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Resilient Innovation: The Role of Antitrust

W. Benedikt Schmal



Zusammenfassung

Können Monopolrenten Innovation fördern oder zementieren sie lediglich Marktmacht? Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Spannungen zwischen zwei konkurrierenden wettbewerbspolitischen Modellen: dem US-amerikanischen Ansatz, der unternehmerische Disruption durch Monopolgewinne belohnt, und dem europäischen Modell, das durch strukturelle Wettbewerbssicherung gezielt Gatekeeping verhindern will. Im Zentrum steht der Gegensatz zwischen Umgehungsinnovation, bei der Herausforderer etablierte Firmen mit radikal neuen Ansätzen umgehen, und Gatekeeper-Regulierung, die Wettbewerb innerhalb bestehender Märkte durchsetzt. Während der US-Ansatz disruptive Innovationen hervorgebracht hat, beruht er auf offenen Kapital-, Personal- und Absatzmärkten, also Voraussetzungen, die zunehmend durch geopolitische Fragmentierung und wirtschaftliche Entkopplung bedroht sind. Demgegenüber mag das europäische Modell weniger auf Durchbruchinnovationen ausgerichtet sein, scheint jedoch widerstandsfähiger gegenüber externen Schocks. Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass sich die Wettbewerbspolitik weiterentwickeln muss: Resiliente Innovation benötigt nicht nur Marktanreize, sondern auch institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen, die in einer fragmentierten Weltwirtschaft tragfähig bleiben.



Abstract

Can monopoly rents fuel innovation or do they entrench dominance? This paper explores the tension between two competing visions of antitrust: the US model, which rewards entrepreneurial disruption through monopoly rents, and the EU model, which aims to prevent gatekeeping by preserving structural competition. At the heart of this debate lies the distinction between circumvention innovation, where challengers bypass incumbents with radical new paradigms, and gatekeeper regulation, which enforces contestability within existing markets. While the US approach has produced breakthrough innovations, it depends on open access to capital, talent, and markets, i.e., conditions increasingly threatened by geopolitical fragmentation and economic decoupling. In contrast, the EU's more restrained model may lack raw disruptive power, but appears more resilient in the face of shocks. This paper argues that antitrust must evolve: resilient innovation requires not just market incentives, but institutional frameworks capable of withstanding a more fractured global economy.

Resilient Innovation: The Role of Antitrust

W. Benedikt Schmal

1 Introduction: The Routes of Antitrust and Their Role for Innovation

How should antitrust policy adapt to a world where innovation is both a strategic asset and a systemic vulnerability? This paper explores the transatlantic divergence in competition policy through the lens of innovation and resilience. The US has long fostered a model in which innovation drives competition, rewarding entrepreneurial disruption with monopoly rents. This approach has fostered some of the most radical technological breakthroughs of the last decades. Yet it is built on the premise of fluid access to global capital, talent, and markets, i.e., on geoeconomic conditions increasingly under threat in an era marked by protectionism, geostrategic fragmentation, and trade as well as migration barriers.

In contrast, the European Union takes a more structuralist stance: competition is not the result of innovation but rather its precondition. Market openness, not market power, is the guarantor of progress. While this paradigm may seem less conducive to disruptive leaps, it may prove more resilient under conditions of geopolitical stress and supply-chain instability. It shifts the emphasis from incentivizing challengers through monopoly rents to preserving the institutional conditions for broad-based participation in innovation.

By reframing the innovation–competition nexus through the additional lens of resilience, this paper argues that what appears less efficient in times of globalization may prove more sustainable in a world where access to capital and talent is no longer guaranteed. Antitrust policy is no longer just about fostering competition; it has become a tool for safeguarding innovation systems under conditions of surging political and economic uncertainty.

To assess how the two contrasting models shape innovation outcomes, the paper proceeds as follows: First, it outlines the US paradigm where innovation drives competition and monopoly rents serve as incentives for entrepreneurial disruption. Subsequently, it turns to the EU paradigm, which sees sustained competition as the structural foundation of innovation. The analysis introduces the concept of “regulatory contestability” and develops the “circumvention hypothesis” as a framework for understanding how radical innovation may emerge outside of, rather than within, established market structures.

By contrasting these pathways, the paper not only evaluates their relative efficiency, but also raises the question of resilience: Which model adapts better

to economic shocks, restricted access to input and output markets, and geopolitical upheaval? The final sections argue that innovation policy in the 21st century must balance short-term dynamism with long-term adaptability, redefining the goals of antitrust in a more volatile global order.

2 **The US Paradigm: Innovation as the Driver of Competition**

The US approach to competition policy has been profoundly shaped by the Chicago School of economics,¹ particularly George Stigler, Richard Posner, and Robert Bork.² A central tenet of this school is that market power is not inherently harmful. It is often rather the result of a firm outperforming its rivals through efficiency and innovation. According to this view, firms that develop groundbreaking technologies or superior business models will naturally gain dominant positions. Still, these positions are inherently transient because they create high (monopoly) profits which, in turn, attract potential competitors to enter this market.

Far from being understood as a market failure, monopoly rents serve two crucial functions. First, they reward innovation by allowing firms to recoup their investment in research and development (R&D). Without the prospect of significant financial returns, firms might underinvest in breakthrough innovations. Second, they create strong competitive incentives by attracting potential challengers who want to capture some of these profits. The larger the monopoly rents, the stronger the incentive for competitors to innovate and enter the market with disruptive technologies.

The US perspective assumes that even the most powerful monopolies remain vulnerable to disruption. A prominent example is the case of IBM in the 1980s: once a dominant force in computing, it was eventually displaced by firms like Microsoft

and Apple. Later, Microsoft possessed absolute dominance in the operating system market with its Windows software – a dominance that lost its relevance significantly since mobile devices like the iPhone entered the market. Now, iOS and Android are important operating system rivals without anyone seriously challenging the Windows dominance on desktop computers. Recently, Google’s dominance in search has been questioned by the rise of generative AI services that may substitute certain types of ‘traditional’ web searches. Crucial in all these scenarios is that these incumbents were not challenged on their “home turf” but by novel technologies that did not exist beforehand.

Because the Chicago School sees competition as an outcome of innovation, US antitrust authorities have historically been reluctant to intervene against dominant firms unless there is clear evidence of consumer harm, such as price increases or reduced output.³ This approach explains why the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have often hesitated to act against tech giants like Amazon and Google. Critics argue that this laissez-faire approach underestimates how dominant firms can use their monopoly rents strategically; not just to fund innovation, but also to erect barriers to entry that insulate them from competition (see, e.g., Parramore, 2021). While the US framework acknowledges the role of monopoly rents as an incentive for competitors, it risks failing to act when those rents become a tool for entrenching market power. Thus, initial innovation seems to foster further breakthroughs.

The EU Paradigm: Competition as the Precondition for Innovation

The antitrust paradigm of the European Union is rooted in the idea that competition is not a natural outcome of market forces, but rather a fragile institutional order that must be actively maintained

1 For the context of this paper, it is important to underline an evolution within the Chicago School regarding antitrust. The names quoted in this sentence belong strictly speaking to the “New Chicago” School, while the generation before, the “Old Chicago” School, had different views of antitrust that very much resembled the European approach as outlined in this paper. For a more detailed discussion of “Old Chicago” vs. “New Chicago” and their proximity to the Freiburg School, see Kolev and Köhler (2022).

2 For the evolution of the Chicago School, see Medema (2010) for the law and economics scholars and their work, and Medema (2024) for the economists.

3 Recently, the DOJ has shifted its antitrust enforcement approach, moving away from the Chicago School’s emphasis on consumer welfare toward a broader focus on market structure and competition dynamics (Shi & Fox, 2024). The DOJ now adopts a more structural and proactive approach, concerned with market dynamics, innovation, and power asymmetries, especially in the digital economy.

by the public authorities, such as the national competition agencies and the European Commission. From this perspective, concentrated market power is inherently dangerous, regardless of whether it leads to immediate consumer harm. The goal of EU competition policy is therefore not just to punish abuse, but to prevent dominance from emerging in the first place.

This means that the EU emphasizes market structure and contestability: firms should not become so large or entrenched that they can block competitors or shape markets unilaterally. The underlying logic is that sustained competition among many actors is what drives innovation, not the promise of monopoly rents. As a result, the EU is more likely than the US to intervene early, even in cases where consumer harm is not immediately measurable, in order to, ideally, preserve long-term competitive conditions. From this perspective, dominant firms threaten the very structure of the market, and allowing them to accumulate excessive monopoly rents undermines innovation rather than foster it.

The European Commission has explicitly framed its antitrust policies as a means of disempowering dominant firms, since a market is only contestable if no large actor dominates it and can suppress competition or entry. Unlike the corresponding US concept, which assumes that competitors will naturally emerge to capture monopoly rents, the EU believes that monopolists will use their dominance to block or absorb these challengers before they can threaten their position. This logic underpins many of the EU's high-profile antitrust efforts. Based on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the current antitrust regime allows the attack of an "abuse of dominance" even if there is no clear evidence of consumers being harmed by that dominance (Lindeboom, 2022). The Digital Markets Act (DMA) – a prominent recent legislative antitrust undertaking of the EU – imposes preemptive restrictions on "gatekeeper" firms before anti-competitive behavior occurs.

Put differently, contestability from a DMA perspective implies imposing gatekeeper obligations in order to allow new market entrants to contest the gatekeepers on their "home turf".⁴ For example, the European Commission fined Apple in the Apple/Spotify antitrust case for "abusing its dominant position on the market for the distribution of music streaming apps to iPhone and iPad users (iOS users) through its App Store" (CASE AT.40437).⁵ Thus, the Commission wanted to ensure fair access to existing distribution channels.

It is intuitive that without competition, innovation is unlikely to emerge because no one would have an incentive to innovate. It corresponds to the Hayekian idea of competition as a discovery procedure since competition itself leads to the discovery and development of otherwise unknown concepts, ideas, products, and services (Hayek, 1969). From this perspective, monopoly rents do not necessarily function as an incentive for competition, but as a weapon for incumbents to entrench themselves. By preventing firms from accumulating excessive rents, the EU believes it can increase the chances that disruptive innovation will emerge from smaller players. In the Apple/Spotify case, without ruling against the former, Spotify would have struggled to become a strong competitor on iOS devices, which in turn should ensure more innovation and stronger competition between Apple Music and Spotify on the audio streaming market.

Low Regulatory Contestability as a Side-Effect of the EU Paradigm?

4

The fundamental question remains: Does competition drive innovation, or does innovation drive competition? The US model views monopoly rents as both a reward and an incentive for competitors. The risk, however, is that firms may use these rents to entrench themselves rather than fund further innovation. In addition, there might be the risk that one monopolistic innovation will be followed by the next one, so that only the monopolist changes.

4 See for further information the outline of the DMA by the European Commission: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en

5 Statement of the European Commission in the press release on the decision of the case: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1161

The EU model sees competition as a structural necessity for innovation. Still, limiting firms' ability to reap significant monopoly rents may reduce incentives for high-risk, high-reward innovation in industries requiring significant upfront investment.

Moreover, the impediment to innovation can be even twofold: Not only are the missing monopoly rents detrimental to being creative. Through its ambitious ex-ante regulatory activities targeting digital markets, such as the DMA or the AI Act, new markets could be more challenging to contest due to this regulation. Put differently, what might be called *regulatory contestability* could be low because it is challenging, especially for start-ups: they find it hard to comply with all ex-ante rules. A prominent example of this is the European data protection legislation GDPR, which became a significant problem for many young and emerging firms and, subsequently, for innovation in the EU (Janßen et al., 2022). In this dimension, regulatory contestability is low as the large incumbent tech firms can easily handle the complex requirements of the GDPR with their large legal departments. However, small start-ups could be driven out of the market or not enter it in the first place. Thus, even if markets may be contestable from a purely economic perspective, regulation may make them hardly contestable from a practical dimension.

5 More Disruptive Innovation to Circumvent Gatekeepers?

Limiting the power of digital gatekeepers, as the EU does in its definition of contestability through instruments like the DMA, can preserve market openness and protect existing competitors, but it may also have the unintended effect of reinforcing incremental innovation, rather than encouraging novel and disruptive ideas. When regulation forces dominant firms to share access or refrain from self-preferencing, it becomes easier for smaller competitors to enter the market with similar business models or technologies. All things equal, this should boost leveraging access rather than disrupting the technological status quo.

In contrast, allowing incumbents to reap monopoly rents and (implicitly) to entrench their business models, as in the US model, can paradoxically fuel radical innovation: new entrants must find entirely new technological paradigms or business models to circumvent the established giants. Figure 1 on the following page sketches this. While the “circumvention” approach leaves the playing field of the incumbent untouched, the “gatekeeper” approach targets exactly the incumbent's playing field with the intention to open it for new competitors.

An important aspect in this regard is what is called the “relevant market definition.” The European Commission understands it as follows: “The relevant product market comprises all those products that customers regard as interchangeable or substitutable to the product(s) of the undertaking(s) involved, based on the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use, taking into consideration the conditions of competition and the structure of supply and demand on the market.” (Communication from the Commission C/2024/1645).⁶

However, it remains unclear how consumers interpret the notion of “interchangeability.” While it is clear for products that provide the same service, e.g., music streaming providers, it becomes more ambiguous when it comes to interchangeability with respect to the “intended use” as this can be conceptually a broad category. Using TikTok could serve the same purpose as watching YouTube videos, but it could also be used as a social network, thereby competing with Facebook. The case of large language models (LLM) is even broader: an LLM could compete with search engines, as well as with visual production, and language proofreading.

Related to the “gatekeeper” and “circumvention” approaches to innovation, the relevant market for the latter is more obvious than for the former. By definition, circumvention implies a creative understanding of the consumers' unobservable needs or wishes, instead of the observable consumption patterns in the gatekeeper case. While for the gatekeeper the relevant competitors and competing

⁶ Full text of the communiqué can be found in the EU's law database EUR-Lex: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1645/oj/eng>

Comparison of Potential Innovation Effects of Dominant Firm Regulation




Figure 1: Potential Mechanisms of Innovation in the US and EU

products are ex ante clear, circumventing innovations only demonstrate ex post which products/firms they compete with.

For example, TikTok’s algorithmic feed composition and video snippet model offered a fundamentally different user experience compared to Facebook or YouTube, rather than trying to replicate them. The platform did not rely on access to incumbent infrastructure, but on rethinking what users could find attractive. In this sense, monopoly rents act as a beacon for entrepreneurial discovery: new entrants innovate not to imitate, but to differentiate and displace.

While the “circumvention hypothesis” is difficult to test empirically due to the lack of counterfactuals, case studies can highlight its applicability.⁷ For example, both Apple’s iPhone and OpenAI’s large

language model ChatGPT can be viewed as paradigm-challenging and -shifting innovations in the sense of Thomas Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (Kuhn, 1962) but applied to technology.

Innovation Case Studies

The iPhone: A Challenge to the Desktop Dominance

When Apple introduced the iPhone in 2007, it did not directly aim to dethrone desktop computing, but it fundamentally redefined how users interact with digital services.⁸ While Microsoft had long dominated the desktop PC space with Windows, and Intel provided the chip technology (x86), the iPhone shifted computing away from static, keyboard-driven environments toward mobile, touch-based, and app-centric ecosystems.⁹

⁷ Aghion and Howitt (1992) use the term “business-stealing innovation.” However, this term does not specify whether the innovation works around an existing business model or tries to mirror it-

⁸ See Apple’s press release on January 9, 2007: <https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phone-with-iPhone/>

⁹ The iPhone also shifted away from processors with an ARM design. It is fundamentally different from the x86 processor architecture: due to its lower heat emissions and its higher efficiency, it had a much stronger use case than x86 processors in mobile devices. While it was long known to be weaker in performance, this did not matter so much anymore in the mobile world, as hardware requirements changed drastically due to the circumvention innovation from Apple and its followers.

Rather than copying the PC paradigm, Apple created a new layer of interaction that eventually became the primary access point for the internet, social media, and e-commerce. In that sense, the iPhone (complemented by tablet devices) displaced the desktop as the dominant computing platform for everyday users. It did not do so by competing head-to-head with Windows PCs, but by circumventing them with a fundamentally different user experience and ecosystem architecture. This aligns with this paper’s “circumvention hypothesis of innovation”: challengers often succeed not by imitating incumbents, but by reframing the problem space altogether.

OpenAI: LLMs as Challengers to Google’s Search Engine Dominance

OpenAI’s ChatGPT, built on the machine learning technique of large language models, represents a more direct challenge to Google Search’s dominance, especially in how users seek and consume information. Instead of returning ranked lists of links, ChatGPT provides natural language responses, allowing users to bypass the traditional search interface.¹⁰ Importantly, this kind of interface introduces a new modality of information access, one that could make link-based search feel obsolete for many queries. However, the question whether OpenAI can displace Google or merely coexist alongside it depends on the broader integration of LLMs into everyday tasks, the monetization models that follow, and whether users trust generative responses over traditional search. In this case, OpenAI’s innovation was not simply a “better search engine,” but instead a reimagining of what search could be. This circumvention strategy was driven in part by the enormous monopoly rents Google had captured, which made direct imitation commercially and strategically unviable.

Perfectly in line with the circumvention hypothesis is the fact that mere copying is unlikely to lead to success, particularly in a network-based data-economy: Microsoft attempted to challenge the Google Search Engine unsuccessfully for years. Only when it implemented an OpenAI LLM into

its search box in Bing, user interest surged (Reiff, 2023) and its market share grew substantially on a relative level (even though it remains low overall, Koetsier, 2023). However, it marked the beginning of a paradigm shift in how people find information on the internet, moving away from ranked lists as provided by Google for some 25 years towards natural text answers.

In both cases, Apple and OpenAI responded to entrenched market power not by copying the incumbent, but by innovating around it, offering new functionalities, interfaces, or user value that redefined the competitive landscape. This supports the theoretical hypothesis that monopoly rents create incentives for radical innovation, as rivals must think beyond incremental improvement and instead find entirely new ways to compete.

The Role of Resilience for the Design of Antitrust Regulation

While the American approach aiming at circumvention innovations appears to be more promising in terms of the disruptiveness of new inventions, this approach comes with conditions. It implicitly assumes that there is a critical mass of potential innovators, that sooner or later there will be some entrepreneur that discovers a circumvention technology that actually works and surpasses the incumbent’s product in its creation of utility for the consumers (Kirzner, 1997). And besides the number of innovators, there is also the need for R&D capital. Put differently, it needs both sufficient human and physical capital to enable innovation. It is already widely examined that the US is ahead of the EU in both dimensions because of the many spatial frictions of labor and capital markets in the European Union (Crescenzi, Rodríguez-Pose, & Storper, 2007). The two case studies discussed beforehand exemplify this: in both cases, a US incumbent was successfully circumvented and, by that, challenged by a US innovator.

Investigations in this dimension were based on the underlying assumption of open markets, a globalizing economy, and an ever-deeper integration of

¹⁰ See OpenAI’s press release from 31 October, 2024: <https://openai.com/index/introducing-chatgpt-search/>

capital markets as well as higher education systems. Since the Covid-19 pandemic, a fragmentation of globalization has started taking shape when governments (especially those of rich countries that benefited a lot from the established model of globalization) realized the dependency on other countries by participating in the global division of labor and cross-border supply chains (Stiglitz, 2021). A second shock followed in 2025, when US President Donald Trump reignited a global tariff war, essentially delivering on threats made during his first presidency. His approach is based on the intention of putting an end to free multilateral trade as organized by the World Trade Organization (Hopewell, 2020). Already early simulations demonstrate that the new tariffs, especially imposed on goods from China, would lead to substantial welfare losses for the American society, but also that many other countries would be negatively affected by such a trade shock (Guo et al., 2018).

Crucial for innovation, such economic battles imply lower access to both human and physical capital. In other words, an antitrust concept that is superior based on the assumption of (nearly) abundant access to both capital types comes under fierce pressure in times of deglobalization, closed borders, and economic reshoring – exactly the time in which Europe and the US find themselves in now and, most probably, in the near future. A more viable alternative to technically highly efficient but vulnerable approaches are resilient systems, i.e., economic or regulatory frameworks that can adapt to changing circumstances and exogenous shocks quickly (Brunnermeier, 2024). Furthermore, during unprecedented events, firms tend to react in a delayed fashion and may gather closer around leading companies of their industry and try to mimic their pricing (Fischer & Schmal, 2025).

But innovation also needs buyers. To recoup the high fixed costs of disruptive innovation, firms require access to large, integrated output markets beyond their respective domestic market. In an era of rising tariffs, regulatory divergence, and strategic decoupling, those markets are fragmenting. For start-ups pursuing circumvention innovations, smaller addressable markets reduce expected returns and deter risk-taking. In contrast, the EU's

focus on maintaining contestability across a fragmented internal market may foster more resilient, if less radical, innovation dynamics.

The concept of circumvention heavily relies on large, open markets to maximize access to human and physical capital as well as potential sales markets. The smaller this pool gets, the more difficult it is to find and breed a successful challenger to existing monopolies. In other words, the potentially more innovative “monopoly rents create innovation” approach in the US becomes risky in our increasingly isolated world economy. Resilience thus offers a new rationale for favoring the European approach to antitrust. The concept of contestability does not imply the actual presence of a challenger capable of contesting an incumbent's monopoly. But without a large pool of human and physical capital, firms in fragmented, entrenched markets can rely much more easily on their oligopoly or even monopoly business models. Spatial frictions lower the chance of entrepreneurial discovery and competition, simply because deglobalization, reshoring, and a new focus on national interests inadvertently serve as a market entry barrier.

The European understanding of defending competition in order to support innovation can come to the rescue here as an exogenous shock to monopolies in the absence of endogenously emerging market contestants. Thus, tomorrow's resilient competition and innovation policies need to take into account already existing and potentially upcoming frictions in the global economic order. Efficiency alone is not sufficient any longer for the design of optimal policies – given the times we live in. Resilience has become an important complement to it.

Conclusion: Pathways to Resilient Innovation and Antitrust Regulation



This policy paper has examined how the United States and the European Union approach the nexus between competition and innovation from fundamentally different starting points. The US paradigm builds on the idea that innovation fuels competition: monopoly rents, emerging from unique and radical product discoveries and developments, are not an enemy, but the signal that incentivizes

entrepreneurial discovery in the first place. In contrast, the EU treats competition as the institutional foundation for innovation, one that must be protected from excessive concentration and gatekeeping.

Each model brings its own strengths and blind spots. The US system has undeniably enabled radical, paradigm-shifting innovation – from smartphones to generative AI – by leaving space for entrepreneurs to circumvent incumbents. But this strength rests on assumptions of global openness: unrestricted access to talent, capital, and, above all, output markets. This foundation appears more brittle than bold in an increasingly fragmented world economy. Without systemic resilience, even the most efficient innovation engine may stall as the pool of human and physical capital cannot move freely, but is held back by fiscal, legal, and ideological barriers. And the lack of a global output market does not make the risk-taking necessary for the US model innovation easier.

By curbing monopoly rents, enforcing structural remedies, and regulating *ex ante*, the EU's approach to antitrust and innovation may seem less conducive to disruptive innovation. But this model offers resilience where the US model offers risk: it prioritizes distributed capabilities, reduces dependency on a few dominant players, and prepares markets to withstand geopolitical shocks and economic

decoupling. What it may lack in raw innovation incentives, it can compensate for through institutional stability and regulatory foresight.

Policymakers today find themselves in a profound dilemma: the conditions that once made the US model so successful – global flows of capital, people, and output – are deteriorating. At the same time, the EU model, while more resilient, may not generate the kind of radical breakthroughs needed to solve emerging global challenges. Simply put, what fosters innovation may not survive disruption, and what survives disruption may not foster breakthrough innovation.

In this strategic ambiguity lies the real challenge for future antitrust frameworks. Policymakers must navigate a moving landscape where innovation cannot be decoupled from resilience, and where efficiency alone no longer suffices as a guiding principle. The goal is not to choose one paradigm over another, but to design hybrid institutions that can preserve contestability in closed systems and enable entrepreneurial exploration in regulated environments.

Resilient innovation policy, then, must recognize that the most powerful ideas may not emerge from access alone. It is not only the gate that matters, but the path around it.

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"Market openness, not market power,
is the guarantor of progress."

"Resilient innovation policy, then,
must recognize that the most powerful ideas
may not emerge from access alone.
It is not only the gate that matters,
but the path around it."

Dr. Wolfgang Benedikt Schmal



Foto: David Außerhofer

ist Wettbewerbsökonom und Koordinator des Forschungsforums Mobilitätsökonomik (FORMOE). Er ist wissenschaftlich mit dem Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics und der Technischen Universität Ilmenau assoziiert.

Benedikt Schmal studierte dual Betriebswirtschaftslehre in Verbindung mit einer Banklehre an der Welfenakademie Braunschweig. Im Anschluss studierte er Volkswirtschaftslehre mit quantitativem Schwerpunkt an der Freien Universität Berlin und dem University College Dublin.

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Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind die ökonomische Analyse von Mobilität, Wirtschaftspolitik und Forschung und Wissenschaft. Nach Stationen am Walter Eucken Institut und der TU Ilmenau beschäftigt sich Benedikt Schmal derzeit beruflich mit der quantitativen Evaluation von Forschungserfolg und engagiert sich für das von ihm mitgegründete Forschungsforum Mobilitätsökonomik.

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Das Ludwig-Erhard-Forum wird von der Überzeugung getragen, dass wir heute in der besten aller historischen Welten leben. In der Tradition der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft wollen wir uns durch das Zusammendenken von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der besten aller möglichen Welten weiter annähern. Vor diesem Hintergrund verstehen wir die Soziale Marktwirtschaft als ein offenes Konzept, dessen historisches Erbe an Grundsätzen, theoretischen Einsichten und Empirie der steten Übersetzung in die Kontexte der Gegenwart bedarf.

Durch die Weiterentwicklung der offenen Sozialen Marktwirtschaft wollen wir nicht zuletzt Debattenräume in der demokratischen Mitte öffnen und so zur Suche nach der „irenischen Formel“ beitragen. Dieses Streben nach Frieden und Versöhnung stellt die Soziale Marktwirtschaft als funktionsfähige und menschenwürdige Ordnung seit ihren Anfängen der steten Gefahr von Vermachtung und Polarisierung in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft entgegen.



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Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft benötigt das Vertrauen der Menschen. Besonders in fragilen Zeiten muss sie immer dringlicher erklärt und vermittelt werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund versteht sich das Ludwig-Erhard-Forum als kritischer Impulsgeber und Mittler an der Schnittstelle zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft. Wir wollen all diejenigen in Dialoge verwickeln, die Ideen entwickeln oder vermitteln, indem wir die politökonomischen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit wissenschaftlich analysieren, provokant diskutieren und optimistisch kommunizieren.

Unser Ziel ist es, eine neuartige ordnungsökonomische Stimme zu entwickeln. Dabei ist es unser Anliegen als Forum, all denjenigen eine Plattform zu bieten, die die ordoliberalen Tradition der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft ernst nehmen und gemeinsam mit uns über ihre zeitgemäße Weiterentwicklung debattieren wollen. Unsere Forschungs- und Arbeitsergebnisse sind unabhängig, transparent und stellen sich dem allgemeinen Wettbewerb der Ideen. Sie beruhen auf einem breiten Austausch mit nationalen und internationalen Wissenschaftlern aus den Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften sowie nicht-wissenschaftlichen Kooperationspartnern.

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