Economics epitomised the extension of Enlightenment ideas to the social sphere and attracted the ire of those who denied its arguments and methods. Dating back to classical economics, a cultural critique of economic thought has spanned the whole period in which formal economic theory has existed. As with the Counter-Enlightenment, the critique came from various sources and never grew into a concerted anti-economics movement or theory. It did, nevertheless, offer an alternative vision. For many of the critics, economic theory was an apologia for capitalism and to criticise one was to criticise the other. The Counter-Enlightenment led to the Romantic critique of capitalism in the early nineteenth century, which queried economic theory as well as capitalist economic relations.

Among the critical arguments was a belief that economic theory was overspecialised, oversimplified and overgeneralised; a better approach would be to integrate economic behaviour with the rest of human activity. Such arguments, because they renounced a separate discipline of economics, were resisted by economists anxious to set up their own scientific realm. Little dialogue took place between economists and their critics and few attempts were made to reconcile the differences. Instead, economics developed separately, while the critical views were ignored or incorporated into non-economic disciplines. The gap between economics and its cultural critics widened with neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth century. By adopting a utilitarian individualism as the basis of its theory, neoclassicism distanced itself further from cultural thought and made it harder to bring cultural ideas to bear on economic theory. Cultural ideas have had influence in the humanities and other social sciences but in economics have been confined mostly to minority, heterodox positions. Even here academic specialisation remains strong, so that heterodox economists have on the whole kept to standard disciplinary boundaries and made few references to the cultural literature. Most culturally based discussion has taken place outside economics.

The result has been an economics/culture divide allowing orthodox economics to define itself as a non-cultural subject. To portray the economy as cultural is to stray beyond normal disciplinary boundaries and cease to participate in mainstream economic discussion. As economics has grown into a profession, the economics/culture divide has been sanctioned and reinforced by institutional structures. Ever-increasing specialisation has reduced the likelihood of economists becoming fully conscious of culture. Although cultural approaches exist within social and cultural theory, they have no bearing on an economic orthodoxy that sees itself as a separate realm and claims a monopoly on economic theory. By default, culture has been delegated to other disciplines. In the current academic environment, it is quite possible to be an economist without ever mentioning the word 'culture' or thinking about cultural issues. The economics/culture divide has set up a boundary that seals economics off from culture and sanctions the neglect of culture by economists.

In cultural thought, the economics/culture divide has no validity. Economic behaviour is no less cultural than any other behaviour and should be tackled through cultural

methods. Capitalist economic development is thoroughly entwined with cultural changes and cannot be understood without considering them. Since economics has no special status as a separate social science, attempts to split the economic from the social or cultural will produce misleading and artificial results. A culture-free economic theory corrodes our ability to recognise the cultural context of economic activity and blunts our appreciation of cultural and institutional diversity. Progress towards a culturally informed economics requires breaching the economics/culture divide and returning to the previous, unresolved arguments between economists and cultural thinkers.

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