Spatz, Julius; Nunnenkamp, Peter

Book Part — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Globalization of the automobile industry: traditional locations under pressure?

Provided in Cooperation with:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Suggested Citation: Spatz, Julius; Nunnenkamp, Peter (2004): Globalization of the automobile industry: traditional locations under pressure?, In: Faust, Michael (Ed.): European industrial restructuring in a global economy: fragmentation and relocation of value chains, ISBN 3-88431-007-0, SOFI - Soziologisches Forschungsinst. an der Georg-August-Univ., Göttingen, pp. 105-129

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/3248

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Globalization of the Automobile Industry –
Traditional Locations under Pressure?∗

Julius Spatz and Peter Nunnenkamp

1. Introduction

In contrast to industries producing labor intensive and standardized goods, the automobile industry in high-income countries should be among the win-
ners of globalization. The production of automobiles is relatively human
capital intensive and technologically advanced. Nonetheless, globalization is
likely to have an impact on wages and employment in this industry, too.
Trade models predict that the gains and costs of globalization are unevenly
distributed among various employment groups and various subsectors of any
industry, including automobile production. Especially low-skilled workers
and labor intensive segments of the sectoral value chain should suffer dete-
riorating wage and employment prospects because of competitive pressure
from low-income countries.

We study the automobile industries of three major traditional producer
countries, namely Germany, Japan and the United States, in order to test this
hypothesis. The analysis covers the period 1978–1998 and proceeds in three
steps. In Section II, we discuss several aspects of globalization in the auto-
mobile industry. We focus on new competitors which emerged in countries

∗ This paper has been published in AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 57 (4), 2002. We would like to
thank the editors for granting permission to reprint the paper in this volume. The paper was
produced as part of the research project „Ursachen und Implikationen der Globalisierung
am Beispiel der Automobilindustrie“. Funding by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation is grate-
fully acknowledged. We are indebted to Gebhard Kirchgässner and Rolf J. Langhammer
for many helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of the paper. The usual dis-
claimer applies.

Michael Faust, Ulrich Voskamp and Volker Wittke (eds.): European Industrial Restructuring in a
Spatz and Nunnenkamp

with relatively low per-capita income. This is because trade models predict that increasing trade between countries at different levels of economic development should have relatively pronounced effects on the intrasectoral distribution of income and employment. In addition to new producers and exporters of finished automobiles, we assess the degree of outsourcing of relatively labor intensive segments of the value chain undertaken by the automobile industry in traditional producer countries.

Section III portrays trends in wages and employment in the automobile industry of Germany, Japan and the United States since the late 1970s. We stress that *inter*sectoral wage premia of the automobile industry, relative to total manufacturing, must not be confused with the *intra*sectoral distributional effects of globalization. The latter are captured by the development of the wage ratio for low-skilled (production) workers versus high-skilled (non-production) workers and the development of the sectoral human capital intensity (proxied by the number of non-production workers per production worker). We then correlate the intrasectoral wage and employment trends with variables reflecting the intensity of international competition. The predictions of trade models are largely supported for Germany and Japan, but rejected for the United States.

Against this background, Section IV inquires more deeply into globalization-induced restructuring processes in the three traditional producer countries. We calculate a measure of revealed comparative advantage, which suggests that the US automobile industry was badly prepared to cope with competitive pressure from below. Next we run simple OLS regressions to evaluate the stability of production patterns in the automobile industry and its degree of specialization. We find that trade unions resisted economic restructuring in the US automobile industry. In Section V, we conclude that the employment record and the world-market performance of the automobile industry in traditional producer countries critically depends on the intensity and timeliness of economic adjustment to fiercer competition from below.
2. Competition from Below: Stylized Facts

The automobile industry is typically considered to be at the forefront of globalization. Evidence supporting this view includes:

- the intricate network of alliances and cross-shareholdings among automobile companies, within nations and regions but also between regions (Vickery 1996);
- intensified M&A (mergers and acquisitions) activities in the 1990s, involving both end-producers and automotive input suppliers (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000; World Trade Agenda 2000);
- the trend towards technologically motivated cooperation agreements, which was caused, inter alia, by end-producers entering into new forms of partnerships for the design of principal components and subsystems (UNCTAD 1998: 25 f.);
- and the significant role of intra-firm trade, e.g. of US-based automobile multinationals (UNCTAD 1999: 443).

All these indicators do not reveal, however, whether new competitors from countries with relatively low per-capita income have become integrated into the international division of labor in the automobile industry. This element of globalization is of utmost importance for analyzing the labor market implications of globalization in traditional producer countries. Labor market effects should be relatively benign as long as international relations remain restricted to intra-industry trade between countries that are similarly advanced economically and characterized by comparable factor endowments. By contrast, competition from below, i.e., from considerably less advanced countries with an abundant endowment of less qualified labor is expected to cause significant adjustment pressure, especially on less qualified automobile workers in high-income countries.

At first sight, the automobile industry seems badly suited to study the consequences of fiercer competition from below. The industry as a whole is technologically advanced and relatively human capital intensive (Heitger et al. 1999; Vickery 1996). As a consequence, automobile production con-

1 For instance, R&D expenditure amounted to 12 percent of value added in the German automobile industry in the mid-1990s, twice as much as in total manufacturing (Weiβ 2000).
continues to be dominated by high-income countries, accounting for about 70 percent of world production. However, subsectors of the automobile industry differ considerably in terms of factor intensities. In Germany, for instance, the ratio of workers to sales was 2.5 times as high in the production of auto-parts as in the production of automobiles and engines (VDA b, var. issues). Hence, outsourcing, the fragmentation of value chains and the integration of low-income countries into the international division of labor are reasonable options in this industry, too.

New competitors comprise end-producers and input suppliers from countries with relatively low per-capita income; in addition to developing and newly industrializing countries, Eastern and Central European transition countries and the so-called EU-periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) belong to this income category. Considering the most important producers of automobiles among low-income countries, Figure 1 reveals rising market shares especially for end-producers located in Asia and in Southern and Central Europe. As a corollary, the share of high-income industrial countries declined by almost 10 percentage points since 1980.

Figure 1: New Competitors: Share in World Production of Automobiles, 1980 and 1998

![Figure 1: New Competitors: Share in World Production of Automobiles, 1980 and 1998](image)

\textsuperscript{a}Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Spain. \textsuperscript{b}PR China (1983 instead of 1980), India, South Korea. \textsuperscript{c}Argentina, Brazil, Mexico.

Source: VDA (a, var. issues).
Several new suppliers, including Mexico, South Korea and Spain were quite successful in penetrating world automobile markets. In the second half of the 1990s, the countries listed in Figure 2 accounted for almost a quarter of world exports of automobiles, thereby nearly doubling their export share within a decade. Taking recent developments into account, Figure 2 tends to understate the competitive pressure from new automobile production locations. Automobile production in Brazil was traditionally restricted to serving local (or at best regional) markets, but its world-market orientation is likely to become stronger. Investment projects initiated since the mid-1990s indicate that automobile multinationals are changing strategy as a response to liberalized import policies in Brazil (Inter-American Development Bank and Institute for European-Latin American Relations 1996: 41; The Economist 2000: 66). Furthermore, while comparable data are lacking for exports from Central European locations, some suppliers in this region have clearly emerged as internationally competitive exporters recently. Notably in the Czech Republic, automobile production has become integrated into the value chains of automobile multinationals, as before in Mexico and Spain (Richet and Bourassa 2000).

Figure 2: Major New Competitors: Share in World Exports of Automobiles, 1985 – 1998a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85/89</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90/94</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95/98</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aPeriod averages; missing values for Mexico: 1985–1991 and 1993; South Korea: 1985. World exports approximated by the sum of exports of relevant exporters as given in VDA.

Source: VDA (b, var. issues); American Automobile Manufacturers Association (1998; for Brazil 1985–1992); Auto & Truck International (var. issues; for Mexico).
The emergence of new producers and exporters of automobiles was frequently due to foreign direct investment (FDI) in low-income countries by multinational companies. For example, low-income countries taken together hosted almost half of total FDI stocks held by the German automobile industry prior to the DaimlerChrysler merger in 1998 (Table 1). In the early 1980s, Latin America represented the by far most important host region for German automobile companies. In the process of forming the European Single Market, Spain attracted substantial FDI by the German automobile industry. More recently, this industry grasped new investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. In the late 1990s, FDI stocks held in this region were of a similar magnitude as FDI stocks held in the EU-periphery.

Table 1: Regional Distribution of FDI Stocks of the German Automobile Industry, 1981 – 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thereof:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– EU-peripheryb</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other industrial countries</td>
<td>21.4c</td>
<td>37.5c</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developing and transition countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– total</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Africa</td>
<td>10.6d</td>
<td>3.6d</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– America</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Asiae</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– transition countriesf</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.5)g</td>
<td>(2.9)g</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (var.issues).
In addition, Korea set up an indigenous automobile industry (Dae-woo/Ssangyong and Hyundai/Kia) which successfully penetrated world markets. In contrast to Mexico and Spain, Korea's exports of automobiles were not focused on neighboring high-income countries, but regionally diversified. As a consequence, traditional producers were affected by competitive pressure from Korea both in their home markets and in third markets, including in the developing world. Yet, the development of an indigenous automobile industry rendered it more difficult for Korea to become integrated into global sourcing networks of automobile multinationals. Apart from assembling automobiles, locations such as Mexico, Spain and Central European countries increasingly supplied traditional producer countries with automotive parts and components. In other words, competition from below goes beyond world-market oriented assembly operations in low-income countries and extends to imports of automotive inputs.

Figure 3 shows that low-income countries have become relevant suppliers of automotive inputs for the automobile industries of Germany, Japan and the United States. According to detailed country studies, trade in automotive inputs with low-income countries expanded particularly on the regional level (Diehl 2001):

- In the case of the US automobile industry, a rising share of imports of engines, electrical equipment and other parts and accessories originated from Mexico.
- For the Japanese automobile industry, other Asian countries represented the most important (low-income) suppliers of automotive inputs.
- Apart from high-income European neighbors, the EU-periphery was the most important supplier of electrical equipment to the German automobile industry. Since the mid-1990s, this industry imported a steeply rising share of engines from Central European countries.

Measured by the share of imports from major low-income trading partners in total imports of automotive inputs, competitive pressure from below appears to be similarly advanced in all three traditional producer countries (Figure 3). However, imports from all sources contributed significantly less to domestic

---

2 In 1998, Europe absorbed 48 percent of Korean exports of automobiles, 31 percent went to America (two thirds of which were exported to the United States and Canada), and about one fifth were destined to Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania (VDAA).
absorption of the automobile industry in Japan than in Germany and the United States (Diehl 2001).

Figure 3: Imported Inputs of the Automobile Industry in Traditional Producer Countries from Low-income Countries\textsuperscript{a}, 1978/79 and 1997/98\textsuperscript{b} (percent)

\textsuperscript{a}Share in total imported inputs; inputs considered here comprise parts and accessories (SITC 784), electrical equipment (SITC 778.3) and motors (SITC 713.2). Low-income trading partners of Germany include the EU-periphery, Turkey, and Central and Eastern Europe; low-income trading partners of Japan and the United States include Asia and Latin America. – \textsuperscript{b}Annual averages.


All in all, the evidence suggests that traditional automobile producing countries have been subjected to increasing competitive pressure from new locations in low-income countries. Countries such as Mexico, Spain and the Czech Republic emerged as competitive suppliers of both finished automobiles and automotive parts. Other countries, notably Korea, focused on penetrating world markets for finished automobiles. All three traditional producer countries considered here were affected, even though imports of automotive inputs remained less important for Japan than for Germany and the United States. Hence, the stylized facts let us expect adverse labor market implications of fiercer competition from below for low-skilled workers in all traditional automobile producing countries.
3. Labor-Market Effects in Traditional Production Locations

Theoretical Models on Distributional Effects of Globalization

The links between the globalization of the world economy and changes in relative factor prices have long been discussed in the theoretical literature. With regard to the *intrasectoral* dimension of income inequality, i.e., wage differentials between workers of different skill levels in the same sector, there are two basic models. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the liberalization of international trade in final goods causes a restructuring towards the relatively human capital intensive sectors in high-income countries. High-skilled workers gain relative to low-skilled workers, both in wages and employment (Stolper, Samuelson 1941). This is because more high-skilled workers per low-skilled worker are required for the expansion of human capital intensive sectors than are released in the contraction of labor intensive sectors. In the Feenstra-Hanson model, the liberalization of foreign direct investment and international trade in intermediate goods enables high-income countries to outsource relatively labor intensive segments of the value chain to low-income countries (Feenstra, Hanson 2001). Hence, like in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the labor market situation of low-skilled workers in high-income countries is expected to deteriorate.

With regard to the *intersectoral* dimension of income inequality, i.e., wage differentials between workers of the same skill level in different sectors, there are also two basic models to explain globalization-induced distributional effects. In rent-sharing models, firms and unions bargain over sector-specific rents. The greater these rents and the greater the union bargaining power, the higher the sectoral wage level. Opening up to international trade erodes the market power of incumbent firms and, hence, the sector-specific rents in once protected sectors. Furthermore, the exit-option of capital and know-how in liberalized factor markets curtails the bargaining power of unions. Therefore, the rent-sharing models predict a decline in the sectoral wage levels in the course of globalization in those sectors where import penetration rises and where firms can easily move production to low-income countries.

---

3 For a comprehensive survey of rent-sharing models see Oswald (1985).
In **efficiency-wage** models, firms do not regard wages as exogenous but use them as a motivation instrument to increase labor productivity. Workers receive a sectoral mark-up on their reservation wage. The size of this mark-up is positively related to the strength of the relationship between wages and labor productivity, which in turn depends on the capital and technology intensity (according to the *shirking* and the *labor-turnover* approach)\(^4\) and on the average profitability of the firms in the sector (according to the *gift-exchange* approach). The higher these variables, the stronger the wage-productivity relationship. Hence, the efficiency-wage models suggest that high wages can be paid only in those sectors which can maintain their international competitiveness by specializing in human capital intensive segments of the value chain.

**Intersectoral Distributional Effects**

The analysis of the intersectoral dimension of globalization-induced distributional effects proceeds in two steps. First, we trace the development of wages and employment in the German, Japanese and US automobile industry relative to the total manufacturing sector of the respective country. Second, we perform the same analysis for important subsectors of the automobile industry.

The automobile industry is characterized by a higher-than-average capital and technology intensity. Furthermore, the development and manufacturing of automobiles requires increasing R&D and involves significant fixed costs (Vickery 1996). Hence, it is not surprising that the average earnings of automobile workers are significantly higher than those of workers in total manufacturing (Table 2).

\(^4\) The different approaches to explain the positive wage-productivity relationship are presented in Akerlof and Yellen (1986).
Table 2: Wage and Employment Trends in the German, Japanese and US Automobile Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average earnings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(total manufacturing = 100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–1982(^b)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1999(^b)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage share of total manufacturing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–1982(^b)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1999(^b)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.6(^c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Transport equipment. – \(^b\) Unweighted average. – \(^c\) 1994–1996.


In Germany and Japan, the intersectoral wage differential increased over the last 20 years, while it slightly decreased (albeit from a very high level) in the United States. According to efficiency-wage models, this development may reflect that the German and Japanese automobile industries were more successful in adapting to globalization by outsourcing labor intensive segments of the value chain to low-income countries.\(^5\) At the same time, the employment share of the automobile industry in total manufacturing increased in Germany and the United States but remained fairly stable in Japan. In the case of the United States, the ostensibly favourable employment trend is, however, mainly due to a seriously depressed starting point. The US automobile industry was hit especially hard by the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, during which it shed 27 percent of its production workers and 18 percent of its non-production workers.

The overall favorable wage and employment situation in the automobile industries of Germany, Japan and the United States does not rule out that some of their subsectors lost out in the course of globalization. Both Heckscher-Ohlin and Feenstra-Hanson models suggest that labor intensive subsectors should be especially vulnerable to competitive pressure from low-income countries. This hypothesis is corroborated by the development of the

\(^5\) As shown below, the high wage premium in the United States does not mean that this country was best prepared to deal with fiercer competition from below.
wage ratio between the relative human capital intensive automobile assembly and the relatively labor intensive production of automotive parts and components (Table 3).6

Table 3: Wage Ratio between the Automobile Assembly and the Production of Automotive Parts and Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.18b</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany: automobiles and motors; Japan: automobiles; US: cars and car bodies.


As expected, this wage ratio increased significantly over the last 10 years in Japan and the United States. In the German automobile industry, by contrast, workers in labor intensive subsectors did not incur income losses relative to their peers in human capital intensive subsectors. The different experience of Germany is striking as all three countries were hit by competitive pressure from low-income countries.7 The fairly stable wage ratio may be explained in two alternative ways: Either the intersectoral wage structure8 in Germany is less flexible, or German producers of automotive parts and components adapted more successfully to globalization.

6 In the United States, the production of automotive parts and components requires 3.7 times as many workers per revenue unit than the automobile assembly. In Germany, the ratio is 2.5.

7 See Section II.

8 As mentioned before, the term intersectoral is also used when comparing different subsectors within the automobile industry.
Globalization of the Automobile Industry

Intrasectoral Distributional Effects

In order to assess the impact of globalization on the intrasectoral dimension of income distribution, we compare recent wage and employment trends of low-skilled and high-skilled automobile workers in Germany, Japan and the United States. Using correlation techniques, we subsequently link the changes in the human capital intensity and the relative wage of low-skilled workers to the changes in import penetration in various subsectors of the automobile industry. Since data on schooling, professional training and work experience are not available at this level of sectoral disaggregation, we use the dichotomy of production versus non-production workers as a rough proxy for the qualification level. As usual in the relevant literature, we assume that non-production workers are more highly qualified than production workers.

In the German automobile industry, employment increased steadily from 1978 to 1991 (Figure 4). The post-unification recession was a severe blow to this industry, however, almost entirely wiping out the employment gains achieved since 1978. In 1994, the sector stabilized and subsequently returned to its pre-unification employment growth path. Despite the positive overall employment trend, the labor market situation of low-skilled workers deteriorated. First, the sectoral human capital intensity increased strongly throughout the observation period; essentially all employment gains accrued to high-skilled workers. Second, the relative wage of low-skilled workers fell steadily, i.e., the wages of low-skilled automobile workers developed less favorably than those of their high-skilled peers.

9 While employment of high-skilled workers increased by 50.4 percent, the number of low-skilled jobs rose by merely 1.5 percent.
Figure 4: Wages and Employment in the German, Japanese and US Automobile Industry

Germany\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital Intensity(^b)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Wage of Production Workers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan\(^d\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital Intensity(^b)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Wage of Production Workers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital Intensity(^b)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Wage of Production Workers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)West Germany. \(^b\)Number of non-production workers divided by number of production workers. \(^c\)Ratio between the average wage of production workers and the average wage of non-production workers. \(^d\)Transport equipment.

Source: Bartelsman and Gray (1996); Ministry of Finance (var. issues); Statistisches Bundesamt (var. issues).
The Japanese automobile industry experienced strong employment growth with an average annual growth rate of 2.7 percent until 1995. In the two consecutive years, employment declined sharply but stabilized afterwards. In contrast to Germany, low-skilled automobile workers in Japan did not lose relative to their high-skilled peers until 1991. Neither did the human capital intensity increase nor did the relative wage of low-skilled workers exhibit a negative trend. Only later did employment prospects of low-skilled workers deteriorate noticeably as evidenced by a rising human capital intensity. All the more surprisingly, their income situation improved with relative wages of low-skilled workers rising steeply since 1994. It points to institutional rigidities in the wage-setting procedure that the Japanese labor-market response to increased competition from low-income countries is only partly in line with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (see below).\(^{10}\)

The employment situation in the US automobile industry was dominated by the two recessions at the beginning of the 1980s and the 1990s. During the first recession, employment shrank dramatically and, despite employment growth in the mid 1980s and 1990s, employment has never since recovered its 1978 level. The peaks in human capital intensity during the two recessions show that low-skilled workers were more severely affected by layoffs than high-skilled workers. However, in contrast to Germany, low-skilled workers regained their initial employment share after the recessions. Consequently, there is no upward trend in human capital intensity.

The development of the relative wage of low-skilled workers in the US automobile industry is quite surprising. In contrast to total manufacturing, the relative wage did not fall but remained above its 1978 level throughout the entire observation period. The lack of adjustment according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem together with the fall in sectoral employment cast considerable doubt on whether the much heralded US labor-market flexibility can be found in the automobile industry. Especially the poor employment performance in automobile assembly (not reported in Figure 4) seems to be due to high unionization and militant labor disputes which prevented restructuring towards human capital intensive products and a decline of the

\(^{10}\) Another explanation would be that labor supply shifted towards higher qualifications. Data constraints prevent us from evaluating the relative importance of this possibility.
relative wage of production workers.\textsuperscript{11} The international competitiveness of the US automobile manufacturers was eroded in this way.

In order to assess more systematically the impact of international competition on the labor market situation of low-skilled automobile workers, we correlate the intrasectoral wage and employment ratios with some indicators reflecting the intensity of international competition.\textsuperscript{12} As a first indicator, we use the share of imports in overall production (MP).\textsuperscript{13} However, the labor market outcome of increasing international trade should depend on the relative income level of the trading partners. Trade models predict that increasing trade between similarly advanced countries with similar relative factor endowments should have smaller intrasectoral distributional effects than increasing trade between countries with different relative factor endowments. Hence, we also run correlations with the share of imports from low-income countries in overall imports (MLC). According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, MP and MLC should be related positively with the human capital intensity (HN) and negatively with the relative wage of low-skilled workers (RW).

As concerns the German automobile industry, all correlation coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant (Table 4).\textsuperscript{14} Similarly strong results are achieved when running the correlations for major subsectors, i.e., automobile assembly and production of automotive parts and component. These results imply that the entire sector adjusted to globalization by specializing in human capital intensive products and by outsourcing labor intensive segments of the value chain to low-income countries. However, most correlation coefficients turn out to be stronger in the production of automotive parts and components. This indicates that the intensity of adjustment was particularly pronounced in this subsector.

\textsuperscript{11} For instance, the dispute between Caterpillar and the UAW on the introduction of more flexible labor contracts began in 1991 and was not resolved till march 1998 (The Economist 1998).

\textsuperscript{12} In the following, we make use of disaggregated wage and employment data of subsectors of the German and US automobile industry. These data, which are not reported here, are available from the authors upon request.

\textsuperscript{13} Subsectoral terms of trade were not available at this level of sectoral disaggregation; calculating unit values from the ITCS Database (OECD 2000) rendered meaningless results.

\textsuperscript{14} The period of observation differs between the three countries under consideration due to availability of consistent time-series data.
Japan resembles Germany with respect to the globalization-induced effects on the human capital intensity. Rising imports and a rising import share from low-income countries went along with deteriorating employment prospects of low-skilled workers. By contrast, the correlation coefficients between the proxies for international competition and the relative wage of low-skilled workers are not significant. This suggests that the intrasectoral wage effects were blurred by other factors. In the Japanese automobile industry, the increase in human capital intensity was achieved mainly by reducing the intake of new low-skilled workers rather than by laying off those employed.\(^{15}\) As a consequence, the average job tenure of low-skilled workers increased disproportionately. In combination with the principle of seniority in wage setting, this modus operandi counteracted a rise in the skill premium.

Table 4: Import Pressure and Labor Market Developments in the Automobile Industry: Correlation Results\(^{a}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Japan(^{b})</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automobile Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ~ HN</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>0.52**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ~ RW</td>
<td>-0.82**</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC ~ HN</td>
<td>0.91**</td>
<td>0.74**</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC ~ RW</td>
<td>-0.84**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automobile Assembly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ~ HN</td>
<td>0.75**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ~ RW</td>
<td>-0.74**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC ~ HN</td>
<td>0.88**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-0.73**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC ~ RW</td>
<td>-0.85**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production of Automotive Parts and Components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ~ HN</td>
<td>0.91**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ~ RW</td>
<td>-0.88**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC ~ HN</td>
<td>0.94**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC ~ RW</td>
<td>-0.81**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) *(**) significant at 5 percent level (1 percent); number of observations: Germany=22, Japan=28, United States=17. \(^{b}\) Transport equipment.

Source: Bartelsman and Gray (1996); Feenstra (1996); Ministry of Finance (var. issues); Ministry of Labor (var. issues); Statistisches Bundesamt (var. issues).

\(^{15}\) By contrast, German automobile producers mainly resorted to early retirement of redundant low-skilled workers.
In the United States, the two subsectors of the automobile industry responded differently to globalization. In the production of automotive parts and components, the signs of the correlation coefficients, though insignificant, suggest that some Stolper-Samuelson-type adjustment may have occurred. This appears to have helped the subsector to recover from the severe crisis in the beginning of the 1980s. By contrast, growing international competition went along with a falling human capital intensity and a rising relative wage of low-skilled workers in automobile assembly. At the same time, overall employment declined rapidly, which appears to be the cost of the subsector's failure to adjust. Low labor-market flexibility in this highly unionized subsector is most likely to blame.

4. The Role of Structural Adjustment

Despite being exposed to a similarly strong competitive pressure from low-income countries, the wage and employment trends in the German, Japanese and US automobile industry in the 1980s and 1990s differed considerably. This suggests that the labor market implications of globalization in traditional producer countries depend to a large extent on how these countries adjusted to globalization. In this section, we inquire more deeply into the nature of globalization-induced adjustment processes in the German, Japanese and US automobile industry. We first track the evolution of international competitiveness by calculating revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index values for the automobile industries since 1978. Based on subsectoral RCA-index values, we then use a simple cross-section OLS-regression model to estimate the direction and strength of the changes in their specialization patterns.

We consider the widely used RCA-index

\[
RCA_i = \frac{X_i - M_i}{X_i + M_i},
\]

which relates the net exports of sector \( i \), \( X_i - M_i \), to the sectoral trade volume, \( X_i + M_i \). In order to estimate the international competitiveness of
Globalization of the Automobile Industry

sector $i$ relative to the total manufacturing sector, we calculate the *relative revealed comparative advantage* (RRCA) index by adjusting $RCA_i$ according to

$$RRCA_i = RCA_i - \frac{X - M}{X + M},$$

where $X$ and $M$ denote the exports and imports of the total manufacturing sector.\(^{16}\)

**Figure 5: RRCA-Index Values of the German, Japanese and US Automobile Industry**

Judging by their relative factor endowments, advanced countries should have a comparative advantage in the relatively human capital intensive and technologically advanced automobile industry. This notion is corroborated for Germany and Japan (Figure 5). In both countries the RRCA-index values of the automobile industry were positive throughout the entire observation period, i.e., this sector was internationally more competitive than the total manufacturing sector. Yet, the decline in the RRCA-index values in the 1980s reveals that these countries were not left unscathed by the growing competition from low-income countries. By contrast, RRCA-index values

\(^{16}\) For an alternative adjustment see Neven (1995).
were persistently negative for the US automobile industry. The substantial wage premium of this industry, reported in Table 2, was thus not backed by high international competitiveness. We suspect these differences in international competitiveness are because the US automobile industry failed to adjust to globalization by shifting towards its “natural” specialization profile.17

In order to test this hypothesis, we run a simple OLS-regression across different subsectors of the automobile industries of Germany, Japan and the United States. The number of subsectors differs between the three countries considered according to data availability (Germany: 13; Japan: 12; United States: 10). We calculate the RRCA-index values for the subsectors at both the beginning (t₀) and the end (t₁) of the observation period 1978 – 1998 according to equation (2).18 Since we are interested in the globalization-induced changes within the automobile industry, the RRCA-index values are calculated relative to the automobile industry, rather than the manufacturing sector.19 For each country, we then regress the RCCA-index at t₁ on the RCCA-index at t₀ according to

\[
RRCA_{i,t_1} = \alpha + \beta \cdot RRCA_{i,t_0} + \epsilon_i.
\]

Estimates of the coefficient \( \beta \) allow us to derive assertions on the stability of the specialization profile within the automobile industry.20 For \( \beta \geq 1 \), the initial specialization profile strengthened over time, i.e., subsectors with a high international competitiveness at time t₀ became even more competitive while the other subsectors lost further ground in world markets. If \( \beta \) lies within the range \((0,1)\), the initial specialization pattern weakened, and for \( \beta < 0 \), it even turned around. Additionally, we can analyze changes in the degree of specialization. Under the standard assumptions of the OLS-regression model, the following relation between the variances of the RRCA-index

---

17 By „natural” specialization profile, we mean the profile that is consistent with the relative factor endowment of the country.
18 In order to reduce the influence of the business cycle on the estimation results, we use three-year averages of the RRCA-index values around 1979 and 1997.
19 That is, in equation (2) index \( i \) now stands for the subsector of the automobile industry and \( X \) and \( M \) denote exports and imports of the total automobile industry.
20 For a detailed exposition of the methodology see Cantwell (1989) and Dalum et al. (1998).
at time $t_0$ and $t_1$, $\sigma^2_{t_1}$ and $\sigma^2_{t_0}$, the regression coefficient $\beta$, and the coefficient of determination $R^2$ holds:

(4) \[ \frac{\sigma^2_{t_1}}{\sigma^2_{t_0}} = \frac{\beta^2}{R^2}. \]

The degree of specialization increases from $t_0$ to $t_1$ if $|\tilde{\beta}| > |\tilde{R}|$, and decreases if $|\tilde{\beta}| < |\tilde{R}|$.

From an economic point of view, a stable specialization profile and a high degree of specialization are positive if (and only if) the sector was already structured in line with its “natural” specialization profile at time $t_0$. In this case, workers can accumulate firm-specific human capital and firms benefit from cumulative innovations and economies of scale, thereby sharpening the competitive edge of the whole sector. However, a stable specialization profile may also be outcome of lacking labor market flexibility or protectionist measures in international trade. In this case, the overall competitiveness of the sector suffers, eventually resulting in a decline in wages and employment.

The estimates of $\beta$, and $\beta / R$ are presented in Table 5. The null $\beta = 0$ can be rejected for all three countries. The specialization pattern of the German, Japanese and US automobile industry was not reversed during the last 20 years. In the case of the United States, however, $\beta$ was significantly different from one, which implies that the initial specialization pattern weakened considerably. This confirms our view that in comparison to its German and Japanese counterparts, the US automobile industry was initially to a lesser extent structured according to its “natural” specialization profile and was, hence, ill-prepared to manage the growing competitive pressure from low-income countries. The US automobile industry is also different with respect to the changes in the degree of specialization. The estimates of $\beta / R$ are above one in Germany and Japan, but below one in the United States. In other words, the degree of specialization rose in the German and Japanese automobile industry and declined in the US automobile industry.
Hence, a lower potential to realize economies of scale could have contributed to the loss in international competitiveness of the US automobile industry.\textsuperscript{21}

Table 5: Specialization Profiles: Regression Results Across Subsectors of the German, Japanese and US Automobile Industry (\(t_f=1998, t_0=1978\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\hat{\beta})</th>
<th>(\hat{\beta} / \hat{R})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: Germany: 13, Japan: 12, United States: 10

5. Conclusions

The increasing integration of developing countries into the global division of labor has put severe competitive pressure on various sectors in high-income countries and triggered far-reaching restructuring processes. Textiles, steel and ship-building are prominent cases in point. Despite persistent protection against imports and high production subsidies, these sectors suffered declining wages and dramatic losses of employment. By contrast, the automobile industry is more likely to be on the "sunny" side of globalization since, taken as a whole, it is technologically advanced and relatively human capital intensive. At first sight, choosing this industry to assess the impact of increased competition from below on the labor market situation in high-income countries seems hardly promising.

However, trade models predict that the gains and costs of globalization should be unevenly distributed among the various employment groups and the various subsectors of the automobile industry. Especially low-skilled workers and labor intensive segments of the sectoral value chain should be vulnerable to competitive pressure from low-income countries and face de-

\textsuperscript{21} To check for robustness, we carried out the regression analysis for two ten-year subperiods (1978 - 1988 and 1988 - 1998). The results are very similar and not reported here.
Globalization of the Automobile Industry

clining wages and employment. We proceeded in three steps, in order to unveil these more subtle labor market effects of globalization.

We started by analyzing the intensity of competition from below in the automobile industry. At the end of the 1990s, Germany, Japan and the United States, i.e., the major traditional producer countries, still accounted for more than half of global production and two fifth of global exports of automobiles and their parts and components. Nevertheless, the automobile industry was affected by globalization. Since the 1980s countries in Southern and Central Europe, South East Asia and Latin America have significantly increased their share in world production and world exports of automobiles. In addition, low-income countries have become relevant suppliers of automotive inputs. Especially on a regional level, outsourcing of relatively labor intensive segments of the value chain has become a viable option for the automobile industries in Germany, Japan and the United States.

In the second step, we traced the wage and employment trends in the German, Japanese and US automobile industry since the late 1970s and linked these trends to the globalization-induced competitive pressure. Compared to total manufacturing, automobile workers received a significant wage premium and enjoyed a rising or at least stable employment level in all three countries. They were, thus, among the winners of globalization. But the favorable wage and employment trends mask substantial differences between the various subsectors of the automobile industry. In the case of Japan and the United States, the average wage level rose far more steeply in the relatively human capital intensive automobile assembly than in the relatively labor intensive production of automotive parts and components.

Furthermore, we found evidence that the labor market situation of low-skilled automobile workers deteriorated in the traditional producer countries in the last 20 years. In Germany, the sectoral human capital intensity rose and the sectoral relative wage of low-skilled workers fell. In the Japanese automobile industry, the employment prospects of low-skilled workers deteriorated while their relative wages remained fairly stable. Only in the United States the sectoral human capital intensity did not reveal a clear trend. Even more surprisingly, the relative wage of low-skilled automobile workers in the United States remained above its 1978 level throughout the entire observation period. We then correlated the intrasectoral wage and employment ratios with a number of indicators reflecting the intensity of international competi-
tion. Apart from the US automobile industry, we found Stolper-Samuelson-type adjustment to growing competitive pressure from low-income countries.

Finally, we analyzed the evolution of the subsectoral revealed comparative advantages of the automobile industries in Germany, Japan and the United States to inquire more deeply into the nature of globalization-induced restructuring processes. Simple OLS regressions suggest that the relatively poor performance of the US automobile industry in world markets vis-à-vis its German and Japanese counterparts in the last 20 years can be explained by two factors: First, the powerful United Automobile Workers’ Union (UAW) obstructed the industry’s efforts to restructure towards its "natural" specialization profile. Second, the degree of specialization declined in the US automobile industry, which was in contrast to Germany and Japan. For these reasons, this industry was ill-prepared to cope with competitive pressure from below and lost international competitiveness.

REFERENCES


Globalization of the Automobile Industry


VDA (VERBAND DER AUTOMOBILINDUSTRIE) (a, var. issues). International Auto Statistics. Frankfurt a.M.

VDA (VERBAND DER AUTOMOBILINDUSTRIE) (b, var. issues). Tatsachen und Zahlen aus der Kraftverkehrs wirtschaft. Frankfurt a.M.


WORLD TRADE AGENDA (2000): Global or Not: The Auto Sector Looks Open to New Trade Disputes and Heavy Pressure on Market Opening and Investment Terms. No. 00/01, Geneva.