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A Cross-Country Study of Preferences for Choice Autonomy

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A Cross-Country Study of Preferences for Choice Autonomy*

Jana Freundt[†] Holger Herz[‡]

October 30, 2025

Abstract

We establish the existence of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy, defined as a preference for own choice in the absence of any instrumental value of choice, in large general population samples in nine countries using a novel preference elicitation tool. We find that such preferences are widespread, but also reveal stark differences across countries. Within countries, individuals who place a higher value on self-reliance and personal identity exhibit stronger intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy. In our small cross-country sample, we find suggestive evidence that differences are correlated with power distance, but not with measures of individualism, and that differences are predictive of managerial decentralization across countries.

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1 Introduction

It has long been argued that freedom and liberty are of central importance to human being and welfare. To meaningfully exercise one’s freedom, choice autonomy is one necessary prerequisite. While choice autonomy is thus widely seen as valuable to individuals, multiple potential sources of such value are discussed in the literature. On the one hand, the consequentialist viewpoint focuses on the instrumental value of the right to choose: Individuals derive value from outcomes, and having choice autonomy ensures that the most favored options can be chosen [1]. Complementary to the purely consequentialist viewpoint, it has also been argued that autonomy is a fundamental human need [2–4]. According to this view, the value of choice autonomy cannot be reduced to the consequences of choice, but also entails an *intrinsic value* component.

In this paper, we study potential differences in the intrinsic value of autonomy in a cross-cultural context. In particular, we are interested in whether the intrinsic valuation of autonomy fundamentally differs across individualist and collectivist cultures.¹ Indeed, autonomy has been argued to be of higher importance to individuals in individualist cultures [14–18]. However, it should be noted that the argumentation is primarily consequentialist: Because people in individualist cultures emphasize the pursuit of individual goals, choice autonomy is a necessity. When focusing on the value of autonomy as a fundamental human need instead, there is no immediate reason why its value should be connected to individualism and the consequentialist realization of individual goals. From this perspective, it has thus been argued that autonomy is of equal importance to collectivists and individualists [19–21].

In order to assess differences in the value assigned to autonomy, it is thus fundamentally important to cleanly differentiate between its intrinsic and instrumental value components. However, existing empirical constructs that aim to measure the value of autonomy usually identify both components jointly. For example, if the value of autonomy is inferred from simple survey questions, individual differences in an expressed desire for choice autonomy may express differences in (perceived) instrumental value, intrinsic value, or both. Thus, observed differences cannot clearly be attributed to one of the value components. This is particularly problematic in cross-cultural comparisons, as the instrumental value of choice autonomy is clearly affected by factors that are known to vary across cultures, such as trust, institutions, or social norms [22–25]. To better understand whether and how individuals value choice autonomy, it is thus indispensable to separate its intrinsic and instrumental value components.

In this paper, we aim to advance our understanding of cross-cultural differences in preferences for choice autonomy by employing a novel behavioral preference measurement that allows isolating the intrinsic value component of choice autonomy in an incentivized and neutrally framed decision task [11]. The advantage and key novelty of this approach is that instrumental value considerations of choice autonomy are ruled out by design, and the intrinsic value component of choice autonomy is isolated at the individual level. Utilizing this novel measurement tool, we assess whether postulated

¹Intrinsic preferences for autonomy, and related concepts such as decision rights, authority, power or control, have previously been studied at the individual level. See, for example, [5–13].

differences in the individual importance of autonomy across individualist and collectivist cultures may go beyond its instrumental value and extend towards expressed intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy.

To this end, we measure intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy in large general population samples across nine countries, with a total of 8769 observations:² China, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The nine countries have been deliberately selected along differences in individualism. In particular, according to the classification in [26], the USA, the UK and Sweden rank high in individualism, China, Portugal and Greece rank relatively low in individualism, and Germany, Italy, and France are in-between. Although nine countries provide a necessarily limited basis for inference, the use of large general population samples across diverse cultural contexts offers a solid and informative first assessment of the role of cultural differences in the valuation of choice autonomy within and across countries. Exploiting this variation across countries allows us to find first indications of whether choice autonomy is valued differentially along this cultural dimension.

We find clear evidence that intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy are present in all nine countries in our sample. Individuals on average are willing to sacrifice 5.4% of the expected value of the choice they face to maintain choice autonomy—in the absence of any instrumental value. Thus, both collectivist and individualist cultures on average assign intrinsic value to choice autonomy. However, we also find substantial heterogeneity in intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy both across countries and at the individual level within countries, with a substantial minority in each country exhibiting an aversion to choice autonomy. At the individual level, we find that intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy are significantly positively associated with horizontal-individualist cultural values, that is, with assigning importance to personal identity and self-reliance. We also find that women assign significantly lower intrinsic value to choice autonomy than male participants.

Although our sample at the country level is small, we can still make an initial assessment of correlations between cultural values and the average intrinsic value of choice autonomy at the country level, contributing to a growing literature that tries to understand how and why preferences differ across countries.³ Interestingly, countries that score high on individualism do not display stronger intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy. The rank correlation between our measure for intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy and individualism is even slightly negative (but insignificantly so). Our data therefore does not indicate that individualist cultures assign higher value to choice autonomy for non-instrumental reasons. However, we do find marginally significant positive correlations between the strength of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy and power distance [26], as well as the degree of decentralization of organizations [44]. Thus, it appears that a desire for choice autonomy is associated with more centralized organizational cultures, in which work environments

²The sample for our main analysis will be based on 5326 of these observations, due to restrictive selection criteria to ensure sound measurement of intrinsic preferences for autonomy. We will explain these criteria in detail in section 2.

³The list of studies investigating how preferences differ between countries and cultures around the globe includes studies on differences in cooperation [23, 27–33], in anti-social punishments in public goods games [34, 35], in intrinsic honesty [22, 36–38], in risk attitudes [39] and in trust and trustworthiness [40–43].

that enhance personal freedoms are less prevalent and choices tend to be more restricted. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms of these statistical associations in the discussion section.

2 Study Design

Our preference elicitation tool is designed to identify the purely intrinsic value an individual attaches to choice autonomy. We define intrinsic preferences for autonomy as a preference for taking decisions oneself rather than having someone else decide over own consequences on one’s behalf. The working of the elicitation tool is introduced in [11] and described in detail in Appendix A, we will summarize the main mechanisms here. It consists of two parts that serve the purpose of eliciting an individual’s willingness to pay for choice autonomy after excluding instrumental value as a potential explanation. The latter is ensured by part 1, in which participants are repeatedly asked to make a choice between two options. The goal is to identify two alternatives A and B between which an individual is revealed indifferent ($A \sim B$). In a second part, a choice set is constructed that contains exactly these two alternatives. We elicit participants’ willingness to pay to make a choice over this set themselves, rather than having someone else make a choice on their behalf. Because the individual is revealed indifferent between the options contained in the choice set, a positive willingness to pay for choice cannot be explained by instrumental value, but must represent an intrinsic value of making this choice.

Part 1. We use lotteries as choice alternatives because lotteries allow for a fine-grained incremental adjustment of value in order to approximate indifference. They also provide choice options that are as normatively neutral as possible, defined only by monetary values, making them suitable for cross-country comparisons. In part 1, each participant goes through an individual sequence of 10 choice situations in each of which they face the simple binary choice between two lotteries A and B . Lottery A is fixed and always provides a payoff of 600 points with 25% probability and a payoff of 1600 points with 75% probability. Lottery B provides a payoff of 600 points with 50% probability and a payoff of $X \in \{1890, \dots, 2840\}$ points with 50% probability. The value X is adjusted from choice situation to choice situation using Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation (DOSE) [45, 46], a method that provides an estimate of an individual’s point of indifference as well as an estimate of choice consistency, which is informative about the precision with which indifference is identified at the individual level. Using binary choices between two lotteries and adjusting only one value in lottery B from round to round also provides a simple and intuitive decision environment for the participant, reducing complexity of the decision task. The exact decision screens that participants faced are displayed in Appendix D.

Part 2. In part 2, participants are again shown two lotteries, A and \hat{B} . Lottery A is identical to part 1. Lottery \hat{B} is selected such that the participant is just indifferent between the two choice alternatives ($A \sim \hat{B}$), given their own preference, as revealed in part 1 of our elicitation task. Participants are told that either A or \hat{B} will determine their payoff, and that the choice between

A and \hat{B} is either made by themselves, or by another study participant.⁴ Participants are again faced with a sequence of 10 choice situations, in each of which they must choose between choosing themselves (phrased “I choose”) and paying a price p , or delegating the choice to an anonymous study participant (phrased “I delegate”). The price $p \in \{-600, -590, \dots, -10, 10, 20, \dots, 600\}$ in points varies from situation to situation and can either be positive or negative.⁵ Again, an estimated preference parameter for the individual’s value of choice and an estimate of her degree of choice consistency are obtained using DOSE. Because instrumental utility components are fully controlled for, the estimated willingness to pay for choosing oneself in part 2 is taken as an individual-level measure of the intrinsic preference for choice autonomy. Individual estimates of choice consistency serve as important control variables since they determine the accuracy of our measure of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy at the individual level.⁶

The experiment consists of three parts, the two behavioral tasks in parts 1 and 2, plus a questionnaire eliciting general attitudes and views, cultural values and socio-demographic characteristics (the exact list of questions in English is provided in Appendix D). Importantly, decisions taken in parts 1 and 2 of the experiment were monetarily incentivized. In parts 1 and 2, one of the 10 choice situations was randomly selected, implemented and paid. Participants were informed about the outcomes at the end of the experiment. Two control questions and two attention checks distributed across the behavioral tasks and the questionnaire ensured that participants paid attention and read the instructions.

Implementation. The data were collected by a survey agency in May and June 2022. In each country, we implemented quotas for age and gender plus a soft quota for individual income in order to obtain general population samples in each country that are broadly representative of the population with respect to these criteria. The quotas and the final sample composition are summarized in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. Table A.4 gives an overview over average duration and payouts in each country. In the US, the base payment for participation was 2 USD, on average participants earned an additional 2.72 USD. The average duration in the US sample was 24 minutes. Payments and the exchange rate between points in the experiments and payouts were adapted to the national currencies and rounded so that participants in all countries saw sensible numbers. For example, the base payment in Sweden amounted to 20 SEK, in the UK it was 2 GBP.

The complete instructions and the questionnaire were translated into each country’s official language. After translation by a professional translator, each translation was double checked against the original english version by a separate native speaker who is also fluent in English.

Final Sample Composition. A total sample of 8769 observations was collected across the nine countries. Because the identification of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy critically rests on the identifying assumption that participants face a choice set that contains only options

⁴Participants were told that another study participant would choose a lottery on their behalf and receive a fixed base payment that is independent of whether they delegate and of the choices they make.

⁵Negative prices are framed as “bonuses” that the participant receives if they choose themselves.

⁶For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the measured intrinsic preference for choice autonomy and choice consistency, see [11].

between which the decision maker is indifferent, we had to exclude participants for whom we cannot identify a point of indifference in part 1 of the experiment. These are mostly—but not exclusively—individuals that never switch between lotteries. For example, if an individual chooses lottery A in each of the 10 decisions, we are unable to establish indifference between any lottery B and the fixed lottery A . As a consequence, our sample is reduced by 39.26 percent, leaving us with 5326 observations. The high exclusion rate is probably a consequence of the sampling method, utilizing a survey agency that contacts participants through an online panel, which may lead to inattentive responses on the side of the participants. Choosing the same option repeatedly is one plausible decision sequence of an inattentive participant. Consequently, our exclusion restriction is also a screen for inattentive participants. More details on the sample composition and the precise exclusion criteria are provided in Appendix A.3. As a robustness check, we also replicate all our main analyses using the full sample of 8769 observations in Appendix C.1. We only refer to the results of these robustness checks in the main text in case there are substantial deviations.

A second potential threat to the identification of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy stems from measurement error in the indifference point in step 1 of our elicitation task, caused by minor inconsistencies in choice sequences. If the indifference point in step 1 is measured with error, the choice set in step 2 may contain residual instrumental value. We utilize the parameter estimate for choice consistency, which we derive from the application of DOSE, in order to control for such measurement error in the analysis. Among the 5326 observations, 45% of exhibited perfectly consistent choice patterns. Appendix B.1 summarizes further results on choice consistency in our country samples. While inconsistencies introduce the potential for a confound, it is demonstrated in [11] that the expected residual instrumental value of choice is small, unless choice inconsistencies in part 1 become very large. In our analysis, we control for such potential confounds by adding choice inconsistency as a regressor in our regression frameworks. We also replicate all our analyses further conditioning the sample by excluding participants with substantial inconsistencies in their choice patterns, following the definition in [11], in Appendix C.2. Again, we only refer to the results of these robustness checks in the main text in case there are substantial deviations.

3 Results

Preferences for Autonomy. We find that the average willingness to pay to retain the choice amounts to 72.52 points (median 55.05 points), which is equivalent to 5.4% of the expected value of lottery A (we use lottery A as the comparison point as lottery A is identical for all participants), and significantly different from zero (t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR) with $p < 0.001$ each). Figure 1, panel 1, shows the mean willingness to pay in each country in descending order. When comparing the willingness to pay for choice autonomy across countries, we observe that the mean and median values are positive and significantly different from zero in each of the nine countries (t-tests and WSR with $p < 0.001$ each), but they differ quite substantially in magnitude. The mean willingness to pay is highest in China with 95.42 points, followed by Greece with 90.46

points. The lowest mean value is found in Germany with 34.14 points and Sweden with 55.2 points. Sweden and Germany also have the lowest median values (10.23 for Germany and 0 for Sweden), the highest median values are found in Portugal and China (82.01 in Portugal and 81.78 in China).

The second and third panels of Figure 1 show the distribution of the willingness to pay for each country. Within each country, we observe substantial individual heterogeneity in preferences. In particular, a non-negligible part of participants shows an aversion to choice autonomy. Interestingly, the pattern of individual-level heterogeneity in each country is quite similar. In all countries, most participants exhibit a positive willingness to pay (the share is lowest with 49.9% in Sweden and highest with 59.8% in China), approximately a third of the participants exhibit a negative willingness to pay (between 27.7% in China and 37.7% in Sweden), and around 10 percent display zero willingness to pay in each country (between 10.8% in France and 12.8% in Germany).⁷




Figure 1: Panel 1: Mean willingness to pay in points with standard errors by country; Panel 2: share of participants in each country showing a negative, zero or positive willingness to pay; Panel 3: Cumulative distribution of the willingness to pay in each country.

⁷The exception is Portugal with a very high share of 64.2% of positive values and a very low share of 4.6% of subjects having a willingness to pay of zero. Due to the somewhat unusual distribution of the willingness to pay and the higher variance in the Portuguese sample, we discuss this data again in Appendix C.3 and replicate analyses where necessary without the Portuguese data.

Individual Determinants The observed heterogeneity in intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy naturally raises the question whether these differences can be explained by observable individual determinants. Table 1, column (1), displays results of a regression of the willingness to pay for choice autonomy on several socio-economic characteristics. We use OLS regressions with robust standard errors and the following socio-demographic variables as regressors:⁸ age, male, individual income, University degree, and immigrant.⁹ The share of participants who hold a university degree is highest in China with 85.73 percent and lowest in Germany with 31.41 percent.¹⁰ The share of immigrants is below 15% in each sample, with a share of zero in the Chinese and a share of 14.85% in the Portuguese sample. We additionally control for risk attitudes, elicited as a self-reported measure in the questionnaire (see Figure D.36). In addition, country fixed effects are included as categorical variables with the US as the baseline country. Highly inconsistent choice behavior in part 1 or part 2 is controlled for, as well as a possible lack of attention or difficulties to understand the instructions, included via the number of attempts a person needed in the control questions and in the attention checks, respectively.¹¹

Overall, the data suggests that socio-demographic variables have limited predictive power for intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy. The only noteworthy and significant difference in the mean willingness to pay appears for gender: male participants exhibit a substantially and significantly higher willingness to pay than female participants ($p < 0.01$).

Individual cultural values. We also explore if and how preferences for choice autonomy are related to *individual cultural values*. Individual cultural values are defined along four dimensions that each express different facets of the relationship between the individual and social groups. This is conceptualized using the well-established Cultural Orientation Scale [16], a 16-item questionnaire that elicits the following four non-exclusive cultural traits: horizontal-individualist (HI), vertical-individualist (VI), horizontal-collectivist (HC) and vertical-collectivist (VC).¹² HI expresses a perceived importance of personal identity and self-reliance, VI expresses a competitive attitude, HC captures a cooperative and team-oriented attitude and VC describes an in-group and, especially, a family orientation of the individual. Table 1 column (2) presents the results from a regression of the individually measured willingness to pay for choice autonomy on these self-reported cultural values, controlling for the same socio-demographic variables as in column (1). It can be seen that the association with horizontal-individualist values, HI, is positive and statistically significant,

⁸Using (bootstrapped) clusters at the country level does not change the results.

⁹Our sample contains 30 observations with either unspecified or other gender. The regressions include a dummy for male. The coefficient thus give the estimate on the coefficient male relative to being female and these other 30 observations. Excluding the 30 observations from the analysis does not qualitatively change any of the results.

¹⁰The very high share of University degrees in China is likely a consequence of sampling, as we utilize an online panel in which University graduates are probably overrepresented relative to the general population in China.

¹¹The binary variable `Inconsistent_part1` equals 1 if a person made highly inconsistent choices between lotteries A and B in part 1 and accordingly `Inconsistent_part2` captures participants who made highly inconsistent choices in the delegation decisions in part 2. For details see Appendix A.

¹²The exact questionnaire items are presented in Appendix D. Note that identifying cultural values along these four dimensions allows individualist and collectivist (and horizontal and vertical) values to be non-exclusive. Rather, both are seen as independent traits that can co-exist in individuals [16].

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	WTP	WTP	Pos_WTP	Zero_WTP	Neg_WTP
Age	0.639*** (0.219)	0.576*** (0.223)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)
Male	24.226*** (7.160)	26.333*** (7.230)	0.185*** (0.037)	-0.055 (0.049)	-0.177*** (0.039)
Income	-5.466 (4.908)	-5.258 (4.928)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.035)	0.032 (0.026)
University Degree	-12.674* (7.283)	-12.174* (7.301)	-0.078** (0.038)	0.099* (0.051)	0.031 (0.040)
Immigrant	-7.167 (13.890)	-8.380 (13.892)	0.017 (0.068)	0.020 (0.090)	-0.037 (0.071)
HI		8.130** (3.275)	0.013 (0.016)	0.061*** (0.022)	-0.047*** (0.017)
VI		-0.256 (2.554)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.017)	0.014 (0.014)
HC		2.897 (2.973)	0.024 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.015)
VC		-1.621 (2.939)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.019)	0.018 (0.016)
Constant	18.594 (21.075)	-41.401 (32.637)	-0.315* (0.168)	-0.701*** (0.228)	-0.249 (0.174)
(Pseudo) R^2	0.027	0.027		0.030	0.056
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	5326	5326	5326	5326	5326

Table 1: Willingness to pay in points on cultural value indices and socio-demographics. Columns (1-2) OLS; columns (3-5) probit estimation of the likelihood to have a positive, zero or negative willingness to pay. Cultural values according to [16]: HI: horizontal-individualist, VI: vertical-individualist, HC: horizontal-collectivist, VC: vertical-collectivist. Income is coded in three categories relative to the distribution of income in the panel in the respective country^a. University_degree is equal to 1 if the person reports to have a university degree, zero otherwise. Immigrant is equal to 1 if the person was born in another country than the one they reside in at the moment of taking the survey, zero otherwise. Robust Standard errors. Additional controls: risk attitudes, country as a categorical variable with the US as the baseline, Inconsistent_part1, Inconsistent_part2, number of attempts in the control questions in part 1 and in part 2.

Significance levels: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$

^aParticipants in each country are divided into three income categories that correspond roughly to income terciles in that country (it is not always possible to have precise cuts due to the distribution across categories in which income is elicited, see Figure D.4)

implying that the value a person assigns to personal identity and self-reliance is significantly associated with a higher intrinsic value of choice autonomy at the individual level. The regressions presented in columns (3-5), Table 1, offer further insights into this relationship, by using indicators

of a positive, zero or negative willingness to pay as the outcome variable.¹³ The positive association between horizontal-individualist values does not seem to be driven by a larger share of individuals displaying a positive willingness to pay, but by a reduced likelihood of a negative one that is primarily compensated by an increased likelihood of a zero willingness to pay: a person with more horizontal-individualist values is thus more likely to be purely consequentialist, as indicated by a willingness to pay of zero, and less likely to exhibit an aversion to choice autonomy, as indicated by a negative willingness to pay.¹⁴

Cross-Cultural Differences Finally, our data allows us to assess whether the observed heterogeneity across the nine countries in our sample is systematically related to country-level characteristics. To this end, we exploit the variation with respect to two well-established indices to measure cultural differences, namely individualism and power distance [24]. The individualism score by [24] (INDI) ranks countries according to how tight or loose the ties between individuals in a society are. In individualist societies, people attach high importance to individual goals and are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. As discussed previously, social scientists have argued that individualism and the value of choice autonomy may be positively associated [14–18]. However, the argument for such an association is primarily based on instrumental reasoning. We exclude instrumental value by design and instead argue that the experience of living in an individualist culture and internalizing its values may constitute an antecedent of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy. We can provide an initial test of this relationship by relating our preference measure to INDI.

In addition, the power distance index (PDI) measures the extend to which members of a society perceive and accept an unequal distribution of power and dependence relationships at work [24]. Hierarchy and unequal power relations are challenged less in high power cultures, whereas authority is questioned more readily and power relations are expected to be more democratic and participatory in low power cultures. The ranking of the nine countries according to each index is displayed in Table B.3. While the exact ranking differs between the two indices, the US, UK and Sweden tend to be at the top and China rather at the bottom of the ranking among the nine countries.

¹³Note that even though we adapted the payment from the study between countries and also try to account for income and other socio-economic characteristics as much as possible, we cannot completely exclude that differences in the value of the experimental payouts influence people’s behavior in the task. The share of positive and negative values therefore also provides a robustness check of our main findings based on the mean willingness to pay and offers further insights.

¹⁴Replicating this analysis using the full sample replicates the results (see table C.2 in Appendix C.1). When using the subsample that only excludes subjects with substantial inconsistencies in their choice pattern in step 1 of the elicitation task, the coefficient on HI in regression specifications (2) and (5) is slightly reduced, and loses statistical significance ($p = 0.13$ and $p = 0.12$, respectively). The effect of HI on having a WTP of zero in column (4) remains statistically significant. See Table C.4 in Appendix C.2.




Figure 2: Mean willingness to pay in points in relation to the individualism index [24] (Panel 1) ; the power distance index [24] (Panel 2); and the management autonomy index [44] (Panel 3). Spearman’s rank correlation with p-values added in each panel.

The two top panels of Figure 2 show the relationship of our measure of intrinsic preferences for choice autonomy with individualism [24] and power distance [24] on the country level. While there is no statistically significant association with individualism, the mean value for choice autonomy tends to *increase* in power distance (PDI) ($p = 0.09$, Spearman rank correlation).¹⁵

In addition, we assess whether differences in intrinsic preferences for autonomy are associated with differences in management practices across countries. To this end, we correlate the average willingness to pay for choice autonomy at the country level in our study with the degree of management decentralization at the country level, as measured by [44]. The scatterplot is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2. It can be seen that a higher intrinsic value for choice autonomy is associated with *more* centralization and *less* management autonomy at the country level (Spearman rank correlation, $\rho = 0.72, p = 0.03$).¹⁶

¹⁵In Figure B.2 in Appendix B.2, we replicate our analysis for three alternative indicators of individualism [47] to establish the robustness of our results to the choice of the index. These replications confirm our result based on Hofstede’s measure of individualism. They are directionally consistent in that higher mean WTP is correlated with a lower individualism score at the country level, but these associations overall show no consistently statistically significant pattern.

¹⁶Replications using the full sample replicate the results presented in this section, with a slight reduction in statistical significance for the correlation with PDI ($\rho = 0.58, p = 0.1$) and MI ($\rho = -0.63, p = 0.07$). See Figure C.1 in Appendix C.1. When using the sample of excluding individuals with substantial inconsistencies in Appendix C.2 the direction of these results is again confirmed, significance is further reduced (PDI: $\rho = 0.53, p = 0.14$; MI: $\rho = -0.57, p = 0.11$). See Figure C.3 in Appendix C.2.

4 Discussion

The previous section documents substantial cross-country differences in the average intrinsic value for making autonomous choices, but at the same time a striking similarity across country samples with a majority exhibiting a positive value and a non-negligible minority exhibiting a negative value for choice autonomy.

Our individual-level results highlight the importance of personal value orientations. Participants who place greater importance on personal identity and self-reliance display a higher willingness to pay for autonomy, an association that is present in all 9 countries in our sample. This suggests that individuals that score high on horizontal individualism have the strongest intrinsic desire to make free choices within each organizational and cultural environment in our study sample.

Our cross-country conclusions are necessarily limited by sample size. Nonetheless, two patterns emerge. First, choice autonomy does not appear to be systematically more valued in countries that score high on individualism. Second, power distance and management centralization show a statistical association with the average intrinsic value of choice autonomy. Maybe surprisingly, lower expressed intrinsic values of choice autonomy are observed in countries with lower power distance and more decentralization. For example, Germany and Sweden—characterized by relatively low power distance and decentralization—exhibit relatively low mean intrinsic values of choice autonomy, whereas China and Greece—marked by higher power distance—show substantially higher values.¹⁷ Other European countries such as Italy occupy an intermediate position on both power distance and autonomy preferences. Notably, the United Kingdom deviates from this pattern: despite relatively high individualism and decentralization, it exhibits a comparatively high average intrinsic value for choice autonomy.

We emphasize that these findings reflect associations rather than causal relationships, and we can only speculate about underlying mechanisms. One possibility is that decentralization and power distance are themselves consequences of preferences: stronger intrinsic preferences for autonomy may inhibit delegation at the individual level, ultimately fostering more centralized institutions and higher power distance (see, e.g., [48–50]). While such an outcome may seem suboptimal from a utilitarian perspective, it remains plausible. Equally plausible, however, is the reverse direction: autonomy preferences may be shaped by institutional environments. In centralized, high power distance contexts, individuals experience fewer opportunities to exercise autonomy in everyday life, leaving their need for autonomy less satisfied. This may strengthen their intrinsic desire for choice, consistent with psychological reactance theory [51–54], which predicts that restrictions on choice increase the motivation to reclaim it.

At the same time, it is important to distinguish between different conceptualizations of cultural values. Individual-level indices such as [15] capture a person’s own identity and values, whereas

¹⁷In line with this reasoning, the average willingness to pay for choice autonomy within Germany tends to be higher in the Eastern part of the country, formerly the German Democratic Republic (West: median = 0, mean = 30.94, N = 460; East: median = 24.28, mean = 42.25, N = 140). However, this difference is not statistically significant. Because we only asked for the first two digits of the zip code, 32 locations in Germany could not be clearly categorized and were excluded from this analysis.

country-level indicators such as Hofstede’s INDI scale [24] reflect perceptions of the broader organizational culture. The former treat individualist and collectivist (as well as vertical and horizontal) traits as orthogonal dimensions that can coexist within individuals in any society [21, 55], and indeed measures of individualism and collectivism can positively correlate [e.g. 56]—a pattern also observed in our data. By contrast, Hofstede conceptualizes individualism and collectivism as opposite ends of a single continuum.

Taken together, the within-country and cross-country evidence are thus complementary. At the individual level, personal values shape the strength of autonomy preferences, while at the country level, institutional and cultural environments shape the extent to which those preferences are expressed and reinforced.

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Appendix

A Survey Design and Implementation

A.1 DOSE Method for part 1 of the elicitation procedure

In part 1, each participant goes through an individual sequence of 10 choice situations in each of which they face the binary choice between two lotteries A and B . Lottery A is fixed and always provides a payoff of 600 points with 25% probability and a payoff of 1600 points with 75% probability. Lottery B provides a payoff of 600 points with 50% probability and a payoff of $X \in \{1890, \dots, 2840\}$ points with 50% probability. The value X is adjusted from choice situation to choice situation using DOSE [45, 57]. DOSE adjusts the value of X in such a way that given an individual's decision pattern in choice situations 1 to t , the choice between alternatives A and B in choice situation $t + 1$ maximizes the information regarding the individual's degree of risk aversion as well as their choice consistency. In particular, we assume that the participant's risk preferences and choice behavior can be characterized by the following two equations:

$$u_i(w) = \frac{w^{1-r_i}}{1-r_i} \quad (1)$$

where w is the payoff in points and r_i is the individual's risk aversion parameter.

$$Pr(A) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mu_i(U_i(A)-U_i(B))}} \quad (2)$$

where $Pr(A)$ is the probability of choosing lottery A over B , μ_i specifies the individual's degree of stochastic response in choice, and U_i denotes the expected utility of a lottery given u_i .

For estimating \hat{r}_i and $\hat{\mu}_i$, DOSE uses sequential Bayesian updating and combines it with information entropy to increase speed of inference. To initialize DOSE, we first decided on the appropriate discrete parameter space for r given by $\mathcal{R} \in (r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n)$ and μ , given by $\mathcal{M} \in (\mu_1, \mu_2, \dots, \mu_m)$ whereby we define $\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K}$ models k , one for each possible combination of r and μ . We then assign to each model k a prior probability $p_k = Pr(r_k, \mu_k) = Pr(r_k)Pr(\mu_k)$.

Like [45], we use a similar range for the risk parameter as [58], namely from -1.2 to 1.2. The range for μ is sensitive to the chosen payoff values for A and B . Based on precision in estimating parameters of simulated subjects, we found that $\mathcal{M} \in \{1, 10, 20, \dots, 120\}$ provides a sensible parameter space for our setup. Finally, regarding the assumed prior distribution over models, we choose a uniform prior, i.e. $\forall j, i : p_j = p_i$, given that estimates that are made using different priors only slightly differ [45, 57] and given that data on the distribution of the choice consistency parameter in our setting is non-existent.

Second, we define a reference lottery¹⁸ A that pays a high payoff of 1600 points with 75% probability and a low payoff of 600 points with 25% probability, and a set of lotteries $\mathcal{B} = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n\}$

¹⁸Henceforth, a lottery L is defined by $L = (x^{high}, x^{low}, p)$ where x^{high} and x^{low} are two monetary payoffs and p is the probability of receiving x^{high} .

with B_j paying a high payoff of X_j points with 50% probability and a low payoff of 600 points with 50% probability. We then define the set of all binary combinations of lottery A and some lottery B as $\mathcal{Q} \in \{(A, B_1), (A, B_2), \dots, (A, B_n)\}$.

This setup allows updating prior probabilities for every model k with Bayes' rule when asking a participant to make a choice for a choice situation $Q_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ as follows:

$$p(k|a) = p(r_k, \mu_k|a) = \frac{p(a|r_k, \mu_k)p(r_k, \mu_k)}{\sum_j^k p(a|r_j, \mu_j)p(r_j, \mu_j)} \quad (3)$$

where $a \in \{\text{choosing A, choosing B}\}$ denotes the individual's choice.

Iterating this procedure of asking a question and updating beliefs leads to a lower variance in the posterior probability distribution over models, i.e. a more precise estimation of an individual's true parameters. To optimize the sequence of questions with respect to the speed of inference, an information criterion is used: Following [45] and [57], we define a Kullback-Leibler information number for each model k for question $Q_i \in \mathcal{Q}$:

$$I(k; Q_i) = \sum_a \log\left(\frac{l_k(a; Q_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^k p_j l_j(a; Q_i)}\right) p_k l_k(a; Q_i) \quad (4)$$

where $a \in \{\text{choosing A, choosing B}\}$ denotes the binary choice between choosing lottery A or B and l_k is the associated likelihood of choosing a in Q_i under model k . $I(k; Q_i)$ measures how informative question Q_i is if k is the correct model. By summing up $I(k; Q_i)$ for every model and weighing according to the model's probability p_k , we get the Kullback-Leibler information number for a given question $Q_i \in \mathcal{Q}$:

$$KL(Q_i) = \sum_k^n p_k I(k; Q_i) \quad (5)$$

Asking a participant the question $Q^* = \max_Q KL(Q)$ maximizes information gained from the observed choice. In other words, Q^* is the question that in expectation updates the prior the strongest. Iterating the process of (i) choosing Q^* given the current probability distribution and (ii) updating beliefs delivers the most informative sequence of questions at the participant level. It is important to note that, after every iteration, the current Q^* is excluded from \mathcal{Q} for the next round.

Each participant makes a total of 10 choices, where one choice is chosen at random for payment at the end of the experiment. In each round, questions were selected according to the DOSE procedure explained above, except for rounds 5 and 10. For participants that are very consistent in their choice patterns, the DOSE algorithm quickly converges to a narrow range of lotteries B_j , in order to fine-tune the risk aversion parameter at incremental levels. Thus, to break the monotonicity of the choice situation sequence, in round 5 a lottery B_j was chosen for which the expected value of the corresponding lottery B is significantly different¹⁹ to the prior choice situations.

¹⁹Based on simulations, we decided to randomly select a lottery B in choice situation 5 whose value X differed

In round 10, we have an additional reason for selecting a different choice situation. In step 2 of our elicitation procedure, we will use the lottery B_j^* that makes the individual indifferent to lottery A . DOSE would likely choose a lottery in round 10 that is very close to B_j^* , which we wanted to avoid, and rather create more variety in the lotteries the individual faced in the final choice of part 1.²⁰

Because every participant starts with the same prior distribution over models k , the most informative choice situation in the first round is always the same for each participant. Because each choice situation has 2 options (choosing lottery A or lottery B), there are a total of $2^{10} = 1024$ possible decision paths in our elicitation procedure. We pre-specified and stored the optimal sequence of choice situations for each decision path in our experimental implementation, which made intensive computations during the experiment unnecessary.²¹

A.2 DOSE Method for part 2 of the elicitation procedure

In part 2, participants are again shown two lotteries, A and \hat{B} . Lottery A is identical to part 1. lottery \hat{B} is selected such that the participant is just indifferent between the two choice alternatives ($A \sim \hat{B}$), given their own preference, as revealed in step 1 of our elicitation task. Participants are told that either A or \hat{B} will determine their payoff, and that the choice between A and \hat{B} is either made by themselves, or by another study participant. Participants are faced with a sequence of 10 choice situations, in each of which they must choose between choosing themselves and paying a price p , or delegating the choice to an anonymous study participant. The price $p \in \{-600, -590, \dots, -10, 10, 20, \dots, 600\}$ in points varies from situation to situation and can either be positive or negative.

In part 2, we thus estimate the value of choosing oneself d_i and a consistency parameter γ_i . Thus, we initialize DOSE by defining the parameter space for d , given by $\mathcal{D} \in (d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n)$ and the parameter space for γ , given by $\Gamma \in (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_m)$ and assign prior probabilities to all $n \times m = k$ models. Second, we define the parameter space for prices p given by $\mathcal{P} \in (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n)$. The set of choice situations is defined by all combinations of a price p as $Q = \{([p_1, \text{"I choose"}], [0, \text{"I delegate"}]), \dots, ([p_n, \text{"I choose"}], [0, \text{"I delegate"}])\}$. We again chose a uniform prior distribution over all models. Based on pilot data and simulations, we chose a discrete parameter space of $\mathcal{P} \in \{-600, -590, \dots, -10, 10, 20, \dots, 600\}$ and $\gamma \in \{1, 2, \dots, 15\}$.²² As in step 1, we pre-specified and stored the optimal sequence of choice situations in our experimental implementation, creating 1024 predetermined decision paths.

between 50 and 150 points from the B_j in the previous choice situation.

²⁰While we lose some information relative to the application of DOSE in 10 rounds, simulations have shown that the 8 rounds in which DOSE is applied deliver sufficient information on the parameters r and μ to obtain precise parameter estimates at the individual level, at least for high levels of consistency.

²¹The fact that using an information criterion like Kullback-Leibler needs a lot of computing power to calculate the optimal question for a given round makes the calculation of optimal decision paths in real time a major implementation challenge for experiments.

²²The values of γ have to be interpreted in connection with $v_i(d_i, p)$, as it simply scales up differences in expected utility, and values cannot be interpreted in isolation. We again chose the range of γ such that highly inconsistent and highly consistent choice behaviors are covered.

A.3 Implementation and sample

The survey contains the behavioral task that consists of two parts plus a questionnaire that is asked directly after the behavioral task is finished. In part 1 and 2 of the behavioral task there are control questions that ensure the understanding of the instructions. They have to be correctly answered with less than 3 (4 in part 2) attempts before a participant is allowed to continue and make the respective 10 choices, see Figures D.8 and D.19 in Appendix D for the exact questions (English version). Two clearly marked attention checks had to be passed in the post-experimental questionnaire in order to be able to complete the questionnaire. This ensures that participants read the questions attentively.

Ethics approval was granted by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Fribourg²³. In all countries, the surveys were implemented in cooperation with the firm Surveyengine²⁴, who administered the data collection and payment of participants. Translations of the English survey were done by independent professional translators and proof-read by at least one second party who is a native speaker. Participants were invited via e-mail. In each country, we implemented quotas for age and gender plus a "soft quota" for individual income in order to ensure broadly representative samples in each country. The quotas and the final sample composition are summarized in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 below. The data collection took place in May and June 2022. US American subjects received a basepayment of 2 USD plus a variable incentive payment of, on average, 2.75 USD for a survey that took them on average 24 minutes to complete. In each country, the payouts were converted into local currency and rounded, see Table A.4 for duration and payouts in each country.

In order to make the experiment and the delegation logistically feasible, we recruited one Participant on the platform Prolific²⁵. This participant assumed the role of the "other participant" to whom choices could be delegated, and he was paid a fixed amount of 3 for making a series of choices between all 128 lottery combinations that could result from step 1 of the elicitation task, using the strategy method. These decisions were fed into the program, and in case delegation occurred, the associated decision made by the "other participant" beforehand was implemented.

From the dataset with all participants who completed the study, we exclude participants who chose lottery A in the choice situation with the highest value of X in their individual sequence, or lottery B in the choice situation with the lowest value of X in their individual sequence. These are mostly—but not exclusively—individuals that never switch between lotteries in part 1, and thus are categorized as extremely risk averse/risk loving in our data. The key reason for excluding them is that we cannot identify an indifference set for these participants, and therefore the elicitation of the willingness to pay in part 2 does not work. Other subjects switch at least once between lotteries, but given their choices at the boundaries of the range of B lotteries in their sequence, it seems inappropriate to assume that an indifference point may have been properly identified. We

²³Application No. IRB 2022-01-03, granted on February 2, 2022

²⁴<https://surveyengine.com>

²⁵<https://www.prolific.co>

		CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US
Age	18-24	10	10	8	8	8	9	9	10	11
	25-54	59	47	46	48	49	43	50	51	50
	55-64	15	16	19	16	17	16	15	16	17
	65+	16	26	27	27	26	25	26	24	22
Gender	Female	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
	Male	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Income	Segment 1	49	26	38	33	44	31	28	21	27
	Segment 2	29	44	32	37	35	43	40	59	40
	Segment 3	22	29	31	30	21	25	32	20	33

Table A.1: Recruitment Quotas for Age, Gender, and Income in each country. Age and gender: share of the total population in percent. Income: shares of answers to the individual income question in the panel’s subject pool in percent (for comparability since income questions and concepts differ widely).

	CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US
Currency	CNY	EUR	EUR	EUR	EUR	EUR	SEK	GBP	USD
Segment 1	0-301k	0-30k	0-30k	0-30k	0-30k	0-20k	0-150k	0-30k	0-35k
Segment 2	301-661k	30-80k	30-80k	30-100k	30-80k	20-70k	150-300k	30-60k	35-100k
Segment 3	661k+	80k+	80k+	100k+	80k+	70k+	300k+	60k+	100k+

Table A.2: Income segments per country in the respective currency. Income measured as individual annual income, see question in Section D.

thus take the conservative approach to also exclude these subjects from our analyses. This leaves us with a dataset with 5326 out of 8769 observations.²⁶

²⁶The fraction of participants that are excluded is relatively similar across countries, It ranges from 33.2 percent in Italy to 44.2 percent in Portugal and the US.

		CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US
Age	18-24	13.19	8.90	7.95	12.90	8.09	14.95	11.00	9.85	10.70
	25-54	70.83	49.50	53.98	59.13	52.45	59.00	51.50	51.85	50.47
	55-64	14.89	17.10	19.88	19.54	17.68	18.93	15.80	15.30	16.89
	65+	1.10	24.50	18.19	8.43	21.78	7.13	21.70	22.88	21.93
Gender	Female	50.15	51.60	49.70	49.70	50.25	59.00	49.60	50.32	49.84
	Male	49.65	48.30	49.80	50.20	49.55	40.77	49.40	49.05	50.05
Income	Segment 1	73.53	59.10	49.20	60.71	37.56	50.12	17.90	66.31	39.35
	Segment 2	13.29	28.30	31.01	26.49	42.66	32.94	27.70	25.32	41.34
	Segment 3	13.19	12.60	19.78	12.80	19.78	16.94	54.40	8.37	19.31

Table A.3: Actual shares of participants in percent in the recruited sample in each country in percent in the age, gender, and income categories of Tables A.1 and A.2. Male and Female does not exactly add up to 100 since some participants indicated "Other" or "Prefer not to say".

	CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US
Currency	CNY	EUR	EUR	EUR	EUR	EUR	SEK	GBP	USD
Basepayment	15	2	2	2	2	2	20	2	2
Variable payment	13.4	2.71	2.77	2.78	2.75	2.7	27.1	2.06	2.72
Duration in min	25.09	25.61	27.22	43.12	26.62	38.85	25.24	24.16	23.71

Table A.4: Payoffs in national currencies and average duration in minutes for the recruited samples in each country.

B Additional Analyses

B.1 Choice Consistency

Our experimental design allows us to measure people’s preferences as well as the choice consistency with which they implement their preferences. In other words, we obtain two variables measuring possible measurement error for part 1 and for part 2 of the study. While the role of choice consistency is extensively discussed in [11], we merely use it here to assess the robustness of our main results with respect to individuals’ choice quality. The more consistent a subject makes her choices between lotteries in part 1, the more precisely we can estimate her indifference point. Thus, the more consistent, the smaller the possible instrumental value attached to the choice in part 2. In [11] we show that, except for highly inconsistent subjects, the instrumental value component is negligible and cannot explain the elicited willingness to pay. Subjects’ consistency in part 2 expresses the precision with which we measure a person’s willingness to pay. For both measures, the lowest value ($\hat{\mu} = 1$, $\hat{\gamma} = 1$) can be interpreted as making close to random choices, the highest possible values expresses (almost) perfectly consistent choice patterns ($\hat{\mu} = 120$, $\hat{\gamma} = 15$), see also Appendix A.

Overall, 45.19 percent of subjects in the analysis sample (N=5,326) are highly consistent in part 1 ($\hat{\mu} = 120$), 40.54 percent in part 2 ($\hat{\gamma} = 15$). The share of highly consistent subjects in part 1 differs quite a bit between countries, it ranges from 37.8 percent in Greece to the by far highest value of 57.9 percent in China (second highest is Sweden with 48.4 percent). In part 2, again the share of highly consistent subjects is highest in China (47.4 percent) and lowest in Portugal (26 percent). On the other hand, the choices of 7.04 percent of all subjects in part 1 and 20.20 percent in part 2 are highly inconsistent ($\hat{\mu} = 1$, $\hat{\gamma} = 1$). In part 1, the share is lowest in the UK (4.3 percent) and it increases up to 10.75 percent of subjects in the Greek sample. The share of highly inconsistent subjects in part 2 is by far highest in Portugal (36.30 percent, compared with 23.68 percent in the second highest ranking country Greece) and lowest in China (14.29 percent). Figure B.1 displays the differences in the degree of choice consistency between all countries in the sample. Most notably, the Chinese participants appear most consistent in their choices, both in part 1 and part 2. In part 1, Greek subjects show relatively lower choice consistency, in part 2, Portuguese subjects show lower choice consistency than those in other countries.

	CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US	All
Consistency Part 1 ($\hat{\mu}$)										
=120	94.58 (233.42)	73 (255.54)	33.97 (224.63)	82.13 (227.53)	78.53 (250.89)	77.97 (328.95)	70.37 (238.77)	89.61 (230.63)	72.68 (230.06)	75.04 (246.4)
<90	94.59 (279.2)	80.38 (245.75)	28.24 (250.99)	99.06 (258.46)	89.15 (232.18)	54.8 (336.03)	43.73 (266.67)	73.16 (203.24)	74.77 (240.6)	71.61 (256.87)
>80	95.91 (233.01)	72.34 (255.29)	39.33 (220.08)	79.75 (226.96)	77.15 (249.76)	72.31 (327)	65.26 (234.52)	91.03 (231.85)	62.74 (226.63)	73.38 (245.13)
Consistency Part 2 ($\hat{\gamma}$)										
=15	146.07 (258.87)	100.86 (268.67)	36.22 (249.46)	134.43 (276.58)	113.96 (269)	210.66 (311.61)	84.11 (258.84)	112.61 (231.77)	98.66 (239.59)	112.6 (264.46)
<9	43.38 (246.11)	65.66 (242.51)	35.81 (224)	66.42 (229.36)	63.28 (215.8)	-26.67 (323.45)	34.75 (249.43)	62.63 (215.31)	54.67 (238.62)	45.03 (244.94)
>8	131.09 (248.54)	87.33 (258.45)	32.32 (246.63)	117.41 (259.03)	102.42 (259.77)	194.35 (297.42)	72.66 (249.69)	100.73 (221.42)	84.51 (228.15)	99.5 (253.68)

Table B.1: Mean willingness to pay in each country and for all countries pooled, for different values of each estimated consistency parameter (part 1 and part2). $\hat{\mu}$ in part 1 can take 13 values, from 1 to 120, in steps of 10. $\hat{\gamma}$ in part 2 takes 15 values, from 1 to 15 in steps of 1. For both estimated parameters, we display the WTP for those with the highest possible values as well as for a median split. Standard deviations in parentheses.




Figure B.1: LHS: Estimated consistency parameter in part 1 ($\hat{\mu}$) in each country. RHS: Estimated consistency parameter in part 2 in each country ($\hat{\gamma}$). $\hat{\mu}$ in part 1 can take 13 values, from 1 to 120, in steps of 10. $\hat{\gamma}$ in part 2 takes 15 values, from 1 to 15 in steps of 1.

We show the mean willingness to pay for different levels of choice consistency in each country in Table B.1. Overall, the results in this table suggest that especially participants who are highly consistent in their choices in either part of the task have a relatively high willingness to pay. This is reassuring since it indicates that the significantly positive willingness to pay we find seems to not be inflated by a remaining instrumental value from inconsistent choices in part 1, neither by mistakes in the delegation choices in part 2.

B.2 Willingness to pay and indicators of individualism

To substantiate our finding on the relationship with individualism across countries, Figure B.2 shows the same correlations as Figure 2 in the main text with alternative indicators of individualist values across countries that are based on more recent data. Table B.2 shows how each country in our sample ranks with respect to each indicator: share of one person households, attitudes towards a child’s duty to take care of their parents, the importance of teaching independence to one’s children. Share of one-person households is taken as a proxy of individualism. If the attitude questions express individualist values, we would expect Child’s duty to show a negative and Child Independence to show a positive correlation with our measure of choice autonomy.²⁷ The share of one-person households in a country²⁸ is weakly significantly negatively correlated ($p=0.07$) with the willingness to pay for choice. This means that the more one person households, the lower the mean WTP in our study. The world value survey question whether it is a child’s duty to take care of their parents when they are ill (Wave 7, [59]) expresses a person’s family-orientation and it is not significantly correlated with the willingness to pay across countries. Also the world value survey question about the importance of teaching independence to one’s children (Wave 7, [59]) is not significantly correlated.²⁹ Taken together, these three correlations with alternative indicators for individualist values rather support the idea that degree of individualist in a country is not systematically associated with a preference for choice autonomy.

Index	Single HH	Child’s Duty	Child Independence
Rank 1	SE	SE	CN
Rank 2	DE	UK	DE
Rank 3	FR	US	SE
Rank 4	UK	DE	US
Rank 5	IT	GR	UK
Rank 6	US	FR	GR
Rank 7	GR	IT	IT/PT
Rank 8	PT	PT	
Rank 9	CN	CN	FR

Table B.2: Ranking of the nine countries according to each of the additional indicators of individualist values: share of single households, agreement to WVS question ‘It is the child’s duty to care for ill parents’, stated importance of children learning about Independence (both wave 7, [59]). Higher rank means more individualist.

²⁷Please note that none of these three indicators is without confounds, for example the share of one person households is also strongly correlated with the GDP of a country.

²⁸Source: our world in data: <https://ourworldindata.org/living-alone>, accessed May 23, 2023)

²⁹The variables Single HH and Child Independence are also used in [47] as proxies for individualist values across countries.




Figure B.2: Mean willingness to pay in points and share of single households (panel 1), agreement to WVS question 'It is the child's duty to care for ill parents' (panel 2), stated importance of children learning about Independence (panel 3), both wave 7, [59]. Spearman's rank correlation added and p-value in each panel.

B.3 Willingness to pay as a categorical variable and INDI, PDI and MI indicators

This section replicates Figure 2 using the categorical variables Positive, Zero and negative WTP instead of the continuous WTP variable in the main text. First, Table B.3 shows how the countries in our sample rank with respect to the three country-level indicators, INDI, PDI and MI. The correlations in Figure B.4 show that there is no positive or negative correlation for zero WTP, while the correlations of the PDI and MI indicators go in the expected direction for negative and positive WTP (Figure B.3 and Figure B.5). Although the Spearman's rank correlation are not all significant, the directions support the results in the main text, see Figure 2.

Index	INDI	PDI	MI
Rank 1	US	SE	SE
Rank 2	UK	DE/UK	US
Rank 3	IT		UK
Rank 4	FR/SE	US	DE
Rank 5		IT	PT
Rank 6	DE	GR	IT
Rank 7	GR	PT	FR
Rank 8	PT	FR	CN
Rank 9	CN	CN	GR

Table B.3: Ranking of the nine countries according to each of the indicators. Higher rank means more individualist, smaller power distance, more decentralized.




Figure B.3: Share of subjects with a positive willingness to pay in each country and the following indicators: Panel 1: individualism index [24]; Panel 2: power distance index [24]; Panel 3: management autonomy index [44]. Spearman's rank correlation with p-values added in each panel.




Figure B.4: Share of subjects with a zero willingness to pay in each country and the following indicators: Panel 1: individualism index [24]; Panel 2: power distance index [24]; Panel 3: management autonomy index [44]. Spearman's rank correlation with p-values added in each panel.




Figure B.5: Share of subjects with a negative willingness to pay in each country and the following indicators: Panel 1: individualism index [24]; Panel 2: power distance index [24]; Panel 3: management autonomy index [44]. Spearman's rank correlation with p-values added in each panel.

C Robustness Checks

C.1 Replication using all subjects

In this section, we replicate all main results using all subjects, including observations for which the identification for indifference in step 1 of the elicitation task is dubious.³⁰ This larger sample is thus more likely to include individuals for whom the choice set in step 2 contains instrumental value. The resulting sample sizes for each country are shown in table C.1

	CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US	all
Sample with standard exclusion	622	618	632	577	669	478	597	601	532	5,326
Sample without exclusion	1001	1000	1006	1008	1001	856	1000	944	953	8769
Mean WTP without exclusion	106.99	96.75	58.57	113.48	98.91	88.94	76.88	91.26	100.15	92.46

Table C.1: Number of subjects in each country with our standard exclusion restriction (see Section A.3), and without exclusion.

The average willingness to pay then amounts to 92.5 points (median=62.5), which constitutes 6.8 percent of the expected value of lottery A. This is significantly larger than zero (t-test and WSR: $p < 0.001$, $N = 8,769$). The average willingness to pay ranges from 113.5 points in Greece to 58.6 points in Germany and it is significantly different from zero in all countries (t-test and WSR: $p < 0.001$ for all countries).

Table C.2 shows that horizontal individualism remains a significant predictor of the willingness to pay when all observations are included in the analysis.




Figure C.1: Mean willingness to pay in points and the following indicators: Panel 1: individualism index [24]; Panel 2: power distance index [24]; Panel 3: management autonomy index [44]. Spearman’s rank correlation with p-values added in each panel. No exclusions.

Figure C.1 shows qualitatively very similar results and values as the results presented in the main paper (with slightly lower p-values for the correlations with PDI and MI).

³⁰Based on the initialization of the parameter space, these subjects were still assigned a preference parameter, usually very close to the boundary of the parameter space, that is, either the most risk averse or the most risk loving. For example, someone who always chose lottery A would be assigned a choice set in step 2 that included the most attractive lottery B given the predefined parameter space ($X = 2840$). Someone who always chose lottery B would be assigned the least attractive lottery B given the predefined parameter space ($X = 1890$).

	(1) WTP	(2) WTP	(3) Pos_WTP	(4) Zero_WTP	(5) Neg_WTP
Age	0.685*** (0.193)	0.556*** (0.197)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Male	31.874*** (6.237)	32.707*** (6.295)	0.186*** (0.029)	-0.102*** (0.039)	-0.158*** (0.030)
Income	-0.067 (4.395)	-1.148 (4.416)	0.002 (0.020)	-0.046* (0.028)	0.020 (0.021)
University Degree	-9.339 (6.525)	-8.064 (6.532)	-0.048 (0.030)	0.052 (0.040)	0.025 (0.031)
Immigrant	-9.872 (11.791)	-12.315 (11.733)	0.015 (0.052)	-0.027 (0.071)	-0.008 (0.054)
HI		12.551*** (2.864)	0.025** (0.013)	0.041** (0.017)	-0.051*** (0.013)
VI		3.262 (2.240)	0.010 (0.010)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)
HC		1.916 (2.571)	0.020* (0.012)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.007 (0.012)
VC		3.744 (2.565)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.026* (0.015)	0.013 (0.012)
Constant	6.950 (18.517)	-118.847*** (28.589)	-0.511*** (0.128)	-0.470*** (0.175)	-0.147 (0.133)
(Pseudo) R^2	0.034	0.038	0.018	0.033	0.055
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	8769	8769	8769	8769	8769

Table C.2: Willingness to pay in points on cultural value indices and socio-demographics.

Cultural values according to [16]: HI: horizontal-individualist, VI: vertical-individualist, HC: horizontal-collectivist, VC: vertical-collectivist. Income is coded in three categories relative to the distribution of income in the panel in the respective country^a. University_degree is a binary variable equal to 1 if the person reports to have a university degree, zero otherwise. Immigrant is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the person was born in another country than the one they reside in at the moment of taking the survey, zero otherwise. OLS with robust standard errors. Additional controls: risk attitudes, country as a categorical variable with the US as the baseline, lowest consistency in part 1, lowest consistency in part 2, number of attempts in the control questions in part 1 and in part 2. All subjects included.

^aParticipants in each country are divided into three income categories that correspond roughly to income terciles in that country (it is not always possible to have precise cuts due to the distribution across income categories in which income is elicited)

C.2 Replication excluding subjects with substantial choice inconsistencies

In this section, we replicate all main results while excluding participants who made relatively less consistent choices in part 1 of the experiment. With this, we exclude subjects for whom we can be less sure to have reasonably approximated their point of indifference between the two lotteries, and thus there is a higher chance of residual instrumental value (see also [11] for a in-depth discussion of

this issue). As a conservative approach, we therefore replicate the results in the main text with only those who showed a relatively consistent choice pattern and are assigned a consistency parameter in part 1 of $\hat{\mu} > 30$ (see Table C.3 for the number of subjects). The cutoff of $\hat{\mu} > 30$ is chosen based on the analyses of residual instrumental value presented in [11].

The average willingness to pay then amounts to 72.9 points (median=42.1), which constitutes 5.4 percent of the expected value of lottery A. This is significantly larger than zero (t-test and WSR: $p < 0.001$, $N=3,760$) and almost identical to the values for the whole sample. The average willingness to pay ranges from 94.45 points in China to 40.18 points in Germany and it is significantly different from zero in all countries (t-test and WSR: $p < 0.001$ for all countries except for Germany with $p=0.01$ (t-text) and $p=0.02$ (WSR)).

	CN	FR	DE	GR	IT	PT	SE	UK	US	all
Sample with standard exclusion	622	618	632	577	669	478	597	601	532	5,326
Plus with $\hat{\mu} > 30$	493	425	469	363	445	326	446	440	353	3,760

Table C.3: Number of subjects in each country with our standard exclusion restriction (see Section A.3), and with in addition only including those with $\hat{\mu} > 30$.




Figure C.2: Panel 1: Mean willingness to pay in points with standard errors by country; Panel 2: share of participants in each country showing a negative, zero or positive willingness to pay; Panel 3: Cumulative distribution of the willingness to pay in each country. replication of Figure 1 with only subjects with $\hat{\mu} > 30$.




Figure C.3: Mean willingness to pay in points and the following indicators: Panel 1: individualism index [24]; Panel 2: power distance index [24]; Panel 3: management autonomy index [44]. Spearman’s rank correlation with p-values added in each panel. Only subjects with $\hat{\mu} > 30$. N=9.

C.3 Replication without Portugal

In order to assess the robustness of the cross-country comparisons, we repeat the analyses below without the Portuguese sample. In Figure–1, we can see that the Portuguese data has an overall higher variance than all other countries and, especially, that there is an unusual spike in the willingness to pay at a large negative value (40 participants have a willingness to pay of -519 points). In Appendix B.1, we saw that choice consistency is low among Portuguese subjects—especially, in part 2, the share of highly consistent subjects is lowest and the share of highly inconsistent subjects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	WTP	WTP	Pos_WTP	Zero_WTP	Neg_WTP
Age	0.719*** (0.265)	0.651** (0.270)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Male	28.991*** (8.394)	30.831*** (8.449)	0.202*** (0.044)	-0.018 (0.058)	-0.218*** (0.046)
Income	-9.262 (5.693)	-9.047 (5.715)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.040)	0.047 (0.031)
University Degree	-15.819* (8.518)	-15.178* (8.520)	-0.122*** (0.046)	0.168*** (0.060)	0.039 (0.048)
Immigrant	-14.445 (16.821)	-15.144 (16.854)	0.013 (0.084)	0.104 (0.105)	-0.083 (0.088)
HI		5.758 (3.761)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.072*** (0.026)	-0.032 (0.020)
VI		-1.487 (3.024)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.020)	0.020 (0.017)
HC		2.533 (3.408)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.018)
VC		0.036 (3.285)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.016 (0.018)
Constant	18.448 (25.287)	-28.724 (38.924)	-0.173 (0.204)	-0.715*** (0.275)	-0.408* (0.213)
R^2	0.028	0.028	0.019	0.035	0.065
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	3760	3760	3760	3760	3760

Table C.4: Willingness to pay in points on cultural value indices and socio-demographics.

Cultural values according to [16]: HI: horizontal-individualist, VI: vertical-individualist, HC: horizontal-collectivist, VC: vertical-collectivist. Income is coded in three categories relative to the distribution of income in the panel in the respective country^a. University_degree is a binary variable equal to 1 if the person reports to have a university degree, zero otherwise. Immigrant is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the person was born in another country than the one they reside in at the moment of taking the survey, zero otherwise. OLS with robust standard errors. Additional controls: risk attitudes, country as a categorical variable with the US as the baseline, lowest consistency in part 1, lowest consistency in part 2, number of attempts in the control questions in part 1 and in part 2. Only consistent subjects with $\hat{\mu} > 30$.

^aParticipants in each country are divided into three income categories that correspond roughly to income terciles in that country (it is not always possible to have precise cuts due to the distribution across income categories in which income is elicited)

is highest among all countries in the sample. More than one third of participants in the sample make highly inconsistent choices in the delegation decisions (36.30 percent). In Table C.5, we thus replicate the estimations with individual characteristics and we observe highly similar results. Figure C.4 shows again the correlation between the mean willingness to pay in each country with indices of individualism (INDI, [24]), power distance (PDI, [24]) and management decentralisation

(MI, [44]). The correlations with PDI and MI among the eight countries are large and statistically significant.




Figure C.4: Mean willingness to pay in points and the following indicators: Panel 1: individualism index [24]; Panel 2: power distance index [24]; Panel 3: management autonomy index [44]. Spearman's rank correlation with p-values added in each panel. Portuguese data is excluded.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	WTP	WTP	Pos_WTP	Zero_WTP	Neg_WTP
Age	0.485** (0.221)	0.424* (0.226)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
Male	19.397*** (7.272)	21.730*** (7.329)	0.168*** (0.038)	-0.056 (0.051)	-0.156*** (0.040)
Income	-6.311 (4.993)	-6.002 (5.006)	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.036)	0.035 (0.028)
University Degree	-11.858 (7.402)	-11.385 (7.414)	-0.081** (0.040)	0.119** (0.053)	0.022 (0.042)
Immigrant	-6.323 (14.363)	-7.570 (14.386)	0.031 (0.074)	0.042 (0.094)	-0.065 (0.078)
HI		8.488** (3.339)	0.014 (0.017)	0.061*** (0.022)	-0.049*** (0.017)
VI		-0.241 (2.594)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.017)	0.014 (0.014)
HC		3.560 (3.005)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.016)
VC		-2.936 (2.993)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.019)	0.025 (0.016)
Constant	24.221 (21.315)	-34.408 (33.158)	-0.318* (0.174)	-0.648*** (0.234)	-0.278 (0.179)
R^2	0.016	0.017	0.010	0.022	0.052
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	4848	4848	4848	4848	4848

Table C.5: Willingness to pay in points on cultural value indices and socio-demographics.

Cultural values according to [16]: HI: horizontal-individualist, VI: vertical-individualist, HC: horizontal-collectivist, VC: vertical-collectivist. Income is coded in three categories relative to the distribution of income in the panel in the respective country^a. University_degree is a binary variable equal to 1 if the person reports to have a university degree, zero otherwise. Immigrant is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the person was born in another country than the one they reside in at the moment of taking the survey, zero otherwise. OLS with robust standard errors.

Additional controls: country as a categorical variable with the US as the baseline, lowest consistency score in part 1, lowest consistency score in part 2, number of attempts in the control questions in part 1 and in part 2. Portuguese data is excluded.

^aParticipants in each country are divided into three income categories that correspond roughly to income terciles in that country (it is not always possible to have precise cuts due to the distribution across income categories in which income is elicited)

D Experimental instructions and questionnaire

The screenshots show the English instructions from the survey conducted in the US. Translations into other languages are available upon request.

Participation and privacy policy

Consent Form

Welcome to the study! Thank you very much for your participation. This study is part of a research project conducted by Professor Holger Herz at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and it is funded by the European Research Council. The study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology at the University of Fribourg.

Study

This study takes about 15 minutes. It consists of making a series of choices.

Confidentiality

Data obtained will be used for research purposes only. The researchers will at no point receive any personally identifying information about you. The data is therefore anonymous and cannot be linked to personal data. The anonymous data will be used for research purposes only and it will later be stored in open access repositories.

Benefits

For your participation in the study, you will receive a base payment of 2.00 \$ in panel points, plus an additional amount based on your decisions (most previous participants received an additional amount between 1.20 \$ and 3.50 \$ in panel points).

Study Points

During the survey, you will see the term 'points'. These points refer to the study points. To calculate your actual payoff, study points will be converted back into panel points, based on a fixed exchange rate, at the end of the study.

Costs

Your participation will take approximately 15 minutes. We do not consider there to be any other foreseeable risks, discomforts, inconveniences and harms associated with participation.

Voluntary participation

Participation in this study is voluntary, and you can choose to withdraw your participation without stating any reason at any time. If you decide to withdraw, your data will be deleted. Please note that it is impossible to delete your data once the study is finished, because then the data is anonymized and can no longer be linked to you.

I confirm that I have understood the information, that I am willing to participate and that I am at least 18 years old.

No, I do not agree.

Figure D.1: Consent Form

Before the study begins, we need to ask you a few short questions.

Figure D.2: Intro

Demographic Information 1

1. How old are you?	<input type="text" value="-- select one --"/>
2. Which is your gender?	<input type="radio"/> Female
	<input type="radio"/> Male
	<input type="radio"/> Other
	<input type="radio"/> Prefer not to say

Figure D.3: Demographic Questions 1

Demographic Information 2

1. Which of these segments describes <u>your</u> personal annual income in 2020? Your answer should include your income <u>before</u> taxes from all sources including salaries, pensions, social security, dividends, interest and any other income. Please select the category that represents your total personal income.	<input type="text" value="-- select one --"/>
2. Which state do you live in?	<input type="text" value="-- select one --"/>
3. What is your ZIP code? Please, enter the first three digits.	<input type="text"/>
4. What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?	<input type="text" value="-- select one --"/>

Figure D.4: Demographic Information 2

Thank you for your participation!

The study consists of **3 parts**. The instructions for each part will be shown on your screen. You receive a fixed payment of 2.00 \$ in panel points/incentives. During part 1 and 2, you have the possibility to earn additional money that depends on your choices. The additional payoffs will be calculated in points. They will be converted into \$ at the end of the study. The exchange rate is:

1000 points = 1.00 \$

Therefore, your total earnings from the study consist of your payoff from part 1 plus your payoff from part 2 plus your fixed payment of 2.00 \$.

Total earnings = payoff part 1 + payoff part 2 + 2.00 \$

Figure D.5: General Information

Part 1

Figure D.6: Part 1

The choice situation in part 1

In part 1, you will face a total of **10 choice situations**, in each of which you are asked to choose between two lotteries: lottery A and lottery B. Your task is to choose the lottery you prefer. Lottery A is the same in all choice situations. Lottery B varies between situations.

In **lottery A** you can either receive

a **high outcome of 1600 points** 

or

a **low outcome of 600 points.** 

In **lottery B** you can either receive

a **high outcome** 

or

a **low outcome of 600 points.** 

The high outcome differs from situation to situation. The low outcome is always 600 points.


In lottery A, the chance to receive the high outcome is 75% ($\frac{3}{4}$). The chance to receive the low outcome is 25% ($\frac{1}{4}$).

In lottery B, the chance to receive the high outcome is 50% ($\frac{1}{2}$). The chance to receive the low outcome is 50% ($\frac{1}{2}$).

To determine the outcome of a lottery, the computer spins a wheel of fortune. The wheel has 16 segments. When spinning the wheel, the arrow turns around the wheel and randomly stops. The arrow has the same chance to stop in any segment.




The outcome of lottery A is determined by wheel A. On wheel A, 12 of the 16 segments (75%) are **red**, 4 segments (25%) are **blue**.



If the arrow stops on a **red segment** you receive 1600 points.
If the arrow stops on a **blue segment** you receive 600 points.

The outcome of lottery B is determined by wheel B. On wheel B, 8 of the 16 segments (50%) are **yellow**, 8 segments (50%) are **green**.



If the arrow stops on a **yellow segment** you receive the **high outcome**
If the arrow stops on a **green segment** you receive 600 points.

I understand the instructions

Continue to control questions

Figure D.7: The choice situation in part 1

Control Questions

The following questions ensure that everyone understands the instructions. Once you have answered all questions correctly, you will be directed to the next screen.
Note: You have **three** tries to answer the questions correctly. After the third wrong answer you will be excluded from the study and you will not receive any payment.

Which of the following is correct?

If a participant chooses lottery B ...

	Wrong	Correct
1. <i>it is equally likely that he or she receives the high or low outcome.</i>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

If a participant chooses lottery A ...

	Wrong	Correct
2. <i>he or she always gets a payout of 1600 points.</i>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. <i>the computer spins a wheel of fortune which determines if he or she receives 1600 or 600 points.</i>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. <i>he or she gets a payoff of 600 points with a likelihood of 25%.</i>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Figure D.8: Control questions Part 1

The choice situation in part 1

In part 1, you will face a total of **10 choice situations**, in each of which you are asked to choose between two lotteries: lottery A and lottery B. Your task is to choose the lottery you prefer. Lottery A is the same in all choice situations. Lottery B varies between situations.

In **lottery A** you can either receive

a **high outcome of 1600 points** 
1000 points

or


a **low outcome of 600 points.** 
600 points

In lottery A, the chance to receive the high outcome is 75% ($\frac{3}{4}$). The chance to receive the low outcome is 25% ($\frac{1}{4}$).

To determine the outcome of a lottery, the computer spins a wheel of fortune. The wheel has 16 segments. When spinning the wheel, the arrow turns around the wheel and randomly stops. The arrow has the same chance to stop in any segment.



The outcome of lottery A is determined by wheel A. On wheel A, 12 of the 16 segments (75%) are **red**, 4 segments (25%) are **blue**.



If the arrow stops on a **red segment** you receive 1600 points.
If the arrow stops on a **blue segment** you receive 600 points.

In **lottery B** you can either receive

a **high outcome** 


or

a **low outcome of 600 points.** 
600 points

The high outcome differs from situation to situation. The low outcome is always 600 points.

In lottery B, the chance to receive the high outcome is 50% ($\frac{1}{2}$). The chance to receive the low outcome is 50% ($\frac{1}{2}$).

The outcome of lottery B is determined by wheel B. On wheel B, 8 of the 16 segments (50%) are **yellow**, 8 segments (50%) are **green**.



If the arrow stops on a **yellow segment** you receive the **high outcome**
If the arrow stops on a **green segment** you receive 600 points.

Figure D.9: Control questions WRONG Part 1

Practice stage to get to know the wheels

Before the study begins, you will have the chance to familiarize yourself with how the lottery outcomes are determined. Each time you click *Start*, the computer spins the arrow.

This is a mere illustration to help you understand the mechanism. You can click *Start* as many times as you wish, until you feel familiar with the way the wheels work. This will have no consequences for your payoff or the choices you will face in this study. When you feel ready, click *Continue* to start the study.




Figure D.10: Practice stage to get to know the wheels

How your payoff is chosen

There will be **10 choice situations** in total, in each of which you are asked to choose between lotteries A and B. At the end of the study, one of the 10 situations will be selected and the lottery that you chose in this situation will determine your payment from part 1.

I understood the instructions

Figure D.11: Information payoff Part 1

You have now completed the instructions and correctly answered the control questions from part 1. Please click *Continue* to proceed to the choice situations.

Figure D.12: Proceed to choice situations

Choice Situation 1 of 10
Please choose between lottery A or lottery B.

Lottery A

You get

1600 points with a chance of 75% (if the arrow stops on a **red segment**)
or
600 points with a chance of 25% (if the arrow stops on a **blue segment**)

Lottery A

Lottery B

You get

2280 points with a chance of 50% (if the arrow stops on a **yellow segment**)
or
600 points with a chance of 50% (if the arrow stops on a **green segment**)

Lottery B

Figure D.13: Choice situations 1 of 10

End of part 1

You have completed part 1. The payoff relevant choice situation will be selected at the end of the study. You will then be informed about the selected situation as well as your payoff from part 1. Please click *Continue* to proceed to part 2.

Figure D.14: End of part 1

Part 2

Figure D.15: Part 2

General Instructions

On the next screen you will again see two lotteries: Lottery A and some lottery B. You can decide if you want to be able to choose yourself which one of these two lotteries determines your payoff or if you want to delegate this choice to **another participant of this study**. This other participant has been pre-selected and assigned the task to make the lottery choice for you in case you delegate. He or she earns a fixed base payment that is independent of whether or not you delegate. His or her payment is also not affected by the choices he or she makes on your behalf.

If you decide to choose yourself, you choose the lottery that will determine your payoff from part 2.

If you decide to delegate, the other participant chooses which lottery will determine your payoff from part 2.


Figure D.16: General Instructions for part 2

The Lotteries

In the following you will again see lottery A as well as lottery B. Lottery A and Lottery B remain constant throughout part 2 of this study.

You will make 10 choices. The choice is whether you want to choose between these lotteries yourself or whether you let another participant make this choice for you.


Lottery A



You get

1600 points with a chance of 75% (if the arrow stops on a **red segment**)
or
600 points with a chance of 25% (if the arrow stops on a **blue segment**)

Lottery B



You get

2470 points with a chance of 50% (if the arrow stops on a **yellow segment**)
or
600 points with a chance of 50% (if the arrow stops on a **green segment**)

I understand the instructions

[Continue](#)

Figure D.17: The lotteries in part 2

The Decision Situation

You will make **10 decisions** in total, where you decide to choose yourself or to delegate. The decision whether you choose a lottery yourself or delegate and let the other participant choose a lottery for you may have additional payoff consequences:

If you choose yourself, you may either have to pay a **price** or you may receive a **bonus payment** to determine your payment from part 2 at the end of the study.
If you delegate, there is no price or bonus.

On the next screens, you will be asked to decide if you want to choose yourself or delegate the choice between lotteries A and B. In the 10 decision situations, lotteries A and B remain the same, while the **price** or **bonus** may change between situations.

The following graphic illustrates the payoff consequences of your choice in a given decision situation:




Figure D.18: The decision situations in part 2

Control questions

The following questions ensure that everyone understands the instructions. Once you have answered all questions correctly, you will be directed to the next screen.

Note: You have four tries to answer the questions correctly. After the fourth wrong answer you will be excluded from the study and you will not receive any payment.

Is it correct that...?

	Wrong	Correct
1. The price for choosing a lottery is the same in all situations.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. There can be either a price or a bonus payment associated with choosing a lottery yourself.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Which of the following statements is correct?

3. Consider a situation in which there is a bonus for choosing yourself, and you decided to let the other participant choose a lottery for you.	
Your payoff will be one of the outcomes of the lottery that the other person chooses. You do not get the bonus.	<input type="radio"/>
Your payoff will be one of the outcomes of the lottery that the other person chooses plus the bonus.	<input type="radio"/>
4. Consider a situation in which you have to pay a price for choosing yourself and you decided to choose a lottery yourself .	
Your payoff will be one of the outcomes of the lottery that you choose. You do not pay the price.	<input type="radio"/>
Your payoff will be one of the outcomes of the lottery that you choose minus the price.	<input type="radio"/>

Figure D.19: Control questions Part 2

The Decision Situation

You will make **10 decisions** in total, where you decide to choose yourself or to delegate. The decision whether you choose a lottery yourself or delegate and let the other participant choose a lottery for you may have additional payoff consequences:

If you choose yourself, you may either have to pay a **price** or you may receive a **bonus payment** to determine your payment from part 2 at the end of the study. If you delegate, there is no price or bonus.

On the next screens, you will be asked to decide if you want to choose yourself or delegate the choice between lotteries A and B. In the 10 decision situations, lotteries A and B remain the same, while the **price** or **bonus** may change between situations.

The following graphic illustrates the payoff consequences of your choice in a given decision situation:




Figure D.20: Control questions WRONG Part 2

How your payoff is chosen

At the end of the study, one of the 10 situations will be selected to determine your payment from part 2.

If you decide to choose yourself in this situation, you will be asked to select lottery A or B at the end of part 2. The chosen lottery will then be played to determine your payment from part 2.

If you decided to delegate in this situation, the other participant will be asked to select lottery A or B for you. You will be informed about his/her choice and the lottery he/she chose will be played to determine your payment from part 2 at the end of the study.

I understood the instructions



Figure D.21: Information about payoffs in part 2

You have now completed the instructions and correctly answered the control questions from part 2. Please click *Continue* to proceed to the decision situations.

Figure D.22: Transition

Decision Situation 1 of 10




Figure D.23: Decision situation 1 of 10.

You have made all your choices for part 2. Please click *Continue* to see which choice situation is selected to determine your payoff from part 2.

Figure D.24: End decision situations.

Lottery Choice

The computer chose **choice situation 5**. In this situation, you decided to choose a lottery **yourself** and receive a bonus of 30 points. After your decision you will be directed to part 3. You will be informed about the outcome at the end of the study and will see a summary of your total earnings.

Please choose one of the lotteries:

Lottery A

1600 points

900 points

You get

1600 points with a chance of 75% (if the arrow stops on a **red segment**)
or
600 points with a chance of 25% (if the arrow stops on a **blue segment**)

Lottery A

Lottery B

2470 points

600 points

You get

2470 points with a chance of 50% (if the arrow stops on a **yellow segment**)
or
600 points with a chance of 50% (if the arrow stops on a **green segment**)

Lottery B

Figure D.25: Lottery chosen yourself.

Lottery Choice

Choice situation 7 has been selected by the computer. In this situation, you decided that the other participant chooses a lottery for you. The choice was sent to **the other participant** and you will be informed about the outcome at the end of the study.

Please click '*continue*' to be directed to part 3. After completion of part 3 will see a summary of your total earnings.

Figure D.26: Lottery choice delegated.

Part 3

Figure D.27: Part 3

You are almost done!

In part 3, we would like you to complete a short questionnaire. Your answers to these questions are very important to our research, please make sure to answer them carefully and honestly.

Figure D.28: Instructions Part 3

Questionnaire Part 1

1. How many people live in your household (including family members and partners, not including roommates)?	<input type="text"/>	people
2. Please indicate your marital status	Married	<input type="radio"/>
	Single	<input type="radio"/>
	Widowed	<input type="radio"/>
	Divorced	<input type="radio"/>
3. How many children do you have?	<input type="text"/>	children
4. The next question is about the total annual income of you and your family members living in your household in 2021. This figure should include income before taxes from all sources including salaries, pensions, social security, dividends, interest and any other income. Please select the category that represents your total household income.	<input type="text" value="-- select one --"/>	

Figure D.29: Questionnaire Part 1

Questionnaire Part 1

1. What is your employment status?	Employed	<input type="radio"/>
	Self-employed	<input type="radio"/>
	Unemployed	<input type="radio"/>
	Student	<input type="radio"/>
	Retired	<input type="radio"/>
	Stay-at-home mother/father	<input type="radio"/>
	<hr/>	
2. What category do you identify with the most?	American Indian or Alaska Native	<input type="radio"/>
	Asian / Asian American	<input type="radio"/>
	Black / African American	<input type="radio"/>
	Hispanic or Latino	<input type="radio"/>
	Middle Eastern or North African	<input type="radio"/>
	Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	<input type="radio"/>
	White / European American	<input type="radio"/>
	I prefer not to say	<input type="radio"/>
<hr/>		
3. What is your country of birth?	<input type="text"/>	
<hr/>		
4. What is your nationality?	<input type="text"/>	

Figure D.30: Questionnaire Part 1 second part

Questionnaire Part 1

1. Do you consider yourself religious?	Yes	<input type="radio"/>
	No	<input type="radio"/>

Figure D.31: Questionnaire Part 1 third part

Questionnaire Part 2

Which point on this scale best describes your political views when it comes to...

	Extremely liberal	Liberal	Slightly liberal	Moderate	Slightly conservative	conservative	Extremely conservative
1. ...social issues? (Issues like same-sex marriage and abortion)	<input type="radio"/>						
2. ...economic issues? (Issues like taxes and the economy)	<input type="radio"/>						

Figure D.32: Questionnaire Part 2

Questionnaire Part 2

1. On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you agree with the following statement?
"The government should reduce income differences by increasing welfare assistance to the poor and raising higher taxes from wealthier people."

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely Disagree										Completely Agree
<input type="radio"/>										

2. Should the government have the right to keep people under video surveillance in public areas and to collect personal data of its citizens (think of mobility data through their mobile phones, health or communication data)?

Definitely should not have the right										Definitely should have the right
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

3. Please select 'Completely Disagree' in order to show that you are paying attention

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely Disagree										Completely Agree
<input type="radio"/>										

4. Think more broadly about the purpose of government. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 10 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<input type="radio"/>										

5. On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is "Only luck", 4 is "Equally important", and 7 is "Only effort", indicate to what extent you think that differences in income are caused by differences in peoples' efforts over their lifetime or rather by luck? By luck, we mean conditions which you have no control over. By effort, we mean conditions which you can control.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Only Luck			Equally important			Only Effort
<input type="radio"/>						

Figure D.33: Questionnaire Part 2 second part

Questionnaire Part 2

1. On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you agree with the following statement?
"The government should reduce income differences by increasing welfare assistance to the poor and raising higher taxes from wealthier people."

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely Disagree										Completely Agree
<input type="radio"/>										

2. Should the government have the right to keep people under video surveillance in public areas and to collect personal data of its citizens (think of mobility data through their mobile phones, health or communication data)?

Definitely should not have the right										Definitely should have the right
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

3. Please select 'Completely Disagree' in order to show that you are paying attention

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely Disagree										Completely Agree
<input type="radio"/>										

4. Think more broadly about the purpose of government. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 10 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<input type="radio"/>										

5. On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is "Only luck", 4 is "Equally important", and 7 is "Only effort", indicate to what extent you think that differences in income are caused by differences in peoples' efforts over their lifetime or rather by luck? By luck, we mean conditions which you have no control over. By effort, we mean conditions which you can control.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Only Luck			Equally important			Only Effort
<input type="radio"/>						

Figure D.34: Questionnaire Part 2 second part inattentive

Questionnaire Part 3

We now would like to ask you about your attitudes more generally. Please indicate for each statement how much this is true for you personally.

	1 Never	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 Always
1. I'd rather depend on myself than others.	<input type="radio"/>								
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.	<input type="radio"/>								
3. I often do "my own thing."	<input type="radio"/>								
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.	<input type="radio"/>								
	1 Never	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 Always
5. It is important that I do my job better than others.	<input type="radio"/>								
6. Winning is everything.	<input type="radio"/>								
7. Competition is the law of nature.	<input type="radio"/>								
8. Please select Always in order to show that you are paying attention.	<input type="radio"/>								
	1 Never	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 Always
9. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.	<input type="radio"/>								
10. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.	<input type="radio"/>								
11. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.	<input type="radio"/>								
12. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.	<input type="radio"/>								
	1 Never	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 Always
13. I feel good when I cooperate with others.	<input type="radio"/>								
14. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.	<input type="radio"/>								
15. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.	<input type="radio"/>								
16. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.	<input type="radio"/>								
17. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.	<input type="radio"/>								

Figure D.35: Questionnaire Part 3

Questionnaire Part 4

1. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control their lives while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No choice at all									A great deal of choice
<input type="radio"/>									

2. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are "completely unwilling to take risks" and a 10 means you are "very willing to take risks", how willing are you to take risks in general?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely unwilling to take risks										Very willing to take risks
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

3. Now consider the values of people in your community. How important is it for you to do what other people consider socially appropriate?

Not important at all										Very Important
<input type="radio"/>										

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

4. In general, it is important for me to take decisions myself and to live my life without external interferences.

Completely Disagree										Completely Agree
<input type="radio"/>										

5. I don't mind letting other people make choices on my behalf.

Completely Disagree										Completely Agree
<input type="radio"/>										

Figure D.36: Questionnaire Part 4

Questionnaire Part 4

1. Generally speaking, how much do you trust other people?

Completely
Distrust



Completely Trust

2. How much do you trust the government to take actions in the interest of its citizens?

Completely
Distrust



Completely Trust

Figure D.37: Questionnaire Part 4 second part

Summary of Payoffs

You have now completed the whole study.

This is an overview of your total earnings from the study.

One decision from part 1 and one decision from part 2 are paid. In each part, a random draw selects one of the 10 situations to determine your total earnings.

Part 1

The computer selected Situation 3.

In Situation 3 you chose Lottery A.

The high outcome of 1600 has been selected by the wheel of fortune.

Payoff Part 1: **1600 points**

Converted into \$, this is: **1.60 \$**.

Part 2

The computer selected Situation 7.

In Situation 7 you decided to let another participant choose a lottery.

The low outcome of 600 has been selected by the wheel of fortune.

Payoff Part 2: **600 + 0 = 600 points**

Converted into \$, this is: **0.60 \$**.

Total Earnings

Thus, your total earnings from this study in \$, including the base payment of 2.00 \$, is:

1.60 \$ + 0.60 \$ + 2.00 \$ = 4.20 \$.

Figure D.38: Summary of payoffs

Feedback

Thank you very much for participating!

We greatly appreciate your feedback. If you have any comments or suggestions regarding this study, you can leave them in the textbox below.

1. Do you have any comments or suggestions regarding this study?

Figure D.39: Feedback

Thank You

That concludes the survey.

Figure D.40: End page