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Charitable Giving by the Poor: A Field Experiment in Kyrgyzstan

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Online Appendix for

Charitable giving by the poor

A field experiment in Kyrgyzstan

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Appendix A.

A1 Details of the fundraising campaign

At the time of the fundraising campaign, the company had around 650 active credit specialists in over 100 offices, each of which has a manager. Credit specialists work for a specific office only and sell micro-loans to members of the local community.

Before the start of the drive, at the beginning of March, all managers came to the capital city for a retreat (this is typically an annual or semi-annual event). During the retreat, the micro-finance company's CEO announced the fundraising campaign (not treatment specific) and the fund. The director of the fund also gave a presentation about the nine projects. On March 27, the managers of each office received treatment-specific explanations as an audio message from the CEO and scripts for communications with the clients. On March 29, all credit specialists received promotional videos (not treatment specific) about the fundraising campaign and the fund on their mobile phones in three languages: Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian. They also received detailed, treatment-specific instructions by email, which included the main idea and a short script for communication with clients. All managers were instructed to discuss the (treatment-specific) details of the experiment and publicly answered questions from credit specialists during weekly morning meetings. Credit specialists were advised to inform their clients about the charitable campaign. The fundraising call lasted around two months until the end of May 2018.

Every week, the manager of the office took a photo of all new donation receipts and sent it to the director of the fund. Due to logistical constraints, the official collection of the donations was conducted only once, after the end of the experiment by an accountant of the fund. The sum of donations inside the boxes was compared to the sum claimed on the receipts.

To sum up, there were three ways for clients to learn about the campaign: First, when they arrived at the office for regular repayments and saw the posters and the donation box; second, when they were contacted by the credit specialist to advertise the campaign; third, when they received the call from the survey call-center.

A2 Population under study

In order to better understand how the population under study compares to the rest of the population in Kyrgyzstan, we draw on the Life in Kyrgyzstan (LiK) representative survey (2010-2013). Among the approximately 3,000 households surveyed, 7.4 percent indicated having obtained a loan/credit at a microfinance company in the last 12 months (12.3 percent: any loan/credit in the last 12 months). The average household income was similar, independent of the microcredit intake, at 18,500 soms (see more comparisons in Table A2a).¹ In LiK, 3.7 percent of households indicated having donated funds to poor and other vulnerable people while according to the World Giving Index 2017, 29 percent indicated having donated to a charity in a past month. Globally, according to the Focus Economics ranking of the countries for 2019 and 2020, Kyrgyzstan is ninth poorest country in the world.² In the Global Finance 2016 rank, Kyrgyzstan is number 148 out of 189.³ Broader indices that include aspects such as education or rule of law rank Kyrgyzstan somewhat in the middle (see, for example, the Legatum Prosperity Index™ 2017).⁴

¹ Note that the data from the panel dated back five years, thus the nominal income is not directly comparable to the data from 2018.

² <https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world>, date accessed 03.12.2018

³ <https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/worlds-richest-and-poorest-countries>, date accessed 03.12.2018

⁴ <https://www.prosperity.com/rankings>, date accessed 03.12.2018

Table A2a: Life in Kyrgyzstan survey—comparing individuals with and without microcredit

		hh has taken a loan from a microcredit agency in the last 12 months							
		no			yes				
Variable	Values and labels	mean	se	N	mean	se	N	t-test p-value	
number of HH members	1-16	5.21	0.05	2210	5.23	0.17	176	0.903	
dummy: HH member donated funds to poor and other vulnerable people	1=yes, 0=no	0.04	0.00	2190	0.05	0.02	173	0.374	
total hours all HH members spent donating funds to poor and other vulnerable people	0-40	0.15	0.03	2190	0.13	0.05	173	0.739	
district code	0-city, 1-village	0.63	0.01	2210	0.61	0.04	176	0.568	
total HH income in soms	0-230000	18473.13	382.77	2210	18384.53	1007.03	176	0.935	
total HH income in soms / equalized by square root scale	0-91000	8359.63	164.48	2210	8508.12	513.19	176	0.783	
general satisfaction with life / average of all adult HH members	0-extremely unsatisfied, 10-absolutely satisfied	6.88	0.03	2203	6.93	0.12	176	0.648	
satisfaction with HH income / average of all adult HH members	0-extremely unsatisfied, 10-absolutely satisfied	6.40	0.04	2185	6.45	0.13	176	0.702	
satisfaction with standard of living / average of all adult HH members	0-extremely unsatisfied, 10-absolutely satisfied	6.54	0.04	2202	6.42	0.13	175	0.346	
satisfaction with income situation / average of all adult HH members	0-extremely unsatisfied, 10-absolutely satisfied	6.05	0.03	2207	6.23	0.12	176	0.146	
satisfaction with income situation compared to others from village / average of all adult HH members	0-extremely unsatisfied, 10-absolutely satisfied	6.04	0.03	2207	6.14	0.12	176	0.461	
dummy: general satisfaction with life	1-dissatisfied, 0-neutral or satisfied	0.05	0.00	2203	0.07	0.02	176	0.472	
dummy: satisfaction with HH income	1-dissatisfied, 0-neutral or satisfied	0.11	0.01	2185	0.11	0.02	176	0.960	
dummy: satisfaction with standard of living	1-dissatisfied, 0-neutral or satisfied	0.08	0.01	2202	0.10	0.02	175	0.599	
dummy: satisfaction with income situation	1-dissatisfied, 0-neutral or satisfied	0.14	0.01	2207	0.09	0.02	176	0.044	
dummy: satisfaction with income situation compared to others from village	1-dissatisfied, 0-neutral or satisfied	0.14	0.01	2207	0.11	0.02	176	0.264	

Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Study, 2013. IDSC of IZA. Version 1.0, <https://datasets.iza.org/dataset/124/life-in-kyrgyzstan-panel-study-2013>, doi:10.15185/izadp.7055

A3 Details of loan terms

The interest and the maximum amount of loan depend on the client's loan history and whether the client is eligible for special conditions. The share of Islamic (Sharia compliant) loans is 20 percent. These loans are issued without interest but are based on a fee to be paid in monthly installments alongside the loan repayment. In these cases, their monthly sum due for future months is instantly recalculated, lowering the amount of interest still to be paid (except for Islamic loans with a fixed fee). The share of female clients is 55 percent and the share of group loans, that is loans in which the whole group of individuals is liable for the repayment, is 27 percent. Most of the loans are issued for micro business purposes, but they also include some consumer loans. The default rate of the loans is very low for the microfinance market, below 1 percent.

The main determinant of the discount on the interest is the number of previous loans that the client has received and repaid without any delay (see Table B1e in the Appendix B that shows empirically how the interest rate depends on individual characteristics).

The Islamic loans can be only issued for payments for particular goods or services. They are also not offered in cash; instead the money is transferred to the merchant directly, while the client receives the good and becomes responsible for repayment of the price (plus a fee) in installments to the loan-issuing company.


Typically, there are close relations between the credit specialists and the clients, as specialists decide whether to approve a loan, conditional on meeting formal requirements (like a clean loan history, Kyrgyz citizenship, availability of documents), and after an interview, visit at the workplace or at home, and potentially an interview with neighbors or colleagues of the client. Each credit specialist is free to reject the client or to acquire information over and above what is formally required. Specialists are motivated to give the loans to clients with a low risk of default, as the repayment rate is connected to the variable part of specialists' monthly salary.

A4 Details of communication to clients

The communication to clients included flyers in Russian and Kyrgyz languages that were printed in A5 and were available to be taken from the office and posters in the office (Kyrgyz and Russian languages) placed on the cash desk and close to the donation box. Below, we present sample flyers and posters and explain treatment differences.

A4.1 Flyers:

Figure A4a: Example of the flyer in Russian language for treatment matching and local.



In addition to the campaign slogans and the descriptions of means of payments, the flyer included treatment-specific descriptions:

“Birinchi Kadam” project involves the implementation of nine social initiatives in each region of the country. The total cost of the project is around 2.5 million KGS.⁵

“Apace fund” is starting a charitable campaign to collect donations to realize the project “Birinchi Kadam.”

Baseline (no matching, no local incentives):

We already have a sponsor who donated half a million KGS for the project.

Matching (no local incentives):

Every som that you donate will be doubled thanks to a sponsor up to a total of half a million KGS.

Local (no matching incentives):

We already have a sponsor who donated half a million KGS for the project.

Moreover, if you and other clients of the “Company name” from your region will contribute the highest amount per client relative to the other regions, then the next project of the fund will be implemented in your region.

⁵ Note that the realized costs we around 2 million KGS.

Matching and local (example flyer on Figure A4a)

Every som that you donate will be doubled thanks to a sponsor up to half a million KGS.

Moreover, if you and other clients of the “Company name” from your region will contribute the highest amount per client relative to the other regions, then the next project of the fund will be implemented in your region.

A4.2 Posters:

In addition to the campaign slogans, the descriptions of means of payments, and the map of the projects, the poster included a treatment-specific description.

Baseline

A sponsor donated 500 000 KGS for this project.

Matching

An anonymous sponsor will double every som you donate* (*up to 500 000 KGS)

Local

A sponsor donated 500 000 KGS for this project.

If clients from your region donate the highest amount per client, the next project that will be funded from the charity will aim to help your region.

Figure A4b. Example of a poster for treatment matching and local.



Matching plus local (example poster on Figure A4b)

An anonymous sponsor will double every som you donate*. (*up to 500 000 KGS)

If clients from your region donate the highest amount per client, the next project that will be funded from the charity will aim to help your region.

A5 Randomization

The randomization was conducted at the office level taking into account the following variables: number of credit specialists working for the office, average interest rate of all current loans, average current balance of all current loans, average cycle (number of loans issued to a current loan holder), average share of loan repayments delayed by 30 days, average experience of credit specialists in months, share of female credit specialists, average age of clients, share of female clients, share of clients married, share of clients of Kyrgyz nationality, region dummy 1–8, dummy equal to one if the current realized charitable project by the micro-lending company is in the same place as the office, share of clients of Uzbek nationality, and average number of children per client with the following weights: 10, 2, 2, 12, 3, 15, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 9, 4, 2. The choice of the variables and weights was motivated by the perceived importance of a particular variable, and in some cases, by the convergence properties of the

algorithm. The client level data is as of 16.01.2018 but the specialists level data is as of the summer 2017. The sample has been divided block wise in 4 groups with earlier blocks being more homogenous than later ones. The total number of blocks is 26 (we dropped block 27 with only one office that was very different from others) making a total of 104 office level treatment units. We combined the groups 1–2 for the treatment without local benefits and 3–4 for the treatment with local benefits. Groups 1 and 3 were combined for the treatment with a lead donor and no matching and 2, 4 for the treatment with matching. Thus, group one was chosen to be a baseline, group two had the matching only, group 3 had the local benefits only, and group 4 had both matching and local benefits.

Office level data: In order to test the balance, we run a set of pairwise t-tests for comparisons between the treatments. Given that the blocked randomization was performed at the office level (104 offices), there is a good balance concerning all available variables as can be seen in Table A5a. In none of the tests $p < 0.1$.

Credit specialist data: From a total of 492⁶ we have individual level data on 370 credit specialists concerning their gender, region of origin, first language, age, experience in months etc. In what follows we check again balance of our treatment assignment based on the available characteristics using pairwise t-tests (see Table A5b). In 56 comparisons, we find some significant differences (two at $p < 0.01$, two at $p < 0.05$, and six at $p < 0.1$), however, this approach is very conservative and might suffer from multiple testing problem. Therefore, in the next step, we run logit regressions with dependent variables being either the local treatment or the matching treatment and all available individual level variables as independent variables. Table A5c presents average marginal effects after logit. The robust standard errors are clustered at the office level. When looking at Table A5c, we can assess which individual characteristics of clients are correlated with the probability of being assigned to a particular treatment. There are no significant correlations at all. We conclude that we have achieved a reasonable balance at the specialists' level.

Individual level data: Given a large number of individuals (over 160,000), even small differences yield significant differences according to simple t-test comparisons. Therefore, in order to assess the balance at client's level, we run logit regressions with dependent variables being either the local treatment or the matching treatment and all available individual level characteristics as independent variables. Table A5d presents average marginal effects after

⁶ Excluding the dropped office.

logit. The robust standard errors are clustered at the office level. When looking at Table A5d, we can assess which individual characteristics of clients are correlated with the probability of being assigned to a particular treatment. We find one coefficient significant at $p < 0.01$ and two coefficients significant at $p < 0.1$ but the size of the marginal effects is rather small in all cases.

Table A5a: Balance at the office level

Treatment	No local benefits		Local benefits			Lead donor		Matching		
	mean	standard error	mean	standard error	p-value	mean	standard error	mean	standard error	p-value
Number of specialists	3.74	0.26	3.58	0.27	0.67	3.36	0.24	3.96	0.28	0.11
Number of female specialists	2.18	0.25	2.07	0.25	0.76	1.99	0.21	2.26	0.29	0.45
Kyrgyz nationality dummy specialists	0.88	0.04	0.89	0.04	0.85	0.87	0.04	0.91	0.04	0.48
Uzbek nationality dummy specialists	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.80	0.12	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.34
Tadjik nationality dummy specialists	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.75	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.17
Other nationality dummy specialists	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.92	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.45
Speak Kyrgyz dummy specialists	0.88	0.04	0.89	0.04	0.85	0.87	0.04	0.91	0.04	0.48
Speak Uzbek dummy specialists	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.80	0.12	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.34
Speak Russian dummy specialists	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.84	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.48
Age of specialist	30.63	0.56	31.04	0.70	0.66	30.74	0.60	30.92	0.67	0.84
Experience in company in months	38.46	2.58	35.96	2.66	0.50	35.66	2.28	38.76	2.92	0.40
Number of clients per specialists	359.08	11.36	352.49	11.62	0.69	353.44	11.28	358.37	11.71	0.76
Portfolio at risk 30 days+	0.60	0.12	0.92	0.24	0.24	0.64	0.20	0.87	0.18	0.39
Portfolio size KGS	95614 62.30	343694. 31	95005 09.93	318451. 34	0.90	94535 18.64	321921. 28	96119 72.26	342339. 52	0.74
Number of clients per office	1696.1 2	151.04	1495.0 0	121.65	0.30	1459.2 4	124.68	1731.8 8	147.38	0.16
Number of female clients	980.40	87.49	868.16	76.34	0.34	829.92	74.66	1018.6 4	87.60	0.10
Share of female clients	0.57	0.01	0.58	0.01	0.74	0.57	0.01	0.58	0.01	0.71
Dummy for marital status category: married	0.70	0.01	0.69	0.02	0.51	0.69	0.02	0.69	0.01	0.99
Dummy for marital status category: single	0.13	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.84	0.13	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.77
Interest	31.05	0.26	31.30	0.33	0.54	31.42	0.30	30.93	0.28	0.24
Kyrgyz nationality dummy clients	0.79	0.04	0.83	0.04	0.45	0.78	0.04	0.84	0.03	0.32
Uzbek nationality dummy clients	0.17	0.04	0.13	0.03	0.44	0.17	0.04	0.12	0.03	0.37
Tadjik nationality dummy clients	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.47	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.79
Russian nationality dummy clients	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.58	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.49
Other nationality dummy clients	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.32	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.30
Dummy for new clients (first loan in the company)	0.38	0.01	0.37	0.01	0.68	0.37	0.01	0.37	0.01	0.91
Age	41.59	0.28	41.79	0.31	0.64	41.65	0.30	41.74	0.29	0.83
Number of children	1.61	0.04	1.67	0.05	0.34	1.63	0.04	1.65	0.05	0.75
Family size	4.38	0.06	4.31	0.07	0.47	4.36	0.06	4.32	0.06	0.68
Current balance of the client's loan	27077. 33	481.98	27219. 52	671.89	0.86	26803. 92	652.24	27492. 94	503.68	0.41
Sum of loan when issued	43301. 47	777.96	43868. 83	878.73	0.63	43430. 35	801.53	43739. 95	858.63	0.79
Cycle	2.87	0.09	2.92	0.08	0.70	2.82	0.07	2.98	0.09	0.17

Share of delayed loans	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.44	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.63
Dummy for Bishkek region	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.65	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.17
Dummy for Osh city region	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.94	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.94
Dummy for Osh region	0.26	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.63	0.26	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.68
Dummy for Djalal-Abad region	0.18	0.05	0.24	0.06	0.47	0.26	0.06	0.16	0.05	0.22
Dummy for Chuy region	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.30	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.73
Dummy for Issyk-Kul region	0.10	0.04	0.14	0.05	0.54	0.08	0.04	0.16	0.05	0.22
Dummy for Batken region	0.16	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.36	0.12	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.79
Dummy for Naryn region	0.06	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.70	0.06	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.70
Dummy for Talas region	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.65	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.65
Share of female specialists	0.56	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.91	0.58	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.56
Dummy for project in the same locality	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.72	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.73

Note: The base for all variables concerning credit specialist and clients are means at the office level

Table A5b: Balance at the credit specialists' level

Treatment	No local benefits		Local benefits			Lead donor		Matching		
	mean	standard error	mean	standard error	p-value	mean	standard error	mean	standard error	p-value
Dummy for Bishkek region	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.34	0.03	0.01	0.11	0.02	0.00
Dummy for Osh city region	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.38	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.67
Dummy for Osh region	0.29	0.03	0.22	0.03	0.13	0.29	0.03	0.23	0.03	0.17
Dummy for Djalal-Abad region	0.14	0.03	0.29	0.03	0.00	0.27	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.01
Dummy for Chuy region	0.10	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.11	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.88
Dummy for Issyk-Kul region	0.08	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.01
Dummy for Batken region	0.15	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.11	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.82
Dummy for Naryn region	0.09	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.19	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.82
Dummy for Talas region	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.89	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.94
Kyrgyz nationality dummy specialist	0.85	0.03	0.89	0.02	0.25	0.87	0.03	0.87	0.02	0.82
Uzbek nationality dummy specialist	0.13	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.21	0.11	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.99
Tadjik nationality dummy specialist	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.53	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.08
Other nationality dummy specialist	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.60	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.49
Speak Kyrgyz dummy specialist	0.85	0.03	0.89	0.02	0.25	0.87	0.03	0.87	0.02	0.82
Speak Uzbek dummy specialist	0.13	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.21	0.11	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.99
Speak Russian dummy specialist	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.93	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.52
Female	0.58	0.04	0.59	0.04	0.95	0.59	0.04	0.58	0.04	0.77
Age	31.51	0.50	31.14	0.59	0.63	30.78	0.53	31.80	0.55	0.18
Experience in company in months	41.90	2.09	38.85	2.24	0.32	37.25	2.01	43.17	2.24	0.05
Number of clients	364.43	13.21	350.53	13.17	0.46	355.99	13.89	359.23	12.61	0.86
Portfolio at risk 30 days+	0.60	0.09	1.00	0.22	0.08	0.71	0.15	0.86	0.16	0.50
Portfolio size KGS	9757832	358254	9543717	362306	0.67	9584149	381037	9715301	342537	0.80
Dummy for project in the same locality	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.67

Table A5c: Credit specialist's characteristics and the probability of assignment to a treatment.

Dependent variable	Dummy treatment local	Dummy treatment matching
	0.078	0.352
Dummy for Bishkek region	(0.340)	(0.332)
	-0.136	-0.085
Dummy for Osh city region	(0.363)	(0.333)
	-0.036	-0.082
Dummy for Osh region	(0.257)	(0.229)
	0.184	-0.131
Dummy for Djalal-Abad region	(0.254)	(0.233)
	-0.146	0.052
Dummy for Chuy region	(0.291)	(0.257)
	0.135	0.219
Dummy for Issyk-Kul region	(0.268)	(0.242)
	-0.097	0.005
Dummy for Batken region	(0.271)	(0.256)
	-0.118	0.036
Dummy for Naryn region	(0.316)	(0.298)
	-0.124	-0.051
Kyrgyz nationality dummy specialist	(0.237)	(0.252)
	-0.166	0.041
Uzbek nationality dummy specialist	(0.256)	(0.270)
Female	0.033	-0.050
	(0.060)	(0.061)
Age	0.001	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Experience in company in months	-0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of clients	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Portfolio at risk 30 days+	0.012	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Portfolio size KGS	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dummy for project in the same locality	-0.132	-0.067
	(0.165)	(0.163)
Observations	365	365
Pseudo R^2	0.062	0.062

Average marginal effects after logit, Robust standard errors clustered at office level in parentheses;

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5d: Individual characteristics of clients and the probability of assignment to a particular treatment.

Dependent variable	Dummy treatment local	Dummy treatment matching
Cycle	-0.001 (0.005)	0.012*** (0.005)
Issuing fee	0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)
Interest rate	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Balance left to be paid	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Dummy for Kyrgyz nationality	0.052 (0.082)	0.092 (0.085)
Dummy for Uzbek nationality	-0.020 (0.117)	0.056 (0.119)
Dummy for Tadjik nationality	0.213 (0.210)	0.179 (0.216)
Dummy for Russian nationality	0.004 (0.083)	0.057 (0.087)
Dummy for new client	-0.006 (0.019)	0.008 (0.020)
Number of children	0.013 (0.011)	0.016 (0.012)
Family size	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)
Female dummy	-0.007 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)
Dummy for marital status category: married	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.017 (0.022)
Dummy for marital status category: single	-0.025 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.032)
Dummy for project in the same locality	-0.141 (0.176)	-0.080 (0.181)
Observations	161759	161759
Pseudo R ²	0.009	0.008

Notes: Average marginal effects after logit, Robust standard errors clustered at office level in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A6 Power calculations and multiplicity hypothesis testing

POWER CALCULATIONS

We calculated power in our experiment using `rdpower` package for `stata`. Given our cluster randomization, we first need an estimate of intra cluster correlation (ICC). We are not aware of any study in a similar setting that could give us a valid estimate of ICC. Most studies on charitable giving rely on simple randomization and are conducted in western countries with middle-income subjects. In order to obtain best guess we computed ICC in our sample with respect to the current balance (current debt of a client) and total current loan issued per client. ICC based on current balance equals to 0.02 while ICC based on loan issued equals to 0.04. Assuming ICC=0.02, with 52 clusters and (over) 1500 individuals per cluster, we have enough power (>0.8) to detect a standardized effect size of at least 0.1. While assuming ICC=0.04, there

is enough power to detect a standardized effect size of at least 0.12. Note however, that there is additional efficiency gain due to blocked randomization (see below) and potential inclusion of covariates when estimating the causal effect.

NO MULTIPLICITY HYPOTHESIS TESTING CORRECTIONS FOR THE MAIN HYPOTHESES

There appears to be some disagreement among statisticians on whether and when corrections for MHT should be applied. While some call for uniform use of those, other criticize that they lead to overcorrection. We follow the more moderate view like in Schulz & Grimes (2005) and abstain from corrections in case of testing our main hypotheses. Here are the reasons:

- (i) Our main hypotheses are guided by literature and theory. In other words, we are testing theory and not some random outcomes.
- (ii) The number of tests is clearly limited by (i) and not large.
- (iii) The corrections, like Bonferroni, lead to a redefinition of a hypothesis being tested to “all differences are zero versus at least one difference exists.” This is not of interest to us.
- (iv) Our three outcomes, response rate, positive contribution, and return depend linearly on each other (each one is a composite of two other), that is, the number of tests is less than it appears on first sight.

A7 Additional hypotheses on specialist level

Given the specific implementation of the campaign, we formulated additional hypotheses on specialist level:

S1 There are no treatment differences in shares of clients informed about the fundraising campaign.

Motivation: Given the incentive structure provided to credit specialists to spread the information about the campaign, we expect no treatment effect on credit specialists’ motivation to ask clients for donations, which we measure with the shares of clients informed measured by a survey.

S2 Specialists with higher shares of informed clients raise more funds.

Motivation: Since the shares of clients informed may serve as a proxy for specialist motivation, we want to see whether this measure is, at the same time, a good predictor for donations. While a direct link seems obvious, we will also perform an indirect test at the level of clients by regressing the rate of informed other clients of the same specialists on individual giving behavior.

A8 Derivation of the crowding out condition

Crowding out occurs whenever the local elasticity of demand for the charitable good at the optimally chosen bundle for $p = 1$ is greater than minus 1, that is, when demand is not too price elastic, $e_{x,p} > -1$.

Re-writing the first-order condition as $F(x, p) = -pu_y + u_x = 0$ we can employ the implicit function theorem to obtain

$$\frac{\partial x}{\partial p} = -\frac{\frac{\partial F}{\partial p}}{\frac{\partial F}{\partial x}} = -\frac{-u_y}{-pu_{xy} + u_{xx}}.$$

Inserting this into equation (2) in the main text from Section 5 we get the elasticity as

$$e_{x,p} = \frac{\frac{u_y}{u_{xx} - pu_{xy}}}{x/p}.$$

The goal is to find conditions for crowding out relative to a baseline where $p = 1$ so that we can simplify

$$e_{x,p} = \frac{\frac{u_y}{u_{xx} - u_{xy}}}{x} = \frac{u_y}{x(u_{xx} - u_{xy})}.$$


Hence, for crowding out to occur we need $0 > \frac{u_y}{x(u_{xx} - u_{xy})} > -1$. Now note that the first part of the inequality is satisfied whenever $u_{xx} < u_{xy}$ which holds as long as x and y are not perfect substitutes. For the right-hand part we obtain

$$u_{xy} > \frac{u_y}{x} + u_{xx}, \text{ equation (4) from Section 5.}$$

Appendix B.


B1 Additional figures and tables

Figure B1a: Histogram of donation values




Notes: X-axis presents the bins of the donation sums in KGS. Y-axis presents density of the distribution.

Figure B1b: Differences in reported donation relative to donations in the box by office




Notes: X-axis presents the bins of the donation sums in KGS. Y-axis presents density of the distribution.

Figure B1c: Distribution of gift levels in the Munich sample of opera goers (Huck and Rasul 2011)



Notes: X-axis presents the bins of the donation sums in Euro. Y-axis presents density of the distribution.

Figure B1d: Histogram of the number of payments by clients in the period under study



Note: X-axis presents the bins of the number of repayments done in the period of the experiment. Y-axis presents density of the distribution.

Table B1a: Determinants of the interest rate

	Interest rate	Interest rate
	I	II
Sum borrowed in KGS	-0.000*** (0.000)	
Cycle	-0.437*** (0.023)	
Term of loan in months	-0.160*** (0.013)	
Delayed sum	0.297 (0.230)	
Product category fixed effects	yes	
Income proxy	-0.077* (0.041)	0.669*** (0.135)
Dummy for urban area	0.140* (0.079)	0.373 (0.325)
Age	-0.013*** (0.002)	0.013** (0.006)
Female dummy	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.538*** (0.086)
Education category: unknown	-1.418 (3.716)	4.875 (5.362)
Education category: less than high school	1.069*** (0.394)	1.380** (0.609)
Education category: high school	0.850** (0.338)	0.559 (0.360)
Education category: unfinished university	0.671* (0.348)	0.569* (0.332)
Education category: university degree	0.354 (0.347)	-0.168 (0.334)
Occupation category: employee with salary	-0.261* (0.134)	2.148*** (0.489)
Occupation category: agriculture self employed	-0.130* (0.068)	3.381*** (0.503)
Occupation category: trade self employed	0.021 (0.092)	2.858*** (0.425)
Occupation category: service self employed	0.208*** (0.065)	3.340*** (0.430)
Occupation category: production self employed	0.082 (0.176)	3.074*** (0.503)
Marital status category: Single	-2.647 (3.456)	2.212 (5.901)
Marital status category: Married	-2.962 (3.451)	1.979 (5.907)
Marital status category: Divorced	-2.780 (3.461)	2.619 (5.911)
Marital status category: Widow	-2.801 (3.449)	2.031 (5.914)
Constant	39.313*** (3.531)	20.225*** (6.199)
Observations	153900	153900
R^2	0.672	0.035
Adjusted R^2	0.672	0.034

Notes: OLS; Robust errors clustered at the office level; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B1b: Treatment effect on the extensive and the intensive margin by income groups

Panel A: Treatment effect on the intensive margin (log positive donation)

Income threshold		KGS 15,000	KGS 20,000	KGS 25,000	KGS 30,000	KGS 35,000	KGS 40,000
Below income threshold	Coefficient for treatment matching	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	Std. Error	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09
Equal or higher income threshold	Coefficient for treatment matching	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.12	-0.18	-0.21*
	Std. Error	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12
Difference between coefficients		-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.07	-0.14	-0.17

Panel B: Treatment effect on the extensive margin (donation dummy)

Income threshold		KGS 15,000	KGS 20,000	KGS 25,000	KGS 30,000	KGS 35,000	KGS 40,000
Below income threshold	Coefficient for treatment matching	0.009	0.011*	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**
	Std. Error	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.005
Equal or higher income threshold	Coefficient for treatment matching	0.012**	0.013**	0.012**	0.013***	0.012***	0.011***
	Std. Error	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004
Difference between coefficients		-0.003	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.00	0.001

Notes: Sample restricted to identified donations and to the clients with the income below or above respective the threshold; Income thresholds are chosen in increments of 5,000 KGS (approx. \$75) such that there are at least 1,000 observations in each category (higher or lower than the threshold); Controls: treatment local dummy.

B2. Is there a preference for local charitable output?

One of our two main research goals was to test the presence of preferences for local charitable output, keeping the charitable organization constant. We test this through a treatment that decreases (in expectation) the distance to future charitable output. More pronounced preferences for a “close” output should be expressed through a higher amount of donations in the local treatment. In our regressions, Tables 4–6 in the main text, although positive, the coefficient on treatment dummy is only significant for the intensive margin in one of the specifications (Table 5, Column IV). There is no effect on the extensive margin neither an overall effect suggesting that there might be no preference for more local charitable output.

In order to analyze the robustness of this null effect, we explore whether there are any heterogeneous treatment effects between clients of offices that are more or less centrally located within the region. The local treatment could have more appeal to clients who live more centrally as for them the expected distance to the additionally implemented project in case that their region donates the highest average per client should be the lowest.

Clients who are living further away from the center of the region, i.e., closer to the borders, might have a concern that the next project will be realized far away from their location, though

still within the region, and this would mean that local incentives are less appealing for such clients. Even if those, who are close to the border could profit from a projects implemented in the neighboring region, they cannot influence the probability of its realization. Therefore, we define a dummy variable “center” which is equal to 1 for offices which are located in a 60 km radius from the geographical center of each region and interact it with the local benefits treatment dummy. The results are presented in Table B2a. There are no significant effects on any of the outcome variables. This means that our main results are robust to the above concern of centrality.

Table B2a. Heterogeneous treatment effect with respect to location within region

	Response rate	Response rate	Positive donation (log)	Positive donation (log)	Log donation +1 (including zeros)	Log donation +1 (including zeros)
Treatment matching	0.013** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.004)	-0.040 (0.085)	-0.019 (0.055)	0.049** (0.022)	0.049*** (0.017)
Treatment local	0.013 (0.013)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.073 (0.251)	0.188 (0.131)	0.047 (0.047)	0.004 (0.034)
Treatment local*center of region	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.172 (0.270)	-0.096 (0.150)	-0.049 (0.053)	-0.019 (0.044)
Center of region dummy	0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.041 (0.108)	0.150* (0.080)	0.025 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.027)
Observations	185845	149969	7027	5148	185845	149969
R ²	0.002	0.018	0.008	0.136	0.002	0.016
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.018	0.007	0.125	0.001	0.016
Controls	-	yes	-	yes	-	yes
Sample	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.

Notes: OLS; Robust errors clustered at the office level; Conservative sample excludes incomplete blocks from the randomization stage and new offices; Sample full with controls is identical to the one excluding unidentified donors since no controls available; Controls include: dummies for the randomization-level block, client level controls including gender of the client, age of the client, the number of previous loans taken in the company, education level dummies, marital status dummies, occupation type dummies, dummies for taking up and closing the loan in the experiment period, self-reported income, interest rate of the loan, the sum of due repayment delayed for more than 30 days, and the term of the loan in months; office and region level controls including dummy for urban areas, region dummy, number of clients per office; specialist level controls including client number, portfolio size, age, number of children, education dummies, experience in months, family size, female dummy, material status dummies, and nationality dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Alternatively, we can look at the correlation of the donation to the proximity of the currently implemented projects (independent of the treatments). The reason is that the clients cannot affect the distance to the currently implemented projects. All posters showed a map with location of the current projects such that the clients in each treatment knew where they are being implemented. We use geolocation of all offices and projects and calculate the direct distance from each office to each of the projects. We use two approaches: distance to the closest project and the distance to the project within of the respective region.

First, we define a variable distance to the closest project, ignoring the borders between regions. We find no significant correlation between the proximity of the closest project and any of the outcomes. The treatment differences remain the same. The results of the estimation are presented in Table B2b.

Table B2b. Correlation of distance to the closest project with main outcome variables

	Response rate	Response rate	Positive donation (log)	Positive donation (log)	Log donation +1 (including zeros)	Log donation +1 (including zeros)
Treatment matching	0.013** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.004)	-0.056 (0.088)	-0.018 (0.059)	0.048** (0.021)	0.050*** (0.016)
Treatment local	0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.072 (0.084)	0.116** (0.058)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.018)
Distance to closest project	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Observations	185730	149969	7025	5148	185730	149969
R ²	0.002	0.018	0.018	0.135	0.001	0.016
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.018	0.017	0.124	0.001	0.015
Controls	-	yes	-	yes	-	yes
Sample	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.

Notes: see notes to Table B2a.

Table B2c. Correlation of distance to the local project with main outcome variables

	Response rate	Response rate	Positive donation (log)	Positive donation (log)	Log donation +1 (including zeros)	Log donation +1 (including zeros)
Treatment matching	0.012** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.004)	-0.051 (0.091)	-0.054 (0.057)	0.044** (0.021)	0.048*** (0.016)
Treatment local	0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.039 (0.106)	0.100 (0.054)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.018)
Distance to local project	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	185730	149969	7025	5148	185730	149969
R ²	0.001	0.018	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.018	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Controls	-	yes	-	yes	-	yes
Sample	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	full	conservative + excl. unidentified don.

Notes: see notes to Table B2a.

Second, we define a variable capturing the distance to the project within one's region. Again, we find no significant correlation between the proximity of the project within the region in

either specification. The treatment differences remain the same. The results of the estimation are presented in Table B2c. Thus, we conclude that there is indeed no preference for local charitable output in our sample.

B3 Robustness of main results

Table B3a. Summary statistics by four groups separately

	Lead donor, non Local	Matching only	Local only	Both
Percent of clients who donated	3.3%	3.8%	2.8%	4.9%
Average positive donation, KGS	59.1	63.5	71.1	61.6
Average donation per client, KGS	1.98	2.43	2.02	3.05
Average donation per office, KGS	3,662.8	4,984.0	3,348.3	6,048.6
Share of unidentified donations	7.2%	9.3%	10.5%	8.1%
Number of clients	47,890	49,097	41,363	47,495

Notes: Full sample. Average donation per office is based on total sum of donations in the donation boxes and includes unidentified donations.

Table B3b. Treatment effects on total donations

Dependent variable: donation amount				
	I	II	III	V
treatment matching	0.727** (0.353)	0.659* (0.334)	0.712* (0.390)	0.756*** (0.265)
treatment local	0.340 (0.357)	0.300 (0.338)	0.408 (0.396)	0.098 (0.270)
Observations	185845	185239	152319	149969
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006
controls	-	-	-	yes
sample	full	excl. unidentified don.	conservative + excl. unidentified don.	conservative + excl. unidentified don.

Notes: OLS; Robust errors clustered at the office level; Conservative sample excludes incomplete blocks of four from the randomization stage and new offices; Sample full with controls is identical to the one excluding unidentified donors since no controls are available for those observations; Controls include: dummies for the randomization-level block, client level controls including gender of the client, age of the client, the number of previous loans taken in the company, education level dummies, marital status dummies, occupation type dummies, dummies for taking up and closing the loan in the experiment period, self-reported income, interest rate of the loan, the sum of due repayment delayed for more than 30 days, and the term of the loan in months; office and region level controls including dummy for urban areas, region dummy, number of clients per office; specialist level controls including client number, portfolio size, age, number of children, education dummies, experience in months, family size, female dummy, marital status dummies, and nationality dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

B4 Price elasticity of charitable giving—additional analysis

With 1:1 matching, the price of a one unit donation received by the charity is only half of the unit. Matching would be optimal for price elasticities below -1.⁷ Relying on field experiments, Karlan and List (2007) reported a price elasticity of -0.225 while Huck and Rasul (2011) estimate elasticity values closer to -1. However, a review of the methods used to estimate the price elasticity of demand for charitable goods in different papers reveals important differences such that the values are not directly comparable. The most common approach estimates the price elasticity in a log-log specification such that nondonors are automatically dropped (for example, Eckel and Grossman 2008). This is a valid approach only if the price reduction does not induce additional subjects to donate, otherwise one needs to adjust for that.⁸ Also note that a log-log specification assumes constant elasticity. Karlan and List (2007) calculate the checkbook (point) elasticity using sample averages: the average donation per letter excluding the match. Note that this elasticity assumes linearity and is only appropriate for small changes in price (that is, it does not appear to be perfect for a price reduction of 50 percent). Moreover, their comparison treatment is a control without a lead gift, that is, the difference between the matching and the control is twofold: there is signaling through the presence of a lead donor (as theoretically proposed by Vesterlund 2003) and a price reduction.

We modify the approach by Karlan and List (2007) such that we include the match amount into the price elasticity formula as we are interested in the total donation received by the charity and we calculate the arc elasticity which is more appropriate for large price changes.⁹ The arc elasticity is given by $\frac{d^{r,M} - d^{r,LD}}{p^M - p^{LD}} \frac{p^M + p^{LD}}{d^{r,M} + d^{r,LD}}$, with d^r being donation including the match, p denoting the price, and the superscripts M and LD signifying the matching and lead donor

⁷ The literature on the price elasticity of charitable giving started by studying the effectiveness of tax incentives with the price of giving being equal to one minus the marginal tax rate (see, for example, Adena (2022) for a review of this literature). This literature uses data from tax reports, although there is an inherent problem that the marginal tax rate is (usually) related to income and other personal characteristics that affect donation behavior as well. Therefore, the estimates strongly rely on the estimation procedure and, thus, on the validity of various assumptions.

The advent of field experiments provided a new direction in the literature on the price elasticity of giving. In such experiments purely exogenous variations can be studied, for example, by varying the matching rate.

⁸ For example, one could take $\log(\text{donations}+1)$ as the outcome variable and include, additionally to all donors, a share of nondonors in the lead donor treatment such that the shares of individuals included in both treatments are equal. Note that inclusion of all nondonors leads to an inclusion of many never-compliers, and the more never-compliers included, the lower the estimates (in absolute terms).

⁹ The point elasticity is defined for marginal changes in price at a starting price level while the arc elasticity measures it at a midpoint between two price levels. When using point elasticity formula for a discrete change in price there are two possible and very different values, one at the price with matching and one without.

treatments respectively. The value of the arc elasticity can be calculated both, at the sample averages or in level-level regression, and, importantly, it does not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of subjects who never donate. Moreover, we can simply repeat this calculation for other studies and compare the price elasticities between different populations. Table B4a, Column VIII shows the relevant results. The price elasticity is the largest (in absolute terms) in our population with -1.393.¹⁰ Our calculation for Karlan and List's (2007) experiment is also relatively large (in absolute terms), but it is based on a comparison without the signaling value of a lead donor, and thus is expected to be lower for a control with a lead donor. In the remaining studies the price elasticity is above -1 except in Adena and Huck (2017b).¹¹

Table B4a: Matching-price (arc) elasticity of charitable giving in different field experiments

	Comparison treatment	Sample	Donors	Share of donors	Price	Donation per letter/customer, excluding match	Donation per letter/customer, including match	Price elasticity
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Karlan List 2007	pure control	16,687	300	0.018	1	0.81	0.81	
		11,133	234	0.021	0.5	0.94	1.88	-1.193
Rondeau List 2008	lead donor	750	37	0.049	1	2.16	2.16	
		750	36	0.048	0.5	1.65	3.29	-0.623
Huck Rasul 2011	lead donor	3770	132	0.035	1	4.62	4.62	
		3718	155	0.042	0.5	3.85	7.70	-0.750
Gneezy, Keenan, and Gneezy 2014	lead donor	10000	475	0.048	1	1.32	1.32	
		10000	441	0.044	0.5	1.22	2.44	-0.893
Adena Huck 2017	lead donor	6143	93	0.015	1	1.84	1.84	
		6143	129	0.021	0.5	2.30	4.59	-1.287
Our paper	lead donor	89,253	2,787	0.031	1	2.00	2.00	
		96,592	4,240	0.044	0.5	2.74	5.48	-1.393

Notes: We only report the treatments with the price of 1 and 0.5, and take lead donor as a control treatment if available. Price elasticity including the match, see the formula in the text. The numbers provided in the table are based on summary statistics and information provided in the respective papers.

Next, for comparison reasons, we also report the results for a log-log specification. It shows that our subjects are highly price elastic, with a (constant) price elasticity of around -2.5 (that is statistically different from -1). However, unlike previous studies, we do not use all data, but only account for potential compliers while getting rid of potential never-takers. This means that we include in our estimation equal shares of clients from both treatments: 4.4 percent of customers from each treatment which includes all donors and, in the lead donor treatment, 1.3

¹⁰ Analogue level-level regression without controls leads to an elasticity of -1.35, significantly different from -1.

¹¹ Notice that despite the price elasticity below -1, Adena and Huck (2017) documented a reduction of large gifts in the matching treatment compared to the lead donor control. This seems to be explained by a large heterogeneity of their sample since the opera offers both highly subsidized and very expensive tickets.

percent of non-donors (that constitute our group of potential compliers). Since we do not know the identities of would-be donors, we present results without control variables. Drawing the control subjects at random is a possible alternative, but it does not affect the results and we do not present them here. The dependent variable is the log of the amount received plus one due to the inclusion of zero amounts. Table B4b, Columns I–III present the results of this exercise. For comparison, Columns VII–IX show the common log-log approach that relies on the donor sample only and is not correct if price reduction induces potential compliers to start giving as in our case. Columns IV–VI repeat the previous exercise, but use the log donation received plus one as a dependent variable. This is to show that the difference in the size of the coefficients resulting from adding one before the log is small. Our preferred specification for the constant elasticity assumption is in Columns I–III. It shows that our subjects are highly price elastic, with a (constant) price elasticity of around -2.5 (that is statistically different from -1).

Table B4b: Matching-price (constant) elasticity of charitable giving

Dependent variable	Log(amount received +1)						Log(amount received)		
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
Log price	-2.495*** (0.187)	-2.595*** (0.192)	-2.549*** (0.219)	-0.912*** (0.140)	-0.900*** (0.140)	-0.892*** (0.157)	-0.934*** (0.144)	-0.921*** (0.144)	-0.913*** (0.162)
Observations	8151	7545	6392	7027	6421	5480	7027	6421	5480
R ²	0.264	0.273	0.270	0.112	0.112	0.110	0.111	0.111	0.108
Adjusted R ²	0.264	0.273	0.270	0.112	0.112	0.109	0.111	0.111	0.108
sample	incl. unidentif ied don.	excl. unidentif ied don.	conservat ive + excl. unidentifi ed don.	incl. unidentif ied don.	excl. unidentif ied don.	conservat ive + excl. unidentifi ed don.	incl. unidentif ied don.	excl. unidentif ied don.	conservat ive + excl. unidentifi ed don.
	All donors plus some non-donors in LD treatment such that shares included are equal				Donors only			Donors only	

Notes: OLS; Robust errors clustered at the office level; Conservative sample excludes incomplete blocks from the randomization stage and new offices; no controls; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B5 Interest price elasticity of charitable giving

In our data, we have in fact two sources of variation in the price for giving. The first results from our treatment manipulation and is purely exogenous (in what follows, we refer to this price as the “matching price”). The second results from the fact that the money donated cannot be used to repay the loan and costs the individual one plus the interest rate (in what follows we refer to this price as “interest price”).¹² The typical tax price does not apply in our context as there are no tax deductions for charitable giving in Kyrgyzstan. The interest rate is mainly

¹² The microfinance company allows for flexible repayments on top of the monthly rate. Indeed, we observe a non-negligible number of additional repayments above the required 2–3 times in the period under study; see Figure B1d in Appendix B1. Additionally, the repayment amounts vary.

determined by the type of loan (28 categories) and the individual's loan repayment history. In addition, there is a random component depending on official interest rates at the time of taking the loan and on later interest rate adjustments resulting from recalibrations of the company's portfolio.¹³ That means that, after accounting for loan category, repayment history, and observables, we can consistently estimate the interest-price elasticity of charitable giving and compare it to the match-price elasticity implied by our treatments.

Table B5a shows the results from a level-level regression of the (nominal) interest price on donations received which includes controls for the available determinants of the interest rate, other individual characteristics, and the match price. The resulting estimates are -2.5 to -3.0, and very clearly below -1. The coefficients can be interpreted as the point interest-price elasticity calculated at means and we can compare this point elasticity to the arc match-price elasticity calculated in Table B4a (last column and row) to be around -1.4. The conclusion is that our sample is both price elastic with respect to the interest price and with respect to the match price. The fact that the interest-price elasticity seems larger (in absolute terms) than the match-price elasticity might be explained by the higher awareness of own interest rate compared to some clients not being aware of the matching.¹⁴

Table B5a: Interest-price elasticity of charitable giving

Dependent variable: donation amount		
	I	II
Interest-price elasticity	-3.008*** (0.459)	-2.539*** (0.6322)
Controls	no	yes
Observations	185125	126291
R2	0.001	0.009
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.008
sample	excl. unidentified don.	conservative + excl. unidentified don.

Notes: OLS with loan type fixed effects (areg in stata); Robust errors clustered at the office level; Conservative sample excludes incomplete blocks from the randomization stage and new offices Controls include: dummies for the randomization-level block, client level controls including gender of the client, age of the client, the number of previous loans taken in the company, education level dummies, marital status dummies, occupation type dummies, dummies for taking up and closing the loan in the experiment period, self-reported income, interest rate of the loan, the sum of due repayment delayed for more than 30 days, and the term of the loan in months; office and region level controls including dummy for urban areas, region dummy, number of clients per office; specialist level controls including client number, portfolio size, age, number of children, education dummies, experience in months, family size, female dummy, material status dummies, and nationality dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

¹³ In Table B1a in the Appendix B1, we study the determinants of the interest rate in our sample. Observable characteristics alone do not have much predictive power, with an R squared of 0.035, see Column II. Once controlling for product category and history of loans (see Column I), most of the coefficients on personal characteristics lose significance, while the R squared increases to 0.672. Although we cannot exclude that there are other unobservable determinants of the interest rate that are correlated with charitable behavior, we are confident that they do not have much influence.

¹⁴ See Eckel and Grossman (2017) for differences resulting from donor awareness of the offered subsidies in a setting with matching and rebate.

B6 Treatment effects on credit specialists

One of the design features of our experiment is that, beyond the posters placed in the offices, credit specialists were instructed (and incentivized) to inform the clients about the charitable campaign and the treatments, that is, implicitly they acted as fundraisers. However, the credit specialists could themselves be influenced by treatments, which could lead them to be more active in one treatment than another, resulting in different rates of informed clients and thus confounding the main analysis. See Section A7 for the hypotheses regarding the spread of information from credit specialists to clients.

To test potential treatment effects on the behavior of credit specialists who acted as intermediaries, the company conducted phone surveys with 7,511 randomly chosen customers, with the first surveys starting 10 days after the beginning of the campaign and lasting until the end. In total, 10.6 percent surveyed clients confirmed that they knew about the campaign. This number is relatively low, but it might be a function of the relatively early start of the telephone survey. In Table B6a, in a regression framework, we compare rates of informed clients by treatments and confirm that there are no significant differences in credit specialist motivation to inform more or fewer clients about the campaign in a particular treatment. Thus, we can conclude that potential treatment differences in the likelihood of giving are not driven by different shares of clients being informed about the campaign. In other words, we do find support for hypothesis S1 in the data.

However, this does not exclude the possibility that credit specialists differentially selected the clients to be informed depending on treatments. For example, if they were motivated more by one of the treatments, they could have put more effort into informing richer customers who they expected to be more likely to give while holding the total number of informed clients constant due to time restrictions. To address this concern Tables 3–5 in the main text include or exclude controls. Given that this has no meaningful impact on coefficient size, we deem this scenario unrealistic.

Table B6a: Share of clients informed

Dependent variable: informed dummy		
treatment matching	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.009)
treatment local	0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.009)
Observations	7511	7511
R ²	0.000	0.000
errors clustered	No	specialist

Notes: Sample of surveyed clients; Robust or clustered robust errors; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Finally, we want to confirm that information is directly linked to donations. To test hypothesis S2, that credit specialists with a higher share of informed clients raise more funds, we run regressions on specialist and client levels separately. The test on the specialist level is a direct one. Here, we regress the average share of clients with the positive donations of a specialist on her average share of informed clients (Table B6b, Columns I and II). This average share of informed clients per specialist is inferred from the subset of clients that were surveyed by phone. Note that we excluded specialists with a zero share of informed clients from the sample as well as those with two or less surveyed clients (the last was most likely for new credit specialists, who did not have many clients at the start of the experiment). The results of the regression show that the higher the share of informed clients per specialist the higher the average share of donors among her clients.

Table B6b: Behavior of the specialists

Dependent variable:	Share of donors		Likelihood of giving		Average return per specialist (log of)		Donation per client including zeros (+1, log of)	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
average rate of informed clients per specialist	0.045* (0.023)	0.050** (0.024)			0.166* (0.090)	0.184** (0.092)		
average rate of other informed clients of the same specialist			0.044* (0.023)	0.042** (0.020)			0.161* (0.088)	0.155** (0.078)
Observations	373	362	129002	128900	373	362	129002	128900
Observation-level	specialist	specialist	client	client	specialist	specialist	client	client
R ²	0.024	0.082	0.001	0.007	0.023	0.087	0.001	0.006
Controls	-	yes	-	yes	-	yes	-	yes

Notes: OLS; Robust errors clustered at the office level; Sample: excluding specialists with zero rate of informed and less than three clients surveyed; Controls include: treatment dummies, urban, cycle, age, female, education dummies, business type dummies marital status dummies, taking/closing loan dummies, income; Specialist level regressions (averages by specialist) are weighted by the number of clients; controls include specialist level controls: age, number of children, education category dummies, experience in months, family size, and female dummy; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

For client level regressions, we regress a dummy equal to one if a client donated on the average rate of other clients of the same specialist being informed. Note that when calculating this average, we exclude for each client his/her own contribution to the specialist's overall average

since, especially for specialists with a small number of surveyed clients, the shares of informed clients are highly dependent on the own declaration in the interview and, of course, being informed is expected to affect giving directly. The results are presented in Table B6b, Columns III and IV. Again, each client is more likely to donate the higher the rate of other clients being informed by the same specialist.

The second set of regressions take as an outcome the average donation revenue per client for each specialist in the specialist-level regressions per specialist (log, Table B6b, Columns V and VI) or individual donations (including zeros) in the client-level regressions (donation +1, log, Table B6b, Columns VII and VIII). The results suggest that, the higher the rate of informed clients, the higher the average return per specialist and the higher the average rate of informed other clients, the higher the return per client. Thus, we conclude that hypothesis S2 is also supported by the data.

Altogether, after critically assessing our design, we are confident that our findings are not confounded.

B7 Individual characteristics and heterogeneous treatment effects

In this section, we report the controls that are significantly correlated with one of the variables of interest and also perform an analysis of heterogeneous treatment effect of the pre-registered variables.

First, we analyze the correlates with the response rate among the control variables. Clients who had more loans previously in this company (long-term clients) are more likely to donate relatively to newer clients. Older clients and women are also more likely to donate than younger ones and men, respectively. Those who took the loan during the duration of the experiment are more likely to donate relatively to those who took loan before the start of the experiment. This effect might be driven either by the intention of the clients to signal their “good” type to the credit specialist who decided on the eligibility of receiving the loan, by displaying some “immediate” reciprocity for the loan agreement, or by the “effect of holding the money in hand.” Those who were called during the survey are also more likely to donate, as their attention might be directed towards the campaign. Finally, those clients who had delayed payments to the company by more than 30 days were less likely to donate, as they are likely to never show up in the office and hide from contacts from company’s side. Interestingly, self-reported income is not significantly related to the response rate.

Among the controls, we found several significant predictors of the donation amount, conditional on giving. Single clients donate higher sums than other clients. Those who took loan during the experiment donated smaller sums relative to those who took loan before the start of the experiment (although they are more likely to donate). Finally, clients with higher self-reported income donate significantly higher amounts.