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## Experiencing Carbon Pricing

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# Experiencing carbon pricing\*

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## **Abstract**

Many socially desirable policies are not implemented because of their ex-ante unpopularity, but this unpopularity may be overcome through experience with the policy. In this paper, we examine how opposition to carbon pricing in the state of Washington turned into support after voters experienced a cap-and-trade policy with revenues earmarked for environmental purposes – "cap-and-invest." Analyzing voting behavior at the census block group level, we observe that support varies by political affiliation as expected, but experience consistently increases support across the board. Using a proprietary survey, we further show that the increase in support among voters in Washington state is specific to the cap-and-invest policy they experienced; support for carbon pricing or climate policies more generally remained unchanged.

**Keywords** Carbon pricing; experience; public support; voting; polarization

**JEL codes** C93; D72; D83; H23; H71; Q58

# 1 Introduction

Tackling climate change implies putting a price on carbon, implicitly or explicitly. Almost a third of global greenhouse gas emissions are covered by a carbon price, at varying levels of stringency (World Bank 2025). All existing carbon pricing policies have been introduced through votes in the legislature. Until 2024, no carbon pricing policy had been supported by voters directly through a referendum. In particular, the rejections of carbon tax proposals in Washington state by voters in 2016 and 2018, along with protests by the yellow vest movement in France, led many commentators to define carbon pricing as politically toxic, even in progressive jurisdictions.<sup>1</sup>

To the contrary, in this paper, we examine how it came about that voters in Washington state went from opposing a carbon tax in 2018 to supporting a cap-and-trade policy after having experienced it for about a year. In both cases, revenues in the proposed carbon pricing policies were earmarked for environmental purposes, so that the cap-and-trade policy in Washington state came to be known as "cap-and-invest."<sup>2</sup>

We start by examining voting for and against Initiative 2117 (I-2117), an initiative launched in late 2023 with the goal of repealing the cap-and-invest policy implemented by the legislature in 2021, and which entered into force at the beginning of 2023. In November 2024, voters rejected I-2117 with 61.95% of the votes against, thus preserving

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<sup>1</sup>Some examples include "Forget the carbon tax for now" in *The New York Times* (<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/opinion/carbon-tax-climate-change.html>, last accessed, May 20, 2025), "The problem with putting a price on the end of the world," also in *The New York Times* (<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/09/magazine/climate-change-politics-economics.html>, last accessed, May 20, 2025), "The Trouble with Carbon Pricing" by political scientists Matto Mildenberger and Leah Stokes (<http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-politics/matto-mildenberger-leah-c-stokes-trouble-carbon-pricing>, last accessed, May 20, 2025), and "It's Time to Abandon Carbon Pricing" by political scientist Jessica Green (<https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/carbon-pricing-green-new-deal-fossil-fuel-environment>, last accessed, February 11, 2024).

<sup>2</sup>Opponents of cap-and-invest referred to it as "carbon tax carbon trading," which was also the official language on the ballot.

cap-and-invest. Voting across census block groups was strongly correlated with political partisanship, which explains the overwhelming majority of the variation in the data. However, the *difference* in support for carbon pricing from 2018, when voters opposed carbon taxation (with environmental earmarking), is positive across almost all census block groups: support increased by about 10 to 20 percentage points across census block groups, regardless of their political leaning. Furthermore, this result is largely unchanged when accounting for changes in participation. Hence, while partisanship is clearly important in determining support, it does not considerably mediate – or interfere with – the impact of experience.

This key finding is robust to the addition of a variety of characteristics at the census block group level, including those which are specific to the design of cap-and-invest, which exempts agricultural fuels and allocated part of the auction revenues as carbon dividends to low- and moderate-income households. A strong preference for the status quo, a state of the world without carbon pricing in 2018 but with carbon pricing in 2024, also does not seem to fully explain the patterns we observe, pointing to an important role for experience with the policy itself.

To rule out the possibility that a nationwide trend in support for climate policy explains the difference in voting behavior in Washington state between 2018 and 2024, we turn to data from opinion polls. The Cooperative Election Survey (CES) allows us to measure public support for climate policy in Washington state and the rest of the country over time, relying on the same survey question – a question about climate regulation in general, not carbon pricing in particular. We find no evidence for a secular trend affecting support for climate policy: support is relatively flat both in Washington state and across the rest of the country for the decade from 2014 to 2024.

Thus, the effect of experience seems to be rather specific to carbon pricing and even

to the exact policy Washingtonians experienced, cap-and-invest. To show this more thoroughly, we rely on a survey experiment which we administered in October 2024, just prior to the 2024 vote. We conducted the survey with a sample that is representative of the United States, except that Washington state is overweighted. The survey experiment measured voters’ knowledge of and support for carbon pricing, as well as eliciting their perceptions of the effects of carbon pricing in an open-ended fashion. To determine the extent to which the particular policy matters, we randomly divided survey respondents into one of four groups. Each was asked about only one type of policy: cap-and-invest, cap and trade with revenues distributed as dividends (cap and dividend), a carbon tax with environmental earmarking, and a carbon tax with dividends. Consistent with the CES survey results, we find that the effect of experience tends to be specific to the policy design that Washingtonians experienced. The respondents express stronger support for cap-and-invest relative to their counterparts from the rest of the country, and relative to the three other policy designs. Furthermore, respondents’ perceptions are consistent with this pattern: statements about cap-and-invest are more favorable in Washington compared to the other parts of the country, while those related to the other carbon pricing designs do not differ substantially.

We view our paper as making three key contributions. The first contribution is that experience can help to increase support for a policy. Our findings support the idea that trial periods, in which voters experience a policy before taking an informed decision about it, may help to overturn preconceived notions about the impacts of a policy.

The second important finding relates to political partisanship and its role, or lack thereof, in mediating the effect of experience. Beliefs about policies may largely be determined by the narratives one is exposed to, which can in turn depend on one’s political inclination (e.g. Martin and Yurukoglu 2017). On the other hand, experience



is direct and can serve to overcome biases originating from those with particular political agendas. Hence, experience may contribute to overcoming resistance to polarizing policies.

A third lesson from this paper is that learning tends to be specific to cap-and-invest. That is, voters in Washington state do not appear to have become more supportive of carbon pricing in general, but rather only more supportive of cap-and-invest as a policy design.

This paper contributes, through a unique angle, to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to a long-standing tradition in public choice and political economy which examines voting behavior, including on environmental topics, using administrative data (Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Fischel 1979; Kahn and Matsusaka 1997; Kotchen and Powers 2006; Bornstein and Lanz 2008; Anderson et al. 2023; Epstein and Muehlegger 2024; Navarro et al. 2024) or survey data (Thalmann 2004; Carattini et al. 2017; Anderson et al. 2023). We explicitly study the role of experience in changing voting behavior. Second, we add to a strand of literature that studies people’s understanding of and support for environmental policy (e.g. Thalmann 2004; Kallbekken et al. 2011; Tiezzi and Xiao 2016; Carattini et al. 2017; Cherry et al. 2017; Carattini et al. 2019; Douenne and Fabre 2022; Carattini et al. 2024; Dechezleprêtre et al. 2025). A specific stream of research in this space has examined the role of experience in the lab (Cherry et al. 2014; Dal Bó et al. 2018; Janusch et al. 2021) and in the field, both correlationally (Schuitema et al. 2010; Murray and Rivers 2015; Andersson and Nässén 2016; Mildemberger et al. 2022) and causally through the use of survey data (Carattini et al. 2018). Here, we combine administrative data on voting behavior, opinion polls, and a proprietary survey experiment to shed light on how voters learn from experiencing policies directly, adapting the framework of Carattini et al. (2024) to our context. Third,

and relatedly, we support an emerging strand of literature on the political economy of policy experimentation (Briscese and List 2024; DellaVigna et al. 2024; Dur et al. 2024) as well as a more established conceptual and theoretical literature on (optimal) policy experimentation (e.g. Bennett and Howlett 1992; May 1992; Callander and Hummel 2014; Callander and Harstad 2015; Athey and Wager 2021). Finally, we speak to a growing body of work on polarization, in particular studies with an experimental angle aimed at reducing it through information provision (e.g. Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Kahan et al. 2012; Baysan 2022; Druckman 2023; Kashner and Stalinski 2024; Martel et al. 2024; Voelkel et al. 2024). In this respect, we provide evidence that experience influences public support, in a way that is largely unmitigated by extant polarization.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information concerning cap-and-invest and I-2117. Section 3 describes the three data sources that we use in our analyses: administrative data on voting behavior at the census block group level and population characteristics at the census-tract level, data from the CES, and data from our proprietary survey experiment. Section 4 provides the results for each of the three datasets. Section 5 shortly concludes.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Cap-and-Invest

In 2016, voters in Washington state voted for the first time on a carbon tax proposal, Initiative 732 (I-732). The tax was designed to start at \$15 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub> and then to increase steadily over time. It would have covered fossil fuels from all sources, with the tax being applied upstream. In an attempt to replicate the revenue-neutral design of

British Columbia (Murray and Rivers 2015), in the absence of an income tax, revenues would have been used to reduce the state’s sales tax, among other things. According to its backers, the tax was designed as a business-friendly carbon tax. I-732 was rejected on November 8, 2016, with 59.25% of the votes against. At the margin, I-732 was rejected by environmental groups, both because of personal frictions with the individuals behind I-732 and because of a strong preference for environmental earmarking (Anderson et al. 2023).

After the failure of I-732, the same environmental groups that opposed it announced a new initiative, Initiative 1631 (I-1631). Like I-732, it would have introduced a (largely) economy-wide carbon tax that would have been implemented upstream, with a tax escalator. The key difference is that revenues were intended to be earmarked for environmental (and social) purposes, including a fund for clean air and clean energy, a fund for promoting water quality and forest health, and a fund for community-related investments. I-1631 was rejected with 56.56% of the votes against on November 8, 2018.

Following a hiatus of about three years, the state legislature passed the Climate Commitment Act (CCA), which the governor signed into law in 2021. The Climate Commitment Act is implemented through the cap-and-invest program, which is a cap-and-trade (emissions trading) policy with revenues earmarked for environmental purposes (and thus “invested” into “greening” the state’s economy). The new policy held its first auction in February 2023, with the first trading period running from 2023 to 2026. Over its lifetime, the cap is scheduled to gradually tighten.

Cap-and-invest covers all businesses emitting more than 25,000 metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent per year, representing about 75% of all emissions in the state. Methane from landfills is covered by a separate policy, and some fuel use is also exempt, such as fuel used for agricultural purposes, aviation, and marine fuel combusted outside of

Washington. Exports of fuel are also exempt.

Cap-and-invest uses sealed-bid auctions for initial allocations. First, participants bid at different prices for different groups of allowances. Then the bids are sorted in order of bid price and the allowances are allocated accordingly. The lowest successful bid determines the price for all allowances for all bidders. Subsequently, unsuccessful bidders can buy allowances from other market participants. Notably, cap-and-invest includes both a price floor (\$19.70 in 2023) and a price ceiling (\$72.29 in 2023). Both the floor and ceiling prices increase by 5% per year on top of inflation. In 2024, ahead of the ballot on I-2117 (described in the following section), the auction price fluctuated between \$20 and \$30 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>. Following the rejection of I-2117 in November 2024, the auction price increased at the December 2024 auction, reaching \$40 per ton of CO<sub>2</sub>. With about 8 million allowances on sale, total revenues were on the order of \$300 million.<sup>3</sup>

Importantly, revenues from the cap-and-invest system are earmarked for environmental projects. In practice, the earmarking takes place by dividing auction revenues into three funds. The Carbon Emissions Reduction Account (CERA), further divided into the Climate Active Transportation Account and the Climate Transit Programs Account; the Climate Investment Account, further divided into the Climate Commitment Account (focused on climate mitigation) and the Natural Climate Solutions Account (focused on adaptation but also mitigation through carbon storage on land and in the ocean); and the Air Quality & Health Disparities Improvement Account. Currently more than 300 projects receive funding through cap-and-invest, in a system of grants similar to the Inflation Reduction Act. Common themes across projects include trans-

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<sup>3</sup>Some grandfathering applies to emission-intensive, trade-exposed companies, such as The Boeing Company, as was initially the case in the European Union Emissions Trading System (see Martin et al. 2014). A small and declining fraction of emissions can be offset, with Washington state following closely California’s protocol on the matter.

portation (expansion of public transport, free access for the youth), bicycle lanes, energy efficiency and renewable energy, conservation and habitat restoration, forest management and carbon sequestration, as well as data collection and monitoring of pollution. Overall, specific attention is given to overburdened communities: a minimum of 35% of auction revenues need to benefit vulnerable populations, and to engage with tribal communities when appropriate. Section 3.1 discusses descriptive statistics about appropriations and how they have been shared across the state.

It is not the case that all revenues are earmarked, however. In 2024, before the vote on I-2117, about 700,000 Washingtonians received a lump-sum transfer (or carbon dividend) on the order of \$200. This transfer specifically targeted low- and moderate-income individuals: eligible individuals must make less than 80% of the median income in their area.<sup>4</sup>

## 2.2 Initiative 2117

In Washington state, policy introduced through the state legislature can be challenged if enough signatures can be raised to have voters vote on an initiative to repeal the policy. More than 300,000 signatures were required for I-2117, based on turnout at the last gubernatorial election in Washington. A group named "Let's Go Washington," which was led by State representative Jim Walsh of the Republican party and a wealthy donor to conservative causes, Brian Heywood, sponsored six initiatives to the legislature, including one to repeal cap-and-invest. The group collected the required number of signatures by December 2023, so that the initiative was placed on the ballot in November 2024. The state legislature had the option to accept the initiatives without requiring a

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<sup>4</sup>The dividends were introduced in March 2024 through a vote in the state legislature and were operationalized through utilities. In April 2024, the state legislature set aside \$150 million for such dividends, to be delivered before September 15, 2024.

ballot measure. The legislature, controlled by the Democratic party, enacted three of the initiatives into law and took no action regarding the remaining three, including the initiative concerning cap-and-invest.<sup>5</sup>

The goal of I-2117 was not only to repeal the cap-and-invest policy but also to introduce language that would prohibit the use of cap and trade (or carbon taxation) in the state, in the present and in the future. Specifically, the ballot wording for the initiative was: "Initiative Measure No. 2117 concerns carbon tax credit trading. This measure would prohibit state agencies from imposing any type of carbon tax credit trading and repeal legislation establishing a cap-and-invest program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This measure would decrease funding for investments in transportation, clean air, renewable energy, conservation, and emissions reduction. Should this measure be enacted into law?"

Proponents of the initiative pointed to the amount of auction revenue raised by the policy (the rectangle in welfare analysis, see Kotchen 2025), and the increase in gas prices that the state experienced following the implementation of cap-and-invest. Gas prices in the state increased on the order of \$0.40, which is roughly consistent with a high degree of pass-through under the auction prices described in Section 2.1. Proponents of the initiative also highlighted declarations by Jay Inslee, governor of Washington state from 2013 to 2025, who suggested that any effect on gas prices would be marginal. The state never released an official calculation of how cap-and-invest would affect gas prices, though local media coverage pointed to likely effects on the order of \$0.40-0.50 per gallon of regular gas.<sup>6</sup> Proponents of the initiative also stressed

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<sup>5</sup>The other initiatives on the ballot were Initiative 2109 (I-2109), designed to repeal the capital gains tax, and Initiative 2124 (I-2124), designed to allow individuals to opt out of the state payroll tax and health service program.

<sup>6</sup>For instance, <https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/former-wsdot-economist-files-claim-against-state-over-forecasted-gas-prices/SMK3CPNYBBEEDJ5GLJWLJTRXZY/> and <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/gas-prices-or-pollution-the-high-dollar-fight->

that people need to drive to work, go to the grocery store, drop their kids off at school, and heat their homes, suggesting that cap-and-invest would not reduce emissions, but only raise revenues.

Proponents of cap-and-invest, and thus opponents of I-2117, included the governor, a few large corporations (including corporations that had previously opposed I-1631), environmental groups, and many grassroots organizations and tribal nations. Support from regular citizens and many grassroots organizations featured prominently in their campaign. The campaign also flipped the script on the cost of cap-and-invest, highlighting the cost of inaction with their slogan being "no to I-2117: we can't afford it" or "no to I-2117: a bad deal for Washington." From the point of view of the campaign, I-2117 would have made the state worse off, through higher congestion, less transit, less vehicle electrification, fewer green jobs, worse wildfires, and worse air pollution. In general, the campaign tended to focus on the benefits coming from the earmarking of revenues and less on climate mitigation.

Proponents of I-2117 outspent opponents by about \$8 million, \$23 million to \$15 million. On November 5, 2024, I-2117 was rejected with 61.95% of the votes against. Hence, cap-and-invest is currently still in place, although on April 8, 2025, the federal administration released an executive order "Protecting American Energy from state overreach," aimed at eliminating cap-and-trade schemes across the country, including Washington state's cap-and-invest.

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over-wa-cap-and-trade/ (last accessed, May 20, 2025). See also Myers (2022) for a report by the camp in favor of the initiative and opposed to cap-and-invest.

## 3 Design and Data

### 3.1 Administrative data on voting and census block group characteristics

In this section, we describe our approach to examining administrative data on voting behavior, following an established literature in the public choice tradition on the correlation between voters' characteristics and voting behavior. This literature has studied ballot initiatives in American jurisdictions, including on environmental topics, from early work by Deacon and Shapiro (1975), Fischel (1979), Kahn and Matsusaka (1997), and Kotchen and Powers (2006), to more recent studies such as Anderson et al. (2023), Epstein and Muehlegger (2024), and Navarro et al. (2024). Anderson et al. (2023) examine voters' rejection of Washington state's I-732 and I-1631 in 2016 and 2018, respectively. Similar studies have analyzed voting determinants for rejected carbon taxes in other contexts such as Switzerland (Bornstein and Lanz 2008).

In this analysis, we are interested in both the determinants of support and opposition to I-2117, as well as the change in support for carbon pricing between 2018 and 2024. We obtain administrative data at the census block level on yes-votes and turnout from Washington state's Secretary of State, and voter characteristics from the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS). We collapse the administrative data to the census block group level and match it to voter characteristics at the same level in the 2023 ACS. An important variable in our analysis is the census block group level Republican vote share in the 2024 presidential election, calculated as the number of Republican votes divided by total votes cast in the presidential race. For characteristics available only at the census tract level, we assign tract-level data to all block groups within that tract.



Following Anderson et al. (2023), we include voter characteristics such as vehicle ownership, commuting time, industry employment shares (manufacturing, construction, and transportation/utilities), dwelling size (number of rooms), age groups, gender, race, ethnicity, education, household size, and home ownership. We use proportions of categorical variables for commuting times, dwelling size, and education. Vehicle ownership data, available only at the census tract level, is assigned to its corresponding block groups.

We also incorporate cap-and-invest specific factors. Since farmers are exempted from the cap and thus eligible for fuel purchase reimbursements, we include the fraction of agricultural workers at the census tract level. Additionally, because a portion of the auction revenues were redistributed as dividends to low- and middle-income households, we control for the fraction below \$75,000.<sup>7</sup>

We analyze the voting data using five specifications as follows. First, we include only party affiliation. Second, we add census characteristics, following Anderson et al. (2023). Third, we add agricultural employment shares. Fourth, we add the fractions of low- and middle-income households. Our fifth specification includes all of the above factors: party affiliation, census characteristics, fraction of low- and middle-income households, and agricultural employment shares.

In additional specifications, we further expand the analysis to factors specific to cap-and-invest by including measures accounting for CCA-funded expenditures at the county level. We consider both a binary variable for whether a census block group is in a county that received fiscal year 2024 CCA expenditures, and a continuous variable capturing the amount of such expenditures. For continuous variables, we assign expenditures based on population, by assigning to each census block group the product of the

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<sup>7</sup>We set this limit based on the fact that the median income in Washington is \$94,605 (from the ACS in 2024), so that 80% of the median income is \$75,684.

proportion of the county population in the census block group and the total amount of CCA expenditures in the county.

To further understand the results of our analysis of voting behavior, we consider whether abstention may play a role, and in particular whether there were differential rates of abstention across years that could confound our main analysis.

### **3.2 Opinion polls**

To help contextualize the results of the analysis of voting behavior at the census block group level, we use the Cooperative Election Survey (CES) to help understand how support for climate policy has evolved in Washington relative to the rest of the country. For our measure of support over time, we use the question from the CES surveys from 2014 to 2023, “Give the Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.” Sample sizes, listed in Table A.1, range from 1,000 in 2018 to 64,600 in 2016. Smaller sample sizes in selected years do not appear to make the time series more volatile.

### **3.3 Proprietary survey**

Before the November vote on I-2117, we administered a survey to 1,754 American respondents who were recruited nationwide by a professional survey company. Given our specific focus on Washington state, which represents approximately 2% of the U.S. population, we oversampled this state, recruiting 875 respondents. This approach enables direct comparisons between Washington state and the rest of the country. In Appendix Section A.3, we compare the representativeness of our sample against actual population distributions for Washington state and the entire United States.

By October 2024, Washington residents were exposed to both cap-and-invest and the political discourse surrounding I-2117, whereas respondents from the rest of the country were generally unexposed to these specific influences. California, however, has operated under a cap-and-trade program since 2012; as such, we test the sensitivity of our results by excluding California in robustness tests.<sup>8</sup> We also note that Northeastern states are exposed to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which is a cap-and-trade scheme covering emissions from the power sector. However, since this program is not economy-wide, and research from Lang et al. (2021) indicates most voters in the Northeast are unaware of it, we do not omit these states from our analyses.

The survey begins with questions about respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics, including their state of residence. We then assess respondents’ knowledge about and familiarity with carbon pricing. Following this initial set of questions, we measure public support for carbon pricing using a design that randomly assigns respondents to one of four treatments. This design contrasts policy choices (carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade) and revenue distribution approaches (carbon dividends in the form of uniform per-capita redistribution versus earmarking for environmental purposes). The combination of cap and trade and environmental earmarking follows the design of Washington state’s cap-and-invest program. In Appendix Section A.3, we provide the balance of covariates across the four treatment arms.

We measure policy support in a binary way, as in a vote, and in line with many studies in the literature (see Carattini et al. 2018 for a review). Consistent with the stated preference literature, we also measure respondents’ certainty in their response concerning policy support. In addition, respondents answer an open-ended question to describe the effects they think the specific carbon pricing design to which they are assigned would have if adopted in their state. The survey then measures respondents’

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<sup>8</sup>There are 36 respondents from California in the sample.

exposure to carbon pricing, based on self-reported gas expenditures, heating expenditures, and the availability of public transportation in the area, among other factors. We also measure awareness of existing or planned carbon pricing schemes and any potential rebate programs in the respondents' state.

The specific open-ended question we asked respondents was, "If your state implements this policy, what effects do you think it would have?" The responses to this question are used to assess how (whether) respondents think about carbon pricing, and whether respondents in Washington state have different perceptions or mental models about the effects of carbon pricing from respondents elsewhere. Based on our experimental design, we can also compare responses based on the policy design to which respondents are exposed.

Based on a random sample of responses, we identified the following categories of responses to the open-ended question: uninformative (the response provides no benefits or costs of the policy and does not state an opinion); direct cost (the response states the policy will have one or more direct costs); direct benefit (the response states the policy will have one or more direct benefit); indirect impact (the response states the policy will cause something which will cause something else); other cost/benefit (the response provides a description of costs and/or benefits that does not fit into the previous categories); inequality (the response suggests that the policy will generate or alleviate some form of inequality); no effect (the response suggests that the policy will have no effects); general dislike (the response expresses dislike for the policy or states that it will anger people without giving any cost or benefit); general appreciation (the response expresses appreciation for the policy or states that it will help people without giving any cost or benefit). We then provided coding instructions to three domestic English-speaking freelancers (recruited via the platform Upwork) to code the entire set

of responses. We provide the coding instructions in Appendix Section A.3.5.

The survey concludes with a module that collects additional characteristics for the respondents. Using the scale in Falk et al. (2023), we elicit respondents’ risk and time preferences. Using the Big Five Inventory (John et al. 2012), we record respondents’ altruism and uncertainty management capabilities. Using the scale in Kemper et al. (2017), we measure respondents’ levels of optimism and pessimism. Finally, we use the scale in Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) to measure respondents’ cognitive abilities. We also measure political affiliation, trust in various institutions (including the press, television, state governments, the federal government, and scientists), perceived inequalities, and plans to vote in the 2024 cycle. Appendix A.3.4 includes the full instrument.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Voting

This section presents our results regarding voting behavior on I-2117 and on changes in the support of carbon pricing between I-1631 and I-2117. Ancillary results and robustness tests are provided in Section B.1, which also includes maps of the opposition to I-2117, support for I-1631, and changes in support for carbon pricing between I-1631 and I-2117 across census block groups (Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3, respectively).

We begin by documenting how characteristics of census block groups correlate with voting behavior on I-2117 in 2024, utilizing the five specifications outlined in Section 3.1. The results are reported in Table 1.

First, we simply identify the association between census block groups’ Republican

vote shares in the 2024 presidential election and "no" votes for I-2117. Not surprisingly, Republican census block groups are 80.6 percentage points less likely to vote against the initiative, with party affiliation explaining over 94.5% of the observed variation across census block groups, as shown in column (1). This result remains consistent in column (2) when controlling for census block group characteristics from the U.S. Census Bureau as described in Section 3.1. The coefficients for all census characteristics are provided in Table B.1 in the Appendix.

The remaining columns of Table 1 explore the role of additional census block group-level characteristics and their correlation with public support. As discussed in Section 2, since farmers were exempt from the cap and thus eligible for fuel purchase reimbursements, we control for the share of agricultural workers at the census tract level, in column (3). The coefficient for Republican vote share remains virtually the same, and we observe no effect of the share of farmers. Further, to account for the revenues that were redistributed back to low- and middle-income households, we control for the percentage of households under 80% of the state's median income, as described in Section 3.1. Once more, the coefficient for the Republican vote share is quantitatively unchanged. We observe a small but significant positive correlation between the proportion of households making less than \$75,000 and support for carbon pricing in column (4). Finally, when we include both the share of agricultural workers and the share of households under 80% of the state median income in the same specification, the correlations remain unchanged in column (5).

In Table B.2 we also include appropriations from the CCA, another factor specific to cap-and-invest. Our main finding concerning the role of partisanship is unaffected, whereas the presence or level of appropriations does not seem to matter across all specifications.

Table 1: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group Level (2024)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
Republican	-0.806*** (0.012)	-0.821*** (0.018)	-0.821*** (0.019)	-0.817*** (0.017)	-0.817*** (0.017)
Pct. Farmer			0.009 (0.010)		0.006 (0.009)
AMI 80 (Less than 75k)				0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)
Constant	0.934*** (0.003)	1.039*** (0.023)	1.039*** (0.023)	1.005*** (0.024)	1.005*** (0.024)
Observations	5296	5284	5284	5284	5284
$R^2$	0.945	0.971	0.971	0.972	0.972

**Note:** This table shows coefficient estimates from OLS regressions modeling share voting in support of carbon pricing (against I-2117) in 2024 as a function of ideology, demographics, and other factors. Republican measures the share voting for the Republican party in the 2024 presidential election. Pct. Farmer measures the share of people working in agriculture. AMI 80 (Less than 75k) measures the share of people under 80% of the state's median income. Column (1) is the first specification using only party affiliation as described in Section 4.1. Column (2) adds census characteristics to the first specification. Column (3) adds agricultural employment shares to the second specification. Column (4) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the second specification. Column (5) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the third specification. Clustered standard errors are provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table 2 turns to the difference between I-2117 and I-1631, using the same structure as in Table 1. Here, the dependent variable is the fraction of no-votes against I-2117 minus the fraction of yes-votes for I-1631, so that a positive coefficient indicates an increase in support for carbon pricing. Coefficients for all census characteristics are provided in Table B.3 in the Appendix. Table B.4 also includes variables for appropriations. Whether controlling for appropriations or not, once we control for census characteristics, we find that partisanship does not correlate with the change in support for carbon pricing observed between 2018 (vote on carbon taxation with environmental earmarking) and 2024 (vote on cap-and-invest). In column (1), without any census controls, support among Republican-leaning census block groups actually increases by 8.3 percentage points. Overall, Tables 1 and 2 show that, while partisanship is a key determinant of support for carbon pricing, it does not play much of a role in explaining the change in support between 2018 (before carbon pricing was implemented) and 2024 (after carbon pricing was implemented). If anything, unconditionally, we observe an effect of partisanship on the change in support that is opposite to its effect on the level of support.

To explore heterogeneity in how partisanship correlates with the change in support, Figure 1 plots the change in vote share between I-2117 (in favor of cap-and-invest) and I-1631 (carbon taxation with environmental earmarking) against the Republican vote share in the 2024 presidential election. The change in support for carbon pricing is bounded between 11 to 22 percentage points, with moderate census block groups seeing the largest gains in support. Thus, we observe that experience with carbon pricing increases support for carbon pricing across the board: partisanship does not seem to mediate the effect of experience on support.

This result runs contrary to Anderson et al. (2023), where support between the




Table 2: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the Census Block Group level (2024 minus 2018)

	Party (1)	+Census (2)	+Pct. Farmer (3)	+Income (4)	Pct. Farmer + Income (5)
Republican	0.083** (0.039)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)
Pct. Farmer			-0.001 (0.012)		-0.002 (0.011)
AMI 80 (Less than 75k)				0.003 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)
Constant	0.161*** (0.017)	0.308*** (0.052)	0.308*** (0.052)	0.306*** (0.049)	0.306*** (0.049)
Observations	5296	5284	5284	5284	5284
$R^2$	0.083	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376

**Note:** This table shows coefficient estimates from OLS regressions modeling the change in share voting in support of carbon pricing in 2024 (against I-2117) minus 2018 (in support of I-1631) as a function of ideology, demographics, and other factors. Republican measures the share voting for the Republican party in the 2024 presidential election. Pct. Farmer measures the share of people working in agriculture. AMI 80 measures the share of people under 80% of the state’s median income. Column (1) is the first specification using only party affiliation as described in Section 4.1. Column (2) adds census characteristics to the first specification. Column (3) adds agricultural employment shares to the second specification. Column (4) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the second specification. Column (5) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the third specification. Clustered standard errors are provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Figure 1: Voting Behavior: Change in Vote Share on Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117 in 2024 Minus For I-1631 in 2018) Versus Republican Vote Share in the 2024 Presidential Election By Decile



**Note:** This figure plots changes in average “no” votes for I-2117 (votes in favor of cap-and-invest) relative to “yes” votes for I-1631 (votes in favor of carbon taxation with environmental earmarking) by decile of the Republican vote share in the 2024 presidential election. Each decile contains census block groups that together add up to one-tenth of the total number of census block groups in Washington state. We sort census block groups from the lowest to the highest Republican vote share and then determine decile cutoffs. In addition, we display 95% confidence interval bands.

revenue-neutral I-732 and the green-new-deal-like I-1631 changed along party lines. In our analysis, the use of revenues remained largely the same. But, what differs in our context is that voters had direct experience with the policy under consideration, which may act to mute polarizing political discourse that would otherwise drive voters' views on support. The prior literature has shown that the ordering of information provision, partisan versus non-partisan, matters for the formation of opinions (Kashner and Stalinski 2024). In particular, once issues become partisan, information provision may or may not reduce polarization (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Kahan et al. 2012; Chen 2022; Pennycook and Rand 2022; Druckman 2023; Long et al. 2023; Zhang and Rand 2023; Tessler et al. 2024; Voelkel et al. 2024), and can even increase it in some cases (Baysan 2022). Our results show though that persistent polarization may not be inevitable because the effect of experience is to a large extent non-partisan. In our context, voters are exposed first to (partisan) information, ahead of the ballots in 2016 and 2018, then to direct experience, and then to (partisan) information again in 2024. A clear partisan divide can be observed in the 2018 vote on I-1631. A partisan divide remains in 2024, but with an increased share of support coming from Republican-leaning areas.

A potential confound for our result is that voting on I-2117 occurred during a Presidential election year, while voting on I-1631 coincided with midterm elections. As such, the types of voters that turned out for I-2117 and I-1631 may be different, as turnout is generally higher during Presidential election years.


To explore this alternative hypothesis, we first test whether differences in turnout between 2018 and 2024 correlate with partisanship. In Figure 2, we plot the difference in turnout versus the Republican vote share in the 2024 Presidential election.<sup>9</sup> There, we observe the slight expected increase in turnout during the Presidential election but also

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<sup>9</sup>Our measure of turnout includes both showing up to vote and casting a ballot on the initiative (i.e., it accounts for abstention).

that the change in turnout does not appear to be completely orthogonal to partisanship.

Figure 2: Difference in Turnout by Republican Vote Share Decile



**Note:** This figure plots the change in turnout by decile of Republican vote share in the 2024 Presidential election. Change in turnout is calculated as the difference between turnout on I-2117 and support on I-1631. Turnout for each election is defined as:

$$\frac{\text{number of votes for initiative}}{\text{number of registered voters in the year of initiative}}.$$

Each decile contains census block groups that together add up to one-tenth of the total number of census block groups in Washington state. We sort census block groups from the lowest to the highest Republican vote share and then determine decile cutoffs.

To determine whether this correlation in turnout with partisanship can account for our results, we conduct a bounding exercise on the effect of experience. Specifically, to estimate a lower bound on the role of experience, we assume that the increased turnout was driven by new voters that all supported I-2117. To do so, we subtract the change in the number of ballots from the change in votes in support for carbon pricing, and then divide this number by the total number of votes for I-2117:

$$\frac{[(\# \text{ no votes in I-2117} - \# \text{ yes votes in I-1631}) - (\# \text{ ballots cast in 2024} - \# \text{ ballots cast in 2018})]}{\text{total votes for I-2117}}.$$


To calculate an upper bound, we proceed similarly, but instead assume that all new voters opposed I-2117:

$$\frac{[(\# \text{ no votes in I-2117} - \# \text{ yes votes in I-1631}) + (\# \text{ ballots cast in 2024} - \# \text{ ballots cast in 2018})]}{\text{total votes for I-2117}}.$$

Figure 3 plots these upper and lower bounds by decile of Republican vote share, showing that the effect of experience is substantial on average: it accounts for at least 5-10% of the change in support except for in the most Republican-leaning deciles. Thus, it is only in these districts, and under an extreme assumption about who turns out in Presidential elections, that we can rule out a role for experience.

Another possible concern is that we are not picking up the effect of experience but instead status quo bias. Intuitively, if a majority of voters are subject to status quo bias, we would observe an increase in support for carbon pricing: a vote in 2018 for the status quo is against carbon pricing, and a vote in 2024 for the status quo is in support of carbon pricing. However, in 2018, 56.56% of voters opposed I-1631 and thus supported the status quo. But in 2024, 61.95% of voters opposed I-2117 and thus supported the status quo, a difference of 5.39%. We would therefore need a substantial increase in the fraction of voters subject to status quo bias to explain the observed pattern, even under the extreme assumption that all voters who opposed carbon pricing in 2018 also opposed its repeal in 2024.

Figure 3: Lower Bound and Upper Bound of Change in Support Driven by Experience by Republican Vote Share Decile



**Note:** This figure plots changes in average “no” votes for I-2117 (votes in favor of cap-and-invest) relative to “yes” votes for I-1631 (votes in favor of carbon taxation with environmental earmarking) that either cannot be attributed to the increase in turnout (lower bound) or would result from the entirety of the increase in turnout to vote against I-2117 (upper bound), by decile of the Republican vote share in the 2024 presidential election. Each decile contains census block groups that together add up to one-tenth of the total number census of block groups in Washington. We sort census block groups from the lowest to the highest Republican vote share and then determine decile cutoffs. In addition, we include 95% confidence interval bands. The formula used to calculate the lower bound is:

$$\frac{[(\# \text{ no votes in I-2117} - \# \text{ yes votes in I-1631}) - (\# \text{ ballots cast in 2024} - \# \text{ ballots cast in 2018})]}{\text{total votes for I-2117}}.$$

The formula used to calculate the upper bound is:

$$\frac{[(\# \text{ no votes in I-2117} - \# \text{ yes votes in I-1631}) + (\# \text{ ballots cast in 2024} - \# \text{ ballots cast in 2018})]}{\text{total votes for I-2117}}.$$

In Section 4.2, we leverage opinion polls to rule out another possible explanation for our results – that support for climate policy in general increased over our time frame within Washington state and the rest of the country.


## 4.2 Opinion polls

In this section, we use survey data from the CES to investigate the evolution of public support for climate policy over time, both in Washington state and in the rest of the country. The goal is to see whether or not the sharp increase in support for carbon pricing we observed in Section 4.1 reflects a broader, secular trend taking place throughout the country, leading to higher support for climate policy independent of the experience with carbon pricing that voters in Washington state acquired. Our approach allows us to approximate the causal analysis of public support (Carattini et al. 2024) in the absence of a baseline, relying on opinion polls as time machines.

The CES allows us to track support for climate policy over time, leveraging the same question and a relatively large sample for Washington state and the rest of the country. Figure 4 shows the evolution of public support for climate policy in general in Washington state and the rest of the United States between 2014 and 2024. The top panel pools all responses by geography, while the bottom panel differentiates between Democrats and Republicans. In Panel (a) of Figure 4, we observe that public support remained quite constant over time both within Washington state and in the rest of the country, with very similar levels of support across geographies. Similar evidence is provided in Panel (b), where we do not identify any specific pattern affecting Democrats and Republicans differentially, including when comparing across geographies.

Given how similar public support is in Washington state and the rest of the country in the pre-period, we rely on a simple comparison of average support, without involving

Figure 4: Opinion Poll: Support for Climate Regulation over Time (CES)



**Note:** This figure plots the level of support for climate regulation for Washington (black line) and the rest of the country (gray line) from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Panel (a) shows pooled responses, and Panel (b) shows responses conditional on political affiliation (solid line for Republicans, dashed line for Democrats). The plot shows the fraction of supportive responses to the following question: “Give the Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.”

synthetic methods.

In Figure B.5, we extend the analysis to support for environmental policy in general, including the Clean Air Act, which targets local air pollution, and the Clean Water Act, which targets local water pollution. Once more, we observe in Panel (a) that support in Washington state and in the rest of the country is very similar over time. We also do not have much evidence of an effect of experiencing cap-and-invest on support for environmental policy at large in Washington state. In Panel (b) in Figure B.5, we also do not identify any specific pattern that affects Democrats and Republicans differentially, including when comparing across geographies.

The fact that public support remained largely constant over time implies that the change in support observed in Section 4.1 between I-1631 and I-2117 is not driven by a change in support for climate policy in general, or environmental policy in general, as



measured by the CES. Rather, the level of support for carbon pricing in Washington state, particularly cap-and-invest, moved closer to the level of support for climate policy in general, as expressed in opinion polls.

### 4.3 Proprietary survey

In this section, we leverage our proprietary survey to buttress the evidence for the role of experience established in the previous sections. In particular, our survey measures support for four different policy designs for carbon pricing, including cap-and-invest, which goes beyond what existing opinion polls offer.

We start by comparing public support, measured through a binary variable that proxies an actual vote, between Washington state and the rest of the country for the four different carbon pricing designs measured by our survey: carbon tax and dividend, carbon tax with environmental earmarking, cap and dividend, and cap-and-invest. The summary statistics are provided in Table 3.

Three observations follow from Table 3. First, support for carbon tax and dividend, carbon tax with environmental earmarking, and cap and dividend are generally similar between Washington state and the rest of the country. Second, support for cap-and-invest is substantially higher in Washington state than in the rest of the country, as well as when compared to the other carbon pricing designs, both within Washington state and in the rest of the country. Third, support for cap-and-invest is slightly lower than observed in the rejection of I-2117, but we note that our survey was conducted several weeks before the vote.

We confirm the finding that the increase in support for carbon pricing is unique to cap-and-invest within Washington in a regression that includes a standard set of control

Table 3: Proprietary Survey: Summary Statistics for Public Support

Design	Washington (1)	Rest of the country (2)
Carbon Tax and Dividend	0.486 (0.501) [218]	0.443 (0.498) [221]
Carbon Tax and Environmental Earmark	0.456 (0.499) [217]	0.471 (0.500) [221]
Cap and Dividend	0.441 (0.498) [220]	0.431 (0.496) [218]
Cap and Invest	0.536 (0.500) [220]	0.447 (0.498) [219]

**Note:** This table reports average public support for carbon pricing across policy designs and geographies. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses, and the number of observations is provided in brackets. The first column shows support only for respondents in Washington state, and the second column shows support for respondents from the rest of the country.

variables and clusters at the level of the treatment to exposure to the policy, namely, the state. The estimates of the main coefficients of interest are provided in Table 4. We report estimates for the remaining variables in Table B.5 in Appendix B.3.1.

Column (1) in Table 4 indicates that respondents in Washington state are substantially more supportive of cap-and-invest relative to respondents in the rest of the country. Importantly, this finding allows us to reconcile the evidence provided in Figures 1 and 4. Rather than the increase in support in Washington state reflecting some broad increase in support for climate policy across time, it is instead specific to the exact policy design to which voters were exposed. Carbon pricing generally receives lower support among the general public than other forms of climate policy (see Carattini et al. 2018). However, experience brings support for cap-and-invest closer to that for climate policy in general, as measured in Section 4.2.

Table 4: Proprietary Survey: Public Support

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.143** (0.060)	0.101 (0.063)	0.132* (0.075)
Washington	-0.061* (0.031)	0.008 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.044)
Cap and Invest	-0.019 (0.060)	-0.002 (0.062)	0.014 (0.074)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1189	838	566
$R^2$	0.112	0.144	0.195

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the cap-and-invest treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we rely on our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent’s support is measured in Question 16 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

In columns (2) and (3), we restrict our sample to individuals whose certainty in expressing support or opposition with carbon pricing is relatively high (5 or above and 6 and above on a 7-point Likert-scale), in line with standard approaches in stated preference research (Johnston et al. 2017). Within these subsamples, we continue to find that respondents in Washington state are more supportive of cap-and-invest compared with respondents in the rest of the country, although one coefficient is less precisely estimated. We further show that our results in Table 4 are robust to a very conservative specification in which we treat respondents who do not know whether to support or oppose as respondents who oppose. The idea is that respondents may prefer to indicate that they are unsure rather than to indicate opposition because of social desirability bias. We do so in Table B.6: the coefficient of interest gets smaller, as may be expected, but remains significant. Conversely, estimates tend to be larger when restricting to likely voters, as shown in Table B.7. Further, as shown in Table B.8, our findings also extend to a less demanding question for survey respondents, which does not require them to determine whether they would support the carbon pricing design to which they are exposed, but to state whether they generally think of it as a good idea.

In addition to measures of support, our survey elicited open-ended perceptions about the effects of the various carbon pricing schemes. In Table B.9, we investigate how these perceptions differ between Washington state and the rest of the country, and in particular how the perceptions differ for respondents in Washington state exposed to questions about cap-and-invest.

Consistent with the results of Table 4, we observe that respondents in Washington state share different perceptions when asked about cap-and-invest compared with respondents in the rest of the country. In particular, we observe a statistically significantly lower propensity to share general dislike, a result that is also robust to multiple

hypothesis testing over the nine specifications. This difference in statements is consistent with voters in Washington state having different beliefs about cap-and-invest compared to other designs and to voters in the rest of the country.

Next, we explore whether respondents in Washington state differ from those in the rest of the country in terms of how they engage with climate change and climate policy in general. We leverage responses in the initial blocks of the survey, before randomization occurs and thus before respondents are provided information about one particular carbon pricing design. We begin by examining the frequency with which respondents in Washington state versus the rest of the country discuss climate change and climate policy. In Table B.10, we do not observe any statistically significant pattern. We do observe larger effects in terms of perceived knowledge and preparedness, as shown in Table 5 (Table B.11 displays the coefficients for all control variables). At the same time, voters in Washington state are less interested in reading (more) news about carbon pricing, as shown in Table B.12. Further, we do not find any statistically significant pattern when inquiring about whether the government is doing enough to mitigate the effects of climate change, as shown in Table B.13. Taken together, these results suggest that respondents in Washington state may be more knowledgeable about climate issues, but that general support for climate action is not affected by experience with cap-and-invest, consistent with the evidence in Section 4.2.

The estimates presented thus far are robust to the exclusion of respondents from California, given the rationale described in Section 3.3. The corresponding estimates are provided in Tables B.14 to Table B.19. The estimates presented thus far are also robust to the use of non-linear models. The corresponding estimates are provided in Tables B.21 to B.26.

Finally, we explore potential heterogeneous treatment effects in the support for car-

Table 5: Proprietary Survey: Perceived Knowledge of and Preparedness to Vote on Carbon Pricing

	Knowledge (1)	Preparedness (2)
Washington	0.119* (0.061)	0.195*** (0.062)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	1754
$R^2$	0.114	0.099

**Note:** This table reports estimates for the perceived knowledge of and the perceived preparedness to vote on carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Perceived knowledge and preparedness are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating very limited knowledge or not at all prepared, respectively, and 7 indicating a great deal of knowledge or very prepared, respectively. Specific wording can be found in Questions 12 and 14 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

bon pricing by political preference, personal preferences, personal traits, socioeconomic indicators, awareness of cap and trade, and measures of carbon footprint. We do so in Tables B.28 to B.35. More details about how we split the sample for each variable are provided in Appendix Section B.3.4, although we generally aim to split the sample into roughly two even subsamples. Consistent with the evidence provided in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we observe a positive interaction between cap-and-invest and Washington state for Democrats and Republicans alike, although the coefficient for the latter is less precisely estimated. That is, supporters of either major party in Washington state tend to be more inclined to support cap-and-invest than those outside of Washington state and those in Washington state that are asked about a different policy design. The effect of experience with cap-and-invest is stronger for respondents who describe themselves as Democrats than those who describe themselves as Republicans, but insignificantly so. Section B.3.4 reports estimates for other margins of heterogeneity, for completeness.

Overall, this section provides evidence that complements that of Sections 4.1 and 4.2, indicating that the effect of experience identified in Section 4.1 is specific to cap-and-invest and does not extend to other policy designs for carbon pricing, or to demand for other forms of climate action in general.

## 5 Conclusions

There is the understanding, at least in some circles, that carbon pricing may be a "toxic" policy proposition because of its ex-ante unpopularity. Despite the presence of at least moderate levels of carbon pricing in more than 70 jurisdictions around the world, which cover almost a third of global greenhouse gas emissions, prominent examples of setbacks (including in France and Canada where carbon taxes were repealed after having quickly escalated to high levels of stringency) may dominate the narrative about carbon pricing's viability.

In this paper, we examine the implementation of cap-and-invest in Washington state, a cap-and-trade scheme which earmarks revenues for environmental purposes that came about via the state legislature after several unsuccessful attempts to introduce carbon pricing in the state through ballot measures. We compare voting behavior in a 2018 unsuccessful initiative aimed at introducing a carbon tax with revenues earmarked for environmental purposes with voting behavior in a 2024 unsuccessful attempt at repealing cap-and-invest. Support for carbon pricing increased considerably between the two periods, with the observed changes in support being relatively similar in more Republican-leaning and more Democratic-leaning census block groups. This finding suggests that experiencing a policy directly can overcome its ex-ante unpopularity, and that political partisanship does not hinder this process. The analysis of time series

from opinion polls shows that nationwide secular trends do not drive the change in public support observed in voting behavior. A proprietary survey allows us to go one step further, showing that the effect of experience is specific to cap-and-invest, with respondents in Washington state being more supportive of this policy design, relative to respondents from the rest of the country and those exposed to alternative designs.

Our findings support the use of trial periods in policymaking, including for policies that are ex-ante unpopular. Such trial periods can potentially overcome partisan differences in support, boosting support among all voters equally. Over time, by overcoming policy-specific partisan disagreements, experience may also favor dialogue across party lines on a broader set of topics.

Looking forward, the campaign supporting cap-and-invest focused substantially on the benefits of raising auction revenues and earmarking them for environmental purposes. Such benefits, however, may decline over time as the most urgent needs are met, while costs rise as the cap shrinks and the policy becomes increasingly ambitious (as currently implemented). With voters in Washington state expressing higher support for cap-and-invest over other designs, we provide evidence for the effect of direct experience in increasing support for this policy design. However, we also note experience's inability to reduce skepticism towards carbon pricing more generally, which has implications for potential changes in design towards revenue neutrality as the ambition (and cost) of the policy increases.



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# Appendix


## A Additional data description

As mentioned in Section 3, this Appendix section provides additional information on the datasets used in our analysis, namely administrative voting data, census block group characteristics, opinion polls, and the proprietary survey.

### A.1 Administrative data on voting and census block group characteristics


Following the discussion in Section 3.1, supplemental information on administrative voting data and census block group characteristics is discussed in what follows. Figures A.1 to A.3 show the distribution of appropriations at the county level.

Figure A.1: Voting Behavior: Histogram of Fiscal Year 2024 CCA Expenditures




**Note:** This figure shows the distribution of total CCA expenditures in millions of dollars at the county level.

Figure A.2: Voting Behavior: Histogram of Total CCA Appropriations



**Note:** This figure shows the distribution of total CCA appropriations in millions of dollars at the county level.

Figure A.3: Voting Behavior: Histogram of Total CCA Projects



**Note:** This figure shows the distribution of total CCA projects at the county level.

## A.2 Opinion polls

Following the discussion in Section 3.2, supplemental information on nationwide support for climate policy as observed in opinion polls is discussed in what follows. In particular, we provide sample sizes for the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CES) used to map carbon pricing support over time in Figure 4. We use surveys from 2014 to 2023, with sample sizes ranging from 1,000 in 2018 to 64,600 in 2016.

Table A.1: Cooperative Election Survey Sample Sizes

CCES Year	Washington	Rest of Country	Total
2014	1,323	54,677	56,000
2015	298	13,952	14,250
2016	1,444	63,156	64,600
2017	389	17,811	18,200
2018	25	975	1,000
2019	442	17,558	18,000
2020	1,374	59,626	61,000
2021	641	25,059	25,700
2022	1,275	58,725	60,000
2023	566	23,934	24,500

**Note:** This table reports the sample sizes in the Cooperative Election Survey for the years 2014-2023. The samples are split between Washington and the rest of the country. The CES is a national survey administered by YouGov. For a more detailed description of the sampling methodology, see Kuriwaki (2024).

### **A.3 Proprietary survey**

Following the discussion in Section 3.3, supplemental information about our proprietary survey, including power calculations, comparison with the underlying population, balance of covariates, the full survey instrument, and instructions for freelancers coding statements about perceptions and mental models, is provided in what follows.

#### **A.3.1 Power calculations**

Here, we briefly present the power calculations for our  $4 \times 1$  design, adjusted for ex post data. In particular, we utilize data from our proprietary survey ( $N = 1754$ ) to determine standard deviations and the proportion of variance in support of carbon pricing designs. Specifically, we use the standard deviation of 0.50 in the share of "yes" votes on questions eliciting support for specific carbon pricing designs. We also know that 8.13% of the variance in our outcome can be explained by demographic covariates. Based on these parameters, at 80% statistical power and 5% level of significance, with 1,754 respondents, our experiment has a minimum detectable effect size of 0.074.

#### **A.3.2 Comparison with the underlying population**

In this section, we compare the characteristics of our respondents from Washington state with those of the state's population, and compare the characteristics of our respondents from the rest of the country with those of the country's population. We do so in Table A.2. Our samples are generally representative of the underlying populations. Not surprisingly, we observe deviations at the extremes of the income distribution.

Table A.2: Comparison of the Proprietary Survey Sample with the Underlying Population

	Washington		Rest of the Country	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Age</b>				
18-34	29.7%	28.00%	28.9%	29.92%
35-64	48.6%	51.31%	48.5%	49.03%
65+	21.7%	20.69%	22.6%	21.05%
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	49.6%	48.11%	49.8%	48.69%
Female	49.6%	50.74%	49.8%	50.74%
Other	0.8%	1.14%	0.4%	0.57%
<b>Education</b>				
HS Grad or Less	31.4%	25.94%	37.5%	32.08%
Some College	20.9%	23.31%	19.7%	23.89%
Associates Degree	10.0%	14.06%	9.2%	10.47%
College 4 Year Degree	22.7%	21.71%	20.2%	21.16%
Postgraduate Degree	15.0%	14.97%	13.3%	12.40%
<b>Income</b>				
< \$10,000	1.3%	11.66%	1.5%	10.24%
\$10,000 – \$14,999	1.1%	6.17%	1.7%	5.57%
\$15,000 – \$24,999	3.2%	9.26%	5.9%	11.04%
\$25,000 – \$34,999	7.2%	10.40%	11.0%	10.24%
\$35,000 – \$49,999	16.0%	10.51%	18.9%	14.79%
\$50,000 – \$74,999	23.5%	20.11%	24.6%	19.00%
\$75,000 – \$99,999	15.4%	10.06%	13.4%	12.86%
> \$100,000	32.2%	19.55%	23.0%	14.33%
N		875		879

**Note:** This table reports the distribution of demographic characteristics among the underlying population alongside the recorded distribution in our samples for Washington state and the rest of the United States, respectively. All demographic distribution estimates for the underlying populations are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. For additional information on gender, information from the University of California Los Angeles School of Law’s Williams Institute is used.

### A.3.3 Balance of covariates

As described in Section 3.3, the survey includes a  $4 \times 1$  experimental design, with equal-sized samples of Washington state and the rest of the country. Hence, in this section, we compare the characteristics of respondents across the corresponding eight nodes. We present this information in Tables A.3 and A.4 for Washington state and the rest of the country, respectively. In Washington state and across the rest of the country, our treatments are balanced across age, gender, education, and income.



Table A.3: Balance Test Across Four Treatment Arms, Washington

	CTD	CTEE	CD	CI
<b>Age</b>				
18-34	27.52%	26.73%	28.18%	29.55%
35-64	51.83%	52.07%	51.36%	50.00%
65+	20.64%	21.20%	20.45%	20.45%
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	46.33%	48.39%	48.18%	49.55%
Female	52.29%	50.69%	50.45%	99.55%
Other	1.38%	0.92%	1.36%	0.91%
<b>Education</b>				
HS Grad or Less	26.61%	23.04%	28.64%	25.45%
Some College	27.06%	24.88%	21.82%	19.55%
Associates Degree	11.47%	14.29%	13.18%	17.27%
College 4 Year Degree	16.97%	23.04%	24.55%	22.27%
Postgraduate Degree	17.89%	14.75%	11.82%	15.45%
<b>Income</b>				
< \$10,000	9.63%	10.14%	14.55%	12.27%
\$10,000 – \$14,999	5.05%	7.37%	4.55%	7.73%
\$15,000 – \$24,999	8.26%	8.76%	10.91%	9.09%
\$25,000 – \$34,999	11.47%	11.52%	12.27%	6.36%
\$35,000 – \$49,999	10.55%	10.14%	11.36%	10.00%
\$50,000 – \$74,999	20.64%	19.82%	20.45%	19.55%
\$75,000 – \$99,999	11.01%	12.44%	7.27%	9.55%
> \$100,000	20.19%	17.51%	16.36%	24.09%
N	218	217	220	220

**Note:** This table reports the balance test for gender across the four treatment arms: Carbon Tax and Dividend (CTD), Cap and Trade with Environmental Earmarking (CTEE), Cap and Dividend (CD), and Cap and Invest (CI), for the Washington state sample. The distribution of demographics is not statistically different along treatment arms: age ( $\chi^2 = 0.4825$ ,  $p = 0.998$ ), gender ( $\chi^2 = 0.8064$ ,  $p = 0.992$ ), education ( $\chi^2 = 13.2784$ ,  $p = 0.349$ ), and income ( $\chi^2 = 25.6732$ ,  $p = 0.692$ ). These  $\chi^2$  tests are joint tests of independence between each demographic variable and each treatment assignment, evaluating whether the overall distribution of the variable is the same across all four treatment arms.

Table A.4: Balance Test Across Four Treatment Arms, Rest of the Country

	CTD	CTEE	CD	CI
<b>Age</b>				
18-34	30.77%	31.22%	29.36%	28.31%
35-64	48.42%	48.42%	49.08%	50.23%
65+	20.81%	20.36%	21.56%	21.46%
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	50.23%	48.87%	48.17%	47.49%
Female	48.87%	50.68%	51.38%	52.05%
Other	0.90%	0.45%	0.46%	0.46%
<b>Education</b>				
HS Grad or Less	28.96%	32.58%	32.57%	34.25%
Some College	26.70%	23.08%	22.02%	23.74%
Associates Degree	9.50%	11.76%	11.47%	9.13%
College 4 Year Degree	24.43%	18.10%	22.02%	20.09%
Postgraduate Degree	10.41%	14.48%	11.93%	12.79%
<b>Income</b>				
< \$10,000	9.05%	10.86%	9.17%	11.87%
\$10,000 – \$14,999	5.43%	5.88%	7.34%	3.65%
\$15,000 – \$24,999	11.76%	9.05%	12.84%	10.50%
\$25,000 – \$34,999	10.41%	13.12%	10.09%	7.31%
\$35,000 – \$49,999	13.57%	15.84%	16.97%	12.79%
\$50,000 – \$74,999	16.29%	18.55%	18.81%	22.37%
\$75,000 – \$99,999	15.38%	10.41%	11.01%	14.61%
> \$100,000	15.83%	14.03%	12.84%	14.61%
N	221	221	218	219

**Note:** This table reports the balance test for gender across the four treatment arms: Cap and Trade with Dividend (CTD), Cap and Trade with Environmental Earmarking (CTEE), Cap and Dividend (CD), and Cap and Invest (CI), for the non-Washington state sample. The distribution of demographics is not statistically different along treatment arms: age ( $\chi^2 = 0.5893$ ,  $p = 0.997$ ), gender ( $\chi^2 = 1.0170$ ,  $p = 0.985$ ), education ( $\chi^2 = 7.1059$ ,  $p = 0.851$ ), and income ( $\chi^2 = 26.2969$ ,  $p = 0.660$ ). These  $\chi^2$  tests are joint tests of independence between each demographic variable and each treatment assignment, evaluating whether the overall distribution of the variable is the same across all four treatment arms.

### **A.3.4 Full survey instrument**

In this section, we provide the full survey instrument administered to respondents online through a professional survey company.

#### **BLOCK0: Consent**

You are about to participate in a survey that is expected to take about 15 minutes, and for which you will be paid \$4. The data collected from the survey are completely anonymous and cannot be used to identify you. Please express your opinions freely. This is a public opinion survey and there are no right or wrong answers. We encourage you to take your household budget into account when answering our questions, and to treat your answers as if they could have actual consequences on the design and implementation of policies in your state and country.

You do not have to be in this study. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. You may exit the survey at any time, but will only receive payment after completing the survey in full (except for questions on political leaning and affiliation, which are optional).

This study is being conducted by Georgia State University. It has been approved by the Institutional Review Board of Georgia State University. They can be contacted at [irb@gsu.edu](mailto:irb@gsu.edu) if you wish to express concerns. If you have any questions or concerns, you can also contact the researchers at [scarattini@gsu.edu](mailto:scarattini@gsu.edu).

By clicking the next icon below, you are providing your consent to participate. By participating in this survey, you become eligible for a possible follow-up survey in the future.

*Page break.*

## **BLOCK1: Initial socioeconomic characteristics**

Q1. Please enter your age:

*Values: 0-99*

Q2. How do you currently describe yourself?

- a. Male
- b. Female
- c. Non-binary
- d. Other
- e. Prefer not to say

Q3. What is your highest attained education level?

- a. Have not attained high school diploma or equivalent
- b. High school diploma or equivalent
- c. Some college credit but no degree
- d. Associate's degree
- e. Bachelor's degree
- f. Master's degree
- g. Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, JD)
- h. Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)

Q4. Please select the state where you reside:

*Dropdown menu with list of states.*

Q5. Please select the county where you reside:

*Dropdown menu with list of counties in the state selected under Q4.*

Q6. How many members does your household have?

a. Adults: 0-10

b. Minors: 0-10

Q7. Which of the following best describes your current employment status:

a. Employed full-time

b. Employed part-time

c. Retired

d. A student

e. Unemployed but looking for work

f. Unemployed but not currently looking for work

g. Other

*Page break.*

## **BLOCK2: Stage of belief formation**

We are interested in whether and how you think about economic policies. One type of economic policy is climate policy, categorizing policies aimed at tackling climate change. One form of climate policy, called carbon pricing, consists in putting a price on carbon emissions. Carbon pricing can take the form of carbon taxes or cap and trade.

Q8. Thinking about the people you talked with over the past month, whether in person, over the phone, or online. How often, if ever, have you discussed the need for action on global climate change?

- a. Nearly every day
- b. A few times each week
- c. Once or twice
- d. Never

Q9. Thinking about the people you talked with over the past month, whether in person, over the phone, or online. How often, if ever, have you discussed the need for putting a price on carbon emissions?

- a. Nearly every day
- b. A few times each week
- c. Once or twice
- d. Never

Q10. There are a number of sources of information about policies such as carbon pricing. Below are a number of common sources for such information. Please indicate if you have seen information on carbon pricing from each of the following sources. [*Check list.*]

- a. Local or state level government
- b. The federal government or federal agencies such as the EPA
- c. International organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, or United Nations
- d. Non-governmental organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund
- e. Research institutions or think tanks such as Resources for the Future or the Heritage Foundation
- f. Print or digital media outlets such as the Associated Press, Fox News, CNN, New York Times, New York Post
- g. Social media outlets such as X, Instagram or Facebook
- h. Podcasts or webinars
- i. Videos hosted on platforms such as YouTube
- j. Commercials or ads from special interest groups or political organizations on TV

*Provide a matrix including only the sources selected under Q10.*

Q11. Do you find the information for the following sources to be:

	Source 1	Source 2	Source 3...
Very informative or relevant			
Somewhat informative or relevant			
Somewhat uninformative or irrelevant			
Highly uninformative or irrelevant			

Q12. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the minimum and 7 the maximum, how would you describe your knowledge of carbon pricing?

- a. 1 (very limited knowledge)

- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7 (a great deal of knowledge)

Q13. When you hear or see news stories about carbon pricing, do you personally find these stories interesting?

- a. Yes, very interesting
- b. Yes, somewhat interesting
- c. No, not interesting at all

Q14. If you were to vote soon on carbon pricing in your state, how prepared would you consider yourself today, on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the minimum and 7 the maximum?

- a. 1 (not at all prepared)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5



f. 6

g. 7 (very prepared)

*Page break.*

### BLOCK3: Public support

*Q15 exists in four versions. Respondents will be assigned at random to each version. Let us call them versions a, b, c, and d. That is, 25% of respondents will be assigned at random to each version and see one of the four versions. Respondents who see 15a here will then see all “a” versions of the following questions. Respondents who see 15b here will then see all “b” versions of the following questions. Respondents who see 15c here will then see all “c” versions of the following questions. Respondents who see 15d here will then see all “d” versions of the following questions.*

Q15a. Carbon pricing can take the form of carbon taxes. A carbon tax consists of putting a tax, a “carbon tax,” on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Tax revenues can be redistributed back to the population uniformly as “carbon dividends” so that each resident receives the same amount. We call this policy “carbon tax and dividend.” Would you support or oppose a measure that seeks to have carbon tax and dividend in your state?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Do not know

Q15b. Carbon pricing can take the form of carbon taxes. A carbon tax consists of putting a tax, a “carbon tax,” on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Tax revenues can be used for environmental purposes (environmental earmarks). We call this policy a “carbon tax with environmental earmarking.” Would you support or oppose a measure that seeks to have a carbon tax with environmental earmarking in your state?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Do not know

Q15c. Carbon pricing can take the form of cap and trade. Cap and trade consists of setting a cap, which decreases over time, on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The cap is implemented by auctioning off a limited number of permits to emit, which can be traded. Auction revenues can be redistributed back to the population uniformly as “carbon dividends” so that each resident receives the same amount. We call this policy “cap and dividend.” Would you support or oppose a measure that seeks to have a cap and dividend in your state?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Do not know

Q15d. Carbon pricing can take the form of cap and trade. Cap and trade consists of setting a cap, which decreases over time, on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The cap is implemented by auctioning off a limited number of permits to emit, which can be traded. Auction revenues can be used for environmental purposes (environmental earmarks). We call this policy “cap and invest.” Would you support or oppose a measure that seeks to have cap and invest in your state?

- a. Yes
- b. No

c. Do not know

*Only for respondents who answered “Yes” or “No” to Q15 where “Yes” implies “support” and “No” implies “Oppose.”*

*Q16 exists in four versions: a, b, c, and d. Treatment assignment occurred under Q15. Respondents remain assigned to the same letter. Under a, “carbon tax and dividend.” Under b, “carbon tax with environmental earmarking.” Under c, “cap and dividend.” Under d, “cap and invest.”*

Q16. On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means totally uncertain and 7 means totally certain, how certain are you that you [support/oppose] [carbon tax and dividend/carbon tax with environmental earmarking/cap and dividend/cap and invest] in your state?

a. 1 (totally uncertain)

b. 2

c. 3

d. 4

e. 5

f. 6

g. 7 (totally certain)

*Q17 exists in four versions: a, b, c, and d. Treatment assignment occurred under Q15. Respondents remain assigned to the same letter. Under a, “carbon tax and dividend.” Under b, “carbon tax with environmental earmarking.” Under c, “cap and dividend.” Under d, “cap and invest.”*

Q17. Do you think [carbon tax and dividend/carbon tax with environmental earmarking/cap and dividend/cap and invest] is a good idea or a bad idea?

- a. Good idea
- b. Bad idea
- c. Unsure

Q18. Some people think the government is trying to do too much, and that limiting the effects of climate change should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that the government should do more to limit the effects of climate change. Which comes closer to your own view?

- a. The government is trying to do too much to limit the effects of climate change
- b. The government should do more to limit the effects of climate change
- c. I do not know

*Only for respondents who answered “Yes” or “No” to Q18 where “Yes” implies “support” and “No” implies “Oppose.”*

Q19. On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means totally uncertain and 7 means totally certain, how certain are you that the government is doing [too much/too little] when it comes to limiting the effects of climate change?

- a. 1 (totally uncertain)
- b. 2
- c. 3

d. 4

e. 5

f. 6

g. 7 (totally certain)

*Page break.*

#### **BLOCK4: Mental model**

*Q20 exists in four versions: a, b, c, and d. Treatment assignment occurred under Q15. Respondents remain assigned to the same letter.*

*Open-ended question. Allow for a relatively large box in which to type the answer. Prevent cut and paste into the box.*

Q20a. One form of climate policy, called carbon pricing, consists of putting a price on carbon emissions. One way to price carbon consists of putting a tax, a “carbon tax,” on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Tax revenues can be redistributed back to the population uniformly as “carbon dividends” so that each resident receives the same amount. We call this policy “carbon tax and dividend.” If your state implements a carbon tax and dividend, what effects do you think it would have? Please use complete sentences to describe the effects. We are interested in your current thoughts about the policy, so please do not use external sources of information.

Q20b. One form of climate policy, called carbon pricing, consists of putting a price on carbon emissions. One way to price carbon consists of putting a tax, a “carbon tax,” on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Tax revenues can be used for environmental purposes (environmental earmarks). We call this policy a “carbon tax with environmental earmarking.” If your state implements a carbon tax with environmental earmarking, what effects do you think it would have? Please use complete sentences to describe the effects. We are interested in your current thoughts about the policy, so please do not use external sources of information.

Q20c. One form of climate policy, called carbon pricing, consists of putting a price on carbon emissions. One way to price carbon consists of setting a cap, which decreases

over time, on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The cap is implemented by auctioning off a limited number of permits to emit, which can be traded. Auction revenues can be redistributed back to the population uniformly as “carbon dividends” so that each resident receives the same amount. We call this policy “cap and dividend.” If your state implements a cap and dividend, what effects do you think it would have? Please use complete sentences to describe the effects. We are interested in your current thoughts about the policy, so please do not use external sources of information.

Q20d. One form of climate policy, called carbon pricing, consists of putting a price on carbon emissions. One way to price carbon consists of setting a cap, which decreases over time, on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The cap is implemented by auctioning off a limited number of permits to emit, which can be traded. Auction revenues can be used for environmental purposes (environmental earmarks). We call this policy “cap and invest.” If your state implements cap and invest, what effects do you think it would have? Please use complete sentences to describe the effects. We are interested in your current thoughts about the policy, so please do not use external sources of information.

*Page break.*



## BLOCK5: Exposure

Q21. How would you describe the availability of public transportation where you live?

- a. Very poor
- b. Poor
- c. Average
- d. Good
- e. Very good
- f. I do not know

Q22. On average, how much do you spend on gas per month?

*Dollar figure with "I do not know" option.*

Q23. On average, how much do you spend on heating your home per month?

*Dollar figure with "I do not know" option.*

Q24. During a regular year, do you take more than one flight?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. I do not know

Q25. In a typical week, how often do you eat meat?

- a. Several times a day

- b. Daily
- c. A few times a week
- d. Once a week or less
- e. Never

Q26. Which of following best describes the industry you work in?

- a. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
- b. Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
- c. Utilities
- d. Construction
- e. Manufacturing
- f. Wholesale trade
- g. Retail trade
- h. Transportation and warehousing
- i. Information
- j. Finance and insurance
- k. Real estate and rental and leasing
- l. Professional, scientific, and technical services
- m. Management of companies and enterprises

- n. Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services
- o. Educational services
- p. Health care and social assistance
- q. Arts, entertainment, and recreation
- r. Accommodation and food services
- s. Other services (except public administration)
- t. Public administration
- u. Does not apply

Q27. To what extent do you think climate change already has had or will have a negative effect on your personal life?

- a. -2 (not at all)
- b. -1
- c. 0 (moderately)
- d. 1
- e. 2 (A great deal)

Cap and trade consists of setting a cap, which decreases over time, on the most important sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The cap is implemented by auctioning off a limited number of permits to emit, which can be traded.

Q28. As far as you know, does a cap-and-trade scheme (including “cap and invest,” whereby auction revenues are mostly used for environmental purposes) currently exist in the state in which you reside?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. I do not know

Q29. As far as you know, are there any plans to implement a cap-and-trade scheme (including “cap and invest,” whereby auction revenues are mostly used for environmental purposes) in the future in the state in which you reside?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. I do not know

Q30. As far as you know, have you ever received a rebate because of a cap-and-trade scheme (including “cap and invest”)?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. I do not know

*Page break.*

## **BLOCK6: Exit Questions**

Q31. How many members does your household have?

- a. Adults: 0-10
- b. Minors: 0-10

Q32. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

- a. No
- b. Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, or Chicano
- c. Yes, Puerto Rican
- d. Yes, Cuban
- e. Yes, other Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

Q33. Please select your political party affiliation:

- a. Republican
- b. Democrat
- c. Independent
- d. Other
- e. None

Q34. I would describe myself as:

- a. Very conservative
- b. Moderately conservative
- c. Neither conservative nor liberal
- d. Moderately liberal
- e. Very liberal

Q35. This is an election year. Are you planning to vote and, if so, have you voted already, depending on the laws in your state?

- a. Planning to vote but not voted yet
- b. Voted already
- c. Not planning to vote
- d. I do not know whether I am going to vote this year

Q36. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- a. Most people can be trusted
- b. Need to be very careful
- c. I do not know

Q37. We are now going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all.

A great deal   Quite a lot   Not very much   Not at all   I do not know

- a. The press
- b. Television
- c. Your state's government
- d. The country's government
- e. Scientists

Q38. From -2 to 2, how big of an issue do you think income inequality is in the United States?

- a. -2 (not an issue at all)
- b. -1
- c. 0 (moderately)
- d. 1
- e. 2 (a very serious issue)

Q39. Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks, using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling to take risks” and 10 means you are “very willing to take risks.” You can also use any number between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, using 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.

- a. 10 (very willing to take risks)
- b. 9
- c. 8
- d. 7
- e. 6
- f. 5

- g. 4
- h. 3
- i. 2
- j. 1
- k. 0 (completely unwilling to take risks)
- l. I do not know

Q40. We now ask you for your willingness to act in a certain way. Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means “completely unwilling to do so,” and a 10 means “very willing to do so.” You can also use any number between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, using 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10. How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future?

- a. 10 (very willing to do so)
- b. 9
- c. 8
- d. 7
- e. 6
- f. 5
- g. 4
- h. 3



- i. 2
- j. 1
- k. 0 (completely unwilling to do so)
- l. I do not know

*Matrix with characteristics and response options.*

Q41. Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. I am someone who:

[Disagree strongly, Disagree a little, Neutral/No opinion, Agree a little, or Agree strongly]

- a. Tends to be quiet.
- b. Is compassionate, has a soft heart.
- c. Tends to be disorganized.
- d. Worries a lot.
- e. Is fascinated by art, music, or literature.
- f. Is dominant, acts as a leader.
- g. Is sometimes rude to others.
- h. Has difficulty getting started on tasks.
- i. Tends to feel depressed, blue.

- j. Has little interest in abstract ideas.
- k. Is full of energy.
- l. Assume the best about people.
- m. Is reliable, can always be counted on.
- n. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset.
- o. Is original, comes up with new ideas.

Q42. This question deals with optimism. Optimists are people who look to the future with confidence and who mostly expect good things to happen. How would you describe yourself? How optimistic are you in general?

- a. 1 (not at all optimistic)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7 (very optimistic)

Q43. This question deals with pessimism. Pessimists are people who are full of doubt when they look to the future and who mostly expect bad things to happen. How would you describe yourself? How pessimistic are you in general?

- a. 1 (not at all pessimistic)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7 (very pessimistic)

Q44. Below are a series of statements that describe how an individual may or may not think or act when facing situations that are new or uncertain. Please indicate the extent to which you believe each statement is characteristic of you:

[Characteristic of me, Not characteristic of me, Do not know]

- a. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous
- b. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand
- c. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity
- d. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain

Q46. How willing are you to give to good charitable causes without expecting anything in return?

- a. 10 (very willing to do so)
- b. 9

c. 8

d. 7

e. 6

f. 5

g. 4

h. 3

i. 2

j. 1

k. 0 (completely unwilling to do so)

Q47. Imagine the following situation. You unexpectedly receive 5,000 dollars. How much of this amount would you donate to a good charitable cause?

*Slider from 0 to \$5,000*

Q48. If you're running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in?

*Values: 0-9*

Q49. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left?

*Values: 0-99*

Q50. Emily's father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the third daughter's name?

*Open-ended question. Allow for a small box in which to type a quick answer.*

Q51. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3' deep x 3' wide x 3' long?

*Values: 0-99*

Q52. What is your personal annual income from all sources?

1. Less than \$10,000
2. \$10,000-14,999
3. \$15,000-24,999
4. \$25,000-34,999
5. \$35,000-49,999
6. \$50,000-74,999
7. \$75,000-99,999
8. \$100,000-149,999
9. \$150,000-199,999
10. Greater than \$200,000
11. Prefer not to answer

### A.3.5 Perceptions

In this section, we provide the exact wording (in italics) of the instructions given to Upwork freelancers on how to code open-ended responses, allowing us to categorize perceptions and mental models. We also provide descriptive statistics showing the distribution of such categories of responses across policy designs and geographies in Table A.6.

*Thank you for participating in our research. Your task will be to assign codes to survey responses.*

*Specifically, we surveyed people about the effects they think different environmental policies would have if implemented in their state. The environmental policies relate to putting a price on carbon. We described one of several related policies and then asked, “If your state implements this policy, what effects do you think it would have?”*

*We would like you to assign the responses to different categories based on the category that best matches the response. The categories, with examples, are provided in the table below.*

Table A.5: Instructions Provided to Upwork Freelancers Categorizing Statements

<i>Category</i>		<i>Code</i>	<i>Example</i>
<i>Uninformative</i>	<i>Provides no benefits or costs of the policy and does not state an opinion</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>“I don’t know”</i>
<i>Direct cost</i>	<i>States the policy will have one or more direct costs</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>“The policy will cause gas prices to increase.”</i>
<i>Direct benefit</i>	<i>States the policy will have one or more direct benefits</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>“The policy will reduce pollution.”</i>
<i>Indirect impact</i>	<i>States the policy will cause something which will cause something else</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>“The policy will cause gas prices to increase which will cause people to drive less.”</i>
<i>Other cost/benefit</i>	<i>A description of costs and/or benefits that doesn’t fit into categories 1-3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>“The policy may or may not help because it depends on...”</i>
<i>Inequality</i>	<i>The policy will generate or alleviate some form of inequality</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>“The policy will help people in cities, but hurt those in the suburbs.”</i>
<i>No effect</i>	<i>The policy will have no effects</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>“The policy will not do anything.”</i>
<i>General dislike</i>	<i>Expresses dislike for the policy or states that it will anger people <b>without</b> giving any cost or benefit</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>“The policy will just make people angry.”</i>
<i>General appreciation</i>	<i>Expresses appreciation for the policy or states that it will help people <b>without</b> giving any cost or benefit</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>“The policy is good.”</i>

Table A.6: Proprietary Survey: Summary Statistics for Perceptions

Statement	Washington (1)	Rest of the country (2)
Uninformed	0.331 (0.471)	0.267 (0.443)
Direct cost	0.142 (0.349)	0.162 (0.369)
Direct benefit	0.220 (0.415)	0.184 (0.388)
Indirect impact	0.023 (0.151)	0.020 (0.139)
Other cost/benefit	0.058 (0.234)	0.033 (0.178)
Inequality	0.026 (0.160)	0.034 (0.181)
No effect	0.043 (0.202)	0.048 (0.215)
General dislike	0.099 (0.299)	0.133 (0.340)
General appreciation	0.058 (0.234)	0.119 (0.324)

**Note:** This table reports the distribution of perceptions about carbon pricing. Definitions are outlined in Table A.5. The first column displays the distribution of perceptions for respondents in Washington state only, and the second column shows the distribution of perceptions for the rest of the country.



## B Additional results


Complementing the main estimates displayed in Section 4, this section provides additional results for our three approaches. Section B.1 provides additional estimates for voting behavior as analyzed in Section 4.1. Section B.2 provides additional results for opinion polls as analyzed in Section 4.2. Section B.3 provides additional estimates for our proprietary survey as analyzed in Section 4.3.

### B.1 Voting behavior

In this section, we provide maps showing support for carbon pricing across census block groups, in terms of opposition to I-2117, as displayed in Figure B.1, support for I-1631, as displayed in Figure B.2, and the difference in support for carbon pricing between the two initiatives, as displayed in Figure B.3. Figure B.4 shows changes in turnout and abstention, respectively, relative to Republican vote share in the 2024 presidential election.


In this section, we also provide estimates for voting behavior. Table B.1 shows all estimates for our baseline estimation provided in Table 1. Table B.2 shows similar estimates for our baseline estimation, including different measures of appropriations. Table B.3 shows all estimates for our baseline estimation provided in Table 2. Table B.4 shows estimates including different measures of appropriations.

Figure B.1: Map of Opposition against Initiative 2117 by Census Block Group




**Note:** This figure provides a map showing opposition across census block groups to I-2117 (cap-and-invest). Red indicates that a census block group has greater than 50% opposition against I-2117, and blue indicates that a census block group has less than 50% opposition against I-2117. The higher the saturation, the closer to extreme support or opposition the census block group is.

Figure B.2: Map of Support for Initiative 1631 by Census Block Group




**Note:** This figure provides a map showing support across census block groups for I-1631 (carbon taxation with environmental earmarking). Red indicates that a census block group has less than 50% support for I-1631, and blue indicates that a census block group has greater than 50% support for I-1631. The higher the saturation, the closer to extreme support or opposition the census block group is.

Figure B.3: Map of Difference in Support by Census Block Group



**Note:** This figure provides a map showing the changes in vote shares against I-2117 (in favor of cap-and-invest) versus in favor of I-1631 (carbon taxation with environmental earmarking). Red indicates that a census block group has lower opposition to I-2117 compared to support for I-1631, and blue indicates vice versa. The higher the saturation, the more extreme the change in support for a census block group is.

Figure B.4: Abstention Difference by Republican Vote Share Deciles



**Note:** This figure plots the change in abstention by decile of Republican vote share in the 2024 presidential election. Change in abstention is calculated as the difference between abstention from I-2117 and I-1631. Abstention for each election is based on the number of ballots cast in the respective initiative per cast ballot. Abstention is defined as:

$$\frac{(\# \text{ of votes for initiative}) - (\# \text{ of votes for 2024 presidential election or 2018 senatorial election})}{\# \text{ of votes for 2024 presidential election or 2018 senatorial election}}$$

Table B.1: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group level  
(2024) - Estimates for All Controls

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Republican	-0.806*** (0.012)	-0.821*** (0.018)	-0.821*** (0.019)	-0.817*** (0.017)	-0.817*** (0.017)
Pct. Farmer			0.009 (0.010)		0.006 (0.009)
AMI 80				0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)
Pct. Construction		0.236** (0.092)	0.230** (0.092)	0.213** (0.096)	0.209** (0.095)
Pct. Manufacturing		-0.306*** (0.094)	-0.318*** (0.096)	-0.284*** (0.097)	-0.293*** (0.099)
Pct. Utilities and Transport		-0.075*** (0.016)	-0.075*** (0.016)	-0.065*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)
Pct. 1 room		0.028 (0.075)	0.026 (0.075)	-0.003 (0.070)	-0.005 (0.070)
Pct. 2 rooms		0.021 (0.070)	0.022 (0.069)	0.018 (0.067)	0.018 (0.067)
Pct. 3 rooms		0.047 (0.074)	0.048 (0.073)	0.049 (0.070)	0.050 (0.070)
Pct. 4 rooms		0.108 (0.078)	0.109 (0.078)	0.104 (0.080)	0.106 (0.081)
Pct. 6 rooms		-0.130 (0.126)	-0.127 (0.125)	-0.143 (0.121)	-0.141 (0.120)
Pct. 7 rooms		0.027 (0.033)	0.027 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.035)
Pct. 8 rooms		0.030 (0.037)	0.031 (0.037)	0.030 (0.040)	0.030 (0.040)
Pct. 9 or more rooms		0.020 (0.048)	0.020 (0.048)	0.024 (0.049)	0.024 (0.049)
Ages 0-4		-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)
Ages 5-9		-0.067***	-0.066***	-0.060***	-0.060***

Continued on next page

Table B.1: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group level  
(2024) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ages 10-14		-0.062***	-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.054***
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ages 15-19		-0.055**	-0.054**	-0.048**	-0.047**
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Ages 20-24		-0.056**	-0.057**	-0.053**	-0.053**
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Ages 25-29		-0.001	-0.001	-0.013	-0.012
		(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Ages 30-34		-0.036	-0.036	-0.037	-0.037
		(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Ages 35-39		-0.031*	-0.031*	-0.020	-0.020
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Ages 40-44		0.043***	0.043***	0.044***	0.044***
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ages 45-49		0.054***	0.054***	0.058***	0.058***
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Ages 50-54		0.009	0.009	0.016	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ages 55-59		0.014	0.014	0.021**	0.021**
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ages 60-64		-0.027	-0.026	-0.019	-0.019
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ages 65-69		-0.024**	-0.024**	-0.019**	-0.019**
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ages 70-74		-0.034**	-0.034**	-0.031**	-0.031**
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Ages 75-79		-0.053***	-0.052***	-0.048***	-0.048***
		(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Ages 80-84		-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.053***
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Ages 85 plus		-0.046**	-0.046**	-0.048***	-0.048***

Continued on next page

Table B.1: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group level  
(2024) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Pct. Women		-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pct. White		-0.016	-0.016	-0.015	-0.015
		(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Pct. Black		0.007	0.007	0.003	0.003
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Pct. American Indian		-0.016	-0.018	-0.020	-0.021
		(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Pct. Asian		-0.031*	-0.031*	-0.028	-0.028
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Pct. Other Race		-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.013
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Pct. 2 or More Races		-0.015	-0.015	-0.014	-0.014
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Pct. Hispanic or Latino		0.021***	0.021**	0.020***	0.020***
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Commute less than 5 mins.		0.035	0.034	0.039	0.039
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Commute 5-9 mins.		0.041**	0.041**	0.050***	0.049***
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Commute 10-14 mins.		0.019	0.019	0.028**	0.029**
		(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Commute 15-19 mins.		0.016	0.017	0.026**	0.026**
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Commute 20-24 mins.		-0.001	-0.001	0.013	0.013
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Commute 25-29 mins.		-0.002	-0.001	0.009	0.009
		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Commute 30-34 mins.		0.005	0.005	0.018	0.018
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)

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Table B.1: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group level  
(2024) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Commute 35-39 mins.		-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.020	-0.021
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Commute 40-44 mins.		-0.048*	-0.048*	-0.030	-0.029
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Commute 45-59 mins.		-0.043*	-0.042*	-0.026	-0.026
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Commute 60-89 mins.		-0.044*	-0.043	-0.023	-0.022
		(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Commute 90 plus mins.		0.012	0.013	0.029	0.029
		(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Pct. HS Diploma		-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.017*	-0.017*
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Pct. GED		0.031	0.031	0.027	0.028
		(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Pct. Less than 1 yr. College		-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.032***	-0.032***
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Pct. More than 1 yr. College		-0.061***	-0.060***	-0.043***	-0.042***
		(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Pct. Bachelor's Degree		-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.028**	-0.027**
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Pct. Master's Degree		-0.132***	-0.131***	-0.099***	-0.099***
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pct. Prof. Degree		-0.140***	-0.140***	-0.101***	-0.101***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Pct. Doct. Degree		-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.062***	-0.062***
		(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Pct. 0 Vehicles		-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.004	-0.004
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Pct. 1 Vehicle		0.073***	0.073***	0.082***	0.082***
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Pct. 2 Vehicles		-0.007	-0.007	0.006	0.006

Continued on next page

Table B.1: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group level (2024) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Pct. 3 Vehicles		-0.059***	-0.059***	-0.045***	-0.046***
		(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Pct. 4 Vehicles		-0.073**	-0.074**	-0.055*	-0.055*
		(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Pct. 5 Vehicles		-0.056*	-0.056*	-0.045	-0.045
		(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Pct. No Car Commute		-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Household Size		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pct. Urban		-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.028***	-0.028***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Owner Occupied		-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.934***	1.039***	1.039***	1.005***	1.005***
	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Observations	5296	5284	5284	5284	5284
$R^2$	0.945	0.971	0.971	0.972	0.972

**Note:** This table shows comprehensive coefficient estimates from OLS regressions modeling share voting in support of carbon pricing (against I-2117) in 2024 as a function of ideology, demographics, and other factors. This table is an extended version of Table 1. Republican measures the share voting for the Republican party in the 2024 presidential election. Pct. Farmer measures the share of people working in agriculture. AMI 80 (Less than 75k) measures the share of people under 80% of the state's median income. Column (1) is the first specification using only party affiliation as described in Section 4.1. Column (2) adds census characteristics to the first specification. Column (3) adds agricultural employment shares to the second specification. Column (4) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the second specification. Column (5) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the third specification. Clustered standard errors are provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.2: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group Level with Expenditure Controls, Estimates for All Controls

	Base (1)	Tot. Approp. (Cont.) (2)	Tot. Approp. (Bin.) (3)	FY24 Exp. (Cont.) (4)	FY24 Exp. (Bin.) (5)	Total Projects (Cont.) (6)	Total Projects (Bin.) (7)
Republican	-0.817*** (0.017)	-0.817*** (0.018)	-0.818*** (0.017)	-0.817*** (0.017)	-0.817*** (0.017)	-0.816*** (0.018)	-0.817*** (0.017)
Pct. Urban	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.026** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.010)
Pct. Farmer	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.004 (0.010)	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
Total Approp. (Cont.)		0.000*** (0.000)					
Total Approp. (Bin.)			-0.011 (0.008)				
FY24 Spending (Cont.)				0.000 (0.000)			
FY24 Spending (Bin.)					0.002 (0.006)		
Total Projects (Cont.)						0.002*** (0.001)	
Total Projects (Bin.)							0.002 (0.006)
AMI 80	0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.006)
Pct. Construction	0.209** (0.095)	0.214** (0.094)	0.194** (0.085)	0.211** (0.094)	0.209** (0.095)	0.214** (0.093)	0.209** (0.095)
Pct. Manufacturing	-0.293*** (0.099)	-0.297*** (0.099)	-0.280*** (0.089)	-0.294*** (0.099)	-0.293*** (0.100)	-0.298*** (0.099)	-0.293*** (0.100)
Pct. Utilities and Transport	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.063*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)
Pct. 1 room	-0.005 (0.070)	0.000 (0.070)	0.005 (0.069)	-0.003 (0.070)	-0.005 (0.070)	-0.000 (0.070)	-0.005 (0.070)
Pct. 2 rooms	0.018 (0.067)	0.014 (0.067)	0.008 (0.065)	0.016 (0.066)	0.018 (0.067)	0.015 (0.067)	0.018 (0.067)
Pct. 3 rooms	0.050 (0.070)	0.045 (0.070)	0.038 (0.068)	0.048 (0.069)	0.050 (0.070)	0.046 (0.070)	0.050 (0.070)
Pct. 4 rooms	0.106 (0.081)	0.102 (0.082)	0.092 (0.081)	0.105 (0.081)	0.106 (0.081)	0.103 (0.082)	0.106 (0.081)
Pct. 6 rooms	-0.141 (0.120)	-0.138 (0.118)	-0.146 (0.120)	-0.140 (0.119)	-0.141 (0.120)	-0.138 (0.119)	-0.141 (0.120)
Pct. 7 rooms	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.018 (0.034)	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.021 (0.035)
Pct. 8 rooms	0.030 (0.040)	0.027 (0.038)	0.027 (0.039)	0.030 (0.039)	0.030 (0.040)	0.028 (0.038)	0.030 (0.040)
Pct. 9 or more rooms	0.024 (0.049)	0.022 (0.048)	0.021 (0.048)	0.024 (0.049)	0.024 (0.049)	0.023 (0.048)	0.024 (0.049)
Ages 0-4	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)
Ages 5-9	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.019)	-0.057*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)
Ages 10-14	-0.054*** (0.015)	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.054*** (0.015)	-0.054*** (0.015)	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.054*** (0.015)
Ages 15-19	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.047** (0.021)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.047** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.021)
Ages 20-24	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.053** (0.022)	-0.052** (0.023)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.053** (0.023)
Ages 25-29	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.022)
Ages 30-34	-0.037 (0.030)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.030)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.030)
Ages 35-39	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.018)
Ages 40-44	0.044*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)

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Table B.2: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group Level with Expenditure Controls, Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Base (1)	Tot. Approp. (Cont.) (2)	Tot. Approp. (Bin.) (3)	FY24 Exp. (Cont.) (4)	FY24 Exp. (Bin.) (5)	Total Projects (Cont.) (6)	Total Projects (Bin.) (7)
Ages 45-49	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.059*** (0.010)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)
Ages 50-54	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)
Ages 55-59	0.021** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	0.023** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)
Ages 60-64	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)
Ages 65-69	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.019* (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.019** (0.009)
Ages 70-74	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.030** (0.012)	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.030** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.012)
Ages 75-79	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)
Ages 80-84	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.051*** (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.053*** (0.016)
Ages 85 plus	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.049*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.016)
Pct. Women	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Pct. White	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.019)
Pct. Black	0.003 (0.020)	0.004 (0.019)	0.002 (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	0.003 (0.020)	0.004 (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)
Pct. American Indian	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.023)
Pct. Asian	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.018)
Commute less than 5 mins.	0.039 (0.030)	0.040 (0.030)	0.039 (0.030)	0.038 (0.030)	0.039 (0.030)	0.040 (0.030)	0.039 (0.030)
Commute 5-9 mins.	0.049*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.016)
Commute 10-14 mins.	0.029** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)	0.027** (0.012)	0.029** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)
Commute 15-19 mins.	0.026** (0.013)	0.027** (0.013)	0.023* (0.012)	0.027** (0.013)	0.026** (0.013)	0.026** (0.013)	0.026** (0.013)
Commute 20-24 mins.	0.013 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)
Commute 25-29 mins.	0.009 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)	0.013 (0.019)	0.009 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)
Commute 30-34 mins.	0.018 (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)	0.020 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)
Commute 35-39 mins.	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.018)
Commute 40-44 mins.	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.028 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.024)
Commute 45-59 mins.	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.017)
Commute 60-89 mins.	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.023)
Commute 90 plus mins.	0.029 (0.031)	0.031 (0.031)	0.027 (0.031)	0.029 (0.031)	0.029 (0.031)	0.032 (0.032)	0.029 (0.031)
Pct. Other Race	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.018)
Pct. 2 or More Races	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.018)
Pct. Hispanic or Latino	0.020*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)
Pct. HS Diploma	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)

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Table B.2: Voting Behavior: Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117) at the Census Block Group Level with Expenditure Controls, Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Base (1)	Tot. Approp. (Cont.) (2)	Tot. Approp. (Bin.) (3)	FY24 Exp. (Cont.) (4)	FY24 Exp. (Bin.) (5)	Total Projects (Cont.) (6)	Total Projects (Bin.) (7)
Pct. GED	0.028 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)	0.027 (0.022)	0.027 (0.022)	0.028 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)	0.028 (0.022)
Pct. Less than 1 yr. College	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.034*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.034*** (0.011)	-0.032*** (0.011)
Pct. More than 1 yr. College	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.012)	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.012)	-0.042*** (0.012)
Pct. Bachelor's Degree	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.027** (0.013)
Pct. Master's Degree	-0.099*** (0.008)	-0.100*** (0.008)	-0.100*** (0.008)	-0.099*** (0.008)	-0.099*** (0.008)	-0.100*** (0.008)	-0.099*** (0.008)
Pct. Prof. Degree	-0.101*** (0.012)	-0.102*** (0.012)	-0.102*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.012)	-0.102*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.012)
Pct. Doct. Degree	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.022)
Pct. 0 Vehicles	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)
Pct. 1 Vehicle	0.082*** (0.015)	0.083*** (0.015)	0.081*** (0.015)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.083*** (0.015)	0.082*** (0.015)
Pct. 2 Vehicles	0.006 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)
Pct. 3 Vehicles	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.045*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.015)
Pct. 4 Vehicles	-0.055* (0.029)	-0.053* (0.029)	-0.056* (0.029)	-0.054* (0.029)	-0.055* (0.029)	-0.053* (0.029)	-0.055* (0.029)
Pct. 5 Vehicles	-0.045 (0.030)	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.030)	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.030)
Pct. No Car Commute	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Household Size	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Owner Occupied	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	1.005*** (0.024)	1.002*** (0.024)	1.015*** (0.024)	1.004*** (0.024)	1.003*** (0.022)	1.001*** (0.024)	1.003*** (0.022)
Observations	5284	5284	5284	5284	5284	5284	5284
R <sup>2</sup>	0.972	0.972	0.972	0.972	0.972	0.972	0.972

**Note:** This table shows coefficient estimates from OLS regressions modeling share voting in support of carbon pricing (against I-2117) in 2024 as a function of ideology, demographics, and other factors. Republican measures the share voting for the Republican party in the 2024 presidential election. Pct. Farmer measures the share of people working in agriculture. AMI 80 (Less than 75k) measures the share of people under 80% of the state's median income. Column (1) is the final specification in Table 1 as described in Section 4.1. Column (2) adds total appropriations by county weighted by proportion of county population that lives in the census block group to the first specification. Column (3) adds a binary indicator equal to unity if the census block group had the weighted county total appropriations greater than zero. Columns (4) and (5) replicate Columns (2) and (3), but with FY24 spending. Columns (5) and (6) replicate Columns (2) and (3), but with total projects. Continuous variables are weighted by the proportion of the county population that lives in the census block group. Clustered standard errors are provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.3: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the Census Block Group level (2024 minus 2018) - Estimates for All Controls

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Republican	0.083**	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Pct. Farmer			-0.001		-0.002
			(0.012)		(0.011)
AMI 80				0.003	0.003
				(0.013)	(0.012)
Pct. Construction		0.262	0.263	0.261	0.262
		(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.203)
Pct. Manufacturing		-0.397*	-0.395*	-0.395*	-0.393*
		(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.215)	(0.217)
Pct. Utilities and Transport		-0.061	-0.061	-0.060	-0.060
		(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Pct. 1 room		-0.100	-0.100	-0.102	-0.102
		(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Pct. 2 rooms		0.168	0.168	0.168	0.168
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Pct. 3 rooms		0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104
		(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Pct. 4 rooms		-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.018
		(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Pct. 6 rooms		0.205	0.204	0.204	0.203
		(0.318)	(0.317)	(0.318)	(0.317)
Pct. 7 rooms		-0.061	-0.061	-0.064	-0.064
		(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Pct. 8 rooms		0.078*	0.078*	0.078*	0.078*
		(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Pct. 9 or more rooms		0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
		(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Ages 0-4		0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
		(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Ages 5-9		-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
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Table B.3: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the level of Census Block Group (2024 minus 2018) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Ages 10-14		0.018	0.018	0.019	0.019
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Ages 15-19		0.017	0.017	0.018	0.017
		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Ages 20-24		-0.070*	-0.070*	-0.069*	-0.069*
		(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Ages 25-29		-0.149***	-0.149***	-0.150***	-0.150***
		(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Ages 30-34		-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.100***
		(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Ages 35-39		-0.058	-0.058	-0.057*	-0.057*
		(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Ages 40-44		-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ages 45-49		-0.041*	-0.041*	-0.040*	-0.040*
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ages 50-54		-0.055***	-0.055***	-0.054***	-0.054***
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Ages 55-59		-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.079***	-0.079***
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ages 60-64		-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.083***
		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ages 65-69		-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.091***
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ages 70-74		-0.072***	-0.072***	-0.072***	-0.072***
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Ages 75-79		-0.104***	-0.104***	-0.104***	-0.104***
		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Ages 80-84		-0.061***	-0.061***	-0.061***	-0.061***
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ages 85 plus		-0.063**	-0.063**	-0.063**	-0.063**

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Table B.3: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the level of Census Block Group (2024 minus 2018) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Pct. Women		-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)
Pct. White		-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.115*** (0.036)
Pct. Black		-0.070 (0.055)	-0.070 (0.055)	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.070 (0.054)
Pct. American Indian		-0.134*** (0.043)	-0.134*** (0.042)	-0.134*** (0.042)	-0.134*** (0.042)
Pct. Asian		-0.052 (0.047)	-0.052 (0.047)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.052 (0.048)
Pct. Other Race		-0.081** (0.039)	-0.080** (0.039)	-0.081** (0.039)	-0.080** (0.039)
Pct. 2 or More Races		-0.063* (0.036)	-0.063* (0.036)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.063* (0.037)
Pct. Hispanic or Latino		0.058*** (0.013)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.058*** (0.013)
Commute less than 5 mins.		0.082* (0.047)	0.082* (0.047)	0.083* (0.048)	0.083* (0.048)
Commute 5-9 mins.		0.077*** (0.024)	0.077*** (0.024)	0.078*** (0.026)	0.078*** (0.026)
Commute 10-14 mins.		0.065*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)
Commute 15-19 mins.		0.068*** (0.020)	0.068*** (0.020)	0.068*** (0.022)	0.068*** (0.022)
Commute 20-24 mins.		0.046** (0.019)	0.046** (0.019)	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)
Commute 25-29 mins.		0.038 (0.033)	0.038 (0.033)	0.039 (0.035)	0.039 (0.035)
Commute 30-34 mins.		0.059** (0.025)	0.059** (0.025)	0.060** (0.027)	0.060** (0.027)

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Table B.3: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the level of Census Block Group (2024 minus 2018) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Commute 35-39 mins.		0.075*** (0.021)	0.075*** (0.021)	0.076*** (0.019)	0.076*** (0.019)
Commute 40-44 mins.		0.056** (0.026)	0.056** (0.026)	0.057** (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)
Commute 45-59 mins.		0.036 (0.025)	0.036 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)
Commute 60-89 mins.		0.145*** (0.043)	0.145*** (0.043)	0.147*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.046)
Commute 90 plus mins.		0.106* (0.059)	0.106* (0.059)	0.107* (0.061)	0.107* (0.061)
Pct. HS Diploma		0.079*** (0.025)	0.078*** (0.024)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)
Pct. GED		0.153*** (0.044)	0.153*** (0.044)	0.153*** (0.045)	0.153*** (0.044)
Pct. Less than 1 yr. College		0.089** (0.037)	0.089** (0.037)	0.090** (0.034)	0.090** (0.034)
Pct. More than 1 yr. College		0.069 (0.046)	0.069 (0.045)	0.070* (0.041)	0.070* (0.041)
Pct. Bachelor's Degree		0.074** (0.031)	0.074** (0.030)	0.075*** (0.028)	0.075*** (0.028)
Pct. Master's Degree		-0.066 (0.046)	-0.066 (0.046)	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.039)
Pct. Prof. Degree		-0.101** (0.043)	-0.101** (0.043)	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)
Pct. Doct. Degree		-0.258*** (0.054)	-0.258*** (0.054)	-0.255*** (0.048)	-0.255*** (0.048)
Pct. 0 Vehicles		-0.176*** (0.043)	-0.176*** (0.043)	-0.175*** (0.037)	-0.175*** (0.037)
Pct. 1 Vehicle		-0.092*** (0.012)	-0.092*** (0.012)	-0.092*** (0.012)	-0.092*** (0.012)
Pct. 2 Vehicles		0.011	0.011	0.012	0.012

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Table B.3: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the level of Census Block Group (2024 minus 2018) - Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Party	+Census	+Pct. Farmer	+Income	Pct. Farmer + Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Pct. 3 Vehicles		-0.032	-0.032	-0.031	-0.031
		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Pct. 4 Vehicles		-0.074***	-0.074**	-0.073***	-0.073***
		(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Pct. 5 Vehicles		-0.165***	-0.165***	-0.164***	-0.164***
		(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Pct. No Car Commute		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Household Size		-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pct. Urban		0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Owner Occupied		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.161***	0.308***	0.308***	0.306***	0.306***
	(0.017)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Observations	5296	5284	5284	5284	5284
$R^2$	0.083	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376

**Note:** This table shows comprehensive coefficient estimates from OLS regressions modeling the change in share voting in support of carbon pricing in 2024 (against I-2117) minus 2018 (in support of I-732) as a function of ideology, demographics, and other factors. This table is an extended version of Table 1. Republican measures the share voting for the Republican party in the 2024 presidential election. Pct. Farmer measures the share of people working in agriculture. AMI 80 measures the share of people under 80% of the state's median income. Column (1) is the first specification using only party affiliation as described in Section 4.1. Column (2) adds census characteristics to the first specification. Column (3) adds agricultural employment shares to the second specification. Column (4) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the second specification. Column (5) adds the fraction of low-to-middle-income households to the third specification. Clustered standard errors are provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.4: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the Census Block Group Level (2024 minus 2018) with Expenditure Controls, Estimates for All Controls

	Base (1)	Tot. Approp. (Cont.) (2)	Tot. Approp. (Bin.) (3)	FY24 Exp. (Cont.) (4)	FY24 Exp. (Bin.) (5)	Total Projects (Cont.) (6)	Total Projects (Bin.) (7)
Republican	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)
Pct. Urban	0.016 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)	0.016 (0.015)	0.018 (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.016 (0.015)
Pct. Farmer	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)
Total Approp. (Cont.)		0.000 (0.000)					
Total Approp. (Bin.)			-0.004 (0.009)				
FY24 Spending (Cont.)				0.000 (0.000)			
FY24 Spending (Bin.)					-0.004 (0.010)		
Total Projects (Cont.)						0.002 (0.002)	
Total Projects (Bin.)							-0.004 (0.010)
AMI 80	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)
Pct. Construction	0.262 (0.203)	0.264 (0.205)	0.257 (0.200)	0.269 (0.204)	0.262 (0.203)	0.266 (0.206)	0.262 (0.203)
Pct. Manufacturing	-0.393* (0.217)	-0.395* (0.218)	-0.388* (0.214)	-0.399* (0.218)	-0.393* (0.217)	-0.397* (0.219)	-0.393* (0.217)
Pct. Utilities and Transport	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.061 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.037)
Pct. 1 room	-0.102 (0.128)	-0.100 (0.129)	-0.098 (0.128)	-0.095 (0.128)	-0.102 (0.129)	-0.099 (0.128)	-0.102 (0.129)
Pct. 2 rooms	0.168 (0.127)	0.166 (0.127)	0.164 (0.127)	0.161 (0.127)	0.167 (0.127)	0.165 (0.127)	0.167 (0.127)
Pct. 3 rooms	0.104 (0.129)	0.102 (0.129)	0.100 (0.129)	0.098 (0.128)	0.104 (0.129)	0.102 (0.129)	0.104 (0.129)
Pct. 4 rooms	-0.018 (0.125)	-0.019 (0.126)	-0.023 (0.127)	-0.021 (0.125)	-0.018 (0.125)	-0.020 (0.125)	-0.018 (0.125)
Pct. 6 rooms	0.203 (0.317)	0.205 (0.316)	0.201 (0.317)	0.205 (0.316)	0.203 (0.317)	0.206 (0.316)	0.203 (0.317)
Pct. 7 rooms	-0.064 (0.052)	-0.063 (0.051)	-0.063 (0.051)	-0.063 (0.051)	-0.064 (0.052)	-0.063 (0.051)	-0.064 (0.052)
Pct. 8 rooms	0.078* (0.039)	0.077* (0.038)	0.077** (0.038)	0.077* (0.039)	0.078* (0.039)	0.076* (0.038)	0.078* (0.039)
Pct. 9 or more rooms	0.008 (0.053)	0.007 (0.053)	0.007 (0.053)	0.008 (0.053)	0.008 (0.053)	0.007 (0.053)	0.008 (0.053)
Ages 0-4	0.042 (0.025)	0.042 (0.025)	0.042* (0.025)	0.042 (0.025)	0.042 (0.025)	0.042* (0.025)	0.042 (0.025)
Ages 5-9	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)
Ages 10-14	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)
Ages 15-19	0.017 (0.027)	0.017 (0.027)	0.018 (0.027)	0.017 (0.027)	0.017 (0.027)	0.018 (0.027)	0.017 (0.027)
Ages 20-24	-0.069* (0.038)	-0.070* (0.038)	-0.069* (0.038)	-0.069* (0.038)	-0.069* (0.038)	-0.070* (0.038)	-0.069* (0.038)
Ages 25-29	-0.150*** (0.051)	-0.150*** (0.051)	-0.148*** (0.050)	-0.150*** (0.051)	-0.150*** (0.051)	-0.150*** (0.052)	-0.150*** (0.051)
Ages 30-34	-0.100*** (0.037)	-0.099*** (0.036)	-0.099*** (0.037)	-0.099*** (0.036)	-0.099*** (0.037)	-0.099*** (0.036)	-0.099*** (0.037)
Ages 35-39	-0.057* (0.034)	-0.057* (0.034)	-0.057* (0.033)	-0.058* (0.034)	-0.057* (0.034)	-0.057* (0.034)	-0.057* (0.034)
Ages 40-44	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.048*** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.015)

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Table B.4: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the Census Block Group Level  
(2024 minus 2018) with Expenditure Controls, Estimates for All Controls (continued)

	Base (1)	Tot. Approp. (Cont.) (2)	Tot. Approp. (Bin.) (3)	FY24 Exp. (Cont.) (4)	FY24 Exp. (Bin.) (5)	Total Projects (Cont.) (6)	Total Projects (Bin.) (7)
Ages 45-49	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)
Ages 50-54	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.017)	-0.054*** (0.017)	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.016)
Ages 55-59	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.080*** (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.080*** (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.080*** (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)
Ages 60-64	-0.083*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.021)
Ages 65-69	-0.091*** (0.015)	-0.091*** (0.015)	-0.090*** (0.015)	-0.091*** (0.015)	-0.091*** (0.015)	-0.090*** (0.015)	-0.091*** (0.015)
Ages 70-74	-0.072*** (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.013)	-0.071*** (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.014)
Ages 75-79	-0.104*** (0.029)	-0.104*** (0.029)	-0.103*** (0.029)	-0.105*** (0.029)	-0.104*** (0.029)	-0.104*** (0.029)	-0.104*** (0.029)
Ages 80-84	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Ages 85 plus	-0.063** (0.029)	-0.063** (0.029)	-0.064** (0.029)	-0.062** (0.029)	-0.063** (0.029)	-0.062** (0.029)	-0.063** (0.029)
Pct. Women	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)
Pct. White	-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.114*** (0.036)	-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.114*** (0.036)	-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.114*** (0.036)	-0.115*** (0.036)
Pct. Black	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.069 (0.054)	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.069 (0.054)	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.069 (0.054)	-0.070 (0.054)
Pct. American Indian	-0.134*** (0.042)	-0.133*** (0.043)	-0.133*** (0.042)	-0.132*** (0.042)	-0.134*** (0.042)	-0.132*** (0.043)	-0.134*** (0.042)
Pct. Asian	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.051 (0.048)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.051 (0.048)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.050 (0.048)	-0.052 (0.048)
Commute less than 5 mins.	0.083* (0.048)	0.083* (0.048)	0.083* (0.047)	0.081* (0.048)	0.083* (0.048)	0.084* (0.048)	0.083* (0.048)
Commute 5-9 mins.	0.078*** (0.026)	0.078*** (0.026)	0.078*** (0.026)	0.079*** (0.026)	0.078*** (0.026)	0.078*** (0.026)	0.078*** (0.026)
Commute 10-14 mins.	0.066*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.067*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)
Commute 15-19 mins.	0.068*** (0.022)	0.069*** (0.022)	0.067*** (0.021)	0.069*** (0.022)	0.068*** (0.022)	0.069*** (0.022)	0.068*** (0.022)
Commute 20-24 mins.	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)
Commute 25-29 mins.	0.039 (0.035)	0.039 (0.035)	0.040 (0.036)	0.039 (0.035)	0.039 (0.035)	0.039 (0.035)	0.039 (0.035)
Commute 30-34 mins.	0.060** (0.027)	0.060** (0.027)	0.061** (0.027)	0.060** (0.027)	0.060** (0.027)	0.061** (0.027)	0.060** (0.027)
Commute 35-39 mins.	0.076*** (0.019)	0.076*** (0.020)	0.076*** (0.019)	0.077*** (0.019)	0.076*** (0.019)	0.077*** (0.020)	0.076*** (0.019)
Commute 40-44 mins.	0.057** (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)	0.056** (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)
Commute 45-59 mins.	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)	0.037 (0.025)
Commute 60-89 mins.	0.147*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.046)	0.146*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.046)
Commute 90 plus mins.	0.107* (0.061)	0.108* (0.062)	0.106* (0.061)	0.105* (0.061)	0.107* (0.061)	0.109* (0.062)	0.107* (0.061)
Pct. Other Race	-0.080** (0.039)	-0.079* (0.040)	-0.081** (0.039)	-0.079* (0.039)	-0.080** (0.039)	-0.079* (0.040)	-0.080** (0.039)
Pct. 2 or More Races	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.062* (0.037)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.062* (0.036)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.062 (0.037)	-0.063* (0.037)
Pct. Hispanic or Latino	0.058*** (0.013)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.059*** (0.013)
Pct. HS Diploma	0.079*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.080*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)

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Table B.4: Voting Behavior: Difference in Vote Share in Support of Carbon Pricing (Against I-2117, For I-1631) at the Census Block Group Level (2024 minus 2018) with Expenditure Controls, Estimates for All Controls (continued)


	Base (1)	Tot. Approp. (Cont.) (2)	Tot. Approp. (Bin.) (3)	FY24 Exp. (Cont.) (4)	FY24 Exp. (Bin.) (5)	Total Projects (Cont.) (6)	Total Projects (Bin.) (7)
Pct. GED	0.153*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.045)	0.153*** (0.044)	0.151*** (0.045)	0.153*** (0.044)	0.151*** (0.045)	0.153*** (0.044)
Pct. Less than 1 yr. College	0.090** (0.034)	0.089** (0.034)	0.090** (0.034)	0.089** (0.034)	0.090** (0.034)	0.089** (0.034)	0.090** (0.034)
Pct. More than 1 yr. College	0.070* (0.041)	0.069* (0.041)	0.069* (0.041)	0.069 (0.041)	0.070* (0.041)	0.069 (0.041)	0.070* (0.041)
Pct. Bachelor's Degree	0.075*** (0.028)	0.075** (0.028)	0.075*** (0.028)	0.074** (0.028)	0.075*** (0.028)	0.074** (0.028)	0.075*** (0.028)
Pct. Master's Degree	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.065 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.039)
Pct. Prof. Degree	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.099*** (0.034)
Pct. Doct. Degree	-0.255*** (0.048)	-0.256*** (0.048)	-0.255*** (0.048)	-0.256*** (0.048)	-0.255*** (0.048)	-0.256*** (0.048)	-0.255*** (0.048)
Pct. 0 Vehicles	-0.175*** (0.037)	-0.174*** (0.037)	-0.175*** (0.038)	-0.174*** (0.037)	-0.175*** (0.037)	-0.174*** (0.037)	-0.175*** (0.037)
Pct. 1 Vehicle	-0.092*** (0.012)	-0.091*** (0.013)	-0.092*** (0.012)	-0.091*** (0.012)	-0.092*** (0.013)	-0.091*** (0.013)	-0.092*** (0.013)
Pct. 2 Vehicles	0.012 (0.029)	0.012 (0.028)	0.012 (0.029)	0.013 (0.029)	0.012 (0.029)	0.013 (0.028)	0.012 (0.029)
Pct. 3 Vehicles	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.034)
Pct. 4 Vehicles	-0.073*** (0.027)	-0.072*** (0.026)	-0.073*** (0.027)	-0.070** (0.026)	-0.073*** (0.027)	-0.071*** (0.026)	-0.073*** (0.027)
Pct. 5 Vehicles	-0.164*** (0.034)	-0.164*** (0.034)	-0.166*** (0.034)	-0.164*** (0.034)	-0.164*** (0.034)	-0.163*** (0.034)	-0.164*** (0.034)
Pct. No Car Commute	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Household Size	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Owner Occupied	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.306*** (0.049)	0.305*** (0.050)	0.310*** (0.049)	0.303*** (0.050)	0.310*** (0.051)	0.303*** (0.050)	0.310*** (0.051)
Observations	5284	5284	5284	5284	5284	5284	5284
R <sup>2</sup>	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376

**Note:** This table shows coefficient estimates from OLS regressions modeling the change in share voting in support of carbon pricing in 2024 (against I-2117) minus 2018 (in support of I-1631) as a function of ideology, demographics, and other factors. Republican measures the share voting for the Republican party in the 2024 presidential election. Pct. Farmer measures the share of people working in agriculture. AMI 80 measures the share of people under 80% of the state's median income. Column (1) is the final specification in Table 2 as described in Section 4.1. Column (2) adds total appropriations by county weighted by proportion of county population that lives in the census block group to the first specification. Column (3) adds a binary indicator equal to unity if the census block group had the weighted county total appropriations greater than zero. Columns (4) and (5) replicate Columns (2) and (3), but with FY24 spending. Columns (5) and (6) replicate Columns (2) and (3), but with total projects. Continuous variables are weighted by the proportion of the county population that lives in the census block group. Clustered standard errors are provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

## B.2 Opinion polls

In this section, we provide additional evidence from the CES. Broadening the scope even further, we consider support for environmental policy in general, including the Clean Air Act, which targets local air pollution, and the Clean Water Act, which targets local water pollution. We do so in Figure B.5. Here too, we observe that support in Washington state and in the rest of the country are very close over time, as shown in Panel (a). We only observe a minor uptick in the most recent period. A largely similar pattern is observed for Democrats and Republicans, as shown in Panel (b). Overall, we confirm that the large increase in public support observed in voting behavior does not extend beyond carbon pricing, in this case to environmental policy at large.

Figure B.5: Opinion Poll: Support for Strengthening the Environmental Protection Agency over Time (CES)



**Note:** This figure plots the level of support for strengthening the Environmental Protection Agency for Washington (black line) and the rest of the country (gray line) from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Panel (a) shows pooled responses and Panel (b) shows responses conditional on political affiliation (solid line for Republicans, dashed line for Democrats). The plot shows the fraction of supportive responses to the following question: “Strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs.”

## B.3 Proprietary survey

This section provides additional results for our proprietary survey, namely baseline estimates displaying coefficients for control variables and interactions terms for all policy designs in Section B.3.1, baseline estimates excluding respondents from California in Section B.3.2, baseline estimates using non-linear models in Section B.3.3, and baseline estimates for public support accounting for heterogeneity in individual characteristics in Section B.3.4.

### B.3.1 Baseline estimates displaying coefficients for control variables and coding of responses

In this section, we provide estimates for the support for carbon pricing designs. All estimates use OLS and cluster standard errors at the state level. Table B.5 shows all estimates for measures of public support for carbon pricing across policy designs, as shown in Table 4. Table B.6 replicates these estimates for measures of public support for carbon pricing across policy designs, very conservatively treating undecided respondents as opposed to carbon pricing rather than as missing observations. Table B.7 replicates the estimates in Table B.5 for measures of public support for carbon pricing across policy designs, only for likely voters. A respondent is considered a likely voter if they stated they were “Planning to vote but not voted yet” or who “Voted already” on Question 35 in Appendix A.3.4. Table B.8 shows all estimates for support of carbon pricing as an idea. Table B.9 shows all estimates for perceptions of carbon pricing across policy designs. Table B.10 presents all estimates for binary outcomes related to the frequency of conversations about the need for climate action and carbon pricing. Table B.13 shows all estimates for support of government action to limit the effects of climate change across policy designs. Table B.11 shows all estimates for perceived

knowledge of and preparedness to vote on carbon pricing, as shown in Table 5. Table B.12 shows all estimates for measures of interest in news stories about carbon pricing.



Table B.5: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.143** (0.060)	0.101 (0.063)	0.132* (0.075)
Cap and Invest	-0.019 (0.060)	-0.002 (0.062)	0.014 (0.074)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.072 (0.049)	0.058 (0.053)	0.112* (0.058)
Cap and Div.	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.040 (0.053)	-0.063 (0.058)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.037 (0.046)	-0.134** (0.059)	-0.037 (0.075)
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.010 (0.045)	0.056 (0.058)	0.020 (0.075)
Washington	-0.061* (0.031)	0.008 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.044)
Age	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.043** (0.018)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.033)
Latino	0.118*** (0.016)	0.124*** (0.021)	0.116*** (0.040)
College Grad	0.019 (0.032)	0.003 (0.035)	0.021 (0.029)
Republican	-0.249*** (0.025)	-0.275*** (0.023)	-0.333*** (0.035)
Constant	0.963*** (0.049)	0.988*** (0.057)	1.011*** (0.072)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1189	838	566
$R^2$	0.112	0.144	0.195

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table is an extended version of Table 4. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we use our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support decision (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support decision (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent’s support is measured in Question 16 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.6: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Treating Undecided Respondents as Opposed

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.075* (0.043)	0.101 (0.063)	0.132* (0.075)
Cap and Invest	0.018 (0.042)	-0.002 (0.062)	0.014 (0.074)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.056 (0.038)	0.058 (0.053)	0.112* (0.058)
Cap and Div.	0.007 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.053)	-0.063 (0.058)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	0.003 (0.049)	-0.134** (0.059)	-0.037 (0.075)
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.030 (0.049)	0.056 (0.058)	0.020 (0.075)
Washington	-0.028 (0.032)	0.008 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.044)
Age	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.166*** (0.013)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.033)
Latino	0.078*** (0.020)	0.124*** (0.021)	0.116*** (0.040)
College Grad	0.101** (0.047)	0.003 (0.035)	0.021 (0.029)
Republican	-0.143*** (0.018)	-0.275*** (0.023)	-0.333*** (0.035)
Constant	0.726*** (0.053)	0.988*** (0.057)	1.011*** (0.072)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	838	566
$R^2$	0.088	0.144	0.195

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the estimates in Table B.5, treating undecided respondents as opposed rather than missing observations as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we use our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support decision (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support decision (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent’s support is measured in Question 16 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.7: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions with only Likely Voters

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.187*** (0.063)	0.137** (0.066)	0.119 (0.078)
Cap and Invest	-0.049 (0.062)	-0.027 (0.065)	-0.007 (0.078)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.082 (0.054)	0.035 (0.056)	0.057 (0.051)
Cap and Div.	-0.033 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.056)	-0.037 (0.052)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.067 (0.048)	-0.149*** (0.053)	-0.083 (0.073)
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.012 (0.047)	0.064 (0.052)	0.040 (0.072)
Washington	-0.080** (0.032)	-0.002 (0.039)	0.010 (0.041)
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.023 (0.020)	0.007 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.031)
Latino	0.105*** (0.014)	0.097*** (0.023)	0.095*** (0.029)
College Grad	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.035)	0.019 (0.035)
Republican	-0.282*** (0.025)	-0.286*** (0.023)	-0.342*** (0.035)
Constant	1.068*** (0.049)	1.083*** (0.054)	1.092*** (0.069)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1061	776	528
$R^2$	0.152	0.176	0.221

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the estimates in Table B.5, only using likely voters as described in Section 4.3. A likely voter is a respondent who stated they were “Planning to vote but not voted yet” or who “Voted already” on Question 35 in Appendix A.3.4. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we use our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support decision (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support decision (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent’s support is measured in Question 16 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.8: Proprietary Survey: Support of Carbon Pricing as an Idea with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions

	Pooled (1)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.143** (0.057)
Cap and Invest	-0.010 (0.056)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.083 (0.054)
Cap and Div.	-0.058 (0.055)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.039 (0.053)
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.001 (0.053)
Washington	-0.077** (0.036)
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.026 (0.017)
Latino	0.104*** (0.021)
College Grad	0.039 (0.039)
Republican	-0.212*** (0.028)
Constant	0.996*** (0.051)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes
Controls	Yes
Observations	1049
$R^2$	0.105

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing as an idea across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 17, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.9: Proprietary Survey: Perceptions with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions

	Uninformative (1)	Direct Cost (2)	Direct Benefit (3)	Indirect Impact (4)	Other C/B (5)	Inequality (6)	No Effect (7)	General Dislike (8)	General Appreciation (9)
Washington × Cap and Invest	0.091* (0.049)	-0.018 (0.028)	0.020 (0.039)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	0.036* (0.018)	0.004 (0.022)	-0.100***** (0.034)	-0.053* (0.031)
Cap and Invest	-0.012 (0.049)	0.014 (0.027)	0.000 (0.039)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.029* (0.016)	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.037 (0.022)	0.010 (0.034)	0.036 (0.031)
Washington × Cap and Dividend	-0.023 (0.045)	0.014 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.014)	0.017 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.026)	0.017 (0.033)	0.055* (0.030)
Cap and Div.	-0.028 (0.046)	0.044 (0.031)	0.045 (0.036)	0.010 (0.016)	0.010 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.026)	0.005 (0.033)	-0.075*** (0.030)
Washington × Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.031 (0.042)	0.041 (0.032)	-0.061 (0.038)	0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.014)	0.046***** (0.015)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.045* (0.025)	0.038 (0.028)
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.103*** (0.042)	0.125***** (0.032)	0.057 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.026* (0.014)	-0.033*** (0.015)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.060*** (0.027)
Washington	0.055* (0.028)	-0.017 (0.020)	0.042 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.025***** (0.008)	-0.032*** (0.015)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.010 (0.022)	-0.077***** (0.022)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.002***** (0.001)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001***** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)
Woman	0.161***** (0.017)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.050***** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.023***** (0.006)	-0.050***** (0.014)	-0.031*** (0.013)
Latino	0.074* (0.042)	-0.071***** (0.022)	0.011 (0.063)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.026***** (0.006)	0.027 (0.020)	-0.046***** (0.010)	0.051*** (0.022)
College Grad	-0.144***** (0.039)	0.038 (0.028)	0.119***** (0.027)	0.015***** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.006)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)
Republican	-0.015 (0.018)	0.106***** (0.020)	-0.084***** (0.016)	-0.021***** (0.006)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.014 (0.009)	0.012 (0.008)	0.070***** (0.022)	-0.039*** (0.017)
Constant	0.271***** (0.040)	0.031 (0.039)	0.244***** (0.046)	0.039*** (0.016)	0.049***** (0.014)	0.062***** (0.023)	0.024 (0.023)	0.097*** (0.038)	0.184***** (0.033)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491
R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.058	0.045	0.011	0.013	0.010	0.014	0.038	0.039

**Note:** This table reports estimates for perceptions of carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. The categories across the columns are drawn from responses to Question 20, as outlined in Appendix A.3.4 and described in Section 3.3. For specific definitions of the categories, see Section A.3.5. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, °, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero.

Table B.10: Proprietary Survey: Frequency of Conversations about Climate Change and Carbon Pricing with Estimates for Controls

	Climate Action				Carbon Pricing			
	Never (1)	Occasionally (2)	Weekly (3)	Daily (4)	Never (5)	Occasionally (6)	Weekly (7)	Daily (8)
Washington	0.011 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.022 (0.016)	0.030 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.001 (0.008)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Woman	0.030 (0.020)	0.033 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.049*** (0.010)	0.113*** (0.022)	-0.047** (0.019)	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.006)
Latino	-0.085*** (0.021)	-0.098*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.027)	0.089*** (0.024)	-0.160*** (0.031)	0.001 (0.058)	0.105*** (0.035)	0.054*** (0.017)
College Grad	-0.119*** (0.014)	0.017 (0.021)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.140*** (0.046)	0.062*** (0.016)	0.034 (0.034)	0.045*** (0.008)
Republican	0.093*** (0.021)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.049*** (0.016)	-0.026** (0.012)	0.041** (0.020)	-0.041** (0.016)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.010)
Constant	0.202*** (0.031)	0.380*** (0.039)	0.256*** (0.032)	0.162*** (0.015)	0.344*** (0.045)	0.291*** (0.036)	0.255*** (0.057)	0.111*** (0.015)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754
$R^2$	0.041	0.006	0.024	0.038	0.096	0.016	0.045	0.036

**Note:** This table reports binary outcomes for the frequency of conversation about climate change (left panel) and carbon pricing (right panel) that respondents engaged in over the past month. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Specific question wording can be found in Questions 8 and 9 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.11: Proprietary Survey: Perceived Knowledge of and Preparedness to Vote on Carbon Pricing with Estimates for Controls

	Knowledge (1)	Preparedness (2)
Washington	0.119* (0.061)	0.195*** (0.062)
Age	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)
Woman	-0.606*** (0.093)	-0.708*** (0.113)
Latino	0.688*** (0.082)	0.474*** (0.095)
College Grad	0.713*** (0.165)	0.797*** (0.218)
Republican	0.168** (0.067)	0.127 (0.086)
Constant	3.659*** (0.300)	3.983*** (0.366)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	1754
$R^2$	0.114	0.099

**Note:** This table reports estimates for the perceived knowledge of and the perceived preparedness to vote on carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table is an extended version of Table 5. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Perceived knowledge and preparedness are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating very limited knowledge or not at all prepared, respectively, and 7 indicating a great deal of knowledge or very prepared, respectively. Specific wording can be found in Questions 12 and 14 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.12: Proprietary Survey: Interest in Carbon Pricing News with Estimates for Controls

	Very Interested (1)	Somewhat Interested (2)	Not Interested (3)
Washington	-0.051*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.023* (0.013)
Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.099*** (0.014)	0.053** (0.026)	0.046** (0.021)
Latino	0.150*** (0.027)	-0.071 (0.043)	-0.079** (0.031)
College Grad	0.099*** (0.029)	0.028 (0.021)	-0.127*** (0.041)
Republican	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.030 (0.033)	0.066*** (0.024)
Constant	0.394*** (0.042)	0.428*** (0.042)	0.178*** (0.025)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	1754	1754
$R^2$	0.067	0.007	0.041

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for interest in news stories about carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Specific question wording can be found in Question 13 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.



Table B.13: Proprietary Survey: Government Action on Climate Change with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington	0.023 (0.019)	0.021 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.027)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Woman	0.036* (0.021)	0.055* (0.030)	0.091*** (0.021)
Latino	-0.030 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.017 (0.049)
College Grad	0.028 (0.025)	0.027 (0.024)	0.040 (0.028)
Republican	-0.324*** (0.022)	-0.364*** (0.022)	-0.368*** (0.030)
Constant	0.820*** (0.052)	0.819*** (0.064)	0.836*** (0.072)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1477	968	736
$R^2$	0.109	0.135	0.149

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support of government action to limit the effects of climate change. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Government effort to limit the effects of climate change is measured in Question 18, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we use our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support for more action (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support for more action (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent's support for more action is measured in Question 19 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who think the government is doing too much or too little to limit the effects of climate change, respondents who indicate an uncertain support for the policy ("I don't know") are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

### **B.3.2 Baseline estimates excluding respondents from California**

In this section, we provide estimates as in Appendix B.3.1, now excluding respondents from the state of California, as described in Section 3.3. All estimates use OLS and cluster standard errors at the state level. Table B.14 replicates the estimates in Table B.5. Table B.15 replicates the estimates in Table B.8. Table B.16 replicates the estimates in Table B.9. Table B.17 replicates the estimates in Table B.10. Table B.18 replicates the estimates in Table B.11. Table B.19 replicates the estimates in Table B.12. Table B.20 replicates the estimates in Table B.13.

Table B.14: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions without Respondents from California

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.160** (0.063)	0.115* (0.065)	0.124 (0.080)
Cap and Invest	-0.036 (0.063)	-0.017 (0.065)	0.021 (0.080)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.089* (0.049)	0.064 (0.056)	0.105* (0.062)
Cap and Div.	-0.049 (0.049)	-0.047 (0.056)	-0.056 (0.062)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.136** (0.062)	-0.061 (0.075)
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.014 (0.049)	0.057 (0.062)	0.043 (0.075)
Washington	-0.064* (0.034)	0.007 (0.044)	0.007 (0.045)
Age	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.042** (0.018)	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.032)
Latino	0.122*** (0.017)	0.132*** (0.022)	0.120** (0.046)
College Grad	0.014 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.039)	0.019 (0.032)
Republican	-0.249*** (0.026)	-0.279*** (0.024)	-0.331*** (0.036)
Constant	0.963*** (0.052)	0.978*** (0.059)	0.984*** (0.072)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1146	814	550
$R^2$	0.111	0.145	0.194

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, without respondents from the state of California as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we rely on our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support decision (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support decision (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent’s support is measured in Question 16 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.15: Proprietary Survey: Support of Carbon Pricing as an Idea with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions without Respondents from California

	Pooled (1)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.155** (0.060)
Cap and Invest	-0.022 (0.060)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.086 (0.059)
Cap and Div.	-0.062 (0.060)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.040 (0.058)
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.003 (0.058)
Washington	-0.074* (0.040)
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.026 (0.018)
Latino	0.109*** (0.023)
College Grad	0.030 (0.043)
Republican	-0.214*** (0.029)
Constant	0.991*** (0.054)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes
Controls	Yes
Observations	1011
$R^2$	0.103

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing as an idea across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.8, without respondents from the state of California, as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Support for carbon pricing as an idea is measured in Question 17 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.16: Proprietary Survey: Perceptions with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions without Respondents from California

	Uninformative	Direct Cost	Direct Benefit	Indirect Impact	Other C/B	Inequality	No Effect	General Dislike	General Appreciation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.097* (0.052)	-0.028 (0.028)	0.025 (0.041)	0.012 (0.014)	0.007 (0.017)	0.031 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.022)	-0.088*** (0.034)	-0.052 (0.034)
Cap and Invest	-0.019 (0.052)	0.023 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.034)	0.035 (0.034)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	-0.034 (0.046)	0.015 (0.033)	-0.041 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.017 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.026)	0.026 (0.033)	0.055* (0.032)
Cap and Div.	-0.017 (0.047)	0.043 (0.033)	0.038 (0.037)	0.011 (0.018)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.023)	-0.000 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.074*** (0.033)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.026 (0.045)	0.030 (0.033)	-0.046 (0.037)	0.010 (0.020)	0.006 (0.015)	0.048*** (0.016)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.039 (0.026)	0.032 (0.029)
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.109*** (0.045)	0.135*** (0.032)	0.042 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.028* (0.014)	-0.034** (0.016)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.053* (0.028)
Washington	0.059* (0.030)	-0.017 (0.021)	0.039 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.024*** (0.008)	-0.029* (0.015)	0.005 (0.018)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.077*** (0.024)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)
Woman	0.156*** (0.017)	0.015 (0.019)	-0.051*** (0.014)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.050*** (0.015)	-0.030** (0.014)
Latino	0.059 (0.039)	-0.066*** (0.026)	0.023 (0.061)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.025*** (0.006)	0.025 (0.021)	-0.048*** (0.012)	0.046** (0.023)
College Grad	-0.143*** (0.041)	0.038 (0.029)	0.115*** (0.029)	0.015*** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.015** (0.007)	0.005 (0.014)	-0.032*** (0.014)	0.024* (0.013)
Republican	-0.013 (0.018)	0.111*** (0.021)	-0.086*** (0.016)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)	0.065*** (0.022)	-0.041*** (0.019)
Constant	0.272*** (0.043)	0.029 (0.040)	0.240*** (0.048)	0.041*** (0.017)	0.047*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.022)	0.015 (0.023)	0.105*** (0.039)	0.186*** (0.034)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438
R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.059	0.045	0.011	0.013	0.009	0.013	0.037	0.037

**Note:** This table reports estimates for perceptions about carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.9, without respondents from the state of California as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. The categories across the columns are drawn from responses to Question 20, as outlined in Appendix A.3.4 and described in Section 3.3. For specific definitions of the categories, see Section A.3.5. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero.

Table B.17: Proprietary Survey: Frequency of Conversations about Climate Change and Carbon Pricing with Estimates for Controls without Respondents from California

	Climate Action				Carbon Pricing			
	Never (1)	Occ. (2)	Weekly (3)	Daily (4)	Never (5)	Occ. (6)	Weekly (7)	Daily (8)
Washington	0.010 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.031* (0.016)	0.045*** (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.008)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Woman	0.031 (0.021)	0.035* (0.021)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.052*** (0.010)	0.116*** (0.025)	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.007)
Latino	-0.087*** (0.023)	-0.109*** (0.022)	0.109*** (0.024)	0.088*** (0.026)	-0.163*** (0.036)	-0.022 (0.048)	0.119*** (0.029)	0.066*** (0.016)
College Grad	-0.120*** (0.014)	0.021 (0.022)	0.076*** (0.024)	0.023** (0.011)	-0.135** (0.051)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.031 (0.037)	0.048*** (0.007)
Republican	0.096*** (0.022)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.029** (0.012)	0.051*** (0.018)	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.010)
Constant	0.198*** (0.031)	0.383*** (0.038)	0.253*** (0.033)	0.165*** (0.015)	0.350*** (0.047)	0.285*** (0.034)	0.256*** (0.057)	0.110*** (0.015)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690
$R^2$	0.043	0.006	0.025	0.039	0.098	0.019	0.046	0.039

**Note:** This table reports binary outcomes for the frequency of conversation about climate change (left panel) and carbon pricing (right panel) that respondents engaged in over the past month. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.10, without respondents from the state of California as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Specific question wording can be found in Questions 8 and 9 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.18: Proprietary Survey: Perceived Knowledge of and Preparedness to Vote on Carbon Pricing with Estimates without Respondents from California

	Knowledge Preparedness	
	(1)	(2)
Washington	0.104 (0.064)	0.191*** (0.065)
Age	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Woman	-0.607*** (0.098)	-0.715*** (0.121)
Latino	0.705*** (0.083)	0.469*** (0.099)
College Grad	0.729*** (0.163)	0.817*** (0.217)
Republican	0.150** (0.070)	0.097 (0.093)
Constant	3.663*** (0.306)	3.961*** (0.366)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1690	1690
$R^2$	0.117	0.102

**Note:** This table reports estimates for the perceived knowledge of and the perceived preparedness to vote on carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.11, without respondents from the state of California as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Perceived knowledge and preparedness are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating very limited knowledge or not at all prepared, respectively, and 7 indicating a great deal of knowledge or very prepared, respectively. Specific wording can be found in Questions 12 and 14 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.19: Proprietary Survey: Interest in Carbon Pricing News with Estimates for Controls without Respondents from California

	Very Interested (1)	Somewhat Interested (2)	Not Interested (3)
Washington	-0.051*** (0.016)	0.030 (0.018)	0.022 (0.014)
Age	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.101*** (0.014)	0.056** (0.026)	0.044** (0.022)
Latino	0.165*** (0.022)	-0.089** (0.034)	-0.077** (0.033)
College Grad	0.098*** (0.031)	0.026 (0.023)	-0.124*** (0.044)
Republican	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.033 (0.033)	0.074*** (0.022)
Constant	0.381*** (0.038)	0.445*** (0.034)	0.173*** (0.025)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1690	1690	1690
$R^2$	0.069	0.008	0.042

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for interest in news stories about carbon pricing. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.12, without respondents from the state of California as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Specific question wording can be found in Question 13 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.



Table B.20: Proprietary Survey: Government Action on Climate Change with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions without Respondents from California

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington	0.031 (0.019)	0.028 (0.024)	0.008 (0.027)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Woman	0.040* (0.020)	0.058* (0.029)	0.093*** (0.021)
Latino	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.049 (0.051)	-0.038 (0.054)
College Grad	0.028 (0.026)	0.027 (0.025)	0.037 (0.028)
Republican	-0.322*** (0.022)	-0.364*** (0.023)	-0.373*** (0.031)
Constant	0.809*** (0.054)	0.815*** (0.064)	0.830*** (0.073)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1426	944	718
$R^2$	0.109	0.136	0.151

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support of government action to limit the effects of climate change. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.13, without respondents from the state of California as described in Section 3.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Government effort to limit the effects of climate change is measured in Question 18, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we use our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support for more action (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support for more action (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent's support for more action is measured in Question 19 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who think the government is doing too much or too little to limit the effects of climate change, respondents who indicate an uncertain support for the policy ("I don't know") are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

### **B.3.3 Baseline estimates using non-linear estimations**

In this section, we replicate the estimates provided in Appendix B.3.1 using non-linear estimation models. All estimates are marginal effects at the mean, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Table B.21 replicates the estimates in Table B.5, using a logit model. Table B.22 replicates the estimates in Table B.8, using a logit model. Table B.23 replicates the estimates in Table B.9, using a multinomial logit model. Table B.24 replicates the estimates in Table B.10, using a logit model. Table B.25 replicates the estimates in Table B.11, using an ordered logit model. Table B.26 replicates the estimates in Table B.12, using a logit model. Table B.27 replicates the estimates in Table B.13, using a logit model.

Table B.21: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Using Nonlinear Models

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.154*** (0.060)	0.110* (0.058)	0.146** (0.069)
Cap and Invest	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.002 (0.057)	0.015 (0.068)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.075 (0.047)	0.053 (0.049)	0.112** (0.054)
Cap and Div.	-0.029 (0.048)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.055)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.031 (0.045)	-0.134** (0.058)	-0.040 (0.071)
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.007 (0.045)	0.062 (0.058)	0.025 (0.071)
Washington	-0.063** (0.031)	0.009 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.040)
Age	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.041** (0.017)	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.032)
Latino	0.156*** (0.023)	0.168*** (0.029)	0.152*** (0.051)
College	0.017 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.033)	0.019 (0.026)
Republican	-0.220*** (0.019)	-0.239*** (0.017)	-0.288*** (0.025)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1189	838	566
Pseudo $R^2$	0.092	0.121	0.158

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, using a logit model. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we rely on our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support decision (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support decision (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent’s support is measured in Question 16 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.22: Proprietary Survey: Support of Carbon Pricing as an Idea with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Using Nonlinear Models

	Pooled (1)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.158*** (0.057)
Cap and Invest	-0.012 (0.057)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.082 (0.053)
Cap and Div.	-0.054 (0.053)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.034 (0.053)
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.003 (0.053)
Washington	-0.078** (0.037)
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.024 (0.016)
Latino	0.137*** (0.030)
College Grad	0.036 (0.037)
Republican	-0.190*** (0.023)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes
Controls	Yes
Observations	1049
$R^2$	0.088

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing as an idea across designs. This table replicates the results in Table B.8, using a logit model. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Support for carbon pricing as an idea is measured in Question 17 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who support or oppose the policy, respondents who do not indicate either support for or opposition to the policy (responding “I don’t know”) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.23: Proprietary Survey: Perceptions with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Using Nonlinear Models

	Uninformative	Direct Cost	Direct Benefit	Indirect Impact	Other C/B	Inequality	No Effect	General Dislike	General Appreciation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.096** (0.048)	-0.002 (0.032)	0.027 (0.046)	0.025 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.041***** (0.016)	0.010 (0.026)	-0.149***** (0.029)	-0.033* (0.018)
Cap and Invest	-0.008 (0.048)	0.016 (0.031)	0.004 (0.046)	-0.030 (0.025)	0.046* (0.024)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.040 (0.026)	0.011 (0.028)	0.021 (0.018)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	-0.013 (0.047)	0.036 (0.032)	-0.052 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.031 (0.030)	0.022 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.015 (0.029)	0.034 (0.028)
Cap and Div.	-0.034 (0.047)	0.040 (0.032)	0.045 (0.038)	0.007 (0.014)	0.020 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.029)	-0.066*** (0.027)
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.008 (0.049)	0.055* (0.030)	-0.060 (0.040)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.020)	0.053***** (0.015)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.047** (0.022)	0.016 (0.023)
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.115*** (0.048)	0.105***** (0.030)	0.060 (0.039)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.042*** (0.020)	-0.034*** (0.015)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.022)	-0.047*** (0.022)
Washington	0.046 (0.029)	-0.037 (0.025)	0.043 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.041*** (0.020)	-0.034***** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.066***** (0.016)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.002***** (0.001)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001***** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Woman	0.159***** (0.017)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.050***** (0.016)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.022***** (0.006)	-0.049***** (0.015)	-0.030*** (0.014)
Latino	0.099*** (0.039)	-0.092* (0.053)	0.023 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.044*** (0.018)	0.032*** (0.015)	-0.054***** (0.020)	0.049***** (0.015)
College Grad	-0.141***** (0.032)	0.036 (0.028)	0.116***** (0.019)	0.014***** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.007)	0.005 (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	0.024 (0.015)
Republican	0.000 (0.018)	0.094***** (0.016)	-0.083***** (0.019)	-0.027*** (0.011)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.012* (0.007)	0.063***** (0.017)	-0.035*** (0.017)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491
$R^2$	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694	0.0694

**Note:** This table reports estimates for perceptions of carbon pricing. This table replicates the results in Table B.9, using a multinomial logit model. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. The categories across the columns are drawn from responses to Question 20, as outlined in Appendix A.3.4 and described in Section 3.3. For specific definitions of the categories, see Section A.3.5. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, °, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero.

Table B.24: Proprietary Survey: Frequency of Conversations about Climate Change and Carbon Pricing with Estimates for Controls Using Nonlinear Models

	Climate Action				Carbon Pricing			
	Never (1)	Occasionally (2)	Weekly (3)	Daily (4)	Never (5)	Occasionally (6)	Weekly (7)	Daily (8)
Washington	0.010 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.021 (0.016)	0.029 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.008)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Woman	0.029 (0.020)	0.033 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.052*** (0.010)	0.113*** (0.023)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.041*** (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.007)
Latino	-0.102*** (0.025)	-0.102*** (0.025)	0.078*** (0.021)	0.054*** (0.013)	-0.147*** (0.029)	-0.001 (0.055)	0.070*** (0.021)	0.031*** (0.009)
College Grad	-0.119*** (0.014)	0.017 (0.021)	0.079*** (0.022)	0.025** (0.010)	-0.140*** (0.044)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.036 (0.034)	0.048*** (0.008)
Republican	0.088*** (0.019)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.052*** (0.017)	-0.030** (0.014)	0.043** (0.020)	-0.043** (0.017)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.011)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754	1754
$R^2$	0.034	0.004	0.024	0.068	0.074	0.015	0.062	0.089

**Note:** This table reports binary outcomes for the frequency of conversation about climate change (left panel) and carbon pricing (right panel) that respondents engaged in over the past month. This table replicates the results in Table B.10, using a logit model. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Specific question wording can be found in Questions 8 and 9 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.25: Proprietary Survey: Perceived Knowledge of and Preparedness to Vote on Carbon Pricing with Estimates for Controls Using Nonlinear Models

	Knowledge (1)	Preparedness (2)
Washington	0.163*** (0.055)	0.240*** (0.056)
Age	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.005)
Woman	-0.468*** (0.112)	-0.540*** (0.136)
Latino	0.688*** (0.130)	0.444*** (0.123)
College Grad	0.516*** (0.125)	0.613*** (0.165)
Republican	0.255*** (0.065)	0.256*** (0.069)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1491	1491
$R^2$	0.058	0.062

**Note:** This table reports estimates for the perceived knowledge of and the perceived preparedness to vote on carbon pricing. This table replicates the results in Table B.11, using an ordered logit model. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Perceived knowledge and preparedness are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating very limited knowledge or not at all prepared, respectively, and 7 indicating a great deal of knowledge or very prepared, respectively. Specific wording can be found in Questions 12 and 14 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

Table B.26: Proprietary Survey: Interest in Carbon Pricing News with Estimates for Controls Using Nonlinear Models

	Very Interested (1)	Somewhat Interested (2)	Not Interested (3)
Washington	-0.054*** (0.014)	0.028* (0.017)	0.021 (0.013)
Age	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Woman	-0.101*** (0.015)	0.052** (0.026)	0.045** (0.021)
Latino	0.116*** (0.019)	-0.071 (0.044)	-0.096*** (0.037)
College Grad	0.101*** (0.032)	0.028 (0.021)	-0.125*** (0.040)
Republican	-0.038* (0.020)	-0.030 (0.033)	0.063*** (0.023)
Other Treatment Arms	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1754	1754	1754
$R^2$	0.065	0.005	0.035

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for interest in news stories about carbon pricing. This table replicates the results in Table B.12, using a logit model. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Specific question wording can be found in Question 13 in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.



Table B.27: Proprietary Survey: Government Action on Climate Change with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Using Nonlinear Models

	Baseline (1)	Fairly Certain (2)	Very Certain (3)
WA	0.023 (0.019)	0.020 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.027)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Woman	0.036* (0.021)	0.055* (0.030)	0.091*** (0.021)
Latino	-0.030 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.050)
College Grad	0.027 (0.025)	0.026 (0.024)	0.040 (0.028)
Republican	-0.276*** (0.015)	-0.309*** (0.015)	-0.311*** (0.022)
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1477	968	736
Pseudo $R^2$	0.085	0.103	0.115

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support of government action to limit the effects of climate change. This table replicates the results in Table B.13, using a logit model as described in Section 3.3. Estimates are marginal effects. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Government effort to limit the effects of climate change is measured in Question 18, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. In the first column, we use our entire sample. In the second column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were at least fairly certain in their support for more action (scores of 5 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). In the third column, we limit our analysis to respondents who were very certain in their support for more action (scores of 6 and above on a 7-point Likert scale). Certainty in a respondent's support for more action is measured in Question 19 outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Since certainty questions are only asked to respondents who think the government is doing too much or too little to limit the effects of climate change, respondents who indicate an uncertain support for the policy ("I don't know") are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and provided in the parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.

### **B.3.4 Heterogeneous treatment effects for public support**

In this section, we provide estimates for the support of carbon pricing designs, replicating the main estimates in Table 4, accounting for heterogeneity in responses. All estimates use OLS and cluster standard errors at the state level. Multiple hypothesis testing adjustments are provided with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Table B.28 lists heterogeneous effects along political preferences, specifically partisanship and inequality aversion, as described in Questions 33 and 38 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.29 lists heterogeneous effects along personal preferences, specifically risk aversion and time discounting, as described in Questions 39 and 40 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.30 lists heterogeneous effects along prosocial inclinations, specifically two measures of altruism: the inclination to be altruistic and a charitable donation question, as described in Questions 46 and 47 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.31 lists heterogeneous effects along personal traits, specifically pessimism, optimism, trust, aversion to uncertainty, and intelligence quiz scores, as described in Questions 43, 42, 36, 44d, and 48-51 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.32 lists heterogeneous effects along socioeconomic indicators, specifically income and education level, as described in Questions 42 and 3 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.33 lists heterogeneous effects along awareness climate issues, specifically the existence of cap-and-trade policies and concern about climate change, as described in Questions 28 and 27 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.34 lists heterogeneous effects along exposure to cap and trade policies, specifically the availability of public transportation as well as gas spending, heat spending, flight frequency, meat consumption, and greenhouse gas emission exposure by industry, as described in Questions 2, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively. Table B.35 lists heterogeneous effects along information sources,

specifically the consumption of information from institutions (local government, federal government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and research institutions), traditional media (print and digital news sources), contemporary media (social media, podcasts, and video news), and advertisements, as described in Question 10 in Appendix A.3.4, respectively.

For all potential margins of heterogeneity, we attempt to split the sample into roughly two even subsamples. For simple binary indicators (such as political affiliation, trust in others, awareness of cap-and-trade policies, etc.), the sample is already split in two. However, for more continuous, or ordinal, measures (such as inequality aversion, risk aversion, income, concern about climate change, etc.), we first identify the distribution of responses from the relevant survey questions. Following this step, we determine the median value and split the values into "above median" and "median and below." There are two other splits. The first deals with our cognitive quiz questions at the end of the survey instrument, which are pooled together and graded, then subject to the same median split to determine a "high scorer" and a "low scorer." Second, for the industry question, we generate a weighted average of greenhouse gas emissions by NAICS-2 industry classification. Using our survey question at the NAICS-6 level, we aggregate up to the NAICS-2 level. For industries that had missing data on greenhouse exposure (public administration) or for the few cases where the respondent's industry did not fit one of the NAICS-2 classifications, we assigned them an exposure of 0. We then subject this measure of exposure to the same median split to determine "high-exposure" and "low-exposure" industries. For the source of information, we create an indicator equal to unity if a respondent consumed one or more of the sub-categories in each type of news source, and zero otherwise. Question 10 in Appendix A.3.4 also includes a "not seen" option if a respondent does not select any of the news sources; these respondents are always given a value of zero.

Table B.28: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Political Preferences

	Partisanship			Inequality Aversion		
	Republican	Democrat	Difference	Inequality Averse	Not Inequality Averse	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.070 (0.095)	0.191** (0.075)	-0.121	0.108* (0.061)	0.142* (0.080)	-0.034
Cap and Invest	-0.078 (0.096)	-0.042 (0.074)	-0.036	0.064 (0.061)	-0.063 (0.079)	0.127
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	-0.023 (0.103)	0.021 (0.061)	-0.044	0.095 (0.085)	0.056 (0.055)	0.039
Cap and Div.	-0.015 (0.104)	0.040 (0.061)	-0.055	0.013 (0.085)	-0.056 (0.054)	0.069
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.243*** (0.087)	0.013 (0.045)	-0.256**	-0.102 (0.065)	-0.075 (0.061)	-0.027
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.029 (0.086)	0.041 (0.044)	-0.012	0.115* (0.066)	-0.058 (0.058)	0.173*
Washington	0.068 (0.068)	-0.068* (0.040)	0.136	-0.010 (0.063)	-0.087** (0.038)	0.077
Age	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.006*** <sup>o</sup>	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.004**
Woman	-0.127* (0.063)	0.029 (0.021)	-0.156**	-0.031 (0.025)	-0.062** (0.029)	0.031
Latino	0.092 (0.100)	0.095*** (0.013)	-0.003	0.010 (0.025)	0.180*** (0.029)	-0.170*** <sup>ooo</sup>
College Grad	-0.094 (0.095)	0.057* (0.029)	-0.151*	0.048* (0.025)	0.008 (0.049)	0.040
Republican				-0.197*** (0.050)	-0.203*** (0.048)	0.006
Constant	0.932*** (0.085)	0.872*** (0.055)	0.060	0.852*** (0.068)	0.973*** (0.061)	-0.121
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	344	481		457	732	
$R^2$	0.097	0.045		0.074	0.123	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for partisanship and inequality aversion as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. <sup>ooo</sup>, <sup>oo</sup>, <sup>o</sup> indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.

Table B.29: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Personal Preferences

	Risk Aversion			Time Discounting		
	Risk Seeking (1)	Risk Averse (2)	Difference (3)	High Discount (4)	Low Discount (5)	Difference (6)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.059 (0.072)	0.244** (0.098)	-0.185	0.024 (0.073)	0.256*** (0.088)	-0.232**
Cap and Invest	0.008 (0.071)	-0.046 (0.100)	0.054	0.040 (0.072)	-0.077 (0.087)	0.117
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.019 (0.077)	0.151** (0.060)	-0.132	-0.011 (0.065)	0.173** (0.080)	-0.184*
Cap and Div.	-0.016 (0.077)	-0.054 (0.061)	0.038	0.035 (0.065)	-0.118 (0.080)	0.153
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.031 (0.065)	-0.020 (0.079)	-0.011	-0.108* (0.059)	-0.034 (0.077)	-0.074
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.012 (0.064)	-0.037 (0.079)	0.049	0.137** (0.059)	-0.148* (0.076)	0.285**
Washington	-0.019 (0.047)	-0.131** (0.059)	0.112	0.052 (0.040)	-0.165*** (0.055)	0.217***
Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.000	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.002
Woman	-0.040 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.031	-0.067*** (0.023)	0.006 (0.025)	-0.073**
Latino	0.140*** (0.025)	0.044 (0.076)	0.096	0.063** (0.025)	0.181*** (0.033)	-0.118**
College Grad	0.020 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.045)	0.021	0.002 (0.052)	0.016 (0.033)	-0.014
Republican	-0.182*** (0.030)	-0.322*** (0.046)	0.140**	-0.250*** (0.034)	-0.216*** (0.037)	-0.034
Constant	0.938*** (0.075)	0.922*** (0.076)	0.016	0.879*** (0.059)	0.971*** (0.083)	-0.092
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	667	522		628	561	
$R^2$	0.079	0.137		0.095	0.144	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for risk aversion and time discounting as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, °, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.

Table B.30: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Prosocial Inclinations

	Altruism (Inclination)			Altruism (Donation)		
	Altruistic	Not Altruistic	Difference	Charitable	Not Charitable	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.201** (0.083)	0.109 (0.080)	0.092	0.152** (0.073)	0.106 (0.077)	0.046
Cap and Invest	0.004 (0.082)	-0.035 (0.080)	0.039	-0.049 (0.073)	0.019 (0.077)	-0.068
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.025 (0.078)	0.111 (0.076)	-0.086	0.102 (0.073)	0.018 (0.068)	0.084
Cap and Div.	0.023 (0.078)	-0.069 (0.076)	0.092	-0.062 (0.072)	0.006 (0.069)	-0.068
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.008 (0.057)	-0.057 (0.083)	0.049	0.089 (0.066)	-0.152* (0.078)	0.241**
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.106* (0.057)	-0.113 (0.082)	0.219*	-0.065 (0.065)	0.050 (0.078)	-0.115
Washington	-0.064 (0.050)	-0.062 (0.055)	-0.002	-0.115*** (0.037)	0.004 (0.051)	-0.119*
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.002
Woman	-0.059* (0.032)	-0.033 (0.028)	-0.026	-0.064 (0.039)	-0.020 (0.042)	-0.044
Latino	0.074** (0.030)	0.142*** (0.028)	-0.068	0.125*** (0.019)	0.078** (0.034)	0.047
College Grad	-0.017 (0.037)	0.043 (0.030)	-0.060**	-0.014 (0.042)	0.037 (0.030)	-0.051
Republican	-0.300*** (0.038)	-0.199*** (0.026)	-0.101***	-0.194*** (0.032)	-0.289*** (0.041)	0.095
Constant	1.008*** (0.075)	0.951*** (0.080)	0.057	0.992*** (0.052)	0.863*** (0.072)	0.129
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	520	669		562	627	
$R^2$	0.147	0.114		0.083	0.130	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for respondents' inclination to be altruistic and charitable as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the "cap and invest" treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the "carbon tax and dividend" treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the "carbon tax with environmental earmarking" treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.

Table B.31: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Personal Traits

	Pessimism			Optimism			Trust			Uncertainty			Quiz Score		
	Pessimistic	Not Pessimistic	Difference	Optimistic	Not Optimistic	Difference	Trusting	Not Trusting	Difference	Averse to Uncertainty	Not Averse to Uncertainty	Difference	High Score	Low Score	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Washington × Cap and Invest	0.328*** (0.109)	0.052 (0.075)	0.276** (0.112)	0.041 (0.056)	0.349*** (0.118)	-0.308*** (0.134)	0.132 (0.091)	0.163** (0.074)	-0.031 (0.074)	0.042 (0.074)	0.210** (0.080)	-0.168* (0.106)	0.140 (0.106)	0.147** (0.080)	-0.007
Cap and Invest	-0.094 (0.111)	0.018 (0.075)	-0.112 (0.111)	0.018 (0.055)	-0.116 (0.121)	0.134 (0.092)	0.021 (0.073)	-0.042 (0.073)	0.063 (0.079)	-0.006 (0.079)	-0.029 (0.079)	0.023 (0.105)	0.025 (0.105)	-0.048 (0.080)	0.073
Washington × Cap and Dividend	0.179** (0.083)	0.011 (0.056)	0.168* (0.057)	-0.137** (0.057)	0.426*** (0.086)	-0.563*** (0.121)	-0.060 (0.083)	0.181*** (0.067)	-0.241** (0.067)	-0.030 (0.068)	0.144** (0.060)	-0.174** (0.037)	0.016 (0.115)	0.122** (0.060)	-0.106
Cap and Div.	-0.041 (0.082)	-0.025 (0.056)	-0.016 (0.057)	0.045 (0.057)	-0.173* (0.086)	0.218** (0.085)	0.083 (0.068)	-0.098 (0.068)	0.181 (0.069)	-0.026 (0.069)	-0.037 (0.069)	0.011 (0.115)	0.015 (0.062)	-0.059 (0.062)	0.074
Washington × Tax and Env. Earm.	0.201*** (0.074)	-0.152** (0.064)	0.353*** (0.064)	-0.237*** (0.059)	0.305*** (0.088)	-0.542*** (0.100)	-0.142* (0.073)	0.018 (0.055)	-0.160* (0.070)	-0.140* (0.070)	0.029 (0.060)	-0.169* (0.103)	-0.011 (0.059)	-0.072 (0.059)	0.061
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.081 (0.074)	0.021 (0.064)	-0.102 (0.064)	0.100* (0.058)	-0.240** (0.090)	0.340*** (0.072)	0.169** (0.055)	-0.080 (0.055)	0.249*** (0.067)	0.008 (0.067)	-0.025 (0.059)	0.033 (0.102)	0.075 (0.060)	-0.058 (0.060)	0.133
Washington	-0.135** (0.056)	-0.016 (0.043)	-0.119 (0.037)	0.087** (0.037)	-0.310*** (0.056)	0.397*** (0.071)	0.089 (0.071)	-0.151*** (0.039)	0.240*** (0.038)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.136*** (0.040)	0.178*** (0.078)	-0.045 (0.037)	-0.064* (0.037)	0.019
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.000
Woman	-0.001 (0.077)	-0.064* (0.035)	0.063 (0.024)	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.015 (0.036)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.057* (0.028)	0.041 (0.028)	-0.061* (0.032)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.038)	0.008 (0.038)	-0.081*** (0.022)	0.089*
Latino	0.075** (0.028)	0.157*** (0.023)	-0.082** (0.029)	0.079*** (0.019)	0.141** (0.052)	-0.062 (0.018)	0.111*** (0.027)	0.105** (0.022)	0.006 (0.022)	0.114*** (0.042)	0.120*** (0.042)	-0.006 (0.029)	0.144*** (0.036)	0.103*** (0.026)	0.041
College Grad	0.034 (0.045)	0.005 (0.031)	0.029 (0.041)	0.012 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.018 (0.029)	-0.046 (0.039)	0.031 (0.039)	-0.077* (0.039)	0.004 (0.055)	0.029 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.043)	0.001 (0.043)	0.031 (0.035)	-0.030
Republican	-0.195*** (0.038)	-0.270*** (0.030)	0.075 (0.028)	-0.275*** (0.028)	-0.224*** (0.040)	-0.051 (0.048)	-0.256*** (0.048)	-0.200*** (0.021)	-0.004 (0.040)	-0.221*** (0.030)	-0.271*** (0.030)	-0.050 (0.047)	-0.297*** (0.047)	-0.216*** (0.042)	-0.081
Constant	0.991*** (0.081)	0.930*** (0.069)	0.061 (0.065)	0.978*** (0.065)	0.973*** (0.090)	0.005 (0.074)	1.036*** (0.066)	0.967*** (0.066)	0.069 (0.066)	0.942*** (0.065)	0.956*** (0.062)	-0.014 (0.103)	0.876*** (0.103)	1.022*** (0.063)	-0.146
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	390	799		801	388		420	736		486	703		476	713	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.106	0.123		0.147	0.110		0.181	0.109		0.108	0.114		0.127	0.1197	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for pessimism, optimism, trust, uncertainty aversion, and quiz performance as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, °, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.

Table B.32: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Socioeconomic Indicators

	Income			Education		
	High Income	Low Income	Difference	Degree Holding	Non Degree Holding	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.207** (0.085)	0.014 (0.079)	0.193*	0.227** (0.102)	0.079 (0.069)	0.148
Cap and Invest	-0.075 (0.085)	0.085 (0.078)	-0.160	-0.092 (0.101)	0.030 (0.069)	-0.122
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.079 (0.085)	0.046 (0.078)	0.033	0.153* (0.082)	-0.008 (0.057)	0.161
Cap and Div.	-0.020 (0.085)	-0.039 (0.078)	0.019	-0.094 (0.082)	0.016 (0.057)	-0.110
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.041 (0.089)	-0.055 (0.058)	0.014	-0.011 (0.076)	-0.085 (0.057)	0.074
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.013 (0.088)	0.006 (0.058)	-0.019	-0.008 (0.076)	-0.017 (0.055)	0.009
Washington	-0.053 (0.066)	-0.062 (0.046)	0.009	-0.071 (0.056)	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.017
Age	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.000
Woman	-0.072** (0.027)	-0.008 (0.031)	-0.064	0.007 (0.033)	-0.086** (0.034)	0.093
Latino	0.139*** (0.029)	0.072 (0.044)	0.067	0.116*** (0.024)	0.099** (0.043)	0.017
College Grad	0.042 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.035)	0.044	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000
Republican	-0.255*** (0.032)	-0.239*** (0.034)	-0.016	-0.322*** (0.062)	-0.176*** (0.048)	-0.146
Constant	0.966*** (0.083)	0.935*** (0.062)	0.031	1.020*** (0.061)	0.941*** (0.061)	0.079
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	631	558		617	572	
$R^2$	0.137	0.099		0.157	0.089	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for income and education level as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, °, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.



Table B.33: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Awareness of Carbon Pricing and Concern about Climate Change

	Cap and Trade			Climate		
	Aware	Not Aware	Difference	Worried	Not Worried	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Washington $\times$ Cap and Invest	0.169** (0.077)	0.188** (0.081)	-0.019	0.104 (0.070)	0.209** (0.088)	-0.105
Cap and Invest	-0.106 (0.078)	-0.111 (0.077)	0.005	-0.022 (0.070)	-0.053 (0.088)	0.031
Washington $\times$ Cap and Dividend	0.124 (0.094)	0.141 (0.108)	-0.017	0.073 (0.052)	0.111 (0.071)	-0.038
Cap and Div.	-0.126 (0.096)	-0.024 (0.109)	-0.102	0.000 (0.053)	-0.066 (0.071)	0.066
Washington $\times$ Tax and Env. Earm.	0.027 (0.060)	0.008 (0.089)	0.019	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.009 (0.073)	-0.012
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.069 (0.058)	-0.056 (0.087)	-0.013	0.069* (0.040)	-0.105 (0.074)	0.174**
Washington	-0.160*** (0.035)	-0.160*** (0.054)	0.000	-0.047 (0.033)	-0.108** (0.048)	0.061
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.000	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.001
Woman	-0.066 (0.044)	-0.016 (0.082)	-0.050	-0.039 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.012
Latino	0.060** (0.027)	0.220*** (0.057)	-0.160**	0.031 (0.022)	0.203*** (0.043)	-0.172*** <sup>oo</sup>
College Grad	0.059** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.044)	0.063	0.020 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.034)	0.027
Republican	-0.189** (0.068)	-0.274*** (0.061)	0.085	-0.070* (0.040)	-0.275*** (0.028)	0.205*** <sup>ooo</sup>
Constant	1.197*** (0.061)	0.989*** (0.091)	0.208**	0.962*** (0.044)	0.846*** (0.081)	0.116
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	308	273		603	586	
$R^2$	0.142	0.129		0.032	0.124	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for the awareness of current cap-and-trade programs within states and concern about climate change as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. <sup>oo</sup>, <sup>o</sup>, <sup>o</sup> indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.

Table B.34: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Exposure to Carbon Pricing

	Public Transportation			Gas Spending			Heat Spending			Flight Frequency			Meat Frequency			Industry Exposure		
	Good (1)	Bad (2)	Difference (3)	High (4)	Low (5)	Difference (6)	High (7)	Low (8)	Difference (9)	Frequent (10)	Not Frequent (11)	Flier (12)	Frequent (13)	Meat (14)	Not Frequent (15)	High Exposure (16)	Low Exposure (17)	Difference (18)
Washington × Cap and Invest	-0.018 (0.072)	0.256*** (0.086)	-0.238*** (0.088)	-0.002 (0.088)	0.246*** (0.068)	-0.248** (0.071)	0.149** (0.106)	0.127 (0.106)	0.022 (0.092)	0.213** (0.069)	0.176** (0.069)	0.037 (0.178)	-0.162 (0.069)	0.174** (0.071)	-0.336* (0.169)	0.169** (0.071)	0.116 (0.093)	0.053
Cap and Invest	0.117 (0.072)	-0.094 (0.085)	0.211** (0.089)	0.026 (0.089)	-0.050 (0.068)	0.076 (0.070)	-0.097 (0.106)	0.067 (0.088)	-0.164 (0.088)	-0.110 (0.069)	0.012 (0.069)	-0.122 (0.179)	0.264 (0.070)	-0.056 (0.068)	0.320 (0.070)	-0.016 (0.070)	-0.030 (0.094)	0.014
Washington × Cap and Dividend	-0.087 (0.063)	0.196*** (0.072)	-0.283*** (0.101)	0.092 (0.101)	0.081 (0.055)	0.011 (0.055)	0.038 (0.061)	0.125 (0.087)	-0.087 (0.061)	0.082 (0.077)	0.087 (0.062)	-0.005 (0.156)	0.059 (0.156)	0.077 (0.054)	-0.018 (0.054)	0.023 (0.048)	0.143* (0.075)	-0.120
Cap and Div.	0.074 (0.062)	-0.106 (0.074)	0.180* (0.101)	-0.095 (0.101)	0.004 (0.054)	-0.099 (0.062)	-0.032 (0.086)	-0.042 (0.074)	0.010 (0.063)	-0.043 (0.063)	-0.008 (0.063)	-0.035 (0.156)	0.049 (0.156)	-0.040 (0.054)	0.089 (0.054)	-0.063 (0.048)	-0.003 (0.076)	-0.060
Washington × Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.116 (0.074)	0.029 (0.073)	-0.145 (0.093)	-0.039 (0.093)	-0.043 (0.056)	0.004 (0.056)	0.048 (0.054)	-0.120 (0.082)	0.168 (0.082)	0.048 (0.057)	-0.055 (0.057)	0.083 (0.186)	-0.247 (0.186)	-0.014 (0.050)	-0.233 (0.050)	0.000 (0.063)	-0.069 (0.078)	0.069
Tax and Env. Earm.	0.039 (0.073)	-0.049 (0.072)	0.088 (0.094)	0.001 (0.094)	-0.013 (0.056)	0.014 (0.053)	-0.072 (0.081)	0.054 (0.081)	-0.126 (0.080)	-0.107 (0.080)	0.036 (0.056)	-0.143 (0.186)	0.255 (0.186)	-0.043 (0.049)	0.298 (0.062)	-0.048 (0.062)	0.023 (0.077)	-0.071
Washington	0.026 (0.043)	-0.155*** (0.052)	0.181** (0.072)	-0.024 (0.072)	-0.090** (0.035)	0.066 (0.035)	-0.081** (0.037)	-0.040 (0.065)	-0.041 (0.054)	-0.088 (0.054)	-0.096** (0.040)	0.008 (0.147)	0.074 (0.034)	-0.074** (0.034)	0.148 (0.043)	-0.071 (0.043)	-0.059 (0.050)	-0.012
Age	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.000
Woman	-0.096** (0.038)	0.018 (0.033)	-0.114* (0.033)	-0.104*** (0.036)	0.004 (0.039)	-0.108 (0.039)	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.043)	0.002 (0.026)	-0.054** (0.026)	0.056 (0.094)	-0.108 (0.094)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.064 (0.021)	-0.082*** (0.025)	0.001 (0.027)	-0.083**
Latino	0.079*** (0.022)	0.134*** (0.041)	-0.055 (0.038)	0.157*** (0.038)	0.047 (0.057)	0.110 (0.022)	0.136*** (0.022)	0.096*** (0.029)	0.040 (0.030)	0.127*** (0.027)	0.107*** (0.027)	0.020 (0.020)	0.081 (0.020)	0.126*** (0.020)	-0.045 (0.025)	0.103*** (0.025)	0.129*** (0.027)	-0.026
College Grad	0.096*** (0.026)	-0.051 (0.044)	0.147** (0.026)	0.013 (0.026)	0.023 (0.048)	-0.010 (0.048)	0.026 (0.032)	0.001 (0.040)	0.025 (0.044)	-0.028 (0.028)	-0.013 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.054)	0.013 (0.054)	-0.024 (0.037)	-0.008 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.048)	0.092*** (0.031)	-0.117**
Republican	-0.214*** (0.036)	-0.268*** (0.038)	0.054 (0.033)	-0.120*** (0.033)	-0.357*** (0.044)	0.237*** (0.044)	-0.262*** (0.046)	-0.239*** (0.042)	-0.032 (0.048)	-0.246*** (0.048)	-0.261*** (0.029)	0.015 (0.029)	-0.273*** (0.056)	-0.236*** (0.056)	-0.037 (0.025)	-0.247*** (0.025)	-0.254*** (0.024)	0.007
Constant	0.902*** (0.063)	0.971*** (0.078)	-0.069 (0.069)	0.985*** (0.069)	0.973*** (0.052)	0.012 (0.052)	1.028*** (0.057)	0.907*** (0.089)	0.121 (0.089)	1.180*** (0.082)	0.858*** (0.061)	0.322*** (0.179)	0.878*** (0.179)	0.989*** (0.053)	-0.111 (0.053)	1.025*** (0.070)	0.949*** (0.068)	-0.085
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	574	615		523	666		610	579		385	796		135	1054		647	542	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.120	0.119		0.086	0.174		0.122	0.116		0.175	0.096		0.146	0.116		0.121	0.1301	

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for availability of public transportation, gas spending, heat spending, flight frequency, meat consumption, and industry emission exposure as described in Section 4.3. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, °, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.

Table B.35: Proprietary Survey: Public Support with Estimates for Controls and Policy Interactions Analyzing Heterogeneity Along Information Sources

	Institutions			Traditional News			Contemporary News			Advertisements		
	Governments and Institutions	No Governments and Institutions	Difference	Print/Digital Media	No Print/Digital Media	Difference	Podcasts/Social Media	No Podcasts/Social Media	Difference	Advertisements	No Advertisements	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Washington × Cap and Invest	0.097 (0.078)	0.181** (0.080)	-0.084 (0.034)	0.091 (0.114)	0.157** (0.060)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.072 (0.079)	0.323*** (0.079)	-0.395*** (0.100)	0.044 (0.066)	0.166** (0.066)	-0.122
Cap and Invest	0.004 (0.077)	-0.030 (0.080)	0.034 (0.114)	-0.068 (0.060)	0.094 (0.060)	-0.072 (0.068)	0.074 (0.079)	-0.107 (0.098)	0.181* (0.079)	0.056 (0.098)	-0.043 (0.066)	0.099
Washington × Cap and Dividend	0.166* (0.083)	0.026 (0.055)	0.140 (0.112)	0.115 (0.051)	0.051 (0.051)	0.064 (0.072)	0.031 (0.060)	0.090 (0.060)	-0.059 (0.101)	0.181* (0.101)	0.030 (0.056)	0.151
Cap and Div.	-0.163* (0.083)	0.072 (0.056)	-0.235** (0.114)	-0.100 (0.051)	-0.010 (0.051)	-0.090 (0.072)	-0.030 (0.062)	-0.024 (0.062)	-0.006 (0.102)	-0.054 (0.102)	-0.026 (0.057)	-0.028
Washington × Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.048 (0.063)	-0.005 (0.070)	-0.043 (0.099)	-0.141 (0.054)	-0.024 (0.054)	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.105 (0.067)	-0.033 (0.067)	-0.072 (0.137)	-0.237* (0.137)	0.014 (0.055)	-0.251
Tax and Env. Earm.	-0.063 (0.062)	-0.017 (0.070)	0.014 (0.098)	0.028 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.053)	0.048 (0.077)	0.048 (0.067)	-0.030 (0.139)	0.099 (0.067)	-0.027 (0.139)	-0.027 (0.055)	0.126
Washington	-0.065 (0.043)	-0.115** (0.046)	0.050 (0.058)	0.029 (0.058)	-0.091** (0.040)	0.120 (0.053)	0.069 (0.048)	-0.163*** (0.048)	0.232*** (0.066)	0.023 (0.066)	-0.089** (0.040)	0.112
Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.000
Woman	-0.036 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.038)	0.069** (0.025)	-0.068*** (0.025)	0.137*** (0.022)	-0.061** (0.025)	-0.012 (0.025)	-0.049 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.042* (0.023)	0.016
Latino	0.069*** (0.026)	0.148*** (0.038)	-0.059 (0.048)	0.112** (0.029)	0.119*** (0.025)	-0.007 (0.025)	0.066*** (0.034)	0.160*** (0.034)	-0.092* (0.067)	0.167** (0.067)	0.102*** (0.032)	0.065
College Grad	0.041 (0.040)	-0.047* (0.025)	0.088** (0.041)	0.075* (0.028)	-0.007 (0.028)	0.082** (0.027)	0.018 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.031)	0.031 (0.045)	0.065 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.031)	0.068
Republican	-0.226*** (0.029)	-0.265*** (0.032)	0.039 (0.050)	-0.197*** (0.029)	-0.269*** (0.029)	0.071 (0.038)	-0.192*** (0.038)	-0.301*** (0.029)	0.109** (0.074)	-0.226*** (0.074)	-0.255*** (0.027)	0.032
Constant	1.003*** (0.064)	0.874*** (0.080)	0.129 (0.090)	1.001*** (0.062)	0.948*** (0.062)	0.053 (0.069)	0.898*** (0.071)	0.871*** (0.071)	0.027 (0.142)	0.903*** (0.142)	0.983*** (0.065)	-0.080
Other Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	612	577		305	884		482	707	282	907		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.117	0.113		0.120	0.120		0.074	0.132	0.157	0.109		

**Note:** This table reports estimates for support for carbon pricing across designs. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. This table replicates the results in Table B.5, analyzing heterogeneous effects for sources of information as described in Section 4.3. Institutions include local governments, the federal government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and research institutions. Traditional news includes print and digital news outlets. Contemporary news includes social media, podcasts, and video news. Advertisements include all forms of advertisements. Washington is an indicator of whether the respondent is in the state of Washington. Cap and Invest is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “cap and invest” treatment arm. Cap and Div. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax and dividend” treatment arm. Tax and Env. Earm. is an indicator of whether the respondent was assigned to the “carbon tax with environmental earmarking” treatment arm. Public support for carbon pricing is measured in Question 15, outlined in Appendix A.3.4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively. °°, ° indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively, with q-values from Anderson (2008), which itself builds on, among others, Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). All multiple hypothesis testing adjusted q-values test whether the coefficient for one heterogeneous group equals the coefficient for the other heterogeneous group.