

Martorano, Bruno; Metzger, Laura; Justino, Patricia; Iacoella, Francesco

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Social movements' impact on inequality beliefs, preferences for redistribution, and political participation

Bruno Martorano,¹ Laura Metzger,² Patricia Justino,³ and Francesco Iacotella⁴

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Abstract: We study whether exposure to social movements campaigning against income and gender income inequality shifts individual beliefs about inequality, reshapes preferences for redistribution, and translates into political participation in the UK. Since the Great Recession of the 2010s, the UK has seen significant growth in social movements, particularly those mobilizing against inequality. We focus on income and gender income inequality, two persistent and politically contested forms of inequality in advanced democracies like the UK. Responses to social movements can diverge sharply between them. Using observational data, we show that exposure to protests against inequality is strongly correlated with increased support for redistribution. To identify causal effects, we complement this evidence with an online experiment in which we randomly assign 1,436 UK citizens to follow real social movement content focused on either income or gender income inequality over a two-week period on Facebook. Participants exposed to information about income inequality increase support for reducing income disparities, while those exposed to gender income inequality support targeted measures to address gender gaps. Both groups favor higher taxes on the wealthy and are more likely to take political action, including signing a petition, contacting a politician, or meeting a public official.

Key words: social movements, income inequality, gender inequality, redistribution preferences, political participation, survey experiment, United Kingdom

JEL classification: D31, D72, H23, I38, J16

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¹ UNU-MERIT United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, Maastricht University, The Netherlands, corresponding author: bruno.martorano@maastrichtuniversity.nl; ² Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; ³ UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland; ⁴ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Evaluation Office, New York, USA.

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Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland

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1 Introduction

Social movements¹ can be powerful drivers of political and social change (Amenta et al. 1999; Chenoweth and Stephan 2024; Lipsky 1968; Lohmann 1994; Tilly et al. 2019). Beyond shaping public discourse and influencing policy agendas, social movements also aim to influence how individuals think, feel, and act. A central way in which they attempt to do so is by providing tailored messaging that offers a counterweight to mainstream politics, thereby shifting people's beliefs and preferences about social problems and mobilizing them politically. Yet we know comparatively little about how social movements' campaigning causally affects individual attitudes toward specific issues and willingness to engage in political action. Systematically unpacking the pathway from information to political action is essential for explaining when and why social movements succeed, or fail.

We examine this question in the context of social movements demanding action against income and gender income inequality in the United Kingdom. Both types of inequalities rank among the most pressing and contested challenges in advanced democracies, including the UK (Bovill 2014; Chancel and Piketty 2021; Nunn 2016). Responses to social movements can diverge sharply across these dimensions: people may hold different views about them, and specific messaging may not work, or may even backfire, with certain groups (Druckman 2022). It is therefore important to examine not only how messages from social movements about inequality are received, but also how the interaction with gender shapes these responses, as public attitudes and policy support may shift significantly depending on who is perceived as the primary beneficiary.

The UK offers a highly relevant but understudied context in research on social movements (Cantoni et al. 2024). The British Government introduced a decade-long fiscal austerity programme in 2011 to respond to rising public debt after the Great Recession. By now, it is well documented that austerity exacerbated existing inequalities and restricted lower-income households' capacity to cover basic needs and weather economic shocks, most notably Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Ukraine war (Beatty and Fothergill 2016; Innes and Tetlow 2015; Jenkins 2021; Wiedemann 2022). Often overlooked in this context is the well-being of women from lower-income households, who were disproportionately affected. Austerity measures, including tax and benefit changes, hit women especially hard (Razzu and Singleton 2018), and the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the problem, as women were more likely

¹ A social movement is a collective effort by a large group of people or organizations to bring about social, economic, or political change from the bottom up (Amenta et al. 2010). Protests and civil disobedience belong to its most important forms. Like other studies in the field, e.g., Gethin and Pons (2024); Klein Teeselink and Melios (2025), we do not consider organizational strength or form of social movements, or their particular strategies as factors in our analysis. We consider a social movement to be a persistent stream of activities aimed at demanding change from the government related to a particular set of issues.

than men to leave employment to take on domestic and caregiving responsibilities (Andrew et al. 2020). In response to this rising hardship, the UK has witnessed a significant increase in bottom-up social movements campaigning against inequality (Ishkanian 2019). The activism flowing from these social movements has exposed the public to a steady stream of messaging about inequality, keeping the topic salient in the public discourse and political debate.

Since we study social movements campaigning against inequality, we are specifically interested in whether their political success depends on their ability to change individual beliefs about inequality and preferences for redistribution. Preferences for redistribution represent a primary downstream consequence of inequality beliefs in political economy models (see e.g., Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Giuliano (2011); Benabou and Ok (2001); Meltzer and Richard (1981)), and offer a direct way to assess whether updated beliefs about inequality translate into changed attitudes about the role of government. Our empirical approach is guided by Bayesian models of perception and action, in which information updates beliefs, beliefs shape preferences, and preferences ultimately guide behaviour (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; Ma et al. 2023). This framework highlights why messaging from social movements can matter: if movements succeed in changing people’s beliefs about inequality, they can shift preferences for redistribution and, in turn, spur political action.

While prior work shows that protests and movements can influence voting patterns, we know much less about how they translate into individual-level political engagement. Even less is understood about how campaigns targeting different dimensions of inequality, such as income versus gender income inequality, produce divergent effects on beliefs, preferences, and actions (Günther and Martorano 2025; Settele 2022). We address these gaps by combining observational and experimental data to trace how exposure to social movements shapes individual beliefs about inequality, preferences for redistribution, and political action. First, we analyze the relationship between exposure to social movements campaigning against inequality and preferences for redistribution by matching information on protests from the *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project* (ACLED) to individual-level representative data from the *British Election Study* (BES). We find a strong correlation between exposure to inequality protests and redistribution preferences. While this confirms a meaningful link in our study context, it does not establish causality. We therefore complement this evidence with data from an online experiment with 1,436 UK citizens, conducted on Prolific between June and July 2022. We exogenously vary individuals’ exposure to real social movement content about income and gender income inequality in the UK by delivering targeted messaging via Facebook over a two-week period. Today, most social movements disseminate information on social media and use it as a medium to organize protests and mobilize people politically (Dunivin et al. 2022; Fergusson and Molina 2019; Jost et al. 2018; Steinert-Threlkeld 2017). Exposing people to information treatments about income inequality on Facebook is a natural second-best choice given that we cannot simulate social movements in a controlled experiment.

To investigate whether information about income and gender income inequality impacts people's beliefs, preferences, and behaviour differently, we randomly assigned participants to two treatment groups: the first group followed a Facebook page reposting original content from social movements focusing on income inequality; the second group followed a Facebook page reposting original content from social movements focusing on gender income inequality. Our study differs from previous work by combining observational and experimental data, using authentic messages from real social movements, and systematically testing how specific messaging determines the direction of changes in beliefs, preferences, and political action. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to causally trace the full pathway through which social movements influence beliefs about inequality, reshape preferences for redistribution, and encourage political action.

We find that participants exposed to information about income inequality want to allocate significantly more resources towards reducing income inequality, while those exposed to information on gender income inequality want to allocate significant more resources to addressing gender income inequality. Participants in both groups support raising taxes on richer income groups to finance these expenses and are significantly more willing to take political action by signing a petition against inequalities, writing a politician, and meeting a public official to discuss inequalities.

We add to the literature in various ways. First, we extend political economy research on social movements by examining the full causal pathway through which social movements influence political behaviour: from individual beliefs, to reshaping preferences, to political action (Acemoglu et al. 2017; Archibong et al. 2022; Cantoni et al. 2019; Caprettini et al. 2021; El-Mallakh 2020; Enos et al. 2019; Lagios et al. 2025; Madestam et al. 2013; Mazumder 2018). While a growing body of research² documents that social movements shape voting outcomes (by increasing electoral participation and shifting vote shares) these studies often focus on electoral effects without properly unpacking the underlying mechanisms of belief and preference formation (Andrews 1997; El-Mallakh 2020; Klein Teeselink and Melios 2025; Madestam et al. 2013; Mazumder 2018; McVeigh et al. 2014). More recent work has begun to explore how social movements influence public opinion and policy attitudes (Dunivin et al. 2022; Lagios et al. 2025; Reny and Newman 2021; Wasow 2020) but tends to stop short of directly connecting individual attitudinal changes to political participation (among other things due to the limitations placed on observational data). We contribute to closing this gap by providing experimental evidence on both the “if” and the “why”: how social movements influence beliefs about inequality, how these beliefs shape preferences for redistribution, and how these preferences spur political action. Empirically, we show that our information treatment increases individual concerns

² See Amenta et al. (2010) for a review of research in comparative political sociology. In this paper, we focus the discussion mostly on quantitative literature on social movements.

about inequality, fairness, and perceptions of inequality as a pressing problem. These belief changes, in turn, significantly raise individual preferences for redistribution. Finally, participants with stronger preferences for redistribution are more likely to sign a petition against inequality (political action).

Second, our results, particularly the link we establish between belief changes and policy preferences, address an ongoing debate in the literature about how social movements influence political behaviour. Theoretical contributions suggest that social movements aim to sway public opinion by disseminating information and framing issues to build broader support for their cause (Amenta et al. 1999; Lipsky 1968; Lohmann 1994). While a few case studies have documented shifts in public opinion resulting from social movements, such as Israel's Four Mothers Peace Movement (Lieberfeld 2009), the 2006 Latino protests in the US (Branton et al. 2015; Carey et al. 2014; Wallace et al. 2013), or recent climate strikes (Brehm and Gruhl 2024), these studies do not focus on inequality, nor do they provide causal evidence on how belief and preference formation translates into political action. In particular, quantitative research that systematically investigates how social movements shape beliefs and preferences as mechanisms of political mobilization remains scarce (Cantoni et al. 2024). To our knowledge, only two recent studies explore these dynamics. Klein Teeselink and Melios (2025) use observational data and an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the impact of Black Lives Matter protests on voting outcomes in the 2020 US presidential election, suggesting that exposure to protests shifted beliefs about racial disparities. Gethin and Pons (2024) examine the effect of protests on public opinion, political attitudes, and electoral behaviour in the US between 2017 and 2022, finding that while protests raise issue salience, they have limited effects on underlying beliefs or voting intentions—except in the case of Black Lives Matter. Neither study, however, provides causal evidence linking belief changes to redistribution preferences and subsequent political participation.

Third, we contribute to a large experimental literature in economics that uses information treatments to investigate the link between inequality beliefs and redistribution preferences (e.g., Alesina et al. (2018); Ciani et al. (2021); Günther and Martorano (2025); Hvidberg et al. (2023); Kuziemko et al. (2015); Settele (2022)).³ A key takeaway from this work is that information on inequality often raises concern about inequality but tends to have limited and heterogeneous effects on demand for redistribution. Findings also tend to depend on factors such as trust in government, beliefs about policy effectiveness, or ideological predispositions. In line with more recent studies (Günther and Martorano 2025; Settele 2022), we show that information about different types of inequality not only shapes attitudes but also translates into demand for targeted political action.

³ See Günther and Martorano (2025) and Settele (2022) for further discussion of the literature.

2 Correlating inequality protests & preferences for redistribution in the UK

We first present analysis from observational micro data exploring the correlation between exposure to protests against inequality and preferences for redistribution between 2020 and 2022 in the UK.⁴ The goal is to establish the relevance of our research question for the broader UK context beyond the experimental setting.

To do so, we use individual-level panel data on preferences for redistribution from the *British Election Study* (BES) and match it to protest events from the ACLED. We conduct our analysis at the Local Authority District (LAD) level, which are local government units in the UK and represent the most granular administrative level to which we can reliably map both datasets, considering geographic precision and data availability.

The BES is a nationally representative longitudinal survey conducted around national elections. It includes information from a sample of between 2,000 and 3,600 individuals surveyed in each round on political preferences, political orientation, and overall opinion on key national issues. We use the post-election data. In line with our research question, we focus on two key survey items measuring preferences for redistribution. The first variable captures agreement with the statement: "The government should enact redistributive policies," measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where 5 indicates strong agreement. The second variable is based on responses to the following statement: "Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's incomes are. Where would you place yourself on this scale?". Responses range from 0 ("Government should try to make incomes equal") to 10 ("Government should be less concerned about equal incomes").

Data on protest events are sourced from the ACLED which assigns geographical coordinates to the events it records. The highest precision score is assigned when events can be pinpointed to the exact town in which they happened. This applies to 99% of the events included in our analysis. The remaining 1% is assigned the second-highest score, indicating that the event is coded to a town with geo-referenced coordinates representing the area where it occurred. Each protest event in the dataset is accompanied by a brief description of its context. We coded protest events according to their primary motive, specifically identifying those focused on the cost of living crisis or inequality.⁵ To avoid double counting, we count at most one protest per


⁴ We focus on this period because data from the *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project* (ACLED) for the UK is consistently available from January 2020 onward, ensuring full coverage of protest events during our period of interest.

⁵ We included events whose notes mentioned the terms "cost of living" or "inequality." Due to imprecise or missing information, we were unable to reliably identify the actors targeted by each protest.

day and location (LAD). We then aggregate the number of protests per year and per LAD and match this information to individual-level data on preferences for redistribution.

Figure 1 displays protests (left panel) against inequality and economic hardship (cost of living crisis) alongside preferences for redistribution across LADs (right panel). Preferences for redistribution vary considerably between areas and are correlated with the number of protest events observed.

Figure 1: Inequality protests (left) & support for redistribution (right) by LAD



Note: The figure shows average individual preferences for redistribution, aggregated at the LAD level. Preferences are measured on a 5-point Likert scale indicating agreement with the statement: "The government should enact redistributive policies," where 5 denotes strong agreement.

Source: Authors' elaboration. Data on protests are sourced from the *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project* (ACLED). Data on preferences for redistribution are sourced from the *British Election Study* (BES).

Table 1 presents the results based on the following regression:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Protests}_j + X_{ij} + \delta_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where i refers to the individual in LAD j . y_{ij} denotes our outcome of interest, individual preferences for redistribution. Protests_j is our main covariate of interest and measures the total number of protests against inequality or the rising cost of living per LAD over the period

2020–2022. X_{ij} is a vector of control variables.⁶ We include LAD fixed effects δ_j to account for unobserved heterogeneity across areas. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level.

The data suggest that greater exposure to protests against inequality is positively associated with stronger preferences for redistribution. In particular, respondents in areas with more protests are more likely to believe that the government should enact redistributive policies and strive to make incomes more equal. While suggestive, these correlations cannot be interpreted as causal, given the potential for endogeneity—such as unobserved factors influencing both protest activity and political attitudes. To address these concerns and enable causal inference we implemented a large-scale, representative online experiment in the UK, which we turn to next.⁷

⁶ We control for (i) demographic characteristics (a female dummy and age); (ii) socio-economic information (dummy variables for whether the respondent self-identifies as white British, is a full-time employee, part-time employee, or student); and (iii) education level, measured on a scale from 1 (no qualifications) to 6 (postgraduate degree).

⁷ We obtained ethical approval from Maastricht University and preregistered the study in the AER registry (AEARCTR-0013740).

Table 1: Effect of protest exposure on preferences for redistribution

	Government should make incomes equal				Government should enact redistribution			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Protests	-0.546*** (0.0578)	-0.165*** (0.0278)	-0.163*** (0.0286)	-0.139*** (0.0337)	0.219*** (0.0226)	0.0776*** (0.00905)	0.0788*** (0.0104)	0.0815*** (0.0118)
Constant	4.619*** (0.0292)	4.640*** (0.00266)	4.584*** (0.00259)	2.045*** (0.0850)	3.271*** (0.0109)	3.269*** (0.000905)	3.284*** (0.000998)	4.020*** (0.0340)
Individual fixed effects	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LAD fixed effects	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	129,822	109,486	129,822	111,286	130,132	109,939	130,132	111,627
R-squared	0.003	0.808	0.029	0.061	0.003	0.819	0.027	0.045


Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Data on preferences for redistribution are obtained from the British Election Study (BES). The first variable captures agreement with the statement: "Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's incomes are. Where would you place yourself on this scale?". Responses range from 0 (Government should try to make incomes equal) to 10 (Government should be less concerned about equal incomes). The second variable is based on responses to the following statement: "The government should enact redistributive policies," measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where 5 indicates strong agreement.

3 Randomized survey experiment

The experiment exogenously varies individuals' exposure to real information about income and gender income inequality, sourced from existing social movements, to assess its impacts on beliefs about inequality, redistribution preferences, and political action.

This design, combined with a state-of-the-art mediation framework (Heller et al. 2016; Imai et al. 2011; Justino et al. 2025), allows us to trace the full pathway from informational exposure to attitudinal and behavioural outcomes. Figure 2 illustrates our approach. Panel (a) presents the overall conceptual pathway; panel (b) depicts the first mediation analysis, which tests whether changes in beliefs mediate the effect of exposure on redistribution preferences; and panel (c) shows the second mediation analysis, which examines whether changes in redistribution preferences (following belief changes) mediate the effect on political action..

Figure 2: Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) of the causal pathways tested in the mediation analysis



Note: (a) Full pathway from exposure to beliefs, preferences, and political action. (b) Mediation of exposure effects on preferences via beliefs. (c) Mediation of exposure effects on political action via preferences. Dashed arrows indicate indirect (mediated) pathways.

Source: Authors' illustration.

We implemented the experiment on Prolific, an online research platform with a strong UK user base and demonstrated reliability in survey-based research (Peer et al. 2022). We collected the data in two waves between June and July 2022, and informed participants in the recruit-

ment message that the study involved three parts: (1) a baseline survey (15 minutes), (2) a requirement to follow a Facebook page for a two-week period, and (3) a follow-up survey conducted 14 days after the baseline (15 minutes). The Facebook pages were created specifically for this study and curated to share real content on either income or gender income inequality, depending on treatment assignment.

Participation in the experiment was compensated in line with Prolific policy. To minimize attrition, we moreover raised incentives to participate in the follow-up survey. We paid £15.76 per hour in the baseline survey, which participants completed in 6 minutes on average, and £16.47 per hour in the follow-up survey, which participants completed in 9 minutes on average. A total of 1,463 individuals participated in the baseline study; 1,280 took part in the follow-up survey. This translates into an attrition rate of about 13%, which is in line with similar studies (Kuziemko et al. 2015). Moreover, based on observable characteristics, attrition appears to occur at random (Section 3.3, and Appendix A, Table A2).

3.1 Experimental design

Figure 3 presents an overview of the experimental design. The baseline survey collected information on personal characteristics of the participants as well as their opinions on government, politics, and societal issues in the UK. At the end of the baseline survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group, which followed a Facebook page providing information on weather forecasts; treatment group 1, which followed a Facebook page created by the authors and sharing original content on income inequality from the pages of social movements in the UK; and treatment group 2, which follow a Facebook page sharing original content on gender income inequality. We shared three posts per day, at 11:00 hours CET, 15:00 hours, CET, and 19:00 hours CET.


All information, data, or videos posted on the Facebook pages drew on real content from a set of prominent UK-based social movements and advocacy organizations campaigning against inequality (see Appendix D for an overview). The material reflects the type of local experiences and public discourse about inequalities that UK citizens were exposed to in recent years and that may plausibly have influenced their views.⁸

After following the assigned Facebook page for 14 days, participants completed a follow-up survey measuring our main outcome variables: beliefs about inequality, preferences for redistribution, and political action. To ensure that participants in all groups were exposed to the intended informational content, even if their engagement with the Facebook page during the 14-day period was irregular, we embedded a short recap video in the follow-up survey sum-

⁸ The full list of shared posts is available upon request.

marizing the key posts from their assigned page (weather forecasts for the control group, income inequality for treatment group 1, and gender income inequality for treatment group 2). This safeguard reduces the risk of treatment non-compliance and strengthens internal validity. We discuss implications of this design choice in Section 5.

Figure 3: Overview of the experimental design and flow: baseline survey, random treatment assignment, and follow-up survey (14 days after the baseline)



Source: Authors' illustration.

3.2 Mediators and outcome variables

We provide the complete survey in Appendix C. Here, we focus on the measures of the mediators and the final outcome variables collected in the follow-up survey. Guided by our earlier assumption of a sequential causal pathway, we first measured individual beliefs (mediator 1), then preferences for redistribution (mediator 2), and finally willingness to take political action against inequality.

Beliefs about inequality: mediator 1.

Beliefs about inequality can encompass several distinct dimensions. We measure four: perceived magnitude, inevitability, and seriousness as a societal problem, plus perceptions of the overall fairness of UK society. Fairness can be seen as a higher-order construct that integrates different views about inequality (Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Previous research shows that fairness perceptions are a strong predictor or support for redistribution (Alesina and Angele-

tos 2005; Fong 2001), making it a theoretically and empirically relevant concept for our causal framework. We therefore consider fairness alongside the other dimensions and, as discussed in Section 4.3, use it as our preferred mediator in the first stage of the mediation analysis.

Although related, these dimensions may not move together or influence downstream outcomes in the same way. For example, recognizing inequality as a problem may not spark political action if perceptions of its inevitability or fairness remain unchanged. We therefore measure each dimension separately (Table 2).

Table 2: Dimensions of beliefs about inequality

Dimension	Item	Scale
Magnitude	"Differences in income between the poor and the rich in the UK are too large."	1–5
Magnitude	"Differences in income between men and women in the UK are too large."	1–5
Inevitability	"Income gaps between the poor and the rich in the UK are inevitable."	1–5
Inevitability	"Income gaps between men and women in the UK are inevitable."	1–5
Seriousness (income)	"Differences in income levels between the rich and the poor are a serious problem in the UK."	1 = Definitely not; 5 = Definitely yes
Seriousness (gender)	"Differences in income levels between women and men are a serious problem in the UK."	1 = Definitely not; 5 = Definitely yes
Fairness	"How fair do you think society in the UK is?"	1 = Very fair; 5 = Very unfair

Note: Survey items measuring beliefs about inequality across four dimensions: perceived magnitude, inevitability, and seriousness as a societal problem, plus overall fairness perceptions. All items were rated on 5-point Likert scales, with scale anchors shown in the right column.

Preferences for redistribution: mediator 2.

As discussed earlier, preferences for redistribution represent a primary downstream consequence of inequality beliefs in political economy models (see, e.g., Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Giuliano (2011); Benabou and Ok (2001); Meltzer and Richard (1981)), and a direct way to assess whether updated beliefs about inequality translate into changed attitudes about the role of government. To capture these preferences and ensure comparability with prior work while adhering to the UK context, we adapt established items from the literature and the *British Election Study* (BES).

Our primary measure for mediation analysis ("The government should implement policies to reduce differences in income levels") captures a broad, higher-order attitude toward redistribution, rather than focusing on any particular policy instrument. This reduces overlap with our belief measures, helping us to test the hypothesized causal pathway at a more general level. However, we also include more concrete items that link redistribution to government spending and progressive taxation to test whether the change in belief translates into specific policy preferences (Table 3).

Table 3: Dimensions of preferences for redistribution

Dimension	Item	Scale
Redistribution	"The government should implement policies to reduce differences in income levels."	1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree
Government spending	"The UK government has received extra budget to spend over the categories below next year. How do you want to divide the budget in percentages between them?" (Total must sum to 100%). Categories: Spending for economic development; Spending for gender equality; Spending for reducing differences between poor and rich.	Percentage allocation
Taxation	"In order to support extra spending, the government should raise taxes on rich families."	1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree

Note: Items adapted from Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and the *British Election Study* (BES).

Political action: final outcome.

We measured political action using a behavioural measure and two intention-based items. Our main outcome is whether respondents chose to sign a petition against inequality, submitted anonymously to a real Member of Parliament. Petition signing is a real political action that can be implemented within the survey, allowing direct observation of behaviour rather than relying on self-reports that tend to be more prone to experimenter demand effects and social desirability bias.⁹

However, we also asked participants how likely they would be to write to a politician or meet with a politician to address inequality. Although potentially more influential forms of engagement, these are longer-term, higher-cost activities that we could only hypothetically measure in the experiment. As such, they complement, but cannot substitute for, our behavioural petition measure (Table 4).

Table 4: Political action measurement

Political action	Text	Response options
Behavioural outcome	"You can now take action by signing a petition. We will submit a petition to a Member of Parliament involved in the fight against inequality issues. We will not tell them your name, just how many people in our study support the petition. We will send you proof of submission in the next few weeks."	1. "I want to sign a petition against inequalities." 2. I do not want to sign a petition against inequalities. 3. "I never sign petitions."
Self-reported Outcome	Write letters, email, or phone public officials about inequality issues	1 = Definitely would not; 4 = Definitely would
Self-reported Outcome	Meet with an elected official or their staff about inequality issues	1 = Definitely would not; 4 = Definitely would

Note: Behavioural and self-reported outcomes measuring political action.

⁹ Evidence supporting these concerns about self-reported measures is, in fact, weak (Settele 2022).

3.3 Data quality and descriptive statistics

We restricted our sample to respondents from the UK and used Prolific’s representative sampling option to match national distributions by gender, age, and ethnic group.¹⁰ A total of 1,463 individuals participated in the baseline survey, of whom 1,280 completed the follow-up, yielding an attrition rate of roughly 13%. Table A1 (Appendix A) compares baseline characteristics between attriters and those who completed both rounds. Attrition appears largely random, with only minor differences in observable characteristics. This suggests that while some individuals dropped out between waves, the resulting sample composition changed only marginally. Possible reasons for attrition include the two-week gap between surveys, participants’ inability to remain active on the Facebook page for the full period, or other random factors beyond our control. While the treatment may have induced some attrition, it did not disproportionately affect specific subgroups.

We implemented several measures to ensure data quality. First, we excluded 139 participants who failed to complete either the baseline or follow-up survey. Second, we asked demographic questions in both rounds and excluded 4 participants who gave inconsistent answers about their gender. Third, we dropped 7 participants with missing information on ethnicity or number of children. Finally, we placed an attention check immediately before collecting data on political behaviour to test if participants devoted their full attention to the survey¹¹. All respondents reported paying attention. In total, we excluded 150 participants based on this data-quality process. Combined with the 183 attriters, this yields a total of 333 excluded participants, leaving 1,130 individuals in the final analysis (Table 5).

Table 5: Participant exclusions due to attrition and data quality checks

Groups of participants excluded	Number
Participants who did not participate in the follow-up survey	183
Participants who did not complete either the baseline or the follow-up survey	139
Participants who reported inconsistent responses about their gender	4
Participants with missing information about ethnicity or the number of children	7
Total participants excluded	333

We verified that these exclusions did not compromise the randomization process by conducting a balance test across treatment groups for the final sample. Table A2 in Appendix A reports the results. The first column shows the probability of being assigned to any treatment, while the remaining columns show the probability of assignment to each treatment arm. Observable

¹⁰ Prolific offers an option to researchers to distribute their survey to a representative sample using an allocation algorithm based on UK 2011 Census figures. Additional information on the identification process is provided here: [Prolific Representative Samples FAQ](#).

¹¹ The attention check did not affect payment which we informed participant about.

characteristics appear balanced across groups, with the exception of full-time employment, which is significant at the 5% level.

Table 6 summarizes the characteristics of the 1,130 individuals who completed both survey waves. Compared to nationally representative data from the 2021 Office for National Statistics (NOMIS) and the most recent UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UK HLS, 2018), our sample matches national distributions for ethnic British and female respondents aged 18 and over. However, participants in our study tend to be younger and more highly educated than the UK adult population.

Table 6: Comparison of sample characteristics with official UK statistics

Variable	Online experiment	Official figures
<i>Age group (%)</i> *		
18–24	11.82	9.00
25–34	20.71	14.40
35–44	19.24	13.49
45–54	16.38	16.90
55–64	20.56	18.09
65–74	9.81	16.22
75–84	1.39	8.94
85 or older	0.08	2.96
<i>Female (%)</i> #	50.31	50.58
<i>British (%)</i> *	80.45	82.59
<i>Higher education (%)</i> #	62.52	43.50

Note: *Data from UK HLS. #Data from NOMIS.

In a final step, we also examined survey completion times. On average, participants spent 6 minutes on the baseline survey and 9 minutes on the follow-up. Ninety-eight per cent of participants completed both surveys within three standard deviations of the mean time.

3.4 Estimation strategy

To estimate the impact of exposure to social movements campaigning for equality on beliefs, preferences for redistribution, and political action, we estimate the following OLS model including the full set of controls. Results without controls are very similar and are reported in Appendix B.

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 X_i + u_i \quad (2)$$

where i indexes individuals. The dependent variable y_i measures the outcomes of interest—namely, redistributive preferences, beliefs, or political action. The main explanatory variable T_i is a treatment indicator capturing whether the participant was exposed to the experimental intervention. The vector X_i contains the following control variables: (i) *demographic characteris-*

tics: the respondent's age group and four dummy variables indicating whether the participant is female, married, has children, self-identifies as ethnically British, and resides in the UK; (ii) *socio-economic information*: a dummy variable indicating full-time employment status, the participant's income class¹², and a dummy variable for holding a university degree or higher; (iii) *trust in government*: measured on a scale from 1 ("All the time") to 5 ("Never") in response to the question "How much of the time can you trust the government to do what is right?"; (iv) *political orientation*: a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent self-identifies as "left-wing" or "left of center." We control for trust in government and political orientation because both have been shown to shape redistribution preferences (Kuziemko et al. 2015; Settele 2022).

By estimating this model, we can assess the causal impact of exposure to social movements on beliefs, preferences for redistribution, and political action, while accounting for relevant covariates. In the next section, we present the results in four steps, beginning with treatment effects on beliefs and moving through to preferences for redistribution and political action.

4 Results

We first examine whether exposure to social movements' messaging affects beliefs about income and gender income inequality and perceptions of the fairness of UK society. We then turn to preferences for redistribution, followed by the first stage of the mediation analysis, which tests whether changes in beliefs serve as a channel linking exposure to redistribution preferences (Figure 2, panel (b)). Finally, we assess effects on political action and conduct the second stage of the mediation analysis to examine whether shifts in redistribution preferences mediate the treatment effect on political action (Figure 2, panel (c)).

4.1 Does exposure to social movements change beliefs about inequality?

Exposure to social movements' messages makes participants perceive UK society as significantly less fair (Panel A, Column 7 of Table 7). It also increases concern about income differences between the poor and the rich (Panel A, Column 1) and between men and women (Panel A, Column 2), as well as the perception that both income and gender income inequality are serious problems (Panel A, Columns 3 and 4).

A notable finding is the significant difference between the two treatment groups in concerns about income differences between men and women (Panel B, Column 2, $p - value = .000$)

¹² We defined twelve classes: less than 15,000; 15,000–24,999; 25,000–34,999; 35,000–44,999; 45,000–54,999; 55,000–64,999; 65,000–74,999; 75,000–84,999; 85,000–94,999; 95,000–104,999; 105,000–144,999; more than 145,000.

and in perceptions that gender inequality is a serious problem (Panel B, Column 4, $p - value = .015$). This suggests that targeted messages can shift beliefs in ways consistent with their specific content. We also observe a stronger effect of gender-based messaging on these beliefs (Panel B, Columns 2 and 4), which may reflect greater dispersion of individual priors regarding gender income inequality (Settele 2022).

By contrast, the treatment does, on average, not meaningfully change beliefs that income or gender income inequality is inevitable (Panel A, Columns 5 and 6). If anything, participants who were exposed to information about income inequality are more likely to view it as inevitable (Column 5, Panel B), but this effect is absent for gender income inequality. In short, while exposure to social movements' messaging can shift beliefs about inequality, it generally does not foster the view that nothing can be done to address it. This insight is useful insight for our mediation analysis later: to the extent that inevitability beliefs remain unchanged, they are unlikely to act as a channel through which exposure influences redistribution preferences

4.2 Does exposure to social movements change preferences for redistribution?

Table 8 reports the estimated impact of exposure to social movements' messages on preferences for redistribution. We begin with the statement "The government should implement policies to reduce differences in income levels.", which captures general support for redistribution without reference to specific policies. Panel A shows that exposure to social movements campaigning against inequality significantly increases agreement with this statement, consistent with our findings from the observational data.

Panel A also shows that the treatment increases preferences for redistribution across other measures. Treated participants would allocate more government resources to reduce gender inequality and less to economic development. They would also raise taxes on wealthier individuals to finance these expenditures.

Panel B disaggregates the effects by treatment type. As with beliefs, most preference outcomes do not differ significantly between the two message types. The main exceptions align closely with message content: participants exposed to information about income inequality allocate significantly more resources to reducing income inequality, while those exposed to information about gender inequality allocate more to reducing gender inequality. Taken together with the belief results in Table 7, this pattern underscores that targeted messaging tends to shift both beliefs and policy preferences in the domain it addresses.

Building on these results, we next examine whether the treatment's effects go beyond shifting beliefs and preferences separately. In particular, we test whether changes in beliefs serve as a channel through which the treatment influences redistribution preferences.

Table 7: Effects of social movements' messaging (treatment) on inequality beliefs and fairness

	Differences Poor/ Rich Too Large (1)	Differences Men/ Women Too Large (2)	Income Inequality Problem (3)	Gender Inequality Problem (4)	Inevitability Income Inequality (5)	Inevitability Gender Inequality (6)	Fairness (7)
<i>Panel A</i>							
Treatment	0.138*** [0.028]	0.257*** [0.033]	0.113*** [0.031]	0.204*** [0.039]	-0.065 [0.040]	-0.045 [0.038]	0.177*** [0.031]
R-Squared	0.172	0.200	0.233	0.191	0.140	0.089	0.283
<i>Panel B</i>							
T1: Income Inequality	0.301*** [0.054]	0.273*** [0.065]	0.291*** [0.060]	0.218*** [0.077]	-0.160** [0.079]	-0.096 [0.074]	0.387*** [0.060]
T2: Gender Inequality	0.274*** [0.055]	0.514*** [0.066]	0.224*** [0.061]	0.407*** [0.079]	-0.128 [0.080]	-0.090 [0.075]	0.352*** [0.061]
Control Group Mean	4.222	3.446	4.024	3.443	3.406	2.296	3.433
<i>p</i> -value Diff. <i>T</i> 1 – <i>T</i> 2	0.614	0.000	0.276	0.015	0.693	0.937	0.561
Obs.	1,130	1,130	1,130	1,130	1,130	1,130	1,130
R-Squared	0.181	0.200	0.241	0.191	0.142	0.089	0.293

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 8: Effects of experimental treatments on redistribution preferences

	Gov. Should Reduce Inequality (1)	Spending for Economic Development (2)	Income Equality Spending (3)	Gender Equality Spending (4)	Raising Taxes (5)
<i>Panel A</i>					
Treatment	0.124*** [0.033]	-2.491*** [0.760]	0.656 [0.627]	1.836*** [0.430]	0.139*** [0.035]
R-Squared	0.225	0.248	0.179	0.145	0.187
<i>Panel B</i>					
T1: Income Inequality	0.339*** [0.065]	-6.392*** [1.492]	5.440*** [1.224]	0.952 [0.846]	0.214*** [0.069]
T2: Gender Inequality	0.245*** [0.066]	-4.946*** [1.515]	1.266 [1.243]	3.680*** [0.859]	0.278*** [0.071]
Control Group Mean	3.852	47.704	33.799	18.496	3.879
<i>p</i> -value Diff. <i>T</i> 1 – <i>T</i> 2	0.156	0.336	0.001	0.001	0.360
Obs.	1,130	1,130	1,130	1,130	1,130
R-Squared	0.235	0.255	0.193	0.146	0.188

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

4.3 Do beliefs change preferences? a mediation analysis

Consistent with our central assumption that beliefs about fairness shape how individuals evaluate redistributive policies, we expect that preferences for redistribution are more likely to change if participants also revise their beliefs. To quantify this indirect pathway, we conduct a mediation analysis using *Fairness* as our preferred indicator of individual beliefs and *The government should implement policies to reduce differences in income levels.* as our measure of redistributive preferences.

As discussed in Section 3.2, we use *Fairness* as our preferred belief measure because it captures a higher-order construct that integrates different views about inequality and has been shown to be a strong predictor of support for redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Fong 2001). This measure offers three advantages. First, it mitigates the risk of construct overlap between the mediator and outcome, which could inflate estimated mediation effects. Second, it achieves a higher level of conceptual generality than any single belief dimension, making it more appropriate for testing a broad causal pathway. Third, it avoids the statistical and interpretive complications of estimating separate mediation models for each belief measure, thereby yielding a more parsimonious and coherent test of our mediation hypothesis.

Similarly, our redistribution preference measure captures a higher-order attitude, general support for government intervention, without reference to specific policy instruments such as spending or taxation. Using these two conceptually distinct but broadly framed measures minimizes the risk that the mediator and outcome capture the same underlying construct and it raises the level of generality. This approach reinforces the internal validity and the interpretability of the mediation analysis.

We now turn to our empirical strategy for estimating the indirect effect. We first outline the naïve approach to mediation analysis and the bias it can introduce, and then describe our approach, which conditions only on control group variation in the mediator–outcome relationship. A naïve mediation approach would involve estimating:

$$y_{ij} = \delta + \delta_1 M_{ij} + \delta_2 X_i + u_{ij}, \quad (3)$$

where y_{ij} is preferences for redistribution for individual i in treatment status j , M_{ij} is the mediator (Fairness), and X_i is a set of pre-treatment controls. The coefficient δ_1 would capture the relationship between beliefs and preferences, holding covariates constant.

However, in a randomized experiment, the independence assumption applies to the treatment assignment, not to the mediator. Once we condition on the mediator, it may be correlated with unobserved determinants of the outcome, leading to post-treatment bias. In other words, $E[u_{ij} |$

$M_{ij}] \neq 0$, even when treatment is randomly assigned. As a result, including M_{ij} in the regression for the entire sample may produce biased estimates of the indirect effect.

To address this, we follow Justino et al. (2025) and Heller et al. (2016) and estimate the mediator–outcome relationship using only the control group:

$$y_{ij} = \delta + \delta_1 M_{ij} + \delta_2 X_i + u_{ij} \quad \text{for all } i \text{ with } T_{ij} = 0. \quad (4)$$

In the control group, both the mediator and the outcome must be independent of the treatment, avoiding conditioning on a post-treatment variable in the treated sample.

We compute the indirect effect as the product of δ_1 (from the control-only regression) and the estimated treatment effect on the mediator (obtained from a regression of fairness on the treatment). Dividing this indirect effect by the total treatment effect (exposure to social movements) on preferences for redistribution yields the proportion of the treatment effect that operates through changes in beliefs.

Table 9 shows that beliefs about fairness mediate roughly 60% of the total effect of social movement messaging on preferences for redistribution. This suggests that while other pathways exist, belief revision is a substantial mechanism linking exposure to social movement messages and increased support for redistribution.

Table 9: Mediation analysis: preferences for redistribution and beliefs

Relationship	Coefficient
Treatment \rightarrow <i>Fairness</i>	0.177*** (0.031)
Treatment \rightarrow <i>Government should reduce income inequality</i>	0.124*** (0.033)
<i>Government should reduce income inequality</i> \rightarrow <i>Fairness</i>	0.405*** (0.054)
Share of effect mediated by <i>Fairness</i>	$(0.177 \times 0.405) / 0.124 = 58\%$

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

4.4 Via beliefs and preferences to political action

Having established that changes in beliefs can mediate the effect of social movement messaging on redistributive preferences, we now examine whether such messaging also affects individuals' willingness to take political action against inequality. Respondents were asked how likely they would be to (i) write to a politician, (ii) meet with a public official, and (iii) sign a real petition that we would anonymously forward to a UK Member of Parliament, urging them to address inequality in Parliament.

We find that the treatment significantly increases the likelihood of signing the petition and of writing to a politician, while the effect on meeting a public official is positive and significant at

the 10% level Table 10. Disaggregating the analysis by treatment type (Panel B) reveals no statistically significant differences between the income inequality and gender income inequality messages.

Table 10: Effects of experimental treatments on willingness to take political action against inequality

	Writing to a Politician (1)	Meeting with a Public Official (2)	Signing a Petition (3)
<i>Panel A</i>			
Treatment	0.065** [0.031]	0.055* [0.031]	0.035** [0.016]
R-Squared	0.109	0.058	0.147
<i>Panel B</i>			
T1: Income Inequality	0.127** [0.061]	0.117* [0.061]	0.084*** [0.031]
T2: Gender Inequality	0.129** [0.062]	0.109* [0.062]	0.070** [0.032]
Control mean	2.106	1.995	0.620
<i>p</i> -value Diff. $T1 - T2$	0.977	0.906	0.654
Obs.	1,130	1,130	1,130
R-Squared	0.110	0.059	0.150

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

This final step completes our empirical test of the assumed causal pathway linking targeted social movement messaging to political action. In our framework, messaging can influence political participation directly, but also indirectly by first shaping beliefs, which then shift preferences for redistribution, which in turn increase the likelihood of political action. The previous mediation analysis showed that changes in beliefs (*Fairness*) account for a substantial share of the treatment effect on preferences for redistribution. We now assess whether these preference changes themselves act as a channel for mobilizing political action.

We focus on *Petition* as our primary behavioural outcome considering that writing to or meeting a politician are hypothetical scenarios in our experiment. Following the same strategy as in Section 4.3, we estimate the association between preferences for redistribution and petition signing, using only the control group.

Table 11 shows that agreeing with the statement “The government should implement policies to reduce differences in income levels.” is strongly associated with petition signing. Participants holding this view are substantially more likely to sign the petition. Based on our estimates, individual preferences for redistribution mediate approximately 69% of the total effect of exposure to social movements on political participation.

Table 11: Mediation analysis: political participation and preferences for redistribution

Relationship	Coefficient
Treatment → <i>Government should reduce income inequality</i>	0.124*** (0.033)
Treatment → <i>Petition</i>	0.035** (0.016)
<i>Government should reduce inequality</i> → <i>Petition</i>	0.195*** (0.023)
Share of effect mediated by <i>Preferences</i>	$(0.124 \times 0.195) / 0.035 = 69\%$

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

5 Discussion and conclusion

This paper investigates whether, and through what mechanisms, social movements campaigning against income and gender income inequality can translate into individual political action. Using observational data and an online experiment that exposes participants to a sustained stream of authentic campaign messaging, we show that shifts in beliefs about inequality precede changes in redistribution preferences, which in turn spur political action. These empirical findings are consistent with Bayesian models of perception and action, in which information updates beliefs, which then shape preferences and ultimately guide behaviour (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; Ma et al. 2023). While our analysis centers on the UK, the mechanisms we identify are likely to operate in other democratic settings where social movements seek to influence policy agendas.

Regarding beliefs, we document that informational treatments meaningfully shifted both general (fairness) and domain-specific beliefs about inequality, without increasing fatalistic views that the problem is inevitable. In our setting, this suggests that exposure to social movement messaging made respondents more concerned about inequality without diminishing their sense that policies can address it. Similarly, treatments increased both general and domain-specific preferences for redistribution. Both types of messages enhanced support for redistributive policies and higher taxation of the wealthy, while domain-specific messages specifically boosted support for targeted measures on income and gender inequality, respectively. Finally, all information treatments, regardless of content, increased willingness to take political action against inequality.

Mediation analyses provide suggestive evidence for a sequential pathway linking beliefs to action. Roughly 60% of the treatment effect on redistribution preferences is explained by shifts in fairness perceptions, and about 70% of the effect on political action is mediated by redistribution preferences. Crucially, the absence of any rise in inevitability beliefs strengthens the plausibility of this pathway: belief change in the direction of greater perceived unfairness, without fatalism, appears to increase redistribution demands and facilitate political engagement.

By tracing this pathway empirically, our study adds to a small but growing political economy literature that examines how social movements influence downstream outcomes (Brehm and Gruhl 2024; Gethin and Pons 2024; Klein Teeselink and Melios 2025; Lagios et al. 2025). We advance this literature by providing empirical evidence on the full pathway from beliefs to preferences to action, rather than only partial links of the chain. In particular, our results highlight fairness perceptions as a general belief “lever” that increases demand for redistribution and mobilizes political participation. At the same time, the domain-specific effects we observe suggest that social movements can simultaneously shift general attitudes and sharpen support for specific policy areas. Our findings resonate with Klein Teeselink and Melios (2025), which shows that Black Lives Matter Protests in the US increased Democratic vote shares in counties exposed to higher protest activity in the 2020 presidential elections and that this might have been driven by shifts in political preferences and beliefs about racial inequality. They contrast, however, with findings by Gethin and Pons (2024) which investigates a much broader set of protests in the US and shows that, on average, exposure to protests has muted effects on policy views.

We also add to the broader experimental literature on information treatments and redistribution preferences (e.g., (Ciani et al. 2021; Günther and Martorano 2025; Kuziemko et al. 2015; Settele 2022)). Consistent with prior work by Günther and Martorano (2025) we find that information provision shifts domain-specific beliefs about different types of inequality. Unlike many existing studies, however, our findings on redistribution preferences are not confined to particular subgroups but hold on average, suggesting broader responsiveness to authentic campaign messaging.¹³

Our design also has limitations. First, using a recap video in the follow-up survey ensured treatment compliance but complicates disentangling the effects of sustained versus immediate information exposure. Privacy restrictions on Facebook data also prevented us from measuring individual engagement with the campaign content, which may have led us to understate or overstate the effects of sustained versus immediate exposure. Second, exposure to a stream of real campaign content brings our controlled experiment closer to real-world conditions but limits our ability to pinpoint which specific messages or themes were most effective in driving the observed effects. Third, our mediation analysis cannot provide causal proof on the pathway from beliefs to action, among other things because beliefs are themselves endogenous and shaped by unobservable factors, just as other links in the chain may be. Our results should therefore be interpreted as suggestive evidence consistent with the hypothesized pathway.

¹³ In contrast to many previous studies, we do not find that our results are conditional on factors such as trust in government, political leaning, or demographic characteristics.

Finally, redistribution debates are inevitably context-dependent and, in the UK, inequality debates have been particularly salient over the past decade. Yet, the issue we investigate may have broader relevance. Rising income and gender inequalities are not unique to the UK, and social movements worldwide, from the Yellow Vests in France to the Women’s Marches in the United States, have mobilized against them. Moreover, the underlying mechanism we identify (information leading to belief revision, which in turn reshapes preferences and spurs political action) is general and consistent with Bayesian models of updating and behaviour (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; Ma et al. 2023).

Despite these caveats, our study is one of the first systematic attempts to offer causal evidence on how sustained exposure to authentic campaign messaging (rather than one-shot and highly stylized information treatments) shapes the sequence from beliefs to preferences to political action. In doing so, we aim to bridge the gap between controlled experimental treatments and the more complex reality of social movements in democratic settings. Future work could extend our approach to other contexts, other issue domains, or to designs that test whether repeated or long-term exposure yields stronger or more durable effects.

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Appendices

A Attrition and randomization check

Table A1: Attrition analysis: predictors of survey completion

Variable	Coefficient	<i>p</i> -value
Gender	0.0310	0.750
<i>Age groups (ref: 75–84)</i>		
18–24	-0.536	0.209
25–34	-0.126	0.766
35–44	0.0210	0.960
45–54	0.101	0.809
55–64	0.228	0.580
65–74	0.278	0.514
Married	-0.182	0.136
With children	0.238	0.049
Ethnically British	-0.252	0.093
UK resident	0.262	0.148
With university degree	0.0112	0.913
<i>Income groups (ref: < GBP 15,000)</i>		
15,000–24,999	0.101	0.560
25,000–34,999	0.189	0.269
35,000–44,999	0.0891	0.625
45,000–54,999	0.418	0.042
55,000–64,999	0.240	0.262
65,000–74,999	0.565	0.040
75,000–84,999	0.203	0.482
85,000–94,999	0.393	0.183
95,000–104,999	0.642	0.097
105,000–144,999	0.908	0.068
145,000 or more	-0.224	0.593
Employment status	-0.127	0.240
Political interest	-0.0540	0.387
Political position	-0.0123	0.911
Trust in government	0.0927	0.127
Opinion on why people are poor	0.0676	0.257
Opinion on why people are rich	0.0415	0.480

Note: Coefficients and *p*-values from a single OLS regression of survey completion on all listed covariates.

Table A2: Balance test

	Treatment (1)	Treatment income inequality (2)	Treatment gender income inequality (3)
Female	0.080 [0.050]	0.009 [0.029]	0.035 [0.029]
Age group	0.007 [0.018]	0.011 [0.011]	-0.002 [0.011]
Married	0.044 [0.058]	-0.034 [0.034]	0.039 [0.033]
Children	-0.032 [0.059]	0.008 [0.034]	-0.020 [0.034]
Asian background	0.154 [0.100]	-0.048 [0.059]	0.101* [0.058]
Mixed background	0.170* [0.094]	-0.015 [0.055]	0.093* [0.054]
UK resident	0.164 [0.101]	0.010 [0.059]	0.077 [0.058]
University	-0.002 [0.054]	-0.019 [0.032]	0.009 [0.031]
Income class	-0.012 [0.010]	-0.002 [0.006]	-0.005 [0.006]
Working	0.126** [0.058]	0.017 [0.034]	0.055 [0.033]
Trust	0.008 [0.031]	-0.021 [0.018]	0.014 [0.018]
Left	0.049 [0.052]	0.039 [0.031]	0.005 [0.030]
Constant	0.659*** [0.176]	0.363*** [0.103]	0.148 [0.101]
Obs.	1,130	1,130	1,130
R-squared	0.013	0.006	0.011

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Each column reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of the listed covariate on the treatment indicator, where the omitted category is the control group. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B Robustness checks

In the following, we present all regression results from the experiment without control variables.

Table B1: Effects of social movements' messaging (treatment) on inequality beliefs and fairness (without controls)

	Differences poor/ rich too large (1)	Differences men/ women too large (2)	Income inequality problem (3)	Gender inequality problem (4)	Inevitability income inequality (5)	Inevitability gender inequality (6)	Fairness (7)
<i>Panel A</i>							
Treatment	0.152*** [0.030]	0.274*** [0.035]	-0.087** [0.042]	-0.060 [0.039]	0.136*** [0.034]	0.226*** [0.043]	0.199*** [0.035]
R-squared	0.023	0.051	0.004	0.002	0.014	0.024	0.028
<i>Panel B</i>							
T1: Income inequality	0.325*** [0.058]	0.304*** [0.069]	-0.198** [0.084]	-0.131* [0.077]	0.311*** [0.068]	0.247*** [0.084]	0.410*** [0.069]
T2: Gender inequality	0.303*** [0.059]	0.549*** [0.070]	-0.174** [0.085]	-0.120 [0.078]	0.271*** [0.068]	0.451*** [0.085]	0.397*** [0.070]
Control group mean	4.222	3.446	3.406	2.296	4.024	3.443	3.433
<i>p</i> -value diff. <i>T</i> 1 – <i>T</i> 2	0.706	0.001	0.779	0.889	0.553	0.016	0.851
Obs.	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137
R-squared	0.033	0.051	0.006	0.003	0.021	0.024	0.038

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A2: Effects of social movements' messaging (treatment) on redistribution preferences (without controls)

	Differences poor/ rich too large (1)	Differences men/ women too large (2)	Income inequality problem (3)	Gender inequality problem (4)	Inevitability income inequality (5)	Inevitability gender inequality (6)	Fairness (7)
<i>Panel A</i>							
Treatment	0.152*** [0.030]	0.274*** [0.035]	-0.087** [0.042]	-0.060 [0.039]	0.136*** [0.034]	0.226*** [0.043]	0.199*** [0.035]
R-squared	0.023	0.051	0.004	0.002	0.014	0.024	0.028
<i>Panel B</i>							
T1: Income inequality	0.325*** [0.058]	0.304*** [0.069]	-0.198** [0.084]	-0.131* [0.077]	0.311*** [0.068]	0.247*** [0.084]	0.410*** [0.069]
T2: Gender inequality	0.303*** [0.059]	0.549*** [0.070]	-0.174** [0.085]	-0.120 [0.078]	0.271*** [0.068]	0.451*** [0.085]	0.397*** [0.070]
Control group mean	4.222	3.446	3.406	2.296	4.024	3.443	3.433
<i>p</i> -value diff. $T1 - T2$	0.706	0.001	0.779	0.889	0.553	0.016	0.851
Obs.	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137
R-squared	0.033	0.051	0.006	0.003	0.021	0.024	0.038

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Effects of social movements' messaging (treatment) on willingness to take political action against inequality (without controls)

	Writing to a politician (1)	Meeting with a public official (2)	Signing a petition (3)
<i>Panel A</i>			
Treatment	0.079** [0.032]	0.065** [0.031]	0.046*** [0.017]
R-squared	0.005	0.004	0.006
<i>Panel B</i>			
T1: Income inequality	0.142** [0.064]	0.121* [0.062]	0.096*** [0.034]
T2: Gender inequality	0.157** [0.065]	0.130** [0.063]	0.091*** [0.034]
Control mean	2.106	1.995	0.620
<i>p</i> -value diff. $T1 - T2$	0.819	0.894	0.866
Obs.	1,137	1,137	1,137
R-squared	0.006	0.005	0.009

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

C Experimental questionnaires

The following pages reproduce the baseline survey and the follow-up surveys for the income inequality and gender inequality treatments, respectively. Question wordings are presented verbatim.

Baseline Survey

Start of Block: Prolific ID - OK



Q1 What is your Prolific ID? *Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID*

End of Block: Prolific ID - OK

Start of Block: Underage -OK

Q1 I'm not a robot.

Page Break

Q2 Please confirm that you are 18 years of age or older.

- ☐ Yes, I am 18 years of age or older
- ☐ No, I am under the age of 18

End of Block: Underage -OK

Start of Block: Consent - OK

Q1

Welcome!

You are being asked to take part in a survey conducted by the University of Sussex and Maastricht University. All information provided in this survey is verified, and you will not receive false feedback of any kind.

Survey:

The survey will be divided into two parts, one administered now and the other one in approximately 14 days. There are no right or wrong answers. The first part of the survey, which you will complete now, comprises a set of questions about yourself and your view on

government, politics, and societal issues in the UK. Total time to answer all questions should be around 10 minutes.

After completing this survey, you will be asked to follow a Facebook page. This represents an integral part of the study and you will have to keep following the page until the end of the study (i.e. after you have completed the second part of the survey in approximately 14 days). **Please note that your hourly rate for participating in this study is higher because you commit to follow this Facebook page.** The research team will not access your personal details on Facebook, nor any detail will be included in the study. We are asking you to please check your Prolific email account daily in the week of June 27, since we will be sending information on the follow-up survey to this account (always in full respect of your privacy).

Participation is voluntary. If you begin the survey, you may leave the survey at any time, although in this case you forfeit payment. We anticipate no costs apart from the time you spend completing the survey. Your study-related information will be kept confidential. Data collection, analysis and reporting will be anonymous and used for research purposes only. Your data will be kept separate from your Prolific ID to ensure anonymity. All data will be published in aggregate form only.

Payment:

Upon completion of the second part of the survey (the second part will be administered after approximately 14 days since the completion of the first part) you will receive a compensation for your time. You will only receive the payment if you complete both parts. The parts count as completed once you reach the last page displaying an automatic message that your response was recorded. You will not receive payment if you abandon the survey prior to completing it, which you are free to do any time. The payments will be processed within 3 weeks after the completion of the final part.

If you have questions or remarks concerning this survey, please contact bruno.martorano@maastrichtuniversity.nl. At the end of the survey, you will have the opportunity to provide feedback on your experience.

Page Break

Q2 I hereby give permission to use my data for scientific purposes. I had enough time to decide whether I want to participate in the survey. I know that participation is voluntary and that I can abandon the survey any time. If I withdraw I forfeit any monetary compensation.

I know that the data will be saved anonymously and only be made public in aggregate form. By proceeding to the next page, I agree to participate in this survey

☐ No

☐ Yes

End of Block: Consent - OK

Start of Block: Final reminder - OK

Q1

Please read the following information carefully.

Survey:

The first part of the survey, which you just completed, comprised a set of questions about yourself and your view on government, politics, and societal issues in the UK. **Now, we will ask you to keep following a Facebook page** until the end of the study (i.e. after you have completed the second part of the survey in approximately 14 days). **Please note that your hourly rate for participating in this study takes into account your commitment to follow this Facebook page.** The research team will not access your personal details on Facebook, nor any detail will be included in the study. Please remember, we are asking you to check your Prolific email account daily in the week of June 27, since we will be sending information on the follow-up survey to this account (always in full respect of your privacy).

Payment:

Upon completion of the second part of the survey (the second part will be administered after approximately 14 days since the completion of the first part) you will receive compensation for your time. You will only receive the payment if you complete both parts. The parts count as completed once you reach the last page displaying an automatic message that your response was recorded. You will not receive payment if you abandon the survey prior to completing it, which you are free to do any time. The payments will be processed within 3 weeks after the completion of the final part.

End of Block: Final reminder - OK

Start of Block: Standard Questions - OK

Q1 How do you identify?

- ☐ Man
- ☐ Woman
- ☐ Non-binary/third gender
- ☐ Prefer to self-describe _____
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q2 What is your age?

- ☐ 18-24
- ☐ 25-34
- ☐ 35-44
- ☐ 45-54
- ☐ 55-64
- ☐ 65-74
- ☐ 75-84
- ☐ 85 or older
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q3 Do you have children?

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q4 How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

☐ British/ English/ Scottish/ Welsh/ Northern Irish

☐ Irish

☐ Gypsy or Irish Traveller

☐ Any other white background. Please describe:

☐ White and black Caribbean

☐ White and black African

☐ White and Asian

☐ Any other mixed background. Please describe

☐ Indian

☐ Pakistani

☐ Bangladeshi

☐ Chinese

☐ Any other Asian background. Please describe:

☐ Caribbean

☐ African

☐ Any other black background. Please describe:

☐ Arab

☐ Any other ethnic group. Please describe:

☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q5 What is your marital status?

- ☐ Married
- ☐ Legally recognized civil partnership
- ☐ Single and never married or in a Civil Partnership
- ☐ Divorced
- ☐ Separated but legally married
- ☐ Widowed
- ☐ Other _____
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q6

What is the highest educational or school qualification you obtained?
(If you are currently enrolled, pick the highest degree received to date)

- ☐ Higher degree level qualification (Masters, PhD or equivalent doctoral level qualification)
- ☐ Postgraduate academic below-Masters level qualification (e.g. Certificate or Diploma)
- ☐ Bachelors or equivalent first degree qualification
- ☐ Post-secondary academic below-degree level qualification (up to 1 year, or 2 and more years)
- ☐ Post-secondary vocational training (up to 1 year, or 2 and more years)
- ☐ Completed secondary school
- ☐ Completed primary school
- ☐ Other _____
- ☐ None of the above

Page Break

Q7 What is your current employment status?

- ☐ In paid employment (full or part-time)
- ☐ Self-employed
- ☐ Unemployed
- ☐ Retired
- ☐ On maternity/paternity leave
- ☐ Looking after the family or home
- ☐ In full-time education
- ☐ Long-term sick or disabled
- ☐ On a government training scheme
- ☐ Unpaid worker in family business
- ☐ Working in an apprenticeship
- ☐ Doing something else

Page Break

Q8 Roughly, what is your total annual household income in 2021 before taxes?

- ☐ Less than 15,000
- ☐ 15,000 - 24,999
- ☐ 25,000 - 34,999
- ☐ 35,000 - 44,999
- ☐ 45,000 - 54,999
- ☐ 55,000 - 64,999
- ☐ 65,000 - 74,999
- ☐ 75,000 - 84,999
- ☐ 85,000 - 94,999
- ☐ 95,000 - 104,999
- ☐ 105,000 - 144,999
- ☐ More than 145,000

Page Break

Q9 Compared with other British families, would you say that your household's income is...

- ☐ Far below average
- ☐ Below average
- ☐ Average
- ☐ Above average
- ☐ Far above average

Page Break

Q10 Have you lived in the UK for most of your life?

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes

Page Break

Q11 Are you a UK citizen?

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes

Page Break

Q12 In which area of the UK do you live today?

- ☐ Aberdeen City
- ☐ Aberdeenshire
- ☐ Adur
- ☐ Allerdale
- ☐ Amber Valley
- ☐ Angus
- ☐ Argyll and Bute
- ☐ Arun
- ☐ Ashfield
- ☐ Ashford
- ☐ Aylesbury Vale
- ☐ Babergh
- ☐ Barking and Dagenham
- ☐ Barnet
- ☐ Barnsley
- ☐ Barrow-in-Furness
- ☐ Basildon
- ☐ Basingstoke and Deane
- ☐ Bassetlaw
- ☐ Bath and North East Somerset
- ☐ Bedford

- ☐ Bexley
- ☐ Birmingham
- ☐ Blaby
- ☐ Blackburn with Darwen
- ☐ Blackpool
- ☐ Blaenau Gwent
- ☐ Bolsover
- ☐ Bolton
- ☐ Boston
- ☐ Bournemouth
- ☐ Bracknell Forest
- ☐ Bradford
- ☐ Braintree
- ☐ Breckland
- ☐ Brent
- ☐ Brentwood
- ☐ Bridgend
- ☐ Brighton and Hove
- ☐ Bristol, City of
- ☐ Broadland
- ☐ Bromley

- ☐ Bromsgrove
- ☐ Broxbourne
- ☐ Broxtowe
- ☐ Burnley
- ☐ Bury
- ☐ Caerphilly
- ☐ Calderdale
- ☐ Cambridge
- ☐ Camden
- ☐ Cannock Chase
- ☐ Canterbury
- ☐ Cardiff
- ☐ Carlisle
- ☐ Carmarthenshire
- ☐ Castle Point
- ☐ Central Bedfordshire
- ☐ Ceredigion
- ☐ Charnwood
- ☐ Chelmsford
- ☐ Cheltenham
- ☐ Cherwell

- ☐ Cheshire East
- ☐ Cheshire West and Chester
- ☐ Chesterfield
- ☐ Chichester
- ☐ Chiltern
- ☐ Chorley
- ☐ Christchurch
- ☐ City of Edinburgh
- ☐ City of London
- ☐ Clackmannanshire
- ☐ Colchester
- ☐ Conwy
- ☐ Copeland
- ☐ Corby
- ☐ Cornwall
- ☐ Cotswold
- ☐ County Durham
- ☐ Coventry
- ☐ Craven
- ☐ Crawley
- ☐ Croydon

- ☐ Dacorum
- ☐ Darlington
- ☐ Dartford
- ☐ Daventry
- ☐ Denbighshire
- ☐ Derby
- ☐ Derbyshire Dales
- ☐ Doncaster
- ☐ Dover
- ☐ Dudley
- ☐ Dumfries and Galloway
- ☐ Dundee City
- ☐ Ealing
- ☐ East Ayrshire
- ☐ East Cambridgeshire
- ☐ East Devon
- ☐ East Dorset
- ☐ East Dunbartonshire
- ☐ East Hampshire
- ☐ East Hertfordshire
- ☐ East Lindsey

- ☐ East Lothian
- ☐ East Northamptonshire
- ☐ East Renfrewshire
- ☐ East Riding of Yorkshire
- ☐ East Staffordshire
- ☐ Eastbourne
- ☐ Eastleigh
- ☐ Eden
- ☐ Eilean Siar
- ☐ Elmbridge
- ☐ Enfield
- ☐ Epping Forest
- ☐ Epsom and Ewell
- ☐ Erewash
- ☐ Exeter
- ☐ Falkirk
- ☐ Fareham
- ☐ Fenland
- ☐ Fife
- ☐ Flintshire
- ☐ Forest Heath

- ☐ Forest of Dean
- ☐ Fylde
- ☐ Gateshead
- ☐ Gedling
- ☐ Glasgow City
- ☐ Gloucester
- ☐ Gosport
- ☐ Gravesham
- ☐ Great Yarmouth
- ☐ Greenwich
- ☐ Guildford
- ☐ Gwynedd
- ☐ Hackney
- ☐ Halton
- ☐ Hambleton
- ☐ Hammersmith and Fulham
- ☐ Harborough
- ☐ Haringey
- ☐ Harlow
- ☐ Harrogate
- ☐ Harrow

- ☐ Hart
- ☐ Hartlepool
- ☐ Hastings
- ☐ Havant
- ☐ Havering
- ☐ Herefordshire, County of
- ☐ Hertsmere
- ☐ High Peak
- ☐ Highland
- ☐ Hillingdon
- ☐ Hinckley and Bosworth
- ☐ Horsham
- ☐ Hounslow
- ☐ Huntingdonshire
- ☐ Hyndburn
- ☐ Inverclyde
- ☐ Ipswich
- ☐ Isle of Anglesey
- ☐ Isle of Wight
- ☐ Isles of Scilly
- ☐ Islington

- ☐ Kensington and Chelsea
- ☐ Kettering
- ☐ King's Lynn and West Norfolk
- ☐ Kingston upon Hull, City of
- ☐ Kingston upon Thames
- ☐ Kirklees
- ☐ Knowsley
- ☐ Lambeth
- ☐ Lancaster
- ☐ Leeds
- ☐ Leicester
- ☐ Lewes
- ☐ Lewisham
- ☐ Lichfield
- ☐ Lincoln
- ☐ Liverpool
- ☐ Luton
- ☐ Maidstone
- ☐ Maldon
- ☐ Malvern Hills
- ☐ Manchester

- ☐ Mansfield
- ☐ Medway
- ☐ Melton
- ☐ Mendip
- ☐ Merthyr Tydfil
- ☐ Merton
- ☐ Mid Devon
- ☐ Mid Suffolk
- ☐ Mid Sussex
- ☐ Middlesbrough
- ☐ Midlothian
- ☐ Milton Keynes
- ☐ Mole Valley
- ☐ Monmouthshire
- ☐ Moray
- ☐ Neath Port Talbot
- ☐ New Forest
- ☐ Newark and Sherwood
- ☐ Newcastle upon Tyne
- ☐ Newcastle-under-Lyme
- ☐ Newham

- ☐ Newport
- ☐ North Ayrshire
- ☐ North Devon
- ☐ North Dorset
- ☐ North East Derbyshire
- ☐ North East Lincolnshire
- ☐ North Hertfordshire
- ☐ North Kesteven
- ☐ North Lanarkshire
- ☐ North Lincolnshire
- ☐ North Norfolk
- ☐ North Somerset
- ☐ North Tyneside
- ☐ North Warwickshire
- ☐ North West Leicestershire
- ☐ Northampton
- ☐ Northumberland
- ☐ Norwich
- ☐ Nottingham
- ☐ Nuneaton and Bedworth
- ☐ Oadby and Wigston

- ☐ Oldham
- ☐ Orkney Islands
- ☐ Oxford
- ☐ Pembrokeshire
- ☐ Pendle
- ☐ Perth and Kinross
- ☐ Peterborough
- ☐ Plymouth
- ☐ Poole
- ☐ Portsmouth
- ☐ Powys
- ☐ Preston
- ☐ Purbeck
- ☐ Reading
- ☐ Redbridge
- ☐ Redcar and Cleveland
- ☐ Redditch
- ☐ Reigate and Banstead
- ☐ Renfrewshire
- ☐ Rhondda Cynon Taf
- ☐ Ribble Valley

- ☐ Richmond upon Thames
- ☐ Richmondshire
- ☐ Rochdale
- ☐ Rochford
- ☐ Rossendale
- ☐ Rother
- ☐ Rotherham
- ☐ Rugby
- ☐ Runnymede
- ☐ Rushcliffe
- ☐ Rushmoor
- ☐ Rutland
- ☐ Ryedale
- ☐ Salford
- ☐ Sandwell
- ☐ Scarborough
- ☐ Scottish Borders
- ☐ Sedgemoor
- ☐ Sefton
- ☐ Selby
- ☐ Sevenoaks

- ☐ Sheffield
- ☐ Shepway
- ☐ Shetland Islands
- ☐ Shropshire
- ☐ Slough
- ☐ Solihull
- ☐ South Ayrshire
- ☐ South Bucks
- ☐ South Cambridgeshire
- ☐ South Derbyshire
- ☐ South Gloucestershire
- ☐ South Hams
- ☐ South Holland
- ☐ South Kesteven
- ☐ South Lakeland
- ☐ South Lanarkshire
- ☐ South Norfolk
- ☐ South Northamptonshire
- ☐ South Oxfordshire
- ☐ South Ribble
- ☐ South Somerset

- ☐ South Staffordshire
- ☐ South Tyneside
- ☐ Southampton
- ☐ Southend-on-Sea
- ☐ Southwark
- ☐ Spelthorne
- ☐ St Albans
- ☐ St Edmundsbury
- ☐ St. Helens
- ☐ Stafford
- ☐ Staffordshire Moorlands
- ☐ Stevenage
- ☐ Stirling
- ☐ Stockport
- ☐ Stockton-on-Tees
- ☐ Stoke-on-Trent
- ☐ Stratford-on-Avon
- ☐ Stroud
- ☐ Suffolk Coastal
- ☐ Sunderland
- ☐ Surrey Heath

- ☐ Sutton
- ☐ Swale
- ☐ Swansea
- ☐ Swindon
- ☐ Tameside
- ☐ Tamworth
- ☐ Tandridge
- ☐ Taunton Deane
- ☐ Teignbridge
- ☐ Telford and Wrekin
- ☐ Tendring
- ☐ Test Valley
- ☐ Tewkesbury
- ☐ Thanet
- ☐ Three Rivers
- ☐ Thurrock
- ☐ Tonbridge and Malling
- ☐ Torbay
- ☐ Torfaen
- ☐ Torridge
- ☐ Tower Hamlets

- ☐ Trafford
- ☐ Tunbridge Wells
- ☐ Uttlesford
- ☐ Vale of Glamorgan
- ☐ Vale of White Horse
- ☐ Wakefield
- ☐ Walsall
- ☐ Waltham Forest
- ☐ Wandsworth
- ☐ Warrington
- ☐ Warwick
- ☐ Watford
- ☐ Waveney
- ☐ Waverley
- ☐ Wealden
- ☐ Wellingborough
- ☐ Welwyn Hatfield
- ☐ West Berkshire
- ☐ West Devon
- ☐ West Dorset
- ☐ West Dunbartonshire

- ☐ West Lancashire
- ☐ West Lindsey
- ☐ West Lothian
- ☐ West Oxfordshire
- ☐ West Somerset
- ☐ Westminster
- ☐ Weymouth and Portland
- ☐ Wigan
- ☐ Wiltshire
- ☐ Winchester
- ☐ Windsor and Maidenhead
- ☐ Wirral
- ☐ Woking
- ☐ Wokingham
- ☐ Wolverhampton
- ☐ Worcester
- ☐ Worthing
- ☐ Wrexham
- ☐ Wychavon
- ☐ Wycombe
- ☐ Wyre

- ☐ Wyre Forest
- ☐ York
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q13

It is vital for the quality of this survey that you devote your full attention to the questions we ask. In your honest opinion, have you devoted your full attention to this study so far?
(Your answer to this question does not affect your payment)

- ☐ Yes, I have devoted my full attention so far and have answered the questions thoroughly
- ☐ No, I have not devoted my full attention so far and have not answered the questions thoroughly

Page Break

Q14 You will now be asked a set of questions about your view on government, politics, and societal issues in the UK.

Page Break

Q15 How interested would you say you are in politics?

- ☐ Very interested
- ☐ Quite interested
- ☐ Hardly interested
- ☐ Not at all interested
- ☐ I don't know

Page Break

Q16 When it comes to most political issues, do consider yourself as...?

- ☐ Left wing
- ☐ Left of center
- ☐ Center
- ☐ Right of center
- ☐ Right wing

Page Break

Q17 How often can you trust the government to do what is right?

- ☐ All the time
- ☐ Most of the time
- ☐ Only some of the time
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Never

Page Break

Q18 What do you think has more to do with why a person is poor?

- ☐ A lack of effort/hard work on the person's part
- ☐ A lack of talent on the person's part
- ☐ The person being unlucky

Page Break

Q19 What do you think has more to do with why a person is rich?

- ☐ A person's effort/ hard work
- ☐ A person's talent
- ☐ The person being lucky

Page Break

End of Block: Standard Questions - OK

Start of Block: Control - OK

Q1

Please, follow AND like the below Facebook page with your personal account. **Posts will be shared daily and we kindly ask you to look at them closely as this represents an integral part of the study.**

<https://www.facebook.com/ukweatherforecast/>

End of Block: Control - OK

Start of Block: Treatment - Threads

Q1

Please, follow AND like the below Facebook page with your personal account. **Posts will be shared daily and we kindly ask you to look at them closely as this represents an integral part of the study.**

<https://www.facebook.com/Inequality-Threads-109687848319453/>

End of Block: Treatment - Threads

Start of Block: Treatment 1 - Inside

Q1

Please, follow AND like the below Facebook page with your personal account. **Posts will be shared daily and we kindly ask you to look at them closely as this represents an integral part of the study.**

<https://www.facebook.com/Inside-Inequality-112407924711916/>

End of Block: Treatment 1 - Inside

Start of Block: End of survey - OK

Q1 Thank you for participating in the survey. Please click on the proceed button and you will be redirected to Prolific.

End of Block: End of survey – OK

Follow-Up Survey: Income Inequality

Start of Block: Prolific ID



QPID What is your Prolific ID? *Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID*

End of Block: Prolific ID

Start of Block: Underage

QID0 I'm not a robot

Page Break

QID1 Please confirm that you are 18 years of age or older.

- ☐ Yes, I am 18 years of age or older
- ☐ No, I am under the age of 18

End of Block: Underage

Start of Block: Consent

QID2

Welcome! You are being asked to take part in a survey conducted by the University of Sussex and Maastricht University. All information provided in this survey is verified, and you will not receive false feedback of any kind.

Survey:

This is the second part – the follow-up - of the first survey you completed approximately 14 days ago. In the past days, you should have also followed a Facebook page. This follow-up survey comprises a set of questions about yourself and your view on the government, politics, and societal issues in the UK. Additionally, you will be asked to watch a video. **For this, you**

need to have working speakers or headphones. The total time needed to complete the survey is estimated to be 15 minutes.

Payment:

Upon completion of this follow-up survey you will receive a compensation for the time spent completing both parts of the survey. This follow-up part counts as completed once you reach the last page displaying an automatic message that your response was recorded. You will not receive payment if you abandon the survey prior to completing it, which you are free to do any time. The payments will be processed within 3 weeks after the completion of the final part.

Page Break

QID3 I hereby give permission to use my data for scientific purposes. I had enough time to decide whether I want to participate in the survey. I know that participation is voluntary and that I can abandon the survey any time. If I withdraw I forfeit any monetary compensation.

I know that the data will be saved anonymously and only be made public in aggregate form. By proceeding to the next page, I agree to participate in this survey

☐ No

☐ Yes

End of Block: Consent

Start of Block: Demographics

Q1 How do you identify?

☐ Man

☐ Woman

☐ Non-binary/third gender

☐ Prefer to self-describe _____

☐ Prefer not to say

Page Break

Q2 What is your age?

- ☐ 18-24
- ☐ 25-34
- ☐ 35-44
- ☐ 45-54
- ☐ 55-64
- ☐ 65-74
- ☐ 75-84
- ☐ 85 or older
- ☐ Prefer not to say

End of Block: Demographics

Start of Block: Treatment Block

QIDt1

Now you will be shown a video. Please, watch it carefully as it is a core element of this survey.

Make sure your computer audio is working, so you can follow what is being said in the video.
You will be able to advance the survey once the video is finished.

QIDTIME Timing

First Click

Last Click

Page Submit

Click Count

Page Break

QIDt2 What was the video about?

- ☐ Weather forecast
- ☐ Financial crisis
- ☐ Income inequality
- ☐ Housing market in London

Page Break

QIDt3 Inequality of income in the UK, in the past years, has:

- ☐ Increased
- ☐ Decreased
- ☐ Stayed the same

End of Block: Treatment Block

Start of Block: Preferences block

QIDIntro Please provide your views on income redistribution, government spending and taxation.

Page Break

QID5

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"Differences in income between **the poor and the rich** in the UK are too **large**."

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Page Break

QID6

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"Differences in income between **men and women** in the UK are too **large**."

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Page Break

QID7

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"Income gaps between **the poor and the rich** in the UK are **inevitable**."

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Page Break

QID8

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"Income gaps between **men and women** in the UK are **inevitable**."

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Page Break

QID9 How fair do you think is society in the UK?

- ☐ Very fair
- ☐ Fair
- ☐ Neither fair nor unfair
- ☐ Unfair
- ☐ Very unfair

Page Break

QID10 Do you think differences in income levels between **the rich and the poor** are a serious problem in the UK?

- ☐ Definitely not
- ☐ Probably not
- ☐ Might or might not
- ☐ Probably yes
- ☐ Definitely yes

Page Break

QID11 Do you think differences in income levels between **women and men** are a serious problem in the UK?

- ☐ Definitely not
- ☐ Probably not
- ☐ Might or might not
- ☐ Probably yes
- ☐ Definitely yes

Page Break

QID13

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"The government should implement policies to reduce differences in income levels."

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Page Break



QID14 The UK government has received extra budget to spend over the below categories next year. How do you want to divide the budget in percentages between them? (The total must sum up to 100)

Spending for economic development : _____

Spending for gender equality : _____

Spending for reducing differences between poor and rich : _____

Total : _____

QID15

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"In order to support extra spending, the Government should raise taxes on rich families."

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Page Break

QID16 How likely would you be to do each of these things?

	Definitively would	Probably would	Probably would not	Definitively would not
Write letters, email, or phone public officials about inequality issues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Meet with an elected official or their staff about inequality issues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Volunteer time to a non-profit organization helping disadvantaged groups in the UK	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

QID17

You can now take action by signing a petition.

We will submit a petition to a Member of Parliament who has been involved in the fight against inequality issues. We will not tell them your name, just how many people in our study support the petition. We will send you proof of the petition's submission in the next few weeks.

Page Break

QID18 Would you like to sign a petition?

- ☐ I want to sign a petition against inequalities.
- ☐ I do not want to sign a petition against inequalities.
- ☐ I never sign petitions.

Page Break

QID19

In addition to payment for your participation, you now receive a bonus of 1 GBP from which you can make a donation to a well-established charity that fights to reduce inequalities in the UK.

We will provide you with a link to the charity at the end of the survey and in a few weeks you will receive proof of the total amount donated to the charity. The total amount equals the sum of all donations made by participants in this survey.

If you chose not to donate, you will receive the entire bonus amount after completing this study.

QID20 How much of your 1 GBP bonus would you like to donate?

- ☐ 0 pence
- ☐ 5 pence
- ☐ 10 pence
- ☐ 15 pence
- ☐ 20 pence
- ☐ 25 pence
- ☐ 30 pence
- ☐ 35 pence
- ☐ 40 pence
- ☐ 45 pence
- ☐ 50 pence
- ☐ 55 pence
- ☐ 60 pence
- ☐ 65 pence
- ☐ 70 pence
- ☐ 75 pence
- ☐ 80 pence
- ☐ 85 pence
- ☐ 90 pence
- ☐ 95 pence
- ☐ 1 GBP

Page Break

QID21 Have you donated to charity in the past 12 months, excluding donations on Prolific?

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ Rather not say

Page Break

QID23 Do you plan to donate money to charities in the next 12 months?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ Maybe
- ☐ No
- ☐ Rather not say

Page Break

QIDDonation

The charity selected to receive the donation is **brap**, an organisation transforming the way people think and do equality.

Read more about them at this link:
<https://www.brap.org.uk/about>

IMPORTANT! To be able to continue the survey, **COPY AND PASTE THE LINK IN A NEW**

BROWSER TAB.

Page Break

QID24 You can provide your feedback to the survey team here. Thank you! (Please understand that we do not accept hateful messages and might follow-up with Prolific if necessary.)

Page Break

QID99 Thank you for participating in the survey. Please click on the proceed button and you will be redirected to Prolific.

End of Block: Preferences block

Follow Up: Gender Inequality

Start of Block: Prolific ID



QPID What is your Prolific ID? *Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID*

End of Block: Prolific ID

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Page Break

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☐ No

☐ Yes

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Q67 Timing
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Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

Page Break

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Page Break

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Page Break

QID8

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Page Break

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Page Break

QID16 How likely would you be to do each of these things?

	Definitively would	Probably would	Probably would not	Definitively would not
Write letters, email, or phone public officials about inequality issues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Meet with an elected official or their staff about inequality issues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Volunteer time to a non-profit organization helping disadvantaged groups in the UK	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

QID17

You can now take action by signing a petition.

We will submit a petition to a Member of Parliament who has been involved in the fight against inequality issues. We will not tell them your name, just how many people in our study support the petition. We will send you proof of the petition's submission in the next few weeks.

Page Break

QID18 Would you like to sign a petition?

- ☐ I want to sign a petition against inequalities.
- ☐ I do not want to sign a petition against inequalities.
- ☐ I never sign petitions.

Page Break

QID19

In addition to payment for your participation, you now receive a bonus of 1 GBP from which you can make a donation to a well-established charity that fights to reduce inequalities in the UK.

We will provide you with a link to the charity at the end of the survey and in a few weeks you will receive proof of the total amount donated to the charity. The total amount equals the sum of all donations made by participants in this survey.

If you chose not to donate, you will receive the entire bonus amount after completing this study.

QID20 How much of your 1 GBP bonus would you like to donate?

- ☐ 0 pence
- ☐ 5 pence
- ☐ 10 pence
- ☐ 15 pence
- ☐ 20 pence
- ☐ 25 pence
- ☐ 30 pence
- ☐ 35 pence
- ☐ 40 pence
- ☐ 45 pence
- ☐ 50 pence
- ☐ 55 pence
- ☐ 60 pence
- ☐ 65 pence
- ☐ 70 pence
- ☐ 75 pence
- ☐ 80 pence
- ☐ 85 pence
- ☐ 90 pence
- ☐ 95 pence
- ☐ 1 GBP

Page Break

QID21 Have you donated to charity in the past 12 months, excluding donations on Prolific?

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ Rather not say

Page Break

QID23 Do you plan to donate money to charities in the next 12 months?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ Maybe
- ☐ No
- ☐ Rather not say

Page Break

QIDDonation

The charity selected to receive the donation is **brap**, an organisation transforming the way people think and do equality.

Read more about them at this link:
<https://www.brap.org.uk/about>

IMPORTANT! To be able to continue the survey, **COPY AND PASTE THE LINK IN A NEW BROWSER TAB.**

Page Break

QID24 You can provide your feedback to the survey team here. Thank you! (Please understand that we do not accept hateful messages and might follow-up with Prolific if necessary.)

Page Break

QID99 Thank you for participating in the survey. Please click on the proceed button and you will be redirected to Prolific.

End of Block: Preferences block

D Facebook posts

In the UK, campaigns against inequality are carried out by a diverse set of actors that blend grassroots mobilization with advocacy-oriented NGOs. Some of these are primarily grassroots protest movements, such as UK Uncut and the People's Assembly Against Austerity, which have organized large demonstrations and direct actions. Others, such as the Equality Trust, Tax Justice UK, and My Fair London, operate more as advocacy and research-focused organizations, using campaigns, public engagement, and lobbying to highlight the consequences of inequality and demand policy change. Still others, such as the Fight Inequality Alliance, function as umbrella networks that connect UK-based organizations to global coalitions mobilizing around inequality. Together, these initiatives form a heterogeneous but complementary landscape of social movement activity, combining direct action, public campaigning, and policy advocacy. For reference, we provide an overview of key organizations in the table below as well as a representative selection of Facebook posts published over the course of two weeks.

Table A4: Overview of organizations and movements from which informational treatment materials were drawn

Organization	Focus	Typical activities / messaging
Equality Trust	Income and wealth inequality	Research reports, public campaigns, education resources, advocacy for fairer taxation and living wages.
UK Uncut	Anti-austerity, corporate tax avoidance	Direct action, protests, social media campaigns highlighting corporate tax avoidance and cuts to public services.
Tax Justice UK	Progressive taxation, closing tax loopholes	Policy advocacy, media campaigns, coalition building for fairer tax system.
Fight Inequality Alliance (UK chapter)	Global and national inequality	Grassroots organizing, international solidarity, media and online campaigns focused on structural inequality.
My Fair London	Reducing inequality in London	Local campaigning, public debates, community outreach, advocacy for fairer housing and wages.
People's Assembly Against Austerity	Anti-austerity, public services	Mass demonstrations, rallies, local branches organizing around cuts, welfare, and privatization.

Note: All groups use social media as a central channel of communication.

Facebook Experiment – Weekly Plan

Publishing times:

- First post – 11.00 CET
- Second post – 15.00 CET
- Third post – 19.00 CET



Day 2

- Income inequality
- Post
- Action against CEO pay




Day 2+

- Income inequality
- Video
- Tax justice / tax the rich



Day 2++

- Gender inequality
- Post
- Unpaid care work



Day 3

- Gender inequality
- Video
- Equal pay day

The Equality Trust •
25 November 2021 •

There's so much we can do to tackle inequality in the UK! Our Manifestos are full of ideas on how we can all tackle #inequality in our everyday lives!
Read more here > ow.ly/f3FV30j3zWVY

THE EQUALITY TRUST

TEN THINGS YOU CAN DO TO TACKLE INEQUALITY


The UK is one of the most unequal countries in the developed world. But inequality is not inevitable. We can all do our bit to reduce it. Here are TEN actions you can take:

- 1 AS A VOTER**
Vote for parties that pledge to tackle inequality. Read their manifestos and choose the party that you think has the best policies to reduce inequality.
- 2 AS A CITIZEN**
Hold your elected representatives to account: be an active citizen and challenge decisions that will worsen inequality, and lobby for changes that will improve it.
- 3 AS A WORKER**
Join a trade union. Countries with large and strong trade unions have lower inequality. Find a union to join today, here: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/join-union>
- 4 AS AN ACTIVIST**
Join or start a local equality group: our affiliated local equality groups do great work tackling inequality across the UK, and you can join the movement.
- 5 AS A CONSUMER**
Favour good businesses that pay the real Living Wage, pay their taxes and treat their workforces well – and shun those that don't wherever possible.

12 4 shares


Day 3+

- Income inequality
- List
- Call to action




Day 3++

- Income / Gender inequality
- Video
- Fair pay




Day 5

- Income inequality
- Article
- Stories about inequality




Day 5+

- Income inequality
- Post
- Support for wealth tax




Day 5++

- Gender inequality
- Post
- Equal pay




Day 8+

- Gender inequality
- Page
- Pay gap calculator




Day 8++

- Income inequality
- Article
- Tax the rich



Day 9

- Gender Inequality
- Video
- Equal pay




Day 9+

- Income
- Post
- Tax the rich




Day 9++

- Income inequality
- Post
- Housing costs




Day 11+

- Income inequality
- Post
- Structural inequality



Day 11+

- Income Inequality
- Picture
- Tax the rich



Day 11++

- Gender inequality
- Video
- Equal pay