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# **Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment**

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## ABSTRACT

### **Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment<sup>\*</sup>**

We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.

JEL Classification: J33, M52

Keywords: managerial incentives, targeting, selection, earnings inequality

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# 1 Introduction

The last two decades have seen a surge in the popularity of performance pay for individuals in executive and managerial positions, from CEOs down to middle and lower management (Hall and Liebman 1998, Hall and Murphy 2003, Oyer and Schaefer 2004). The literature, however, does not provide much evidence on how managerial performance pay affects firms' productivity and the performance of individual workers in lower tiers of the firms' hierarchy. We present evidence from a firm level experiment explicitly designed to shed light on these issues. In the experiment we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives by augmenting managers' fixed wages with a performance bonus based on the average productivity of workers managed. Importantly, bottom-tier workers were rewarded according to the same compensation scheme throughout.

In our context, as in most firms, managers can affect average workers productivity through two channels – (i) they can take actions that affect the productivity of existing workers, and, (ii) they can affect the identity of the workers selected into employment. We analyze the impact of managerial performance pay on both dimensions of managers' behavior in a simple theoretical framework. The theory indicates that, when workers are of heterogeneous ability and managers' and workers' effort are complements, the introduction of managerial performance pay makes managers target their effort towards the most able workers. We label this a 'targeting effect' of managerial incentives. In addition, the introduction of managerial performance pay makes managers select the most able workers into employment. We label this a 'selection effect' of managerial incentives.

The theory highlights that targeting and selection affect both the mean and the dispersion of workers' productivity. Mean productivity unambiguously raises as managers target the most able workers and fire the least able. The effect on the dispersion is however ambiguous. On the one hand, targeting the most able workers exacerbates the natural differences in ability and leads to an increase in dispersion. On the other hand, if only more able and hence more similar workers are selected into employment in the first place, the dispersion of productivity may fall, depending on the underlying distribution of ability across workers.

Our research design combined with data from personnel records on the daily productivity of individual workers allows us to provide evidence on how the provision of incentives to managers affects manager's behavior and therefore filters through to the performance of individual workers at lower tiers of the firm hierarchy. We identify the effect of managerial performance pay on average worker productivity, on the dispersion of workers' productivity, and use individual productivity data to separate the targeting and selection effects.

The firm we study is a leading UK producer of soft fruit. Managerial staff belongs to two classes. The first class consists of a single general manager, the second comprises ten field managers. Throughout we refer to the general manager as the chief operating officer (COO), to distinguish him from the field managers. The bottom tier of the firm hierarchy consists of workers.

The main task of the bottom tier workers is to pick fruit. This is a physically strenuous task and one for which workers are of heterogeneous ability. Managers are responsible for field logistics, most importantly to assign workers to rows of fruit within the field and to monitor workers. In this context, managerial effort can be targeted to individual workers and is complementary to worker's effort. The main task of the COO is to decide which workers are selected to pick fruit each day, and which are assigned to non-picking tasks. The COO also decides the allocation of workers and managers to fields. Hence managers and workers do not decide where they work or whom they work with.

The design of the experiment is as follows. We divided the peak picking season into two periods of two months each. In the first period the COO and managers were paid a fixed wage. In the second period, we added a daily performance bonus to the same level of fixed wages. The performance bonus is an increasing function of the *average* productivity of workers in the field on that day, conditional on average productivity being above an exogenously set threshold.

The data has three key features that allow us to identify the consequences of managerial performance pay on the mean and dispersion of productivity among bottom tier workers, and the heterogeneous effects across individual workers. First, the change in managerial incentives is orthogonal to other determinants of the firm's productivity – we had full control over the timing of the change, the structure of managerial compensation, and the information provided to managers. Second, we observe the *same* workers and managers under both managerial incentive schemes and therefore control for time invariant sources of heterogeneity across workers, such as their ability, and across managers, such as their management style.<sup>1</sup> Third, we have daily information on the pool of workers available to pick fruit on that day which allows us to precisely identify the effect of managerial incentives on the selection of workers. We observe the entire pool of workers because individuals are hired seasonally from Eastern Europe, and they live on the farm for the duration of their stay. Importantly, there is typically an excess supply of bottom-tier workers, and work is offered on a casual basis with no daily guarantee of employment.

The empirical analysis yields six findings. First, the introduction of managerial performance pay increases the average productivity of lower-tier workers by 21%. Second, the introduction of managerial performance pay increases the *dispersion* of productivity among workers – the coefficient of variation increases by 38%.

Third, the analysis of individual productivity data reveals that the most able workers experience a significant increase in productivity while the productivity of other workers is not affected or even decreases. This suggests that the targeting effect is at play – after the introduction of performance pay, managers target their effort towards more able workers. The introduction of managerial

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<sup>1</sup>Our empirical strategy is informed by the evidence that individual 'styles' of managers affect firm performance over and above firm level characteristics themselves (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2004).

performance pay thus exacerbates earnings inequality due to underlying differences in ability.

Fourth, the individual data also provides evidence of a selection effect. More able workers, namely workers who had the highest productivity when managers were paid fixed wages, are more likely to be selected into the workforce when managers are paid performance related pay. Least able workers are employed less often and workers at the bottom of the productivity distribution are fired. Fifth, we find that the selection and targeting effect reinforce each other, as workers who experience the highest increase in productivity are also more likely to be selected into employment. This further exacerbates the raise in earnings inequality among workers.

Finally, we evaluate the relative importance of the targeting and selection effects through a series of thought experiments. We find that at least half of the 21% increase in average productivity is driven by the selection of more productive workers. In contrast, we find that the change in dispersion is nearly entirely due to managers targeting the most able workers after the introduction of performance pay. Namely, the dispersion of productivity would have increased by almost the same amount had the selection of workers remained unchanged. The reason is that the distribution of ability across workers is such that even when the least able workers are fired, the marginal worker selected to pick is still of relatively low ability. Hence there remains considerable heterogeneity in productivity among selected workers.

We contribute to the empirical literature on the effects of incentive pay on performance. Our analysis complements recent evidence on the effects of incentives to bottom-tier workers on their own or aggregate firm performance (Lazear 2000, Paarsch and Shearer 2000, Jones and Kato 1995), and on the effect of incentive pay for CEOs and managers on aggregate firm performance (Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Groves *et al* 1994, Oyer 1998).

Our paper combines both themes as we analyze the effect of *managerial* incentives on the productivity of *individual workers* in lower tiers of the firm's hierarchy. Using individual level personnel data at various layers of the firm's hierarchy, we open the black box of behavior within the firm and explore the efficiency and distributional consequences of the introduction of managerial incentives. Our findings draw attention to the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among workers. On the methodological front, our experimental research design allows us to address a key empirical challenge in identifying the causal effects of incentives on firm or individual performance, namely that observed incentive contracts might be endogenous to firm's performance (Prendergast 1999, Chiappori and Salanie 2003).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our context, develops a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of managerial performance pay, and discusses how our experiment is designed to identify such effects. Section 3 describes the personnel data and presents descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents evidence on the effect of managerial incentives on the average and dispersion of workers' productivity. Section 5 uses the individual level data to identify the het-

erogenous effects across workers. Section 6 presents evidence on the selection effects of managerial incentives. Section 7 concludes. Proofs and robustness checks are provided in the Appendix.

## 2 Context, Theory, and the Experiment

### 2.1 Context

The firm we study is a leading UK producer of soft fruit.<sup>2</sup> Managerial staff belongs to two classes. The first class consists of a single general manager, the second comprises ten field managers. Throughout we refer to the general manager as the chief operating officer (COO), to distinguish him from the field managers. The bottom tier of the firm hierarchy consists of workers.

The main task of the bottom-tier workers is to pick fruit. On average, workers pick on two different fields per day. Within a field-day, each worker is allocated their own row of fruit to pick. A worker's productivity depends on field conditions, on her effort and on the managerial effort targeted towards her. The amount of fruit to be picked and hence the number of workers on a field varies both across fields on any given day because fields vary in their size, and within a field over time because plants reach maturity at different times. There are no complementarities among workers in picking – each worker's productivity is independent of the efforts of other bottom-tier workers. The only choice variable of workers is how much effort to exert into picking. Workers do not choose how many hours to work – all workers are present on the field-day for the number of hours it takes to pick all the available fruit.

Workers are organized and supervised by managers, with each manager being responsible for around twenty workers. Managers on the same field focus on their assigned group of workers and work independently of each other. Managers are responsible for field logistics. In particular they are responsible for allocating workers to rows at the start of the day, and for reallocating workers to new rows once they have finished picking the row they were originally assigned to. If several workers finish at the same time the manager has to decide whom to reallocate first. Workers place the fruit they have picked into crates. Managers have to ensure that full crates of fruit are removed from the rows and new empty crates provided to workers. If several workers simultaneously fill their crates, the manager chooses whom to help first.

The key choice variable of each manager is how to allocate her effort among her different workers. Managerial effort is complementary to worker's effort, namely, for a given effort level of the worker, her productivity is higher the more effort the manager targets towards her. For example, by assigning her to more plentiful rows and removing her full crates quickly.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>The soft fruit industry in the UK is a competitive market on the supply side, with the majority of fruit being sold directly to supermarkets or market wholesalers.

<sup>3</sup>Managerial and worker effort are not substitutes because managers themselves never pick fruit.



The effect of managerial effort on worker productivity can be substantial. Assuming that workers pick at a constant speed, if the manager slacks for five minutes every hour and a worker is left to wait for a new crate for the same amount of time, his productivity would be  $5/60=8\%$  lower. The effort costs to the manager are considerable because the workers she is responsible for are dispersed over a large area. The median field size in our sample is three hectares. Given that on the median field-day there are three managers, each manager has to cover an area of one hectare. This implies that to make sure she notices workers who need to be reallocated to new rows and crates that need to be replaced, the manager needs to walk continuously around the field.

Workers and managers are hired seasonally from Eastern Europe and live on the farm.<sup>4</sup> Their work permit allows them to work on other UK farms subject to the approval of the permit agency. Their outside option to employment at the farm is therefore to return home or to move to another farm during the season. Individuals are typically not observed moving from picking tasks to managerial tasks or *vice versa*. Finally, work is offered on a casual basis with no daily guarantee of employment. In practice, managers manage each day, and workers are typically engaged in picking tasks every other day. On other days workers are asked to perform non-picking tasks such as planting or weeding, or may be left unemployed for the day. Therefore on any given day, there is an excess supply of workers available for picking.

The COO is a permanent employee of the farm. His main task is to decide which of the workers present on the farm are selected to pick fruit each day, assigned to non-picking tasks, or left unemployed for the day. In the event that two fields are operated simultaneously, the COO allocates workers and managers to fields. Managers and workers do not choose which field to work on, nor whom they work with. The COO monitors managers to ensure that fields are properly cleared of fruit. The fruit is planted some years in advance, so the sequence in which fields are picked over time is determined at the start of the season, and is not decided by the COO.

Workers are paid piece rates. The piece rate is the same for all workers on a given field-day and is set to minimize the firm's wage bill each field-day subject to a minimum wage constraint.<sup>5</sup> The piece rate is set so the *average* worker obtains an hourly wage of  $\underline{w}$ , where  $\underline{w}$  is above the legally prescribed minimum wage, is chosen by the owner of the firm at the beginning of the season, and does not change over the season.

In practice, the COO has some discretion to make small adjustments to the piece rate across

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<sup>4</sup>There are 10 nationalities represented in the data, both genders are equally represented, and individuals are aged 20 to 25 years. In order to be recruited, individuals must be full-time university students, have at least one year before graduation, and must return to the same university in the Fall. Workers are not typically hired from the local labor market due to the seasonality of the work. Very few workers are hired for two consecutive seasons.

<sup>5</sup>This is consistent with profit maximization. Given a competitive market for soft fruit, and that the total quantity of fruit available is fixed some years in advance when fruit is actually planted, the firm faces little uncertainty over its total revenue. In contrast given workers are paid piece rates, the firm's total wage bill is uncertain.

field-days as field conditions vary. Let  $\beta_{ft}$  be the piece rate on field  $f$  and day  $t$ . This is set according to the following rule;

$$\beta_{ft} = \frac{w}{E(y_{ft})} \quad (1)$$

where  $E(y_{ft})$  is the expected productivity of the average worker on the field-day.<sup>6</sup> Hence the piece rate is lower whenever productivity is expected to be higher.<sup>7</sup>

The focus of our experiment is the compensation schemes of managers and the COO. Halfway through the peak picking season we exogenously change the compensation scheme by adding a field-day performance bonus to the existing level of managers' wages. The purpose of the experiment is twofold. First, we aim to identify the causal effect of managerial incentives on the mean and dispersion of worker's productivity. Second, we aim to decompose these aggregate effects into those that are attributable to the differential targeting of managerial effort across workers, and those that are attributable to the differential selection of workers into picking by the COO.

## 2.2 Theoretical Framework

We develop a stylized model of the firm to analyze the effect of the introduction of managerial performance pay on the equilibrium mean and dispersion of workers' productivity. The model is tailored to fit our particular context and experimental design. The firm's hierarchy has three layers – a COO, managers, and workers. For parsimony and without loss of generality, we assume there is one manager and three workers. Since in our context there is an excess supply of workers available for picking tasks, we assume production requires only two workers and one manager in any given field. The division of tasks is as follows – workers pick fruit, the manager organizes logistics for each worker, and the COO decides which of the workers pick fruit and which is left unemployed.

The output of worker  $i$  is given by  $y_i = (1 + km_i)e_i$ , where  $e_i$  is her effort,  $m_i$  is the managerial effort targeted towards her, and  $k > 0$  is a measure of the strength of the complementarity

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<sup>6</sup>At the start of the day the COO inspects each field to be picked. He then forms an expectation of worker productivity that field-day and sets the piece rate so that a worker with average productivity expects to obtain an hourly equivalent of  $w$ . This piece rate is announced to workers before they start picking, and cannot be revised *ex post*. If a worker's productivity is so low that they earn an hourly equivalent less than the legally prescribed minimum wage, they are paid a one-off supplement to ensure they reach the minimum wage. When they first arrive on the farm, workers are informed that they will be sent home if they consistently need to be paid this supplement. We observe less than 1% of worker-field-day observations where workers are paid the supplement.

<sup>7</sup>This raises concerns of a ratchet effect, whereby workers deliberately underperform to keep the piece rate high. In Bandiera *et al* (2005) we provide evidence that in this setting, workers are unable to collude in this way. This is partly driven by the uncertainty they have over where they will work in the future, with whom they will work, and their inability to monitor workers in other fields. Moreover, given the stochastic nature of agricultural production, it is difficult for workers to disentangle changes in the piece rate due to changing conditions and those due to management learning about workers' true ability (Ickes and Samuelson 1987). Such ratchet concerns have been documented in firms where productivity shocks are less common such as shoe making (Freeman and Kleiner 2005) and bricklaying (Roy 1952).

between the manager's and worker's efforts. To make matters concrete, the managerial effort directed towards a worker can be thought of as the effort the manager devotes to ensuring worker  $i$  is allocated a new row of fruit as soon as she is done picking the current one.<sup>8</sup>

The productivity of worker  $i$ , measured as the kilograms of fruit picked per hour, is defined as  $y_i/h$ , where  $h$  is the number of hours worked on the field. This is the same for all workers in the field and so we make the simplifying assumption that  $h = 1$ . This implies that in our framework output and productivity coincide.

The timing of actions is as follows. In the first stage, the COO chooses which two out of the three workers are selected into picking tasks. In the second stage, the manager and workers simultaneously choose their efforts. We solve for the equilibrium choices of workers, the manager, and COO. We then determine the effects on the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity of changing the manager and COO's compensation from fixed wages to performance pay related to workers' average productivity.

### 2.2.1 Workers

Workers are paid piece rates, where the piece rate is  $\beta$  per kilogram fruit picked and is taken as given by workers. The total pay of worker  $i$  is therefore  $\beta y_i$ . Worker  $i$  has a disutility of effort of  $\frac{1}{2}\theta_i e_i^2$ , where  $\theta_i$  captures the heterogeneity across workers, and is interpreted as the inverse of the worker's innate ability. The utility of a worker is assumed to be linear and additively separable between pay,  $\beta y_i$ , and effort,  $-\frac{1}{2}\theta_i e_i^2$ .

Workers choose their effort taking as given the managerial effort targeted towards them. Each worker's maximization problem is;

$$\max_{e_i} \left( \beta y_i - \frac{1}{2}\theta_i e_i^2 \right). \quad (2)$$

The first order condition of worker  $i$ 's maximization problem yields the worker's optimal effort;

$$e_i^* = \frac{\beta(1 + km_i)}{\theta_i}. \quad (3)$$

Consistent with previous empirical evidence from similar settings, worker effort increases as the variable component of pay becomes more high powered, as given by an increase in the piece rate  $\beta$ , and high ability workers choose to exert more effort than low ability workers (Paarsch and Shearer 1999, Lazear 2000). Workers optimally exert more effort when the managerial effort targeted towards them increases because managerial and worker effort are complementary in the

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<sup>8</sup>There may also be a pure public good component to managerial effort which affects all workers. The key comparisons between the managerial incentive schemes remain qualitatively unchanged in that case.

production technology.<sup>9</sup>

## 2.2.2 The Manager

The manager's compensation schedule is  $w + b\bar{Y}$ , where  $w$  is a fixed wage and  $\bar{Y} = \frac{1}{2}(y_i + y_j)$  is the average productivity of the two workers  $i$  and  $j$ . The parameter  $b$  captures the strength of managerial incentives, namely the variable component of managerial pay which is linearly related to the average productivity of workers. We assume the manager's effort choice can either be 0 (low) or 1 (high). The manager chooses high or low effort, and how to allocate her effort between workers  $i$  and  $j$ . Effort entails disutility  $cm$ , where  $m = m_i + m_j$ , for the manager.

The manager chooses her effort taking as given the effort choices of the workers. The manager's maximization problem is;

$$\max_{m_i, m_j} w + \frac{1}{2}b[(1 + km_i)e_i + (1 + km_j)e_j] - cm, \quad (4)$$

where  $m \in \{0, 1\}$ . We then have that;

**Lemma 1 (Optimal Manager's Effort):** *There exists a unique threshold  $\bar{b}$  such that if  $0 \leq b < \bar{b}$  the manager chooses low effort while if  $b \geq \bar{b}$  the manager chooses high effort. If the difference in workers' ability is sufficiently large, there is a unique equilibrium where the manager targets the more able worker.*

The benefit of choosing high effort is linearly increasing in  $b$  and the disutility of high effort is constant. If incentives are sufficiently strong ( $b$  is high), the benefit of choosing high effort exceeds the cost and the manager exerts high effort. In this case, the manager also chooses how to allocate her effort between the workers. Since the managers' pay is a linear combination of the output produced by the two workers, the manager maximizes her payoff by targeting worker  $i$  if  $e_i > e_j$  and *vice versa*.<sup>10</sup>

From (3) we see that workers' effort depends on their ability and the managerial effort targeted towards them. If the difference in ability is sufficiently large, the more able worker always exerts more effort, regardless of the level of managerial effort. Therefore if workers are sufficiently heterogeneous, the unique equilibrium outcome is where the manager targets the most able worker.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>The piece rate embodies information on field conditions because it is set according to (1). Hence worker's effort depends indirectly on field conditions through the piece rate.

<sup>10</sup>The results are robust to assuming that the low level of effort is positive. In that case, the manager solves the allocation problem both for low and high effort.

<sup>11</sup>In a more general setting with a production function that is concave in manager and worker efforts, the same result holds as long as the strength of the complementarity between manager and worker efforts is not decreasing in the worker's effort.

In this case the equilibrium effort levels of the two workers,  $\hat{e}_i$  and  $\hat{e}_j$ , are;

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}_i &= \frac{\beta}{\theta_i} & \hat{e}_j &= \frac{\beta}{\theta_j} & \text{if } 0 \leq b < \bar{b}. \\ \hat{e}_i &= \frac{\beta(1+k)}{\theta_i} & \hat{e}_j &= \frac{\beta}{\theta_j} & \text{if } b \geq \bar{b}. \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Substituting these values into the production function we have the following result.

**Proposition 1 (Targeting):** *Changing the manager's compensation scheme from fixed wages ( $b = 0$ ) to sufficiently high powered performance pay ( $b \geq \bar{b}$ ) increases both the mean and the dispersion of workers' productivity. The dispersion increases in the strength of the complementarity between manager and worker's efforts,  $k$ .*

The intuition behind the result is as follows. Managerial effort increases average productivity through two channels. First, it enters the production function directly. Second, the worker's best response is non-decreasing in managerial effort, as shown by the worker's optimal effort function (3). Hence tying managerial pay to average productivity indeed increases average productivity.

The intuition behind why managerial incentive pay increases the dispersion of productivity is that the manager targets workers to maximize the marginal return to her effort. Given that managerial and workers' efforts are complements in production and managerial pay is increasing in the sum of the two workers' productivities, Lemma 1 shows that the manager maximizes her pay by targeting the more able worker. This increases the more able worker's productivity while leaving the productivity of the other worker unchanged.

An implication is that with managerial performance pay, the differences in productivity between workers that arise naturally because workers are of heterogeneous ability, are exacerbated by the differential targeting of managerial effort across workers. The effect of managerial incentives on the dispersion of productivity, and therefore on the earnings inequality among workers, can be weakened or reinforced by the selection strategy of the COO, to which we now turn.

### 2.2.3 The COO

The COO's compensation schedule is  $W + B\bar{Y}$ , where  $W$  is a fixed wage and  $\bar{Y}$  is the average workers' productivity. The parameter  $B$  captures the strength of incentives, namely the variable component of COO pay which is linearly related to the average productivity of workers.

The COO selects two of the three available workers into employment. We label workers as 1, 2, 3 and assume  $\theta_1 < \theta_2 < \theta_3$  so worker 1 is the most able and worker 3 the least able. We make the simplifying assumption that the COO does not know the workers' ability *ex ante*, but can exert one unit of effort to learn each worker's ability. In our context, the COO may learn workers' ability by analyzing personnel files on workers' performance for example. We denote the COO's effort choice as  $s \in \{0, 1\}$ , and his total effort cost as  $C_s$ . Hence if the COO chooses to learn each

worker's ability, he is able to creamskim the two most able workers into employment. Otherwise he chooses each possible pair of workers with equal probability.

To focus on the effect of the COO's incentives on both the average and the dispersion of productivity, we assume the manager is paid a fixed wage and thus chooses the low effort level. The COO then chooses  $s$ , taking into account that managerial effort is low and workers' efforts are as given in (3). The COO maximization's problem is;

$$\max_s W + BE(\bar{Y}(s)) - Cs \quad (6)$$

where  $E(\bar{Y}(s))$  is expected average productivity of the selected workers, and depends on the COO's choice on whether to learn the workers' ability.

**Lemma 2 (Optimal COO Effort):** *There exists a unique threshold  $\bar{B}$  such that if  $0 \leq B < \bar{B}$  the COO chooses low effort and hence selects each worker with equal probability. If  $B \geq \bar{B}$  the COO chooses high effort and selects the two most able workers.*

The benefit of exerting high effort is linearly increasing in  $B$ , while the cost of doing so is constant and equal to  $C$ . When incentives are sufficiently strong, so  $B$  is large enough, the benefit is larger than the cost and the COO exerts high effort. Solving for the mean and the dispersion of productivity in the two cases yields the following result.

**Proposition 2 (Selection):** *Changing the COO's compensation scheme from fixed wages ( $B = 0$ ) to sufficiently high powered performance pay ( $B \geq \bar{B}$ ) increases workers' average productivity. If the ability difference between the least able worker and the two most able is sufficiently large, the dispersion of productivity decreases, otherwise it increases.*

The effect on average productivity is straightforward. When the COO's incentives are sufficiently strong, so  $B \geq \bar{B}$ , only the two most able workers contribute to the average. When  $0 \leq B < \bar{B}$ , all workers – including the least able – are selected with equal probability, and this reduces the expected average productivity. Note that the selection effect identified here is different from the sorting effect of incentive pay identified by Lazear (2000, 2005). Here we show that when the COO's pay is sufficiently sensitive to firm's performance he changes the way he selects workers into employment. Thus the introduction of managerial incentives affects the *demand* for lower-tier workers. Lazear (2000, 2005) makes the related point that incentive pay affects the *supply* of workers, namely when workers or managers are offered incentive pay they self-select into jobs where they expect their compensation to be higher.

The effect on the dispersion of productivity depends on the distribution of ability among workers. Intuitively, when  $B \geq \bar{B}$ , the dispersion depends only on the difference in ability between workers 1 and 2, given that worker 3 is never selected. In contrast, when  $0 \leq B < \bar{B}$  the dispersion depends on the pairwise differences between the three possible combination of workers, since all are selected with equal probability. The comparison of dispersion in the two cases then depends

on the distribution of ability across workers. If the least able worker is sufficiently less able than the other two, creamskimming by the COO results in a pairing of the most similar workers and thus reduce dispersion.

#### 2.2.4 The Combined Effect of COO's and Manager's Performance Pay

In our experiment we changed the compensation scheme of both the manager and the COO by adding a performance bonus to their existing fixed wage. Namely in the first part of the experiment  $b = B = 0$ , in the second part  $B > 0$ , and  $b > 0$ . In practice managers were paid the performance bonus only if average aggregate productivity was above a fixed threshold. For simplicity we here assume that the threshold is set at zero. Assuming a positive threshold makes the analysis more cumbersome but leaves the qualitative results unchanged.

The effects on the mean and dispersion of productivity thus depend on the balance of effects stemming from changes in behavior of the manager and the COO.

**Proposition 3 (Targeting and Selection Effects):** *Changing the COO's and manager's compensation scheme from fixed wages ( $B = 0, b = 0$ ) to sufficiently high powered performance pay ( $B \geq \bar{B}, b \geq \bar{b}$ ) increases average productivity. The effect on the dispersion of productivity depends on the net effect of targeting by the manager, which is non-negative, and the effect of the selection by the COO, which is ambiguous. The targeting effect prevails and dispersion increases when the complementarity between the manager's and the workers' effort is sufficiently strong.*

The first part of the result follows immediately from the fact that both the manager and the COO change their behavior in ways that increase average productivity when they are given performance pay. The COO increases productivity by choosing more able workers and the manager increases productivity by exerting more effort and targeting the more able worker.

The second part of the result is less obvious. As the manager targets the most able worker, dispersion increases. The COO's actions can either reinforce or offset this effect on the dispersion depending on the distribution of workers' ability. In particular, if the selection effect reduces dispersion, the net effect depends on the balance between the two factors. The positive targeting effect prevails when the complementarity between the manager and worker's effort is sufficiently strong.

The framework highlights the various economic forces at play when managerial incentives become tied to workers' performance. Providing incentives tied to average productivity does indeed lead to higher average productivity but the prediction on the dispersion of productivity and hence earnings inequality is ambiguous. Other things equal, if workers are sufficiently heterogeneous so managers target only the most able, managerial incentives exacerbate the natural productivity differences among workers and dispersion increases. On the other hand, other things equal, if the COO cream-skims only the most able workers, dispersion may fall. We later present evidence from

our setting, on which of the targeting and selection effects prevails overall, the relative importance of each, and the heterogeneous effects across workers.

### 2.3 The Design of the Experiment

Table 1 shows the design of our experiment. At the start of the 2003 season, workers were paid piece rates, and the COO and managers were paid a fixed wage. In the experiment we exogenously changed the compensation schemes of the COO and managers. Midway through the 2003 season, we added a performance bonus to the same level of fixed wages. The experiment left the structure of the compensation scheme of bottom-tier workers unchanged – workers were paid piece rates throughout the 2003 season.<sup>12</sup>

The COO and managers did not know that they were taking part in an experiment and that the data would be used for scientific research. As such, our experiment is a natural field experiment according to the taxonomy developed by Harrison and List (2004). The COO and managers were aware that productivity data were recorded and kept by the owner, and that the data would be analyzed to improve the firms' efficiency.

The bonus payment was awarded on field  $f$  and day  $t$  if the average productivity of the bottom-tier workers on the field-day,  $\bar{Y}_{ft}$ , exceeded an exogenously fixed threshold,  $Y^*$ .<sup>13,14</sup> Conditional on reaching the threshold, the total monetary value of the bonus payment available to the managers on field-day  $ft$ ,  $B(\bar{Y}_{ft})$  increases at an increasing rate in the average field-day productivity. The bonus payment schedule is piecewise linear;

$$B(\bar{Y}_{ft}) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } Y^* > \bar{Y}_{ft} \\ a_1 + b_1\bar{Y}_{ft} & \text{if } Y^* + c_1 > \bar{Y}_{ft} \geq Y^* \\ a_2 + b_2\bar{Y}_{ft} & \text{if } Y^* + c_2 > \bar{Y}_{ft} \geq Y^* + c_1 \\ a_3 + b_3\bar{Y}_{ft} & \text{if } \bar{Y}_{ft} > Y^* + c_2 \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

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<sup>12</sup>The change in managerial incentives was announced to the COO and managers a week in advance of the actual change. During this week, we spent time going through numerical examples with management to make sure they understood how the performance bonus would be calculated. Workers were not informed of the change in managerial compensation, but given that managers and workers live on the farm, they are likely to have understood the change over time.

<sup>13</sup>We do not claim that this is the optimal managerial compensation scheme. However, these types of performance threshold are commonly observed in executive compensation contracts (Murphy 1999). Zhou and Swan (2003) develop a principal-agent model that makes precise the conditions under which such linear performance threshold contracts are optimal.

<sup>14</sup>To avoid multi-tasking concerns (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), the performance bonus was not awarded if the *quality* of fruit picking declined. Quality is measured in two ways. First is simply the quantity of damaged fruit. Second, fruit has to be classified as either suitable for market or supermarket. This classification is largely based on the size of each fruit. If the percentage of damaged or misclassified fruit rose by more than 2% of a pre-established norm, then the performance bonus was not awarded that field-day.



where  $a_i$ ,  $b_i$  and  $c_i$  are constants such that  $a_3 < a_2 < a_1$ ,  $b_3 > b_2 > b_1$ ,  $c_2 > c_1$ .<sup>15</sup> This reflects the fact that the marginal cost of supplying managerial effort is increasing. Each manager obtains an equal share of the bonus payment generated on the field-day. If there are  $M_{ft}$  managers present, then each obtains a payment of  $\frac{1}{M_{ft}}B(\bar{Y}_{ft})$ .

Each manager’s bonus payment depends only on the fields that she has worked on that day. In contrast, the COO effectively works on every field each day. The daily bonus payment that accrues to the COO for any given field is 1.5 times that which accrues to a manager on the field. The COO’s daily bonus payment is the sum of these payments across all fields operated that day and is therefore given by;

$$1.5 \sum_f \frac{1}{M_{ft}} B(\bar{Y}_{ft}).$$

The fraction of field-days on which the bonus was earned varies from 20 to 50% across managers. The *ex post* monetary value of the performance bonus to managers is substantial. Averaged across all field-days actually worked under the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by 7%. Conditional on obtaining the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by 25%. The true expected hourly earnings increase to managers of the performance bonus scheme lies between these two bounds.<sup>16</sup>

Our experimental design allows us to address two key concerns. First, in our context managers live and work on the farm and therefore each manager is aware of the compensation scheme offered to other managers. This raises the possibility of contamination effects if different managers were contemporaneously paid according to different compensation schemes. For example, those managers paid fixed wages throughout may become de-motivated, leading us to overestimate the causal effect of managerial performance pay on workers’ productivity. To prevent such contamination effects arising, we offer all managers the same pay scheme at any given point in time.

Second, in our context there are a small number of managers and their behavior is analyzed only for one season. Hence unobservable heterogeneity among managers is a more important determinant of productivity than unobservable time varying factors. Our design allows us to compare the same manager under the two schemes and we are thus able to control for time invariant sources of unobserved heterogeneity across managers such as their management style or motivational skills.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>The parameters  $a_i$ ,  $b_i$ , and  $c_i$  are set such that  $B(\bar{Y}_{ft})$  is a continuous and convex function. The actual values of  $a_i$ ,  $b_i$ ,  $c_i$ , and  $Y^*$  cannot be provided due to confidentiality reasons. We later provide details on the fraction of field-days on which the performance bonus was achieved.

<sup>16</sup>Given that managers are from Eastern Europe, their base pay is 20% higher than the UK minimum wage, and that most individuals save earnings to spend later in their home country, these increases in hourly earnings translate into large increases in real income. As of January 2003, gross monthly earnings at the UK minimum wage (€1105) are 5 times as high as at the minimum wage in Poland (€201), where 40% of managers come from, and almost 20 times higher than in Bulgaria (€56), where 29% of managers come from.

<sup>17</sup>The alternative design where one gives the treatment to a random group of managers would, with few managers,

## 3 Data and Descriptive Evidence

### 3.1 The Data

We exploit the firm’s personnel records which contain information on each worker’s productivity for each field-day they pick fruit. Productivity is defined as kilograms of fruit picked per hour and is electronically recorded with little measurement error. Personnel records also allow us to identify all the workers and managers present each field-day.

Throughout, we analyze data on the main fruit type grown on the farm, and focus on the main site on the farm during the peak picking season from May 1st until August 31st.<sup>18</sup> To compare the effects of managerial incentives on the same pool of workers, we restrict the sample to workers that were available for work at least three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentives. Similarly, we restrict the sample to fields that were operated for at least one week either side of the change in managerial incentives to compare the effects of managerial incentives within the same set of fields. The final sample contains 247 field-days and 9897 worker-field-day observations. This covers 13 fields, one COO, 10 managers, 197 workers, and 95 days. As part of our experimental design, the change in managerial incentives occurs midway through the peak season so that there are 44 days in the pre-bonus period and 51 days in the post-bonus period.

### 3.2 Data Description

The top panel of Figure 1 shows the time series for worker productivity, averaged over all workers each day, for the 2003 picking season. Average productivity was somewhat declining in the pre-bonus period, rose after the introduction of performance bonuses, and remained at this higher level throughout the remainder of the season.

Identification of any causal effect of the change in managerial incentives on productivity is confounded if there is any natural time trend in productivity. To begin to address such concerns, the lower panel of Figure 1 shows the comparable time series for the 2004 season, when managers and the COO were paid the same level of fixed wages throughout and no performance bonus scheme was in place.<sup>19</sup> In 2004 aggregate productivity again declines in the first half of the season and then remains at the same level throughout the second half of the season.<sup>20</sup>

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be unlikely to yield observationally equivalent groups of treated and untreated managers.

<sup>18</sup>Fields are located on two sites on the farm, of which we only use the largest for the analysis as fruit in the smaller site began to ripen only after the introduction of the performance bonus scheme.

<sup>19</sup>We were only able to present our findings on the causal effect of the performance bonus to the farm management shortly before the beginning of the 2004 season. Due to technical constraints, at that point they could not adjust their personnel practices to incorporate performance bonus calculations. Given the success of the scheme however, the farm has implemented a performance bonus scheme in 2005.

<sup>20</sup>Both time series in Figure 1 average the productivity of workers in different fields. Hence these aggregate series are in part driven by changes in the composition of fields over time. This composition effect explains the downward

Table 2 provides descriptive evidence on worker level productivity in 2003 and 2004. Column 1 shows that on average, workers' productivity in the first half of 2003 when managers are paid fixed wages is 8.37 kg/hr. The corresponding figure for 2004 is similar. Column 2 shows that in the second half of the 2003 season when managers are paid performance bonuses, productivity significantly rises by 25% to 10.4 kg/hr. In contrast, in the second half of the 2004 season worker productivity remains almost unchanged.<sup>21</sup>

As discussed in Section 2, any causal effect of the change in managerial incentives on worker productivity in 2003 can potentially be ascribed to two mechanisms – a targeting effect and a selection effect. To begin to provide descriptive evidence on these mechanisms, we first note that in the second half of the 2003 season when managers are paid performance bonuses, only 130 out of the 197 workers continue to pick. The remaining 67 workers are 'fired' from picking and either allocated to non-picking tasks or left unemployed for some days. In contrast, at the corresponding time of the season in 2004, no workers are fired. All workers who pick in the first half of the season continue to do so in the second half of the season.

Columns 3 and 4 divide workers in the 2003 season into two groups: those who continue to pick after the introduction of managerial performance pay and those who are fired. We note that when managers are paid fixed wages the fired workers are less productive than the selected workers. This suggests management can identify the most productive workers, and it is these individuals that are selected to pick when managerial performance bonuses are introduced. Finally, comparing Columns 3 and 5 we see that among the selected workers, productivity increases by 22% from 8.52kg/hr to 10.4kg/hr when managerial performance bonuses are introduced. This suggests the increase in overall productivity shown in Columns 1 and 2, is not only driven by the selection of better workers, but also because the managerial effort towards those selected workers changes when performance bonuses are introduced.

To help shed light on whether managers target their effort differentially across selected workers, Table 2 then provides evidence on the between and within worker variation in productivity. In 2003, the variation in productivity both between and within workers significantly increases when performance bonuses are introduced. Workers become more dissimilar to each other in terms of their productivity over time, and the performance of a given worker over time also becomes more variable.

In contrast in 2004, the variation in productivity declines over time. The variation between

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trend in productivity in the first half of both seasons – the most productive fields are picked early in the season. Our empirical analysis controls for differences in the level of productivity across fields by including field fixed effects throughout.

<sup>21</sup>Farm management also provided us information on what they had expected productivity to be on a subset of fields each week of the 2003 season. These expectations were formed before the start of the 2003 season, and before they were aware of the design of the field experiment. Productivity was projected to be 9.06kg/hr in the pre-bonus period and 8.99kg/hr in the post-bonus period.

workers declines presumably because differences in picking experience become less relevant for differences in productivity later in the season. The variation in productivity within a worker might also decline because the productivity of a worker with more experience is less sensitive to daily shocks in field conditions.

To illustrate the effect of managerial incentives on the whole distribution of worker's productivity, Figure 2a shows the kernel density estimate of worker productivity by managerial incentive scheme. This is calculated for those workers that are selected to pick under both managerial incentive schemes, and is therefore purged of any selection effect. Two points are of note. First, in line with Table 2, among selected workers, average productivity increases. Second, the variance of productivity among selected workers increases both because some selected workers have lower productivity on average when their managers are paid performance bonuses, and others have on average higher productivity.

To highlight the effect of managerial incentives on the productivity of each worker, Figure 2b plots each worker's average productivity when managers are paid fixed wages, against average productivity when managers are paid performance bonuses. Each observation is weighted by the number of times the worker is selected to pick under the performance bonus and a larger bubble identifies a worker who is selected more often.

Two points are of note. First, Figure 2b shows the heterogeneous effects across workers – some workers have higher productivity with the change in managerial incentives, others have lower productivity. Second, those workers that experience an increase in their productivity (and so lie above the 45° line), are those workers that pick more frequently under the performance bonus. However, even among the selected workers, there remains considerable heterogeneity in the frequency with which they are selected to pick.

Table 3 provides further descriptives by managerial incentive scheme. The first panel shows that the increase in worker productivity is driven by workers picking the same quantity of fruit each field-day, but in less time. This is as expected given that fruit is planted some years in advance, so the total quantity of fruit available is exogenous to the current incentive scheme.

The Table also shows that worker's hourly earnings are left almost unchanged throughout the season. Empirically we therefore provide an estimate of the effect of managerial incentives on worker productivity holding constant workers' income. As productivity rises by 22%, then in order to minimize the wage bill subject to the same minimum wage constraint, the piece rate has to fall. Table 3 indeed confirms that the piece rate unconditionally falls by 23%. In the Appendix we present evidence that the magnitude of this fall is explained by the introduction of performance bonuses. Following the introduction of the bonus, the COO, over 9 days, revises his expectation of worker productivity and sets a lower piece rate thereafter. This provides evidence that the COO does not attempt to game the bonus scheme by increasing the piece rate above the level

that minimizes the wage bill. This is as expected given that the wage bill is easily observable by the owner of the firm.

It is important to stress that the increase in worker productivity is *not* due to an increase in the piece rate, as piece rates are actually lower after the introduction of the bonus. In the absence of large income effects, we therefore expect workers to exert less effort in the second half of the season, all else equal (Paarsch and Shearer 1999, Lazear 2000). Hence any estimated effect of performance bonuses on worker productivity, provides a *lower bound* on the causal effect of managerial performance bonuses holding constant the piece rate of workers.<sup>22</sup>

The final panel of Table 3 provides information on the number of workers and managers per field-day, and the ratio of the two. The number of workers declines by 29% after the introduction of performance incentives. As each worker’s productivity has risen and the quantity of fruit available to pick is unchanged, fewer workers are needed to perform the same task. The number of managers on the field-day declines in proportion to the number of workers so the ratio of the two is unchanged. Therefore each managers span of control remains at close to 20 workers, so that managers have to allocate their effort across the same number of workers within a field-day throughout the season.

## 4 Aggregate Effects on Workers’ Performance

### 4.1 Average Productivity

To begin with we investigate the effect of the change in managerial incentives on average field-day productivity, as this is the measure on which performance bonus payments are based. We estimate the following panel data specification;

$$y_{ft} = \lambda_f + \gamma B_t + \eta Z_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + \varepsilon_{ft}, \quad (8)$$

where  $y_{ft}$  is the log of average productivity of workers on field  $f$  on day  $t$ ,  $B_t$  is a dummy equal to one after the performance bonus is introduced, and zero otherwise. The  $\lambda_f$  are field fixed effects which capture permanent differences in the level of productivity across fields. The  $Z_{ft}$  are time-varying field characteristics measured in logs. These include the average picking experience

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<sup>22</sup>Given workers cannot choose the hours they pick for, they do not face a standard trade-off between leisure and income and so income targeting is unlikely to explain their behavior. We later exploit the delay in the change in the piece rate once performance bonuses are introduced to provide further evidence against the income targeting hypothesis. Other analyses of income targeting in different settings reach mixed conclusions. Camerer *et al* (1997) find that New York cab drivers work fewer hours when the observed daily wage is higher and interpret this as evidence in favour of income targeting. However, Farber (2004) presents evidence against income targeting by cab drivers.

of workers, and the field’s life cycle, defined as the  $n$ th day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. This captures the natural within-field trend in productivity as fields deplete over time. We also include a time trend to capture learning by farm management and aggregate trends in productivity.<sup>23</sup>  $S_{sft}$  is a dummy equal to one if manager  $s$  works on field  $f$  on day  $t$ , and zero otherwise, and  $M_{ft}$  is the set of managers that work on the field-day. We allow the error terms  $\varepsilon_{ft}$  to follow an AR(1) process, and given that the dependent variable is a mean, all observations are weighted by the number of workers on the field-day.<sup>24</sup>

The parameter of interest is the coefficient on the performance bonus dummy,  $\gamma$ . This captures in reduced form the effect of the change in managerial incentives on average worker productivity at the field-day level. More precisely, this measures a combination of two effects – (i) the change in managerial effort targeted towards selected workers; (ii) the effect of the COO selecting different workers into the workforce. We expect both effects to work in the same direction of increasing average productivity on the field-day.

The first two columns of Table 4 report OLS estimates of (8). Column 1 only controls for the bonus dummy. Productivity is significantly higher after performance bonuses are introduced. Column 2 shows this result is robust to conditioning on field fixed effects, workers’ picking experience, the field life cycle and a time trend.<sup>25</sup> The signs of the coefficients on these controls make intuitive sense. There are positive returns to picking experience, and productivity naturally declines later in a field’s life cycle. There is no aggregate trend in productivity at the farm level, which is consistent with the farm’s practice to stagger fields to ensure a constant yield throughout the peak season.

The estimates indicate that average productivity increases by 21% after the bonus is introduced. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in a field’s life cycle decreases productivity by 22%, and a one standard deviation increase in the average picking experience of workers increases productivity by 18%. This suggests the introduction of performance bonuses has an economically as well as statistically significant effect on average productivity.

Column 3 shows that the coefficients are very similar when the same specification is estimated allowing for field-specific AR(1) error terms. The specification in Column 4 controls for manager fixed effects. These can be separately identified from the field fixed effects because a given manager does not always work on the same field, and capture all time invariant sources of heterogeneity

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<sup>23</sup>As fields are operated on at different parts of the season, and not all workers pick each day, the effects of the field life cycle and workers’ picking experience can be separately identified from the effect of the time trend.

<sup>24</sup>Therefore  $\varepsilon_{ft} = \rho\varepsilon_{ft-1} + u_{ft}$  where  $u_{ft}$  is a classical disturbance term. We control for autocorrelation by estimating a Prais-Winsten regression. This estimator is consistent and performs well in short time series and trended data relative to other estimators (Doran and Griffiths 1983).

<sup>25</sup>To the extent that the COO selects more experienced workers after the introduction of the bonus, this effect is captured by the experience variable rather than the bonus dummy. In practice, by the time performance bonuses have been introduced, the marginal return to experience is low for most workers. Thus the estimated effect of the bonus is quantitatively similar regardless of whether we control for average workers’ experience.

across managers. We find that the magnitude and significance of the previous controls remain similar to those in Column 3. Moreover, the manager fixed effects are jointly significant at the 1% significance level suggesting that, as expected, the middle-tier of managers have significant effects on workers' productivity.

To provide more direct evidence that the behavior of managers changes with the introduction of performance bonuses, we next include a set of interactions between each manager's fixed effect and the performance bonus dummy and so estimate;<sup>26</sup>

$$y_{ft} = \lambda_f + \eta Z_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \varsigma_s (B_t \times S_{sft}) + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + \varepsilon_{ft}. \quad (9)$$

The interaction terms are positive and jointly significant. Weighting each interaction term by the number of field-days manager  $s$  works under the performance bonus, we find the weighted average effect of managers' fixed effects on the log of workers' average productivity is .261, and is significantly different from zero at the 2% significance level. This suggests managers change behavior with the introduction of the performance bonus and this leads to a significant increase in average productivity.

The final specification explores whether the baseline results are robust to controlling for the number of days the bonus has been in place for, or equivalently, allowing the bonus dummy to be interacted with the time trend. The result in Column 5 shows the time trend does not vary over the two halves of the season. This indicates the effect of the bonus is long lasting, namely the bonus dummy is not just picking up a short run change in behavior.<sup>27</sup>

We also performed a series of further robustness checks. First, the baseline results in Column 4 are also robust to alternative functional forms such as allowing the controls to enter in levels rather than logs, and allowing for a non-linear effect of the field life cycle. Second, the baseline results are robust to controlling for other time varying variables such as meteorological conditions and the average experience of managers on the field-day. Third, the results are robust to controlling for changes in the composition of non-picking tasks over time by restricting the sample to workers who are exclusively assigned to picking tasks on a given day.

A final concern is that the increase in average productivity may be due solely to workers changing their behavior rather than managers reacting to the change in incentives. For example this may be the case if workers have an income target and work harder because, following the introduction of the performance bonus, the piece rate falls. To address this concern we exploit the fact that for the first 9 days in the post-bonus period, corresponding to 20% of days in the

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<sup>26</sup>The performance bonus dummy is itself dropped so the interaction term can be defined for every manager.

<sup>27</sup>This specification also helps rule out that the performance bonus dummy is picking up workers' and managers' career concerns that lead them to exert more effort later in the season, when they might believe that good performance has greater influence over them being rehired the following season.

post-bonus sample, the piece rate was not significantly different from that under the fixed wage regime. If our findings were due to income targeting, we should find no effect of the introduction of the bonus for the first 9 days when the piece rate remains at its pre-bonus level. However estimates of our baseline specification when we restrict the post-bonus sample to the first 9 days, shows the magnitude of the performance bonus on average productivity is comparable to that in the sample as a whole.

## 4.2 The Dispersion of Productivity

We now analyze the effect of the introduction of managerial performance bonuses on the dispersion of workers' productivity within a field-day. We estimate;

$$cv_{ft} = \lambda_f + \gamma B_t + \eta Z_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + u_{ift}, \quad (10)$$

where  $cv_{ft}$  is the log of the coefficient of variation of productivity of workers on field  $f$  on day  $t$ . To account for workers becoming more heterogenous to each other in their experience over time, we control for the log of the coefficient of variation of worker's picking experience on the field-day. Similarly, the variation in fruit available between rows within a field may increase over time so we control for the log of the field life cycle. Table 5 presents estimates of (10) following a similar set of specifications as in Table 4.

The parameter of interest is the coefficient on the performance bonus dummy,  $\gamma$ . This captures in reduced form the effect of the change in managerial incentives on the dispersion in worker productivity at the field-day level. More precisely, this measures a combination of two effects – (i) for a given set of selected workers, managers have incentives to differentially target their effort across workers which increases the dispersion in productivity; (ii) different workers are initially selected by the COO to pick fruit, which has an ambiguous effect on the dispersion in productivity.

The baseline result is that the introduction of performance bonuses increased the dispersion of productivity on the field-day by 38% other things equal (Column 4). This result is robust to – (i) controlling for the coefficient of variation of experience of managers on the field-day; (ii) controlling for other time varying variables such as meteorological conditions; (iii) alternative functional forms that allow the controls to enter in levels, and allowing for a non-linear effect of the field life cycle; (iv) restricting the sample to workers who are exclusively assigned to picking tasks on a given day.

We note that in Column 4 the manager fixed effects are jointly significant at the 1% significance level suggesting that, as expected, the middle-tier of managers have significant effects on the dispersion of productivity. To provide more direct evidence that the behavior of managers changes with the introduction of performance bonuses, we next include a set of interactions between each manager's fixed effect and the performance bonus dummy and so estimate a specification analogous



to (9). The interaction terms are positive and jointly significant. Weighting each interaction term by the number of field-days manager  $s$  works under the performance bonus, we find the weighted average effect of managers' fixed effects on the log of workers' coefficient of variation of productivity is .375, and is significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. This suggests managers change behavior with the introduction of the performance bonus and this significantly increases the dispersion of worker's productivity.

These results have important implications for the inequality of earnings among workers. In particular, the earnings inequality among workers significantly increases moving from a regime in which their managers are paid fixed wages to when their managers are paid performance bonuses. Figure 3 shows how the daily earnings inequality across workers – as measured by the interquartile range of daily earnings – increases after the introduction of managerial performance bonuses.<sup>28</sup>

### 4.3 Further Evidence of a Causal Effect of Managerial Incentives

The experimental design is such that the change in managerial incentives occurs simultaneously for all managers in all fields. Hence identification of a causal effect of this change on productivity arises from a comparison within a field over time. The estimated effect is then biased upward to the extent that it captures factors that cause productivity to rise through the season regardless of the change in incentive schemes and that are not captured by the observable time varying controls such as the farm level trend, workers' experience, or the field life cycle. We address this concern using two different strategies.

First, we augment the sample by adding field-day observations from the same farm in 2004 when managers were paid the same level of fixed wages throughout. This counterfactual allows us to identify the causal effect of managerial incentives on productivity under the assumption that productivity would have been the same in 2003 and 2004, had managerial incentives remained unchanged in 2003.

We construct the sample of field-days for the 2004 season in the same way as for the 2003 data. In particular, we restrict the 2004 sample to be based on fields that were operated at least a week either side of June 27th – the date on which managerial incentives changed in 2003, and we restrict the sample to be based on workers that were available for work at least three weeks either side of June 27th. The final 2004 sample then contains 123 field-days, 55 of which occur before

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<sup>28</sup>Note also that there are some days when performance bonuses are in place where earnings inequality is lower than when managers are paid fixed wages. This is due to the fact that, as discussed in Section 6, the most productive workers pick much more frequently post-bonus. On days in which few pickers are needed only the most able workers are present, which lowers earnings inequality among employed workers.

June 27th. We stack the 2003 and 2004 field-day level data and estimate the following regression;

$$y_{ft} = \lambda_f + \sum_{\tau=1}^2 \alpha_{\tau} d_t^{\tau} + \sum_{\tau=1}^2 \gamma_{\tau} P_t d_t^{\tau} + \eta Z_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + \varepsilon_{ft}, \quad (11)$$

where  $y_{ft}$  is the log of average productivity of workers on field  $f$  on day  $t$ ,  $\tau \in \{1, 2\}$  identifies the season and  $d_t^1 = 1$  for the 2003 season and 0 otherwise, while  $d_t^2 = 1$  for the 2004 season and 0 otherwise.  $P_t = B_t$  for the 2003 season, and is a placebo for the 2004 season. Namely,  $P_t$  is equal to one after June 27th 2004, that is when performance bonuses were introduced in 2003, and zero otherwise. Thus  $\gamma_1$  measures the effect of managerial performance bonuses in 2003 on average productivity and  $\gamma_2$  measures the effect of the placebo managerial performance bonus in 2004. As in the earlier specification we include field fixed effects  $\lambda_f$ , and control for time varying factors such as workers' picking experience, the field life cycle, and a farm level time trend, in  $Z_{ft}$ .<sup>29</sup> Permanent productivity differences across years are captured in the year fixed effects  $\alpha_{\tau}$ .

The results are presented in Table 6. The difference-in-difference estimates in Column 1 indicate that in 2003 the introduction of performance bonuses for managers significantly increases average productivity. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the baseline specification in Column 4 of Table 4. In contrast, the placebo bonus dummy for the 2004 season has no effect on productivity, suggesting there is no natural increase in productivity on June 27th each year.

The second strategy exploits a feature of the performance bonus scheme that is orthogonal to time and makes the incentives faced by managers stronger on some days and weaker on others. The nominal productivity threshold,  $Y^*$ , is fixed at the start of the season and is the same across all fields. Given that the fruit in fields deplete with time, the probability of exceeding the threshold on a field declines later in its life cycle. Managerial incentives are therefore weaker later in the field's life cycle, all else equal. To explore this hypothesis we use the stacked 2003 and 2004 data to estimate the following specification;

$$y_{ft} = \lambda_f + \sum_{\tau=1}^2 \alpha_{\tau} d_t^{\tau} + \sum_{\tau=1}^2 \gamma_{\tau} P_t d_t^{\tau} + \eta L_{ft} + \sum_{\tau=1}^2 \pi_{\tau} P_t d_t^{\tau} L_{ft} + \eta Z'_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + \varepsilon_{ft}, \quad (12)$$

where  $L_{ft}$  is the field life cycle,  $P_t d_t^{\tau} L_{ft}$  is an interaction between the performance dummy the field life cycle for season  $\tau$ , and  $Z'_{ft}$  denotes the other time varying controls.

The result in Column 2 shows the marginal effect of the performance bonus is significantly lower when a field is later in its life cycle in the 2003 season. Importantly, in 2004 there is neither

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<sup>29</sup>While some of the fields observed in 2004 are the same as those in 2003 we allow the fixed effect to be different to capture the fact that the plants are at a different stage of their life in the two years. The same managers are not present in both seasons. We restrict the coefficients on the time varying variables to be the same across seasons. Allowing these to also vary by year is equivalent to running each field-day regression by year. The results are qualitatively unchanged in this case.

a direct effect of the placebo performance bonus on average productivity, nor does the effect of the placebo bonus vary with the field life cycle.

Figure 4 plots the implied marginal effect of the bonus scheme on the log of average productivity, by the field life cycle, from specification (12). The magnitude of the estimated coefficients imply that if the performance bonus were introduced in a field at the start of its life cycle when the performance bonus is most likely to be obtained, average workers' productivity would increase by close to 60%. By the end of the field life cycle, when the performance bonus is unlikely to be obtained, the implied productivity is no different to that when managers are paid fixed wages.<sup>30</sup>

We then repeat the analysis when the dependent variable is the coefficient of variation of workers' productivity on the field-day, and the time varying controls are defined accordingly. The difference-in-difference estimates in Column 3 show that in 2003 the introduction of performance bonuses for managers significantly increases the coefficient of variation of productivity. The magnitude of the effect is slightly larger than in the baseline specification in Column 4 of Table 5. The placebo bonus dummy for the 2004 season is significant and negative, which in line with the descriptive evidence in Table 2, suggests the dispersion in productivity usually declines over time.

In Column 4 we see that the effect of the performance bonus on the dispersion of productivity does not vary with the life cycle in 2003. In contrast in 2004, the effect of the placebo bonus significantly falls with the field life cycle. One interpretation of this pattern of coefficients is that later in a field's life cycle, there is less variation in the quantities of fruit across rows. When managers are paid fixed wages, workers are allocated to rows independently of their ability. Hence any dispersion in workers' productivity reflects underlying heterogeneity in workers' ability and declines later in the field life cycle. In contrast when managers are paid performance bonuses they have incentives to target their efforts towards more able workers, and this offsets the decline in the dispersion of productivity across workers that would otherwise naturally occur.

We have so far defined the placebo bonus dummy  $P_t$  in terms of the *date* on which, in the 2003 season, the change in managerial incentives occurred. This date of June 27th corresponds to the 44th day of the picking season in 2003. One concern is that there are natural changes in productivity around the 44th day of picking, rather than around June 27th *per se*. This is of concern because the picking season starts at a later date in 2004 than in 2003.

To address this concern we define an alternative placebo bonus dummy that is equal to one after the 44th day of the 2004 season and zero otherwise. This placebo bonus dummy is therefore defined in terms of the *days* of picking under the fixed wage regime rather than the date on which managerial incentives were changed in 2003. Columns 5 to 8 repeat the earlier analysis using

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<sup>30</sup>The fact that productivity is no lower than under fixed wages by the end of the field life cycle suggests there are no discouragement effects of performance bonuses. This result also suggests there is no intertemporal substitution of managerial effort over time, from field-days when the threshold level of productivity is unattainable to field-days when it is.

this alternative definition of the placebo bonus dummy. For both the average and dispersion of workers' productivity, the results are very similar to those presented earlier.

Taken together, the results in Table 6 add weight to a causal interpretation of the effect of managerial performance bonuses on workers' productivity. If the performance bonus dummy were spuriously capturing other time varying factors, the effect of the placebo bonus dummy should be similar in the 2004 season, and the difference-in-difference effect of the bonus dummy should not vary with the strength of managerial incentives as captured by the field life cycle.

## 5 Targeting Effects

We now use individual level data to break down the aggregate effects of managerial performance bonuses into those arising through two separate channels – (i) a targeting effect that stems from managers having incentives to allocate their effort across workers differently; (ii) a selection effect that stems from the COO selecting different workers into the workplace. In this Section we provide evidence on the targeting effect. Section 6 investigates the selection effect.

The targeting effect is identified from a comparison of the same worker's productivity under both managerial incentive schemes. We therefore restrict attention to those workers that pick when managers are paid a fixed wage and continue to be selected to pick under the managerial performance regime. We first estimate a quantile regression to identify the heterogeneous effects of managerial performance bonuses across workers. We then estimate a fixed effects regression to identify the effects of performance bonuses on the same worker and to shed light on which observable worker characteristics explain the increased between worker variation in productivity under managerial performance bonuses.

### 5.1 Quantile Regression Estimates

Theory suggests managers have greater incentives to target their effort towards high ability workers when they are paid performance bonuses tied to the average productivity of the workers they manage, than when they are paid a fixed wage. Hence the effect of managerial performance bonuses on worker's productivity will differ at different points of the distribution of workers' productivity conditional on observables.

The quantile regression (QR) method developed in Koenker and Bassett (1978) provides a general approach to characterizing the effect of the performance bonus on different percentiles of the conditional distribution of worker productivity. The key advantages of this approach are that it allows us to estimate changes in the shape and spread of the conditional distribution of productivity, not just the change in the mean as estimated by OLS. In addition the QR method

imposes no distributional assumptions on the error term, which in our context relates to the unobservable distribution of ability.<sup>31</sup>

We use QR to estimate the following conditional distribution of the log of productivity of worker  $i$  on field  $f$  on day  $t$ ,  $y_{ift}$ , at each quantile  $\theta \in [0, 1]$ ;

$$Quant_{\theta}(y_{ift}|\cdot) = \gamma_{\theta}B_t + \phi_{\theta f}\lambda_f + \delta_{\theta}X_{ift} + \eta_{\theta}Z_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_{\theta s}S_{sft}, \quad (13)$$

where  $B_t$  is a dummy equal to one after the performance bonus is introduced, and zero otherwise,  $\lambda_f$  is a dummy equal to one for field  $f$ , and zero otherwise,  $X_{ift}$  is the log of worker  $i$ 's picking experience, and  $Z_{ft}$  includes the log of the field life cycle, and a farm level time trend, and  $S_{sft}$  is a fixed effect for manager  $s$ . The error terms are clustered by field-day because workers on the same field-day face similar field conditions and hence are likely to be subject to common productivity shocks. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications are calculated throughout.

The parameter of interest,  $\gamma_{\theta}$ , measures the effect of the managerial performance bonus at the  $\theta$ th conditional quantile of log worker productivity. Figure 5a graphs estimates of  $\gamma_{\theta}$  and the associated 95% confidence interval at each quantile. This shows the heterogeneous effects of the performance bonus on worker productivity – the effect is negative at the lowest conditional quantiles, and positive and significant for those above the 60th conditional quantile. In line with the descriptive evidence on the unconditional distribution of workers' productivity in Figure 2a, the QR estimates suggest the conditional distribution of productivity becomes more dispersed under managerial performance bonuses.

Table 7 presents coefficients and estimated standard errors at specific quantiles for the specification in (13). The pattern of coefficients on the other controls are of note. While the returns to picking experience are similar across quantiles, the effect of the field life cycle varies across quantiles. Although worker productivity declines in fields later in their life cycle, this effect is significantly smaller (in absolute value) for workers at higher quantiles of the conditional distribution of productivity. Consistent with the earlier evidence, if managerial effort is targeted towards high ability workers under performance bonuses, these workers will be less effected by the natural decline in productivity within a field over time.

One possible concern with this interpretation is that the conditional distribution of productivity may naturally become more dispersed over time. For instance this may be because some pickers quickly move up the learning curve and others become bored. The evidence from the control season in 2004 however suggests the opposite. The descriptive evidence in Table 2 shows that in 2004 the dispersion of worker productivity is lower in the second half of the season. In addition,

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<sup>31</sup>The QR approach is particularly applicable to our context because the dependent variable, workers productivity, is electronically recorded and measured with little or no error.

estimating the quantile regression specification (13) in this control season, we find the effect of the placebo bonus dummy to be positive and significant for all quantiles below the 40th, zero for intermediate quantiles, and negative and significant for the very highest quantiles. This finding implies that in the absence of a change in managerial incentives, the conditional distribution of productivity naturally becomes less dispersed over time.

## 5.2 Fixed Effect Estimates

While the QR results provide evidence of the heterogenous effects of managerial performance bonuses on worker productivity, they do not pin down whether a given worker’s productivity is systematically higher or lower when their manager is paid a performance bonus relative to when she is paid a fixed wage. To provide such evidence on the effects of managerial incentives on the productivity of the *same* worker, we present fixed effects estimates. We first estimate the following worker-field-day specification for the 130 selected workers that pick under both managerial incentive schemes;

$$y_{ift} = \sum_{i=1}^{130} (\rho_i + \phi_i B_i) D_i + \lambda_f + \delta X_{ift} + \eta Z_{ft} + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + u_{ift}, \quad (14)$$

where  $y_{ift}$  is the log of productivity of worker  $i$  on field  $f$  on day  $t$ ,  $D_i$  is a dummy equal to one for worker  $i$ , and zero otherwise, and the other variables are as previously defined. We estimate (14) using OLS, where disturbance terms are clustered by field-day because workers on the same field-day are likely to face common productivity shocks.<sup>32</sup>

$\hat{\rho}_i$  is an estimate of worker  $i$ ’s expected productivity when her managers are paid a fixed wage, and  $(\hat{\rho}_i + \hat{\phi}_i)$  is her expected productivity when her managers are paid performance bonuses. To re-scale these estimates in terms of kilograms per hour, Figure 5b then plots the exponent of  $\hat{\rho}_i$  against the exponent of  $(\hat{\rho}_i + \hat{\phi}_i)$  for each selected worker. Each worker’s observation is weighted by the number of field-days that she is selected to pick under the performance bonus scheme. The figure thus provides evidence on the effect on the same worker of the change in a managerial incentive scheme, conditional on observable determinants of productivity.

Figure 5b reiterates the message of the earlier descriptive evidence on unconditional worker productivity by managerial incentive scheme (Figure 2b). In particular we see that conditional on observable determinants of worker productivity – (i) there are heterogeneous effects of managerial incentives across workers – some workers have systematically higher productivity with the change in managerial incentives, others have systematically lower productivity; (ii) the more productive

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<sup>32</sup>Clustering at the worker or worker-managerial incentive scheme level yields considerably smaller standard errors. The fixed effects alone explain around 38% of the variation in productivity, suggesting there is considerable heterogeneity in the underlying ability of workers.

workers under the fixed wage regime always have higher productivity under the performance bonus scheme; (iii) those workers that experience an increase in their productivity are selected to pick most frequently under the performance bonus.<sup>33</sup>

These heterogeneous effects are also partly explained by the fall in the piece rate that follows from the rise in average productivity. More precisely, productivity falls for some workers because – (i) less managerial effort is targeted towards them so for example, they are allocated worse quality rows; (ii) the piece rate has fallen and they would prefer to exert less effort all else equal. In contrast, the productivity of others workers increases because managerial effort is targeted towards them and despite the fact that the piece rate has fallen. These results highlight that the increase in earnings inequality documented earlier, even among selected workers, arises because some of them significantly increase their productivity under managerial performance bonuses while others experience a significant decrease in their productivity.

Further analysis shows that the heterogeneous productivity responses across workers are partially explained by observed workers characteristics. We find that the introduction of managerial incentives increases the productivity of workers who – (i) are men; (ii) report playing sports; (iii) report monetary earnings as one of the main reasons for coming to the farm.<sup>34</sup> These factors may reasonably proxy physical strength, motivation or ability. The estimates imply a worker with all these characteristics has 18% higher productivity under the performance bonus compared to himself pre-bonus. A worker with none of these characteristics has 11% lower productivity under the bonus compared to herself pre-bonus.

## 6 Selection Effects

### 6.1 Descriptive Evidence

Theory predicts that changing the COO’s compensation scheme from fixed wages to sufficiently high powered performance pay will make him change his selection strategy in favor of the most able workers as this increases average productivity. The descriptive evidence in Table 2 and the estimated effects on the productivity of individual workers in Figure 5b are both indicative of selection effects as they highlight that some workers are fired while more productive workers are

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<sup>33</sup>Using  $\hat{\rho}_i$  as a measure of a worker’s ability, we find that groups of workers on the field-day were equally heterogeneous before and after the change in managerial incentives. Hence there is no evidence the COO sorts workers differently by ability into fields post-bonus. This is as expected given the considerable variation in the quantity of fruit available across rows within a field.

<sup>34</sup>This information was obtained from a survey we administered to workers and managers before the performance bonus was introduced. The ‘play sports’ dummy is defined to be one if the worker reports playing sports at least once a month, and zero otherwise. The ‘came for earnings’ dummy is defined to be one if the worker reports one reason why they came to the farm is because the pay is good, and zero otherwise. Other options were ‘to travel and meet new people’, ‘to learn English’, and ‘it is part of my university course’.

selected to pick more often after the change in managerial pay. This section presents evidence on the selection mechanism and sheds light on the relative importance of the selection and targeting effects of managerial incentives on the rise in average productivity.

To analyze the selection choices of the COO, we now consider the sample of all workers that are available to pick fruit. This is the relevant pool of workers over which the COO makes his selection decision.<sup>35</sup> Each day the COO selects which workers pick fruit, which workers perform other tasks such as weeding or planting, and which workers are unemployed for the day. As the introduction of the managerial bonus scheme increases workers' productivity, fewer workers are needed to pick the same quantity of fruit. Indeed as shown earlier in Tables 2 and 3, 67 workers are fired from picking tasks and the average number of workers on a field-day is 29% lower after the introduction of managerial incentives. For the average worker, the probability of being assigned to a picking task on any given day falls from 44% to 25%.

Figure 6 shows the distribution of the number of field-days workers are selected to pick fruit by managerial incentive scheme, conditional on being chosen at least once under both schemes. The histograms highlight that even among those workers that still pick at least once under performance bonuses, there is a wide dispersion in the number of field-days workers are selected to pick fruit post-bonus. We divide selected workers into two groups – we define selected-in workers as those in the top quartile of the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. On average, workers in this group pick on 100 field-days after the introduction of the bonus. Selected-out workers are defined to be those workers in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. The average worker in this category picks on 18 field-days post bonus. Moreover, a further 67 out of the 197 workers in our sample are fired, namely they are *never* selected to pick after the introduction of the bonus scheme.

Table 8 shows that, as expected, whether a worker falls in the selected-in, selected-out or fired category is correlated to her productivity before the introduction of managerial incentives. Panel A shows there is a clear ranking in terms of productivity across different groups of workers – those who were most productive when managers were paid fixed wages are selected to pick more frequently when managers are paid performance bonuses. Workers with intermediate productivity levels are only selected to pick occasionally post-bonus, and those workers with the lowest productivity pre-bonus are fired from picking tasks altogether.

Panel B of Table 8 shows unemployment rates by worker type and managerial incentive scheme. Under fixed wages, there is a clear ranking of unemployment rates across the three types of worker. When performance bonuses are introduced, unemployment rates rise for all workers, but the increase is higher for workers who are fired and those who are selected out, indicating that

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<sup>35</sup>Recall that to present evidence on the targeting effect, we previously considered those workers that were available for picking three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentive schemes.



these workers are not simply reallocated to other non-picking tasks. In contrast, no workers are fired in the 2004 picking season. This is as expected given there is no rise in productivity over the two halves of the season in 2004.

An important consequence of these changes in the selection of workers into work and unemployment is that the differential rise in unemployment increases the earnings inequality across workers over the season. This selection effect exacerbates the increase in earnings inequality documented earlier, that arises because the effects of managerial incentives on individual worker productivity are very heterogeneous to begin with.

## 6.2 Conditional Logit Estimates

We shed light on the effect of managerial performance pay on the selection of workers into employment while controlling for farm level variables that affect the probability of being hired independently of the incentive scheme in place. Importantly, we are able to disentangle the effect of managerial performance pay from changes in the supply and the demand of labor. We measure labor supply using personnel records on the number of workers available for hire on the farm on any given day. We measure the demand for labor using the total daily fruit yield on each site on the farm. The total yield is orthogonal to the incentive scheme as it is determined by planting decisions taken one or two years earlier. Fields are located on two sites, of which we use the largest for the analysis as fruit in the smaller site begins to ripen only after the introduction of the performance bonus scheme. Since both sites hire workers from the same pool, we control for yields in each site separately.

We estimate the following conditional logit model, where observations are grouped by worker;

$$\Pr(p_{it} = 1) = \Lambda(B_t, X_t^D, X_t^S, X_{it}). \quad (15)$$

$p_{it}$  equals one if worker  $i$  is selected by the COO to pick on day  $t$  on the main site, and is zero otherwise.  $X_t^D$  and  $X_t^S$  proxy the demand and supply of labor on day  $t$ . All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can be interpreted as an increase of one standard deviation. We report odds ratios throughout, and standard errors are calculated using the delta method.

Column 1 of Table 9 shows that, other things equal, workers are significantly less likely to be selected into the workforce after the introduction of the performance bonus – the odds ratio post-bonus is 77% of the ratio pre-bonus. The other coefficients show that, as expected, workers are more likely to work on days in which the fields on the main site bears more fruit and on days in which they face less competition from other workers. The estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in yield more than doubles the odds of being selected, whereas one standard

deviation increase in the stock of available workers reduces the odds of working to less than a half.

Conditional on not being selected to pick on the main site on a given day, a worker can either be assigned to other tasks on the main site, to work on the other site, or be left unemployed for the day. Column 3 shows that the introduction of the bonus scheme significantly raises the probability of being unemployed. In particular, when the bonus scheme is in place the odds of being unemployed on any given day rise by a quarter. Reasonably, the probability of being unemployed is lower when yields are higher and when the stock of available workers is lower.

The results in Table 9 show that conditional on time varying factors, the average worker is less likely to be selected into picking and more likely to be left unemployed following the introduction of the managerial bonus scheme. Section 5 showed that, conditional on being selected to pick, the productivity of some workers raises while the productivity of others falls after the introduction of the managerial bonus scheme. Next, we analyze whether these two effects reinforce each other, namely whether workers who experience the largest increase in productivity are also more likely to be selected into picking.

To do so we use a linear probability model and estimate the following specification;

$$p_{it} = \sum_{i=1}^{130} (\psi_i + \omega_i B_t) D_i + \delta X_t^D + \eta X_t^S + u_{it}, \quad (16)$$

where  $p_{it}$ ,  $X_t^D$  and  $X_t^S$  are as defined before, and  $D_i$  is a dummy equal to one for worker  $i$ , and zero otherwise.<sup>36</sup>  $\widehat{\psi}_i$  is an estimate of worker  $i$ 's probability to be selected to pick when her managers are paid a fixed wage, and  $(\widehat{\psi}_i + \widehat{\omega}_i)$  is her probability to be selected when her managers are paid performance bonuses.

Figure 7a then plots  $\widehat{\omega}_i$  – the change in probability of worker  $i$  to be selected into picking with the introduction of performance bonuses for managers, against  $\widehat{\phi}_i$  from the fixed effects regression of worker's productivity (14) – worker  $i$ 's change in log productivity when performance bonuses are introduced. The line of best fit slopes upward, indicating that workers who experience the largest increase in productivity also have the greatest increase in the likelihood to be selected into employment, conditional on all other determinants of productivity and selection.

To assess whether workers who are less likely to be selected into picking are reallocated to other tasks or left unemployed, Figure 7b presents evidence on the relationship between the change in the probability of being unemployment and the change in the probability of being selected into picking. We estimate a linear probability model analogous to (16) where  $p_{it}$  is redefined to be equal to one if worker  $i$  is unemployed on day  $t$ , and zero if worker  $i$  is assigned to a non-picking task. Figure 7b plots the change in the probability of worker  $i$  being unemployed against the

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<sup>36</sup>The mean of the dependent variable is close to one half and so the LPM does not predict any probabilities outside the [0,1] interval.

change in the probability of worker  $i$  being selected into picking, moving from fixed wages to managerial performance bonuses. The relationship is negative, suggesting workers who are less likely to be selected to pick after the introduction of the bonus scheme are also more likely to be left unemployed.

Figures 7a and 7b indicate that the introduction of managerial performance bonuses has heterogeneous effects on different workers' probability to be selected into picking and on their probability of being left unemployed. The analysis also illustrates that the targeting and selection effects reinforce each other. Workers who experience a greater increase in their productivity also experience the greatest increase in the likelihood of being selected to pick fruit, and the greatest decrease in the likelihood of being left unemployed for the day.

### 6.3 The Relative Importance of the Targeting and Selection Effects

In our setting, the introduction of managerial performance pay increases productivity both because the productivity of the most able workers increases and because the most able workers contribute to the average more often. These two effects reinforce each other, as the workers who experience the highest rise in productivity are also more likely to be selected in.<sup>37</sup>

To understand the relative importance of the selection and targeting effects on average productivity, we conduct two thought experiments. In each case we compute the increase in productivity had the selection process remained unchanged over the season. Namely, the increase in productivity had each worker been chosen with the same probability after the bonus as she was before the bonus. In both cases we assume the productivity of selected-in and selected-out workers would be the same as actually observed, as given in Table 8.<sup>38</sup>

For the first thought experiment we assume the productivity of fired workers would have remained *unchanged* after the introduction of the bonus scheme. Under this assumption, average productivity would have increased by 7.5% in the post-bonus period.

For the second thought experiment we assume the productivity of all fired workers would have increased in the same proportion as the average of the selected-in workers. Under this assumption, average productivity would have increased by 11.1% in the post-bonus period.

Given the unconditional increase in productivity is 25%, these thought experiments suggest that the observed increase in productivity is driven at least as much by the selection of more

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<sup>37</sup>There are too few managers in the data to say anything meaningful on the possible selection by the COO of 'better' managers post-bonus. Although fewer managers are needed on each field-day under the performance bonus (Table 3), managers continue to work each day. They are typically reassigned to fields either on the smaller site, or onto fields in the main site that are only operated post-bonus.

<sup>38</sup>We implicitly assume that there are no peer effects, namely the effect of the bonus would be the same regardless of the composition of the workforce, and that the effect of the bonus on each individual worker does not depend on how frequently they pick – namely that the best pickers would experience the same increase even if they were to pick less frequently post bonus.

productive workers – that is largely attributable to the behavior of the COO, as it is driven by increases in the productivity of the same workers – something that is largely attributable to the behavior of managers. This is consistent with a ‘magnification effect’ (Rosen 1982), so that the actions of individuals higher up in the firm hierarchy have a greater impact on firm performance than do the actions of individuals at lower tiers of the hierarchy.<sup>39</sup>

We perform similar thought experiments to assess the relative importance of targeting and selection effects in explaining the observed change in the dispersion of workers’ productivity. These reveal that the change in dispersion is nearly entirely due to the fact that managers target the most able workers after the introduction of performance pay. In other words, the coefficient of variation would have increased by the same amount had the selection remained unchanged. The reason is that, as shown in Table 8, the productivity of the marginal worker who is still employed after the bonus is more similar to the fired workers than to the most able workers. Namely, the distribution of ability across workers is such that even when the least able workers are fired, the marginal worker selected to pick is still of relatively low ability and so there remains considerable heterogeneity in productivity across selected workers.

## 6.4 Potentially Reinforcing Mechanisms

We have so far emphasized that the change in managerial incentives affects worker productivity through both a targeting and selection effect, and provided evidence on the relative importance of both. In our setting there are however two additional mechanisms through which the effects on productivity may be reinforced.

The first possibility is that some of the rise in productivity can be attributed to the fact that tighter selection creates a rat race or rank order tournament among workers (Akerlof 1976, Lazear and Rosen 1981). Indeed, by exerting effort workers not only increase their earnings today because they are paid a piece rate, but also increase the probability of being retained for future employment. In our setting, however, the most able workers experience an increase in productivity whereas the least able do not. This pattern would be consistent with a rat-race only if it were too costly for the low ability workers to engage in the rat-race so that only the high ability workers would be motivated by it. This seems unlikely in light of the fact that the marginal worker selected into employment has low ability, which implies that the high ability workers are unlikely to be left unemployed. In general, any rat race effect would reinforce the large and heterogeneous effects that managerial effort has on workers. Disentangling the effects of managerial effort from those of

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<sup>39</sup>The theoretical literature has traditionally focused on determining the optimal number of layers in a hierarchy, the span of control at each layer, and the distribution of wages within the firm (Williamson 1967, Calvo and Wellisz 1978, Qian 1994). We have taken the first two factors as given throughout – workers are always managed in the firm we study, and as detailed in Section 3, managers’ span of control remains constant throughout the season.

a rat race would at least require more precise information on managerial actions on each field-day, such as the allocation of workers to rows, which is unavailable.

Peer effects are a second mechanism through which the increase in average productivity could be reinforced. We have shown that following the introduction of managerial performance pay, the lowest ability workers are fired and this may affect the productivity of the remaining selected workers. In particular, if workers work harder when they are surrounded by more productive colleagues, firing the least able workers might increase the productivity of the remaining workers. In our context, however, the fact that the most able workers experience the highest increase in productivity while the least able selected workers are not affected (Figure 5a) suggest there would have to be a very particular pattern of peer effects for this hypothesis to explain the data. Namely, peer effects should be such that the individuals who are most dissimilar to the fired workers are affected the most while the individuals who are most similar are affected the least. In other words, the highest ability workers should be most affected by the removal of the least able workers, while the lowest ability workers still selected in, should be unaffected by the removal of similarly low ability workers.

## 7 Discussion

This paper presents evidence from a firm level experiment designed to identify the effects of managerial performance pay on the mean and the dispersion of productivity of lower tier workers. We find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and the dispersion of productivity. The analysis of individual productivity data from personnel records, shows that the results are due to two underlying changes in managerial behavior.

First, there is a targeting effect of managerial incentives. Managers allocate relatively more of their effort towards high ability workers, so that the most able worker experience the highest rise in productivity. Second, there is a selection effect of managerial incentives – the least able workers are employed less often and in some cases fired. In line with theoretical predictions, both effects increase average productivity.

Theoretically, these two forces may however have offsetting effects on the dispersion of productivity depending on the strength of complementarity between manager and workers' efforts, and the underlying distribution of workers' ability. The evidence suggests the targeting effect is relatively more important in explaining the increase in dispersion of productivity. This is because although the least productive workers are fired after the introduction of performance pay, the demand for labor remains sufficiently high so that the productivity differential between the most able workers and the marginal workers hired remains large.

The first order gain to the firm is the 21% increase in average productivity. Since average

worker productivity increased, fewer workers were required to pick the same quantity of fruit. This reduction in the firm's wage bill is orders of magnitude larger than the monetary costs of paying the performance bonuses and administering the scheme. The introduction of managerial incentives thus considerably increased profits for the firm.

The purely exogenous variation in managerial incentives created by our natural field experiment in combination with detailed personnel records and a fixed pool of individuals in the workforce allows us to precisely identify the causal effect of high powered managerial incentives on the firm's productivity through both targeting and selection of lower tier workers. Precision, however, inevitably entails some loss of generality, because the firm we study, as any other, has unique features that drive the effect of managerial incentives on productivity.

Two features of our firm are particularly relevant for the external validity of this study. First, the employment situation is rather special as the pool of managers and workers available for employment is fixed and observable, at least in the short run. While this allows us to analyze the effect of changing incentives for the same managers and to present detailed evidence on how managerial incentives affect the selection of workers into employment, it is unlikely to apply to most settings in the long run. In a more general setting, a number of other factors would need to be taken into account.

Notably, when new workers and managers can join the firm, we expect high powered managerial incentives to attract more able managers and COO to the firm (Lazear 2005). In addition, if the COO can hire from a larger pool of workers, he might want to attract more productive workers when he is paid a performance bonus. To the extent that more productive workers have a higher outside option, however, the COO might need to increase workers' pay to attract them. Thus, in contrast to what happens in our setting, it might be optimal to make the workers' incentives more high powered, for example by increasing the piece rate. This is in line, for instance, with the analysis of Groves *et al* (1994) who find that the introduction of high powered incentives for managers in Chinese firms is correlated with the introduction of high powered incentives for bottom-tier workers.

Overall, when the pool of managers and the pool of individuals available for employment is not fixed the introduction of high powered managerial incentives might attract more productive workers and managers to the firm, thus reinforcing the productivity enhancing effect we find here. However, this might come at the cost of a higher wage bill.

Second, in our setting workers operate independently of one another and the manager can target their effort to individual workers. While this is true in many other settings, such as for salespeople, it is not the case in all settings. When workers operate in teams or, more generally, when managerial effort targeted to one worker has spillovers on others, the incentives for managers to target workers would be different. Hence the effect of targeting on both the average and

dispersion of productivity would be different.

While our experimental research design is tailored to provide credible evidence on the effects of managerial incentives in this particular context, our results have broad implications for understanding behavior within firms more generally.<sup>40</sup>

Our findings shed some light on why firms provide performance related pay to managers in the first place. While such incentive schemes are obviously designed to increase unobservable managerial effort, our results also suggest another more subtle reason for their use. This stems from the general observation that firms are typically constrained to offer bottom-tier workers the *same* compensation scheme. This may be because of legal, technological or informational constraints (Lazear 1989, Bewley 1999, Encinosa *et al* 1997, Fehr *et al* 2004).

To the extent that bottom-tier workers are of heterogeneous ability, however, offering the same compensation scheme to all of them will, in general, not be optimal for the firm. When managers' pay is linked to firm's performance, their interests become more aligned with those of the firm and they have greater incentives to target their effort to specific workers in order to offset the inefficiency that arises because of the common compensation scheme. From the worker's point of view it is then as if they face an individual specific incentive scheme.

This opens a broad empirical research agenda to examine whether firms are indeed more likely to offer managers performance pay in settings where lower tier workers are of heterogeneous ability, managers are able to target their effort towards specific workers, and workers are offered the same compensation scheme.

Our findings also highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and the earnings inequality among lower-tier workers. Such a linkage exists whenever managers can target their efforts towards some workers and away from others, and managers choose which individuals are selected into the workforce. Understanding whether and how managerial incentives determine earnings inequality among workers is important for two reasons.

First, to the extent that managers do not internalize the effect of their actions on the long run performance of the firm, exacerbating inequality due to natural ability differences may be

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<sup>40</sup>The analysis also has wider implications for environments outside of the workplace. For example, the provision of teacher incentives based on the average performance of students may have important consequences for the distribution of test scores among students, and the composition of students, and possibly teachers, admitted into schools. Existing evidence indicate that school accountability programs, whereby schools are rewarded or sanctioned based on average test scores or on the pass rate generate both selection and targeting effects, as weaker students are prevented to sit the test and teachers target resources to the marginal students at the expense of the others. For instance, Burgess *et al* (2005) find that the introduction of school accountability based on test pass rates improved the performance of students in the middle of the ability distribution, at the expense of both high achieving and low achieving students. Similarly, Hanushek and Raymond (2004) and Reback (2005) provide evidence on the distributional consequences on student achievement under the *No Child Left Behind* policy. Finally, Jacob (2002) and Figlio and Getzer (2002) provide evidence on the selection effect. They show that the introduction of accountability schemes lead to an increase in grade retention and special educational placement in Chicago and Florida public schools, respectively.

detrimental to the firms' long run performance. This is because increased perceptions of unfair treatment among workers might lead to less cooperation in the workplace (Baron and Pfeffer 1994, Bewley 1999, Lazear 1989). The possibility that firms trade-off the benefits of incentive pay with these types of long run effects when designing compensation schemes for their employees deserves further research.

Second, the interplay between managerial incentives and earnings inequality among workers highlights a possible link between two important trends in labor markets over the past twenty years that have previously been unconnected in the economics literature – the rising use of managerial performance pay, and the rising earnings inequality among observationally similar workers.<sup>41</sup>

## 8 Appendices

### 8.1 Proofs

**Proof of Lemma 1:** We first show that if the manager chooses  $m = 1$  and workers are sufficiently heterogeneous in ability, the unique equilibrium is the one in which the manager targets the more able worker only. This part of the proof proceeds in two steps. First we show that if  $\theta_i < \theta_j$ , then  $m_i = 1, m_j = 0$  is an equilibrium. We then show that if  $(\theta_j - \theta_i)$  is large enough the equilibrium is unique.

(i) For  $m_i = 1, m_j = 0$  to be an equilibrium we need to show that given  $m_i = 1, m_j = 0$ , the workers' optimal response implies  $e_i > e_j$  and that given  $e_i > e_j$  the manager's optimal response implies  $m_i = 1, m_j = 0$ . For the first part, note that when  $m_i = 1$  and  $m_j = 0$ , the workers' optimal response is  $\hat{e}_i = \frac{\beta(1+k)}{\theta_i}$ ,  $\hat{e}_j = \frac{\beta}{\theta_j}$ , and hence  $\hat{e}_i > \hat{e}_j$  since  $\theta_i < \theta_j$  and  $k > 0$ . For the second part note that if  $e_i > e_j$ , the manager's payoff  $w + \frac{1}{2}b[(1 + km_i)e_i + (1 + km_j)e_j] - cm$  is maximized when  $m_i = 1$  and  $m_j = 0$ .

(ii) Since the manager's payoff is a linear combination of the two workers' effort levels, the solution must lie at a corner. For  $m_i = 1, m_j = 0$  to be the unique equilibrium, we then need to rule out the other corner solution, namely  $m_i = 0, m_j = 1$ . A necessary condition for  $m_i = 0, m_j = 1$  to be an equilibrium is that the workers' optimal response yields  $e_i < e_j$ . When  $m_i = 0, m_j = 1, e_i = \frac{\beta}{\theta_i}$  and  $e_j = \frac{\beta(1+k)}{\theta_j}$ . It follows that if  $(\theta_j - \theta_i) > \frac{k\theta_i}{\beta}$ ,  $e_i > e_j$  and  $m_i = 0, m_j = 1$  cannot be an equilibrium.

We now prove the first part of the Lemma. Using the equilibrium levels of the manager and workers' effort we see that if the manager exerts low effort, her payoff is  $w + \frac{1}{2}b[\frac{\beta}{\theta_i} + \frac{\beta}{\theta_j}]$ . If she

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<sup>41</sup>Residual or within-group wage inequality, namely, the wage dispersion among workers with the same education and experience, accounts for most of the growth in overall wage inequality in the US. This has been argued to have increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Juhn *et al* 1993), and into the 1990s (Acemoglu 2002, and Autor *et al* 2005).



chooses high effort her payoff is  $w + \frac{1}{2}b[\frac{\beta(1+k)^2}{\theta_i} + \frac{\beta}{\theta_j}] - c$ . The manager chooses high effort if and only if the payoff from doing so is larger, namely if and only if;

$$b \geq \bar{b} = 2c \left[ \frac{\beta(1+k)^2 - \beta}{\theta_i} \right]^{-1}. \quad (17)$$

Intuitively, the threshold increases in the marginal cost of effort  $c$ , and decreases if the marginal benefit of managerial effort is higher. The marginal benefit is positively related to worker  $i$ 's ability,  $\theta_i$ , to the piece rate,  $\beta$ , and to the strength of the complementarity between the manager's and the workers' effort,  $k$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 1:** Using Lemma 1 and the workers' best response functions we can straightforwardly compute the average productivity and the dispersion of productivity when the manager is paid fixed wages and when she is given sufficiently high powered incentives. Average productivity is;

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\beta(\theta_i + \theta_j)}{2\theta_i\theta_j} & \text{if } b = 0 \\ & \frac{\beta((1+k)^2\theta_j + \theta_i)}{2\theta_i\theta_j} & \text{if } b \geq \bar{b} \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

and  $\frac{\beta((1+k)^2\theta_j + \theta_i)}{\theta_i\theta_j} > \frac{\beta(\theta_i + \theta_j)}{\theta_i\theta_j}$  since  $k > 0$ . The dispersion of productivity, as measured by the range of productivity, is;

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\beta(\theta_j - \theta_i)}{\theta_i\theta_j} & \text{if } b = 0 \\ & \frac{\beta((1+k)^2\theta_j - \theta_i)}{\theta_i\theta_j} & \text{if } b \geq \bar{b} \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

and  $\frac{\beta((1+k)^2\theta_j - \theta_i)}{\theta_i\theta_j} > \frac{\beta(\theta_j - \theta_i)}{\theta_i\theta_j}$  as  $k > 0$ . The dispersion in productivity is increasing in the strength of the complementarity between manager's and worker's effort. ■

**Proof of Lemma 2:** Given the COO's discrete effort choice, we characterize the solution to his maximization problem by comparing his payoff when  $s = 1$  to when  $s = 0$ . When  $s = 1$  the COO never selects worker 3, and his expected payoff is  $W + B \left( \frac{y_1(\hat{e}_1) + y_2(\hat{e}_2)}{2} \right) - C$ . When  $s = 0$  the COO selects each worker with equal probability, and his expected payoff is  $W + B \left( \frac{y_1(\hat{e}_1) + y_2(\hat{e}_2) + y_3(\hat{e}_3)}{3} \right)$ . Using the worker's equilibrium choice of effort (5), the difference in these payoffs is  $B \frac{\beta}{6} \left( \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_2} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) \right) - C$ , where the first term is positive as  $\theta_1 < \theta_2 < \theta_3$ . The COO chooses  $s = 1$  if and only if the difference in payoffs is non-negative, namely if and only if;

$$B \geq \bar{B} = C \left[ \frac{\beta}{6} \left( \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_2} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) \right) \right]^{-1}. \quad (20)$$

Intuitively, the threshold is higher if the marginal cost of effort is higher, and lower if the marginal benefit is higher. The latter is higher when the workers' piece rate is higher and when the benefit

of cream-skimming is higher, namely when worker 3's ability level is very low ( $\theta_3$  very high).■

**Proof of Proposition 2:** When  $0 \leq B < \bar{B}$  all workers are selected with equal probability and expected average productivity is  $\frac{1}{3}(y_1(\hat{e}_1) + y_2(\hat{e}_2) + y_3(\hat{e}_3))$ . When  $B \geq \bar{B}$  the COO chooses the most able two workers and average productivity is  $\frac{1}{2}(y_1(\hat{e}_1) + y_2(\hat{e}_2))$ . Using the workers' equilibrium effort levels from (5) the difference in expected average productivity is  $\frac{\beta}{6} \left( \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{\theta_2} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) \right)$  which is positive as  $\theta_1 < \theta_2 < \theta_3$ . This proves the first part of the Proposition.

When  $0 \leq B < \bar{B}$  all workers are selected with equal probability and the expected dispersion is  $\frac{2}{3}\beta \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right)$ . When  $B \geq \bar{B}$  the COO chooses the most able two workers and dispersion is  $\beta \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_2} \right)$ . High powered incentives therefore reduce dispersion if and only if  $\left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_2} \right) < \frac{2}{3} \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right)$ . This requires the ability level of worker 3 be sufficiently low or the ability level of workers 1 and 2 to be sufficiently similar. Intuitively, the difference in dispersion derives from the fact that when  $B \geq \bar{B}$  worker 3 is never selected and workers 1 and 2 always work together. If their ability difference is sufficiently low relative to the ability of worker 3, dispersion falls.■

**Proof of Proposition 3:** The effect on average productivity follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2. The effect on dispersion can be computed as follows. When  $b = B = 0$ , both the COO and the manager choose low effort in equilibrium, so  $\hat{s} = 0$  and  $\hat{m} = 0$ . From (5) we see that  $\hat{e}_n = \frac{\beta}{\theta_n}$  for  $n = 1, 2$ , and 3. As the COO selects each worker with equal probability each worker pair is selected with probability  $1/3$ , and expected dispersion is equal to  $\frac{2}{3}\beta \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right)$ . When  $b \geq \bar{b}$  and  $B \geq \bar{B}$ , both the COO and the manager choose high effort in equilibrium, so  $\hat{s} = 1$  and  $\hat{m} = 1$ . The COO selects workers 1 and 2 and the manager targets the most able worker, worker 1. Thus dispersion is  $\beta \left( \frac{(1+k)^2}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_2} \right)$ . The difference in dispersion with the fixed wage scheme is  $\beta \frac{2k+k^2}{\theta_1} + \left[ \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_2} \right) - \frac{2}{3} \left( \frac{1}{\theta_1} - \frac{1}{\theta_3} \right) \right]$ . The first term is the manager's targeting effect and is always positive. The second term is the COO's selection effect which is negative if, as discussed above, the ability level of worker 3 be sufficiently low or the ability level of workers 1 and 2 sufficiently similar. The targeting effect is stronger, and hence more likely to dominate and increase dispersion when the complementarity between the manager's and worker's effort,  $k$ , is higher.■

## 8.2 Predicting the Piece Rate

As discussed in Section 2.1, the firm aims to minimize its wage bill subject to a minimum wage constraint. In particular, the COO is instructed to set the piece rate each field-day so that all workers obtain an hourly wage of at least  $\underline{w}$ , where  $\underline{w}$  is above the legally prescribed minimum wage and is set by the owner at the beginning of the season. Hence in practical terms, the piece rate falls whenever productivity is higher.

In this subsection we explore whether this rule is followed throughout the season, or whether

the COO sets the piece rate higher than is in the firms interests, thereby providing additional incentives to workers and increasing the likelihood he obtains the performance bonus. We estimate the following regression to understand the determinants of the piece rate;

$$\beta_{ft} = \lambda_f + \eta Z_{ft} + \mu R_t + \sum_{s \in M_{ft}} \mu_s S_{sft} + \varepsilon_{ft}, \quad (21)$$

where  $\beta_{ft}$  is the piece rate on field-day  $ft$ ,  $\lambda_f$  are field fixed effects,  $Z_{ft}$  are time varying characteristics of the workers and field,  $R_t$  are meteorological conditions, and  $S_{sft}$  is a dummy for whether manager  $s$  is present on field-day  $ft$ . The error terms are assumed to follow a field-specific AR(1) process.<sup>42</sup>

We first estimate (21) using the sample of pre-bonus field-days, and use this to predict the piece rate in the post-bonus period. Figure A1 shows this out-of-sample prediction, and Appendix Table A1 Column 1 shows the regression coefficients from (21). As expected, the piece rate is consistently over predicted in the post-bonus period when the prediction is derived from the field-days pre-bonus. Moreover, the result in Table A1 shows that factors that are positively correlated to productivity are negatively correlated to the piece rate. If we then additionally control for the performance bonus dummy in (21), Figure A1 shows the actual piece rate is predicted with little systematic error.<sup>43</sup> The information in both the level and the trend in these residuals suggests that the COO continues to set the piece rate using the same algorithm throughout the season. This is as expected given that – (i) the COO is a permanent employee of the firm; (ii) the wage bill is easily observable by the COO’s own manager, the owner of the firm.

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<sup>42</sup>Picking takes place inside tunnels. This ensures the quantity of fruit to be picked is insensitive to weather shocks. However workers effort may be sensitive to meteorological conditions, and if the COO recognizes this in setting the piece rate, these conditions should be included in (21).

<sup>43</sup>A Shapiro-Wilk test of the pre and post-bonus residuals does not reject the null hypotheses that these are both Normally distributed.



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
**Figure 1: Time Series of Productivity, 2003 and 2004 Seasons**




**Notes:** Since there might be more than one field operated per day, each field-day level observation is weighted by the number of pickers on the field-day to compute the average productivity for the day.



**Figure 2a: Kernel Density Estimates of Worker Productivity by Managerial Incentive Scheme**




**Figure 2b: Scatter Plot of Worker Productivity by Managerial Incentive Scheme**




**Notes:** Both figures use data on workers that are selected to pick fruit at least once under each managerial compensation schemes. The density estimates in Figure 2a are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. In Figure 2b, each observation is weighted by the number of field-days the worker picks under the managerial bonus scheme. A larger circle indicates that the worker picks on more field-days under the managerial performance bonus regime.

**Figure 3: Pay Inequality Among Workers, by Managerial Incentive Scheme**  
**Interquartile Range of Daily Pay**




**Figure 4: Estimated Effect of the Change in Managerial Incentives on Productivity, by Field Life Cycle**



**Notes:** In Figure 3, the interquartile range is first calculated for each field-day. The daily average is computed by weighting each field-day by the total man-hours worked on it. Figure 4 graphs the estimated effect of the managerial performance bonus on average worker productivity, at different stages of the field life cycle. The figure also shows the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The field life cycle is defined as the  $n$ th day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season.

**Figure 5a: Quantile Regression Estimates**





**Figure 5b: Workers' Fixed Effects**




**Notes:** Figure 5a graphs the estimated effect of the managerial performance bonus dummy on the log of worker productivity at each quantile of the conditional distribution of the log of worker productivity, and the associated 95% confidence interval. Bootstrapped standard errors that are clustered by field-day are estimated, based on 1000 replications. Figure 5b is based on a worker-field-day fixed effects regression. It plots the exponent of the workers fixed effect when managers are in the fixed wage regime against the exponent of their fixed effect when managers are in the performance bonus regime. Each observation is weighted by the number of field-days the worker picks under the managerial bonus scheme. A larger circle indicates that the worker picks on more field-days under the managerial performance bonus regime.

**Figure 6: Distribution of Field-days Selected to Pick Fruit Across Workers, by Managerial Incentive Scheme**




**Notes:** These histograms are drawn for those workers that are selected to pick fruit at least on one field-day under each managerial incentive scheme. Hence they do not include "fired" workers that would otherwise be massed at zero on the lower histogram.

**Figure 7a: Selection and Productivity**




**Figure 7b: Unemployment and Selection**



**Notes:** To estimate the effect of the performance bonus on individual worker productivity, we regress log productivity on worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, a time trend and workers' fixed effects interacted with the bonus dummy. The effect of managerial bonuses on workers' productivity for any given worker is computed as the difference between the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid bonuses and the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid fixed wages. To estimate the effect of the performance bonus on the probability of being selected to pick fruit, we first define a selection dummy which is equal to one on days in which the worker is selected to pick, and zero otherwise. We then regress this selection dummy on labor supply, labor demand and workers' fixed effects interacted with the bonus dummy. The effect of managerial bonuses on workers' probability of being selected for any given worker is computed as the difference between the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid bonuses and the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid fixed wages. To estimate the effect of the performance bonus on the probability of being unemployed, we first define an unemployment dummy which is equal to one on days in which the worker is unemployed, and zero if she is assigned to non-picking tasks. We then regress the unemployment dummy on labor supply, labor demand and workers' dummies interacted with the bonus dummy. The effect of managerial bonuses on unemployment for any given worker is computed as the difference between the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid bonuses and the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid fixed wages.

**Figure A1: Predicting the Piece Rate for Workers**



**Notes:** The dashed series labeled 'Without bonus dummy' is based on the specification in Column 1 of Table A1. This uses the data on the piece rate in the time period before managerial performance bonuses were introduced, to predict the piece rate in the post bonus period. The solid series is based on the specification in Column 2 of Table A1. This uses the data on the piece rate over all field-days in our working sample and is labeled 'With bonus dummy'.

**Table 1: The Design of the Field Experiment**

**Incentive Scheme in Place**

<b><u>Tier</u></b>	<b><u>May 1st - June 26th</u></b>	<b><u>June 27th - August 31st</u></b>
<b>1. Chief Operating Officer</b>	<b>Fixed wages</b>	<b>Fixed wages plus performance bonus</b>
<b>2. Managers</b>	<b>Fixed wages</b>	<b>Fixed wages plus performance bonus</b>
<b>3. Workers</b>	<b>Piece rates</b>	<b>Piece rates</b>

The performance bonus is obtained by managers and the COO if the average productivity of workers on the field-day is greater than a fixed threshold. This threshold value is the same across all field-days and is set at the start of the season.

**Table 2: Descriptives of Worker Productivity, by Managerial Incentive Scheme**

All observations are at the worker-field-day level

	<u>Fixed Wages</u>		<u>Performance Bonus</u>		<u>Fixed Wages</u>		<u>Performance Bonus</u>
	(May 1st - June 26th)	(June 27th - August 31st)	(May 1st - June 26th)	(June 27th - August 31st)	(May 1st - June 26th)	(June 27th - August 31st)	(June 27th - August 31st)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Managerial Incentive Scheme, 2003 Season:	All Workers	All Workers	Selected Workers	Fired Workers	Selected Workers	Fired Workers	Selected Workers
<b><u>Worker's productivity (kg/hr)</u></b>							
Mean	8.37	10.4	8.52	7.69	8.52	7.69	10.4
Sd, overall	4.29	5.99	4.45	3.44	4.45	3.44	5.99
Sd, between	2.43	3.35	2.49	2.11	2.49	2.11	3.35
Sd, within	3.48	4.64	3.58	2.98	3.58	2.98	4.64

Managerial Incentive Scheme, 2004 Season:	All Workers	All Workers
<b><u>Worker's productivity (kg/hr)</u></b>		
Mean	7.86	7.85
Sd, overall	5.24	3.51
Sd, between	3.08	2.20
Sd, within	4.21	2.87

**Notes:** These figures are based on all workers that are available for work three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentive schemes. Selected workers are defined to be those that pick at least one field-day under both managerial incentive schemes. Fired workers are only selected to pick when managers are paid fixed wages.



**Table 3: Descriptives, by Managerial Incentive Scheme**

**Means, standard errors in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals in brackets**

	<u>Managerial Incentive Scheme</u>	
	Fixed Wages	Performance Bonus
<b>Worker productivity (kg/hr)</b>	8.37 (.240) [ 7.89, 8.84 ]	10.4 (.486) [ 9.47, 11.4 ]
<b>Kilograms picked per field-day</b>	30.2 (.873) [ 28.4, 31.9 ]	30.4 (1.54) [ 27.3, 33.4 ]
<b>Hours worked per field-day</b>	3.70 (.169) [ 3.36, 4.03 ]	3.03 (.157) [ 2.72, 3.34 ]
<b>Hourly earnings from picking (£/hr)</b>	4.81 (.133) [ 4.54, 5.07 ]	4.53 (.199) [ 4.41, 4.93 ]
<b>Piece rate per kilogram picked (£/kg)</b>	.617 (.030) [ .557, .677 ]	.476 (.016) [ .445, .507 ]
<b>Number of workers on field-day</b>	79.3 (4.02) [ 71.4, 87.2 ]	56.4 (2.02) [ 52.4, 60.4 ]
<b>Number of managers on field-day</b>	5.27 (.231) [ 4.82, 5.73 ]	3.28 (.075) [ 3.13, 3.42 ]
<b>Worker-manager ratio</b>	21.3 (2.06) [ 17.2, 25.4 ]	19.2 (.622) [ 17.9, 20.4 ]

**Notes:** Worker productivity, kilos picked per field-day, and hourly earnings are all calculated at the worker-field-day level. The standard errors on these worker-field-day level variables are clustered at the worker level. Hours worked per field-day, the piece rate per kilogram picked, the number of managers on the field-day, the number of workers on the field-day, and the worker-manager ratio, are all calculated at the field-day level.

**Table 4: The Effect of the Managerial Incentives on Average Worker Productivity, Field-Day Level**

Dependent Variable = Log of average productivity (kilogram picked per hour on field-day)

	(1) OLS	(2) Controls	(3) Field Specific AR(1)	(4) Manager Fixed Effects	(5) Tenure
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy</b>	.225*** (.044)	.203*** (.074)	.196*** (.069)	.194*** (.082)	.190** (.082)
<b>Field life cycle</b>		-1.35*** (.167)	-1.42*** (.194)	-1.31*** (.177)	-1.29*** (.174)
<b>Average picking experience of workers</b>		.284*** (.050)	.276*** (.065)	.313*** (.062)	.335*** (.093)
<b>Time trend</b>		-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.003 (.006)
<b>Tenure under performance bonus scheme</b>					.002 (.005)
<b>Field fixed effects</b>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Manager fixed effects</b>	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
<b>R-squared</b>	.0986	.3873	.8264	.8746	.8759
<b>Number of field-day observations</b>	247	247	247	247	247

**Notes:** \*\*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\* at 5%, and \* at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. OLS regression estimates are reported in Columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are calculated. In the remaining columns AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the log of the number of workers present. The managerial performance bonus dummy = 1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. Tenure under the performance bonus scheme is defined as the number of field-days the performance bonus has been in place for.

**Table 5: The Effect of the Managerial Incentives on the Dispersion of Workers' Productivity, Field-Day Level**

Dependent Variable = Log of the coefficient of variation of productivity (kilogram picked per hour on field-day)  
Standard errors allow for field specific AR(1)

	(1) OLS	(2) Controls	(3) Field Specific AR(1)	(4) Manager Fixed Effects	(5) Tenure
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy</b>	.084*** (.031)	.177*** (.060)	.191*** (.058)	.317*** (.063)	.314*** (.065)
<b>Field life cycle</b>		.024 (.150)	.040 (.135)	.208 (.137)	.228 (.145)
<b>CV of picking experience of workers</b>		-.029 (.081)	-.016 (.079)	-.082 (.072)	-.077 (.073)
<b>Time trend</b>		-.002 (.001)	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.003)
<b>Tenure under performance bonus scheme</b>					.001 (.003)
<b>Field fixed effects</b>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Manager fixed effects</b>	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
<b>R-squared</b>	.0279	.0731	.5364	.5780	.5812
<b>Number of field-day observations</b>	247	247	247	247	247

**Notes:** \*\*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\* at 5%, and \* at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. OLS regression estimates are reported in Columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are calculated. In the remaining columns, AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the log of the number of workers present. The managerial performance bonus dummy = 1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. Tenure under the performance bonus scheme is defined as the number of field-days the performance bonus has been in place for.

**Table 6: Further Evidence of a Causal Effect of Managerial Incentives, Field-Day Level**

Standard errors allow for field specific AR(1)	<u>Placebo Bonus Based on Date of Change in Managerial Incentives in 2003 (June 27th)</u>				<u>Placebo Bonus Based on Number of Days Under Fixed Wages for Managers in 2003 (44 days)</u>			
	<u>Average Productivity</u>		<u>Coefficient of Variation of Productivity</u>		<u>Average Productivity</u>		<u>Coefficient of Variation of Productivity</u>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy (2003)</b>	.186*** (.074)	.622*** (.109)	.432*** (.067)	.378*** (.118)	.198*** (.076)	.637*** (.110)	.395*** (.067)	.324*** (.118)
<b>Placebo managerial performance bonus dummy (2004)</b>	-.018 (.099)	.095 (.170)	-.355*** (.088)	-.054 (.181)	.071 (.099)	-.219 (.214)	-.463*** (.102)	-.182 (.204)
<b>Interactions with field life cycle -</b>								
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy (2003)</b>		-1.04*** (.218)		.054 (.226)		-.982*** (.211)		.114 (.221)
<b>Placebo managerial performance bonus dummy (2004)</b>		-.372 (.461)		-.843** (.356)		.704 (.514)		-.766* (.455)
<b>Field life cycle</b>	-1.34*** (.176)	-.968*** (.109)	.342*** (.133)	.346** (.158)	-1.34*** (.180)	-1.02*** (.166)	.274** (.134)	.240 (.164)
<b>Field fixed effects</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Manager fixed effects</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Other controls</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>R-squared</b>	.9044	.8902	.6623	.6749	.9038	.8990	.6656	.6719
<b>Number of observations</b>	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370

**Notes:** \*\*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\* at 5%, and \* at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the log of the number of workers present. The managerial performance bonus dummy = 1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. In Columns 1 to 4 the placebo bonus dummy is equal to one after June 27th in 2004, and zero otherwise. In Columns 5 to 8 the placebo bonus dummy is equal to one after the 44th day of the picking season, and zero otherwise. In Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, other controls include the average picking experience of workers on the field-day, the field life cycle, and a time trend. In Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, other controls include the coefficient of variation in the picking experience of workers on the field-day, the field life cycle, and a time trend.

**Table 7: Quantile Regression Estimates, Worker-Field-Day Level**

**Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour on the field-day)**

**Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level**

	<u>Quantile</u>						
	.1	.25	.33	.5	.66	.75	.9
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy</b>	-.067 (.144)	.026 (.099)	.062 (.092)	.129 (.088)	.186** (.092)	.233*** (.092)	.319*** (.094)
<b>Field life cycle</b>	-1.50*** (.325)	-1.25*** (.212)	-1.23*** (.180)	-1.17*** (.177)	-1.17*** (.205)	-1.19*** (.224)	-.983*** (.256)
<b>Picking experience</b>	.276*** (.034)	.271*** (.025)	.248*** (.025)	.234*** (.021)	.245*** (.019)	.254*** (.018)	.248*** (.019)
<b>Time trend</b>	-.001 (.004)	.000 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.000 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.004 (.003)
<b>Field fixed effects</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Manager fixed effects</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Other controls</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Number of observations</b>	8695	8695	8695	8695	8695	8695	8695

**Notes:** \*\*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\* at 5%, and \* at 10%. Bootstrapped standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level. These are based on 1000 replications. All continuous variables are in logarithms. The regressions are based on those workers selected to pick at least once under managerial performance bonuses. The managerial performance bonus dummy is one when managers are paid according to the performance bonus, and zero otherwise. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season.

## Table 8: Selection into the Workforce

### A: Productivity

Average productivity of workers (kg/hr) by worker type and managerial incentive scheme  
Standard deviation in parentheses

	Selected-In Workers	Selected-Out Workers	Fired Workers
<b>Fixed Wages</b>	9.03 (3.03)	7.45 (2.09)	6.79 (2.15)
<b>Performance Bonus</b>	11.11 (3.66)	7.35 (2.50)	

### B: Unemployment Rate

Average unemployment rate of workers by worker type and managerial incentive scheme  
Standard deviation in parentheses

	Selected-In Workers	Selected-Out Workers	Fired Workers
<b>Fixed Wages</b>	.037 (.052)	.089 (.122)	.187 (.186)
<b>Performance Bonus</b>	.059 (.060)	.146 (.180)	.340 (.372)

**Notes:** These figures are based on the sample of all 197 workers available to pick fruit. Selected-in workers are defined to be those that are in the top quartile of the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. This corresponds to 77 or more field-day observations on which the worker picks post-bonus. Selected-out workers are defined to be those workers in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. Fired workers are those who never pick after the introduction of the performance bonus. There are 67 fired workers. The unemployment rate for a worker is the share of days in which the worker is present on the farm but is not assigned to any task.

**Table 9: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on the Selection of Workers**

Conditional logit estimates

Column 1: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker  $i$  is chosen to pick on day  $t$  in main site, 0 otherwise

Column 2: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker  $i$  is unemployed on day  $t$ , 0 otherwise

Odd ratios reported, standard errors in parentheses

	<u>Probability of Being Selected to Pick</u>	<u>Probability of Being Unemployed</u>
	(1)	(2)
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy</b>	.771*** (.067)	1.23* (.138)
<b>Total yield in site 1</b>	2.26*** (.090)	.756*** (.034)
<b>Total yield in site 2</b>	.879*** (.028)	.829*** (.029)
<b>Number of workers available to pick fruit</b>	.377*** (.017)	1.15*** (.053)
<b>Log-likelihood</b>	-5208.29	-3934.14
<b>Number of observations</b>	15551	11284

**Notes:** \*\*\* denotes that the odd ratio is significantly different from one at 1%, \*\* at 5%, and \* at 10% levels. These regressions are based on the sample of all 197 workers available to pick fruit. Conditional logit estimates are reported where observations are grouped by worker. All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can be interpreted as increase by one standard deviation. "Total yield" on the site is the total kilograms of the fruit picked on the site-day. The "number of workers available to pick fruit" is the total number of individuals that are on the farm that day and are available for fruit picking. Worker  $i$  is defined to be unemployed on day  $t$  if, conditional on not being selected to pick, she is not assigned to any non-picking tasks. The sample is smaller in Column 2 since the sample is based on workers that are not selected into any picking tasks on the day.

**Table A1: Predicting the Piece Rate**

**Dependent Variable = Piece rate on field-day (£ per kilogram picked)**  
**Standard errors allow for field specific AR(1)**

**(1) Pre Bonus Period (2) Entire Sample**

<b>Field life cycle</b>	.366*** (.131)	.503*** (.064)
<b>Average picking experience of workers</b>	.004 (.003)	.001 (.001)
<b>SD of picking experience of workers</b>	-.006 (.004)	-.004** (.002)
<b>Time trend</b>	-.003 (.005)	-.003 (.002)
<b>Rainfall (mm)</b>	-.026*** (.004)	-.005 (.004)
<b>Minimum temperature (Celsius)</b>	-.011** (.006)	-.006* (.003)
<b>Share of workers that are women</b>	.393*** (.148)	.251*** (.097)
<b>Share of workers that play sports</b>	-.711*** (.224)	-.336** (.152)
<b>Share of workers that came for earnings</b>	.016 (.214)	.127 (.139)
<b>Number of managers</b>	-.029 (.062)	-.173 (.153)
<b>Number of workers</b>	-.0004 (.0004)	-.001*** (.0003)
<b>Managerial performance bonus dummy</b>		-.124*** (.040)
<b>Field fixed effects</b>	Yes	Yes
<b>Manager fixed effects</b>	Yes	Yes
<b>R-squared</b>	.7694	.8008
<b>Number of observations</b>	140	245

**Notes:** \*\*\* denotes significance at 1%, \*\* at 5%, and \* at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. The rainfall and minimum temperature measures correspond to a 0900-0900 time frame. The 'play sports' variable is defined to be one if the worker reports playing sports at least once a month, and zero otherwise. The 'came for earnings' variable is defined to be one if the worker reports one reason why they came to the farm is because the pay is good, and zero otherwise. Other options were 'to travel and meet new people', 'to learn English', and 'it is part of my university course'. These variables are then averaged across the workers on the field-day. The piece rate data is missing for two field-days operated in the period before managerial performance bonuses were introduced.