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Polarization and Exposure to Cross-Partisan Media in an Electoral Autocracy*

Jeremy Bowles[†] Horacio Larreguy[‡] Shelley Liu[§] Ahmet Akbiyik[¶]

November 2025

Abstract

Political polarization is an increasing global concern. Although recent research suggests that media exposure can mitigate polarization through persuasion, it is unclear whether polarized individuals are willing to engage with diverse news sources, especially in electoral autocracies where citizens may distrust state-aligned media outlets or lack familiarity with credible alternatives. We implemented a field experiment in Türkiye exposing citizens to cross-partisan online media sources over seven months, which increased participants' consumption of assigned outlets across the board. We find evidence of ideological moderation with important asymmetries. While assignment to pro-government media durably bolstered appraisals of the ruling party and increased vote intentions, assignment to anti-government media, while increasing affinity for opposition parties, had narrower and shorter-lasting impacts. Distinct logics explain these differences: while participants came to trust and learn more about anti-government outlets, the broader and more diverse coverage of pro-government outlets appears responsible for their persuasive impacts. Our findings highlight both the potential and limits of media exposure to shift political views in polarized electoral autocracies.

JEL Classification: C93, D72, D83

Keywords: polarization, cross-partisan media, electoral autocracy

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1 Introduction

Polarization, whether ideologically between partisan camps or affectively between their supporters, is a growing global concern. By worsening policy outcomes (Azzimonti, 2011; Allcott et al., 2021; Milosh et al., 2021), weakening electoral accountability (Prior, 2013; Enriquez et al., 2025), and emboldening extremists and populists (Guriev, Melnikov and Zhuravskaya, 2021; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022), polarization threatens democratic stability (Svolik, 2019). While exposure to counter-attitudinal media can, in principle, have moderating effects (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; De Benedictis-Kessner et al., 2019; Levy, 2021), citizens often distrust (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010), are less likely to consume (Durante and Knight, 2012; Braghieri et al., 2025), and discount sources that hold opposing views—especially when perceived as being partisan-aligned (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Benabou and Tirole, 2016; Cheng and Hsiaw, 2022). Moreover, recent work highlights the potential for counter-attitudinal information to polarize further instead (Bail et al., 2018; Groenendyk and Krupnikov, 2021; Baysan, 2022; Egorov et al., 2025; Enikolopov et al., 2025).

How these concerns translate to nondemocratic settings, however, is far from clear. We focus on electoral autocracies, which are both among the most common regime type globally and where cross-national measures of ideological and affective polarization are highest.¹ In these settings, polarization potentially helps to support their resilience: by deepening political divisions and controlling access to information, rulers can both mobilize supporters and delegitimize opposition voices. Such regimes feature substantial government influence over media reporting (Szeidl and Szucs, 2021; Knight and Tribin, 2022), with well-resourced state-aligned media shaping citizens' perceptions of policy performance and regime competence (Guriev and Treisman, 2019; Rozenas and Stukal, 2019; Acemoglu et al., 2024). Independent media, by contrast, tend to face significant constraints on resources and distribution (Knight and Tribin, 2022; Simonov and Rao, 2022; Enikolopov et al., 2025). These differences shape not only the consumption of different media sources, but also their credibility and persuasiveness. Understanding how citizens respond to counter-attitudinal media,

¹The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project records expert-coded measures of ideological and affective polarization. Figure A5 reports average levels of each type of polarization since 2020 across *closed autocracies* (i.e., autocracies with no political contestation, accounting for 17% of country-years), *electoral autocracies* (autocracies with limited electoral contestation, accounting for 32%), *electoral democracies* (democracies with substantive electoral contestation, accounting for 33%) and *liberal democracies* (democracies with substantive electoral contestation and associated civil rights and freedoms, accounting for 19%). Average levels of both ideological and affective polarization are highest in electoral autocracies.

therefore, not only helps to identify levers for reducing polarization under conditions of constrained political competition, but also to understand the resilience of electoral autocracies.

We consider how exposing citizens to counter-attitudinal media affects their media consumption and perceptions, their political beliefs, and ultimately the extent of their polarization and democratic attitudes. Partnering with an international nongovernmental organization, we conducted a field experiment in Türkiye between 2021 and 2022 with a sample of 4,720 participants.² After two decades of democratic erosion and heightened political polarization under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, citizens' access to opposition media has become increasingly limited. Since coming to power, the AKP has progressively consolidated control over mainstream news outlets and marginalized independent journalism (Çarkoğlu, Baruh and Yıldırım, 2014; Keyman, 2014; Arat, 2019). Political polarization has further reduced citizens' exposure to ideologically diverse news sources (Svolik, 2019). In our sample, participants' partisanship strongly correlates with their consumption of, and trust in, varied media sources.

We recruited a sample of participants through ads on various platforms in rolling batches. We randomly assigned participants to either a control condition or one of four news media outlets with differing political slants: anti-government (either strongly or weakly) and pro-government (either strongly or weakly).³ Our coding of around 150,000 news stories produced by these outlets affirms substantial differences in both their topical coverage and the partisan bias of their content. Treatment was assigned jointly based on participants' baseline affinity for the ruling party and the outlet's political leaning. Our research design primarily allows us to estimate the impact of assignment to *cross-partisan* news outlets: assigning participants who held anti-government (pro-government) beliefs at baseline to pro-government (anti-government) outlets.⁴ Further, our design allows us to assess the importance of ideological distance between participants and their assigned media outlet by considering differences between participants who held stronger versus weaker partisan beliefs at baseline.

²The overall project is part of the NGO's programming, which its donors seek not to be publicized. Therefore, we cannot indicate the name of the NGO.

³While we provide fully disaggregated results for the four treatment outlets for all our results, we prioritize the interpretation of the pooled effects of assignment to either anti-government or pro-government outlets. As discussed in Section 3.2, our coding exercises reveal far larger differences in coverage *across* the political aisle than *between* outlets on the same side.

⁴A small subset of our sample was assigned to *co-partisan* outlets; we leverage these results to explore broader implications in Section 7 and present full results in Appendix G.11. We discuss the exclusion of this subsample from the main estimation in Section 3.3.

We delivered the treatment over seven months in three ways. First, we directed participants to follow their assigned news outlet on social media. As we verify, this increased the probability of participants receiving news from their assigned, as well as other similar, media outlets through social media algorithms (e.g. Levy, 2021; Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023). Second, once a week, we delivered top headlines from their assigned outlet via a phone application created for the project. This encouraged participants to at least read relevant headlines and click on them to access the full article. Third, we incentivized consumption through optional monthly quizzes which rewarded correct answers to questions about news articles published in the previous month (e.g. Chen and Yang, 2019).

Our results prioritize treatment effects at endline, following the seven-month treatment period. We additionally leverage a short midline survey conducted four months into the study, a follow-up survey conducted more than a year after the study and its associated consumption incentives had finished, and measures drawn from the study phone application and a subset of participants' public social media activity. We find rates of treatment compliance and study engagement to be high, uncover no evidence of differential attrition or covariate imbalance, and assuage concerns relating to experimenter demand effects using both participants' beliefs about the study and evidence from behavioral outcome measures.

First, we establish that citizens in electoral autocracies can be induced to follow and consume cross-partisan outlets over a sustained period. Participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) outlets reported exposure to such outlets 0.78 (0.35) standard deviations (sd) higher than control-assigned participants, and consumption 0.42 (0.18) sd higher. We show that these effects combine increases pertaining to participants' assigned treatment outlets and broader effects on the exposure and consumption of other non-assigned outlets. Indicative of substantial activated demand, treatment effects persist for at least a year after the end of the incentivized treatment period. While effects are smaller among participants who held stronger partisan beliefs at baseline, we find no evidence of defiance. Further, the larger treatment effects on assignment to anti-government outlets potentially stem from their smaller baseline reach.

Second, we find evidence broadly supporting the ideologically *moderating* impacts of exposure to cross-partisan media, but uncover important asymmetries. Assignment to anti-government (pro-government) outlets reduced (increased) participants' reported affinity for the ruling AKP by 0.14 (0.19) units on a five-point

scale and reduced (increased) their reported intentions to vote for them by 6 (5) percentage points (pp).⁵ However, while assignment to anti-government outlets increased participants' affinity for opposition parties by 0.18 units, it had no impact on intentions to vote for the opposition, with participants only becoming more uncertain in their vote choice. Assignment to pro-government outlets, by contrast, reduced participants' voting intentions for opposition parties by 6 pp. Only the effects of assignment to pro-government outlets on partisan attitudes persist for a year after the end of the treatment period. Further, leveraging outcomes pertaining to a set of eight contentious issue areas, we find that assignment to pro-government outlets increased participants' evaluations of government policy performance by 0.18 sd without shaping the perceived importance of these issues. In turn, assignment to anti-government outlets had no effect on performance perceptions but modestly increased their perceived importance. While treatment effects, in general, are somewhat smaller among those who held stronger partisan beliefs at baseline, suggestive instrumental variables analyses indicate that effects *conditional on consumption* are relatively similar.

Our results provide little evidence that exposure to counter-attitudinal media exacerbates polarization, even when assigned to state-aligned media. Instead, they reveal the sustained persuasiveness of such media—even among those holding anti-government sentiments at baseline. Leveraging our rich set of data sources to explore the mechanisms behind these effects, as well as the assignment of a small share of our sample to *co-partisan* media outlets, we establish that these effects are driven by the relative impacts of different media outlets rather than differences in the characteristics of the samples assignable to each one due to our research design.

Probing why participants were persuaded by their exposure to counter-attitudinal media, we find that treatment assignment symmetrically increased participants' trust in cross-partisan outlets. However, distinct channels underpinned these shifts. Among those assigned to anti-government outlets, we find clear evidence of participants' increased familiarity with such sources over time, along with their heightened beliefs about the extent of bias in the reporting decisions of *pro*-government outlets. Among those assigned to pro-government outlets, we find modest evidence of reductions in participants' perceptions of the bias of such outlets. More systematically, these participants came to perceive the informational value of pro-government media outlets as being substantially higher, while also viewing their coverage as being much more diverse and entertaining.

⁵Although participants assigned to pro-government outlets reported somewhat more negative attitudes towards AKP at midline, this backlash was reversed by the end of the intervention.

Our coding of outlets' reporting sheds further light on these results. First, we find that pro-government outlets reported on a broader variety of stories compared to anti-government outlets. Second, while *average* bias strikingly varied, the variation in this bias was greater among pro-government outlets: a smaller share of their stories were classified as neutral, but more had an *opposing* (i.e. anti-government) slant compared to the reverse among anti-government outlets' stories. The coverage of pro-government media outlets does not, therefore, seem to reflect overt propaganda as in a highly authoritarian regime. Instead, it reflects both a greater diversity of topics that might generate demand from readers and have incidental effects on persuasion. Further, the greater variation in their political slant potentially reflects more subtle efforts to mask biases, increase trustworthiness, and maximize internalization (Alonso and Padró i Miquel, 2025; Herrera and Sethi, 2025). Anti-government outlets, constrained by resources and reach, instead prioritize a narrower focus on contentious issues for which beliefs are potentially more stubborn.

Finally, we report results on social, behavioral, and democratic outcomes. We find limited but consistent changes in public social media behavior, with participants assigned to pro-government outlets posting less anti-government content on Twitter. The limited effects may reflect the ideological segregation of social networks: participants' self-reported willingness to share stories online did not change regardless of partisan audiences. Moreover, participants assigned to anti-government outlets came to view themselves as being in an echo chamber that constrained discussions of heterogeneous perspectives. Consistent with these results, we find that short-run reductions in affective polarization observed at midline vanish by endline, suggesting that depolarization may require shifts in social interactions alongside an increase in exposure to cross-partisan media.

Our findings suggest that increasing exposure to cross-partisan media does not straightforwardly strengthen democracy when pro-regime outlets are both dominant and persuasive. While we find that no treatment meaningfully affected participants' beliefs about the extent of democracy in Türkiye, assignment to pro-government outlets increased participants' satisfaction with the operation of democracy in Türkiye by 0.12 sd, while, among those holding weaker partisan beliefs, it *reduced* their support for democratic principles by 0.15 sd. These results underscore how pro-government media can reshape citizens' evaluation of the regime more broadly. Increasing exposure to cross-partisan media in electoral autocracies may therefore both reduce ideological polarization yet still strengthen authoritarianism by normalizing incumbent

rule, given the asymmetries in media persuasiveness.

Our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, it speaks to interventions aimed at reducing political polarization through cross-partisan media exposure. Prior field experimental interventions have typically focused on consolidated democracies, been relatively short-term, and uncovered limited or mixed findings. For example, following cross-partisan media outlets on Facebook for two months reduced affective polarization, but did not affect political opinions in one study (Levy, 2021) and had no impact on affect or opinions in another (Guess et al., 2021).⁶ In turn, exposure to cross-partisan news through a Twitter bot for one month increased political polarization among Republicans, while it had no effect on Democrats (Bail et al., 2018). Lastly, assigning regular Fox News viewers to watch CNN for one month moderated their political attitudes regarding the topics they were exposed to (Broockman and Kalla, 2025). However, these effects faded after two months without shifting broader attitudes or reducing affective polarization.

To our knowledge, we are the first to tackle this question in the context of an electoral autocracy over an extended period. Our findings demonstrate that, in such a setting, individuals can be encouraged to consume cross-partisan media. Moreover, our main results on the ideologically moderating effects of the intervention only crystallize by endline, while short-run reductions in affective polarization instead dissipate. These findings indicate that voters' beliefs in this setting might be relatively more malleable over a sustained period, and point to potentially important temporal dynamics in the effects of exposure to counter-attitudinal media more generally.

Second, our findings expand upon research on media exposure in nondemocratic settings. Existing scholarship has predominantly focused on traditional media's persuasive effects among those already predisposed to consume it, focusing separately on the effects of opposition or state-controlled media. Findings suggest that exposure to opposition media can reduce support for ruling parties (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Knight and Tribin, 2022; Shirikov, Syunyaev and Georgiy, 2024), while state-controlled media or propaganda often bolsters regime legitimacy (Adena et al., 2015; Bleck and Michelitch, 2017; Guriev and Treisman, 2019). Building on this work, by simultaneously studying both state-aligned and independent online media in the same empirical setting, we provide experimental evidence on their relative persuasive power among previously unexposed consumers in a setting where political control over information is pervasive.

⁶Guess et al. (2021) additionally incentivized participants to change their default browsing page to a cross-partisan media outlet.

Our results reveal how asymmetric reach, novelty, degree of slant, and credibility shape persuasion in such settings. These differences speak to recent studies which have highlighted how the diversity of coverage potentially shapes incidental political exposure (Simonov and Rao, 2022) and how the capture of media outlets can be strategically masked to maximize internalization (Alonso and Padró i Miquel, 2025; Herrera and Sethi, 2025). Our findings then further underscore the challenges of fostering democratic resilience through media interventions that aim at attracting news consumers in authoritarian settings, where even increased information can reinforce regime support due to the persuasiveness of pro-government media.⁷

Third, our study contributes to the broader literature on media consumption by providing novel evidence from electoral autocracies. Prior work demonstrates the persuasive power of traditional and social media (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017; De Benedictis-Kessner et al., 2019; Guriev, Melnikov and Zhuravskaya, 2021; Levy, 2021; Melnikov, N.d.), suggesting media's potential for reducing polarization. Yet, citizens often consume like-minded news sources (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Durante and Knight, 2012; Alonso and Padró i Miquel, 2025; Braghieri et al., 2025; Herrera and Sethi, 2025), which is further encouraged by social media algorithms (Allcott et al., 2020; Levy, 2021; Nyhan et al., 2023). Such selective exposure can also reinforce and heighten partisanship, thereby contributing to political polarization (Levendusky, 2013; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017; Peisakhin and Rozenas, 2018; Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021; Melnikov, N.d.). We provide novel evidence, in a nondemocratic setting, that sustained consumption of counter-attitudinal media shapes media behaviors even after the withdrawal of incentives. While we find that ideological distance between participants and media outlets conditions the extent of their willingness to consume such media initially, conditional on consumption, we find that the persuasive impacts of media are relatively similar among stronger and weaker partisans.

Finally, our study engages with debates on whether exposure to counter-attitudinal information may backfire due to biased processing (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Benabou and Tirole, 2016), thereby fueling political polarization (Bail et al., 2018; Groenendyk and Krupnikov, 2021). Similarly, opposition-led information campaigns and protests may further polarize the electorate (Baysan, 2022; Caprettini et al., 2024; Egorov et al., 2025; Enikolopov et al., 2025). Contrary to concerns that exposure to cross-partisan media might deepen polarization in authoritarian contexts, our findings suggest that sustained exposure can reduce

⁷Alternative approaches that specifically focus on credibly demonstrating the extent of democratic backsliding are more effective at reducing overall incumbent support (Acemoglu et al., 2024).

ideological—though not affective—polarization. While short-term exposure to counter-attitudinal media may backfire, prolonged exposure appears to build trust in varied media outlets, and helps increase acceptance of their news content over time.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss democratic erosion, political polarization, and the media landscape in Türkiye in the past two decades. In Sections 3 and 4, we describe our experimental design, treatment delivery, and estimation. From Section 5 to 7, we present results on our main outcomes, intermediary outcomes, and broader consequences pertaining to social and democratic outcomes. We conclude in Section 8.

2 Background

2.1 Democratic erosion in Türkiye

The Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s rise to power in 2002 held significant promise for democratic consolidation in Türkiye. Led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP was a newcomer in the Turkish political scene promising to reconcile religion with democracy. Initially elected by its religious base, between 2002 and 2007 the AKP transformed into a catch-all party that implemented popular reforms, boosted economic growth, and took steps towards European Union membership (Carkoglu, 2009). However, its early commitment to liberalization gave way to increasingly authoritarian tendencies (Kirişçi and Sloat, 2019). Since then, Erdoğan's AKP has sidelined moderate elements in favor of conservative loyalists and survived both judicial efforts to ban the AKP in 2008 and a failed coup attempt in 2016 (Öniş, 2015; Şener Aktürk, 2019). The AKP's political control has been reinforced by the fragmentation of the political opposition. Deep ideological, ethnic, and religious divides, combined with efforts to prosecute opposition leaders, have hindered opposition parties' ability to coordinate effectively and present a unified challenge (Selçuk and Hekimci, 2020).⁸ Compared to historical instances of democratic backsliding through military coups in the country, the AKP's consolidation of power represented a new form of democratic erosion.

⁸These divisions have spurred the creation of electoral coalitions ahead of elections to counter the AKP's dominance. For example, the 2023 elections featured coordination among parties to form three main blocs: the ruling People's Alliance comprising the AKP and right-wing parties, the National Alliance comprising the main opposition party—the Republican People's Party—and its partners, and finally the Labor and Freedom Alliance, composed primarily of pro-Kurdish and left-wing parties (Acemoglu et al., 2024). Such coordination, however, has proven difficult to maintain due to persistent disagreements over leadership, policy priorities, and relations with Kurdish parties.

A central component of this erosion has been the narrowing of citizens’ access to independent news and political information. Journalists who speak out against the AKP face harassment and legal consequences: some journalists have been detained under allegations of terrorist propaganda and convicted by the judiciary (Arsan, 2013; Corke et al., 2014). Since October 2022, for example, a new ‘disinformation’ law has enabled the government to imprison citizens or journalists for regime-critical social media posts (Reuters, 2022). The government also routinely blocks access to independent media websites and social media during periods of political turmoil to minimize criticism against the AKP (Freedom House, 2023).

Democratic erosion has also been aided by media capture (Rahmani, 2025; Zafer, 2025). Over the last two decades, the AKP has gradually facilitated the replacement of moderate media owners with members of the new pro-AKP business elite (Arat, 2019; Reporters Without Borders, 2023). This strategy is illustrated by *Sabah*, a once-moderate major outlet that is now strongly pro-government. Originally established in 1985, *Sabah* grew a significant print and online audience. In 2013, the ownership of the media group was transferred to the Turkuvaz Media Group, which is owned by the Kalyon Group—a conglomerate with close ties to AKP elites. These shifts have contributed to the expansion of news outlets with a pro-government stance within domestic Turkish media. Not only have new highly partisan news outlets emerged, but some media organizations that were once considered moderate have also adopted increasingly hardline positions due to ownership changes.

2.2 Polarization in politics

Such democratic backsliding has gone hand-in-hand with increasing levels of political polarization. As voters increasingly prioritize partisan loyalty over democratic principles (Svolik, 2019), heightened polarization potentially helps to sustain Türkiye’s transformation into an electoral autocracy. In Figure 1a, we plot measures of democracy and ideological or affective polarization from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project from 2000 to 2023.⁹ Polarization has risen rapidly during the AKP’s tenure in government and coincides with stark reductions in the measured extent of liberal democracy.

Increases in both ideological and affective polarization are evident. Electoral outcomes, for example,

⁹We rescale each variable between 0 and 1. For democracy, we use an unstandardized measure of the index variable `v2x_libdem`. For ideological polarization we use `v2smpol1soc`, which measures the extent of “serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues.” For affective polarization we use `v2cacamps`, which measures the extent to which “supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner” (Coppedge et al., 2025).




Figure 1: Democracy, polarization, and media in Türkiye, 2000-23

Notes: Author’s calculations using data from the V-DEM project from 2000 to 2023 (Coppedge et al., 2025).

illustrate the extent of ideological polarization: referenda in 2007, 2010, and 2017 have consistently resulted in near-equal splits among voters. In the last three presidential elections in 2014, 2018, and 2023, the AKP received between 51% and 52% of the vote. High voter turnout rates—above 85% in the last two elections—reflect a highly mobilized and polarized electorate. Affective polarization is similarly widespread: Erdogan (2018) finds, across different dimensions of affective polarization—social distance, moral superiority, and political intolerance—that citizens demonstrate an unwillingness to interact with those across the political aisle.¹⁰ In our own survey, we find similarly polarized attitudes (see Section 3).

2.3 Polarization through media

The consolidation of pro-AKP media ownership, legal and extralegal pressures on journalists, and censorship of independent media outlets have contributed to a highly unequal information environment. In contrast to pro-government outlets that dominate the media space—making up 90% of the national media (Newman et al., 2023)—opposition outlets remain underfunded and comparatively smaller in their reach.¹¹ To capture the partisan evolution of the media landscape, we use data from our baseline survey regarding which online

¹⁰For example, 74% of respondents expressed unwillingness to do business with one of the supporters of political parties they disapprove of, while 68% of respondents did not want their children to play with children of other political parties’ supporters (Erdogan, 2018).

¹¹At the beginning of our study, for example, our two pro-government outlets, Hurriyet and Sabah, had over 3 million followers on Facebook each. In contrast, our two anti-government outlets Medyascope and Gazete Duvar had 286,000 and 62,000 followers on Facebook, respectively (see Appendix A.2).




Figure 2: Inferred readership of online media by ideological stance, 2002-22

Notes: SAG reflects outlets coded as having strongly anti-government bias; WAG reflects weakly anti-government bias; WPG reflects weakly pro-government bias; SPG reflects strongly pro-government bias. See Appendix A.1 for additional detail on coding.

newspapers participants most frequently consumed. By tracking the acquisition and founding dates of these outlets between 2002 and 2022, we construct a time-varying measure of outlets’ ideological stance as determined by their contemporaneous ownership and operational status (see Appendix A.1 for coding procedures). Fixing participants’ consumption for a given outlet as in 2022, we then infer their expected historical consumption of media outlets categorized by their ideological stance.¹²

In Figure 2, we show this expected consumption in five-year intervals and note that citizens’ access to moderate opposition voices has gradually diminished over time. By 2022, respondents mostly consumed either weakly pro-government media outlets or ideologically extreme outlets, with very limited consumption of weakly anti-government outlets. This contrasts sharply with 2002, when the bulk of inferred consumption was of weakly anti-government outlets, followed by weakly pro-government outlets, and with very limited inferred consumption of ideologically extreme outlets. Figure 1b shows this aggregate shift by plotting V-Dem measures of the consumption of domestic online media, the homogeneity of main online outlets, and the perspective diversity of online media over time.¹³ While domestic media consumption has gradually

¹²While this approach may not capture precise patterns of ideological media consumption, as individuals likely modify their consumption in response to changes in media outlets’ ideological orientation, it is a useful descriptive exercise for analyzing the evolution of the Turkish media landscape following the rise to power of the AKP, since retrospective media consumption data is unavailable.

¹³These are the variables `v2smonex`, measuring the extent to which people consume domestic online media; `v2smmefra`,

increased, the diversity of major media outlets has substantially decreased as pro-government outlets enjoy far greater funding, often through government advertising, and reach.




Figure 3: Reporting frequency and bias across selected subjects, 2021-22

Notes: Figure pools across the anti-government (red line) and pro-government (green line) outlets in our corpus (see Section 3.2 and Appendix C.2). Share of all articles published by outlets per week containing words referring to various subjects plotted. Color of circles indicates average extent of coded bias, from very anti-government (dark red) to very pro-government (dark green).

This reduced diversity has major implications for how citizens learn from the news. Pro-government outlets frame protests, corruption scandals, and economic events to minimize criticism of the AKP or cast

measuring the extent to which major domestic online media outlets provide similar accounts of events; and $v2smonper$, measuring the extent to which major domestic online media outlets reflect all important perspectives (versus just that of the government) (Coppedge et al., 2025).

opponents as illegitimate. In turn, anti-government outlets, much smaller on average, emphasize government overreach, repression, and policy failures.¹⁴ In Figure 3 we use our large corpus of political articles from two anti-government outlets and two pro-government outlets (see Section 3.2 and Appendix C.2),¹⁵ and plot the share of published articles including words pertaining to various important subjects during the study period—including efforts to shut down the People’s Democratic Party (panel A), protests at Boğaziçi University (panel B), unstable macroeconomic conditions (panel C), and efforts to prosecute the independent Cumhuriyet newspaper (panel D)—reveals notable differences. While anti-government outlets report on these topics at much greater baseline rates, particularly for political topics, these differences are substantially exacerbated around key new events.¹⁶ Pro-government outlets, while not entirely ignoring these new events, report on them with a tone far more favorable towards the government. These divergent portrayals not only deepen partisan divides but also make cross-partisan dialogue more difficult, as citizens encounter fundamentally different versions of ongoing political events in the country depending on their media consumption behaviors.

3 Experimental design

We conducted a field experiment spanning 14 months to study the effects of exposure to *cross-partisan* media that vary in their ideological slant. Participants, recruited on a rolling basis, were encouraged to consume media from one of four online news outlets for seven months each. These outlets varied in the direction and intensity of their political leaning, as described below. We measure changes in political attitudes and behaviors primarily using an endline survey (at the end of the seven-month treatment period) and additionally draw upon a midline survey (four months into the study for a given participant) and a follow-up survey (at least a year after the end of the treatment period). We combine these survey data sources with behavioral data drawn from the cellphone app developed for the project and participants’ public social media accounts.

¹⁴For one example during the period of our study, Moody’s published a credit ratings report in 2021. While *Hürriyet*, a pro-government outlet, highlighted “upward rating pressure in the medium term,” *Gazete Duvar*, an anti-government outlet, instead emphasized “since Turkey’s credit rating is negative, it is very unlikely that the outlook will be directly changed to positive.”

¹⁵While Figure 3 uses the share of articles containing relevant words, plotting the number of articles is very similar given our corpus is quite evenly split between pro-government and anti-government outlets.

¹⁶Differences in the quantity of coverage of macroeconomic conditions are somewhat smaller around key new events, consistent with these being harder for state-aligned outlets to ignore (Rozenas and Stukal, 2019).

3.1 Study recruitment and sample

We recruited 5,890 participants on a weekly rolling basis from February to August 2021 using Facebook ads targeted at individuals living in Türkiye between 18 and 55 years old. To participate in the study, interested individuals were instructed to download a cellphone app designed for the study (see Appendix B.2) and were screened for eligibility before completing a baseline survey, mostly administered by a phone call.¹⁷ After excluding 1,185 participants who completed the baseline but never saw their assignment, our overall baseline sample comprises 4,720 participants, out of which 3,851 were assigned to control or one of the four news outlets and are thus the focus of this paper.¹⁸ Baseline participants were, on average, 55% male, 29.2 years old, and 88% possessed at least secondary education. Appendix B.1 compares these characteristics to a nationally representative sample drawn from Eurobarometer surveys. As we document, our sample quite closely matches the characteristics of representative internet-using Turkish citizens, aside from being a few years younger on average and reporting higher rates of tertiary education. Due to the rolling nature of baseline enumeration, we grouped baseline participants surveyed in the same week into a given “batch” and assigned participants within each batch into *control* or a given *treatment* outlet.

This assignment, detailed below, was stratified according to participants’ baseline affinity towards the ruling AKP—whether they are strongly anti-government (23% of sample), weakly anti-government (30%), weakly pro-government (36%), or strongly pro-government (11%). Table A11 documents how participants’ characteristics vary across these strata. With regard to baseline attitudes and behaviors, strongly pro-government (anti-government) participants are 0.13 (0.36) sd more (less) likely to consume pro-government media outlets relative to mean levels, while being 0.09 (0.26) sd less (more) likely to consume anti-government media outlets; are 0.50 (0.52) sd more (less) likely to trust pro-government media outlets, while being 0.07 (0.37) sd less (more) likely to trust anti-government media outlets; report perceptions of AKP performance which are 0.78 (0.81) sd higher (lower); consider contentious policy issues to be 0.21 (0.33) sd less (more) important; and are 0.80 (0.80) sd more (less) satisfied with Türkiye’s democracy.

Turning to voting behavior, strong partisans, among those who are either pro-government or anti-

¹⁷Only adults who actively used either Facebook or Twitter were eligible to participate in the study. 20% of participants instead completed the baseline survey using the app since they were not available the first three times they were contacted by phone and chose that option.

¹⁸869 participants who were assigned to two fact-checkers are the focus of another paper since the content of the media outlets is far more comparable.

government, are notably more politically engaged and likely to vote than weak partisans on the same side (0.73 pp compared to 0.57 pp for anti-government participants and 0.84 pp compared to 0.66 pp for pro-government participants). Participants with a greater affinity towards the ruling AKP are increasingly more likely to vote for the party (e.g., 74 pp among strongly pro-government participants compared to 6 pp among strongly anti-government participants). The reverse holds for opposition voting intentions (8 pp among strongly anti-government participants compared to 62 pp among strongly pro-government participants).

Considering participants' social media behavior prior to the study, anti-government participants posted more frequently overall, were more likely to have made any political posts (39 pp among strongly anti-government participants compared to 25 pp among strongly pro-government participants), and were much more likely to have made any anti-government posts (38 pp compared to 16 pp). Overall, these characteristics underscore striking differences both *between* pro-government and anti-government participants, as well as *within* pro-government and anti-government participants on the same side, in terms of political beliefs and engagement as well as media consumption and perceptions.

3.2 Treatment conditions

We similarly divide our four treatment media outlets according to their political leaning, based on whether an outlet was owned by a company that had close connections with the government and the expert assessment of the partner NGO. Among the two independent outlets, we defined *Gazete Duvar* as strongly anti-government and *Medyascope* as weakly anti-government. Among the pro-government news outlets, we defined *Hürriyet* as weakly pro-government and *Sabah* as strongly pro-government. Appendix A.2 provides more details about each of these outlets.

We assess the validity of our classification in the following ways. First, we leverage our baseline survey data to assess participants' baseline beliefs about, and knowledge of, these outlets (see Table A12). Each stratum considers Sabah to be more pro-government biased (average extent of pro-government slant equaling 3.45 on a five-point scale) than Hürriyet (3.18), and considers Hürriyet to be more pro-government than either of the independent media outlets (panel A). Between the anti-government media outlets, perceptions are similar (2.78 for Medyascope and 2.77 for Gazete Duvar) at least partially because their much smaller size and reach (panel D) means that many fewer participants are aware of them at baseline (panel B). Consistent

with the expectation that anti-government media outlets are much less well known, participants' trust in them is relatively stable across strata, compared to a steep gradient among the pro-government outlets (panel C).

Then, we validate this classification by independently assessing the bias of their news. First, we collected a sample of articles, sent to participants during the weekly blasts described below, from each of the four outlets ($n = 744$). Turkish university students were asked to code the extent of bias in the *topical selection* and *content* of each article (see Appendix C.1 for details). This exercise highlights stark differences between pro-government and anti-government outlets (see Table A7). For example, 92% (58%) of Sabah's articles were coded as pro-government in topical bias (content bias); 79% (52%) for Hürriyet; 5% (3%) for Medyascope; and 8% (3%) for Gazete Duvar.¹⁹ While Sabah's stories were coded as somewhat more pro-government than Hürriyet, the differences between Gazete Duvar and Medyascope are again marginal.

Second, we scraped the near-universe of *all* articles produced by the four outlets during the study period ($n = 148,818$). We then trained an LLM to classify the topic of each article—based on the eight contentious issue areas we asked respondents about in our surveys—and the slant of its content regardless of topic (see Appendix C.2 for details).²⁰ Considering content bias, for example, 29% of all of Sabah's stories; 18% for Hürriyet; 2% for Medyascope; and 6% of Gazete Duvar's stories were classified as pro-government. While we lack an analogous measure of topical bias, we note that 29% out of all articles published by Sabah; 24% for Hürriyet; 45% for Medyascope; and 42% of Gazete Duvar's stories pertained to one of the eight contentious issue areas (see Table A8). Anti-government outlets published a much greater share of articles about inflation, corruption, and press freedom than pro-government outlets (see Figure A4).

Overall, these exercises underscore stark differences *between* pro-government and anti-government treatment outlets—in terms of participants' familiarity with them, outlets' topical selection, and the slant of their coverage—but comparatively smaller differences *within* pro-government and anti-government outlets (particularly for the latter). This observation motivates our decision to prioritize the discussion of pooled treatment effects, which we further explain in Section 4.

¹⁹These numbers approximate our participants' own perceptions of the biases of the different outlets. Table A13 indicates that 49% of those assigned to Sabah perceived its content to be pro-government; 39% for Hürriyet; 11% for Medyascope; and 7% for Gazete Duvar.

²⁰For issues, we used the same set of policies which were asked about in our surveys, and which formed the majority of stories disseminated during the treatment period: corruption; environmental protection; EU membership; femicides; inflation; Kurdish issues; press freedom; and Syrian refugees.

3.3 Participants' assignment to treatment conditions

Combining the stratification of participants according to their affinity towards the ruling party with variation across our treatment media outlets in terms of their political leaning, we randomly assigned participants to treatment outlets. Table 1 documents the treatment assignment process (columns) according to participants' affinity stratum (rows).

Table 1: Treatment assignment

<i>Affinity stratum</i>	Control	Anti-government		Pro-government	
		Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly
		Gazete Duvar	Medya-scope	Hürriyet	Sabah
<i>Strongly anti-government</i>	✓	-	✓	✓	✓
<i>Weakly anti-government</i>	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
<i>Weakly pro-government</i>	✓	✓	✓	-	✓
<i>Strongly pro-government</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	-

Notes: Table presents the treatment assignment stratified by participants' baseline AKP affinity stratum (rows). Participants of a particular baseline affinity can be assigned to an outlet if the cell is represented by a checkmark (✓). Checkmarks in a circle represent the sample used for analysis, where gray indicates Control; red indicates *co-partisan* treatment; blue indicates *cross-partisan* treatment.

Given our interest in cross-partisan exposure relative to participants' baseline partisan beliefs (i.e., the blue checkmarks in Table 1), we did not assign participants to a condition of 'perfectly aligned' media sources. For example, strongly pro-government participants were never assigned to the strongly pro-government media source. A relatively small share of the sample (17%), however, was assigned to a treatment outlet which aligned with their baseline partisanship but represented either a *moderating* or *polarizing* treatment assignment (i.e., the red checkmarks in Table 1). As discussed further below, our main results focus on the *cross-partisan* treatment assignments, while we briefly discuss the *co-partisan* treatments in Section 7 and provide a more detailed analysis in Appendix E.

Within each batch and affinity stratum of participants, we block randomize using a set of individual-level covariates, including their attitudes towards the government, their consumption of different media sources, and their trust in different media sources.²¹ Among the cross-partisan treatment assignments, because treatment

²¹Generally, these blocks are defined with size $n = 18$, except in rare cases where particularly small batches of baseline data necessitated smaller block sizes.

assignment probabilities varied by stratum (see Table A6), 21% of the sample are assigned to Gazete Duvar, 10% to Medyascope, 10% to Hürriyet and 23% to Sabah and the remaining 36% to control. Figure A3 shows the resulting sample numbers for each treatment arm.

3.4 Treatment delivery and survey enumeration

We administered treatment in three ways. First, participants were asked to follow their randomly assigned outlet on Facebook and/or Twitter and to upload a screenshot to the study’s cell phone application validating this. Participants were expected to thereafter organically see posts from their assigned outlet, and potentially posts from other similar media sources (e.g. Levy, 2021; Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023).

Second, once a week, we compiled three politically-relevant headlines from each of the treatment media outlets and delivered these headlines to treated participants via notifications pushed through the app with links to the full news stories for more information (see Appendix B.3). Third, to mitigate attrition concerns and incentivize the consumption of news from the assigned media outlet, we implemented optional monthly quizzes—incentivized for correctness—that tested participants’ information recall of the previous months’ headlines (e.g. Chen and Yang, 2019; Bowles et al., 2025). Treated participants received nine questions pertaining to stories published by their assigned media outlets, while participants in the control group received a similar number of generic, unrelated, questions to minimize heterogeneity in study engagement.

We administered a midline survey four months after participants’ enrollment into the study, an endline survey seven months after enrollment, and a follow-up survey shortly prior to the presidential elections in May 2023. The midline survey, largely containing the same questions as those asked at baseline, was administered through the study’s app. The endline survey was administered through phone-based surveys whenever possible.²² Within the endline, we included a portion of the baseline questions and added new sets of questions relating to potential mechanisms activated by the treatment.²³ The follow-up survey was administered using the study app and primarily focused on examining the persistence of the main treatment effects well after the provision of incentives to consume assigned media outlets had ceased. Appendix B.6 and B.7 summarize the study timeline and financial incentives provided to participants.

²²In 28% of cases, due to the difficulties of reaching respondents by phone, we instead administered the endline survey using the cellphone app.

²³These new questions were motivated by fourteen focus group discussions conducted among participants prior to endline enumeration. We discuss the sets of questions asked in the outcome surveys as we introduce the results.

3.5 Twitter data collection and classification

To complement our survey measures, we collected social media data from the 521 participants who voluntarily provided their public Twitter account names during the endline survey.²⁴ Several months after the study concluded, we used the now-defunct Academic Twitter API to extract account-level and tweet-level data for these participants. For each participant, we collected data on the list of accounts they were following at the time of data collection, along with all public tweets they posted from one month prior to the study until three months following its conclusion ($n = 331,820$). To measure sustained exposure to media outlets, we matched the list of their followed accounts against a curated set of media outlets, manually classified by their ideological orientation (pro-government or anti-government). Then, to evaluate changes in behavior, we used an LLM-based classifier to code all tweets made by these participants in terms of whether they contained political content and, if so, the pro-government bias of the tweet on a five-point scale (see Appendix C.2 for details).

4 Estimation

We define treatment based on the direction and intensity of the partisanship of the assigned media outlet. In our pre-analysis plan, we did not distinguish between treatment assignments *within* and *across* the political aisle. As a result, for example, participants assigned to the strongly anti-government media outlet would conflate (1) weakly anti-government participants, for whom this would represent a *co-partisan* polarizing treatment reinforcing their existing partisanship, with (2) pro-government participants, for whom this would represent a cross-partisan moderating treatment potentially challenging their existing partisanship (see Table 1). Because these treatments, in principle, are likely to have quite different effects, we therefore estimate *cross-partisan* and *co-partisan* treatment effects separately and primarily focus on the large majority (83%) of the sample assigned to the cross-partisan treatments throughout the results.

²⁴While we also collected Facebook usernames, we were ultimately unable to collect retrospective public data from their profiles.

4.1 Estimating equations

We focus on the endline surveys as our primary data source for outcomes, and present results for the main midline and follow-up survey outcomes in the Appendix. In accordance with our pre-analysis plan, within all surveys, we created inverse covariance weighted (ICW) indices of similar outcomes, standardized relative to the control group, to reduce the risks of multiple testing. Our baseline specification, Equation (1), captures the reduced form effect of participants being assigned to a given treatment condition at baseline:

$$Y_{i,b} = \tau \mathbf{T}_{i,b} + \beta Y_{i,b}^{pre} + \mathbf{X}_{i,b}^{pre} + \kappa_b + \mu_e + \epsilon_{i,b}, \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{i,b}$ reflects individual i 's outcomes from block b regressed onto $\mathbf{T}_{i,b}$, the vector of treatment conditions. We provide two versions of this treatment vector: both a *disaggregated* vector that compares participants assigned to strongly anti-government, weakly anti-government, weakly pro-government, or strongly pro-government outlets to those assigned to control; and a *pooled* vector which aggregates the four disaggregated treatment conditions into pro-government and anti-government assignments. The pooled specification, beyond simplifying exposition, is justified by the comparatively marginal differences in news coverage between same-side treatment outlets as discussed in Section 3.2.

The OLS estimate of τ identifies the reduced form causal effect of assignment to a given treatment condition on outcomes. To improve precision, we control for $Y_{i,b}^{pre}$, which captures pre-treatment baseline values of the outcome of the corresponding variable or family of variables (when available), and for a vector of predetermined covariates defined at baseline, $\mathbf{X}_{i,b}^{pre}$, which we select using LASSO. We add enumerator fixed effects, μ_e , for endline observations, and randomization block fixed effects, κ_b .²⁵ Finally, because the probability of assignment to specific treatments varies by block, we use inverse propensity weighting (IPW) to weight observations by the inverse of the probability of their assignment to a given treatment condition at baseline. We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for inference, reflecting the individual-level randomization.

In addition to our baseline specification, in Equation (2) we consider heterogeneous treatment effects

²⁵Since the midline and follow-up surveys were administered using the study app, no equivalent to enumerator fixed effects exists. When we consider data sources with substantially smaller sample sizes, either our behavioral social media data or the follow-up survey, we use more aggregated *batch-strata* fixed effects rather than highly granular *block* fixed effects to avoid dropping large numbers of singleton blocks.

according to the partisan strength of participants' baseline attitudes:

$$Y_{i,b} = \tau_1 \mathbf{T}_{i,b} + \tau_2 (\mathbf{T}_{i,b} \times \text{Partisan}_{i,b}) + \sum_{p \in \{0,1\}} \left(\mathbb{1}(\text{Partisan}_{i,b} = p) \times (Y_{i,b}^{pre} + \mathbf{X}_{i,b}^{pre} + \mu_e) \right) + \kappa_b + \epsilon_{i,b}, \quad (2)$$

where we interact treatment assignment with an indicator, $\text{Partisan}_{i,b}$, which takes on a value of one if the participant was defined as being *either* strongly anti-government or strongly pro-government at baseline. We similarly interact the baseline-defined controls and endline enumerator fixed effects with $\text{Partisan}_{i,b}$.²⁶ The interactive specification allows us to assess the differential treatment effects for participants who are ideologically more distant from their assigned treatments. While we provide estimates of Equation (2) for both *pooled* and *disaggregated* treatment vectors, we prioritize interpretation of the former since we are much better powered to estimate the relevant interaction effects.²⁷

Our treatment assignments and sample entail that only participants who held anti-government beliefs at baseline are assigned to pro-government outlets while only pro-government participants are assigned to anti-government outlets. We can therefore interpret differences between treatment coefficients in the disaggregated τ vector among treatments with *shared* partisanship (e.g., weakly pro-government and strongly pro-government treatments) as reflecting their relative causal impact since, for example, any participant holding anti-government beliefs could have been assigned to either treatment. However, differences between the coefficients among treatments with *contrasting* partisanship (e.g., pro-government and anti-government treatments) also imply differences in the samples assigned to each one. We therefore provide formal tests for the equality of coefficients only among treatments that share the same partisanship and interpret differences *across* the partisanship of treatments as also speaking to the relative ease of persuading participants holding anti-government, versus pro-government, beliefs at baseline (we return to this point in Section 7).

²⁶The randomization block fixed effects κ_b , which are defined by affinity strata, are mechanically collinear with $\text{Partisan}_{i,b}$ and hence we cannot estimate the fully saturated specification. This collinearity additionally means that the κ_b fixed effects absorb the need to estimate the main effect on $\text{Partisan}_{i,b}$.

²⁷Considering the pooled specification, 171 out of 733 (313 out of 730) of those endline participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) treatments were strong partisans. For the disaggregated specification, 128 out of 496 (43 out of 237) of those assigned to the strongly (weakly) anti-government outlet were partisans; 86 out of 233 (227 out of 497) of those assigned to the weakly (strongly) pro-government outlet were partisans.

4.2 Threats to inference

We find no evidence of differential attrition between baseline and midline, endline, or follow-up enumeration using either Equation (1) or (2) (see Table A14). Among the 3,171 baseline participants assigned either to control or a cross-partisan treatment, both midline and endline response rates are around 70% while long-run follow-up response rates are around 45%. Access to participants' Twitter accounts is similarly balanced as a function of treatment assignment (see columns 1-4 of Table A41). In Tables A15–A17, we also find that baseline covariates are well balanced among the endline sample, with participants appearing similar both in terms of demographic characteristics and their baseline attitudes and behaviors.²⁸

To assess potential experimenter demand effects, in our follow-up survey we asked participants their beliefs about the study: whether they had believed that they would be paid differently based on their survey responses, and whether they thought that the research team was seeking particular types of politically biased responses (see Allcott et al., 2020). Across outcomes and treatment conditions we find no evidence of differences in these beliefs (see Table A18). Our use of behavioral social media data helps to further assuage concerns relating to demand effects in the self-reported survey outcomes.

4.3 Treatment compliance and study engagement

Table A19 descriptively summarizes compliance and engagement among those assigned to treatment using endline survey data (panels A and C), screenshot data provided at baseline (panel B), quiz participation data (panel D), and app-recorded engagement with the weekly news headline blasts (panel E). Across each treatment arm, participants' engagement with their assigned outlet was relatively high. Participants reported following their assigned news outlets on social media, and this was validated with screenshots. Notably, screenshot data closely matched self-reported data (both 77% on average), increasing confidence in respondents' truthfulness. Participants also reported consuming stories from their assigned media (69% on average), both through Twitter and Facebook and from the headlines from the assigned media outlet they received through the app. Finally, we record high levels of quiz participation—with endline participants completing 68% of quizzes through the study—and also reasonably high levels of app engagement with the

²⁸Testing for the significance of the joint hypothesis that the treatment vector τ is different from zero, consistent with chance, only 2 (6) out of 64 instances indicate imbalance at the 5% (10%) level. Rates of covariate imbalance are similar in the midline and follow-up surveys. Any existing imbalances are adjusted for in our specifications including LASSO-selected controls.

weekly news headline blasts, with an average of 55% of participants clicking through to a full story on at least one of them. Levels of self-reported treatment take-up and engagement with the assigned outlet are generally higher among participants assigned to anti-government outlets than those assigned to pro-government outlets.

Directly estimating treatment effects on following outlets at the assigned outlet level is complicated because control-assigned participants in a given block *could* have been assigned to one of two different outlets. To most directly measure compliance treatment effects, we get around this by duplicating control-assigned participants and assigning each duplicate the relevant outcome from one of its two counterfactual treatment outlets.²⁹ Columns 1-2 of Table A24 provide these treatment effects on the self-reported following of assigned outlets, on either Twitter or Facebook, at endline. Participants assigned to anti-government outlets were more likely to follow their assigned outlet at endline by 55 pp compared to those in control; those assigned to pro-government outlets were 31 pp more likely to do so.

We validate this using our Twitter data, in which we observe whether participants were still following treatment outlets several months after the end of the study. Table A20 indicates that participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) treatment outlets were 22 (25) pp more likely to still be following their assigned outlet. These magnitudes are quite sizeable since, as Table A19 indicates, 51% of participants self-reported following their assigned media outlet on Twitter, and we validated that 38% actually did so at baseline. This suggests that at least half of the participants who followed their assigned media outlet via Twitter continued to do so for several months after the study, and its associated incentives, had ended.

5 Main findings

Our experiment sought to induce changes in exposure to cross-partisan media and subsequent consumption patterns, which we then expected to shift participants' political attitudes, as well as related behaviors. Across each set of outcomes, we present pooled (by the general ideological leaning of the assigned media outlets) and disaggregated (by specific media outlet) treatment effects based on endline survey data. Additionally, we provide results leveraging our midline and follow-up surveys in the Appendix.

²⁹Consider participants' self-reported following of various media outlets at endline. To construct a measure pertaining *only* to the assigned outlet for a given participant, this outcome needs to be defined for participants assigned to control—however, for example, pro-government participants were assigned to Control, Gazete Duvar, or Medyascope. We therefore duplicate control-assigned participants and, in this example, define the outcome as pertaining to following Gazete Duvar for one duplicate and following Medyascope for the other. For this exercise, we estimate Equations (1) and (2) while clustering by participant.

5.1 Effects on media exposure and consumption

Our treatments aimed to increase the likelihood that participants would see and engage with cross-partisan media sources. In Table 2, we present results for our exposure and consumption indices, which measure participants' self-reported exposure and consumption of twenty media outlets spanning the ideological spectrum.³⁰ Treatment assignment substantially increased both the exposure and consumption of cross-partisan media. Pooled estimation results (Panel A) show that participants assigned to anti-government media saw 0.71 sd more anti-government media online and consumed 0.42 sd more by endline. Participants assigned to pro-government media saw 0.35 sd more pro-government content and consumed 0.18 sd more. Results instead using our midline survey are similar (see Table A21). While we cannot directly compare effects across participant groups (i.e., those who were pro-government or anti-government at baseline), the larger treatment effects among those assigned to anti-government outlets potentially reflect the much greater baseline reach of pro-government media compared to anti-government media (e.g. see Table A12).

These treatment effects are generally larger among weak partisans. Strong partisans, compared to weak partisans, assigned to anti-government outlets report being less exposed to anti-government media and modestly lower levels of anti-government media consumption at endline. In turn, strong partisans, compared to weak partisans, assigned to pro-government outlets report similar levels of exposure but modestly lower levels of consumption of pro-government media at endline.

Panel B presents results disaggregated by treatment assignment. Average treatment effects on exposure and consumption between the two anti-government treatments are indistinguishable ($p = 0.38$ and $p = 0.41$). Participants assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet had significantly smaller treatment effects on exposure than those assigned to the weakly pro-government outlet ($p = 0.01$), but indistinguishable differences in consumption ($p = 0.74$). Considering the interaction of partisan strength and the disaggregated treatment vector, we find few consistent patterns. This suggests that the treatment effect heterogeneity between strong and weak partisans was not driven by assignment to particular outlets.³¹

³⁰We divide these outlets into being pro-government or anti-government and typically use outcomes defined using the share of outlets a participant reports seeing, or reading, on a given side. The exposure index's three components are: (a) share of outlets followed, (b) share of outlets seen online, and (c) frequency of outlets seen online. The consumption index comprises (a) share clicked on, (b) share read often, and (c) preferred sources. In Table A22 and A23, we expand the indices to show treatment effects for individual components.

³¹The smaller treatment effects on exposure and consumption among strong partisans assigned to anti-government outlets are statistically indistinguishable between those assigned to the strongly anti-government outlet and those assigned to the weakly

Table 2: Media exposure and consumption

	ICW: Exposure				ICW: Consumption			
	Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.71*** (0.07)	0.78*** (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.42*** (0.06)	0.49*** (0.07)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.34** (0.17)		-0.05 (0.17)		-0.18 (0.17)		-0.21 (0.16)
Pro Govt	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.08)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.15)		0.00 (0.13)		-0.05 (0.13)		-0.13 (0.12)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.45*** (0.15)		-0.08 (0.15)		0.31** (0.15)		-0.41*** (0.14)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.06 (0.12)		0.35*** (0.10)		-0.09 (0.11)		0.11 (0.09)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.69*** (0.07)	0.79*** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.48*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.44** (0.17)		-0.11 (0.18)		-0.23 (0.18)		-0.18 (0.17)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.75*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.00 (0.10)	0.46*** (0.08)	0.49*** (0.09)	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.16* (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.19 (0.22)		-0.01 (0.21)		-0.14 (0.21)		-0.25 (0.19)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.46*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.11)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.18)		0.10 (0.16)		0.01 (0.16)		-0.14 (0.15)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.10)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.04 (0.16)		-0.08 (0.14)		-0.10 (0.14)		-0.12 (0.14)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.35** (0.15)		-0.16 (0.16)		0.26 (0.16)		-0.41*** (0.15)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.58*** (0.20)		-0.01 (0.19)		0.36* (0.19)		-0.41** (0.16)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.14 (0.15)		0.52*** (0.12)		-0.02 (0.14)		0.11 (0.11)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.13)		0.21** (0.10)		-0.16 (0.11)		0.11 (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.38	0.81	0.30	0.47	0.41	0.90	0.33	0.33
p(SPG=WPG)	0.39	0.95	0.01	0.16	0.50	0.79	0.74	0.82
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.19		0.34		0.51		1.00
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.23		0.01		0.29		0.99
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-4: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent follows; sees online; and how frequently they see them online; 5-8: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent often clicks on; reads articles from; and whether they prefer pro-government or anti-government sources. See Tables A22-A23 for disaggregated estimates. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The estimates in Table 2 combine changes pertaining to participants' assigned treatment outlets and broader effects on the exposure and consumption of other non-assigned outlets. Disaggregating these by drawing on outcomes defined at the assigned outlet level in Table A24 (see Section 4.3), participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) conditions became 32 (24) pp more likely to regularly come across content from that outlet online; 35 (26) pp more likely to regularly click on links from that outlet; and 30 (21) pp more likely to report regularly reading that outlet. In Table A25, we modify the outcome to reflect the share of outlets *on the same side* as a participant's treatment outlet *but excluding their treatment outlet*. Participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) conditions followed 12 (8) pp more *other* anti-government (pro-government) outlets and often came across articles from 12 (16) pp more of them online. Only participants assigned to the pro-government treatments reported frequently clicking, or actively reading, stories from a higher share of *other* ideologically similar outlets.

While assignment to pro-government outlets crowded in the consumption of other pro-government media sources, assignment to anti-government outlets instead crowded out participants' consumption of their prior media diets. Among those assigned to anti-government treatments, in column 7 of Table 2 we find evidence of treatment inducing substitutions in media consumption by reducing their reported consumption of pro-government media by 0.23 sd.³² These differences in crowding-in potentially owe to the functioning of social media algorithms combined with the much greater general reach of pro-government outlets online, but we lack measures to assess this definitively.³³

Finally, while treatment delivery involved both social media *and* the sending of curated stories via the study app, descriptive magnitudes suggest that the former channel likely accounts for the bulk of the effects on consumption. For example, conditional on consuming any news from their assigned outlets, Table A19 highlights that more participants reported primarily reading stories from their assigned outlets they came across on Facebook or Twitter (52%) rather than through the study app (34%).³⁴

anti-government outlet ($p = 0.19$ and $p = 0.51$). Similarly, the modestly smaller treatment effects on consumption among strong partisans assigned to pro-government outlets are indistinguishable between those assigned to the weakly pro-government outlet and those assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet ($p = 0.99$).

³²In Table A26, we establish that both types of treatment led to modest reductions in participants' preference for consuming traditional media formats, such as print papers or watching television news.

³³The same is true for participants' exposure to information on social media that does *not* originate from media outlets.

³⁴Relevant for this latter group, that we find only 17% of news links sent through the app were clicked suggests a relatively modest intensity of consumption compared to that delivered through social media.

5.2 Changes in political attitudes

Next, we examine treatment effects on participants' political attitudes, voting intentions, and beliefs about contentious policy issues. Table 3 provides treatment effects on our primary outcomes of interest at endline. Considering participants' attitudes towards the ruling party, we find symmetric effects. In column 1, those assigned to anti-government (pro-government) outlets report affinity for the AKP 0.14 units higher (0.19 units lower) on a five-point scale, neither of which varies between outlets in the disaggregated estimation. In column 3, participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) outlets report being 6 pp less (5 pp more) likely to vote for the incumbent if an election were to be held tomorrow.³⁵ Effects on voting intentions are driven by those assigned to more moderate treatment outlets (see Panel B). Moreover, the results in column 3 indicate that the changes in vote intention for participants assigned to pro-government outlets is concentrated among those exhibiting weaker partisanship at baseline. Table A27 shows generally consistent results at midline, with the exception of a short-term backlash effect among those assigned to pro-government outlets—who report initially *lower* affinity for the ruling party. This shorter-run effect is concentrated among those exhibiting stronger partisanship at baseline.³⁶

Results for analogous outcomes with respect to opposition parties do not parallel those of the incumbent party. Participants assigned to anti-government outlets increased their affinity for opposition parties by 0.18 units (column 5) but had no change in voting intentions (column 7). In Table A28, we disaggregate voting intentions by specific opposition parties, as well as political coalitions between them, and find no evidence of increased voting intentions pertaining to any of them. Table A29 indicates no effects on turnout intentions, suggesting instead that those assigned to anti-government outlets became more uncertain regarding how to vote. Participants assigned to pro-government outlets experienced no change in their affinity for the opposition but reported becoming 6 pp less likely to vote for opposition parties in the future, driven primarily by reductions in vote intentions for the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition party (see Table A28). No differences are discernible depending on whether participants were strong or weak partisans,

³⁵We classify voting intentions for the AKP as reflecting intentions to vote for the People's Alliance, which comprised both the AKP and its coalition partner the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), since their tight alignment means the latter cannot be considered part of the political opposition. Table A28, where we disaggregate voting intentions to the party level, demonstrates that effects are driven by changes in intentions regarding the AKP rather than the MHP.

³⁶This result is consistent with literature suggesting that strong partisans are the most likely to exhibit backlash (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Benabou and Tirole, 2016). We note, however, that we do not find analogous backfiring effects across related outcomes.

as well as between outlets on the same ideological side (see Panel B).

Table 3: Effects on political attitudes

	AKP affinity		AKP vote		Opposition affinity		Opposition vote		ICW: AKP Performance		ICW: Issue importance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Pooled estimation												
Anti Govt	-0.14*	-0.13	-0.06*	-0.04	0.18**	0.13	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.11	0.15*
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.08		-0.06		0.20		0.07		-0.07		-0.23
		(0.20)		(0.07)		(0.20)		(0.06)		(0.17)		(0.18)
Pro Govt	0.19***	0.26**	0.05**	0.08**	-0.00	-0.05	-0.06*	-0.05	0.14***	0.18**	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.20		-0.09**		0.09		-0.00		-0.10		-0.09
		(0.14)		(0.04)		(0.16)		(0.06)		(0.10)		(0.14)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.05		-0.11*		0.33**		0.04		-0.06		-0.07
		(0.17)		(0.06)		(0.16)		(0.05)		(0.16)		(0.16)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.06		-0.01		0.05		-0.05		0.08		-0.10
		(0.10)		(0.02)		(0.12)		(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation												
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.15*	-0.15	-0.03	-0.02	0.15	0.12	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.11
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.20		-0.04		0.10		0.04		0.08		-0.14
		(0.21)		(0.07)		(0.21)		(0.06)		(0.18)		(0.21)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.12	-0.09	-0.10**	-0.08	0.21**	0.13	0.02	-0.00	-0.07	-0.03	0.15*	0.21**
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.08		-0.09		0.34		0.10		-0.25		-0.32
		(0.25)		(0.09)		(0.24)		(0.08)		(0.22)		(0.22)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.15*	0.22*	0.07**	0.10**	-0.03	-0.07	-0.05	-0.00	0.16***	0.20**	-0.05	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.16		-0.09*		0.09		-0.09		-0.10		-0.26
		(0.17)		(0.05)		(0.20)		(0.08)		(0.12)		(0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.22***	0.30***	0.03	0.06	0.02	-0.03	-0.07*	-0.09*	0.12**	0.16*	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.24		-0.08*		0.10		0.07		-0.10		0.04
		(0.16)		(0.05)		(0.17)		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.15)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.04		-0.06		0.22		0.00		0.10		-0.03
		(0.18)		(0.06)		(0.18)		(0.05)		(0.17)		(0.19)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.17		-0.17**		0.47**		0.10		-0.27		-0.12
		(0.22)		(0.07)		(0.20)		(0.07)		(0.20)		(0.19)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.05		0.01		0.02		-0.09		0.10		-0.19
		(0.11)		(0.03)		(0.14)		(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.13)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.06		-0.02		0.07		-0.02		0.06		-0.02
		(0.11)		(0.03)		(0.12)		(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.71	0.57	0.04	0.17	0.52	0.92	0.14	0.42	0.26	0.55	0.48	0.29
p(SPG=WPG)	0.40	0.47	0.17	0.37	0.61	0.73	0.74	0.08	0.52	0.64	0.84	0.23
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.25		0.09		0.20		0.11		0.06		0.67
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.97		0.27		0.66		0.23		0.68		0.16
Control Mean	2.54	2.54	0.33	0.33	2.62	2.62	0.44	0.44	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00
Control SD	1.39	1.39	0.47	0.47	1.39	1.39	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.01
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Affinity towards AKP (scale 1-5); 3-4: Respondent intends to vote for AKP if election were to be held tomorrow; 5-6: Affinity towards opposition parties (scale 1-5); 7-8: Respondent intends to vote for an opposition party if an election were to be held tomorrow; 9-10: ICW index of perceived government performance across eight contentious issue areas; 11-12: ICW index of perceived importance of eight contentious issue areas. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Changes in attitudes toward the ruling party can potentially be explained by changes in perceptions of

AKP's performance on various policy issues or the perceived importance of different policy issues. Leveraging a battery of eight contentious policy issues for which we elicited participants' perceptions—corruption, environmental protection, EU membership, femicides, journalist imprisonment, inflation, Kurdish issues, and Syrian refugees—we construct ICW indices of perceived AKP policy performance and the importance of these issues. Participants assigned to pro-government outlets came to view AKP policy performance 0.14 sd more positively, which is similar between the two pro-government outlets and statistically indistinguishable for participants with varying partisan strength, and had no change in their perceptions of the importance of these contentious issues. While participants assigned to anti-government outlets experienced no change in their perceptions of performance (column 9), they did come to view these contentious issues as being marginally more important, particularly among those assigned to the weakly anti-government outlet (column 11) and those with weaker baseline partisanship.

Inspecting these results by specific issue area in Table A30, improved perceptions of AKP performance among those assigned to pro-government outlets are somewhat driven by those issue areas considered less important by participants at baseline, with insignificant effects on the three most salient issues—femicides, inflation, and corruption.³⁷ Fewer systematic patterns are apparent using the importance outcome in Table A31 beyond the result that assignment to pro-government outlets strikingly reduced participants' perceptions of the importance of press freedom. Overall, positive appraisals of AKP performance may help to explain changes in participants' affinity for the ruling party, while marginally increased perceptions of issue importance may have contributed to the effects on opposition affinity.

Compared to the results on exposure and consumption, we find broadly similar, though more attenuated and noisy, differences in the treatment effects between strong and weak partisans. Among participants assigned to pro-government outlets, strong partisans had somewhat smaller responses than weak partisans in terms of AKP affinity, AKP voting intentions, and AKP policy performance. In Panel B, none of these effects clearly vary based on *which* of the pro-government outlets was assigned to the strongly anti-government participants. Among participants assigned to anti-government outlets, compared to weak partisans, strong partisans had slightly smaller responses in terms of AKP affinity, AKP voting intentions, and issue importance, but larger responses regarding opposition affinity and opposition voting intentions. These differences, as highlighted in

³⁷As descending order of perceived importance, these were: femicides, inflation, corruption, environmental protection, Syrian refugees, press freedom, Kurdish issues, EU membership.

Panel B, are mostly concentrated among strong partisans assigned to the weakly anti-government outlet.

Taking stock, we anticipated that inducing the sustained consumption of cross-partisan media would reduce party polarization by increasing participants' affinity towards the opposite side. While we find overall support for this symmetric expectation, the results highlight several nuances. First, while effects on attitudes towards the ruling party are broadly symmetric across the pro-government and anti-government treatment conditions, those assigned to anti-government outlets neither became more likely to vote for the opposition nor came to view the AKP's policy performance more negatively. By contrast, and perhaps highlighting their more persuasive qualities, those assigned to pro-government outlets appear to have updated their beliefs positively towards the ruling party across a wider range of outcomes by endline.³⁸ Second, albeit somewhat mixed, we find suggestive evidence that assignment to more moderate outlets, on either side, overall had larger impacts than assignment to more extreme outlets. Third, while the treatment effects were somewhat smaller among strong partisans, the results on media consumption were similarly smaller among these participants. This suggests that *effects conditional on consumption* were relatively stable across weak and strong partisans on the same side (see Appendix D for an extended discussion on this point).³⁹

5.3 Changes in media trust and perceptions

Changes in political attitudes require not only that participants are exposed to and consume more cross-partisan news, as Section 5.1 demonstrates, but also that they internalize it. Such internalization depends on the extent to which participants trust different media sources. Given initial views and associated uncertainties over different sources' trustworthiness, repeated news exposure from a given source can both shape political beliefs and affect subsequent trust in that outlet as well as other outlets with a similar perspective (Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021; Cheng and Hsiaw, 2022; Gentzkow, Wong and Zhang, 2025).

Table 4 presents results relating to participants' relative trust in media outlets (columns 1-2), along with three complementary channels likely to shape the extent of this trust: relative familiarity with media outlets (columns 3-4), the perceived extent of their relative bias (columns 5-6), and the relative informational value of

³⁸The only exception is the short-term backlash effect on AKP affinity among strong partisans assigned to pro-government outlets that we observe at midline, despite not seeing analogous backfiring effects across related outcomes.

³⁹While we lack a clearly defined endogenous variable for an instrumental variables design (given the treatment did not only involve social media exposure), results reported in Appendix D indicate that leveraging any one of the outcome variables from Table A24 as an endogenous variable, and illustratively using the two party affinity variables as outcomes, generates broadly indistinguishable point estimates between weak and strong partisans on the same side.

reading different outlets (columns 7-8). Each index outcome is constructed by taking the *difference* between participants' responses regarding pro-government outlets and anti-government outlets. A higher (lower) value then implies a larger (smaller) value of that outcome for pro-government outlets compared to anti-government outlets. We reproduce the full set of outcomes, including outcomes separately defined for pro-government outlets and anti-government outlets, in Tables A33–A36.⁴⁰

Treatment assignment increased trust in cross-partisan media in symmetric ways (columns 1-2). Participants assigned to anti-government treatments reported 0.25 sd greater trust for anti-government outlets (relative to pro-government outlets), driven by increased trust in anti-government outlets (column 3 of Table A33). Those assigned to pro-government outlets reported 0.15 sd greater trust for pro-government outlets (relative to anti-government outlets), driven by increased trust in pro-government outlets (column 5 of Table A33). Disaggregating between strongly and weakly partisan outlets, we find little evidence that the strength of the outlets' ideology conditioned these effects. Similarly, the treatment effects are not clearly conditioned by participants' partisan strength.⁴¹

While participants symmetrically updated the extent of their trust in cross-partisan media sources, distinct logics explain these changes. First, sustained exposure to their assigned outlet might have induced participants to simply increase their familiarity with alternative sources of information, which may contribute to the trustworthiness and associated persuasiveness of cross-partisan media consumption over time (e.g. Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021). We expect this to be particularly true for anti-government outlets, which are far less pervasive in the Turkish media landscape than pro-government ones (see Table A12). We use participants' responses to code indicators for whether the respondent is familiar with a news outlet or not.⁴² In columns 3-4, we show the difference in knowledge between pro-government and anti-government outlets. In line with expectations, anti-government treatment assignment substantially increases familiarity with anti-government media relative to pro-government media (0.21 sd), an effect entirely driven by the former (column 3 of Table

⁴⁰In addition, in the endline survey only, we examine participants' trust in either traditional media (print or TV)—which is dominated by pro-government media groups—or online media (social media, fact-checkers, and digital sources), which is likely less constrained. Consistent with our other findings, we find some evidence, presented in Table A37, that those participants assigned to anti-government treatments came to trust online media relatively more than traditional media.

⁴¹We note that, among participants assigned to anti-government outlets, strong partisans reported a modestly larger increase in trust in anti-government outlets relative to pro-government outlets compared to weak partisans (column 2), and that strong partisans assigned to pro-government outlets updated their trust in such outlets less than weak partisans, particularly when assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet (column 6 of Table A33).

⁴²In each survey, participants are asked to rate the news outlets' partisanship from pro-government to anti-government along a five-point scale—or indicate that they "Do not know" the outlet.

Table 4: Effects on media trust and perceptions

	ICW: Media trust (relative)		ICW: Outlet knowledge (relative)		ICW: Perceived bias (relative)		ICW: Extra info (relative)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.13 (0.14)		0.21 (0.14)		-0.28 (0.20)		0.20 (0.18)
Pro Govt	0.15*** (0.05)	0.15** (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.11)		0.23* (0.13)		-0.00 (0.14)		-0.02 (0.14)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.36*** (0.12)		-0.04 (0.12)		-0.08 (0.18)		0.18 (0.16)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.11 (0.09)		0.14 (0.10)		-0.02 (0.11)		0.17 (0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.07)	-0.17*** (0.07)	-0.22*** (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.17* (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.09 (0.15)		0.21 (0.14)		-0.05 (0.21)		0.13 (0.19)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	0.24** (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.18 (0.16)		0.17 (0.17)		-0.56** (0.24)		0.29 (0.21)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.13* (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.19* (0.10)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.16 (0.11)	0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.12)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.03 (0.14)		0.52*** (0.16)		0.05 (0.17)		0.05 (0.18)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.17*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.10 (0.11)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.11 (0.12)		-0.00 (0.14)		-0.05 (0.16)		-0.09 (0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.30** (0.13)		-0.01 (0.12)		0.12 (0.19)		0.14 (0.18)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.45*** (0.15)		-0.11 (0.15)		-0.31 (0.22)		0.24 (0.20)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.12 (0.11)		0.32*** (0.12)		-0.11 (0.13)		0.14 (0.13)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.09)		-0.02 (0.10)		0.06 (0.12)		0.19 (0.12)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.20	0.38	0.20	0.39	0.77	0.44	0.48	0.47
p(SPG=WPG)	0.49	0.17	0.59	0.07	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.11
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.27		0.38		0.03		0.59
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.71		0.00		0.15		0.72
Observations	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of trust in pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: Index of knowledge about pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 5-6: Index of perceived extent of bias of pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 7-8: Index of perceived informational value of consuming pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets. See Tables A33–A36 for disaggregated estimates. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. $p(\text{SAG}=\text{WAG})$ and $p(\text{SPG}=\text{WPG})$ provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; $p(\text{SAG-P}=\text{WAG-P})$ and $p(\text{SPG-P}=\text{WPG-P})$ does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A34). On the other hand, treatment assignment to pro-government outlets generally did not shift familiarity with pro-government media.⁴³

Second, the sustained consumption of cross-partisan media might lead treated participants to update their beliefs about the bias of media outlets, including those otherwise more aligned to their political allegiances.⁴⁴ In columns 5-6, we find that participants assigned to anti-government media outlets reported perceptions of the bias of *pro*-government media 0.15 sd higher relative to anti-government media, which is similar between outlets in the disaggregated specification. This effect is particularly concentrated among weak partisans. Consistent with anti-government outlets covering systematically different topics (e.g. see Figure 3), this is mostly driven by participants assigned to anti-government outlets coming to believe that pro-government outlets were more biased in their decision to cover different news stories compared to anti-government outlets (columns 7 and 9 of Table A35). These shifted perceptions about the bias of their typical media consumption might help to explain the reductions in consumption of pro-government media among participants assigned to anti-government outlets we found in Table 2.

Albeit reliant on the disaggregated specification, participants assigned to the weakly pro-government media outlet reported perceptions of the bias of pro-government media 0.14 sd lower relative to anti-government media. This result, while speculative, is supported by our corpus of coded articles. Both overall and when restricting to articles about the contentious issue areas discussed in Section 3.2, pro-government outlets were generally more neutral in their coverage: 75% (59%) of their articles overall (restricted to those about contentious issues) were classified as neutral compared to 64% (40%) among anti-government outlets, and only 5% (9%) were classified as having a strong bias compared to 10% (18%) for anti-government outlets. Among non-neutral articles, 18% (9%) of the articles from pro-government (anti-government) outlets were coded as having anti-government (pro-government) biases. This is consistent with pro-government outlets selectively mixing over the bias of their coverage to maximize its internalization, as theorized by Alonso and Padró i Miquel (2025) and Herrera and Sethi (2025).

Third, exposure to a cross-partisan media source may increase trust in the outlet if citizens value the

⁴³We note that strong partisans assigned to pro-government outlets reported modestly greater knowledge of such outlets in comparison to their more weakly partisan counterparts (column 6 of Table A34).

⁴⁴We ask participants the degree to which they perceived pro-government and anti-government media to be biased in the type of news they report and how they report them, and consider an index of the difference between pro-government and anti-government media.

consumption of novel information in their diversified media diet. On the one hand, as noted above, exposure to anti-government media might expose participants to new issues and framing of ongoing events that were previously relatively unknown (e.g. Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011). On the other hand, in settings where pro-government media outlets are much better resourced and developed, these outlets may produce a greater volume of news that also covers a wider range of topics than anti-government outlets. To investigate both possibilities, we ask participants how much extra information they glean from reading anti-government in addition to pro-government news sources, and vice versa. Consistent with the latter logic, we show in columns 7-8 of Table 4 that participants assigned to pro-government media reported that pro-government media provided 0.19 sd more information beyond what they would receive by reading anti-government media. Panel B shows that this effect is predominantly driven by the strongly pro-government treatment. On the contrary, we find no analogous effect for participants assigned to anti-government media.

Additional evidence supports the idea that part of the persuasive impact of pro-government outlets is potentially grounded in their broader, and perhaps more interesting, coverage of news stories compared to anti-government outlets, as suggested by (Simonov and Rao, 2022). Consistent with a lower concentration of coverage across topics, in Section 3.2 we noted that a smaller share of the articles published by pro-government outlets pertained to any contentious issue area (26%) compared to anti-government outlets (42%). Finally, in our follow-up survey, we directly asked participants to assess how *diverse* in topical coverage and *entertaining* they found the coverage of various media outlets. In Table A38, we find that participants assigned to pro-government outlets report finding such coverage 0.26 sd more diverse and 0.22 sd more entertaining.⁴⁵ By contrast, we find no effects of treatment assignment to anti-government outlets.

5.4 Persistence of effects

We consider longer-term treatment effects using our follow-up survey administered in May 2023—at least a year after the treatment, and its associated media consumption incentives, had concluded. Table A39 documents sustained differences in exposure to cross-partisan media. Participants assigned to anti-government (pro-government) media remained 0.54 (0.19) sd more intensively exposed to such outlets online. Both effects are roughly half the magnitude of the treatment effects observed at endline. Regarding consumption,

⁴⁵While imprecisely estimated, we also find that respondents assigned to pro-government outlets reported somewhat greater political knowledge using a short battery of factual political questions (column 1 of Table A53).

participants assigned to anti-government media reported 0.20 sd greater consumption of anti-government media and, consistent with persistent substitution effects, 0.30 sd lower consumption of pro-government media. Those assigned to pro-government media report no differences in their media consumption *overall*. However, Table A40, in which we estimate treatment effects defined at the level of the assigned outlet, shows these participants were still 17 pp more likely to frequently read stories from the outlet assigned to them during the study.

Leveraging our social media data supports these persistent treatment effects on exposure and consumption. As previously noted, in Table A20, a sizable share of treated participants continued to follow their assigned outlet several months after the end of the study. In Table A41, we find some evidence that participants were following *other* cross-partisan media outlets after the study (columns 9-12), particularly when assigned to more moderate outlets. In particular, we only observe that participants assigned to weakly anti-government outlets are 0.19 pp more likely to follow *other* anti-government outlets, while participants assigned to weakly pro-government outlets are 0.12 pp more likely to follow *other* pro-government outlets. Moreover, effects on trust in media outlets persisted in the long term, with coefficient magnitudes quite similar to those observed at endline (see Table A42).

Turning to political beliefs, Table A43 documents the attenuation of most treatment effects among those participants assigned to anti-government media outlets. However, those assigned to pro-government outlets continue to report an affinity for the AKP 0.20 units higher on a five-point scale and being 5 pp more likely to vote for the AKP. These effects are particularly concentrated among weak partisans, who indicate a 9 pp greater likelihood of voting for the AKP and view AKP performance 0.18 sd more positively. In Table A44, while we find no significant changes in participants' reported likelihood of voting in support of Erdoğan in the then-imminent presidential election, we note that participants assigned to pro-government outlets believed that Erdoğan's vote share would be 1.9 pp higher compared to those in control; further, they believed he would be 0.24 units more likely to retain power on a five-point scale.

6 Behavioral and social consequences

Beyond citizens' attitudes towards parties and politicians, political polarization also has social dimensions: it structures everyday interactions and networks, which in turn reinforce polarized attitudes. Because these both

reflect and shape polarization, we also examine whether our intervention can shift them.

First, we examine behavioral changes on social media using Twitter posts made by the subset of participants who were willing to share their publicly viewable accounts. Leveraging our more granular measures of *what* participants publicly posted during the treatment period, Table A45 measures participants' posting overall, the extent of their political posting, and their posting classified as anti-government or pro-government. Among the participants assigned to consume anti-government outlets, we find no changes in posting behavior. However, among the participants assigned to pro-government outlets (who, at baseline, engaged in more anti-government posting), we find evidence of a substantial reduction in posting overall (columns 1-2) and whether they made posts classified as being political (columns 3-6). These reductions are particularly concentrated among posts classified as *anti-government* (columns 7-10). These changes persisted even after incentives were removed. In Table A46, we find that participants assigned to pro-government outlets continued to make fewer posts, particularly those critical of the government, in the months after the study.

Our results based on social media data, reflecting only 22% of endline respondents, suggest that the attitudinal impacts of the cross-partisan treatments only partially translate into the public expression of these shifted views. Our survey data, in which we asked participants about their preferences around the sharing of information, further supports this point. In Table A47, we find no consistent treatment effects on participants' self-reported willingness to share different types of information with copartisans or non-copartisans. In Table A48, we find some evidence that participants assigned to anti-government outlets became more willing to share political information they *agreed* with, but few effects across any treatment arm on whether they would share political information they *disagreed* with, as well as for participants assigned to pro-government outlets.

The limited evidence of such behavioral effects is potentially consistent with the presence of ideologically polarized social networks, both online and offline. To assess this, we first consider treatment effects on the extent to which participants believe themselves to be in an echo chamber. In Table A49, we consider an index of whether they think different views can be discussed, and whether social media exposes them to the same opinions. Participants assigned to an anti-government treatment outlet reported echo chamber perceptions 0.16 sd higher, mostly driven by participants assigned to a strongly anti-government outlet and their heightened beliefs that it is hard to discuss views between heterogeneous groups of people. Treatment

effects among those assigned to pro-government treatments are more mixed, with those assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet coming to view themselves as usually being in *less* of an echo chamber. These asymmetric effects could be explained by the fact that, in a media market dominated by pro-government media outlets, it is easier for participants to discuss news favorable towards the government within their social networks.

Finally, we consider how treatment assignment affected measures of participants' affective polarization, which we define based on their attitudes towards members of their partisan in-group and their partisan out-group (comprising their willingness to have neighbors of either group, having them as friends, or trusting them). Table A50 shows that affective polarization is reduced across the board for all treatment arms at midline, with respondents notably more positive towards their partisan out-group. However, all these effects dissipate at endline (Table A51). Achieving a lasting reduction in affective polarization may require significant shifts in social interactions with individuals holding opposing views, which requires more than exposure to cross-partisan news outlets.

7 Implications for democracy

Our experimental results highlight that assignment to pro-government media outlets induced broader, as well as more persistent, changes in political attitudes and behavior compared to assignment to anti-government outlets. The broader implications of this difference depend on whether it owes to differences in our treatments or our samples. In an electoral autocratic context such as Türkiye, and consistent with many of the results highlighted above, these differences could owe to the greater resources, credibility, and persuasiveness of pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets. Alternatively, they could stem from differences in the characteristics of participants assignable to each of the cross-partisan treatments: if, for example, participants holding anti-government beliefs at baseline (who were assignable to pro-government outlets) held more fungible views than pro-government participants (assignable to anti-government outlets).

This alternative explanation is rendered unlikely for several reasons. First, existing work on partisanship in electoral authoritarian regimes emphasizes that regime supporters' beliefs are predicated on a lack of their access to independent media, and tend to be quite instrumental in pursuit of material benefits, while regime opponents tend to hold more informed and ideologically-grounded beliefs (e.g. Reuter and Szakonyi,

2021; Rosenfeld, 2021; Acemoglu et al., 2024).⁴⁶ As a result, the ideological beliefs of those opposing the government, if anything, ought to be *more stable* than those of government supporters. We find evidence consistent with this in our sample. Restricting to those assigned to the control condition, we measure whether participants reported changing their intentions whether or not to vote for the AKP over the course of the study. Among participants holding anti-government (pro-government) beliefs at baseline, 5% (10%) had changed their voting intentions by midline, 5% (11%) did so by endline, and 9% (11%) did so by the follow-up survey.

Second, to more comprehensively disentangle these potential explanations, we can leverage the assignment of a small share of our overall sample to *co-partisan* treatment assignments, who are otherwise excluded from the main estimation (see Sections 3.2 and 4). Appendix E provides a full analysis, including the fact that our randomization generates variation in whether participants were assigned to outlets sharing their prior partisanship but which represented relatively *moderating* or *polarizing* treatments (see Table A10). Focusing on the pooled estimation, Table A61 establishes that participants assigned to pro-government outlets came to view the ruling party 0.22 units more positively on a five-point scale; came to view its policy performance noisily 0.11 sd more positively; and came to view contentious policy issues as being 0.19 sd less important. All these results are driven by weak partisans' assignment to the strongly pro-government outlet. By contrast, while participants assigned to anti-government outlets did come to view the opposition more favorably, they did not update their beliefs across any other outcome, including their perceptions of the ruling party or its policy performance. These differences in treatment effects suggest that variation in our main results is more likely to be driven by differences in the treatments rather than the samples assigned to them by our research design.

Particularly in an electoral autocracy context such as Türkiye, these findings suggest that the democratic implications of reducing polarization through expanding media diets are not straightforward when pro-government outlets dominate the media landscape and appear substantially more persuasive than anti-government outlets. Returning to the primary cross-partisan estimation, we further examine these implications by probing participants' attitudes towards democracy in Table A52. In columns 1-2, we use as an outcome an index of participants' evaluation of the extent of democracy in Türkiye.⁴⁷ Across the different treatment

⁴⁶Closest to our setting Acemoglu et al. (2024), studying the impact of providing information about press freedom and democratic erosion in Türkiye in 2023, find that the beliefs of regime supporters are highly elastic.

⁴⁷This includes the extent to which they believe that the government abuses its control of the military; opposition parties are in danger; people must censor themselves on political issues; opposition media must censor themselves; and the President ignores laws.

arms, assignment to a cross-partisan news outlet broadly failed to shift participants' views on democratic backsliding in the country. In columns 3-4, however, we find that participants assigned to pro-government outlets report becoming 0.12 sd more satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Türkiye, which is concentrated among weak partisans and those assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet. In columns 5-6, we consider an index of support for broad democratic principles.⁴⁸ While overall treatment effects are null, we find some evidence of reduced support for democratic principles among weak partisans assigned to pro-government outlets, who report levels of support 0.15 sd lower by endline.

In Table A53, we show two sets of complementary results. First, despite greater satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye, columns 3-4 show no meaningful treatment effects on participants' beliefs about their ability to speak freely about politics, hold representatives accountable, promote public initiatives, or contribute to election campaigns. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that pro-government media increased participants' satisfaction with the political environment under the AKP, rather than updating their beliefs about the possibilities of meaningful democratic participation. Second, in columns 5-6 of Table A53, we also examine participants' political engagement at endline, which includes how interested they report being in politics, and whether they would vote if an election were to be held this Sunday. We find suggestive evidence that assignment to pro-government media dampened political engagement, and effects are once again clearest among those assigned to strongly pro-government outlets. These results highlight how pro-government media does more than shape partisan attachments; it also reshapes citizens' evaluation of the political regime more broadly.

Overall, these findings suggest that pro-government media not only dampens support for democratic principles, but also consolidates partisan attachments. The results are consistent with our interpretation of our main findings, that persuasiveness drives the different results between pro- and anti-government outlets. The asymmetry we document underscores that expanding media diets in electoral autocracies does not necessarily reduce polarization and strengthen democracy; instead, it may entrench incumbents by normalizing their rule.

⁴⁸This includes whether the government *should* use military force to exert control; whether disruptive political parties should be banned; whether languages beyond Turkish should be taught in schools; and whether the President needs to follow laws.

8 Conclusion

This paper draws on a randomized intervention implemented in Türkiye between 2021 and 2022 to examine whether exposure to cross-partisan media content online can reduce political polarization in an electoral autocracy. Our study generated the following findings. First, treated participants in the study were willing to consume media from cross-partisan outlets upon being incentivized to do so. Second, however, consumption of cross-partisan news led to asymmetric effects on political attitudes by the midline, endline, and follow-up surveys. While participants assigned to pro-government outlets reported somewhat more negative views of the AKP at midline, by endline their perceptions of the ruling party and its performance improved, and they became more likely to intend to vote for the AKP. Importantly, these effects lasted for more than a year after participants' incentives were removed. Although perceptions of the opposition improved among those assigned to anti-government outlets, vote intentions were more difficult to shift. Moreover, these more limited effects dissipated after consumption incentives were removed.

Further examination of potential mechanisms for these findings suggests that participants' attitudes shifted in line with their increased trust in cross-partisan media outlets. However, the nature of these shifts varied depending on whether the participants were assigned to pro-government or anti-government outlets. Specifically, assignment to anti-government outlets exposed participants to previously unfamiliar independent media sources. In contrast, assignment to pro-government outlets increased trust by convincing participants that these outlets offered more comprehensive and entertaining coverage. Moreover, for both treatments, we find evidence of updating regarding the extent of perceived biases in media coverage. Article-level coding of content produced by the treatment outlets underscores substantial differences. Rather than reflecting overt propaganda, we find that pro-government outlets selectively cover contentious issues less, while also varying in the slant of their coverage more, than the narrow coverage of anti-government outlets.

In sum, our findings point to the significance of media consumption diets in shaping political polarization in nondemocratic contexts, while also highlighting the obstacles that anti-government media outlets might encounter in a setting where pro-government media dominates. These findings carry several implications. On the one hand, our findings demonstrate that individuals can be induced to consume cross-partisan news, that this consumption can build trust in previously unfamiliar outlets, and that it may reduce ideological polarization. On the other hand, the effects suggest that such updating can favor the ruling party: in our

setting, pro-government outlets appear more persuasive than anti-government outlets, their effects on political attitudes endure longer, and even increased exposure to independent journalism does not necessarily translate into stronger support for the main opposition parties. Our experiment thus highlights the structural advantages that state-aligned media enjoy in authoritarian contexts in reach, resources, and capacity to shape citizens' perceptions. While efforts to expand citizens' exposure to diverse information sources may reduce ideological polarization at the margins, they also risk reinforcing regime support given these asymmetries. More broadly, these results allude to significant returns to sophisticated autocrats seeking to shape the production of media content.

In addition, our results identify three points for future consideration. First, among our secondary results is the finding that pro-government media elicited positive changes in participants' views about democracy in Türkiye and reduced perceptions of an echo chamber, highlighting the power of pro-government rhetoric. Second, we find that treatment assignments more consistently elicited shifts among participants who held weaker partisan beliefs at baseline, particularly due to their more limited consumption of their assigned cross-partisan media. Finally, our findings align with prior research on the challenges of creating sustained changes in social and affective attitudes. Future research should continue to investigate the conditions under which independent outlets (which tend to be anti-government in electoral autocracies) can translate increased visibility and readership into durable shifts in political behavior. More broadly, our study underscores the complex role of media in shaping polarization under autocratic conditions and opens up new avenues of inquiry with respect to whether, and how, cross-partisan media can help bridge ideological divides as part of broader processes of democratization.

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A Media context in Türkiye

A.1 Ownership over time

We categorize media outlets as strongly anti-government, weakly anti-government, weakly pro-government, or strongly pro-government over time. For any given year, if a media outlet is owned by a company that has close connections with the government, we consider it to be a pro-government media outlet. We determined connections with the government in the media sector using data from these three sources: Euronews, the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies Research Center, and Arat (2019), which monitor shifts in media ownership, specifically focusing on acquisitions by business people with close ties to the government.

Table A1 reflects our coding of partisanship of the main media outlets over time. Media outlets owned by Demiroren Holding Company were coded as weakly pro-government, as they were recently acquired, while those owned by Albayrak Holding and Kalyon Holding Companies were classified as strongly pro-government due to their longer tenure of ownership. Similarly, anti-government media outlets exhibited a similar pattern, with longer-standing outlets that have not changed ownership being categorized as strongly anti-government, while more recently established outlets were classified as weakly anti-government. For further details, Reporters Without Borders (2023) offers an in-depth examination of the current state of media ownership in Türkiye.

Table A1: Ownership of media outlets over time

Outlet name	Founded	Previous owner	Acquired	Current owner	Treatment outlet	Affiliation in 2002	Affiliation in 2007	Affiliation in 2012	Affiliation in 2017	Affiliation in 2022
Cumhuriyet	1924	NA	NA	NA	×	Strongly Anti				
Milliyet	1926	Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti)	2011	Demiroren (Weakly Pro)	×	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro
Hürriyet	1948	Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti)	2018	Demiroren (Weakly Pro)	✓	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Pro
Sabah	1985	Ciner (Weakly Pro)	2007	Turkuvaz (Strongly Pro)	✓	Weakly Pro	Strongly Pro	Strongly Pro	Strongly Pro	Strongly Pro
FOXTV	1993	NA	NA	NA	×	Strongly Anti				
Yeni Akit	1993	NA	NA	NA	×	Strongly Pro				
Posta	1995	Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti)	2018	Demiroren (Weakly Pro)	×	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Pro
Yeni Şafak	1995	NA	NA	Albayrak (Strongly Pro)	×	Strongly Pro				
CNN Türk	1999	Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti)	2018	Demiroren (Weakly Pro)	×	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti	Weakly Pro
Habertürk	2001	Ufuk Güldemir	2007	Ciner (Weakly Pro)	×	Weakly Anti	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro
Birgün	2004	NA	NA	NA	×	NA	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti
HalkTV	2005	NA	NA	NA	×	NA	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti
Sözcü	2007	NA	NA	NA	×	NA	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti
T24	2009	NA	NA	NA	×	NA	NA	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti
Doğruluk Payı	2014	NA	NA	International funds	✓	NA	NA	NA	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti
Sputnik	2014	NA	NA	International funds	×	NA	NA	NA	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro
Medyascope	2015	NA	NA	NA	✓	NA	NA	NA	Weakly Anti	Weakly Anti
Gunun Yalanları	2015	NA	NA	Government funds	✓	NA	NA	NA	Weakly Pro	Weakly Pro
Gazete Duvar	2016	NA	NA	NA	✓	NA	NA	NA	Strongly Anti	Strongly Anti

A.2 Overview of treatment media outlets

Table A2 presents basic information about the four treatment outlets assigned through the study. The following information reflects the status of each outlet prior to the beginning of the study in 2021.

The relatively smaller reach of the anti-government outlets is indicative of the broader media landscape. In our baseline survey, we asked participants to self-report their consumption of 17 different online media outlets, along with the extent of their trust in 10 different outlets (including two television stations). In Figure


Table A2: Summary of treatment media outlets

Outlet name	Founded	Slant	Platform type	Funding	Twitter	Facebook
<i>Gazete Duvar</i>	2016	Strongly anti-govt	Online-based news	Non-government related firms	665K followers	286K followers
<i>Medyascope</i>	2015	Weakly anti-govt	Online-based text and video news	Patreon (crowdfunding)	251K followers	62K followers
<i>Hürriyet</i>	1948	Weakly pro-govt	Newspaper and online-based	Government-related firms (Demirören Group)	4.2M followers	3M followers
<i>Sabah</i>	1985	Strongly pro-govt	Newspaper and online-based	Government-related firms (Turkuaz Media)	2.1M followers	3.5M followers

A1, we plot: (A) the share of our sample who reported reading stories from a given outlet; (B) the average reported trust in each outlet; (C) the share of our sample reporting they did not know whether they trusted each outlet, indicating a lack of familiarity with it.

Among our sample, the reported average readership of a given pro-government outlet was 11% compared to 6% among anti-government outlets (Panel A). Our selected pro-government outlets (*Sabah* and *Hürriyet*) are consumed by a higher share of our sample compared to the average pro-government outlet; while our selected anti-government outlets are consumed by a modestly lower share compared to the average anti-government outlet (and are around the median of the distribution). In Panel B, average reported trust is similar between pro-government and anti-government outlets, with our selected pro-government outlets roughly central in the distribution, and our selected anti-government outlets are modestly below average, likely due to participants' lack of familiarity with them. Consistent with this, Panel C highlights that a higher share of our sample was unfamiliar with anti-government outlets on average. While our selected anti-government outlets were relatively unknown compared to the average among all anti-government outlets, we note that two of the anti-government outlets we asked about in this question were television stations with much broader reach.

Figure A1: Consumption and perceptions of treatment and non-treatment outlets



Notes: Responses defined at baseline survey. Red indicates *anti-government* outlets; green indicates *pro-government* outlets, with averages for each group plotted as vertical lines. Filled points indicate outlets used as treatments in the study.

B Study materials

B.1 Sample characteristics

Our sample, recruited through social media ads, is characterized in Table A11. To assess the extent of its representativeness, we compare a set of sample characteristics with limited available data from Eurobarometer. We pool all Eurobarometer waves during the study period which included Türkiye, which were waves 94.3 (February 2021), 95.2 (April 2021), 95.3 (June 2021), 96.3 (January 2022), 97.5 (June 2022), and 98.2 (January 2023), providing an overall sample of 6,015 respondents from the nationally representative Eurobarometer sample.

Table A3: Comparison of sample characteristics

	Eurobarometer		Study sample
	Internet non-users	Internet users	
Education: Primary	0.96	0.99	1.00
Education: Secondary	0.74	0.86	0.88
Education: University	0.18	0.29	0.47
Age	36.91	34.62	29.26
Male	0.50	0.53	0.55
Pro-government	0.59	0.46	0.48

To approximate our effective sample, Eurobarometer does not ask the Turkish sample about social media usage. We therefore use an indicator for whether those respondents state that they frequently using the internet on their mobile phone (69% report doing so), which is the best available proxy. Within this sample, we assess educational attainment, age, and gender. For the best available proxy for government support, we code responses regarding whether Eurobarometer respondents view themselves as being right-wing or left-wing (with right-wing coded as aligning with the AKP), and compare this to our study participants who were coded as having pro-government views at baseline. Relatively few other variables are available in the Eurobarometer sample to compare directly to our own sample.

Table A3 compares average sample characteristics. Compared to internet non-users, internet users in the Eurobarometer sample are better educated, younger, more male, and hold more anti-government views. Our sample is quite similar to the relevant internet-using Eurobarometer sample in terms of primary and secondary educational attainment, gender, and the proportion of them holding plausibly pro-government views. They report higher rates of tertiary education and are few years younger. While our sample only imperfectly matches the relevant Eurobarometer sample, it is quite likely that the ‘true’ comparison group in the Eurobarometer data (those often using social media) would have more closely matched our own sample in terms of tertiary education and age.

B.2 Phone application




(a) Log-in page



(b) Sign-up page asking for demographic and locational information



(c) Profile page



(d) Main page, including unclaimed financial incentives and access to weekly deposit or gift cards top headlines



(e) Reward page to claim financial incentives through direct deposit or gift cards

Figure A2: Phone application interface

B.3 Example quiz

The corresponding quiz used the following articles from Gazete Duvar: [1] [2] [3] [4]. We only include those questions relating to Article [1] for brevity.

1. In Gazete Duvar’s recent article, what did DEVA party leader Ali Babacan say about the coronavirus?

- ✓ Babacan accused the government of corruption related to the coronavirus vaccine.
- × Babacan accused the government of refusing to provide booster vaccine shots.
- × Babacan said that the government should continue to lock down the country.
- × Babacan said that Turkey should be reopened fully.
- × Do not know

If wrong Babacan accused the government of corruption related to the coronavirus vaccine. Please read since we will ask you additional questions about this news and Gazete Duvar’s coverage.

2. What did Babacan say about the booster vaccine shots?

- × Babacan said that they are not necessary
- × Babacan said that they must happen in August
- × Babacan said that the booster vaccine shots come from RNA vaccines
- ✓ Both (2) and (3)
- × Do not know

If wrong Babacan said that the booster vaccine shots must happen in August, and they must come from RNA vaccines. Please read since we will ask you additional questions about this news and Gazete Duvar’s coverage.

B.4 Deviations from pre-analysis plan

We registered the experiment and our pre-analysis plan at the AEA (AEARCTR-0008489) and OSF (10.17605/OSF.IO/6WAPX) registries. The estimation of average and heterogeneous treatment effects and variable construction adhered closely to prespecified procedures, with the following exceptions:

1. Whereas we specified the use of one-tailed tests for directional hypotheses, to be conservative, we use two-tailed tests throughout our analysis in the manuscript.
2. We excluded the two fact-checkers involved in treatment assignment (*Doğruluk Payı* and *Günün Yalanları*; see Figure A3). We prespecified that we would consider excluding these outlets if their content was sufficiently distinct from the media outlet treatments, which we ultimately found to be the case. Regarding format, one fact-checker produced only very short-fact checks (Tweet-length texts) rather than more conventional stories, while the other fact-checker produced substantially longer investigative articles. In terms of intensity, the fact-checkers produced far less content during the study period than any of the media outlets. In terms of bias, much more of the content produced by the fact-checkers was classified as neutral using either our LLM-based classifier or our manual coding exercise. Since the contrast between media outlets and fact-checkers remains interesting, however, these results will be the focus of a shorter companion paper mostly focusing on our survey-based outcomes of misinformation discernment.




Figure A3: Overview of study

Notes: Assignment to media outlets is stratified by baseline AKP affinity (see Figure 1). Assignment generates variation in whether participants are assigned to *cross-partisan* or *co-partisan* treatments, where the former are the main focus of the results. Participants were additionally incentivized to consume particular content through optional monthly quizzes, relating either to the treatment information (Outlet news quizzes) or pop culture (Placebo quizzes). Colored cells inside *Midline survey*, *Endline survey*, and *Follow-up survey* indicate sample sizes for Control, *Cross-partisan* treatment, and *Co-partisan* treatment.

3. For outcome data sources with substantially smaller sample sizes (Twitter data; follow-up survey; co-partisan analysis), we use batch-strata rather than randomization block fixed effects. However, we prespecified that we would use these more aggregated fixed effects in cases where attrition leaves limited within-block variation, which we found to be relevant outside of the main midline and endline analyses.
4. We did not pre-specify analyses using the follow-up survey, as we did not contemplate such data collection at the time of pre-registration. However, the variable construction and estimation exactly match the midline and endline analyses.
5. We did not specify the exclusion of the minority of participants assigned to *co-partisan* treatment assignments (see Figure 1). As discussed in the manuscript (see Sections 3.3 and 4), including these assignments ultimately muddies the interpretation of our treatment effects by including a small sample for whom a given treatment ought to reinforce, rather than challenge, their existing partisanship. However, we leverage results from this sample in Section 7 and fully report results in Appendix G.11.
6. We specified several candidate treatment vector definitions for the analysis. Our ultimate analysis reflects the pooled “option 3” (Control; Anti-govt; Pro-govt); the disaggregated “option 5” (Control; Strongly Anti-govt; Weakly Anti-govt; Weakly Pro-govt; Strongly Pro-govt); and “option 4” (ideological distance to assigned treatment) using our heterogeneous treatment effects specifications. We discarded “option 1” (Control; Any treatment) because this masks all of the theoretically interesting variation between the pro-government and anti-government outlets. Our “option 2” (Control; Concordant; Discordant) is equivalent to our comparison of the *cross-partisan* and *co-partisan* treatment effects, but again would mask all of the variation between the anti-government and pro-government outlets. Our “option 6” (Control; Fact-checker; Media outlet) is discussed above and left for a companion paper.
7. For outcomes reflecting exposure and consumption (Table 2), we perfectly follow our prespecified measure for exposure. For our consumption index, we excluded whether participants report prioritizing the consumption of online versus traditional media because there is no way to assign this outcome in terms of being pro-government or anti-government (this outcome is reported in Table A26). We replaced this with the measure of whether participants generally prefer anti-government or pro-government sources (columns 13-16 of Table A23).
8. For outcomes reflecting media trust and perceptions (Table 4), we excluded participants’ trust in online versus traditional media because there is no way to assign this outcome in terms of being pro-government or anti-government (this outcome is reported in Table A37). From the auxiliary outcomes, we excluded responses about social media exposing people to congenial content for the same reason (this outcome is reported in Table A49).
9. We report analyses for all of our prespecified hypotheses in the manuscript aside from outcomes pertaining to misinformation discernment, which will be the focus of a companion paper focusing on the fact-checker treatments. Table A4 summarizes our endline survey results regarding our directional hypotheses, which were mostly made with respect to assignment to *any* treatment, including parentheses where we find conditional support for a hypothesis. Table A5 outlines a number of secondary hypotheses which we indicated we would investigate, but did not prespecify any directional hypotheses. Separately by treatment assignment, we report the directionality of our actual results.

Table A4: Prespecified directional hypotheses

Hypothesis	Reported	Confirmed
Treatment exposure		
Increased exposure to assigned media outlets	Table 2	✓
Larger effects among those ideologically proximate to assigned outlet	Table 2	✓
Larger effects among those assigned to anti-government outlets	Table 2	✓
Media consumption and attitudes		
Increased consumption of cross-partisan outlets	Table 2	✓
Increased trust in cross-partisan outlets	Table 4	✓
Misinformation and fact-checking behavior		
Increased ability and efforts to discern misinformation	-	
Discussion and sharing behavior		
Increased sharing of news with in-party supporters	Table A47	×
Increased sharing of news with out-party supporters	Table A47	×
Increased sharing of news in private settings	Table A48	(×)
Increased sharing of news in public settings	Table A48	(×)
Affective polarization		
Improved attitudes towards supporters of out-party	Table A51	(×)
Political information and engagement		
Increased knowledge about politics	Table A53	×
Views about ruling party		
Reduced support for ruling party	Table 3	(✓)
Effects concentrated among those assigned to anti-government outlets	Table 3	✓
Views about democracy		
Increased support for democratic principles	Table A52	×

Notes: ✓ indicates support for hypothesis; × indicates no support for hypothesis. Parentheses used to indicate marginal support, or lack thereof, for hypothesis.

Table A5: Secondary effects (without directional hypotheses)

Effect	Reported	Assigned: Anti	Assigned: Pro
Media consumption and attitudes			
Consumption of co-partisan outlets	Table 2	-	∅
Trust in co-partisan outlets	Table A33	∅	∅
Discussion and sharing behavior			
Similarity of political views with social network	Table A49	∅	∅
Cannot discuss politics with cross-partisans	Table A49	+	(-)
Affective polarization			
Attitudes towards supporters of in-party	Table A51	∅	∅
Political information and engagement			
Political efficacy and engagement	Table A53	∅	∅
Views about ruling party			
Perceived importance of policy areas	Table 3	(+)	∅
Views about democracy			
Extent of democracy in Türkiye	Table A52	∅	∅
Satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye	Table A52	∅	+

Notes: Table provides directional results, split by treatment assignment, for hypotheses where we did not prespecify a directional hypothesis. - indicates a negative treatment effect; + indicates a positive treatment effect; ∅ indicates no treatment effect. Parentheses used to indicate marginal support for a directional result.

B.5 Treatment assignment probabilities

Table A6: Treatment assignment probabilities by affinity strata

<i>Affinity stratum</i>	Control	Anti-govt		Pro-govt	
		Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly
		Gazete Duvar	Medya-scope	Hürriyet	Sabah
<i>Strongly Anti-government</i>	0.32		0.14	0.14	0.39
<i>Weakly Anti-government</i>	0.29	0.18		0.18	0.35
<i>Weakly Pro-government</i>	0.29	0.35	0.18		0.18
<i>Strongly Pro-government</i>	0.32	0.39	0.14	0.14	

Notes: Table presents the treatment assignment probabilities stratified by participants' baseline AKP affinity stratum (rows). Participants are more likely to be assigned to outlets far from their pre-treatment affinity towards the ruling party. Probabilities within strata vary due to initial inclusion of *fact-checker* treatments (coded as weakly pro/anti-government) but subsequently excluded from the study for comparability reasons (see discussion in main body of manuscript).

B.6 Incentives

Participants were provided with small financial incentives to complete each step of the study. Due to substantial depreciation of the Turkish Lira (TL) over the course of the study, we provide amounts in TL as well as relevant USD (\$) amounts for participants in the median batch of the study according to study enrollment date.⁴⁹

- **Recruitment and baseline survey:** Participants received 40 TL (\$4.75) for completing the baseline survey and providing proof of following their assigned media outlet (if assigned to treatment). Participants who completed the baseline but ultimately decided not to follow their assigned media outlet were paid 15 TL (\$1.78).
- **Quizzes:** Participants who chose to complete the six monthly optional quizzes received 10 TL (\$1.11) per completed quiz. Participants who answered more than half of the quiz questions correctly received 20 TL (\$2.22).
- **Midline survey:** Respondents received 30 TL (\$3.40) for completing the midline survey.
- **Endline survey:** Participants received 60 TL (\$4.33) for completing the endline survey. We increased the amount from midline to endline due to the relatively longer survey instrument.
- **Follow-up survey:** Participants received 100 TL (\$5.10) for completing the follow-up survey. We increased the amount from endline to follow-up due to the duration of elapsed time from the end of the treatment period.

In total, participants could therefore receive up to 350 TL (\$30.90) for completing all aspects of the study. The average total amount received by participants in our endline sample was 247 TL (\$21.85). Financial incentives were decided with significant input from the implementing partner based on their past experiences conducting surveys in Türkiye. Participants received payments upon completion of each step, which they could then redeem through the phone app designed to administer the study. Redemption options included a variety of gift cards or a cash transfer.

B.7 Timeline of the study

Recruitment and randomized treatment assignment were conducted on a weekly rolling basis, beginning around February 2021 and ending in September 2021. For each participant who agreed to take part in the study and was eligible to do so, the study timeline proceeded as follows:

- t Participant took baseline survey through phone survey (80.1%) or app (19.9%).
- $t + 1$ week Participants surveyed in a given one-week window (“batch”) were randomly assigned to either control or a media outlet. Participants were asked to upload a screenshot indicating that they were following the assigned media outlet’s Facebook or Twitter accounts.
- $t + n$ weeks Assigned media outlet’s top headlines were delivered to each treated participant through the app’s push notifications. Recurred once per week until endline enumeration.
- $t + n$ months Incentivized quizzes delivered to all participants. Recurred once per month until endline enumeration.

⁴⁹These participants took the baseline survey in May 2021, the midline in September 2021, the endline in February 2022, and the follow-up in May 2023.

t + 4 months Midline administered through app.

t + 7 months Endline administered through phone survey (71.1%) or app (28.9%).

May 2023 Follow-up survey administered through app.

B.8 Coding missing data

While missing outcome data across variables was limited, where data was missing, we assigned the participant the mean value of that covariate within their block. With regard to “do not know” responses to specific survey questions, responses were coded as “negatives”—i.e. not doing the action noted in the question. For example, when asked about consuming news from a particular media source, “don’t know” would be coded as “never”, while for the importance of an issue “don’t know” would be coded as “not at all important.” Where “don’t know” related to a Likert-type scale, the response was coded as the median/neutral option, e.g. as “neither agree nor disagree.”

C Classification and coding exercises

C.1 Manual coding

We collected a sample of 744 news articles, sent to participants during the course of the study through the weekly news blasts from treatment media outlets, for manual coding by research assistants. We sought to measure the extent of bias in terms of both *topical selection* by the various outlets as well as *content* of the articles. For each article, we asked research assistants to code the following on a five-point scale from *very anti-government* to *very pro-government*:

1. Abstracting from the content, how politically biased is the choice of topic of this news article?
2. Abstracting from the topic, how politically biased is the content of this news article?

Each article was coded by two Turkish university research assistants, with one randomly assigned to read a de-identified text version of a given article and one assigned to read the original website version of the article. Table A7 presents summary statistics at the outlet level. We additionally include binary versions measuring the overall share of articles coded as pro-government or anti-government along the two dimensions. Across the panels, which provide similar results, we vary whether we aggregate across the two coded measures per article (Panel A), restrict to the articles coded using de-identified text (Panel B), or those coded using the website links (Panel C).

The manual coding exercise demonstrates stark differences in the bias of the anti-government outlets from the pro-government outlets, with more muted differences *between* outlets on the same side. For example, 92% (58%) of Sabah’s articles were coded as pro-government in topical selection (content bias); 79% (52%) for Hürriyet; 5% (3%) for Medyascope; and 8% (3%) for Gazete Duvar. While the coding exercise indicates that Sabah’s stories were somewhat more pro-government than Hürriyet, the difference between them is much smaller than the difference between either outlet and the anti-government outlets. The differences between Gazete Duvar and Medyascope, overall, are minimal.

C.2 LLM coding

Two of our data sources were well beyond the scale of feasible manual coding. These comprised the near-universe of all articles produced by the four outlets during the study period ($n = 148,818$), which we scraped

Table A7: Manual coding of news stories

	Topical bias			Content bias		
	Mean	Share		Mean	Share	
		Anti	Pro		Anti	Pro
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Average						
Gazete Duvar	1.91	0.87	0.08	2.40	0.47	0.03
Medyascope	1.94	0.88	0.05	2.43	0.45	0.03
Hürriyet	3.88	0.05	0.79	3.65	0.03	0.52
Sabah	4.25	0.01	0.92	3.81	0.00	0.58
B. Text only						
Gazete Duvar	1.90	0.86	0.09	2.28	0.54	0.03
Medyascope	1.90	0.87	0.04	2.45	0.44	0.02
Hürriyet	3.89	0.05	0.77	3.63	0.04	0.54
Sabah	4.29	0.01	0.93	3.88	0.00	0.63
C. Website						
Gazete Duvar	1.91	0.88	0.07	2.51	0.40	0.04
Medyascope	1.99	0.88	0.06	2.40	0.48	0.03
Hürriyet	3.86	0.06	0.80	3.65	0.03	0.49
Sabah	4.21	0.01	0.92	3.73	0.01	0.53

Notes: Table presents hand-coded assessment of bias in topical selection and content. Panel A takes article-level average, with two coders assigned to each article; Panel B restricts to coder randomly assigned to read de-identified article text for a given article; Panel C restricts to coder assigned to read original website story. Columns (1) and (4) provide averages of the 1-5 point scale used in coding, with 1 indicating *strongly anti-government* and 5 indicating *strongly pro-government* bias. Columns (2) and (5) provide the share of articles coded as *anti-government*, i.e. with a score of 1 or 2; columns (3) and (6) do the same for *pro-government*.

based on extracting links from the social media accounts of the various outlets; and a corpus of public tweets made by study participants before, during, and after the treatment period ($n = 331,820$).

For the larger-scale coding and classification of these sources, we relied on Large Language Models (LLMs). We used DeepSeek-R1, a modern chain-of-thought LLM optimized to follow multi-step reasoning chains and hence suitable for complex classification tasks that require justification or the disentangling of multiple dimensions (such as topic and government bias) (Guo et al., 2025). This structure improves label consistency and transparency, especially in tasks where latent features or subtle semantic cues guide classification (Wei et al., 2022). Applied here, each instance (a tweet or article) was passed through a strict prompt that separated classification tasks and instructed the model to reason independently for each.

Separate extraction tasks, along with processing pipelines, were implemented for the two data sources. For news articles, we sought to classify:

1. Topic: either *corruption*; *environmental protection*; *EU membership*; *femicides*; *inflation*; *Kurdish issues*; *press freedom*; *Syrian refugees*; or *none*. These were the eight contentious issue areas we asked about in our surveys.
2. Bias: either *strongly anti-government*, *weakly anti-government*, *neutral*, *weakly pro-government*, or *strongly pro-government*.

For tweets, we sought to classify:

1. Political: whether the tweet was *political* in nature or not.
2. Bias: among those tweets classified as *political*, whether their slant was *strongly anti-government*, *weakly anti-government*, *neutral*, *weakly pro-government*, or *strongly pro-government*.

To mitigate stochasticity, our prompts provided explicit definitions and decision rules for both policy topic classification and government bias detection. We also required the model to conclude with a justification paragraph summarizing the rationale behind each decision, thereby improving transparency and interpretability. Model deployment was distributed over five weeks, both due to the rolling web-scraping process of news articles and to take advantage of time-bracketed API pricing.

C.2.1 LLM coding of news articles

Table A8 provides some descriptive statistics pertaining to the LLM-coded topics and content bias of articles published by the various treatment outlets. Considering content bias, for example, 29% of all of Sabah's stories; 18% for Hürriyet; 2% for Medyascope; and 6% of Gazete Duvar's stories were classified as pro-government. These numbers, and the equivalent ones for anti-government classifications, are a good deal lower than those in Table A7 because those articles used during treatment delivery were specifically chosen to contain political content (and hence likely to have some sort of political bias). The larger corpus contains a much wider range of content about largely apolitical matters. While we lack an analogous measure of topical bias as the manual coding exercise, we note that 29% of all articles published by Sabah; 24% for Hürriyet; 45% for Medyascope; and 41% of Gazete Duvar's stories pertained to one of the eight contentious policy areas.


Considering the interaction of topical selection and content bias, in Figure A4 we plot the share of articles from each outlet classified as pertaining to one of the eight contentious policy areas asked about in our surveys. Overall, anti-government outlets substantially prioritized coverage of stories relating to inflation, corruption, and press freedom compared to pro-government outlets. Again, differences *within* anti-government outlets and pro-government outlets are more muted. Holding fixed the issue area, pro-government outlets reported substantially more favorably than anti-government outlets.

Table A8: LLM coding of news stories

	Topical share	Content bias		
		Mean	Share anti	Share pro
		(1)	(2)	(3)
Gazete Duvar	0.41	2.69	0.30	0.06
Medyascope	0.45	2.61	0.35	0.02
Hürriyet	0.24	3.18	0.04	0.18
Sabah	0.29	3.33	0.02	0.29

Notes: Table presents LLM-coded assessment of bias in topical selection and content for near-universe of articles published by treatment outlets during study period. Column (1) measures share of articles classified as pertaining to one of the eight contentious policy areas asked during our surveys; column (2) provides average of the 1-5 point scale used in coding bias of content, with 1 indicating *strongly anti-government* and 5 indicating *strongly pro-government* bias. Column (3) provides the share of articles coded as *anti-government*, i.e. with a score of 1 or 2; column (4) do the same for *pro-government*.

Figure A4: Share of articles by issue and relative slant



Notes: Colors indicate the average pro-government bias of coverage for a given policy area and outlet on a five-point scale. Policy areas sorted by participants' average perception of issue importance at baseline from most (femicides) to least (EU membership).

C.3 LLM coding of tweets

Overall, 27% of tweets were coded as containing political content. Among those posts classified as political, 13% were coded as containing strongly anti-government sentiment; 40% as containing weakly anti-government coding; 25% were classified as neutral; 14% were classified as containing weakly pro-government sentiment, and 8% as containing strongly pro-government content.

Using the full corpus of participants' tweets before, during, and after the treatment period, Table A9 provides descriptive statistics according to participants' baseline affinity stratum (see Table A12 for related figures only using the pre-treatment period). Overall, anti-government participants tweeted more on average; had a higher incidence of posting political content; and were more likely to post tweets containing both

Table A9: LLM-coded Twitter posting by participants’ affinity strata

Affinity strata	All posts		Political		Anti-government		Pro-government	
	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Strongly anti-government	0.54	2.83	0.50	1.99	0.48	1.69	0.41	1.14
Weakly anti-government	0.64	2.64	0.55	1.57	0.47	1.20	0.42	0.85
Weakly pro-government	0.61	2.49	0.47	1.35	0.41	1.00	0.36	0.76
Strongly pro-government	0.39	1.79	0.34	1.11	0.27	0.71	0.32	0.79

Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics of full corpus of participants’ public tweets before, during, and after treatment period. *Political* is an indicator for tweet containing political content. *Anti-government* is an indicator for tweet being coded as weakly or strongly anti-government. *Pro-government* is an indicator for tweet being coded as weakly or strongly pro-government.

pro-government and anti-government sentiment.

D Instrumental variables results

The heterogeneity in treatment effects according to participants’ partisan strength in Table 3 raises the question of whether the modestly reduced treatment effects we observe among strong partisans is because: (1) the “first stage” effects of the treatment on their exposure and consumption of cross-partisan media is weaker (see Table 2); or (2) the impact of the treatment *conditional on exposure and consumption* is weaker.

Disentangling these naturally calls for an instrumental variables design. However, our bundled treatment delivery implies the absence of a cleanly-defined endogenous variable to use in the first stage. As discussed in Section 3.4, participants’ exposure to their assigned outlets came both through the study app and social media algorithms; however, our primary measures of exposure and consumption in Table 2 mostly relate to social media. The four indicator outcomes featured in Table A24, for example, reflect survey questions comprising:

1. *Do you follow [outlet] on social media?*
2. *When you are on social media, do you often see [outlet] on your feed?*
3. *When you are on social media, do you often click on stories from [outlet]?*
4. *Do you often read stories from [outlet]?*

We therefore only report the results of a “suggestive” IV design in which we leverage these four different exposure and consumption indicators as endogenous regressors to be predicted by treatment assignment. Additionally, we include a z-score index of all four of them. However, we emphasize that because treatment assignment induced participants’ exposure and consumption of news stories *not only* through social media, the coefficients should be interpreted with caution given the potential exclusion restriction violation. To the extent that heterogeneity in exposure and consumption through the study app mirrors that through social media, however, the exercise should still be informative in disentangling the two potential explanations highlighted above.

For estimation, we first split our sample into participants *assignable* to anti-government outlets (i.e., those participants who were categorized as being pro-government at baseline) and those assignable to pro-government outlets (i.e., those participants who were categorized as being anti-government at baseline). Defining outcomes at the assigned outlet level (see Section 4.3), we use Equations (1) and (2) as the first

stages to predict the relevant exposure or consumption indicators as endogenous treatment variables (results are qualitatively identical if we use the pooled or disaggregated treatment vectors). We use analogous versions of Equations (1) and (2) for the second stage, replacing the treatment vector with the instrumented outlet-level measure of exposure or consumption.

Tables A54 and A55 provide the results of this estimation on affinity towards the AKP and opposition, respectively. In Panel A of Table A54, there is little evidence that the impact of being exposed to, or consuming, anti-government outlets has varied impacts on AKP affinity between weaker and stronger partisans. Each of the relevant interaction coefficients is qualitatively relatively small and directionally ambiguous across the different instrumented treatment variables. When using the index, the interaction coefficient is almost exactly zero. In Panel B, there is modest evidence that the impact of being exposed to, or consuming, pro-government outlets had a slightly larger impact on AKP affinity among weak partisans. However, this does not hold universally across instrumented treatment variables; when using the index, the magnitude of the interaction coefficient is substantively relatively small. In Panel A of Table A54, we again find inconsistent evidence that instrumented treatment effects on opposition affinity vary between weaker and stronger partisans; looking at the index, the interaction coefficient is substantively marginal. In Panel B, we find that the null average effects potentially mask some heterogeneity, but these estimates are highly noisy with no coefficient across any specification approaching conventional levels of statistical significance.

Overall, with the caveats noted above, we cautiously interpret the results of the instrumental variables exercise as implying that impacts *conditional on exposure and consumption* were relatively balanced across weaker and stronger partisans; by contrast, these groups varied much more in the extent to which they modified their media diets in response to treatment assignment.

E Co-partisan treatment assignment

While our main results derive from estimating the effects of assigning participants to *cross-partisan* media outlets, we turn to examining how treatment affected participants who were assigned to media outlets aligned with their baseline partisanship—that is, participants holding pro-government (anti-government) beliefs at baseline who were assigned to pro-government (anti-government) outlets. Due to the setup of our study (see Figure 1), we can examine how participants’ assignment to a *co-partisan* media outlet affected outcomes *overall*, as well as how this varied based on whether the participant was *moderated* or *polarized*. Within this sample, the treatment assigned to participants holding strongly pro-government (anti-government) baseline views represented a *moderating* treatment; the treatment assigned to participants holding weakly pro-government (anti-government) baseline views represented a *polarizing* treatment.

This assignment is represented in Table A10, where moderated participants are shaded in blue and polarized participants are shaded in red. To estimate treatment effects, we follow Equation (1) while replacing the block fixed effects with batch strata fixed effects (as we do for our other outcome data sources with substantially smaller sample sizes). We estimate treatment effects using both *pooled* (control; anti-government; pro-government) and *disaggregated* (control; strongly anti-government; weakly anti-government; weakly pro-government; strongly pro-government) treatment vectors. Since participants’ affinity stratum uniquely implies their potential treatment, the latter specification captures the ideologically *moderating* or *polarizing* interpretation of these treatments. Tables A56–A59 demonstrate balanced attrition rates and good rates of balance on baseline covariates, with 2 (4) of the 60 treatment vectors providing evidence of imbalance at the 5% (10%) levels.

Results in A60 indicate that treatment assignment increased co-partisan participants’ exposure to (consumption of) relevant media outlets by 0.56 (0.27) sd among those assigned to anti-government outlets

Table A10: Treatment assignment

<i>Affinity stratum</i>	Control	Anti-govt		Pro-govt	
		Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly
		Gazete Duvar	Medya-scope	Hürriyet	Sabah
<i>Strongly Anti-govt</i>	✓	-	✓	✓	✓
<i>Weakly Anti-govt</i>	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
<i>Weakly Pro-govt</i>	✓	✓	✓	-	✓
<i>Strongly Pro-govt</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	-


Notes: Table presents the treatment assignment stratified by participants' baseline AKP affinity (rows). Participants of a particular baseline affinity can be assigned to an outlet if the cell is represented by a checkmark (✓). Checkmarks in a circle represent the sample used for analysis, where gray indicates Control; red indicates *Polarized* treatment; blue indicates *Moderated* treatment.

and 0.33 (0.18) sd among those assigned to pro-government outlets. The effects on exposure are relatively balanced between treatment conditions in the disaggregated specification, while the effects on consumption are driven by assignment to *polarizing* outlets among those holding more moderate views at baseline. With respect to political attitudes, Table A61 shows that co-partisan participants assigned to pro-government outlets report becoming 0.22 units more favorable towards the AKP on a five-point scale (column 1) and find contentious policy issues to be 0.19 sd less important (column 6). These treatment effects are again driven by those participants experiencing a *polarizing* treatment, who additionally came to view the AKP's policy performance 0.19 sd more positively (column 5). In turn, we find that co-partisan participants assigned to anti-government outlets came to view opposition parties 0.23 units more positively on a five-point scale (column 2); however, no other treatment effects are evident. The effect on opposition affinity is modestly driven by those assigned to a *polarizing* treatment, though the treatment effect itself is insignificant in the disaggregated specification of Panel B.

In terms of trust and media beliefs, in Table A62 we find that co-partisan participants assigned to pro-government outlets came to trust pro-government media sources 0.35 sd more relative to anti-government outlets; came to know 0.20 sd more about them; and viewed them as being 0.24 sd more politically biased. While the effects on knowledge are driven by strong co-partisans assigned to the weakly pro-government (moderating) outlet, the effects on trust and bias perceptions are driven by weak co-partisans assigned to the strongly pro-government (polarizing) outlet. Among co-partisans assigned to anti-government outlets, we find no effects on trust, despite evidence of a 0.17 sd increase in relative knowledge about anti-government outlets and a 0.20 sd increase in the relative perceived informational value of reading stories from such outlets. These effects, in Panel B, are mostly driven by strong co-partisans' assignment to the weakly anti-government (moderating) outlet. Finally, Table A63 shows few lasting changes to affective polarization, while Table A64 shows that co-partisan participants' assignment to pro-government outlets increased their satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye by 0.16 sd and reduced their support for democratic principles by 0.17 sd. By contrast, no treatment effects are apparent among co-partisan participants assigned to anti-government outlets.

F Additional Figures

Figure A5: Average levels of polarization across regime types



Notes: We rescale each variable between 0 and 1 and take average values at the country-year level between 2020 and 2023 (the most recent year for which data is available). For ideological polarization we use `v2smpol1soc`, which measures the extent of “serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues.” For affective polarization we use `v2cacamps`, which measures the extent to which “supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner” (Coppedge et al., 2025).

G Additional Tables

G.1 Descriptive tables

Table A11: Correlates of affinity strata at baseline

	Anti govt		Pro govt		Overall
	Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
A. Demographic characteristics					
Education: Primary	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Education: High school	0.93	0.90	0.88	0.77	0.88
Education: University	0.54	0.52	0.44	0.36	0.47
Age	30.76	28.39	28.90	29.91	29.29
Male	0.67	0.60	0.49	0.43	0.56
Lives in major city	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.43	0.42
Practices religion	0.59	0.83	0.93	0.91	0.82
B. Media consumption					
ICW: Consumption (Anti govt)	0.26	0.07	-0.19	-0.09	0.00
ICW: Consumption (Pro govt)	-0.36	-0.18	0.21	0.13	-0.04
ICW: Main source of news (Digital)	0.14	-0.08	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01
ICW: Main source of news (Traditional)	-0.16	-0.01	0.19	0.26	0.06
C. Political attitudes and behavior					
AKP affinity	1.00	2.57	3.61	4.98	2.88
Opposition affinity	3.48	3.19	3.03	2.96	3.17
AKP vote	0.06	0.20	0.52	0.74	0.35
Opposition vote	0.62	0.30	0.11	0.08	0.28
Would vote for any party	0.73	0.57	0.68	0.84	0.68
ICW: AKP performance	-0.81	-0.28	0.52	0.78	0.02
ICW: Issue importance	0.33	0.00	-0.09	-0.21	0.02
ICW: Political efficacy	0.10	-0.19	0.08	0.53	0.06
ICW: Political engagement	0.30	-0.20	-0.08	0.49	0.04
ICW: Nationalist beliefs	-0.24	0.00	0.15	0.31	0.03
C. Media attitudes and beliefs					
ICW: Media trust (Anti govt)	0.37	0.03	-0.02	-0.07	0.08
ICW: Media trust (Pro govt)	-0.52	-0.06	0.42	0.50	0.08
ICW: Outlet knowledge (Anti govt)	0.07	-0.17	0.04	0.02	-0.02
ICW: Outlet knowledge (Pro govt)	0.05	-0.20	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05
ICW: Perceived media bias (Anti govt)	0.10	-0.05	0.07	0.22	0.06
ICW: Perceived media bias (Pro govt)	0.51	0.04	-0.27	-0.45	-0.03
ICW: Extra info (Anti govt)	0.21	0.03	-0.14	-0.36	-0.04
ICW: Extra info (Pro govt)	0.31	-0.07	-0.16	-0.12	-0.02
D. Broader consequences					
ICW: Perceived echo chamber	0.12	-0.03	-0.02	0.04	0.02
ICW: Satisfaction with democracy in Turkey	-0.80	-0.20	0.43	0.80	0.01
ICW: Support for democratic principles	0.44	0.02	-0.17	-0.26	0.01
E. Social media behavior					
Log Twitter posts	2.18	1.95	1.70	1.36	1.86
Any political posts	0.39	0.43	0.34	0.25	0.37
Any anti-government posts	0.38	0.37	0.29	0.16	0.32
Any pro-government posts	0.34	0.34	0.26	0.23	0.30

Table presents baseline-defined descriptive statistics about study participants according to their affinity stratum. Sample restricted to participants who ultimately completed endline survey.

Table A12: Participants' beliefs about treatment media outlets

	Anti govt		Pro govt		Overall
	Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
A. Perceived pro-government leaning (1-5)					
Political leaning: Gazete Duvar	2.58	2.87	2.84	2.64	2.77
Political leaning: Medyascope	2.73	2.88	2.78	2.68	2.78
Political leaning: Hürriyet	3.67	3.19	2.99	2.83	3.18
Political leaning: Sabah	3.93	3.56	3.22	2.95	3.45
B. Does not know outlet (0-1)					
DNK: Gazete Duvar	0.35	0.48	0.38	0.38	0.40
DNK: Medyascope	0.41	0.50	0.42	0.43	0.44
DNK: Hürriyet	0.08	0.15	0.10	0.09	0.11
DNK: Sabah	0.10	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.12
C. Trust in outlets (1-5)					
Trust outlet: Gazete Duvar	2.76	2.69	2.68	2.78	2.71
Trust outlet: Medyascope	2.84	2.67	2.70	2.69	2.72
Trust outlet: Hürriyet	2.37	2.85	3.42	3.46	3.02
Trust outlet: Sabah	2.04	2.56	3.36	3.55	2.85
D. Consumption of outlets (0-1)					
Read often: Gazete Duvar	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03
Read often: Medyascope	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03
Read often: Hürriyet	0.16	0.11	0.28	0.20	0.20
Read often: Sabah	0.10	0.10	0.29	0.25	0.19

Table presents baseline-defined descriptive statistics about treatment outlets according to participants' affinity stratum. Sample restricted to participants who ultimately completed endline survey.

Table A13: Perceptions of assigned media outlets at endline by treatment assignment

	Anti govt		Pro govt		Overall
	Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
A. Perceptions of outlet bias					
Opposition and biased	0.13	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.10
Opposition but objective	0.22	0.17	0.21	0.17	0.20
Unbiased	0.57	0.65	0.30	0.24	0.46
AKP but objective	0.06	0.08	0.23	0.17	0.12
AKP and biased	0.01	0.03	0.16	0.32	0.13
B. Relative perceived bias					
Assigned outlet is biased relative to normal consumption	2.68	2.54	3.16	3.69	3.08
Surprised by bias of assigned outlet	3.16	3.14	3.32	3.44	3.28
C. Perceived novelty of reported news					
Saw the same stories elsewhere	0.24	0.21	0.37	0.28	0.27
Different perspective on familiar stories	0.43	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.40
New stories	0.33	0.42	0.24	0.34	0.34
D. Attitudes towards outlets					
Liked assigned outlet coverage	3.95	3.96	3.43	3.18	3.60

Table presents descriptive statistics about endline participants' views about their assigned outlet according to which outlet they were assigned to (columns). Questions only administered to participants assigned to a treatment condition.

G.2 Design validation

Table A14: Survey attrition

	Took midline		Took endline		Took midline and endline	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.06 (0.06)		0.06 (0.06)		0.06 (0.06)
Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.05)		-0.05 (0.05)		-0.03 (0.05)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.05 (0.05)		0.03 (0.06)		0.05 (0.05)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.03)		-0.06 (0.04)		-0.04 (0.04)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.05 (0.06)		0.06 (0.07)		0.03 (0.07)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.07)		0.06 (0.08)		0.10 (0.08)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.06)		-0.08 (0.07)		-0.06 (0.07)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.05)		-0.02 (0.06)		0.00 (0.05)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.05 (0.05)		0.02 (0.06)		0.01 (0.06)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.06)		0.05 (0.07)		0.10 (0.07)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.04)		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.06 (0.05)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.04)		-0.05 (0.04)		-0.02 (0.04)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.43	0.41	0.44	0.45	0.25	0.48
p(SPG=WPG)	0.95	0.89	0.98	0.46	0.73	0.57
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.88		0.62		0.14
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.95		0.59		0.37
Control Mean	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.71	0.61	0.61
Control SD	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.49	0.49
Observations	3,137	3,137	3,138	3,138	3,138	3,138

DVs are indicators for baseline participant completing midline, endline, or follow-up survey. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A15: Balance (demographic characteristics and media consumption)

	Education: Primary		Education: Secondary		Education: University		Age		Male		Lives in major city		Practices religion		ICW: Exposure (Anti govt)		ICW: Exposure (Pro govt)		ICW: Main source (Digital)		ICW: Main source (Traditional)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	
A. Pooled estimation																							
Anti Govt	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.16** (0.07)	
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.07)	0.31 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.18)	0.18 (0.16)	0.07 (0.18)	0.18 (0.16)	0.07 (0.18)	0.07 (0.19)	0.18 (0.19)	-0.34* (0.16)	0.29* (0.16)	0.05 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)	0.05 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.16** (0.07)	0.12 (0.15)	
Pro Govt	0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.09 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.12)	0.08 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.04 (0.17)	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.14)	0.07 (0.14)	0.10 (0.15)	0.10 (0.17)	0.10 (0.17)	0.10 (0.17)	-0.21 (0.15)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.16 (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.08 (0.14)	
AG + (AG × Partisan)	0.00 (0.02)		0.30 (0.20)		-0.16 (0.16)		0.09 (0.13)		-0.04 (0.15)		-0.21 (0.17)		0.29** (0.14)		0.02 (0.13)		-0.05 (0.14)		0.06 (0.10)		0.22* (0.13)		
PG + (PG × Partisan)	0.07 (0.07)		0.08 (0.09)		0.09 (0.11)		0.09 (0.14)		-0.17 (0.11)		0.08 (0.11)		0.12 (0.14)		-0.22* (0.13)		-0.01 (0.09)		0.14* (0.08)		0.21* (0.11)		
Joint F-test p-value	0.24	0.75	0.78	0.57	0.61	0.69	0.35	0.67	0.26	0.39	0.75	0.33	0.38	0.34	0.43	0.49	0.29	0.58	0.30	0.26	0.00	0.02	
B. Disaggregated estimation																							
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	0.15 (0.10)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.09 (0.11)	0.27 (0.24)	-0.29 (0.19)	0.06 (0.17)	0.17 (0.19)	-0.46** (0.20)	0.34** (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	0.17 (0.16)	0.17 (0.20)	-0.46** (0.16)	0.34** (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.17 (0.16)	0.17 (0.16)	
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.11 (0.09)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.03 (0.11)	0.00 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.17* (0.09)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.06 (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)	0.09 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	0.19** (0.08)	0.22** (0.09)	
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.04 (0.05)	0.34 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.22)	0.34* (0.18)	-0.09 (0.21)	0.34* (0.18)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.20 (0.24)	0.24 (0.19)	0.24 (0.19)	0.07 (0.18)	0.07 (0.18)	0.14 (0.19)	0.14 (0.19)	0.14 (0.16)	0.07 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.19)	
Weakly Pro Govt	0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.10)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.20** (0.08)	0.15 (0.11)	
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.09 (0.08)	0.11 (0.14)	0.20 (0.18)	0.20 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.21)	-0.14 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.10 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.19)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.13)	0.20** (0.13)	0.15 (0.17)	
Strongly Pro Govt	0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.13 (0.09)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	0.09 (0.08)	0.13 (0.11)	0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.12 (0.07)	0.10 (0.10)	
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.08)	0.04 (0.15)	0.04 (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	0.12 (0.18)	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.18)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.18)	0.02 (0.15)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	0.13 (0.12)	0.03 (0.15)	0.03 (0.15)	
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)	-0.01 (0.03)		0.21 (0.22)		-0.26 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.15)		0.10 (0.16)		-0.31* (0.17)		0.32** (0.15)		0.04 (0.14)		-0.12 (0.14)		-0.01 (0.10)		0.29** (0.13)		
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)	0.02 (0.03)		0.40* (0.22)		-0.06 (0.19)		0.28* (0.16)		-0.19 (0.18)		-0.10 (0.22)		0.26 (0.17)		-0.00 (0.16)		0.04 (0.17)		0.13 (0.14)		0.12 (0.17)		
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)	0.08 (0.08)		0.14 (0.10)		0.16 (0.14)		-0.01 (0.16)		-0.20 (0.13)		-0.10 (0.13)		0.10 (0.17)		-0.26* (0.16)		0.01 (0.12)		0.20** (0.09)		0.28** (0.13)		
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)	0.07 (0.07)		0.03 (0.11)		0.02 (0.12)		0.19 (0.15)		-0.14 (0.11)		0.03 (0.12)		0.15 (0.15)		-0.17 (0.13)		-0.03 (0.10)		0.09 (0.09)		0.13 (0.12)		
Joint F-test p-value	0.47	0.98	0.54	0.58	0.81	0.76	0.25	0.34	0.20	0.38	0.61	0.09	0.24	0.21	0.62	0.72	0.56	0.80	0.53	0.42	0.02	0.04	
p(SAG=WAG)	0.18	0.36	0.14	0.22	0.59	0.96	0.20	0.67	0.09	0.45	0.98	0.62	0.76	0.52	0.31	0.23	0.64	0.75	0.95	0.68	0.63	0.27	
p(SPG=WPG)	0.37	0.46	0.48	0.62	0.60	0.84	0.29	0.85	0.31	0.27	0.15	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.87	0.56	0.73	0.79	0.35	0.66	0.27	0.61	
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.45		0.38		0.24		0.03		0.09		0.25		0.66		0.75		0.30		0.23		0.28	
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.90		0.34		0.31		0.21		0.60		0.46		0.78		0.52		0.69		0.26		0.19	
Observations	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	

Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and endline enumerator fixed effects. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. *p*-values from *F*-tests of the joint significance of all treatment coefficients (and interactions in even-indexed columns) included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A16: Balance (political attitudes)

	AKP affinity		Opposition affinity		AKP vote		Opposition vote		Would vote for any party		ICW: AKP performance		ICW: Issue importance		ICW: Political efficacy		ICW: Political engagement		ICW: Nationalist beliefs	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
A. Pooled estimation																				
Anti Govt	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.08* (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.13 (0.08)
Anti Govt × Partisan				0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.13)	0.05 (0.11)		-0.16* (0.09)		-0.01 (0.10)		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.19)		-0.05 (0.18)		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.12 (0.17)
Pro Govt	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.17* (0.10)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.10)	0.13* (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	-0.11* (0.07)	-0.16* (0.09)	0.05 (0.07)	0.13 (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.00 (0.04)		-0.05 (0.16)		0.11 (0.09)		-0.02 (0.13)		0.04 (0.13)		0.07 (0.10)		0.08 (0.15)		-0.33** (0.15)		0.07 (0.13)		-0.17 (0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.03)		0.07 (0.12)		0.04 (0.07)		-0.03 (0.07)		0.01 (0.06)		-0.13 (0.13)		-0.12 (0.17)		0.00 (0.16)		-0.09 (0.11)		0.00 (0.14)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.06 (0.14)		0.00 (0.03)		-0.08 (0.10)		-0.14 (0.08)		0.10 (0.08)		0.10 (0.11)		-0.06 (0.11)		-0.09 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.12)
Joint F-test p-value	0.72	0.85	0.35	0.61	0.45	0.75	0.15	0.18	0.12	0.17	0.32	0.47	0.69	0.80	0.20	0.08	0.22	0.35	0.38	0.41
B. Disaggregated estimation																				
Strongly Anti Govt	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.09* (0.05)	0.16** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.12)		0.04 (0.12)		-0.25*** (0.09)		-0.09 (0.11)		-0.07 (0.16)		-0.34* (0.20)		-0.05 (0.19)		-0.17 (0.15)		-0.01 (0.18)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.07 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.11)	0.07 (0.09)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.07 (0.08)	0.14 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.05)		0.05 (0.18)		0.08 (0.13)		-0.06 (0.11)		0.09 (0.12)		-0.13 (0.17)		0.09 (0.23)		-0.05 (0.23)		-0.00 (0.17)		-0.25 (0.20)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.08 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.09 (0.09)	0.22* (0.12)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.03 (0.09)	0.18 (0.12)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.04)		-0.13 (0.19)		0.06 (0.11)		-0.09 (0.16)		-0.03 (0.16)		0.11 (0.12)		0.24 (0.18)		-0.28 (0.18)		0.03 (0.17)		-0.28 (0.19)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.24** (0.10)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.08)	0.08 (0.11)	0.16** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.10)	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.21** (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.03 (0.04)		0.03 (0.18)		0.15 (0.10)		0.04 (0.15)		0.09 (0.14)		0.03 (0.11)		-0.07 (0.16)		-0.37** (0.16)		0.10 (0.15)		-0.06 (0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.05 (0.04)		0.04 (0.11)		0.00 (0.07)		-0.09 (0.07)		-0.06 (0.14)		-0.11 (0.14)		-0.25 (0.18)		-0.02 (0.17)		-0.16 (0.12)		0.11 (0.15)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.02)		0.11 (0.17)		0.08 (0.09)		0.03 (0.08)		0.08 (0.15)		-0.15 (0.15)		0.02 (0.20)		0.04 (0.20)		-0.02 (0.14)		-0.10 (0.17)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.09 (0.16)		-0.04 (0.04)		-0.07 (0.11)		-0.12 (0.10)		0.16* (0.09)		0.18 (0.13)		-0.06 (0.14)		-0.07 (0.12)		-0.10 (0.15)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.03 (0.16)		0.04 (0.04)		-0.08 (0.11)		-0.15 (0.10)		0.05 (0.09)		0.01 (0.12)		-0.07 (0.12)		-0.11 (0.11)		0.02 (0.13)
Joint F-test p-value	0.45	0.89	0.71	0.84	0.72	0.59	0.25	0.11	0.16	0.10	0.47	0.75	0.84	0.28	0.29	0.23	0.38	0.49	0.64	0.50
p(SAG=WAG)	0.51	0.58	0.90	0.85	0.52	0.74	0.79	0.37	0.87	0.63	0.67	0.70	0.49	0.10	0.48	0.51	0.83	0.71	0.56	0.75
p(SPG=WPG)	0.11	0.17	0.83	0.28	0.75	0.86	0.28	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.24	0.67	0.66	0.20	0.38	0.43	0.45	0.37	0.69	0.34
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.30		0.63		0.27		0.07		0.03		0.80		0.14		0.73		0.28		0.17
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.83		0.72		0.07		0.96		0.78		0.21		0.19		0.93		0.77		0.39
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and endline enumerator fixed effects. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. *p*-values from *F*-tests of the joint significance of all treatment coefficients (and interactions in even-indexed columns) included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * *p* < 0.1, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01.

Table A17: Balance (trust, media beliefs, and broader consequences)

	ICW: Media trust (Anti govt)		ICW: Media trust (Pro govt)		ICW: Outlet know. (Anti govt)		ICW: Outlet know. (Pro govt)		ICW: Bias (Anti govt)		ICW: Bias (Pro govt)		ICW: Extra info (Anti govt)		ICW: Extra info (Pro govt)		ICW: Echo chamber		ICW: Turkey dem. satisfaction		ICW: Support democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
A. Pooled estimation																						
Anti Govt	0.02 (0.07)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.21** (0.09)	0.11 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.36* (0.18)		0.10 (0.16)		-0.08 (0.18)		0.03 (0.18)		0.39** (0.17)		0.23 (0.17)		0.30* (0.17)		-0.19 (0.18)		-0.10 (0.19)		-0.25 (0.16)		-0.27 (0.17)
Pro Govt	0.08 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	0.09 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.14 (0.14)		0.23* (0.12)		0.03 (0.14)		0.03 (0.17)		0.16 (0.17)		-0.16 (0.14)		0.10 (0.12)		-0.00 (0.15)		0.09 (0.15)		-0.02 (0.15)		0.16 (0.16)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.25 (0.16)		0.02 (0.15)		0.10 (0.16)		0.19 (0.16)		0.30** (0.15)		0.23 (0.16)		-0.18 (0.16)		-0.08 (0.16)		-0.00 (0.16)		-0.20 (0.14)		-0.18 (0.15)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.17 (0.11)		0.25*** (0.10)		-0.05 (0.10)		0.02 (0.11)		-0.11 (0.11)		0.04 (0.09)		-0.07 (0.12)		-0.06 (0.12)		-0.04 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.07)		0.14 (0.13)
Joint F-test p-value	0.50	0.13	0.16	0.07	0.39	0.68	0.30	0.11	0.28	0.13	0.81	0.50	0.71	0.74	0.28	0.50	0.97	1.00	0.99	0.61	0.65	0.32
B. Disaggregated estimation																						
Strongly Anti Govt	0.07 (0.08)	0.17* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.00 (0.10)	0.02 (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.48** (0.20)		0.04 (0.18)		-0.12 (0.19)		0.25 (0.20)		0.39** (0.18)		0.25 (0.18)		-0.30 (0.20)		0.13 (0.20)		-0.14 (0.20)		-0.36** (0.17)		-0.35* (0.18)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.17* (0.09)	-0.31*** (0.11)	0.15* (0.08)	0.15 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.06 (0.11)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.00 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.21 (0.22)		0.15 (0.19)		0.21 (0.22)		0.56*** (0.20)		0.08 (0.21)		0.39* (0.20)		-0.06 (0.22)		-0.36* (0.21)		0.22 (0.22)		-0.13 (0.19)		-0.18 (0.19)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.14** (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.14 (0.17)		0.25* (0.15)		-0.05 (0.17)		0.12 (0.20)		-0.34** (0.17)		-0.02 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.18)		0.03 (0.18)		0.07 (0.19)		-0.11 (0.13)		0.23 (0.19)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.08 (0.07)	0.03 (0.09)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.20 (0.13)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.10)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.01 (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.14 (0.15)		0.21 (0.13)		0.10 (0.16)		0.21 (0.18)		0.05 (0.16)		0.23 (0.14)		-0.03 (0.16)		0.11 (0.16)		-0.01 (0.17)		-0.05 (0.12)		0.09 (0.17)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.31* (0.18)		-0.00 (0.16)		0.00 (0.17)		0.13 (0.18)		0.40*** (0.15)		0.24 (0.16)		-0.26 (0.18)		0.12 (0.17)		-0.14 (0.18)		-0.25 (0.15)		-0.26 (0.16)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.19 (0.20)		0.03 (0.17)		0.22 (0.19)		0.25 (0.19)		0.23 (0.19)		0.26 (0.18)		-0.09 (0.20)		-0.30* (0.18)		0.17 (0.20)		-0.13 (0.17)		-0.10 (0.17)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.17 (0.14)		0.32*** (0.11)		-0.09 (0.12)		0.02 (0.14)		-0.32*** (0.12)		-0.11 (0.11)		-0.04 (0.15)		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.04 (0.09)		0.18 (0.16)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.17 (0.12)		0.19* (0.11)		-0.02 (0.11)		0.01 (0.11)		0.10 (0.12)		0.18* (0.10)		-0.10 (0.13)		-0.03 (0.13)		0.02 (0.13)		-0.05 (0.08)		0.10 (0.14)
Joint F-test p-value	0.58	0.22	0.24	0.16	0.71	0.61	0.40	0.20	0.03	0.00	0.26	0.13	0.89	0.85	0.53	0.21	0.86	0.78	0.77	0.65	0.90	0.59
p(SAG=WAG)	0.23	0.10	0.47	0.32	0.73	0.23	0.23	0.07	0.34	0.08	0.15	0.14	0.55	0.33	0.47	0.48	0.57	0.62	0.38	0.22	0.59	0.95
p(SPG=WPG)	0.97	0.91	0.17	0.25	0.88	0.47	0.45	0.43	0.00	0.59	0.09	0.59	0.84	0.94	0.60	0.81	0.36	0.30	0.32	0.43	0.99	0.55
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.52		0.81		0.22		0.39		0.32		0.86		0.38		0.01		0.11		0.40		0.26
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.98		0.22		0.52		0.93		0.00		0.01		0.66		0.63		0.38		0.88		0.61
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and endline enumerator fixed effects. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. *p*-values from *F*-tests of the joint significance of all treatment coefficients (and interactions in even-indexed columns) included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * *p* < 0.1, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01.

Table A18: Beliefs about research study (follow-up)

	Would be paid differently		Experimenter demands	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Pooled estimation				
Anti Govt	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.01 (0.06)		-0.04 (0.08)
Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.06)		-0.10 (0.06)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.05)		0.02 (0.07)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.03 (0.04)		-0.06 (0.05)
B. Disaggregated estimation				
Strongly Anti Govt	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.07)		-0.01 (0.08)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.07 (0.06)		-0.07 (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.02 (0.07)		-0.09 (0.08)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.11 (0.07)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.07 (0.06)		0.03 (0.08)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.06 (0.04)		0.00 (0.09)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.04 (0.05)		-0.11** (0.06)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.02 (0.05)		-0.02 (0.05)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.80	0.61	0.61	0.48
p(SPG=WPG)	0.28	0.32	0.01	0.03
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.03		0.76
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.62		0.11
Control Mean	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.14
Control SD	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.35
Observations	1,298	1,298	1,306	1,306

DVs: Columns 1-2: Participant believes they would have been paid differently based on their survey responses during the study; 3-4: believes the research team was seeking politically biased responses. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.3 Compliance

Table A19: Study participation by treatment assignment

	Anti govt		Pro govt		Overall
	Strongly	Weakly	Weakly	Strongly	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
A. Self reported following outlet					
Did you follow assigned outlet	0.82	0.80	0.74	0.73	0.77
Followed: Facebook	0.64	0.63	0.51	0.48	0.56
Followed: Twitter	0.50	0.52	0.53	0.50	0.51
B. Validated following outlet					
Validated follow at baseline	0.82	0.79	0.72	0.73	0.77
Confirmed follow: Facebook	0.52	0.57	0.35	0.44	0.48
Confirmed follow: Twitter	0.37	0.30	0.46	0.39	0.38
C. News story consumption					
Have been reading news from assigned outlet	0.76	0.78	0.65	0.58	0.69
How consumed: News links	0.29	0.32	0.16	0.20	0.24
How consumed: Facebook	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.20	0.25
How consumed: Twitter	0.10	0.13	0.14	0.10	0.11
How consumed: Quiz	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
How consumed: Website	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.05
D. Quiz participation					
Share of quizzes taken	0.71	0.76	0.67	0.62	0.68
Average quiz payment	13.57	14.37	13.96	14.25	13.99
Share of quizzes receiving high incentives	0.45	0.48	0.52	0.51	0.49
E. App engagement					
Number of clicked blasts	7.03	5.58	5.36	4.87	5.80
Share of blasts clicked	0.21	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.17
Any clicked blasts	0.57	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.55

Table presents descriptive statistics about endline participants' engagement with their assigned outlet according to which outlet they were assigned to (columns).

Table A20: Following assigned outlet
(Twitter data)

	Following assigned outlet	
	(1)	(2)
A. Pooled estimation		
Anti Govt	0.22*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.19** (0.07)
Pro Govt	0.25*** (0.04)	0.31*** (0.06)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.13 (0.09)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.05)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.18*** (0.06)
B. Disaggregated estimation		
Strongly Anti Govt	0.18*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.06)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.27*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.08)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.34*** (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.27*** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.26** (0.13)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.22*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.07)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.10)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.09)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.04 (0.07)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.13* (0.08)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.22*** (0.07)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.28	0.18
p(SPG=WPG)	0.52	0.18
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.15
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.39
Control Mean	0.03	0.03
Control SD	0.18	0.18
Observations	695	695

DVs: Columns 1-2: Participant validated as following assigned outlet on Twitter following end of treatment period. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.4 Effects on media exposure and consumption

Table A21: Exposure and consumption (midline)

	ICW: Exposure				ICW: Consumption			
	Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.73*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.08)	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.45*** (0.07)	0.52*** (0.08)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.17* (0.10)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.08 (0.18)		0.23 (0.20)		-0.18 (0.18)		0.19 (0.22)
Pro Govt	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.36*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.25** (0.10)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.01 (0.19)		0.01 (0.16)		-0.06 (0.20)		0.04 (0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.67*** (0.16)		0.16 (0.18)		0.34** (0.16)		0.02 (0.19)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.02 (0.17)		0.38*** (0.12)		-0.12 (0.17)		0.29*** (0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.76*** (0.08)	0.81*** (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.53*** (0.08)	0.61*** (0.09)	-0.19** (0.09)	-0.20* (0.11)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.18 (0.18)		0.18 (0.21)		-0.19 (0.20)		0.06 (0.23)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.70*** (0.09)	0.69*** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.36*** (0.08)	0.41*** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.12)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.05 (0.23)		0.28 (0.26)		-0.14 (0.20)		0.32 (0.24)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.39*** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.23* (0.12)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.10 (0.24)		0.13 (0.19)		-0.23 (0.25)		0.10 (0.18)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.11)	0.35*** (0.08)	0.39*** (0.12)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.26*** (0.08)	0.26** (0.12)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.20)		-0.08 (0.17)		0.06 (0.21)		-0.02 (0.17)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.63*** (0.16)		0.14 (0.19)		0.42** (0.18)		-0.14 (0.21)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.74*** (0.21)		0.19 (0.23)		0.27 (0.18)		0.20 (0.21)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.20 (0.22)		0.49*** (0.14)		-0.30 (0.22)		0.33** (0.13)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.10 (0.17)		0.31** (0.13)		0.02 (0.18)		0.25** (0.12)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.45	0.20	0.69	0.60	0.04	0.03	0.12	0.43
p(SPG=WPG)	0.06	0.24	0.66	0.82	0.33	0.82	0.76	0.79
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.55		0.81		0.40		0.04
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.12		0.19		0.10		0.52
Observations	1,839	1,839	1,839	1,839	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-4: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent follows; sees online; and how frequently they see them online; 5-8: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent often clicks on; reads articles from; and whether they prefer pro-government or anti-government sources. See Tables A22-A23 for disaggregated estimates. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A22: Exposure (index components)

	ICW: Exposure				Share of outlets followed				Share of outlets see online				Frequency seen online			
	Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	0.71*** (0.07)	0.78*** (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	0.88*** (0.11)	0.89*** (0.12)	0.19* (0.11)	0.15 (0.12)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.34** (0.17)		-0.05 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.04 (0.06)		-0.07*** (0.02)		-0.00 (0.04)		-0.09 (0.28)		0.00 (0.28)
Pro Govt	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.15)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.42*** (0.15)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.15)		0.00 (0.13)		-0.00 (0.04)		0.00 (0.04)		-0.02 (0.02)		0.01 (0.03)		0.13 (0.23)		-0.05 (0.22)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.45*** (0.15)		-0.08 (0.15)		0.19*** (0.05)		-0.01 (0.06)		0.01 (0.02)		-0.04 (0.04)		0.79*** (0.25)		0.16 (0.25)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.06 (0.12)		0.35*** (0.10)		0.01 (0.03)		0.13*** (0.03)		-0.03 (0.02)		0.05* (0.02)		0.06 (0.17)		0.37** (0.17)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	0.69*** (0.07)	0.79*** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.81*** (0.12)	0.89*** (0.14)	0.14 (0.12)	0.16 (0.13)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.44** (0.17)		-0.11 (0.18)		-0.07 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.07)		-0.07*** (0.02)		-0.01 (0.04)		-0.35 (0.30)		-0.26 (0.29)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.75*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.00 (0.10)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.95*** (0.13)	0.88*** (0.15)	0.24* (0.14)	0.15 (0.15)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.19 (0.22)		-0.01 (0.21)		-0.00 (0.07)		-0.08 (0.08)		-0.07** (0.03)		-0.01 (0.05)		0.24 (0.33)		0.34 (0.35)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.46*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.11)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.01 (0.19)	0.46*** (0.13)	0.49*** (0.18)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.18)		0.10 (0.16)		-0.01 (0.05)		0.04 (0.05)		-0.04 (0.03)		0.04 (0.04)		0.01 (0.28)		-0.09 (0.27)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.10)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.16)	0.37*** (0.12)	0.36** (0.16)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.04 (0.16)		-0.08 (0.14)		0.00 (0.05)		-0.03 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.03)		0.22 (0.25)		-0.01 (0.24)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.35** (0.15)		-0.16 (0.16)		0.16*** (0.05)		0.01 (0.06)		0.02 (0.02)		-0.05 (0.04)		0.55** (0.26)		-0.11 (0.26)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.58*** (0.20)		-0.01 (0.19)		0.22*** (0.07)		-0.05 (0.07)		0.01 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.04)		1.12*** (0.30)		0.48 (0.31)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.14 (0.15)		0.52*** (0.12)		0.02 (0.04)		0.17*** (0.04)		-0.05** (0.02)		0.09*** (0.03)		0.02 (0.21)		0.40** (0.20)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.13)		0.21** (0.10)		0.01 (0.04)		0.10*** (0.03)		-0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.03)		0.10 (0.18)		0.35* (0.19)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.38	0.81	0.30	0.47	0.42	0.88	0.99	0.59	0.81	0.90	0.17	0.31	0.22	0.90	0.42	0.93
p(SPG=WPG)	0.39	0.95	0.01	0.16	0.41	0.37	0.13	0.80	0.02	0.22	0.00	0.08	0.84	0.44	0.45	0.41
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.19		0.34		0.23		0.36		0.93		0.51		0.01		0.03
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.23		0.01		0.71		0.04		0.05		0.00		0.65		0.78
Control Mean	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.18	0.31	0.31	0.07	0.07	0.22	0.22	-0.35	-0.35	-0.13	-0.13
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.01	0.31	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.15	0.15	0.24	0.24	1.52	1.52	1.57	1.57
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of exposure to anti-government/pro-government media outlets online; 5-8: Share of outlets participant follows online; 9-12: Share of outlets participant ever sees when online; 13-16: Frequency participant comes across outlets online. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A23: Consumption (index components)

	ICW: Consumption				Share clicked on				Share read often				Prefer sources			
	Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	0.42*** (0.06)	0.49*** (0.07)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.07)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.14** (0.06)	0.13* (0.07)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.13* (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.18 (0.17)		-0.21 (0.16)		-0.06** (0.03)		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.06*** (0.02)		-0.02 (0.04)		0.17 (0.17)		-0.17 (0.17)
Pro Govt	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.13)		-0.13 (0.12)		-0.03 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.03)		0.11 (0.12)		-0.11 (0.12)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.31** (0.15)		-0.41*** (0.14)		0.02 (0.02)		-0.04* (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)		-0.07* (0.04)		0.30** (0.15)		-0.30** (0.15)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.09 (0.11)		0.11 (0.09)		-0.03* (0.02)		0.03** (0.01)		-0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.10)		-0.01 (0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	0.40*** (0.07)	0.48*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.08)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.10 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.23 (0.18)		-0.18 (0.17)		-0.06** (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)		-0.07*** (0.02)		-0.02 (0.05)		0.17 (0.18)		-0.17 (0.18)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.46*** (0.08)	0.49*** (0.09)	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.16* (0.09)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.18** (0.08)	0.17** (0.09)	-0.18** (0.08)	-0.17** (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.14 (0.21)		-0.25 (0.19)		-0.05 (0.03)		-0.04 (0.03)		-0.06* (0.03)		-0.02 (0.05)		0.15 (0.21)		-0.15 (0.21)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.10)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.01 (0.16)		-0.14 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.04)		0.18 (0.15)		-0.18 (0.15)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.09)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.12* (0.06)	0.14* (0.08)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.10 (0.14)		-0.12 (0.14)		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)		-0.04 (0.02)		-0.04 (0.03)		0.04 (0.13)		-0.04 (0.13)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.26 (0.16)		-0.41*** (0.15)		0.01 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)		-0.09** (0.04)		0.27* (0.16)		-0.27* (0.16)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.36* (0.19)		-0.41** (0.16)		0.02 (0.03)		-0.05* (0.03)		0.02 (0.03)		-0.05 (0.05)		0.32* (0.19)		-0.32* (0.19)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.02 (0.14)		0.11 (0.11)		-0.04** (0.02)		0.05*** (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)		0.02 (0.03)		0.12 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.16 (0.11)		0.11 (0.11)		-0.02 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)		-0.09 (0.11)		0.09 (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.41	0.90	0.33	0.33	0.60	0.96	0.27	0.20	0.59	0.28	0.01	0.04	0.30	0.40	0.30	0.40
p(SPG=WPG)	0.50	0.79	0.74	0.82	0.19	0.66	0.03	0.36	0.91	0.38	0.28	0.57	0.04	0.28	0.04	0.28
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.51		1.00		0.67		0.42		0.97		0.22		0.76		0.76
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.29		0.99		0.28		0.09		0.34		0.36		0.04		0.04
Control Mean	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.13	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.23	0.23	3.03	3.03	2.97	2.97
Control SD	0.99	0.99	1.01	1.01	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.26	0.26	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of consumption of anti-government/pro-government media outlets online; 5-8: Share of outlets participant reports ever clicking on stories from; 9-12: Share of outlets participant reports often reading; 13-16: Participants' preference for different media outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A24: Exposure and consumption of assigned outlets

	Exposure				Consumption			
	Following outlet		See outlet online		Click on outlet		Read outlet	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.55*** (0.03)	0.58*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.03)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.14* (0.07)		-0.13** (0.06)		-0.08 (0.06)		-0.17*** (0.06)
Pro Govt	0.31*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.04)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.02 (0.06)		-0.08 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.06)		-0.15*** (0.05)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.44*** (0.06)		0.21*** (0.05)		0.28*** (0.05)		0.17*** (0.05)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.29*** (0.05)		0.21*** (0.04)		0.26*** (0.04)		0.13*** (0.04)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.53*** (0.03)	0.58*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.24*** (0.08)		-0.09 (0.07)		-0.09 (0.07)		-0.18*** (0.06)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.58*** (0.04)	0.58*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.34*** (0.04)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.04)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.09)		-0.20** (0.08)		-0.09 (0.08)		-0.16** (0.08)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.35*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.05)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.05)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.05 (0.08)		-0.02 (0.08)		0.01 (0.08)		-0.08 (0.07)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.27*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.04)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.09 (0.07)		-0.13** (0.06)		-0.05 (0.06)		-0.20*** (0.06)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.34*** (0.07)		0.27*** (0.06)		0.28*** (0.06)		0.19*** (0.05)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.56*** (0.08)		0.12* (0.07)		0.27*** (0.07)		0.13* (0.07)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.38*** (0.06)		0.32*** (0.06)		0.36*** (0.06)		0.22*** (0.05)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.21*** (0.05)		0.11** (0.05)		0.17*** (0.04)		0.05 (0.04)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.22	0.93	0.05	0.31	0.65	0.70	0.03	0.07
p(SPG=WPG)	0.02	0.59	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.38
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.01		0.05		0.87		0.42
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00
Control Mean	0.22	0.22	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Control SD	0.42	0.42	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32
Observations	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037

DVs: Columns 1-2: Reports following assigned outlet; 3-4: Ever sees assigned outlet online; 5-6: Ever clicks on assigned outlet stories; 7-8: Often reads stories from assigned outlet. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and endline enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Standard errors clustered by participant in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A25: Exposure and consumption of non-assigned outlets on same side

	Exposure				Consumption			
	Following outlet		See outlet online		Click on outlet		Read outlet	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.05)	0.16** (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.01 (0.09)		-0.22* (0.13)		-0.24 (0.16)		-0.27** (0.12)
Pro Govt	0.08** (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	0.16** (0.08)	0.12 (0.11)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.23** (0.10)	0.11 (0.07)	0.21** (0.10)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.05 (0.07)		0.13 (0.16)		-0.07 (0.15)		-0.28* (0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.11 (0.08)		-0.06 (0.11)		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.16 (0.10)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.12** (0.05)		0.24** (0.12)		0.16 (0.12)		-0.06 (0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.09)		-0.31** (0.13)		-0.23 (0.15)		-0.31** (0.12)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.13*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	0.12* (0.07)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.16)		-0.24 (0.19)		-0.21 (0.15)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.08* (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)	0.16 (0.10)	0.09 (0.14)	0.13 (0.10)	0.12 (0.13)	0.03 (0.09)	0.15 (0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.03 (0.09)		0.21 (0.21)		-0.02 (0.20)		-0.32 (0.19)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.08** (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.17** (0.08)	0.14 (0.11)	0.27*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.17** (0.08)	0.27** (0.11)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.07)		0.05 (0.16)		-0.11 (0.16)		-0.24 (0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.08)		-0.21* (0.11)		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.21** (0.10)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.11)		0.10 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.18)		-0.09 (0.13)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.11* (0.06)		0.30* (0.16)		0.11 (0.15)		-0.17 (0.14)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.12** (0.05)		0.20* (0.12)		0.22* (0.13)		0.03 (0.12)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.87	0.99	0.02	0.10	0.65	0.80	0.39	0.64
p(SPG=WPG)	0.93	0.68	0.93	0.67	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.34
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.65		0.01		0.94		0.26
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.80		0.52		0.44		0.16
Control Mean	0.30	0.30	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.62	0.62
Control SD	0.50	0.50	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	1.02	1.02
Observations	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037	3,037

DVs: Columns 1-2: Reports following assigned outlet; 3-4: Ever sees assigned outlet online; 5-6: Ever clicks on assigned outlet stories; 7-8: Often reads stories from assigned outlet. Outlets comprise non-assigned outlets sharing partisanship with assigned outlet. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and endline enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Standard errors clustered by participant in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A26: Main source of information

	ICW: Online sources		ICW: Traditional sources		Websites		Social media		Social messaging		Online papers		Print papers		TV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.00 (0.16)		-0.31* (0.17)		-0.04 (0.06)		0.03 (0.09)		0.03 (0.07)		-0.05 (0.08)		-0.15** (0.06)		-0.04 (0.08)
Pro Govt	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.03 (0.12)		-0.09 (0.14)		0.03 (0.05)		-0.04 (0.06)		0.03 (0.06)		0.02 (0.07)		-0.04 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.07)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.14)		-0.40*** (0.15)		-0.07 (0.05)		0.06 (0.07)		0.05 (0.06)		-0.06 (0.07)		-0.13** (0.06)		-0.14* (0.07)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.09)		-0.19* (0.11)		0.03 (0.04)		0.01 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.05)		0.01 (0.05)		-0.06 (0.04)		-0.06 (0.05)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	-0.17** (0.07)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.06 (0.18)		-0.20 (0.18)		0.00 (0.07)		0.01 (0.09)		0.09 (0.08)		-0.03 (0.09)		-0.08 (0.07)		-0.05 (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.05)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.08 (0.20)		-0.46** (0.21)		-0.09 (0.07)		0.07 (0.10)		-0.06 (0.09)		-0.07 (0.10)		-0.24*** (0.08)		-0.04 (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.01 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.16** (0.08)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.15)		-0.04 (0.16)		0.08 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.08)		0.10 (0.08)		-0.05 (0.08)		-0.02 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.02 (0.13)		-0.12 (0.15)		-0.02 (0.06)		-0.05 (0.07)		-0.02 (0.06)		0.08 (0.07)		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.08)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.07 (0.16)		-0.32** (0.16)		-0.04 (0.06)		0.06 (0.08)		0.09 (0.07)		-0.05 (0.07)		-0.09 (0.06)		-0.13 (0.08)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.05 (0.16)		-0.51*** (0.19)		-0.11* (0.06)		0.07 (0.09)		-0.02 (0.08)		-0.05 (0.08)		-0.18** (0.07)		-0.14 (0.10)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.03 (0.11)		-0.21* (0.13)		0.05 (0.05)		-0.00 (0.06)		0.02 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.07)		-0.05 (0.04)		-0.09 (0.07)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.10)		-0.18 (0.11)		0.03 (0.05)		0.02 (0.05)		-0.05 (0.05)		0.04 (0.06)		-0.07 (0.04)		-0.05 (0.06)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.83	0.79	0.51	0.37	0.83	0.59	0.45	0.21	0.76	0.32	0.35	0.37	0.16	0.05	0.64	0.46
p(SPG=WPG)	0.50	0.20	0.43	0.24	0.21	0.01	0.44	0.40	0.92	0.15	0.72	0.19	0.76	0.27	0.37	0.48
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.45		0.28		0.22		0.92		0.12		0.96		0.15		0.84
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.94		0.78		0.70		0.66		0.21		0.26		0.74		0.49
Control Mean	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.67	0.67	0.23	0.23	0.33	0.33	0.15	0.15	0.57	0.57
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.01	0.37	0.37	0.47	0.47	0.42	0.42	0.47	0.47	0.35	0.35	0.50	0.50
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208	2,208

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of main source of information comprising online sources; 3-4: Index of main source of information comprising traditional media sources; 5-16: Main sources of information include media format listed in column header. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * *p* < 0.1, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01.

G.5 Changes in political attitudes

Table A27: Effects on political attitudes (midline)

	AKP affinity		AKP vote		Opposition affinity		Opposition vote		ICW: AKP Performance		ICW: Issue importance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Pooled estimation												
Anti Govt	-0.15*	-0.29***	-0.06	-0.07	0.11	0.17*	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.21**	0.26***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.45**		0.05		-0.24		-0.02		-0.33*		-0.21
		(0.23)		(0.08)		(0.26)		(0.08)		(0.18)		(0.21)
Pro Govt	-0.21**	-0.01	0.05**	0.06	-0.12	-0.06	-0.08**	-0.05	0.14**	0.16*	0.03	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.40**		-0.02		-0.17		-0.08		-0.01		-0.11
		(0.19)		(0.05)		(0.16)		(0.07)		(0.13)		(0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.16		-0.02		-0.06		-0.03		-0.32**		0.04
		(0.21)		(0.07)		(0.24)		(0.07)		(0.16)		(0.19)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.41**		0.04		-0.23*		-0.13**		0.15*		-0.04
		(0.16)		(0.03)		(0.12)		(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation												
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.23**	-0.32***	-0.04	-0.06	0.11	0.19*	-0.01	0.01	-0.10	-0.07	0.20**	0.22**
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.27		0.09		-0.31		-0.09		-0.11		-0.14
		(0.25)		(0.09)		(0.29)		(0.09)		(0.20)		(0.23)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.05	-0.24**	-0.08*	-0.08	0.11	0.16	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.12	0.22**	0.29***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.66**		0.01		-0.16		0.05		-0.58***		-0.31
		(0.27)		(0.10)		(0.31)		(0.10)		(0.21)		(0.25)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.37***	-0.22*	0.05	0.05	-0.05	-0.00	-0.04	0.02	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.34		0.00		-0.21		-0.15		0.06		-0.04
		(0.25)		(0.07)		(0.20)		(0.09)		(0.18)		(0.18)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.08	0.16	0.05*	0.06	-0.17**	-0.11	-0.10***	-0.10*	0.18***	0.21**	-0.00	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.49**		-0.04		-0.14		-0.03		-0.05		-0.15
		(0.20)		(0.06)		(0.17)		(0.08)		(0.13)		(0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.05		0.03		-0.12		-0.08		-0.19		0.09
		(0.22)		(0.07)		(0.27)		(0.07)		(0.18)		(0.20)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.41*		-0.07		0.00		0.03		-0.46**		-0.02
		(0.24)		(0.09)		(0.29)		(0.09)		(0.18)		(0.22)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.56**		0.06		-0.21		-0.13*		0.17		0.05
		(0.22)		(0.04)		(0.16)		(0.08)		(0.14)		(0.13)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.33**		0.03		-0.25*		-0.13**		0.16*		-0.11
		(0.16)		(0.04)		(0.13)		(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.12)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.06	0.45	0.28	0.56	0.99	0.79	0.79	0.38	0.19	0.06	0.78	0.47
p(SPG=WPG)	0.00	0.00	0.96	0.86	0.19	0.37	0.16	0.04	0.34	0.36	0.33	0.74
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.03		0.22		0.65		0.22		0.11		0.59
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.23		0.46		0.80		0.99		0.94		0.22
Control Mean	2.89	2.89	0.32	0.32	2.87	2.87	0.45	0.45	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00
Control SD	1.34	1.34	0.47	0.47	1.24	1.24	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.02	1.02
Observations	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833

DVs: Columns 1-2: Affinity towards AKP (scale 1-5); 3-4: Respondent intends to vote for AKP if election were to be held tomorrow; 5-6: Affinity towards opposition parties (scale 1-5); 7-8: Respondent intends to vote for an opposition party if an election were to be held tomorrow; 9-10: ICW index of perceived government performance across eight contentious issue areas; 11-12: ICW index of perceived importance of eight contentious issue areas. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A28: Effects on party voting intentions

	People's Alliance						Nation Alliance						Other							
	Any		AKP		MHP		Any		CHP		İyi		DEVA		Other		HDP		Other	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
A. Pooled estimation																				
Anti Govt	-0.06*	-0.04	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.02*	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.06		-0.04		-0.01		0.07		0.03		0.02		0.00		0.01		-0.01		0.00
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Pro Govt	0.05**	0.08**	0.04*	0.05	0.01	0.02	-0.07**	-0.05	-0.06**	-0.00	-0.01	-0.04	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.09**		-0.05		-0.04		-0.02		-0.11*		0.05		0.04		0.01		0.01		0.00
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.11*		-0.09		-0.01		0.05		0.05		0.01		-0.02		0.01		-0.00		-0.00
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.00)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.01		0.01		-0.02		-0.07		-0.12**		0.01		0.02		0.02		0.01		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
B. Disaggregated estimation																				
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.04		-0.04		0.01		0.04		0.04		-0.01		-0.00		0.01		-0.01		0.00
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.10**	-0.08	-0.10***	-0.09*	-0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.09		-0.05		-0.04		0.11		0.03		0.06		0.00		0.02		-0.02		-0.00
		(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.07**	0.10**	0.05*	0.07*	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.00	-0.06*	0.03	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.09*		-0.05		-0.04		-0.09		-0.16**		0.03		0.03		0.03		-0.01		0.01
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.04	-0.00	0.02	-0.08**	-0.09*	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.08*		-0.04		-0.04		0.03		-0.07		0.07		0.05		-0.00		0.02		-0.00
		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.06		-0.06		0.01		0.01		0.03		-0.01		-0.02		0.01		-0.01		0.00
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.17**		-0.14*		-0.04		0.10		0.06		0.04		-0.01		0.01		-0.00		-0.00
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.01		0.02		-0.01		-0.09		-0.14**		0.01		0.02		0.02		-0.00		0.01
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.02		-0.00		-0.02		-0.06		-0.10**		0.01		0.03		0.01		0.02		0.01
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.04	0.17	0.03	0.09	0.88	0.62	0.16	0.56	0.13	0.23	0.93	0.46	0.98	1.00	0.29	0.21	0.29	0.19	0.33	0.37
p(SPG=WPG)	0.17	0.37	0.38	0.41	0.23	0.62	0.49	0.07	0.90	0.27	0.34	0.13	0.68	0.61	0.70	0.20	0.68	0.52	0.24	0.06
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.09		0.20		0.13		0.10		0.57		0.24		0.70		0.47		0.62		0.21
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.27		0.49		0.36		0.57		0.48		0.93		0.61		0.41		0.19		0.82
Control Mean	0.33	0.33	0.27	0.27	0.06	0.06	0.41	0.41	0.28	0.28	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Control SD	0.47	0.47	0.44	0.44	0.23	0.23	0.49	0.49	0.45	0.45	0.29	0.29	0.17	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.14	0.09	0.09
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Which party participant would vote for in an imminent election. Columns 1-2 reflect intended vote choice for any member of the ruling People's Alliance coalition; Columns 7-8 reflect intended vote choice for any member of the Nation Alliance opposition coalition. 'Other' parties in columns 15-16 include Felicity Party (Saadet) and Future Party (GP). 'Other' parties in columns 19-20 include Democratic Left Party (DSP), Country Party (VP), Free Cause Party (HÜDAPAR) and Homeland Party (Memleket). Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A29: Effects on turnout intentions

	Would vote for any party		Would not vote		Do not know	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	-0.05*	-0.05	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.03		-0.01		0.01
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Pro Govt	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05		0.01		0.05
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.05)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.07		-0.01		0.05
		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.04)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.05		0.01		0.04
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.04	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.05		0.02		0.01
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.07*	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.00		-0.06		0.01
		(0.08)		(0.04)		(0.06)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.02	0.07	-0.04*	-0.06	0.02	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.13*		0.05		0.08
		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.06)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.04	-0.05	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.01		-0.02		0.02
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.07		0.02		0.03
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.07		-0.03		0.06
		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.05)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.06		-0.01		0.07
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.05)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.04		0.02		0.02
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.30	0.25	0.61	0.37	0.40	0.38
p(SPG=WPG)	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.55	0.77
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.93		0.05		0.43
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.74		0.32		0.23
Control Mean	0.80	0.80	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Control SD	0.40	0.40	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Reports any party they would vote for; 3-4: Reports they would not vote; 5-6: Does not know who they would vote for. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A30: Effects on perceived government performance

	Corruption		Environment		EU Membership		Femicides		Press freedom		Inflation		Kurdish issues		Syrian refugees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.15 (0.24)		0.07 (0.23)		-0.27 (0.23)		-0.29 (0.24)		-0.07 (0.23)		-0.14 (0.23)		0.06 (0.25)		0.09 (0.24)
Pro Govt	0.11 (0.07)	0.13 (0.11)	0.16** (0.08)	0.28** (0.12)	0.15** (0.07)	0.21* (0.11)	0.11 (0.07)	0.15 (0.11)	0.13* (0.07)	0.19* (0.11)	0.07 (0.07)	0.09 (0.10)	0.15* (0.08)	0.24** (0.11)	0.16** (0.08)	0.14 (0.11)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.04 (0.14)		-0.33** (0.16)		-0.10 (0.15)		-0.05 (0.15)		-0.15 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.14)		-0.23 (0.17)		0.03 (0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.20 (0.22)		-0.07 (0.21)		-0.26 (0.21)		-0.17 (0.22)		-0.13 (0.21)		-0.20 (0.21)		-0.00 (0.22)		0.15 (0.22)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.12)		0.10 (0.10)		0.10 (0.10)		0.04 (0.10)		0.06 (0.10)		0.01 (0.12)		0.16 (0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.00 (0.11)	0.11 (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.11)	0.13 (0.10)	0.08 (0.11)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.26)		0.21 (0.25)		-0.11 (0.25)		-0.16 (0.26)		0.13 (0.25)		-0.02 (0.25)		0.22 (0.26)		0.29 (0.26)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.21* (0.12)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.07 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.35 (0.29)		-0.10 (0.30)		-0.45 (0.29)		-0.47 (0.30)		-0.30 (0.30)		-0.30 (0.27)		-0.14 (0.31)		-0.17 (0.30)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.10 (0.09)	0.15 (0.14)	0.14 (0.10)	0.24* (0.14)	0.12 (0.09)	0.21* (0.13)	0.10 (0.09)	0.08 (0.13)	0.08 (0.09)	0.17 (0.13)	0.11 (0.09)	0.12 (0.12)	0.22** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.13)	0.23** (0.09)	0.21 (0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.14 (0.18)		-0.24 (0.20)		-0.16 (0.18)		0.07 (0.18)		-0.25 (0.18)		0.01 (0.17)		-0.33* (0.20)		0.02 (0.19)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.12)	0.17** (0.09)	0.32** (0.13)	0.18** (0.08)	0.20* (0.12)	0.13 (0.08)	0.20* (0.12)	0.17** (0.08)	0.20* (0.12)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.11)	0.09 (0.09)	0.15 (0.12)	0.10 (0.08)	0.07 (0.12)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.05 (0.15)		-0.40** (0.18)		-0.05 (0.17)		-0.14 (0.16)		-0.07 (0.16)		-0.07 (0.15)		-0.14 (0.18)		0.03 (0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.01 (0.23)		0.10 (0.22)		-0.11 (0.22)		0.00 (0.23)		0.12 (0.23)		-0.09 (0.23)		0.14 (0.24)		0.37 (0.23)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.41 (0.27)		-0.29 (0.27)		-0.43* (0.26)		-0.40 (0.28)		-0.41 (0.27)		-0.37 (0.25)		-0.19 (0.28)		-0.15 (0.27)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.12)		-0.00 (0.14)		0.05 (0.12)		0.15 (0.12)		-0.07 (0.12)		0.14 (0.13)		0.02 (0.15)		0.23* (0.13)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.16 (0.10)		-0.08 (0.13)		0.15 (0.12)		0.06 (0.10)		0.13 (0.11)		-0.00 (0.10)		0.01 (0.14)		0.10 (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.40	0.78	0.28	0.49	0.68	0.87	0.27	0.43	0.14	0.35	0.75	0.97	0.75	0.83	0.18	0.59
p(SPG=WPG)	0.87	0.78	0.74	0.57	0.50	0.95	0.71	0.35	0.28	0.80	0.32	0.65	0.14	0.10	0.13	0.26
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.11		0.14		0.17		0.12		0.05		0.22		0.20		0.03
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.17		0.57		0.37		0.41		0.08		0.25		0.92		0.25
Control Mean	2.06	2.06	2.60	2.60	2.38	2.38	2.04	2.04	2.26	2.26	2.02	2.02	2.60	2.60	2.14	2.14
Control SD	1.27	1.27	1.41	1.41	1.27	1.27	1.28	1.28	1.32	1.32	1.24	1.24	1.31	1.31	1.32	1.32
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-16: Perceptions of government performance on issue area listed in column header (1-5 scale). Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * *p* < 0.1, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01.

Table A31: Effects on perceived importance of policy areas

	Corruption		Environment		EU Membership		Femicides		Press freedom		Inflation		Kurdish issues		Syrian refugees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	0.09 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)	0.18* (0.11)	0.10* (0.06)	0.13* (0.11)	0.05 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.13 (0.10)	0.20* (0.11)	0.17* (0.09)	0.16 (0.10)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.04 (0.18)		0.02 (0.16)		-0.43* (0.23)		-0.13 (0.14)		-0.36* (0.21)		-0.10 (0.15)		-0.29 (0.25)		-0.02 (0.25)
Pro Govt	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.20*** (0.07)	-0.16* (0.10)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.12)	0.01 (0.08)	0.11 (0.12)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.11)		-0.05 (0.14)		-0.01 (0.18)		0.02 (0.10)		-0.06 (0.15)		-0.07 (0.11)		-0.04 (0.19)		-0.30* (0.17)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.16)		0.01 (0.14)		-0.26 (0.21)		-0.01 (0.12)		-0.24 (0.19)		-0.19 (0.13)		-0.09 (0.22)		0.14 (0.23)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.08)		0.04 (0.11)		-0.01 (0.14)		-0.00 (0.08)		-0.23** (0.11)		-0.05 (0.09)		-0.18 (0.15)		-0.19 (0.13)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	0.12 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.12)	0.09 (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.10 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)	0.23** (0.10)	0.22** (0.11)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.20)		0.01 (0.19)		-0.24 (0.26)		-0.08 (0.16)		-0.28 (0.24)		-0.04 (0.17)		-0.12 (0.28)		-0.06 (0.27)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.05 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.25** (0.11)	0.38*** (0.13)	0.11 (0.07)	0.15** (0.08)	0.11 (0.10)	0.22** (0.11)	-0.15* (0.08)	-0.12 (0.09)	0.17 (0.12)	0.28** (0.13)	0.08 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.11 (0.22)		0.05 (0.18)		-0.65** (0.28)		-0.19 (0.16)		-0.47* (0.25)		-0.16 (0.18)		-0.47 (0.29)		0.01 (0.31)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.01 (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.12 (0.11)	0.02 (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.15)	0.11 (0.10)	0.21 (0.14)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.28 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.22)		-0.05 (0.13)		-0.10 (0.18)		-0.23* (0.14)		-0.26 (0.23)		-0.29 (0.20)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.12)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.21*** (0.08)	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.02 (0.13)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.04 (0.12)		0.15 (0.15)		0.01 (0.19)		0.09 (0.11)		-0.04 (0.17)		0.06 (0.12)		0.15 (0.21)		-0.31 (0.19)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.18)		0.01 (0.17)		-0.22 (0.23)		0.03 (0.14)		-0.23 (0.22)		-0.11 (0.15)		0.02 (0.25)		0.16 (0.25)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.03 (0.20)		0.03 (0.17)		-0.28 (0.26)		-0.04 (0.14)		-0.25 (0.23)		-0.27* (0.16)		-0.19 (0.25)		0.08 (0.28)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.05 (0.11)		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.09 (0.17)		-0.06 (0.10)		-0.22 (0.14)		-0.11 (0.11)		-0.34* (0.17)		-0.07 (0.15)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.08)		0.20* (0.11)		0.05 (0.15)		0.05 (0.08)		-0.23* (0.12)		-0.00 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.16)		-0.29** (0.14)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.36	0.61	0.91	0.81	0.01	0.00	0.73	0.49	0.21	0.06	0.52	0.63	0.52	0.22	0.15	0.18
p(SPG=WPG)	0.88	0.42	0.15	0.46	0.22	0.47	0.50	0.78	0.68	0.48	0.66	0.03	0.58	0.41	0.05	0.12
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.40		0.91		0.82		0.64		0.94		0.32		0.40		0.75
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.26		0.01		0.35		0.27		0.92		0.24		0.08		0.14
Control Mean	4.55	4.55	4.45	4.45	3.30	3.30	4.70	4.70	3.73	3.73	4.62	4.62	3.33	3.33	3.97	3.97
Control SD	0.88	0.88	0.85	0.85	1.28	1.28	0.73	0.73	1.22	1.22	0.81	0.81	1.37	1.37	1.28	1.28
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-16: Perceptions of importance of issue area listed in column header (1-5 scale). Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.6 Changes in trust and media beliefs

Table A32: Effects on trust and media beliefs (midline)

	ICW: Media trust (relative)		ICW: Outlet knowledge (relative)		ICW: Perceived bias (relative)		ICW: Extra info (relative)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.16* (0.09)	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.02 (0.15)		-0.27 (0.21)		-0.00 (0.21)		-0.50*** (0.18)
Pro Govt	0.26*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.08)	0.14 (0.09)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.23*** (0.08)	-0.21** (0.10)	0.20** (0.08)	0.29*** (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.15 (0.13)		0.01 (0.20)		-0.06 (0.17)		-0.29* (0.18)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.25* (0.13)		-0.31* (0.18)		-0.17 (0.19)		-0.57*** (0.16)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.35*** (0.11)		0.13 (0.16)		-0.27** (0.13)		-0.00 (0.15)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.21*** (0.08)	-0.15* (0.09)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.16)		-0.29 (0.24)		0.10 (0.22)		-0.32* (0.19)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.24*** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.09)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.22** (0.11)	-0.20 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.01 (0.17)		-0.23 (0.25)		-0.11 (0.27)		-0.69*** (0.21)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.19** (0.08)	0.14 (0.10)	0.09 (0.12)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.19* (0.10)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.17* (0.10)	0.26** (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.09 (0.17)		-0.15 (0.26)		-0.28 (0.21)		-0.37* (0.21)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.31*** (0.07)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.18* (0.10)	0.09 (0.13)	-0.26*** (0.09)	-0.31*** (0.12)	0.23*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.18 (0.14)		0.13 (0.22)		0.12 (0.18)		-0.25 (0.18)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.21 (0.14)		-0.29 (0.22)		-0.04 (0.20)		-0.47*** (0.17)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.27* (0.14)		-0.32 (0.22)		-0.31 (0.24)		-0.66*** (0.19)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.24* (0.14)		0.00 (0.21)		-0.37** (0.16)		-0.10 (0.18)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.42*** (0.11)		0.21 (0.18)		-0.19 (0.14)		0.07 (0.15)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.23	0.20	0.37	0.43	0.25	0.60	0.25	0.04
p(SPG=WPG)	0.09	0.30	0.44	0.68	0.43	0.09	0.51	0.61
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.64		0.92		0.23		0.25
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.13		0.32		0.21		0.24
Observations	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833	1,833

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of trust in pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: Index of knowledge about pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 5-6: Index of perceived extent of bias of pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 7-8: Index of perceived informational value of consuming pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A33: Trust in media outlets

	ICW: Media trust (relative)		ICW: Media trust (Anti govt)		ICW: Media trust (Pro govt)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.13 (0.14)		0.02 (0.18)		-0.16 (0.17)
Pro Govt	0.15*** (0.05)	0.15** (0.07)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.08)	0.15** (0.06)	0.20** (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.11)		-0.09 (0.12)		-0.17 (0.13)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.36*** (0.12)		0.22 (0.17)		-0.19 (0.16)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.11 (0.09)		-0.05 (0.09)		0.04 (0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.09 (0.15)		-0.01 (0.19)		-0.18 (0.18)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.07)	0.24*** (0.08)	0.23*** (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.18 (0.16)		0.04 (0.23)		-0.15 (0.21)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.13* (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)	0.14 (0.10)	0.20*** (0.08)	0.23** (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.03 (0.14)		-0.13 (0.14)		-0.10 (0.16)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.17*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.11 (0.07)	0.18* (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.11 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.13)		-0.22 (0.14)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.30** (0.13)		0.17 (0.17)		-0.19 (0.16)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.45*** (0.15)		0.27 (0.21)		-0.22 (0.20)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.12 (0.11)		0.01 (0.10)		0.13 (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.09)		-0.10 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.10)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.20	0.38	0.43	0.59	0.45	0.40
p(SPG=WPG)	0.49	0.17	0.04	0.03	0.14	0.55
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.27		0.61		0.81
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.71		0.26		0.08
Observations	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of trust in pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: Index of trust in anti-government outlets; 5-6: Index of trust in pro-government outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A34: Outlet knowledge

	ICW: Outlet knowledge (relative)		ICW: Outlet knowledge (Anti govt)		ICW: Outlet knowledge (Pro govt)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.25*** (0.08)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.21 (0.14)		-0.27** (0.13)		-0.04 (0.15)
Pro Govt	0.04 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.08)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.23* (0.13)		-0.01 (0.12)		0.23* (0.13)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.04 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.11)		-0.07 (0.13)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.10)		-0.03 (0.09)		0.13 (0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.17*** (0.07)	-0.22*** (0.08)	0.12** (0.06)	0.17** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.21 (0.14)		-0.16 (0.13)		0.03 (0.14)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.17 (0.17)		-0.38** (0.15)		-0.12 (0.19)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.06 (0.08)	-0.19* (0.10)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.09)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.52*** (0.16)		-0.28* (0.15)		0.24 (0.15)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.00 (0.14)		0.23* (0.12)		0.23 (0.14)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.01 (0.12)		0.01 (0.12)		-0.02 (0.12)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.11 (0.15)		-0.09 (0.13)		-0.13 (0.17)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.32*** (0.12)		-0.23** (0.11)		0.10 (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.02 (0.10)		0.14 (0.09)		0.15 (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.20	0.39	0.14	0.06	0.96	0.52
p(SPG=WPG)	0.59	0.07	0.17	0.17	0.32	0.51
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.38		0.31		0.37
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.00		0.00		0.55
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of knowledge about pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: Index of knowledge about anti-government outlets; 5-6: Index of knowledge about pro-government outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A35: Perceptions of media bias

	ICW: Perceived bias (relative)		Political leaning				Reporting bias			
			Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation										
Anti Govt	0.15*	0.20**	-0.01	0.01	0.07	0.15**	-0.10	-0.10	0.11	0.17*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.28		-0.05		-0.32*		0.10		-0.19
		(0.20)		(0.19)		(0.17)		(0.20)		(0.17)
Pro Govt	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.06	-0.02	0.00	-0.13*	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.00		-0.06		-0.10		-0.15		-0.03
		(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.14)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.08		-0.04		-0.17		-0.01		-0.02
		(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.16)		(0.18)		(0.15)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.02		-0.00		-0.10		-0.24**		-0.11
		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation										
Strongly Anti Govt	0.16*	0.17*	-0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.11	-0.08	-0.03	0.13*	0.16*
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.05		0.01		-0.17		-0.12		-0.04
		(0.21)		(0.21)		(0.19)		(0.21)		(0.19)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.14	0.24**	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.20**	-0.14	-0.20*	0.09	0.17
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.56**		-0.15		-0.50**		0.35		-0.40*
		(0.24)		(0.24)		(0.20)		(0.26)		(0.21)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.14*	-0.16	0.10	0.09	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.10	-0.10	-0.18
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.05		-0.05		-0.21		-0.23		0.14
		(0.17)		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.18)		(0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.26***	-0.25**	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05		-0.07		-0.02		-0.08		-0.17
		(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.14)		(0.16)		(0.15)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.12		-0.02		-0.06		-0.15		0.13
		(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.17)		(0.19)		(0.17)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.31		-0.07		-0.30		0.16		-0.23
		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.19)		(0.24)		(0.18)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.11		0.04		-0.17		-0.13		-0.04
		(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.14)		(0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.06		-0.03		-0.04		-0.34***		-0.18
		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.77	0.44	0.33	0.20	0.73	0.23	0.47	0.08	0.58	0.96
p(SPG=WPG)	0.00	0.01	0.39	0.52	0.71	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.74	0.10
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.03		0.81		0.15		0.15		0.04
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.15		0.53		0.27		0.12		0.24
Control Mean	-0.01	-0.01	0.16	0.16	-0.00	-0.00	2.30	2.30	1.80	1.80
Control SD	1.01	1.01	0.93	0.93	0.97	0.97	1.00	1.00	0.96	0.96
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,207	2,207	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of perceived extent of bias of pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; Columns 3-4: Beliefs in extent of political leaning of anti-government outlets; 5-6: Beliefs in extent of political leaning of anti-government outlets; 7-8: Beliefs in extent of bias in reporting decisions of anti-government outlets; 9-10: Beliefs in extent of political leaning of anti-government outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. $p(SAG=WAG)$ and $p(SPG=WPG)$ provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; $p(SAG-P=WAG-P)$ and $p(SPG-P=WPG-P)$ does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A36: Extra information from reading different outlets

	ICW: Extra info (relative)		Reading anti after pro		Reading pro after anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.20 (0.18)		-0.04 (0.19)		0.33 (0.23)
Pro Govt	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.23*** (0.09)	0.18 (0.11)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.02 (0.14)		0.14 (0.18)		0.10 (0.18)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.18 (0.16)		-0.06 (0.17)		0.28 (0.21)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.17 (0.11)		0.01 (0.14)		0.27* (0.14)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.13 (0.19)		0.16 (0.22)		0.41* (0.24)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.01 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.29 (0.21)		-0.28 (0.22)		0.23 (0.28)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.12)	0.04 (0.11)	0.04 (0.15)	0.22** (0.11)	0.17 (0.14)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.05 (0.18)		0.02 (0.22)		0.13 (0.22)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.26*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.09)	-0.18** (0.09)	-0.26** (0.12)	0.23** (0.09)	0.18 (0.12)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.09 (0.16)		0.22 (0.19)		0.07 (0.20)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.18)		0.12 (0.19)		0.39* (0.22)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.24 (0.20)		-0.29 (0.19)		0.13 (0.25)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.13)		0.06 (0.16)		0.30* (0.17)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.19 (0.12)		-0.04 (0.15)		0.25 (0.16)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.48	0.47	0.70	0.71	0.25	0.49
p(SPG=WPG)	0.08	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.90	0.92
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.59		0.03		0.23
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.72		0.49		0.73
Control Mean	-0.00	-0.00	2.98	2.98	2.63	2.63
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.24	1.24	1.24	1.24
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of perceived informational value of consuming pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: How much extra information from reading anti-government outlets having read pro-government coverage; How much extra information from reading pro-government outlets having read anti-government coverage. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A37: Trust in sources of information

	ICW: Online sources		ICW: Traditional sources		News websites		Social media		Print media		TV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Pooled estimation												
Anti Govt	0.11 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)	0.18** (0.08)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.01 (0.20)		0.12 (0.16)		-0.06 (0.18)		0.03 (0.22)		0.13 (0.19)		0.09 (0.18)
Pro Govt	0.07 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	0.03 (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.11 (0.07)	0.18* (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.13)		-0.03 (0.14)		-0.13 (0.15)		-0.16 (0.14)		-0.13 (0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.11 (0.18)		-0.02 (0.15)		-0.06 (0.16)		0.21 (0.20)		0.04 (0.17)		-0.09 (0.16)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.10)		-0.04 (0.10)		0.04 (0.10)		-0.05 (0.12)		0.02 (0.11)		-0.11 (0.12)
B. Disaggregated estimation												
Strongly Anti Govt	0.00 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.18*** (0.07)	-0.17** (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.11 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.23*** (0.08)	-0.23*** (0.09)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.21)		0.07 (0.18)		-0.22 (0.19)		-0.00 (0.23)		0.04 (0.21)		0.11 (0.20)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.24*** (0.09)	0.22** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	0.29*** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.13 (0.23)		0.19 (0.20)		0.12 (0.21)		0.08 (0.25)		0.23 (0.22)		0.07 (0.22)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.04 (0.08)	0.08 (0.11)	0.01 (0.08)	0.09 (0.10)	0.11 (0.08)	0.13 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.09)	0.14 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.07 (0.17)		-0.19 (0.15)		-0.02 (0.16)		-0.12 (0.18)		-0.15 (0.17)		-0.24 (0.18)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.09 (0.07)	0.12 (0.10)	0.06 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.10)	0.11 (0.08)	0.17* (0.10)	0.15* (0.08)	0.21** (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.11 (0.15)		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.05 (0.15)		-0.15 (0.16)		-0.16 (0.16)		-0.04 (0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.07 (0.20)		-0.11 (0.16)		-0.26 (0.18)		0.11 (0.21)		-0.06 (0.19)		-0.12 (0.18)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.35* (0.21)		0.10 (0.18)		0.17 (0.19)		0.36 (0.23)		0.18 (0.20)		-0.04 (0.20)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.13)		-0.10 (0.12)		0.11 (0.12)		-0.13 (0.15)		-0.01 (0.13)		-0.19 (0.15)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.11)		0.01 (0.11)		-0.03 (0.11)		0.02 (0.13)		0.05 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.13)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.29	0.03	0.27	0.02	0.07	0.32	0.56	0.14	0.23
p(SPG=WPG)	0.51	0.70	0.49	0.90	0.26	0.25	0.03	0.09	0.32	0.50	0.84	0.58
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.02		0.21		0.02		0.16		0.18		0.68
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.99		0.38		0.23		0.31		0.65		0.32
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	3.11	3.11	3.00	3.00	2.96	2.96	3.05	3.05
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	1.06	1.06	1.08	1.08	1.15	1.15
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,207	2,207

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of trust in online sources; 3-4: Index of trust in traditional media sources; 5-16: Trust in media format listed in column header. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A38: Perceived diversity and entertainment content of media outlets (follow-up)

	Diverse: Anti		Diverse: Pro		Entertaining: Anti		Entertaining: Pro	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.15 (0.11)	0.15 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)	0.07 (0.13)	0.13 (0.11)	0.11 (0.13)	0.12 (0.12)	0.10 (0.14)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.00 (0.27)		-0.11 (0.27)		0.07 (0.24)		0.10 (0.26)
Pro Govt	0.05 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.26** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.15)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.13)	0.22** (0.10)	0.38*** (0.13)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.33* (0.20)		-0.35* (0.21)		0.32 (0.20)		-0.36* (0.21)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.16 (0.24)		-0.04 (0.24)		0.17 (0.20)		0.20 (0.22)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.23 (0.15)		0.06 (0.15)		0.21 (0.15)		0.02 (0.16)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.20* (0.12)	0.20 (0.13)	0.09 (0.12)	0.09 (0.14)	0.14 (0.12)	0.10 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	0.11 (0.15)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.00 (0.30)		0.03 (0.28)		0.10 (0.28)		0.10 (0.27)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.09 (0.14)	0.09 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.04 (0.17)	0.11 (0.14)	0.11 (0.16)	0.10 (0.15)	0.09 (0.17)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.00 (0.33)		-0.32 (0.33)		0.02 (0.27)		0.10 (0.31)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.27** (0.13)	0.06 (0.18)	0.10 (0.14)	0.24 (0.21)	0.22* (0.13)	0.10 (0.17)	0.06 (0.13)	0.25 (0.18)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.48* (0.25)		-0.31 (0.28)		0.26 (0.26)		-0.44* (0.27)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.14)	0.37*** (0.11)	0.53*** (0.16)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.26* (0.14)	0.34*** (0.11)	0.47*** (0.13)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.23 (0.21)		-0.39* (0.22)		0.37* (0.21)		-0.31 (0.22)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.20 (0.27)		0.11 (0.24)		0.20 (0.24)		0.21 (0.23)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.29)		-0.28 (0.28)		0.13 (0.22)		0.19 (0.26)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.54*** (0.18)		-0.07 (0.19)		0.36* (0.20)		-0.19 (0.19)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.16)		0.15 (0.16)		0.12 (0.15)		0.16 (0.18)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.42	0.48	0.38	0.78	0.86	0.95	0.85	0.91
p(SPG=WPG)	0.00	0.13	0.06	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.22
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.73		0.07		0.77		0.93
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.00		0.24		0.21		0.06
Control Mean	2.98	2.98	2.72	2.72	2.84	2.84	2.55	2.55
Control SD	1.14	1.14	1.19	1.19	1.09	1.09	1.21	1.21
Observations	1,133	1,133	1,127	1,127	1,131	1,131	1,156	1,156

DVs: Columns 1-4: Perceived diversity of topics published by media outlets; 5-8: Perceived extent of entertaining and engaging news published by outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.7 Persistence of effects

Table A39: Exposure and consumption (follow-up)

	ICW: Exposure				ICW: Consumption			
	Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.54*** (0.08)	0.55*** (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.11)	0.20** (0.08)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.30*** (0.10)	-0.34*** (0.12)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.00 (0.18)		0.07 (0.22)		0.13 (0.18)		0.13 (0.21)
Pro Govt	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.19** (0.08)	0.20* (0.11)	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.10)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.16)		-0.03 (0.16)		0.03 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.15)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.55*** (0.16)		-0.05 (0.20)		0.31** (0.16)		-0.21 (0.18)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.03 (0.12)		0.18 (0.12)		0.05 (0.12)		-0.04 (0.12)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.50*** (0.09)	0.49*** (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.17* (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)	-0.25** (0.10)	-0.31*** (0.12)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.14 (0.21)		0.24 (0.24)		0.21 (0.20)		0.21 (0.23)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.60*** (0.10)	0.64*** (0.12)	-0.19 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.13)	0.25** (0.10)	0.26** (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.12)	-0.37*** (0.14)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.19 (0.22)		-0.14 (0.26)		0.02 (0.22)		0.03 (0.26)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.13 (0.11)	0.18 (0.15)	0.16 (0.11)	0.13 (0.15)	0.21** (0.09)	0.15 (0.11)	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.10 (0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.16 (0.21)		0.10 (0.21)		0.17 (0.19)		-0.18 (0.20)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.11)	0.21** (0.08)	0.26** (0.11)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.04 (0.17)		-0.11 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.15)		0.04 (0.16)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.63*** (0.19)		0.15 (0.21)		0.35* (0.18)		-0.10 (0.19)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.45** (0.18)		-0.30 (0.22)		0.28 (0.18)		-0.35 (0.21)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.15)		0.22 (0.15)		0.31** (0.16)		-0.28* (0.15)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.07 (0.13)		0.15 (0.13)		-0.12 (0.12)		0.10 (0.12)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.33	0.18	0.18	0.59	0.35	0.22	0.30	0.57
p(SPG=WPG)	0.05	0.04	0.61	0.31	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.22
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.38		0.04		0.69		0.21
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.54		0.61		0.01		0.01
Observations	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-4: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent follows; sees online; and how frequently they see them online; 5-8: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent often clicks on; reads articles from; and whether they prefer pro-government or anti-government sources. See Tables A22-A23 for disaggregated estimates. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. $p(\text{SAG}=\text{WAG})$ and $p(\text{SPG}=\text{WPG})$ provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; $p(\text{SAG-P}=\text{WAG-P})$ and $p(\text{SPG-P}=\text{WPG-P})$ does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A40: Exposure and consumption of assigned outlets (follow-up)

	Exposure				Consumption			
	Following outlet		See outlet online		Click on outlet		Read outlet	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.61*** (0.03)	0.64*** (0.04)	0.51*** (0.03)	0.52*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.04)	0.47*** (0.04)	0.55*** (0.03)	0.55*** (0.04)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.11 (0.08)		-0.05 (0.08)		-0.10 (0.09)		0.00 (0.08)
Pro Govt	0.27*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.13** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.04 (0.07)		0.08 (0.07)		-0.02 (0.07)		-0.05 (0.07)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.53*** (0.07)		0.47*** (0.07)		0.38*** (0.08)		0.55*** (0.07)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.24*** (0.05)		0.22*** (0.05)		0.14*** (0.04)		0.15*** (0.05)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.63*** (0.03)	0.65*** (0.04)	0.49*** (0.04)	0.50*** (0.04)	0.44*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.04)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.09 (0.08)		-0.08 (0.09)		-0.11 (0.10)		0.01 (0.09)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.59*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)	0.49*** (0.06)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.14 (0.11)		-0.02 (0.11)		-0.08 (0.12)		-0.01 (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.28*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.08 (0.07)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.17** (0.07)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16** (0.07)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.11)		0.16 (0.10)		-0.04 (0.10)		-0.01 (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.26*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.06)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.08)		0.03 (0.08)		-0.01 (0.07)		-0.08 (0.08)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.56*** (0.07)		0.42*** (0.08)		0.35*** (0.08)		0.56*** (0.07)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.48*** (0.10)		0.53*** (0.09)		0.41*** (0.10)		0.54*** (0.10)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.32*** (0.08)		0.24*** (0.08)		0.13* (0.07)		0.16** (0.08)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.19*** (0.06)		0.20*** (0.06)		0.14*** (0.05)		0.14*** (0.05)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.39	0.59	0.28	0.47	0.56	0.68	0.99	0.90
p(SPG=WPG)	0.82	0.36	0.50	0.24	0.84	0.78	0.66	0.48
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.40		0.30		0.57		0.86
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.15		0.68		0.95		0.83
Control Mean	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.17
Control SD	0.39	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.37
Observations	1,780	1,780	1,780	1,780	1,773	1,773	1,773	1,773

DVs: Columns 1-2: Reports following assigned outlet; 3-4: Ever sees assigned outlet online; 5-6: Ever clicks on assigned outlet stories; 7-8: Often reads stories from assigned outlet. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and endline enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Standard errors clustered by participant in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A41: Any following of account types on Twitter (after treatment period)

	Account information				Following: Treatment outlets				Following: Other media outlets			
	Linked		Visible following		Anti govt		Pro govt		Anti govt		Pro govt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Pooled estimation												
Anti Govt	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.13 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.06)		0.05 (0.06)		-0.17** (0.08)		0.00 (0.07)		0.45** (0.18)		-0.10 (0.13)
Pro Govt	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.08 (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.08 (0.06)		-0.10* (0.05)		-0.02 (0.08)		-0.12 (0.10)		0.14 (0.14)		0.07 (0.12)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.05)		0.03 (0.05)		0.07 (0.06)		0.07 (0.06)		0.53*** (0.16)		-0.11 (0.11)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.07 (0.04)		-0.08* (0.04)		0.01 (0.07)		0.15** (0.07)		0.11 (0.10)		0.12 (0.09)
B. Disaggregated estimation												
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.09)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.06)		0.05 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.11)		0.09 (0.10)		0.34* (0.20)		-0.06 (0.16)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.27*** (0.08)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.19* (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.00 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.09)		0.06 (0.08)		-0.35*** (0.12)		-0.12 (0.11)		0.66** (0.27)		-0.14 (0.16)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.11)	0.09 (0.09)	0.06 (0.13)	0.12 (0.08)	0.16 (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.07 (0.08)		-0.11 (0.07)		-0.09 (0.11)		-0.25* (0.14)		0.04 (0.18)		-0.10 (0.16)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.11)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.10 (0.06)		-0.09 (0.06)		0.05 (0.09)		-0.02 (0.12)		0.22 (0.15)		0.20 (0.13)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.05)		0.01 (0.05)		0.14 (0.08)		0.14 (0.08)		0.37** (0.18)		-0.08 (0.13)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.08)		0.06 (0.07)		-0.04 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.09)		0.79*** (0.24)		-0.14 (0.12)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.06 (0.06)		-0.10* (0.05)		-0.09 (0.10)		0.11 (0.09)		0.10 (0.13)		0.06 (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.06 (0.04)		0.09 (0.08)		0.18** (0.09)		0.11 (0.10)		0.17* (0.10)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.11	0.15	0.17	0.25	0.19	0.12	0.83	0.54	0.22	0.38	0.86	0.81
p(SPG=WPG)	0.91	0.73	0.66	0.93	0.08	0.48	0.48	0.19	0.23	0.13	0.39	0.05
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.44		0.43		0.19		0.19		0.07		0.69
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.85		0.53		0.10		0.43		0.95		0.36
Control Mean	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.19	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.47	0.47	0.21	0.21
Control SD	0.42	0.42	0.39	0.39	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.50	0.50	0.41	0.41
Observations	2,259	2,259	2,266	2,266	500	500	500	500	500	500	499	499

DVs: Columns 1-2: Participant linked to a Twitter account; 3-4: Participant linked to a Twitter account with visible list of accounts being followed; 5-8: Follows treatment outlets; 9-12: Follows other media outlets classified as anti-government or pro-government. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A42: Effects on trust and media beliefs (follow-up)

	ICW: Media trust (relative)		ICW: Outlet knowledge (relative)		ICW: Perceived bias (relative)		ICW: Extra info (relative)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	-0.14*	-0.11	-0.34***	-0.38***	0.14	0.14	0.00	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.19		0.15		-0.05		-0.62*
		(0.18)		(0.23)		(0.19)		(0.37)
Pro Govt	0.18***	0.24**	0.00	-0.05	0.20**	0.29**	0.05	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.14		0.11		-0.21		-0.12
		(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.18)		(0.25)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.30*		-0.23		0.09		-0.48
		(0.16)		(0.21)		(0.16)		(0.36)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.10		0.06		0.08		-0.02
		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.19)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.07	-0.03	-0.34***	-0.38***	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.21
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.24		0.15		0.05		-0.55
		(0.19)		(0.24)		(0.21)		(0.39)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.23**	-0.21*	-0.34***	-0.39***	0.20*	0.25*	-0.11	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.13		0.16		-0.19		-0.70*
		(0.21)		(0.27)		(0.24)		(0.41)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.06	0.10	0.01	-0.07	0.32***	0.44***	0.06	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.23)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.11		0.18		-0.28		-0.18
		(0.18)		(0.22)		(0.23)		(0.32)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.25***	0.33***	0.00	-0.03	0.11	0.18	0.04	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.17		0.07		-0.16		-0.08
		(0.14)		(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.26)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.27		-0.23		0.12		-0.34
		(0.17)		(0.22)		(0.18)		(0.37)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.34*		-0.23		0.05		-0.66*
		(0.18)		(0.25)		(0.20)		(0.40)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.01		0.11		0.16		-0.05
		(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.18)		(0.22)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.17		0.03		0.02		-0.00
		(0.10)		(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.20)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.07	0.09	0.95	0.97	0.32	0.17	0.08	0.19
p(SPG=WPG)	0.02	0.03	0.99	0.80	0.05	0.06	0.92	0.79
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.62		0.97		0.77		0.22
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.20		0.62		0.44		0.77
Observations	1,300	1,300	1,299	1,299	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of trust in pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: Index of knowledge about pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 5-6: Index of perceived extent of bias of pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 7-8: Index of perceived informational value of consuming pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * *p* < 0.1, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01.

Table A43: Effects on political attitudes (follow-up)

	AKP affinity		AKP vote		Opposition affinity		Opposition vote		ICW: AKP Performance		ICW: Issue importance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Pooled estimation												
Anti Govt	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.12 (0.12)	0.11 (0.14)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)	0.08 (0.09)	0.10 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.22)		-0.02 (0.10)		0.05 (0.27)		0.03 (0.07)		-0.08 (0.19)		0.14 (0.25)
Pro Govt	0.20** (0.10)	0.26* (0.14)	0.05* (0.03)	0.09* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.18** (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.11)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.14 (0.19)		-0.09 (0.06)		0.21 (0.23)		0.01 (0.08)		-0.27** (0.12)		0.31* (0.17)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.18)		-0.01 (0.08)		0.16 (0.23)		0.03 (0.04)		0.02 (0.16)		0.23 (0.23)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.12 (0.13)		0.00 (0.03)		0.12 (0.17)		-0.03 (0.05)		-0.08 (0.08)		0.20 (0.13)
B. Disaggregated estimation												
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.14)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.08 (0.13)	0.08 (0.15)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.09)	0.06 (0.11)	0.12 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.16 (0.24)		0.01 (0.10)		-0.01 (0.28)		0.02 (0.07)		0.05 (0.20)		0.18 (0.26)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.17 (0.15)	0.15 (0.17)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.11 (0.11)	0.16 (0.13)	0.11 (0.12)	0.09 (0.13)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.02 (0.28)		-0.06 (0.13)		0.12 (0.37)		0.05 (0.08)		-0.25 (0.25)		0.09 (0.30)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.09 (0.12)	0.14 (0.17)	0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)	0.18 (0.15)	0.04 (0.20)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.03 (0.09)	0.16 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.23)		-0.10 (0.07)		0.34 (0.30)		0.03 (0.10)		-0.30* (0.16)		0.36 (0.22)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.27** (0.11)	0.35** (0.16)	0.07* (0.04)	0.10* (0.06)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.20** (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.13)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.17 (0.22)		-0.08 (0.07)		0.15 (0.25)		0.00 (0.09)		-0.25* (0.13)		0.28 (0.18)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.09 (0.19)		0.01 (0.08)		0.07 (0.24)		0.03 (0.05)		0.10 (0.17)		0.27 (0.24)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.22)		-0.05 (0.11)		0.27 (0.32)		0.04 (0.05)		-0.09 (0.21)		0.18 (0.27)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.04)		0.38* (0.22)		0.02 (0.07)		-0.13 (0.11)		0.21 (0.18)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.18 (0.15)		0.02 (0.04)		-0.05 (0.18)		-0.07 (0.06)		-0.05 (0.09)		0.19 (0.13)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.57	0.48	0.86	0.92	0.55	0.67	0.75	0.79	0.64	0.38	0.92	0.96
p(SPG=WPG)	0.14	0.21	0.41	0.71	0.04	0.26	0.12	0.33	0.47	0.71	0.70	0.62
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.72		0.47		0.52		0.77		0.35		0.68
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.38		0.29		0.06		0.21		0.44		0.93
Control Mean	2.62	2.62	0.34	0.34	2.64	2.64	0.49	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
Control SD	1.47	1.47	0.48	0.48	1.46	1.46	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,299	1,299

DVs: Columns 1-2: Affinity towards AKP (scale 1-5); 3-4: Respondent intends to vote for AKP if election were to be held tomorrow; 5-6: Affinity towards opposition parties (scale 1-5); 7-8: Respondent intends to vote for an opposition party if an election were to be held tomorrow; 9-10: ICW index of perceived government performance across eight contentious issue areas; 11-12: ICW index of perceived importance of eight contentious issue areas. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A44: Effects on beliefs about election (follow-up)

	President vote: AKP		Erdogan %		Erdogan retain power	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.17)	-1.82 (1.50)	-0.49 (1.60)	0.02 (0.12)	0.02 (0.14)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.20 (0.27)		-6.25 (4.03)		-0.01 (0.25)
Pro Govt	0.13 (0.12)	0.12 (0.19)	1.93* (1.11)	2.66 (1.63)	0.24** (0.11)	0.28* (0.15)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.23)		-1.70 (2.15)		-0.07 (0.22)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.15 (0.20)		-6.74* (3.70)		0.01 (0.20)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.14 (0.13)		0.96 (1.40)		0.21 (0.15)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	0.05 (0.15)	0.05 (0.18)	-1.30 (1.54)	0.41 (1.63)	0.06 (0.13)	0.08 (0.15)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.01 (0.28)		-7.61* (4.21)		-0.11 (0.26)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.18 (0.22)	-2.55 (1.98)	-1.72 (2.11)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.18)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.45 (0.32)		-4.37 (5.33)		0.14 (0.30)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.00 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.24)	2.10 (1.37)	2.58 (2.01)	0.25* (0.14)	0.32* (0.19)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.09 (0.29)		-1.00 (2.53)		-0.21 (0.28)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.21 (0.14)	0.23 (0.21)	1.83 (1.25)	2.72 (1.81)	0.24** (0.12)	0.24 (0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.05 (0.27)		-2.14 (2.44)		0.02 (0.24)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.21)		-7.20* (3.88)		-0.04 (0.21)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.28 (0.24)		-6.09 (4.90)		0.08 (0.24)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.16)		1.58 (1.53)		0.12 (0.20)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.18 (0.17)		0.58 (1.64)		0.26 (0.17)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.40	0.24	0.48	0.26	0.49	0.37
p(SPG=WPG)	0.19	0.25	0.84	0.94	0.98	0.66
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.24		0.81		0.59
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.53		0.53		0.49
Control Mean	2.77	2.77	47.80	47.80	3.27	3.27
Control SD	1.69	1.69	15.74	15.74	1.43	1.43
Observations	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198

DVs: Columns 1-2: Respondent intends to vote for Erdogan in presidential election; 3-4: Expectations of first-round vote share received by Erdogan; 5-6: Extent of beliefs in Erdogan retaining power following the election. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.8 Behavioral and social consequences

Table A45: Twitter posts (during treatment period)

	Any posts		Political posts				Anti-govt posts				Pro-govt posts			
			Any		Log+1		Any		Log+1		Any		Log+1	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
A. Pooled estimation														
Anti Govt	0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.17 (0.20)	0.14 (0.21)	0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.07 (0.16)	0.04 (0.18)	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.11 (0.11)	0.10 (0.12)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.12)		0.11 (0.17)		0.12 (0.30)		0.23 (0.16)		0.25 (0.27)		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.01 (0.26)
Pro Govt	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.18** (0.08)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.08)	-0.13 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.05 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.05 (0.13)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.15 (0.09)		0.20** (0.10)		0.07 (0.25)		0.14 (0.09)		-0.08 (0.21)		0.17* (0.10)		-0.07 (0.19)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.08)		0.20 (0.15)		0.27 (0.21)		0.27* (0.15)		0.29 (0.20)		-0.09 (0.12)		0.09 (0.22)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.03 (0.06)		-0.06 (0.06)		-0.06 (0.17)		-0.01 (0.06)		-0.03 (0.15)		0.06 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.14)
B. Disaggregated estimation														
Strongly Anti Govt	0.05 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.19 (0.21)	0.17 (0.23)	0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.08 (0.17)	0.06 (0.19)	0.10 (0.07)	0.11 (0.08)	0.15 (0.12)	0.14 (0.13)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.11)		0.06 (0.15)		0.16 (0.31)		0.21 (0.15)		0.21 (0.30)		-0.09 (0.14)		0.09 (0.26)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)	0.15 (0.21)	0.12 (0.23)	0.09 (0.08)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.17)	0.02 (0.19)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.06 (0.12)	0.07 (0.14)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.19)		0.15 (0.21)		0.06 (0.31)		0.25 (0.20)		0.30 (0.26)		-0.26 (0.16)		-0.17 (0.25)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.10)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.26)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.09 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.09 (0.18)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.15 (0.12)		0.19 (0.12)		-0.04 (0.32)		0.10 (0.11)		-0.18 (0.26)		0.09 (0.12)		-0.14 (0.22)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.15* (0.08)	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.01 (0.12)	0.02 (0.17)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.14)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.16 (0.10)		0.21* (0.11)		0.15 (0.28)		0.16* (0.10)		-0.01 (0.24)		0.24** (0.11)		0.00 (0.23)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.03 (0.08)		0.16 (0.12)		0.33 (0.21)		0.23* (0.13)		0.27 (0.23)		0.03 (0.12)		0.23 (0.22)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.16)		0.25 (0.19)		0.18 (0.21)		0.32* (0.18)		0.32* (0.18)		-0.24 (0.15)		-0.10 (0.21)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.07 (0.06)		-0.14* (0.07)		-0.17 (0.19)		-0.05 (0.06)		-0.08 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.07)		-0.06 (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.01 (0.07)		-0.00 (0.07)		0.02 (0.20)		0.03 (0.06)		0.01 (0.17)		0.14* (0.08)		0.02 (0.18)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.39	0.32	0.81	0.98	0.77	0.77	0.41	0.51	0.81	0.78	0.12	0.20	0.32	0.47
p(SPG=WPG)	0.11	0.43	0.02	0.26	0.40	1.00	0.27	0.90	0.75	0.75	0.09	0.83	0.75	0.69
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.86		0.59		0.28		0.33		0.65		0.07		0.05
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.19		0.03		0.26		0.18		0.48		0.02		0.58
Control Mean	0.52	0.52	0.39	0.39	0.90	0.90	0.32	0.32	0.71	0.71	0.21	0.21	0.37	0.37
Control SD	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	1.52	1.52	0.47	0.47	1.37	1.37	0.41	0.41	0.93	0.93
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	461	461

DVs: Columns 1-2: Participant made any Twitter posts during treatment period; 3-6: Made any/number of posts classified as political during treatment period; 7-10: Made any/number of posts classified as anti-government during treatment period; 11-14: Made any/number of posts classified as pro-government during treatment period. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A46: Twitter posts (after treatment period)

	Political posts													
	Any posts		Political posts				Anti-govt posts				Pro-govt posts			
	(1)	(2)	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1	Any	Log+1
A. Pooled estimation														
Anti Govt	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.18	-0.18	-0.04	-0.03	-0.10	-0.11	-0.08	-0.09	-0.11	-0.14
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Anti Govt × Partisan				-0.12		-0.00		-0.06		0.06		0.02		0.31
				(0.14)		(0.35)		(0.12)		(0.25)		(0.17)		(0.23)
Pro Govt	-0.05	-0.13	-0.05	-0.13	0.06	-0.18	-0.10	-0.17*	0.04	-0.17	-0.00	-0.05	0.12	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.18		0.18		0.56		0.16		0.48		0.14		0.37
		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.35)		(0.13)		(0.29)		(0.11)		(0.24)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.02		-0.16		-0.19		-0.09		-0.05		-0.07		0.17
		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.28)		(0.10)		(0.19)		(0.16)		(0.17)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.05		0.05		0.38		-0.01		0.30		0.09		0.33*
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.27)		(0.10)		(0.23)		(0.07)		(0.19)
B. Disaggregated estimation														
Strongly Anti Govt	0.00	0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.17	-0.17	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06	-0.10	-0.14
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.16		-0.13		0.11		-0.16		0.05		0.00		0.40*
		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.32)		(0.11)		(0.23)		(0.15)		(0.23)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.12	-0.16**	-0.06	-0.06	-0.19	-0.19	-0.07	-0.07	-0.12	-0.13	-0.09	-0.11	-0.13	-0.15
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.41**		-0.11		-0.17		0.06		0.07		0.03		0.17
		(0.19)		(0.21)		(0.40)		(0.18)		(0.31)		(0.26)		(0.28)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.08	-0.18	-0.10	-0.20	0.03	-0.32	-0.14*	-0.24**	-0.00	-0.33	-0.04	-0.10	0.15	-0.11
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.25*		0.26		0.89*		0.23		0.79**		0.21		0.65**
		(0.15)		(0.17)		(0.47)		(0.17)		(0.38)		(0.14)		(0.31)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.03	-0.09	-0.01	-0.07	0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.12	0.06	-0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.09	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.12		0.12		0.31		0.11		0.24		0.10		0.17
		(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.35)		(0.13)		(0.29)		(0.12)		(0.25)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.13*		-0.16		-0.07		-0.15*		-0.03		-0.06		0.26
		(0.08)		(0.11)		(0.23)		(0.09)		(0.17)		(0.13)		(0.17)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.25		-0.17		-0.37		-0.01		-0.06		-0.08		0.03
		(0.17)		(0.20)		(0.32)		(0.16)		(0.26)		(0.25)		(0.22)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.08		0.06		0.56		-0.01		0.47		0.11		0.54**
		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.38)		(0.13)		(0.32)		(0.10)		(0.27)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.03		0.05		0.24		-0.01		0.18		0.08		0.17
		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.25)		(0.09)		(0.22)		(0.07)		(0.19)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.07	0.01	0.69	0.60	0.88	0.91	0.35	0.21	0.77	0.76	0.68	0.47	0.81	0.94
p(SPG=WPG)	0.50	0.36	0.30	0.25	0.77	0.26	0.28	0.17	0.67	0.10	0.30	0.34	0.68	0.36
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.02		0.94		0.28		0.33		0.88		0.94		0.23
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.59		0.88		0.32		0.99		0.29		0.80		0.14
Control Mean	0.51	0.51	0.39	0.39	0.86	0.86	0.34	0.34	0.64	0.64	0.22	0.22	0.34	0.34
Control SD	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	1.37	1.37	0.48	0.48	1.16	1.16	0.41	0.41	0.87	0.87
Observations	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500

DVs: Columns 1-2: Participant made any Twitter posts in months following treatment period; 3-6: Made any/number of posts classified as political in months following treatment period; 7-10: Made any/number of posts classified as anti-government in months following treatment period; 11-14: Made any/number of posts classified as pro-government in months following treatment period. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including batch-strata fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A47: Willingness to share and discuss information

	ICW: Sharing information				Discuss political views with...				Share material you agree with...				Share material you disagree with...			
	In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.00 (0.11)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.04 (0.16)		-0.10 (0.18)		0.03 (0.20)		0.09 (0.22)		-0.33* (0.17)		-0.20 (0.26)		0.18 (0.22)		-0.22 (0.25)
Pro Govt	-0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.09)	0.00 (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.05 (0.08)	0.10 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09)	0.16 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)	0.10 (0.08)	0.17 (0.11)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.10 (0.14)		-0.17 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.15)		-0.17 (0.17)		-0.19 (0.16)		-0.13 (0.18)		-0.20 (0.16)		-0.21 (0.18)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.06 (0.14)		-0.04 (0.16)		0.12 (0.18)		0.06 (0.20)		-0.34** (0.15)		-0.27 (0.24)		0.14 (0.20)		-0.22 (0.23)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.08 (0.11)		-0.10 (0.11)		-0.14 (0.11)		-0.20 (0.14)		-0.08 (0.13)		0.03 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.13)		-0.03 (0.14)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	0.03 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.10)	0.08 (0.09)	0.11 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.07 (0.09)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.03 (0.12)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.16 (0.17)		-0.07 (0.20)		-0.15 (0.21)		0.15 (0.25)		-0.53*** (0.19)		-0.14 (0.28)		0.12 (0.23)		-0.41 (0.27)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.11 (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.21* (0.11)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.13)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.29 (0.19)		-0.14 (0.22)		0.25 (0.25)		0.04 (0.26)		-0.08 (0.21)		-0.24 (0.31)		0.29 (0.26)		0.04 (0.30)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.01 (0.09)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.20** (0.10)	-0.11 (0.13)	0.09 (0.10)	0.19 (0.12)	0.02 (0.11)	0.12 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.07 (0.12)	0.03 (0.11)	0.13 (0.14)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.08 (0.18)		-0.13 (0.17)		-0.08 (0.19)		-0.19 (0.21)		-0.26 (0.21)		-0.21 (0.22)		-0.35* (0.20)		-0.29 (0.22)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.08 (0.08)	0.17 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.04 (0.12)	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.11)	0.18* (0.09)	0.20 (0.13)	0.03 (0.08)	0.05 (0.11)	0.16* (0.09)	0.21* (0.12)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.15)		-0.21 (0.16)		-0.20 (0.16)		-0.14 (0.19)		-0.12 (0.17)		-0.06 (0.20)		-0.07 (0.18)		-0.14 (0.20)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.11 (0.15)		-0.04 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.19)		0.11 (0.23)		-0.45*** (0.16)		-0.16 (0.26)		0.16 (0.21)		-0.38 (0.24)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.26 (0.17)		-0.03 (0.19)		0.32 (0.23)		0.00 (0.23)		-0.19 (0.18)		-0.39 (0.28)		0.14 (0.23)		0.00 (0.27)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.02 (0.13)		-0.16 (0.14)		-0.09 (0.14)		-0.30* (0.17)		-0.08 (0.17)		-0.10 (0.16)		-0.28* (0.16)		-0.16 (0.17)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.13 (0.11)		-0.04 (0.12)		-0.18 (0.12)		-0.10 (0.14)		-0.09 (0.14)		0.14 (0.15)		-0.01 (0.14)		0.07 (0.15)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.72	0.33	0.41	0.42	0.55	0.72	0.76	0.98	0.35	0.06	0.10	0.27	0.13	0.06	0.88	0.59
p(SPG=WPG)	0.50	0.54	0.04	0.07	0.81	0.82	0.05	0.23	0.38	0.17	0.12	0.56	0.24	0.88	0.20	0.54
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.02		0.95		0.07		0.60		0.14		0.34		0.91		0.08
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.36		0.36		0.48		0.23		0.92		0.14		0.08		0.17
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	3.34	3.34	2.43	2.43	3.88	3.88	2.58	2.58	3.59	3.59	2.60	2.60
Control SD	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.13	1.13	1.24	1.24	1.09	1.09	1.28	1.28	1.15	1.15	1.27	1.27
Observations	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of comfort sharing and discussing information with copartisans and non-copartisans; 5-8: Willingness to discuss political views; 9-12: Willingness to share material participant agrees with; 13-16: Willingness to share material participant disagrees with. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. $p(SAG=WAG)$ and $p(SPG=WPG)$ provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; $p(SAG-P=WAG-P)$ and $p(SPG-P=WPG-P)$ does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A48: Preferences over how to share information

	ICW: How to share information				Direct message				Friends in chat thread				Friends in person				Share in public group			
	Agreed		Disagreed		Agreed		Disagreed		Agreed		Disagreed		Agreed		Disagreed		Agreed		Disagreed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
A. Pooled estimation																				
Anti Govt	0.18** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)	0.19** (0.08)	0.23** (0.10)	0.27** (0.11)	0.12 (0.10)	0.24** (0.11)	0.10 (0.09)	0.18* (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)	0.15 (0.11)	0.20** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)	0.13 (0.11)	0.24** (0.10)	0.32*** (0.12)	0.21** (0.10)	0.32*** (0.11)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.36** (0.17)		-0.35* (0.18)		-0.28 (0.23)		-0.51** (0.24)		-0.37 (0.23)		-0.35 (0.23)		-0.49** (0.21)		-0.40* (0.22)		-0.43* (0.24)		-0.36 (0.23)
Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.11 (0.09)	0.13 (0.13)	0.01 (0.08)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.13)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.04 (0.13)		-0.03 (0.14)		0.16 (0.19)		-0.09 (0.19)		-0.22 (0.16)		0.07 (0.19)		-0.18 (0.15)		0.19 (0.19)		0.06 (0.19)		-0.20 (0.19)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.11 (0.15)		-0.16 (0.16)		-0.01 (0.20)		-0.27 (0.21)		-0.19 (0.20)		-0.21 (0.21)		-0.18 (0.18)		-0.27 (0.19)		-0.11 (0.21)		-0.04 (0.20)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.04 (0.09)		-0.05 (0.10)		0.08 (0.14)		0.04 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.12)		-0.04 (0.15)		-0.12 (0.11)		0.04 (0.15)		-0.02 (0.14)		-0.19 (0.14)
B. Disaggregated estimation																				
Strongly Anti Govt	0.14* (0.08)	0.22** (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.15 (0.09)	0.20* (0.10)	0.27** (0.12)	0.11 (0.10)	0.23* (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.05 (0.11)	0.17* (0.09)	0.30*** (0.11)	0.00 (0.10)	0.10 (0.12)	0.19* (0.11)	0.24* (0.13)	0.17 (0.10)	0.27** (0.12)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.38** (0.18)		-0.28 (0.19)		-0.41* (0.24)		-0.42 (0.26)		-0.42* (0.23)		-0.20 (0.24)		-0.54** (0.22)		-0.38 (0.24)		-0.30 (0.25)		-0.34 (0.25)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.22*** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.10)	0.14 (0.09)	0.25** (0.10)	0.26** (0.12)	0.27* (0.14)	0.12 (0.12)	0.26* (0.14)	0.12 (0.11)	0.19 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.27** (0.13)	0.25** (0.11)	0.35*** (0.12)	0.07 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	0.31** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.14)	0.27** (0.12)	0.37*** (0.14)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.33 (0.22)		-0.42* (0.23)		-0.11 (0.27)		-0.61** (0.30)		-0.29 (0.28)		-0.52* (0.29)		-0.43* (0.25)		-0.41 (0.28)		-0.59** (0.29)		-0.38 (0.29)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.15)	0.12 (0.12)	0.16 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.11 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.25* (0.14)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.02 (0.16)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.07 (0.16)		-0.06 (0.17)		0.11 (0.23)		-0.13 (0.24)		-0.26 (0.20)		-0.03 (0.24)		-0.20 (0.19)		0.20 (0.23)		0.07 (0.24)		-0.19 (0.23)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.13)	0.11 (0.10)	0.11 (0.14)	0.03 (0.09)	0.07 (0.12)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.06 (0.08)	0.07 (0.12)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.01 (0.14)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.01 (0.14)		0.00 (0.15)		0.20 (0.20)		-0.06 (0.20)		-0.19 (0.17)		0.15 (0.20)		-0.16 (0.17)		0.19 (0.20)		0.05 (0.21)		-0.21 (0.21)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.16 (0.16)		-0.14 (0.17)		-0.14 (0.21)		-0.20 (0.23)		-0.25 (0.21)		-0.15 (0.21)		-0.24 (0.19)		-0.29 (0.21)		-0.06 (0.22)		-0.07 (0.22)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		-0.05 (0.19)		-0.17 (0.20)		0.16 (0.24)		-0.36 (0.26)		-0.11 (0.26)		-0.25 (0.26)		-0.08 (0.22)		-0.24 (0.25)		-0.18 (0.26)		-0.01 (0.25)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		-0.05 (0.12)		-0.10 (0.13)		0.11 (0.17)		0.03 (0.18)		-0.15 (0.15)		-0.19 (0.18)		-0.15 (0.14)		-0.05 (0.18)		0.01 (0.18)		-0.17 (0.17)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.04 (0.10)		0.00 (0.11)		0.06 (0.16)		0.06 (0.15)		-0.12 (0.13)		0.10 (0.15)		-0.08 (0.12)		0.11 (0.16)		-0.04 (0.16)		-0.20 (0.15)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.36	0.55	0.35	0.26	0.52	0.95	0.96	0.81	0.72	0.91	0.17	0.06	0.40	0.66	0.52	0.56	0.26	0.19	0.37	0.45
p(SPG=WPG)	0.97	0.66	0.32	0.68	0.44	0.38	0.94	0.74	0.62	0.75	0.07	0.41	0.30	0.84	0.06	0.21	0.78	0.86	0.98	0.97
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.49		0.88		0.15		0.51		0.50		0.67		0.39		0.85		0.61		0.79
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.93		0.40		0.79		0.87		0.83		0.09		0.58		0.36		0.78		0.89
Control Mean	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	3.17	3.17	2.72	2.72	3.50	3.50	3.19	3.19	3.60	3.60	3.25	3.25	2.75	2.75	2.51	2.51
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.30	1.30	1.33	1.33	1.25	1.25	1.29	1.29	1.21	1.21	1.28	1.28	1.37	1.37	1.31	1.31
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of comfort sharing information participant agrees/disagrees with; 5-8: Comfort sharing information through direct messages; 9-12: Comfort sharing information with friends in private chat threads; 13-16: Comfort sharing information with friends in person; 17-20: Comfort sharing information in a public group. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A49: Perceptions of echo chamber

	ICW: Perceived echo chamber		Similarity of political views		Varied people cannot discuss views		Social media exposes to same views	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Pooled estimation								
Anti Govt	0.16** (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.03 (0.21)		0.01 (0.21)		0.08 (0.20)		-0.08 (0.18)
Pro Govt	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.08)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.28* (0.15)		0.05 (0.13)		0.25* (0.14)		0.14 (0.13)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.13 (0.20)		0.02 (0.19)		0.20 (0.18)		0.02 (0.16)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.13 (0.12)		0.01 (0.11)		0.08 (0.11)		0.08 (0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation								
Strongly Anti Govt	0.23*** (0.08)	0.26*** (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.19** (0.08)	0.16* (0.09)	0.13* (0.07)	0.16** (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.13 (0.22)		-0.20 (0.22)		0.13 (0.22)		-0.11 (0.19)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.06 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	0.06 (0.10)	0.03 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.08 (0.26)		0.25 (0.25)		0.01 (0.24)		-0.07 (0.20)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.12 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.12)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.10)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.38** (0.18)		0.05 (0.17)		0.30* (0.17)		0.24 (0.15)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.18* (0.10)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.20 (0.16)		0.04 (0.14)		0.21 (0.16)		0.05 (0.14)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.13 (0.20)		-0.10 (0.20)		0.29 (0.19)		0.05 (0.18)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.10 (0.24)		0.16 (0.23)		0.08 (0.22)		-0.04 (0.18)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.32** (0.15)		0.14 (0.14)		0.15 (0.13)		0.21* (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.04 (0.12)		-0.10 (0.11)		0.03 (0.12)		-0.03 (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.04	0.01	0.34	0.04	0.23	0.29	0.13	0.11
p(SPG=WPG)	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.01	0.35	0.80	0.20	0.64
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.87		0.19		0.28		0.57
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.01		0.05		0.31		0.04
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	-2.83	-2.83	-3.00	-3.00	3.20	3.20
Control SD	1.00	1.00	0.93	0.93	1.03	1.03	0.82	0.82
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,215	2,215	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-2: Index of perceptions of being in an echo chamber; 3-4: Homogeneity of political views of people participants normally interact with; 5-6: Difficulty discussing politics among people with differing views; 7-8: Social media exposes people to the same political perspectives. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. $p(\text{SAG}=\text{WAG})$ and $p(\text{SPG}=\text{WPG})$ provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; $p(\text{SAG-P}=\text{WAG-P})$ and $p(\text{SPG-P}=\text{WPG-P})$ does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A50: Affective polarization (midline)

	ICW: Affective polarization				Trust people who are...				Comfort being friends with...				Comfort being neighbors with...			
	In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
A. Pooled estimation																
Anti Govt	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.19** (0.09)	0.20** (0.10)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.29*** (0.11)	0.33*** (0.12)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.18* (0.10)	0.16 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)
Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.10 (0.18)		-0.07 (0.25)		-0.22 (0.21)		-0.23 (0.29)		0.04 (0.18)		-0.01 (0.27)		-0.04 (0.17)		0.01 (0.26)
Pro Govt	0.07 (0.07)	0.11 (0.10)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)	0.19* (0.11)	0.21** (0.09)	0.33*** (0.11)	0.09 (0.08)	0.13 (0.11)	0.19** (0.09)	0.30*** (0.12)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.20** (0.09)	0.28** (0.11)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.08 (0.15)		-0.26 (0.16)		-0.14 (0.17)		-0.29 (0.19)		-0.09 (0.16)		-0.27 (0.20)		0.02 (0.16)		-0.26 (0.20)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.14 (0.15)		0.13 (0.22)		-0.29 (0.18)		0.10 (0.26)		0.02 (0.15)		0.16 (0.25)		-0.03 (0.14)		0.12 (0.23)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.03 (0.11)		0.04 (0.13)		0.05 (0.12)		0.04 (0.15)		0.03 (0.11)		0.03 (0.17)		-0.00 (0.12)		0.03 (0.16)
B. Disaggregated estimation																
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.14 (0.09)	0.17 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.11)	0.23** (0.11)	0.27** (0.13)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	0.14 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.13 (0.12)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		-0.39* (0.20)		-0.25 (0.25)		-0.54** (0.23)		-0.29 (0.29)		-0.12 (0.20)		-0.18 (0.28)		-0.30 (0.20)		-0.37 (0.26)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)	0.25** (0.11)	0.23* (0.12)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.11)	0.36*** (0.13)	0.40*** (0.15)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.22* (0.12)	0.18 (0.14)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.14 (0.12)	0.08 (0.13)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.22 (0.22)		0.12 (0.30)		0.13 (0.25)		-0.19 (0.35)		0.22 (0.23)		0.18 (0.33)		0.24 (0.20)		0.42 (0.31)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.12)	0.22** (0.09)	0.24** (0.11)	0.11 (0.09)	0.16 (0.13)	0.26** (0.11)	0.28** (0.14)	0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.13)	0.18 (0.11)	0.22 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.12)	0.21* (0.11)	0.21 (0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.18)		-0.09 (0.20)		-0.07 (0.20)		-0.11 (0.24)		0.01 (0.19)		-0.15 (0.24)		0.12 (0.19)		-0.09 (0.24)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.09 (0.08)	0.16 (0.12)	0.19** (0.08)	0.35*** (0.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.20* (0.12)	0.18* (0.09)	0.37*** (0.13)	0.13 (0.09)	0.21* (0.12)	0.20* (0.10)	0.37*** (0.13)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.12)	0.20** (0.10)	0.34*** (0.13)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.17 (0.16)		-0.40** (0.18)		-0.19 (0.18)		-0.43** (0.20)		-0.18 (0.17)		-0.38* (0.22)		-0.06 (0.17)		-0.41* (0.21)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.36** (0.18)		-0.08 (0.22)		-0.52** (0.21)		-0.02 (0.26)		-0.11 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.26)		-0.27 (0.18)		-0.24 (0.23)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.11 (0.19)		0.35 (0.28)		-0.05 (0.22)		0.22 (0.32)		0.16 (0.20)		0.36 (0.30)		0.22 (0.17)		0.49* (0.28)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.07 (0.14)		0.14 (0.16)		0.09 (0.15)		0.17 (0.19)		0.03 (0.14)		0.07 (0.20)		0.05 (0.15)		0.12 (0.20)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.01 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.14)		0.01 (0.14)		-0.06 (0.15)		0.03 (0.12)		-0.02 (0.18)		-0.05 (0.12)		-0.06 (0.17)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.82	0.13	0.25	0.58	0.38	0.04	0.23	0.28	0.96	0.45	0.43	0.73	0.53	0.54	0.44	0.65
p(SPG=WPG)	0.62	0.32	0.68	0.26	0.98	0.77	0.43	0.53	0.25	0.13	0.87	0.26	0.93	0.48	0.88	0.29
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.02		0.05		0.04		0.35		0.19		0.11		0.01		0.00
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.53		0.21		0.57		0.16		0.95		0.65		0.41		0.32
Control Mean	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	3.48	3.48	2.21	2.21	3.78	3.78	2.60	2.60	3.85	3.85	2.65	2.65
Control SD	1.01	1.01	0.99	0.99	1.07	1.07	1.13	1.13	1.06	1.06	1.19	1.19	1.02	1.02	1.15	1.15
Observations	1,832	1,832	1,833	1,833	1,832	1,832	1,833	1,833	1,832	1,832	1,833	1,833	1,832	1,832	1,833	1,833

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of attitudes towards copartisans/non-copartisans; 5-8: Extent of trust in copartisans/non-copartisans; 9-12: Extent of comfort being friends with copartisans/non-copartisans; 13-16: Extent of comfort being neighbors with copartisans/non-copartisans. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A51: Affective polarization (endline)

	ICW: Affective polarization				Trust people who are...				Comfort being friends with...				Comfort being neighbors with...				Trust news shared by...			
	In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party		In-party		Out-party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
A. Pooled estimation																				
Anti Govt	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.14 (0.09)
Anti Govt × Partisan				-0.01 (0.17)		0.06 (0.21)		0.01 (0.18)				-0.02 (0.22)		0.03 (0.18)		0.03 (0.25)		-0.05 (0.17)		0.09 (0.24)
Pro Govt	0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)	0.00 (0.08)	0.10 (0.10)	0.07 (0.07)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.02 (0.12)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.12)	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.10)	0.09 (0.07)	0.16* (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan				0.07 (0.15)		-0.12 (0.14)		-0.12 (0.16)				-0.18 (0.15)		0.09 (0.15)		-0.30 (0.19)		0.20 (0.15)		0.04 (0.18)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		-0.08 (0.15)		0.02 (0.19)		-0.01 (0.16)		-0.06 (0.19)				-0.02 (0.16)		0.03 (0.23)		-0.16 (0.14)		0.03 (0.22)		-0.01 (0.14)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.10 (0.11)		-0.06 (0.11)		-0.05 (0.12)		-0.08 (0.11)				0.12 (0.11)		-0.27* (0.15)		0.20* (0.12)		0.09 (0.14)		0.01 (0.12)
B. Disaggregated estimation																				
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.00 (0.08)	0.02 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan				-0.17 (0.18)		-0.09 (0.21)		-0.26 (0.19)		-0.18 (0.22)		-0.10 (0.20)		-0.15 (0.26)		-0.07 (0.19)		-0.04 (0.25)		-0.16 (0.18)
Weakly Anti Govt	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.18* (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.10)	0.04 (0.11)	0.00 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.11)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.17* (0.10)	0.22** (0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan				0.18 (0.21)		0.26 (0.26)		0.35 (0.22)		0.17 (0.23)		0.30 (0.30)		-0.04 (0.20)		0.29 (0.30)		0.29 (0.18)		-0.24 (0.24)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.10 (0.09)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.06 (0.10)	0.10 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.14 (0.09)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.01 (0.14)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.14)	0.10 (0.09)	0.11 (0.12)	0.02 (0.09)	0.04 (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan				0.16 (0.18)		-0.13 (0.17)		-0.08 (0.20)		-0.03 (0.19)		0.22 (0.18)		-0.47** (0.23)		0.27 (0.19)		-0.06 (0.22)		-0.08 (0.19)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.08)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.11)	0.06 (0.08)	0.21* (0.11)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.03 (0.13)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.11)	0.14 (0.10)	0.09 (0.13)	0.00 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.15* (0.08)	0.26** (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan				-0.01 (0.16)		-0.11 (0.16)		-0.15 (0.17)		-0.30* (0.17)		-0.03 (0.16)		-0.14 (0.21)		0.14 (0.16)		0.13 (0.20)		-0.23 (0.17)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.16 (0.16)		-0.12 (0.19)		-0.17 (0.17)		-0.24 (0.19)		-0.08 (0.17)		-0.13 (0.23)		-0.15 (0.16)		-0.05 (0.22)		-0.16 (0.16)		-0.15 (0.17)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.00 (0.19)		0.21 (0.24)		0.18 (0.19)		0.18 (0.25)		0.03 (0.20)		0.26 (0.27)		-0.19 (0.18)		0.15 (0.27)		0.17 (0.15)		-0.02 (0.22)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.21 (0.14)		-0.15 (0.13)		0.02 (0.15)		-0.07 (0.14)		0.28** (0.13)		-0.46** (0.18)		0.27* (0.14)		-0.06 (0.17)		0.06 (0.15)		-0.04 (0.15)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.00 (0.11)		0.01 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.12)		-0.10 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.11)		-0.11 (0.16)		0.14 (0.12)		0.22 (0.15)		-0.03 (0.12)		0.02 (0.13)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.18	0.02	0.53	0.83	0.16	0.00	0.15	0.54	0.40	0.12	0.88	0.62	0.40	0.40	0.61	0.32	0.99	0.20	0.12	0.20
p(SPG=WPG)	0.25	0.70	0.07	0.20	0.33	0.50	0.16	0.05	0.09	0.69	0.10	0.86	0.80	0.96	0.10	0.50	0.24	0.27	0.14	0.06
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.37		0.08		0.05		0.05		0.58		0.08		0.80		0.39		0.03		0.51
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.09		0.22		0.32		0.84		0.02		0.04		0.30		0.10		0.47		0.66
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	3.64	3.64	2.17	2.17	3.88	3.88	2.63	2.63	3.99	3.99	2.61	2.61	3.62	3.62	2.06	2.06
Control SD	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.03	1.03	1.10	1.10	1.01	1.01	1.27	1.27	0.99	0.99	1.24	1.24	1.02	1.02	1.00	1.00
Observations	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of attitudes towards copartisans/non-copartisans; 5-8: Extent of trust in copartisans/non-copartisans; 9-12: Extent of comfort being friends with copartisans/non-copartisans; 13-16: Extent of comfort being neighbors with copartisans/non-copartisans. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.9 Implications for democracy

Table A52: Effects on perceptions of democracy

	ICW: Extent of democracy in Türkiye		ICW: Satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye		ICW: Support for democratic principles	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.26 (0.20)		-0.01 (0.17)		-0.04 (0.15)
Pro Govt	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.12** (0.05)	0.16** (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.15* (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		0.07 (0.15)		-0.09 (0.11)		0.26** (0.13)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.18 (0.18)		0.05 (0.15)		0.02 (0.14)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		-0.06 (0.12)		0.07 (0.08)		0.11 (0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.03 (0.22)		0.01 (0.18)		0.02 (0.16)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.02 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.53** (0.25)		-0.05 (0.21)		-0.10 (0.19)
Weakly Pro Govt	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.23** (0.12)	0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.22** (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		0.30 (0.18)		0.04 (0.13)		0.29* (0.16)
Strongly Pro Govt	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.09)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.13 (0.17)		-0.19 (0.12)		0.24* (0.14)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		-0.03 (0.20)		0.09 (0.16)		0.06 (0.14)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.42* (0.22)		-0.00 (0.19)		-0.03 (0.17)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.07 (0.14)		0.07 (0.10)		0.06 (0.12)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		-0.18 (0.14)		0.06 (0.08)		0.14 (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.40	0.58	0.72	0.70	0.99	0.67
p(SPG=WPG)	0.90	0.11	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.18
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.04		0.59		0.58
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.08		0.91		0.46
Observations	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209	2,209

DVs are all ICW indexes standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of perceived extent of democracy in Türkiye; 3-4: Index of satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye; 5-6 Index of support for democratic principles in general. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A53: Effects on political knowledge, efficacy, and engagement

	ICW: Knowledge		ICW: Efficacy		ICW: Engagement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)
Anti Govt × Partisan		0.06 (0.16)		0.09 (0.17)		-0.27* (0.15)
Pro Govt	0.09 (0.06)	0.11 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)	0.14* (0.08)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)
Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.08 (0.13)		-0.08 (0.14)		-0.23* (0.14)
AG + (AG × Partisan)		0.08 (0.14)		0.13 (0.15)		-0.23* (0.13)
PG + (PG × Partisan)		0.03 (0.10)		0.06 (0.11)		-0.23** (0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt	0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)
Strongly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.02 (0.16)		-0.02 (0.18)		-0.32** (0.16)
Weakly Anti Govt	0.08 (0.09)	0.05 (0.10)	0.08 (0.09)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt × Partisan		0.11 (0.21)		0.23 (0.21)		-0.22 (0.19)
Weakly Pro Govt	0.09 (0.08)	0.14 (0.10)	0.12 (0.08)	0.16* (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.10 (0.11)
Weakly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.12 (0.16)		-0.05 (0.17)		-0.36** (0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt	0.10 (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.05 (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.09 (0.10)
Strongly Pro Govt × Partisan		-0.04 (0.14)		-0.11 (0.14)		-0.12 (0.15)
SAG + (SAG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.14)		0.01 (0.16)		-0.23* (0.13)
WAG + (WAG × Partisan)		0.16 (0.18)		0.27 (0.19)		-0.22 (0.17)
WPG + (WPG × Partisan)		0.02 (0.13)		0.11 (0.15)		-0.26** (0.13)
SPG + (SPG × Partisan)		0.04 (0.11)		0.01 (0.12)		-0.21** (0.11)
p(SAG=WAG)	0.35	0.60	0.51	0.91	0.28	0.27
p(SPG=WPG)	0.90	0.56	0.33	0.70	0.25	0.06
p(SAG-P=WAG-P)		0.42		0.10		0.98
p(SPG-P=WPG-P)		0.85		0.46		0.66
Observations	2,207	2,207	2,209	2,209	2,208	2,208

DVs are all ICW indexes standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of political knowledge about identity of various political leaders; 3-4: Index of political efficacy regarding ability to engage in civil and political actions; 5-6: Index of political engagement including interest in politics. Specifications estimated using Equations (1) (odd-indexed) and (2) (even-indexed) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. p(SAG=WAG) and p(SPG=WPG) provide *p*-value associated with *F*-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients; p(SAG-P=WAG-P) and p(SPG-P=WPG-P) does the same among partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.10 Instrumental variables

Table A54: IV estimates of exposure and consumption on AKP affinity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
A. Participants assignable to anti-government outlets										
$\widehat{\text{Index}}$	-0.111*	-0.116*								
	(0.060)	(0.065)								
$\widehat{\text{Index}} \times \text{Partisan}$		0.001								
		(0.185)								
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}}$			-0.304*	-0.328*						
			(0.166)	(0.186)						
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$				0.073						
				(0.429)						
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}}$					-0.498*	-0.497*				
					(0.268)	(0.277)				
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}} \times \text{Partisan}$						-0.163				
						(1.064)				
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}}$							-0.457*	-0.479*		
							(0.248)	(0.271)		
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$								0.044		
								(0.704)		
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}}$									-0.533*	-0.541*
									(0.289)	(0.305)
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$										-0.108
										(1.033)
First stage F-statistic	321.04	20.74	359.65	25.25	165.29	6.77	185.16	12.22	156.21	7.39
Control Mean	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
Control SD	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
Observations	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453
B. Participants assignable to pro-government outlets										
$\widehat{\text{Index}}$	0.183**	0.219*								
	(0.082)	(0.115)								
$\widehat{\text{Index}} \times \text{Partisan}$		-0.056								
		(0.162)								
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}}$			0.568**	0.701*						
			(0.253)	(0.369)						
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$				-0.213						
				(0.503)						
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}}$					0.766**	0.901*				
					(0.353)	(0.493)				
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}} \times \text{Partisan}$						-0.249				
						(0.680)				
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}}$							0.719**	0.958*		
							(0.325)	(0.514)		
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$								-0.388		
								(0.653)		
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}}$									0.841**	0.889*
									(0.384)	(0.480)
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$										0.082
										(0.849)
First stage F-statistic	107.88	20.97	86.64	21.61	56.74	11.62	61.23	13.06	48.62	5.59
Control Mean	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90
Control SD	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16
Observations	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577

DV: Affinity for AKP (1-5 scale). Specifications estimated using instrumental variables where endogenous treatment variable is predicted by treatment assignment including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, and controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available). *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. Panel A restricts sample to participants assignable to anti-government outlets; Panel B restricts sample to participants assignable to pro-government outlets. First stage F-statistic reported. $\hat{T} + (\hat{T} \times \text{Partisan})$ provides coefficient estimates among strongly partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A55: IV estimates of exposure and consumption on opposition affinity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
A. Participants assignable to anti-government outlets										
$\widehat{\text{Index}}$	0.104	0.091								
	(0.064)	(0.070)								
$\widehat{\text{Index}} \times \text{Partisan}$		0.013								
		(0.152)								
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}}$			0.283	0.258						
			(0.173)	(0.197)						
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$				-0.023						
				(0.364)						
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}}$					0.465	0.393				
					(0.285)	(0.300)				
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}} \times \text{Partisan}$						0.205				
						(0.846)				
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}}$							0.427	0.379		
							(0.263)	(0.291)		
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$								0.021		
								(0.586)		
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}}$									0.495	0.427
									(0.303)	(0.326)
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$										0.162
										(0.821)
First stage F-statistic	319.05	21.22	360.06	25.42	163.38	6.92	180.99	12.32	155.75	7.65
Control Mean	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01
Control SD	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.31
Observations	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453
B. Participants assignable to pro-government outlets										
$\widehat{\text{Index}}$	0.019	-0.036								
	(0.085)	(0.111)								
$\widehat{\text{Index}} \times \text{Partisan}$		0.099								
		(0.174)								
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}}$			0.060	-0.115						
			(0.263)	(0.353)						
$\widehat{\text{Following outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$				0.305						
				(0.536)						
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}}$					0.081	-0.148				
					(0.356)	(0.456)				
$\widehat{\text{See outlet online}} \times \text{Partisan}$						0.398				
						(0.700)				
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}}$							0.076	-0.156		
							(0.336)	(0.479)		
$\widehat{\text{Click on outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$								0.380		
								(0.677)		
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}}$									0.089	-0.149
									(0.393)	(0.455)
$\widehat{\text{Read outlet}} \times \text{Partisan}$										0.524
										(0.928)
First stage F-statistic	107.80	21.78	87.81	22.14	56.98	12.37	60.61	13.32	48.70	5.87
Control Mean	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14
Control SD	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
Observations	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577	1,577

DV: Affinity for Opposition (1-5 scale). Specifications estimated using instrumental variables where endogenous treatment variable is predicted by treatment assignment including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, and controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available). *Partisan* is an indicator for respondent coming from Strongly Anti/Pro affinity strata. Panel A restricts sample to participants assignable to anti-government outlets; Panel B restricts sample to participants assignable to pro-government outlets. First stage F-statistic reported. $\hat{T} + (\hat{T} \times \text{Partisan})$ provides coefficient estimates among strongly partisan participants. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

G.11 Co-partisan treatment assignment

Table A56: Survey attrition (co-partisan)

	Took midline	Took endline
	(1)	(2)
A. Pooled estimation		
Anti Govt	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Pro Govt	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
B. Disaggregated estimation		
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
p(AP=AM)	0.21	0.13
p(PM=PP)	0.28	0.38
Control Mean	0.71	0.71
Control SD	0.45	0.45
Observations	1,794	1,794

DVs are indicators for baseline participant completing midline or endline survey (sample excluded from follow-up survey). Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A57: Balance (demographic characteristics and media consumption; co-partisan)

	Education: Primary	Education: Secondary	Education: University	Age	Male	Lives in major city	Practices religion	ICW: Exposure (Anti govt)	ICW: Exposure (Pro govt)	ICW: Main source (Digital)	ICW: Main source (Traditional)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
A. Pooled estimation											
Anti Govt	0.14 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)
Pro Govt	-0.10 (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)
Joint F-test p-value	0.33	0.25	0.98	0.93	0.57	0.72	0.32	0.23	0.11	0.80	0.48
B. Disaggregated estimation											
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.06 (0.06)	0.18 (0.11)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	0.23 (0.17)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.14)	0.05 (0.16)	0.00 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.17 (0.14)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	-0.55 (0.49)	0.32 (0.24)	-0.00 (0.18)	0.26 (0.20)	0.35 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.20)	0.18 (0.15)	0.15 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.26)	0.00 (0.22)	0.02 (0.16)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.21 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
p(AP=AM)	0.26	0.28	0.33	0.63	0.34	0.67	0.25	0.34	0.44	0.93	0.46
p(PM=PP)	0.25	0.26	0.98	0.17	0.05	0.88	0.03	0.72	0.78	0.77	0.92
Joint F-test p-value	0.68	0.34	0.91	0.69	0.22	0.93	0.07	0.44	0.27	0.97	0.75
Control Mean	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260

Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. p -values from F -tests of the joint significance of treatment coefficients included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A58: Balance (political attitudes; co-partisan)

	AKP affinity	Opposition affinity	AKP vote	Opposition vote	Would vote for any party	ICW: AKP performance	ICW: Issue importance	ICW: Political efficacy	ICW: Political engagement	ICW: Nationalist beliefs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
A. Pooled estimation										
Anti Govt	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
Pro Govt	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)
Joint F-test p-value	0.49	0.97	0.19	0.06	0.57	0.25	0.95	0.65	0.88	0.78
B. Disaggregated estimation										
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)	0.07 (0.08)	0.00 (0.12)	0.26* (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.16 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.19)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.14)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.15)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	0.01 (0.03)	0.23* (0.11)	-0.20 (0.18)	0.17 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.16)	-0.31 (0.17)	0.28 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.23)	-0.03 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.21)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.10)
p(AP=AM)	0.36	0.81	0.66	0.55	0.24	0.62	0.76	0.01	0.96	0.07
p(PM=PP)	0.82	0.04	0.65	0.53	0.71	0.18	0.21	0.74	0.95	0.82
Joint F-test p-value	0.83	0.28	0.44	0.17	0.63	0.32	0.79	0.08	0.99	0.36
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260

Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. p -values from F -tests of the joint significance of treatment coefficients included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A59: Balance (trust, media beliefs, and broader consequences; co-partisan)

	ICW: Media trust (Anti govt)	ICW: Media trust (Pro govt)	ICW: Outlet know. (Anti govt)	ICW: Outlet know. (Pro govt)	ICW: Bias (Anti govt)	ICW: Bias (Pro govt)	ICW: Extra info (Anti govt)	ICW: Extra info (Pro govt)	ICW: Echo chamber	ICW: Turkey dem. satisfaction	ICW: Support democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
A. Pooled estimation											
Anti Govt	-0.03 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.10)
Pro Govt	0.03 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.28*** (0.09)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)
Joint F-test p-value	0.89	0.55	0.87	0.46	0.60	0.01	0.74	0.50	0.62	0.81	0.37
B. Disaggregated estimation											
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.05 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	-0.14 (0.16)	0.06 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.14)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.15)	0.18 (0.13)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.16)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	0.06 (0.22)	0.05 (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)	-0.01 (0.22)	0.07 (0.17)	0.76*** (0.18)	-0.19 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.21)	0.20 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.18)	-0.20 (0.17)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.04 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.11)	0.14 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.12)	0.09 (0.10)	0.21* (0.10)
p(AP=AM)	0.29	0.88	0.47	0.23	0.50	0.09	0.28	0.99	0.90	0.30	0.54
p(PM=PP)	0.88	0.60	0.99	0.59	0.28	0.00	0.30	0.73	0.55	0.24	0.03
Joint F-test p-value	0.87	0.76	0.94	0.35	0.67	0.00	0.49	0.76	0.85	0.59	0.14
Control Mean	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260

Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. p -values from F -tests of the joint significance of treatment coefficients included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A60: Effects on media exposure and consumption (co-partisan)

	ICW: Exposure		ICW: Consumption	
	Anti govt	Pro govt	Anti govt	Pro govt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Pooled estimation				
Anti Govt	0.56*** (0.10)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.27*** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.08)
Pro Govt	-0.06 (0.09)	0.33*** (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)
B. Disaggregated estimation				
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.57*** (0.11)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.33** (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	0.55*** (0.15)	0.03 (0.13)	0.18 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.12)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	0.01 (0.20)	0.35* (0.15)	0.11 (0.19)	0.03 (0.20)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.22* (0.10)
p(AP=AM)	0.91	0.68	0.38	0.61
p(PM=PP)	0.68	0.87	0.36	0.38
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-4: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent follows; sees online; and how frequently they see them online; 5-8: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondent often clicks on; reads articles from; and whether they prefer pro-government or anti-government sources. Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A61: Effects on political attitudes (co-partisan)

	AKP affinity	AKP vote	Opposition affinity	Opposition vote	ICW: AKP Performance	ICW: Issue importance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Pooled estimation						
Anti Govt	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.23** (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)
Pro Govt	0.22** (0.11)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.11 (0.09)	-0.19* (0.10)
B. Disaggregated estimation						
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.01 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.20 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.05 (0.12)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.28 (0.14)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.16)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	0.14 (0.24)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.11 (0.19)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.20)	0.07 (0.21)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.24* (0.12)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.19* (0.09)	-0.27* (0.11)
p(AP=AM)	0.72	0.20	0.67	0.19	0.37	0.57
p(PM=PP)	0.69	0.19	0.27	0.57	0.09	0.15
Control Mean	2.54	0.33	2.62	0.44	-0.00	0.01
Control SD	1.39	0.47	1.38	0.50	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260

DVs: Columns 1-2: Affinity towards AKP (scale 1-5); 3-4: Respondent intends to vote for AKP if election were to be held tomorrow; 5-6: Affinity towards opposition parties (scale 1-5); 7-8: Respondent intends to vote for an opposition party if an election were to be held tomorrow; 9-10: ICW index of perceived government performance across eight contentious issue areas; 11-12: ICW index of perceived importance of eight contentious issue areas. Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A62: Effects on trust and media beliefs (co-partisan)

	ICW: Media trust (relative)	ICW: Outlet knowledge (relative)	ICW: Perceived bias (relative)	ICW: Extra info (relative)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Pooled estimation				
Anti Govt	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.17** (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.20** (0.09)
Pro Govt	0.35*** (0.08)	0.20** (0.10)	0.24** (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)
B. Disaggregated estimation				
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.10)	0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.11)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.54*** (0.16)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	0.10 (0.19)	0.36 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.18)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.42*** (0.08)	0.15 (0.11)	0.33** (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)
p(AP=AM)	0.23	0.88	0.62	0.00
p(PM=PP)	0.11	0.31	0.11	0.41
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260

All DVs are ICW indices standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of trust in pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 3-4: Index of knowledge about pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 5-6: Index of perceived extent of bias of pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets; 7-8: Index of perceived informational value of consuming pro-government outlets relative to anti-government outlets. Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A63: Affective polarization (co-partisan)

	ICW: Affective polarization		Trust people who are...		Comfort being friends with...		Comfort being neighbors with...		Trust news shared by...	
	In-party	Out-party	In-party	Out-party	In-party	Out-party	In-party	Out-party	In-party	Out-party
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
A. Pooled estimation										
Anti Govt	0.13 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.13 (0.11)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.12)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)
Pro Govt	0.07 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.21 (0.14)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.27** (0.13)	0.10 (0.10)	0.13 (0.11)
B. Disaggregated estimation										
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.20 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.30* (0.12)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	0.31* (0.15)	0.05 (0.15)	0.13 (0.16)	0.03 (0.16)	0.28 (0.15)	0.07 (0.20)	0.36* (0.15)	0.04 (0.17)	0.20 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.13)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	-0.14 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.21)	-0.07 (0.22)	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.27)	-0.19 (0.21)	0.18 (0.21)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.24 (0.15)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.31* (0.15)	0.19 (0.11)	0.11 (0.12)
p(AP=AM)	0.09	0.96	0.81	0.42	0.11	0.51	0.02	0.71	0.24	0.00
p(PM=PP)	0.15	0.59	0.06	0.86	0.50	0.62	0.61	0.46	0.09	0.77
Control Mean	-0.00	0.01	3.63	2.17	3.87	2.64	3.99	2.61	3.61	2.05
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.04	1.10	1.02	1.28	0.99	1.23	1.03	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,263	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,263	1,260	1,263	1,260	1,263

DVs: Columns 1-4: Index of attitudes towards copartisans/non-copartisans; 5-8: Extent of trust in copartisans/non-copartisans; 9-12: Extent of comfort being friends with copartisans/non-copartisans; 13-16: Extent of comfort being neighbors with copartisans/non-copartisans. Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A64: Effects on perceptions of democracy (co-partisan)

	ICW: Extent of democracy in Türkiye	ICW: Satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye	ICW: Support for democratic principles
	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Pooled estimation			
Anti Govt	-0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)
Pro Govt	-0.08 (0.10)	0.16* (0.09)	-0.17* (0.09)
B. Disaggregated estimation			
Strongly Anti Govt (Polarized)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)
Weakly Anti Govt (Moderated)	0.07 (0.15)	0.04 (0.10)	0.07 (0.12)
Weakly Pro Govt (Moderated)	-0.12 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.19)	-0.20 (0.16)
Strongly Pro Govt (Polarized)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.23* (0.10)	-0.16 (0.11)
p(AP=AM)	0.41	0.83	0.51
p(PM=PP)	0.81	0.11	0.80
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00
Control SD	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260

DVs are all ICW indexes standardized relative to the control group. Columns 1-2: Index of perceived extent of democracy in Türkiye; 3-4: Index of satisfaction with democracy in Türkiye; 5-6 Index of support for democratic principles in general. Specifications estimated using Equation (1) including randomization block and enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. p(AP=AM) and p(PM=PP) provide p -value associated with F -test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.