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The return of the king: Political conflict and female labour force participation in postwar Greece

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Political Conflict and Female Labour Force Participation in postwar Greece

Xanthi Tsoukli

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

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The Return of the King:
Political Conflict and Female Labour Force Participation in postwar Greece*

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Abstract

Little is known about the effects of political conflicts on the status of women in society. Polarizing attitudes might have a differential effect on women's lives after a conflict. To consider this, the case of Greece after the Second World War is exploited, when the country became highly polarized between left and right ideologies, resulting in a three-year full-scale civil war. A referendum regarding the reinstatement of the monarchy is used as an indicator of political beliefs, and, in a difference-in-differences setting, it is demonstrated that 10% greater political opposition to the monarchy implied that female labour force participation was 1.4% higher after the war. A plausible mechanism is through conservative areas becoming more conservative and liberal areas becoming more liberal, and data on the construction of new churches, a conservative institution, are consistent with this hypothesis. Finally, it is found that these effects were persistent, as reflected by female labour force participation until 1981, and attitudes revealed in the European Value Survey of 1999.

Keywords: political conflict, female labour force participation, gender norms, Greece
JEL: J21, J71, N34, N44, R23, Z13

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1 Introduction

A fundamental change in labour markets over the past hundred years has been the increased participation of women and the subsequent change in their role in society. There is however still a wide variation in female labour force participation rates across the world that has been attributed to cultural beliefs regarding gender roles and their persistence (Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández, 2013; Goldin and Olivetti, 2013; Carranza, 2014; Grosjean and Khattar, 2018). Gender norms tend to arise when a shock takes place that affects the current working status of women, as famously illustrated by the example of the First World War. However, little is known about the role of violent conflicts, such as civil wars. These might result in a similar effect on gender roles by polarizing attitudes; for example, left-wing ideologies might challenge conservative views to the extent that the acceptance of working women becomes the new norm. Political polarization is often accompanied by social movements that might generate better institutionalized policies for previously disadvantaged groups, and therefore lead to better-quality democracies (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; LeBas, 2018). In turn, better-quality democracies might support less conservative institutions, and create the conditions whereby social norms are changed.

This paper exploits just such an example and demonstrates that the Greek Civil War of 1946-49, which pitted conservative supporters of the monarchy against socialist and communist opponents, led to an increase in female labour force participation in areas where left-wing opponents of the ensuing conservative regime were more numerous, as measured using the results of a referendum about the return of the conservative monarchy. Moreover, it is demonstrated that this pattern of female labour force participation is persistent over time, and the underpinning attitudes of the populace can even be detected in modern survey data, as well as by differential increases in the number of churches, a conservative institution. Figure 1 illustrates a general upward trend in female labour force participation over the past one hundred years, with declines immediately following the Civil War, as well as during the rule of the unstable and far-right Military Junta between 1967 and 1974. The decrease in female labour force participation immediately after the wars is not unique to women, as the male labour force participation follows a similar decreasing trend. The destruction of the wars made a significant impact in the labour markets overall. Kottis (1990) attributed the decline over the latter period to a change in the industrial structure of the country, and found that urban areas followed a U-shaped development, while rural areas experienced a sharp and almost linear decrease. I demonstrate that the differential trend in female labour force participation is the consequence of political opposition to the return of monarchy which led to the Civil War.

This paper makes several important contributions. Firstly, the results add evidence to the relatively new literature examining the relationship between cultural differences in gender roles and female labour market outcomes, and more specifically, that which shows the effects of historical shocks on gender-specific outcomes. It is known that historical shocks, such as demographic shocks impacting on sex ratios, can affect gender norms (Angrist, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Fernández et al., 2004; Francis, 2011; Fernández, 2013; Carranza, 2014; Grosjean and Khattar, 2018; Teso, 2018; Boehnke and Gay, 2022). Recent important work shows that the origins of cross-cultural differences matter for national

differences in gender roles (Fernández, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Alesina et al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2015; Xue, 2016). I add to this literature by showing that political differences expressed as extreme views regarding gender roles can impact on female labour force participation.

Secondly, this paper contributes to a vast literature that focuses on the effects of violent conflicts on women's empowerment. In their recent work regarding gender political engagement after a violent conflict, Hadzic and Tavits (2019) suggest that women do not engage in post-conflict political life due to perceptions regarding the masculine nature of politics. Intuitively, their findings point towards the importance of gender stereotypes in women's lives, and they urge future policies to narrow this gender gap (Hadzic and Tavits, 2019). Gender norms are hard to change, but the literature finds that there are situations and events during political violence that provide the opportunity to change these norms and empower women (Bouta et al., 2005; Petesch, 2017). Petesch (2017) shows that women living in areas affected by conflict not only have a stronger sense of empowerment themselves, but consistently report that other women from their local community participate more in the economy and have experienced improvements regarding their domestic roles. Direct effects of conflicts such as deaths and displacements change the composition of households and therefore directly force women and men to adopt new roles (Justino, 2017). The most long-term, indirect changes are the social and economic composition of communities and societies that could, as a result, lead to institutional changes. I show that increases in female labour force participation occur in areas where greater changes in social norms have been made possible by violent conflict.

Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on persistence, and the idea that an important channel explaining the effects of shocks on female labour force outcomes is the transmission of social and cultural norms through generations (Gay, 2023; Fernández, 2013). In line with previous work (Cantoni et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2020), I also demonstrate the persistence of political views and their correlation with gender norms.

The difference-in-differences method employed takes the negative vote share in the referendum on the return of the King, which took place prior to the Civil War, as the treatment capturing the political opponents to the conservative regime. More specifically, the referendum was a vote on whether Greece should be a monarchy under the King Georgios II (Pantelis et al., 2010) after the end of Second World War. The political regime that supported King Georgios II at the time was a royalist government characterized by anti-communism, right-wing terror and police brutality (Liakos and Doumanis, 2023). A negative vote to the reinstatement of monarchy captures the political opposition to the right-wing parties through the support to monarchy; thus, the referendum votes were preferred over election votes as it doesn't capture political affiliation but rather anti-monarchy sentiment and opposition to the right-wing. It has been shown that exposure to opposing political views increases political polarization (Bail et al., 2018), which was the case in Greece. The result of the referendum to reinstate King George II polarized further the Greek society and led to the Civil War (Hatzis, 2018). This paper thus contributes to the literature that studies the effects of political opposition on economic outcomes. The results are in line with work by LeBas (2018) according to whom there are two conditions under which polariza-

tion could generate positive outcomes. First, the two political parties should have roughly even forces, regarding popular support and/or dependencies. Second, there should not be pre-existing identity separations, for example between citizens and non-citizens, where common ground would be difficult to find. Applying these two conditions in the Greek context, it should be noted that by the time of the war the population had been fairly homogeneous regarding demographic and religious characteristics, while popular support was divided fairly equally between the two opposing groups (Polymeris and Ioannis, 2017; Paravantes, 2019). Thus, it is credible to hypothesize that the polarizing effect of the war might have had a positive impact on the lives of women in Greece.

The mechanism underlying the relationship between violent conflict and female labour force participation utilises a theory of conservatism, developed by Wilson (1941), who attempted to explain the differences between conservatives and radicals in the year 1941. Wilson establishes that conservatives are eager to sustain social norms including domestic gender roles while the left-wing would fight for a change towards equality not only within society, but also within the household. Webster et al. (2019) investigate several channels that connect the effect of conflicts on women's empowerment in a cross-country setting. They conclude that domestic gender norms are resistant to change and a major shock, such as a violent conflict, often plays a significant role in provoking social and political changes.

The relationship between political opposition to the King and changes in female labour force participation remains flat between the pre-war years 1920 and 1928 as shown in panel A of Figure 2, while it has a positive slope of 0.22 between the years 1928 and 1951 (panel B). This is of great importance as it shows that there are no pre-existing trends in female labour force participation in areas that were politically opposed to the King. This relationship holds in a difference-in-differences setting: provinces with a larger share of votes against the return of the King have higher levels of female labour force participation after the war. In fact, a 10% increase in political opposition results in a 1.9 percentage point increase in female labour force participation on average. Previous findings in the literature suggest that female labour force participation follows a U-shape development; it increases during war, but decreases in the years immediately following, when men return and reclaim their roles as breadwinners (Goldin, 1991; Goldin and Olivetti, 2013; Kottis, 1990). The same pattern can be identified in relation to the Greek Civil War, with the distinct and important difference that female labour force participation rates remain higher in areas with less support for the King during the Civil War. This result thus provides intrastate evidence that historical shocks could impact gender roles and specifically could change the lives of women and men dramatically regarding their roles in households and communities (Fernández, 2013; Grosjean and Khattar, 2018).

As regards the proposed mechanism, that it was the opposition to of conservative values, as revealed by the extent of support for the King, that had an impact on labour markets, the present work presents two pieces of supporting evidence. First, it is demonstrated that provinces which were politically opposed to the return of the King were less supportive of the spread of conservative institutions, as measured by the construction of new churches after the war. Second, it is shown that historical political views correlate with contemporary political views. If social norms are persistent, this provides additional evidence

that they played a role in determining labour market outcomes for women (Fontana et al., 2017; Cantoni et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2020).

The results are robust when including a number of controls, such as linear time trends, sex ratios, World War II occupation zones, pre-war election result shares, and other province-specific characteristics. In addition, the results cannot be explained by a number of channels, mainly related to the direct effects of violent conflicts, e.g. gender imbalances in sex ratios. I also explore the validity of the identifying assumption. The vote share in the referendum was not randomly distributed, as provinces with higher concentration of communist shares before the war experienced greater opposition to the conservative regime, namely the monarchy. Using pre-war election data from the year 1932, it is shown that although the votes do correlate as expected, the pre-war communist vote shares do not systematically increase in areas opposed to the King. More importantly, the correlation does not disprove the identification, as the political opposition to the King does not correlate with pre-war trends in female labour force participation. To make the identification stronger, the parallel-trends assumption is relaxed in several ways. First, by controlling for region-specific time trends; second, by controlling for department-specific fixed effects; and third, by testing for non-linearity by dividing the treatment into three groups. The results remain in line with the baseline estimates.

As a falsification test, I examine whether the opposition to the conservative regime has the same effect on the male labour force participation. If this was the case, then the interpretation of the opposition to the current regime, as challenging gender norms and laying the basis for social change regarding women's role in society, is overestimated. Consistent with the expectations based on the hypothesis, this paper finds no evidence of changes in the male labour force participation as a result of the variation in political views across the country.

Finally, although time-invariant province-specific World War II damage costs are controlled for in the fixed effects, it has been suggested that German troops differed from other Axis troops (Mazower, 2000; Panourgia, 2009; Polymeris and Ioannis, 2017) in regards to potential damage. Thus, another falsification test performed in the paper is the use of the different occupation zones during the Second World War as the main driver of the variation in female labour force participation. Consistent with the results based on the fixed effect specifications, I find no evidence that the different zones affected female labour force participation via regional damages.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical background and the conceptual framework motivating the identification strategy. Section 3 describes the data and the identification strategy. In Section 4, the empirical results on the effects of political opposition on female labour force participation are presented, while section 5 shows the mechanisms that underpin the effects and their persistence. Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 Historical Context

Despite attempts to ensure ethnic homogeneity, turbulent events of the first half of the twentieth century including two World Wars found Greece polarized and politically fragmented. Foreign interventions left the country divided and in despair of violence that appeared to be critical for its later development (Hatzis, 2018). From the First World War, two main parties were at the frontline and resulted in the National Schism; the Velizelists or the liberals guided by the open-minded and Western-friendly political figure Elefterios Venizelos, and the Anti-Venizelists or the populist supporters of the monarchy. The main distinction between the two opposing groups was reportedly not in the sphere of social policies, but mostly pertained to appearances and opportunistic attempts regarding personal ambitions and vendettas (Iatrides and Wrigley, 1995). The Greek voters of the 1920s and the 1930s were neither ideologists nor radicals: they were caught between two options; Venizelism, representing the republicans; and Anti-Venizelism, representing the monarchists. Both were conservative with minor ideological differences.

Even though the 1920s and the 1930s were filled with political and economic instability, and continuous warfare interrupted by failed attempts at reconstruction and development, the decade to come proved to be even more crucial and turbulent. Despite efforts to maintain neutrality, Greece was forced into the Second World War when it refused to surrender to the Italian forces that attempted to conquer the country on October 28, 1940 (Close, 1995). During the Second World War, Greece was under a triple occupation, due to the strong resistance movement led and organized by the National Liberation Front (EAM) controlled by the Greek Communist Party (KKE). After years of Axis occupation and a year and a half of failed attempts to form a government after the Second World War was over, the Communists met the British and Greek governments to sign the Varkiza Agreement that would settle issues regarding the post-war political regime. The British, who were highly involved in the Second World War as allies to Greece and continued to be after the war, insisted on the return of the monarchy. The main element of the agreement was the decision to hold a referendum regarding the return of King Georgios II (Paravantes, 2019). Prior to the referendum, elections took place and the first post-war government was solidly monarchist, led by the populist party (Close, 1995). The communists, however, who had initiated and organized the resistance movement throughout the Second World War, felt entitled to a part of the government (Polymeris and Ioannis, 2017). Since the monarchy was not overwhelmingly popular, there was the risk that the King would be voted out, which was opposed not only by the royal family itself, but most importantly by the British, who feared Soviet control over the Mediterranean and the beginning of the Cold War. Therefore, the occurrence of this referendum was of great importance.

On September 1, 1946, the referendum was held. A large share of communists ended up boycotting the referendum due to concerns regarding its validity, resulting in a clear majority voting for the return of the King. It should be noted that the available evidence points to an overestimation of the support to the King due to intimidation and the control of armed forces by the monarchists (Clogg, 1987). Nevertheless once the monarchy was

restored, the communists re-organized the Democratic Army (EAM) which had fought the fascist occupiers during the Second World War, in another attempt to overthrow the King. Thus, between 1946 and 1949 Greece was facing a full-scale civil war between the Greek government, supported by the British and later the Americans, and the EAM. During the civil war, communists were not only killed but also persecuted, imprisoned and displaced (Christodoulakis, 2016). The Civil War in Greece put an end to the National Schism of the 1920s and 1930s between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists (Iatrides and Wrigley, 1995), as it was a genuine revolution of the left coalition in an attempt to abolish the monarchy once and for all. The communists were not simply a rebel military faction that aimed to overthrow the King, but can rather be characterized as political activists in search of radical change to the political and social system (Iatrides and Wrigley, 1995; Panourgia, 2009). Despite the fact that the result of the referendum was the return of the King, the referendum itself, in which many communists abstained, can be used to approximate the areas that had the largest (known) share of left-wing support, and thus were more prone to supporting a change of the current regime. Political polarization was at its peak at the time of the referendum, paving the way for a post-war national reconciliation. However, national reconciliation was not achieved as the result of the civil war. On the contrary, after the civil war was over and monarchy was reinstated, not only the Communist Party (KKE) was banned from elections but also communists were systematically discriminated in all aspects of social and working life up to 1974 that reconciliation was achieved with the abolition of a far-right authoritarian military junta and a new democratic constitution that paved the entrance of Greece to the European Union in 1981.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

The emergence of concentrations of left-wing political views, provoked by a violent conflict, can lead to an increase in female labour force participation because conservative institutions are weakened and social norms are relaxed, leaving room for change. As it is shown in figure 3, taken into consideration pre-existing attitudes measured by previous election results, the treatment of the paper is vote share against the return of the King in the referendum of 1946. The referendum took place after the Second World War as an effort to stabilise the country's political scene. The result however was the start of a three-year civil war that strengthened the gap between the leftist and the conservative identity. The treatment captures the political opposition to the monarchy that represented the right-wing anti-communist attitudes (Clogg, 1987).

It has been established in the literature that communism promotes female labour force participation. It has also been shown that communism has long-lasting effects on preferences that might even undermine support for new institutions (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020). Hence, this paper studies female labour force participation in areas that historically opposed anti-communist attitudes that the monarchy supported. I expect areas more politically opposed to the monarchy to experience higher rates of female labour force participation after the civil war.

Next, the paper explores the mechanism through which political opposition can impact

on female labour force participation. Conflicts can create the appropriate conditions for women to change roles which were previously perceived as normal. Given that the norm in the Greek social order was patriarchal (Anagnostopoulou, 2001), the shock of a conflict could force society to find a new equilibrium (Webster et al., 2019). War can potentially change the role of women in many ways. Women might fight in the war alongside their male counterparts, not only due to necessity, but also as a way of protecting their families. Women might also be called upon to take up more social responsibilities outside their household, and to participate in social movements against the war. Anagnostopoulou (2001) describes the active role of Greek women during the civil war as fighters and as organizers of social movements regarding communist political prisoners. Since women were actively involved within and outside the household during the war, an opportunity for social change opened up after the fighting had ceased.

According to Wilson (1941), "the conservative is happiest when he is unconscious of politics, and when the essential propositions of social organization do not have to be defended. (...) Conflict and political struggle are conscious and purposeful". The fight for radical change is not in the interest of a conservative. Instead, a conservative would prefer the economic, social and political environment to remain unchanged. On the other hand, left-wing ideologies are driven by the desire to alter the current political regime towards a more equal distribution of power and wealth. To be a radical in the era of the 1940s was very different to today, since the norm at the time was to be conservative. Therefore, opposing the norm at that time was usually accompanied by a form of conflict.

It is thus considered reasonable to argue that conservatives are eager to sustain social norms including domestic gender roles while the left-wing would fight for a change towards equality not only within society, but also within the household. For a conservative, a well-functioning society includes inequalities in all aspects. The distribution of this inequality might change, but only due to the fights of the radicals that they also consider part of the norms. Based on the above, I expect that provinces more politically opposed to the monarchist regime would relax the current gender norms and therefore rely less on conservative institutions such as churches.

The perceived normal functioning of society was the conservative view of the woman responsible for looking after the household and child-bearing, thus limiting her responsibilities to the confines of the home. That was the case before the war, where women were mainly housewives, unless it was necessary for them to work due to poverty. The war changed this equilibrium and transformed the role of women. During the Greek Civil War, a large share of women participated as fighters, who were therefore imprisoned and displaced like their male counterparts. The ones that were left behind took more responsibilities outside the household, participating both in the labour force and in social life through social movements. This might therefore have impacted on the establishment of conservative institutions, such as churches.

Finally, if gender norms are persistent, I expect that provinces opposed to the return of the King remain left-wing and sustain less conservative gender norms.

3 Data Description

3.1 Female labour Force Participation

I collected data on female labour force participation at the province level for six census years, covering periods before and after the civil war, from 1920 until 1981.[1] The census year 1920 was the first to include the annexations from the Balkan wars, and therefore reports statistics for the entirety of the country as it is today.[2]

The population is divided into two broad categories; the economically active and the economically inactive.The economically active category is further split into two categories: employed, and unemployed or currently seeking work. The records (and even sometimes the definitions) varied in each of the censuses. For reasons of consistency, the female labour force participation rate is defined as the share of women that are economically active. This includes women that are employed, unemployed or actively searching for a job in the year of the census. The female labour force participation (FLFP) is calculated as the share of economically active women in the total female population of all ages in a province for the years 1920-1981.[3] Figure 4 shows the average female labour force participation between 1920 and 1981. Due to several years of warfare, namely World War II and the Civil War, the levels of labour force participation in the census year 1951 are very low. In fact, women reportedly worked even less than in 1920. This was not specific to female employment; the total labour market shows similar patterns in 1951. While many women could not enter the labour force in 1951, a significant increase in female labour force participation is observed in 1961, followed by an overall decrease due to structural changes in the markets (Kottis, 1990). It is worth mentioning that family members helping the head of the family are included in the workforce. Housework is specifically excluded, but women working on the family fields are included in the labour force. In order to perform a falsification test, I have also collected data on male labour force participation (MLFP) data, defined in the same way. MLFP has a similar decreasing trend during the war years (from 1928 to 1951) as their female counterparts, but stabilizes after the war, unlike the FLFP rates, see Figure 5.

[1]The census years are 1920, 1928, 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981. The censuses are divided into several volumes dedicated to different demographic characteristics of the population. The volumes used here are called in Greek *Epaggelmata*, translated as *Professions* and report labour market outcomes. Appendix B describes in detail the censuses.

[2]The only exception is the department of the *Dodecanese Islands*, which is missing in the sample, as it belonged to Italy until 1947. For consistency throughout the the paper, I exclude Dodecanese from my study and have merged several provinces and departments, based on information regarding administrative units in ELSTAT (2019).

[3]There is not a consistent report of population between the ages of 15 and 64 that would be the ideal population to use to estimate labour force participation rates. The age groups are consistently available in a more aggregated level (the department level) with no consistent age range in every census year. The population aged 15 and above is only available in the province level in year 1920, 1928 and 1961; the age groups in 1920 and 1928 are ages 0-14, 15-39, 40-59, and 60 and above; whereas in 1961, the age groups are 0-4, 5-14, 15-44, 45-64, and 65 and above. In 1971 and 1981, there is a separate variable reporting the population above the age of 10 in both the province and department level. In 1951, there is no age group availability in the province level.

The analysis uses data from as early as 1920, instead of e.g. 1913, for two reasons. First, Greece was not the same size in 1913 as in the period from 1920 onward. Caught between wars, namely the Balkan wars and World War I, the data cannot be considered representative, as the population in the regions subsequently annexed were not part of the censuses. Secondly and most importantly, there was no systematic registration of female employment at the province level. An estimation of the more detailed data would have caused great measurement errors in an already distorted source of information.

The number of women in the labour force are available at the province level for all census years, apart from 1971, where the FLFP was available only at the department level. I estimated the province level numbers based on the allocation of the female shares of labour force participation in the departments in the previous year (1961). That being said, there should be measurement errors regarding this year's labour force. The prediction is verified when the levels of female labour force participation across provinces is calculated based on the ratio of the province population size over the department population size in 1971, and approximately results to similar female labour force participation rates.

3.2 Political Opposition

I define political opposition as the share of votes in a practice of direct democracy, that is a public referendum, that opposed monarchy supported by the right government of the time. There was not yet female suffrage. This gives validity to the variation of the treatment, as the outcome of interest is female labour force participation and the fact that women did not have the right to express their opposition to conservatism leaves the decision to men: traditionally the breadwinners of the household. I digitized the results of the referendum provided by the Hellenic Statistical Authority ELSTAT (2019).

The political opposition is measured as the share of votes against the return of King Georgios II in the size of the electorate of the province, excluding invalid votes and non-participants. This referendum of 1946 was meant to be held in March 1948 after the national elections of March 1946, allowing time for political stability to be restored. However, scrutiny regarding the March election combined with the left abstaining from voting increased the necessity for a referendum holding. The British viewed the reinstatement of the monarchy as an effort to stabilise the country's political scene, and with their own interest of maintaining influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Hence, they promoted the referendum as if a vote against the monarchy would be a vote against democracy (Paravantes, 2019). However, the British ally was a far Right government with the support of the military using violence to keep the leftists out of power. This became apparent already by the summer of 1946, when "legislation and emergency decrees had been generated to criminalise political opposition and dissent" (Liakos and Doumanis, 2023, p. 212). The referendum was boycotted by the communists due to the timing and the way the British chose to promote it. In addition, intimidation has played a role in voting in the referendum, underestimating the vote share against the King and questioning the validity of the referendum. On the other hand, the turnout was exceptionally high, compared to the March election (Clogg, 1987). The share of left-wing views would therefore be underes-

timated based on this measure, but this gives validity to the treatment for the following reasons. Areas that still voted against the King were mainly those willing to change the social political order, despite their partisanship (center or left). The political opposition measures the exposure to this exogenous group of people. Areas with higher levels of political opposition express higher levels of left-wing views in an otherwise conservative country, and therefore experienced the civil war more intensively given the government's control of military and police, and the British (and later American) support. For instance, if 28% of the voters in the province of *Thessaloniki* did not support the return of the King in the referendum of 1946, the level of political opposition of *Thessaloniki* would be 28. The larger the share of votes against the King in a province, the larger the political opposition and hence exposure to the potential for change in the province.

Figure 6 maps the distribution of political opposition in percentage points across all 139 provinces. The data are missing for one department that belonged to Italy in 1946 and the province of *Mount Athos* that is located in the Northeastern part of the country, because those areas did not participate.[4] Political opposition ranges from 0.04% in Oetylon that is located in the Southwest of the country to 83.99% in Apocoronas in Crete that is in the South, with an average of 30.16% and a standard deviation of 22.56%. Throughout the paper the political opposition is used flexibly as a continuous predictor, comparing differences in outcomes across provinces that experienced a 10% increase in political opposition.

To test the linearity of the treatment, the provinces were divided into three groups based on their level of political opposition, by sorting the treatment from low to high and based on percentiles, see Figure 7.[5] The "low" group includes provinces with share of opposition up to the first quartile; the "medium" group consists of provinces with share of opposition between the first and third quartile; and in the "high" group, provinces with share of opposition greater than the third quartile are included. The empirical estimates show that the results are driven by the "high" group when compared to the "low" group and their magnitude and significance remain unchanged.[6]

3.2.1 *Sources of Variation*

The level of political opposition is interpreted as the level of exposure to opposing ideologies to monarchy. An exploration of province-specific characteristics before the war allows for an understanding of the sources of variation in political opposition across provinces and strengthens the validity of the treatment.[7] Table 1 reports the estimates when regressing political opposition rates on relevant pre-war characteristics.

Provinces with greater political opposition rates had lower female labour participation before the war (Column 1). This could be explained by structural differences in the labour

[4]See footnote 2 regarding the department of *Dodecanese Islands* that is missing in the data. *Mount Athos* is an autonomous polity within the Hellenic Republic and home to 20 monasteries under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.

[5]Similar approach to the treatment in Boehnke and Gay (2022).

[6]See section 4.4. for equation and results.

[7]Data on economic activities, literacy rates, marital status and age structure are not consistently available in the province level across all census years and therefore were not included here.

markets. Yet, when controlling for urbanization, urbanization itself is not significant and therefore not driving the variation of political opposition. Nevertheless, the relative trends show that there are no significant differences in the levels of female labour force participation across provinces with different levels of political opposition. As expected, provinces with larger shares of communist votes show greater opposition to the King (Columns 2-5). In addition, the share of votes for the center parties is positively correlated to rates of political opposition. The share of communists, the share of center votes and the exact location of the provinces explain more than 40% of the variation in political opposition across provinces (Column 3). The exact location is crucial, due to the diverse nature of the Greek landscape. When including all variables, both characteristics show statistical significance, although the communist share is greater in magnitude (Column 4-5). Finally, their significance does not change when including department fixed effects (Column 5). An unexpected, yet encouraging, result is that urbanization is not correlated to political opposition. This fact removes concerns regarding pre-conditions for industrial activities after the war, that would be problematic for the identification. The communist share and the province coordinates, indicating the exact location, will be used as the main controls in the analysis.

3.3 *Pre-trends in Female Labour Force Participation*

The identification relies on the assumption that female labour force participation rates show no pre-war trends among provinces with different levels of political opposition. Figure 8 shows that before the war the female labour force participation follows a similar trend in areas with low, medium and high political opposition, although areas with high opposition had a slight downward trend relatively to provinces with low and medium opposition. The levels of female labour force participation are normalized to 100 in 1951. In addition to the larger increase in the high group of political opposition, the gap in female labour force participation persists for the next two census years.

To be certain that the identifying assumption of the empirical model is met, I regress political polarization rates on changes in female labour force participation before the war and after the war. Before the war, there was a slight relative decrease in the female labour force participation, but this is not statistically significant and is very close to zero, as shown in Panel A of figure 2. This indicates that before the war, there are no pre-trends in the changes of female labour force participation across provinces with varied levels of political opposition to the monarchy. Panel B of figure 2 shows that after the war, the change is positive and statistically significant with a slope of 0.22.

4 Methodology and results

4.1 Baseline Estimates

To investigate the effects of the level of political opposition on the female labour force participation rate, a difference-in-differences approach is used. The identification comes

from relative changes in female labour participation across provinces with varying levels of political opposition. The baseline results are estimated using the following specification:

$$FLFP_{p,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_p \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{p,t} \ , \tag{1}$$

where $FLFP_{p,t}$ denotes the female labour force participation rate in province p and year t of the census data and is calculated as a percentage. $PoliticalOpposition_p$ is the share of votes against the return of the King in the referendum of 1946 in province p, while $post1949_t$ is an indicator for year t>1949 that was the end of the civil war. Province fixed effects γ_p are included in the estimation, such as pre-existing trends of female labour force participation rates that could be area-specific. Province fixed effects control for province-specific unobservable characteristics that are constant over time and could influence the local levels of female labour force participation. For example, some provinces are closer to mountainous areas than others, and therefore might provide better conditions for the concentration of rebel groups (Close, 1995; Christodoulakis, 2016). In addition, some provinces might have experienced larger damage costs during World War II and therefore reveal lower female labour force participation rates due to larger destruction in infrastructure. Year fixed effects δ_t controls for shocks that are common to all provinces. The coefficient of interest is β and it is interpreted as the change in percentage points of the female labour force participation as the political opposition to the current monarchist regime increases by 10 percentage points after 1949.

Prior to showing the OLS estimates, Figure 10 illustrates the main finding in 1961. The graph plots labour force participation rates for women over political opposition, measured as the share of the vote against the return of the King based on the referendum in 1946. The larger the political opposition to the monarchy, the higher the female labour force participation rate. The unconditional relationship in Panel A is positive and statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.34. When including controls on pre-war share of communist votes and province geographical location in Panel B, a similar pattern is illustrated with even larger magnitude and a t-statistic of 2.95.

Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of the effect of varying levels of political opposition on female labour force participation. Column (1) includes only year fixed effects and province fixed effects, while column (2) reports the estimates when adding controls for the communist vote share, center vote share, rurality, altitude and province coordinates, the most statistically significant pre-war characteristics across provinces. The coefficient β is positive, statistically significant, and its magnitude is not affected by the controls. After 1949, a 10% increase in the political opposition to the King results in a 1.9% increase in the female labour force participation rate.

When further controlling for WWII occupation zones, size of province and sex ratios, the results do not change (Column 3) and remain statistically significant. Column 4 shows that the result remains when all controls are taken into consideration together with department fixed effects. Even when the specification includes region-specific linear time trends (Column 5), which is a much more restrictive approach, the magnitude of the result increases and the model explains 1% more of the variation in female labour force

participation rates, without dropping its statistical significance. Consistent with the main hypothesis, provinces politically opposed to monarchy to a higher degree experience significantly larger rates of female labour force participation. Even though violence creates destruction, when the conflict is political, in areas that were exposed to opposing political ideologies, opportunities for economic empowerment opened up to minority groups, such as women.

4.1.1 *Year-specific difference-in-differences estimates*

To understand the effects through time, the assumption that the effect was constant though time is now relaxed and the year-specific effects are estimated using the flexible difference-in-differences approach as specified in the following equation:

$$FLFP_{p,t} = \sum_{\substack{t=1920 \\ t \neq 1951}}^{1981} \beta_t \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_p \times \textit{Year}_t + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{p,t} \ , \tag{2}$$

The reference year is 1951 and therefore excluded in the analysis, due to being the closest to the shock. $Year_t$ is an indicator for each of the remaining census years, namely 1920, 1928, 1961, 1971, and 1981.

The year-specific results from equation 2 are illustrated in Figure 10. The coefficients of the effect on pre-war years are close to zero and not statistically significant, suggesting that there are no pre-war trends in labour force participation that are driving the results.[8] The effects in the years following the war are positive and significant with a slight decrease in the magnitude though the years. Specifically, in provinces that experienced a 10% increase in political opposition, the increase of the female labour force participation rate ranges from 1.9 percentage points in 1961 to 1.8 in 1971 to approximately 1.5 in 1981. When including controls, the results barely change. What is striking in the results is that the effect of variation in political opposition persists for more than 30 years after the end of the war. Conveniently, this points to the mechanism of persistence in gender norms and conservative attitudes towards women. The model explains approximately 68% of the variation in female labour force participation due to increases in political opposition, which provides confidence that the specifications capture a large part of the story. Table A.1. reports the year-specific estimates in detail.

4.2 Male labour Force Participation as Falsification Test

A potential interpretation of the results could be that the political opposition, and therefore the violence of the Civil War, had an impact on the labour force participation of both genders. As such, analyzing the effects of the level of political opposition on male labour force participation is important. Table 3 reports the estimates of the effects of political

[8] Figure 10 tests for common trends prior to the treatment, as also shown in the relative trends of FLFP in figure 8.

opposition on male labour force participation rates.[9] Clearly, table 3 provides evidence that rejects the alternative hypothesis that the civil war impacted male employment. For every specification, the effect is close to zero and not statistically significant. Table A.2. reports the year-specific difference-in-differences estimates. When relaxing the assumption that the effect of political opposition on male labour force participation rates was constant through the years, the results remain statistically insignificant and close to zero. This falsification test confirms the hypothesis that the impact was on women, rather than labour force participation as a whole.

Consistent with the argument that political opposition paves the way to changes in gender norms, the results confirm that this political shock led to higher rates of labour force participation among women. In addition, the result motivates the construction of hypotheses in the next section regarding the mechanisms through which this might have worked.

4.3 Controlling for Region-Specific Time Trends

In order to verify that differential trends in female labour participation across provinces are not affecting the results, the baseline specification also controls for region-specific time trends:

$$FLFP_{p,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_p \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \lambda_p \times \mathrm{t} + \epsilon_{p,t} \ , \tag{3}$$

where λ_p is the region-specific linear time trend. The results are reported in column 5 of table 2. The specification includes all controls and extra controls as defined in the table. The coefficient is statistically significant and the magnitude is close to the estimates presented in the table using the other specifications. This suggests that differential pre-war trends in female labour participation might slightly bias the baseline estimates upward, but the difference with the baseline estimates is extremely small.

4.4 Test for non-linearity

Next, the political opposition is measured as the share of votes against the return of the King, and is divided into three groups based on their level; low, medium and high. After sorting the treatment from minimum to maximum values, the "low" group is defined as the share of votes less than the 25th percentile; the "medium" group is the share of votes between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile; and the "high" group is the share of votes more than the 75th percentile.[10] The groups are used to test whether the identification strategy in Equation 1 is valid. The estimators of the pre-war periods test whether these types of political opposition had been trending similarly. This test exploits the potentially non-linear relationship between political opposition and female labour force participation. If a high group province has a lower estimate than the medium group, then

[9] I estimate Equation 1 for Male Labour Force Participation and use the same specifications as in Table 1.
[10] Figure 7 maps the distribution of the political opposition groups.

the linear estimation is not appropriate. If this is the case, then the interpretation of the baseline estimates would not be correct. To test this, the following equation is estimated:

$$FLFP_{p,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_g \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{p,t} \ , \tag{4}$$

where $PoliticalOpposition_g$ could be $PoliticalOpposition_{low}$, $PoliticalOpposition_{medium}$ or $PoliticalOpposition_{high}$ based on the groups created for the treatment. Using the low group as reference, table 4 reports that the results are driven by the group with the high rate of political opposition. This means that the continuous treatment captures the effects of the increase and the distribution of the treatment is rather linear.

5 Mechanisms

After establishing the positive and significant effect of the political opposition on female labour force participation, the investigation of the mechanisms explaining this relationship follows. Conceptually, the main explanation is found in the political polarization that was further caused by the Civil War. This means that the fundamental ideological differences between the extreme political views that fought the Civil War can provide an explanation for the larger increase of female labour force participation in the areas with larger anti-monarchy sentiments. An investigation of the variation of the effects based on potential structural differences in the local labour markets is available in Appendix E.1. In this section, I test the two hypotheses that were constructed based on the conceptual framework. A measure of conservatism is suggested, using the cumulative number of churches in provinces and the establishment of a relationship between the concentration of churches and political opposition. Next, I investigate the persistence of the social values, focusing on the beliefs regarding gender norms using the European Value Survey of 1999, the first relevant and consistent study that Greece participated in. In Appendix E, I show that the spatial variation of the marital status of the female population cannot explain the increase in the labour force participation in the areas with high concentrations of leftist supporters.

5.1 The Conservatism Channel

I use the number of churches in a province as a measurement of conservatism. The vast majority of churches, as reported in the building census of 1991, were built before 1919. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the destruction of the Second World War affected churches and monasteries. Thus, I hypothesize that areas with greater concentration of churches given the size of the population are more conservative as the demand for church attendance is higher. Areas with less demand for reconstruction of churches are considered less conservative, and therefore capture a proxy for the level of conservatism. During the course of the civil war, a propaganda war was taking place in efforts to demonise the Left so the government gets the public support. One of the means used for this cause was the Church taking place in campaigns against the Left (Liakos and Doumanis, 2023). It is therefore reasonable to use the establishment of churches as a measure of conservatism.

Table 6 explains how the number of churches are reported in the Building Census (1991). The year in the dataset (Column 1) represents the number of churches of Column 2. For example, in year 1919 the number of churches in the province includes all the churches and monasteries built in the province up to the year 1919.

As shown in Figure 11, areas with low, medium and high shares of voters opposing the return of the return of monarchy have similar changes in the number of churches before the war, while the number of churches increases in areas with greater shares of supporters of the monarchy after the war. This difference in concentration of churches persists throughout the sample years.

$$Churches_{p,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_p \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{p,t} \ , \tag{5}$$

where $Churches_{p,t}$ denotes the cumulative number churches in province p in year t, measured per 1000 people. The $PoliticalOpposition_p$ represents the political opposition, measured as the share of votes against the return of the King in the Referendum of 1946 in province p. Province fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Table 6 shows that the effects of exposure to political opposition on the number of churches per 1000 people are statistically significant at the 5% level consistently for all specifications. A 10% increase in political opposition leads to a decrease in the demand for churches in the province, as less churches were built after the war. These results provide evidence for the decline of conservative institutions when exposed to opposed political views.

Table A.3. reports year-specific estimates supporting the hypothesis that there was no difference among provinces before the war, as the estimate is close to zero and not significant. After the war, in areas with a greater share of political opposition, less churches were built, which suggests a reduced demand for religiosity. Religiosity has been used as a measurement of conservatism and the number of churches built up to the census year seems a relevant measure to illustrate the intensity of the political beliefs across provinces (Wilson, 1941). The year-specific coefficients show no pre-trends when using different identifications. This suggests that the parallel-trends assumption holds and the results are statistically significant and robust.

5.2 Persistent Gender Norms

Social norms persist through time and are transmitted across generations (Grosjean and Khattar, 2018; Fernández, 2013). The political polarization in Greece was among two extreme political views, the conservatives and the left. There are fundamental differences between the two groups regarding social values, e.g. family structure and marriage, religion, migration policies, etc. An important difference regards gender roles, i.e. what the role of a woman is in a society. From the conservative perspective, the roles in the household are very specific and distinctive. The man is the one who works and the woman takes care of the household and raises the children. Therefore, it could be argued that in a conservative society, women are not participating in the labour market unless needed.

Table 7 shows the correlations between left-wing share of votes as reported in 1999 and a number of survey questions that relate to gender norms, answered in the European Value Survey by a representative sample of the population in 1999 (Gari et al., 2012). The answers have been coded as "conservative" and "left-wing". A positive and statistically significant relationship indicates that left-wing opinions regarding gender roles correlate with left-wing votes. It is obvious in the table that most left-wing gender-related beliefs correlate with the relevant voting behaviors. For example, the question regarding equal contribution by both the husband and the wife in the household is correlated with the Voting Preference as reported in 1999 in the European Values Survey. In order to test if the beliefs are persistent, this paper links the recent voting preferences to the historical votes regarding the return of the King. To accomplish that, the votes are aggregated to the department level for both the historical and the contemporary data and figure 12 illustrates that the views on gender norms are persistent and shape the way a society views women and other minority groups for the next generations. It is extremely hard to change social norms and Greece has proven to be a useful case for testing this hypothesis, as the female labour force participation is even nowadays not as high as the male labour force participation and society is adapting at a much slower pace to the European family types and gender roles. There are only 13 observations, as I aggregated the individual-level data into departments to link them to the historical departments, but the correlation is positive and statistically significant.

6 Conclusion

Female labour force participation is crucial to women's status in society. In the past century there has been significant changes towards gender inequality and the choice of women to participate in the labour markets, among other. This paper studies female labour force participation in Greece during a large part of the twentieth century, utilising a referendum regarding the return of the King in Greece right after the Second World War to estimate opposition to anti-communist attitudes of monarchists. The paper reports significant and long-lasting effects of a political conflict on female labour force outcomes in Greece. I show that a 10% increase in the concentration of political opposition to conservative institutions has a positive and statistically significant impact on female labour force participation rates by 1.9 percentage points on average. This effect persists for more than 30 years after the outbreak of the political conflict and is driven by province-level variation in political opposition to the monarchist regime. The level of political opposition reflects the intensity of the political conflict, as the civil war in Greece was a struggle between left-wing and conservative ideologies that polarized society politically. To measure the political opposition, the paper exploits a referendum that took place right before the outbreak of the civil war in 1946. The share of votes against the return of the King represents the level of political opposition to the monarchy.

The results of political opposition leading to political conflict on female labour force participation are in line with results by Petesch (2017) on the post-conflict society in Liberia, where gender norms changed and women were empowered, as they increased their par-

ticipation in labour markets and political life. This paper provides evidence that provinces more exposed to political ideologies opposed to monarchy show significantly higher rates of female labour force participation. This increase can be explained by the differences in social values of the two opposing groups, conservatives and the left-wing. In fact, the paper shows that an increase in left-wing political opposition leads to a decline in demand for conservative institutions, such as churches. The results are robust when including controls, such as the share of communist parties, province coordinates, indicators of urbanization and sex ratios. Other robustness checks include a falsification test that uses as an outcome male labour force participation, showing zero impact; control for province-specific linear time trends verify that differential trends in female labour participation across provinces are not affecting the results; and grouping the political opposition shows that there are no non-linearities driving the results. Moreover, data from the European Value Survey of 1999 reveal persistence of attitudes regarding gender roles.

Finally, it is shown that the effect of the exposure to political opposition on female labour force participation persists up to 1981 and is robust to a series of alternative specifications and controls. This mechanism implies that values regarding gender roles persist and are transmittable through generations. More generally, political conflicts open opportunities for social and political change that lead to the empowerment of minority and subordinate groups (Justino, 2017). The paper shows that women's labour market outcomes are subject to changes when conservative institutions are relaxed, and in this case, these changes persisted for at least the next three decades.

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Figures

Figure 1: Female Labour Force Participation in Greece (%), 1920-2019

Notes. This figure shows the evolution of the average Female Labour Force Participation rate in Greece over a century. Female Labour Force Participation is considered here the number of women of all ages actively participating in the labour markets. A person is actively participating in the labour market when they are fully employed, partly employed or unemployed actively seeking for a job. The dashed red vertical lines indicate the years of the Civil War, 1946-1949. Source: 1920-1981 (ELSTAT, 2019), 1991-2019 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database, The World Bank Data.

Figure 2: Political Opposition and Changes in Female labour Force Participation



(a) Panel A



(b) Panel B

Notes: Panel A: Each dot represents one of 139 provinces. The vertical axis is the changes in female labour force participation rates in percentage points between 1928 and 1951, before the civil war. Panel B: Each dot represents one of 139 provinces. The vertical axis is the changes in female labour force participation rates in percentage points between 1951 and 1961, after the civil war.

Figure 3: Measure of Political Opposition



Figure 4: Female labour Force Participation (%), 1920-1981

Notes: This graph shows female labour force participation (FLFP) rates in percent over the period of the analysis 1920-1981. The graph illustrates average FLFP in Greece. The vertical dashed grey lines indicate the years of the civil war (1946-1949).

Figure 5: Female and Male labour Force Participation (%), 1920-1981

Notes: This graph shows male labour force participation (MLFP) rates and female labour force participation (FLFP) rates in percent over the period of the analysis 1920-1981. The graph illustrates average values of both FLFP and MLFP in Greece.

Figure 6: Political Opposition Across Provinces (%)



Notes: This figure maps the share of political opposition across 139 provinces, as counted in the referendum of 1946. The political opposition is measured as the share of votes against the return of the King in the size of the electorate of the province, excluding invalid votes and non-participants. Missing data are for one department that belonged to Italy in 1946 and the province of *Mount Athos* that did not participate in the referendum.

Figure 7: Political Opposition, Groups



Notes: This figure maps the share of political opposition across 139 provinces, as counted in the referendum of 1946, divided into three groups; low, medium and high. The "low" group includes provinces with share of opposition up to the first quartile; the "medium" group consists of provinces with share of opposition between the first and third quartile; and in the "high" group, provinces with share of opposition greater than the third quartile are included.

Figure 8: Relative Trends in Female labour Force Participation, 1920-1981



Notes: Each line corresponds to a group of provinces with a defined level of political opposition (low, medium, or high). The "low" group includes provinces with share of opposition up to the first quartile; the "medium" group consists of provinces with share of opposition between the first and third quartile; and in the "high" group, provinces with share of opposition greater than the third quartile are included. Female labour force participation (FLFP) is normalized to 100 in 1951. The vertical red lines indicate the years of the civil war (1946-1949).

Figure 9: Female labour Force Participation Rates on Political Opposition, 1961



(a) Panel A



(b) Panel B

Notes: Panel A: Figure of FLFP rates in 1961 as percentage to to the political opposition, measured as share of votes against the return of the King reported in the referendum of 1946. Each dot represents a province. Standard errors are robust and clustered in 139 provinces. Panel B: Same figure but conditional on pre-war share of votes of communist party in the election of 1932 and geographical location as coordinates.

Figure 10: Year-specific Difference-in-Differences Effects on FLFP



Notes: This figure shows the year-specific difference-in-differences effects of Political Opposition on female labour force participation (FLFP), as estimated in equation (2). The reference year is 1951 and therefore excluded in the analysis, due to being the closest to the shock. Each dot represents the effect on FLFP when an increase of 10% in political opposition occurs. The vertical red lines indicate the years of the civil war (1946-1949).

Figure 11: Relative Trends in Conservatism



Notes: This figure shows the relative trends of the number of churches per 1000 people for each year available in the building census (1991). Each line represents a group of political opposition, measured as the share of votes against the return of the King; low, medium and high. The "low" group includes provinces with share of opposition up to the first quartile; the "medium" group consists of provinces with share of opposition between the first and third quartile; and in the "high" group, provinces with share of opposition greater than the third quartile are included. Conservatism is measure as the share cumulative number of churches in 1000 population and is normalized to 100 in 1945.The vertical red lines indicate the years of the civil war (1946-1949).

Figure 12: Correlation between historical and modern political views



Notes: This figure shows the positive and statistically significant correlation between historical and modern political views. Historical negative votes are measured as the share of votes against the return of the King in the size of the electorate of the province, excluding invalid votes and non-participants (Referendum in 1946). Modern political views are measured as the left-wing share of votes as reported in European Value Survey (1999). Both measures are in percent and aggregated into department-level. Each dot represents a department.

Tables

Table 1: Political Opposition and Pre-War Characteristics

Dependent variable:	Political Opposition				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FLFP	-0.669***		-0.242*	-0.187	-0.193
	(0.205)		(0.144)	(0.119)	(0.131)
Communist share 1932		0.965***	1.017***	1.126***	0.700***
		(0.285)	(0.274)	(0.239)	(0.230)
Center share 1932		0.447***	0.432***	0.300***	-0.005
		(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.079)	(0.100)
Conservative share 1932		-0.404***	-0.393***	-0.334***	-0.108
		(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Rural		-0.040	-0.018	-0.042	-0.173***
		(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Altitude		0.016**	0.015**	0.010*	0.011**
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Province coordinates	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Characteristics	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.061	0.546	0.550	0.722	0.876
N	139	139	139	139	139

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates when regressing political opposition on pre-war province characteristics measured in 1951, or else specifically mentioned. *FLFP* denotes female labour force participation in percent; *Communist share* is the share of votes for the communist party in 1932 in percent; *Center share* is the share of votes for the liberal party in 1932 in percent; *Other characteristics* include WWII occupation zones as an indicator, sex ratios in percent, and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Effect of Political Opposition on Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP)

Dependent variable:	Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PoliticalOpposition × post1949	0.167***	0.192***	0.189***	0.184***	0.147**
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.064)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region×Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.658	0.761	0.780	0.772	0.792
N	832	832	832	832	832

Notes: This table estimates the effect of political opposition after 1949 on female labour force participation. All models include parish and year fixed effects. Specifications differ by inclusion of controls, department fixed effects, and region-year interactions. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Effect of Political Opposition on Male Labour Force Participation (MLFP)

Dependent variable:	Male Labour Force Participation (MLFP)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PoliticalOpposition × post1949	0.000	-0.012	0.030	0.035	0.010
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region×Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.541	0.596	0.604	0.583	0.613
N	832	832	832	832	832

Notes: This table estimates the effect of political opposition after 1949 on male labour force participation. All models include parish and year fixed effects. Specifications differ by inclusion of controls, department fixed effects, and region-year interactions. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Effect of Political Opposition Groups on Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP)

Dependent variable:	Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Medium group × post1949	-0.771	3.842***	3.615***	3.121**	3.059**
	(1.388)	(1.268)	(1.187)	(1.231)	(1.384)
High group × post1949	7.354***	10.402***	9.378***	9.147***	7.528***
	(1.866)	(2.150)	(2.362)	(2.434)	(2.592)
_cons	23.405***	-46.258**	-19.248	-19.079	-56.057
	(0.561)	(22.318)	(19.308)	(19.850)	(41.349)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region×Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.657	0.764	0.781	0.773	0.793
N	832	832	832	832	832

Notes: This table estimates the effect of political opposition divided into groups after 1949 on female labour force participation. All models include parish and year fixed effects. Specifications differ by inclusion of controls, department fixed effects, and region-year interactions. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Years explained, Number of Churches

Year in dataset	Years included
1919	up to 1919
1945	1919 - 1945
1960	1946 - 1960
1970	1961 - 1970
1980	1971 - 1980
1985	1981 - 1985

Notes. This table explains how the number of churches are reported in the Building Census (1991). The year in the dataset (Column 1) represents the number of churches of Column 2. For example, in year 1919 the number of churches in the province includes all the churches and monasteries built in the province up to the year 1919.

Table 6: The Conservatism Channel

Dependent variable:	Number of Churches per 1000 population				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PoliticalOpposition × post1949	-0.041**	-0.103***	-0.164***	-0.166***	-0.088***
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.033)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region×Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.877	0.894	0.915	0.910	0.940
N	832	832	832	832	832

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the share of number of churches in 1000 population. The years are different and explained in table 9. All models include parish and year fixed effects. Specifications differ by inclusion of controls, department fixed effects, and region-year interactions. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km. All controls are considered for the years 1920, 1928, 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 7: Gender Norms and Left Vote (European Values Survey, Greece 1999)

Question	Coeff. (Left vote)	Std. Error	Pseudo R^2	Obs.
(1) Jobs are scarce: giving men priority (Q20B)	0.177	(0.131)	0.003	479
(2) Women need children in order to be fulfilled (Q42)	0.048	(0.133)	0.000	489
(3) Woman single parent, no stable relationship with man (Q44)	0.550***	(0.140)	0.030	406
(4) Working mother warm relationship with children (Q46A)	0.197	(0.124)	0.004	522
(5) Pre-school child suffers with working mother (Q46B)	0.362***	(0.135)	0.013	519
(6) Women really want home and children (Q46C)	0.286**	(0.125)	0.008	509
(7) Being housewife as fulfilling as paid job (Q46D)	0.211*	(0.118)	0.005	510
(8) Job best way for women to be independent (Q46E)	0.272**	(0.133)	0.008	517
(9) Husband + wife contribute to household income (Q46F)	0.232*	(0.139)	0.006	519
(10) Fathers as well suited to look after children as mothers (Q46G)	0.188	(0.117)	0.004	521
(11) Men less able to handle emotions in relationships (Q46H)	0.153	(0.120)	0.002	500

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports results of probit regressions. The dependent variables are responses to various gender norm questions from the 1999 European Values Survey in Greece.

Appendices

A Flexible Difference-in-Differences Results

Table A.1: Year-specific Difference-in-Differences Estimates, Equation 2

Dependent variable:	Female labour Force Participation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PoliticalOpposition x 1920	0.021	-0.011	0.047	0.050	0.063
	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.067)
PoliticalOpposition x 1928	-0.048	-0.023	-0.011	-0.008	-0.029
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.078)
PoliticalOpposition x 1961	0.220***	0.223***	0.260**	0.256**	0.141
	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.094)
PoliticalOpposition x 1971	0.215***	0.253***	0.289***	0.289***	0.252**
	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.097)
PoliticalOpposition x 1981	0.176***	0.226***	0.278***	0.273***	0.251**
	(0.052)	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.099)
_cons	21.920***	-35.970	-0.444	-1.489	-68.453*
	(0.823)	(24.226)	(19.189)	(19.707)	(39.819)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region x Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Provinces	139	139	139	139	139
Departments	35	35	35	35	35
Observations	832	832	832	832	832
adj. R^2	0.672	0.769	0.787	0.779	0.795

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is FLFP rates. The reference year is 1951. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.2: Year-specific Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MLFP

Dependent variable:	Male labour Force Participation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PoliticalOpposition x 1920	-0.021	-0.003	-0.073*	-0.079*	-0.058
	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.056)
PoliticalOpposition x 1928	-0.048***	-0.034	-0.074**	-0.079**	-0.062
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.041)
PoliticalOpposition x 1961	-0.044	-0.024	-0.060	-0.061	-0.129
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.098)
PoliticalOpposition x 1971	-0.064*	-0.066**	-0.114**	-0.114*	-0.190**
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.092)
PoliticalOpposition x 1981	-0.029	-0.031	0.004	0.003	0.119
	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.074)
_cons	76.173***	26.984	72.612***	72.795***	19.636
	(0.489)	(23.078)	(22.633)	(23.133)	(38.972)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region x Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Provinces	139	139	139	139	139
Departments	35	35	35	35	35
Observations	832	832	832	832	832
adj. R^2	0.541	0.596	0.605	0.584	0.624

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is MLFP rates. The reference year is 1951. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.3: The Conservatism Channel, Flexible

Dependent variable:	Number of Churches per 1000 population					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PoliticalOpposition x 1919	0.011*	0.018*	0.029	0.029	0.022	
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	
PoliticalOpposition x 1960	-0.023**	-0.053***	-0.071***	-0.073***	-0.030	
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)	
PoliticalOpposition x 1970	-0.037**	-0.090***	-0.138***	-0.140***	-0.065**	
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)	
PoliticalOpposition x 1980	-0.038**	-0.088***	-0.169***	-0.170***	-0.106***	
	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.032)	
PoliticalOpposition x 1985	-0.046	-0.142***	-0.225***	-0.227***	-0.111*	
	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.061)	
_cons	9.509***	-21.361**	-33.120***	-32.997***	-103.479**	
	(0.344)	(9.475)	(12.294)	(12.460)	(42.454)	
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	
Region x Year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	
Year_construction	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	832	832	832	832	832	832
adj. R^2	0.877	0.895	0.918	0.914	0.940	

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the share of number of churches in 1000 population. The years are different and explained in table 6. Controls and extra controls are considered for the years 1920, 1928, 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

B Data Source

The main source of the data is the Population Censuses in Greece conducted by the Hellenic Statistical Authority on behalf of the Greek state (ELSTAT, 2019). The censuses cover the entire country and are carried out approximately every first year of every decade. The censuses includes the population in Greece at the time of the census and demographic characteristics of the population. The information is given both aggregated for the entire Greek peninsula, but also in sub-divisions, a more detailed level.

Although the Greek Independence from the Ottoman Empire was in 1821, the Greek state expanded in 1881 and then again in 1912, forming the Greek Independent state as we know it today[1]. Due to the annexations, several reforms regarding the administrative division of the country took place. The censuses used and linked in this paper are for the years 1920, 1928, 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981. In 1940, a collection of data was planned to take place, but got interrupted by the war. The available information was destroyed during World War II and only the population records were saved from this year. Among these censuses, the administrative units have changed, either merged or separated, but not substantially. For consistency reasons, I am using the administrative division as formed in 1920.

In 1920-1961, Greece has 9 regions (in Greek *Periphereies*) that are persistent throughout all the years of this paper's scope. The polymorphic geography of the country, with the long coastline and mountainous areas, is the main geographical characteristic that creates regional disparities. The next and main administrative unit is the prefectures, or in Greek *Nomoi* (in singular *Nomós*). Prefectures are equivalent to the French *Dèpartements* and there are several in one region. The unit of my analysis in the Province, or in Greek *Eparchia*. A prefecture usually is divided into several provinces, but in some cases there is only one province in a prefecture that has the same name. This goes back to the geographical features that frequently determine the level of aggregation in the administration units.

Table B.1. shows the final regions, departments and provinces, after linking the six censuses. In this paper, there are 9 regions that contain 35 departments in total and 139 provinces. Each province is further divided into municipalities and cities, but since I am interested in labour force participation rates, the availability of my main variable is on the province level. Therefore, this level of aggregation is sufficient for the scope of the paper. Understanding the administrative units is important, since the data that I am using include voting. The size of the region could potentially play a role for the overall result regarding the political character of the geographical location.

Table B.2. reports the summary statistics of the main variables of the historical censuses used in the paper. There are a few points to be made about some of the variables. There are some extreme values in the final database that are kept for a number of reasons. There are extreme values in the lower of the labour Force Participation, the male, female and the total. These extreme values are reported in remote areas (mainly small islands), where

[1]Excluding the Dodecannese islands that were formally part of Greece in 1947.

most of the population is employed in seasonal work, such as tourism, and there are high shares of unreported employment. The low and high extreme values of sex ratio are also reported in remote areas, where people tend to live temporarily and therefore some do not report themselves in those areas, while some do.

Table B.1: Number of Departments and Provinces per Region

Region	Number of Departments	Number of Provinces
Central Greece and Evia	4	21
Crete	4	20
Aegean islands	4	14
Epirus	3	10
Ionian islands	3	7
Macedonia	8	26
Peloponnese	5	23
Thessaly	2	10
Thrace	2	8
Total	35	139

Table B.2: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std Deviation	Min	Median	Max
Share_no	30.16	22.57	0.04	27.50	83.99
FLFP	24.86	15.18	0.93	21.16	78.15
MLFP	75.14	8.92	1.11	76.10	97.20
LFP	48.92	9.97	1.01	46.76	82.51
rural	62.85	17.77	4.91	67.15	89.82
Communist_share	3.89	6.13	0.00	1.70	34.83
Center_share	34.35	16.17	3.79	31.74	84.11
Altitude	268.09	211.46	32.00	204.00	1083.00
Size_area_km	912.46	660.75	31.00	734.00	3505.00
Sex_ratio	95.05	9.53	62.11	94.94	224.99
N	832				

Table B.3: Summary Statistics, Pre and Post-1949

	Mean	Std Deviation	Min	Median	Max
Pre-1949					
LFP	50.54	10.15	32.12	49.01	82.51
MLFP	80.59	5.53	65.74	80.85	93.76
FLFP	23.12	14.77	1.71	18.34	71.92
Sex ratio	95.50	9.79	66.40	96.29	125.96
Post-1949					
LFP	48.11	9.79	1.01	46.36	80.28
MLFP	72.43	9.04	1.11	72.81	97.20
FLFP	25.73	15.33	0.93	22.82	78.15
Sex ratio	94.82	9.40	62.11	94.40	224.99
Total					
LFP	48.92	9.97	1.01	46.76	82.51
MLFP	75.14	8.92	1.11	76.10	97.20
FLFP	24.86	15.18	0.93	21.16	78.15
Sex ratio	95.05	9.53	62.11	94.94	224.99
Observations	832				

C Greek Annexations

After the War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire, a Greek Kingdom was created in 1832 consisting of three regions; Central Greece (including the greater area of Athens) and Eubee, Peloponesse and the west Aegean Islands. In 1863, ceded by the United Kingdom, the Ionian Islands were annexed as a fourth region, while in 1881 the region of Thessaly was added to the Kingdom after the Conference of Constantinople. After the Balkan wars in 1914, the regions of Epirus, Macedonia, Crete and the east Aegean islands were incorporated. Finally, with the Treaty of Lausanne, and a massive population exchange between Turkey and Greece, the region of Thrace was the last territory to join Greece, and this is the geographical extent of the country used for the purposes of this paper. The expansion of the Greek state as it is currently known was finally brought together for an ethnic and religious unification not earlier than 1947, with the concession of Dodecanese Islands by Italy. For consistency, the region of Dodecanese Islands is not included in the analysis of this paper.

D European Value Survey (1999)

	Political Views							
	Other		Conservative		Communists/Left wing		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Job Priority to Men								
agree	105	17.2	89	24.9	28	18.8	222	19.9
disagree	463	75.8	242	67.8	106	71.1	811	72.6
neither	43	7.0	26	7.3	15	10.1	84	7.5
Total	611	100.0	357	100.0	149	100.0	1117	100.0
Women need children in order to be fulfilled								
needs children	399	72.9	264	78.1	105	76.1	768	75.1
not necessary	148	27.1	74	21.9	33	23.9	255	24.9
Total	547	100.0	338	100.0	138	100.0	1023	100.0
Woman single parent and no stable relationship								
approve	200	32.6	95	26.4	50	33.1	345	30.7
disapprove	226	36.8	190	52.8	59	39.1	475	42.2
depends	188	30.6	75	20.8	42	27.8	305	27.1
Total	614	100.0	360	100.0	151	100.0	1125	100.0
Working mother has a warm relationship with children								
strongly agree	192	31.3	114	31.8	59	39.3	365	32.6
agree	274	44.7	149	41.6	60	40.0	483	43.1
disagree	138	22.5	86	24.0	28	18.7	252	22.5
strongly disagree	9	1.5	9	2.5	3	2.0	21	1.9
Total	613	100.0	358	100.0	150	100.0	1121	100.0
Pre-school child suffers with working mother								

Table D.1 continued from previous page

	Other		Conservative		Communists/Left wing		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
strongly agree	98	16.1	66	18.6	28	18.7	192	17.3
agree	382	62.9	208	58.6	87	58.0	677	60.9
disagree	116	19.1	73	20.6	31	20.7	220	19.8
strongly disagree	11	1.8	8	2.3	4	2.7	23	2.1
Total	607	100.0	355	100.0	150	100.0	1112	100.0
Women really want home and children								
strongly agree	98	16.9	80	22.9	27	18.5	205	19.1
agree	268	46.2	156	44.7	67	45.9	491	45.7
disagree	188	32.4	97	27.8	43	29.5	328	30.5
strongly disagree	26	4.5	16	4.6	9	6.2	51	4.7
Total	580	100.0	349	100.0	146	100.0	1075	100.0
Being housewife as fulfilling as paid job								
strongly agree	57	9.8	55	15.8	17	11.6	129	12.0
agree	162	27.9	109	31.2	49	33.3	320	29.7
disagree	294	50.6	152	43.6	65	44.2	511	47.4
strongly disagree	68	11.7	33	9.5	16	10.9	117	10.9
Total	581	100.0	349	100.0	147	100.0	1077	100.0
Job best way for women to be independent								
strongly agree	232	38.6	130	36.8	56	37.3	418	37.9
agree	265	44.1	152	43.1	76	50.7	493	44.7
disagree	95	15.8	60	17.0	17	11.3	172	15.6
strongly disagree	9	1.5	11	3.1	1	0.7	21	1.9
Total	601	100.0	353	100.0	150	100.0	1104	100.0
Husband and wife contribute to household income								
strongly agree	269	43.9	153	43.1	63	42.0	485	43.4

Table D.1 continued from previous page

	Other		Conservative		Communists/Left wing		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
agree	280	45.7	152	42.8	62	41.3	494	44.2
disagree	62	10.1	44	12.4	22	14.7	128	11.4
strongly disagree	2	0.3	6	1.7	3	2.0	11	1.0
Total	613	100.0	355	100.0	150	100.0	1118	100.0
Fathers as well suited to look after children as mothers								
strongly agree	114	18.7	61	17.1	28	18.7	203	18.2
agree	293	48.1	143	40.1	73	48.7	509	45.6
disagree	184	30.2	131	36.7	44	29.3	359	32.2
strongly disagree	18	3.0	22	6.2	5	3.3	45	4.0
Total	609	100.0	357	100.0	150	100.0	1116	100.0

Table D.1: EVS Questions on Gender norms, 1999

E Robustness checks

E.1 Sensitivity to reference year

To strengthen the argument that there is no effect before the 1940s, I use as a reference year 1928 instead of 1951 (the last available census year before the wars). Table E2 shows that the results remain the same, not statistically significant and close to zero in 1920; whereas the effects start from 1961 onwards and have positive and similar magnitude.

Table E.1: Year-specific Difference-in-Differences Estimates, Equation 2

Dependent variable:	Female labour Force Participation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PoliticalOpposition x 1920	0.069**	0.012	0.057	0.057	0.086
	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.074)
PoliticalOpposition x 1951	0.048	0.024	0.011	0.011	0.020
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.076)
PoliticalOpposition x 1961	0.276***	0.251***	0.286***	0.286***	0.205**
	(0.053)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.093)
PoliticalOpposition x 1971	0.263***	0.276***	0.300***	0.300***	0.293***
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.097)
PoliticalOpposition x 1981	0.235***	0.219***	0.298***	0.298***	0.316***
	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.099)
_cons	20.324***	-57.059***	-5.554	-5.554	-66.151*
	(0.889)	(16.530)	(19.008)	(19.442)	(36.594)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	No	No	No	Yes	No
Region x Year	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.689	0.789	0.809	0.799	0.818
N	832	832	832	832	832

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is FLFP rates. The reference year is 1928. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include WWII occupation zones, sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

E.2 Department-level analysis

As a robustness check, I investigate whether the effect remains when analysing the departments. The equation changes accordingly:

$$FLFP_{s,d,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_d \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{s,d,t} \ , \tag{1}$$

where $FLFP_{s,d,t}$ denotes female labour force participation, measured as the number of women in department d and year t of the census data and is calculated as a percentage of the total female population aged 10 and above in the department. $PoliticalOpposition_d$ is the share of votes against the return of the King in the Referendum of 1946 in department d. Department fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Table E.1. shows that the effects of exposure to political opposition on FLFP are still statistically significant in the more aggregated department level, and their magnitude positive and similar to the main results. At the same time, we see that there is still no effect on male labour force participation still confirming the gender-specific effect of the political conflict.

Table E.2: Department level Year-specific Difference-in-Differences Estimates

Dependent variable:	Female labour Force Participation			MLFP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PoliticalOpposition x 1920	-0.006	-0.112	-0.164*	-0.011
	(0.037)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.045)
PoliticalOpposition x 1928	-0.029	-0.062	-0.066	-0.018
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.027)
PoliticalOpposition x 1961	0.269***	0.366*	0.292**	0.039
	(0.085)	(0.184)	(0.136)	(0.057)
PoliticalOpposition x 1971	0.246***	0.396***	0.365***	-0.015
	(0.068)	(0.123)	(0.098)	(0.047)
PoliticalOpposition x 1981	0.203**	0.279***	0.273***	-0.058
	(0.084)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.050)
_cons	16.443	-164.036	555.962	-486.797
	(18.083)	(345.504)	(524.318)	(352.734)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Extra Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.743	0.856	0.862	0.859
N	210	210	210	210

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is FLFP rates or MLFP. The reference year is 1951. Controls include vote share of the communist party in 1932, vote share of the Liberal party in 1932, province coordinates, rurality and altitude. Extra controls include sex ratio and size of province in km.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

F Testing Other Mechanisms

F.1 Structure of labour Markets

An analysis of the local labour market structure follows to examine if there are specific occupations driving the results. One potential interpretation of the results could be that areas that experienced political opposition to a larger degree, and therefore were impacted by the civil war in more severe ways, received less investments to comply with the government's decision to change the economy from agricultural to industrial after the war. Table F.1. shows the share of women working in different sectors as a share of female population aged 10 and above. Throughout the years (pre and post-war), the majority of the female

population was employed in agriculture and a smaller share in industries and services. The analysis excludes the year 1971, as all information is given in department level; therefore, the measurement error is too large for the results to be reliable. For the year 1961 that the sectoral economic activity labour force participation is given in the department level, I have extrapolated the province level based on the total labour force participation rate per province. This means, that I have a share of women working in each sector per department in 1961 and I apply this to the total female labour force participation in each province to get the number of women working in each sector. There is some measurement error but it appears to be really small. In the case of 1971, this method would not give close-to-accurate results, as there is no information on the province level regarding labour markets.

Table F.1: FLFP in Economic Activities

	Mean	Std Deviation	Min	Median	Max
Pre-1949					
Agriculture	13.45	14.70	0.20	6.74	65.82
NotAgri	9.67	3.92	1.18	9.33	29.93
Mines	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.00	1.91
Industry	2.38	2.00	0.05	1.97	19.60
Commerce	0.11	0.10	0.00	0.09	0.63
Transport	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.22
Services	0.87	0.88	0.00	0.65	6.47
Other	6.25	2.61	0.68	5.95	15.59
Post-1949					
Agriculture	17.03	15.46	0.00	11.98	69.63
NotAgri	7.69	5.16	0.60	6.56	47.19
Mines	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.00	1.49
Industry	2.67	2.44	0.00	2.02	17.46
Commerce	1.13	1.28	0.00	0.63	10.65
Transport	0.12	0.17	0.00	0.06	1.13
Services	2.57	1.89	0.00	2.13	19.27
Other	1.16	0.75	0.00	1.04	5.69
Total					
Agriculture	15.61	15.25	0.00	10.45	69.63
NotAgri	8.48	4.80	0.60	7.68	47.19
Mines	0.03	0.16	0.00	0.00	1.91
Industry	2.55	2.28	0.00	2.00	19.60
Commerce	0.73	1.12	0.00	0.25	10.65
Transport	0.08	0.14	0.00	0.04	1.13
Services	1.89	1.77	0.00	1.50	19.27
Other	3.19	3.04	0.00	1.75	15.59
N	693				

Table F1 shows that most women work in agriculture both before and after the war. Due to this fact, I expect that the results are driven by employment in agriculture, as there is only a small change in other sectors. The map of To disentangle the structure of labour markets from female labour force participation, the paper estimates the following equation:

$$Sector_{s,p,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_p \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{s,p,t} \ , \tag{2}$$

where $Sector_{s,d,t}$ denotes the size of sector s, measured as the number of people in province p and year t of the census data and is calculated as a percentage of the total female population aged 10 and above in the province. $PoliticalOpposition_p$ is the share of votes against the return of the King in the Referendum of 1946 in province p. Province fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Table E.2. shows that the effects of exposure to political opposition on the share of labour working within specific economic sectors are driven by agriculture as was expected by the descriptive statistics. All other sectors are not driving the results, which would have meant that the structural change from agriculture to industry could have been the reason why women work more in some areas than others but it is clearly not the case.

F.2 The Marriage Market

The marriage market has been investigated in the literature as a channel due to the scarcity of men (Boehnke and Gay, 2022; Angrist, 2002). Male fatalities and military drafts due to the war means that both the supply and the demand for labour create the conditions for women to enter the labour market to substitute their male counterparts. Due to the shortage of men, women have less opportunities to get married and decide to participate in the labour markets. In the Greek case, the sex ratios show that there are no substantial differences in the fatalities among men and women. Women participated in the war and the losses are distributed among men and women. Nevertheless, there are still losses and displacements of men and for this reason, I investigate if the results could be explained through the channel of the marriage market.

Figure F.1. shows that, if anything, the share of single women decreased after the war years, as we;; as the share of married women, while share of widowed and divorced women seems very stable. In any case, internal displacements might have affected the decision of women to get married and it is a channel that is worth investigating. The average share of single and married women is similar, approximately 40%, while there is an 11% share of women that is divorced or widowed.

Table F.2: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Economic Sectors

Dependent variable:	Agriculture	Not Agri	Mines	Industry	Commerce	Transport	Services	Other	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PoliticalOpposition x post1949	0.055	-0.004	0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.008*	-0.011	-0.041	
	(0.033)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.040)	
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Department FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Departments	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	
Observations	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	
Adj. R^2	0.603	0.148	0.384	0.710	0.481	0.884	0.856	0.967	

Notes. This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is female labour Force Participation rates in different economic sectors, indicated in the title of each column.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered in 139 provinces. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure E.1: Share of women based on marital status



To understand if the marriage market is the channel that can explain the impact of political conflict on female labour force participation, I estimate the following:

$$MaritalStatus_{m,d,t} = \beta \textit{PoliticalOpposition}_d \times \textit{post1949}_t + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{m,d,t} \ , \qquad (3)$$

where $MaritalStatus_{m,d,t}$ denotes the share of women of marital status m in department d and year t of the census data and is calculated as a percentage of the female population in the department. $PoliticalOpposition_d$ is the share of votes against the return of the King in the Referendum of 1946 in department d. Department fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Table E.3. shows that the effects of the political conflict on the share of married, single and widowed/divorced women is close to zero and not statistically significant.

Figure E.3: Marital Status estimates

Dependent variable:	Single Women	Married Women	Widowed/Divorced Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PoliticalOpposition x 1920	-0.184	-0.070	-0.066***
	(0.146)	(0.088)	(0.022)
PoliticalOpposition x 1928	-0.057	-0.028	-0.023
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.015)
PoliticalOpposition x 1961	-0.039	-0.084***	-0.028***
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.008)
PoliticalOpposition x 1971	-0.068	-0.189	-0.045
	(0.063)	(0.135)	(0.030)
PoliticalOpposition x 1981	-0.148	-0.278	-0.074*
	(0.148)	(0.174)	(0.040)
_cons	613.740	-32.148	186.809
	(372.285)	(543.078)	(206.096)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
adj. R^2	0.937	0.708	0.794
N	210	210	210

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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