

Reifenscheid, Maximiliane; Möhring, Katja

## Article

# Towards a new working time paradigm? Public support for trade union demands for working time reduction

Industrielle Beziehungen

## Provided in Cooperation with:

Verlag Barbara Budrich

*Suggested Citation:* Reifenscheid, Maximiliane; Möhring, Katja (2022) : Towards a new working time paradigm? Public support for trade union demands for working time reduction, Industrielle Beziehungen, ISSN 1862-0035, Verlag Barbara Budrich, Leverkusen, Vol. 29, Iss. 3-4, pp. 186-210, <https://doi.org/10.3224/indbez.v29i3.02>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324668>

### Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

### Terms of use:

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de>

# Towards a new working time paradigm? Public support for trade union demands for working time reduction\*

Maximiliane Reifenscheid, Katja Möhring\*\*

**Abstract** Recent societal developments such as the significant increase in female employment or digitalization challenge existing working time regimes. As part of its 2017/18 collective bargaining position, the IG Metall demanded a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation by the employer. Using data from the German Internet Panel we address the question of which groups among the working population support this demand. Our analysis proves the existence of traditional conflict lines: union members are in favour of the demand, while high earners and self-employed reject it. However, based on theoretical assumptions on value change, we argue that a second conflict line between libertarian and conservative values is important. Results show that support for this demand is influenced by individual preferences for a better work-life balance, especially high among young people and supporters of the Green party. This is an example of the union's attempts to broaden its member base. Additionally, our analysis can contribute to the discussion of reduced working hours in the context of the Corona pandemic imposed short-time work.

**Keywords:** Attitudes, working hours, working time reduction, trade unions, work-life balance. JEL: L50, J51, I31

## Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Arbeitszeitparadigma? Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung zu Gewerkschaftsforderungen nach Arbeitszeitverkürzung

**Zusammenfassung** Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen, wie die deutliche Zunahme der Erwerbsarbeit von Frauen oder die Digitalisierung, stellen bestehende Arbeitszeitregime in Frage. Im Rahmen der Tarifverhandlungen 2017/18 hat die Gewerkschaft IG Metall ein Recht auf Arbeitszeitverkürzung mit teilweisem Lohnausgleich durch die Arbeitgeber gefordert. Anhand von Daten des German Internet Panels gehen wir der Frage nach, welche Gruppen der erwerbstätigen Bevölkerung diese Forderung unterstützen. Unsere Analyse zeigt das Bestehen traditioneller Konfliktlinien: Gewerkschaftsmitglieder sind für die Forderung, Besserverdienende und Selbständige lehnen sie ab. Basierend auf theoretischen Annahmen zum Wertewandel argumentieren wir, dass auch eine zweite Konfliktlinie zwischen libertären und konservativen Werten wichtig ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Unterstützung für die Forderung auch auf individuellen Präferenzen für eine bessere Work-Life-Balance beruht und besonders bei jungen Menschen sowie bei Anhängern der Grünen groß ist. Das ist ein Hinweis auf die Bemühungen der Gewerkschaft ihre Mitgliederbasis zu erweitern. Unsere Analyse

\* Artikel eingegangen: 08.12.2020. Revidierte Fassung akzeptiert nach doppelt-blindem Begutachtungsverfahren: 19.01.2023

\*\* Maximiliane Reifenscheid, M.A., Lehrstuhl für Soziologie, insbes. Familie und Arbeit, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Kapuzinerstraße 16, D-96047 Bamberg. E-Mail: maximiliane.reifenscheid@uni-bamberg.de  
Prof. Dr. Katja Möhring, Lehrstuhl für Soziologie, insbes. Familie und Arbeit, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Kapuzinerstraße 16, D-96047 Bamberg. E-Mail: katja.moehring@uni-bamberg.de

kann darüber hinaus zur Diskussion um Arbeitszeitverkürzung im Rahmen der Corona-Pandemie verhängten Kurzarbeit beitragen.

**Schlagwörter:** Einstellungen, Arbeitszeiten, Arbeitszeitverkürzung, Gewerkschaften, Work-Life-Balance

## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

In recent years, trade unions in Germany have brought bargaining on working time back on the agenda (Bispinck & Schulten, 2017; Bosch, 2017; Hellmich & Lesch, 2018). Collective agreements, which were aimed at giving employees more rights in terms of working time, were negotiated by the major unions. These focused either on a choice for employees between an increase in pay or a reduction in working hours, on individual rights to reduce working hours, or a combination of both. Efforts in this regard, aiming at fostering the self-determination of employees, are comparatively new (Seifert, 2019). High media attention was given to the collective bargaining demand of Germany's largest trade union *IG Metall* in 2018, considered a pioneer of collective working time reductions (Lehndorff, 2004). The demand included not only a collectively agreed individual entitlement to a temporary reduction of working hours to 28 hours per week, but also a partial wage compensation by the employers for the reduction in working hours. Up to 3.9 million employees are covered by collective agreements negotiated by *IG Metall* (Hübler, 2018). Over the past 25 years, the average weekly working time of full-time employees in Germany has hardly changed: in 1995 it stood at 41.2 compared to 41.0 in 2019. Reported fluctuations over the entire period were always within a range of one hour (Eurostat, 2019).

From a macro-economic perspective, a general working time reduction can be used as a tool to balance working hours between over- and under-employment, as well as to protect larger sections of society from unemployment. In the political arena, especially politicians from left-wing parties seem to argue for the potential benefits of a reduction in working time. The idea of reduced working time also resonates with others' convictions, most of which are still to be considered close to left political orientations, but overall do not quite fit into the classic left-right pattern. Promising a so-called "triple dividend" (Buhl & Acosta, 2016), a general working time reduction is intended to foster ecological sustainability, social justice and individual quality of life. From an environmental point of view, it is argued that the potential benefits of a general working hours reduction lie in the contraction of economic activity and increase in sustainability (e.g. Devetter & Rousseau, 2011; Gunderson, 2019; King & van den Bergh, 2017), or in (potential) conjunction with health considerations and well-being (Bosch, 1999; Flecker & Schönauer, 2010; Sánchez, 2017). Finally, possibilities of working time reduction are viewed as an approach towards a more equal distribution of paid work and care work due to its potential to increase working time of mothers and reduce that of fathers (Haug, 2011; Kurz-Scherf & Breil, 2014). Furthermore, a relevant factor in the debate on the general reduction of working time is whether or not salary adjustments should be made.

1 Acknowledgment: We thank the Collaborative Research Center 884 "Political Economy of Reforms" at University of Mannheim and the team of the German Internet Panel (GIP) for their generous support of our research.

This differentiation is controversial, especially with regard to the discussion about the potential environmental benefits of a general reduction in working hours (Pullinger, 2014).

In light of the economic downturn due to the Corona-virus pandemic, the topic of working time reduction is gaining new momentum. By June 2020, around 15 percent of the German workforce had to reduce working hours while receiving the state-funded short-time work compensation (Möhring et al., 2020a, 2020b). This programme has already proven successful during the Great Recession from 2008 to 2012 (Crimmann, Wießner, & Bellmann, 2012; Rinne & Zimmermann, 2012). At that time, the situation was assessed as a historic opportunity for a change in working time, whereby an appropriate proportion of the German working population faced impediments, but also advantages of a reduction in working time for individual well-being and the compatibility of work and family life (Flecker & Schönauer, 2010; Groß & Seifert, 2010; Lehdorff, 2010). Several political parties support this argument in their basic party programmes. A general reduction or more equal distribution of working time are aimed at by the Social Democrats (SPD, 2007), the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2020) and the Left Party (Die Linke, 2011). However, soon after the Great Recession, the idea seemed to vanish quite fast from the political agenda with the German economy's rapid recovery, the shortage of skilled workers in several key industries and the constant government leadership of the conservative party since then.

However, about a decade later, German society has considerably changed and so has policy: the ecologist movement grew stronger and is by now reaching far into the middle of society. Family policies in Germany are now oriented differently, aiming, amongst other things, at increasing fathers' engagement in care work. The trade unions' recent revitalization of the working time debate is closely connected to the results of recent studies which point out—at different levels of intensity—the population's wishes to reduce working time (Allmendinger & Haarbrücker, 2017; Brauner, Wöhrmann, & Michel, 2018; Schäfer, 2018). In addition, in connection with the Corona-virus crisis, *IG Metall* advocated a four-day week with partial wage compensation in order to cope with the consequences of the economic downturn (*IG Metall*, 2020). Despite comparatively good knowledge about people's personal preferences to reduce working time, there is—to the best of our knowledge—not a single study that investigates whether this desire also translates into support for innovative working time regulations, aiming at a reduction in working time for a larger part of the working population and involving employers in bearing the costs.

In the context of this new dynamic, we take up the 2018 collective bargaining demand of *IG Metall* to analyse attitudes of the population in Germany on the subject of reduced working hours, here referring to the actual demand for an individual right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation. Our analysis is based on data from the German Internet Panel (GIP) from July 2018 (N=1,010). The GIP works with a randomly drawn population sample that is representative of the German-speaking population living in private households (Blom, Gathmann, & Krieger, 2015). The survey was conducted in July 2018, just a few months after the social partners in the metalworking and electrical industry came to an agreement. In this article, we investigate to what extent the union's demand for a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation meets with public approval and which lines of conflict can be identified in the working population on this issue. Thus, we address the following questions: Who supports the right to working time reduction with partial wage compensation in Germany? Does *IG Metall's* demand meet approval in the general working population, and can it reach important target groups in membership recruitment, such as younger employees and

women (Hassel, 2007)? How are attitudes towards *IG Metall*'s demand linked to political leanings? To answer these research questions, we conduct regression analysis with support for the union's demand as a dependent variable and include socio-demographic characteristics, political attitudes, the individuals' living situation, such as the presence of children, and satisfaction with work and family life as explanatory factors.

Our contribution is structured as follows: in the next section, we give an overview of important milestones in the reduction of working time and the role of *IG Metall* in this context. After a description of important outcomes of recent studies on working time preferences, we then present our theoretical considerations and derive hypotheses for the empirical analysis regarding the public support for the union's demand. We describe our data basis and the procedure of the empirical analysis in the section "Data and Method". In the results section, we first show essential descriptive evaluations and then the results of multivariate regression models for the support of the demand for working time reduction. Against the background of the theoretical considerations, we discuss our results and, in conclusion, place them in a broader political context.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Collective bargaining on working time and the role of IG Metall

Due to the centralized bargaining structures in Germany based on the structural division into sectors, the results of collective bargaining can largely influence the working conditions for significant parts of the workforce. In 2018, some 56 percent of employees were directly covered by collective agreements and a further 23 percent associated to collective agreements in 2018 (WSI, 2018). However, trade unions in Germany, as unions in many Western European countries, have been facing considerable challenges for several decades due to membership decline and loss of political influence (e. g. Addison Addison, Teixeira, Evers, & Bellmann, 2016; Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999; Haipeter, 2020). Furthermore, there has been intensive debate on a fundamental reform towards greater flexibility for employers and decentralization (Grahl & Teague 2004; Hassel & Schulten 1998).

The metalworking and electrical industry plays a crucial role in this debate due to its importance for the German economy and its strong export orientation. This sector in particular is highly regulated and often serves as a benchmark for negotiations in other sectors, foremost for wage setting (Tüselmann & Heise, 2000), and to some extent also for working time (Hassel & Schulten, 1998). This contributed to the fact that *IG Metall*, being on the one hand, a key player for reform efforts and, on the other hand, a historical organization with structures deeply rooted in the "old" system, was particularly challenged to reform collective bargaining towards a more decentralized system.

In addition to the demand for structural reforms in the system of industrial relations, three social developments are calling into question existing working time regimes, triggering debates on reforms of the existing working time regulations: (1) the rise of women's employment, whose working time requirements differ greatly from the regulations of the existing regime (Carney & Junor, 2014; Lewis & Plomien, 2009; Lott, 2015; Pollmann-Schult, 2016); (2) the growing shortage of skilled workers in combination with demographic developments;

and (3) digitalization which expands the possibilities for new working arrangements, but also poses threats to work-life balance and health (Brauner et al., 2018; Haipeter, 2020). How to design a modern working time regime that provides more flexibility for employers and employees is high up on the agenda and had a particular impact on collective bargaining in the metalworking and electrical industry. The general interests on how to design modern working times points into two directions along traditional conflict lines: trade unions seek to establish greater autonomy for employees and tend to want to reduce working hours, while the interest of employers is to retain control over who works when and for how long, thereby tending to push for an extension of working hours.

Since the end of the 1970s, a broad-based or general reduction in working hours, as a departure from the 40-hour week, has been the subject of repeated debate in Germany and other European countries (Blyton, 1987; Knudsen, 1989). Throughout history, *IG Metall* has repeatedly been involved in initiating fundamental changes in working time. Starting with the introduction of the 40-hour week at the end of the 1950s with a compulsory free weekend, which has since then not only regulated industries with collective bargaining agreements, but has also had a normative effect on society as a whole (Lehndorff, 2003; Schroeder & Karch, 2001). Time and again, initiatives aimed at reducing working hours came to a standstill (Sopp & Wagner, 2017) and finally, around the turn of the millennium, working hours were even extended in some sectors (Bispinck & Schulten, 2017). After a serious defeat in the attempt to align working hours in the East German metalworking and electrical industry to the 35-hour week in West Germany (Iwer & Jänicke, 2019), *IG Metall* chose the 2017/18 collective bargaining round as moment in time to make an attempt to re-centralize bargaining by “recapturing collectively agreed working time” (Boguslawski & Zitzelsberger, 2019). At the same time, *IG Metall* has for some years been implementing a strategy to attract new members and mobilize existing ones (Wetzel, 2014). Employee surveys and the utilization of the survey results in collective bargaining are part of this strategy (Schroeder, 2018).

The outcome of the negotiations on working time in the metalworking and electrical industry in 2018 was hailed as a great success by both *IG Metall* and the employers’ association *Gesamtmetall* (Gesamtmetall, 2018; IG Metall, 2018). Negotiations resulted in the introduction of the possibility of reducing working hours to 28 hours per week for full-time employees over a period of up to two years, possible to be repeated unlimited times. Employers can refuse a request for working time reduction on very limited grounds. In return, employers have pushed through a significant increase in the proportion of employees who can work more than the 35 hours that are the norm in most companies in the metalworking and electrical industry in West Germany. Instead of partial wage compensation by the employers, parents and shift workers can convert a collectively agreed additional pay, which all employees receive, into eight additional days off (Hellmich & Lesch, 2018; Zitzelsberger, 2018). Both elements of this collective bargaining agreement, the option to choose between a pay rise and more free time, as well as the individual option to reduce working time, are comparatively new in this form and aim at strengthening employees’ self-determination (Seifert, 2019). In recent years, at least one of these two new elements of the collectively agreed working time policy has also been integrated into the collective agreements of several other trade unions (Schulten, 2017; Seifert, 2019): e.g. the railway and transport union *EVG* for employees of *Deutsche Bahn AG* in 2016 and 2018, *Ver.di* for employees of *Deutsche Post AG* (2018) and the union *IG BCE* in negotiations with the chemical industry for East Germany in 2018, followed by a nationwide agreement for the chemical industry in 2019.

## 2.2 Working time preferences of employees

The time autonomy of employees in the EU has increased in recent decades due to the expansion of working time accounts, part-time work and flex time (Eurofund, 2015). Compared to other EU countries, working time arrangements in Germany are characterized as “regulated flexibility” (Haipeter & Lehdorff, 2005). The proportion of part-time workers is comparably high (Walwei, 2014) and has grown significantly over the past years. Almost 30 percent of employees in Germany work part-time with a pronounced gender gap: 11.5 percent of male employees work part-time compared to 48.4 percent of female employees (Institute for Work, Skills and Training, IAQ, 2020). Yet, at the time when *IG Metall* raised the demand for a temporary reduction in working hours, there had already been a legal entitlement to part-time work without wage compensation, in the sense of a “one-way” flexibility. Employees have had the right to reduce hours and work part-time, but no right to return to previous working hours until 2019, when new state regulation came into force.

Empirical studies on working time preferences for Germany vary considerably depending on the data basis and wording of the survey question (Brauner et al., 2018; Ehing, 2014; Schäfer, 2018). Brauner et al. (2018) use data from a representative panel study from 2015 and 2017 commissioned by the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA), Schäfer (2018) works with data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 2013 and 2016, and Allmendinger and Haarbrücker (2017) use data from a survey conducted on behalf of *IG Metall* that is representative for companies in the organizational area of the metalworking and electrical industry. Schäfer (2018) as well as Brauner et al. (2018) find that a considerable share of the working population has a preference for a reduction of working hours with corresponding reductions in earnings. Depending on the extent of the reduction in working time, the proportion of the working population who would prefer to work fewer hours is between 39 and 58 percent, compared to those who are satisfied with their working time or prefer an extension. Allmendinger and Haarbrücker (2017) show that a significant proportion of full-time employees, both men and women, in the metalworking and electrical industry would prefer fewer working hours, e. g. 14 percent of male employees report that they prefer working hours in a corridor of 21–34 hours, but less than 3 percent of male employees actually have these working hours contracted. However, also 22 percent of women and almost 35 percent of men indicated that they prefer to work more than the 35 norm hours of the metalworking and electrical industry (Allmendinger & Haarbrücker, 2017).

In general, those working full-time (35 hours and more per week) are more likely to want to reduce working hours, while amongst those working part-time, a preference for working hour extension is more prevalent. Permanent work contracts are associated with reduction preferences. In contrast, those with fixed-term contracts, young professionals and (self-employed) contract workers tend to prefer longer working hours (Ehing, 2014). The financial situation of the household also plays an important role. Among employees from households with difficulties making ends meet, almost 20 percent prefer an extension of working hours, and financial reasons are important to explain why preferences for shorter working hours are not realized.

According to Brauner et al. (2018), the preferred working time of women is between 20 and 34 hours, but varies quite a lot over the life course. By contrast, that of men is at a much higher level with 40–47 hours and rather constant over the life course. Living with a partner and the presence of dependent children influences actual working hours and working time

preferences, again with considerable differences between women and men. Mothers' preferred working hours are considerably lower compared to fathers and also to childless women. However, men with below school-aged children or care responsibilities for adults are often among those who want to reduce working hours, while those with school-aged children are more satisfied working full-time (Brauner et al., 2018).

### 3 Determinants of attitudes on working time

As a society's economy develops, its values and political beliefs change. This assumption is the core of Inglehart's modernisation theory (1971; 1997). In the face of a long period of sustained prosperity after the Second World War, post-industrial societies emerged, characterized among other things by shifts in occupational structure, rising levels of education and digitalized communication. The transition from industrial production to a post-industrial, service-oriented economy is accompanied by a considerable change in values in these societies. Post-materialistic values begin to gain importance, including a stronger emphasis on quality of life and self-fulfilment. Value systems consequently differ between generations who lived under different economic models. In short, post-materialist values are important to today's younger generations and will essentially remain so as these generations grow older, while the values of older generations are shaped by different frameworks. Age cohorts are therefore important predictors of values and beliefs when there are differences in economic production methods between cohorts. Given the assumed post-materialist emphasis on self-realization and quality of life versus the materialist orientation towards individual income maximization and wealth, the question of sovereignty over one's own lifetime is a question of societal prosperity and an important conflict issue in post-industrial societies.

#### 3.1 Work regimes of industrial societies: fulltime work and presence at the workplace

The theoretical concept of the "ideal worker norm" (Williams, 2000) describes which work-related values of industrial societies persist today. According to the ideal worker norm, an employee who works full-time, is willing to do extra hours, and spends little or no time on child rearing or care is considered ideal. Employees who succeed in meeting this norm are rewarded through promotions, salary increases or recognition. The ideal worker norm is not just an expectation of employers regarding the behaviour of their employees, but an ideal shared by large parts of society. The individual ability to fulfil the ideal worker norm creates satisfaction that goes beyond the benefits of gaining income, power or reputation. Thus, it is not just based on purely rational considerations, but reaches into the realm of values and morality. Devotion to work in the sense of the ideal worker norm constitutes a moral end in itself, which is described by Blair-Loy (2010) as the "work devotion scheme" and also expands to non-breadwinners who are satisfied by their contribution of taking on all care work which enables the partner to fulfil this norm, and thus fosters a gendered division of paid work and care work.



### 3.2 New social needs and values in a changing society

Conflicting with the ideal worker norm are socio-economic changes in post-industrial societies, creating “new social risks,” such as the lack of opportunities to balance family and work (Bonoli, 2005; Huber & Stephens, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). In contrast to the welfare state coverage of “old risks” through social insurance, there is not yet sufficient protection against welfare losses for the new risks (Häusermann, 2006). Unlike Inglehart (1971), Yerkes and Tjidsens (2010) stress the role of trade unions and employers as providers of welfare in this context. Their findings show that, particularly in the areas of childcare and part-time work, collective agreements were concluded long before corresponding state regulations were in place. As such, in the sense of “occupational welfare,” social partners also contribute to state protection against welfare losses stemming from new social risks (Yerkes and Tjidsens, 2010). The conflict between old working (time) regimes and new social needs is certainly a matter of a mismatch of structures and regulations, but in light of the ideal worker norm, even more so a matter of conflict between values. In the following, we will outline the theoretical concept suggested by Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi (2015), which describes the current arena of societal conflict as two-dimensional and outlines socio-structural determinants for the formation of preferences, which occurred in many advanced industrial democracies to a similar extent (Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015).

### 3.3 Two dimensions of individual-level preference formation

For a long time, the conflict space in which the most important political decisions for a society were negotiated was considered as one-dimensional, described along one axis contrasting preferences for a high degree of state intervention with market liberalism, also described as a left-right dimension, which further encompasses the labour and capital divide. Over the past five decades, this conflict was transformed and preferences are no longer to be mapped along one single axis. Beramendi et al. (2015) argue that the state-market axis, in light of fundamental changes in post-industrial societies, needs to be supplemented by a second conflict line, a scale for cultural liberalism. Following Inglehart (1971), Kitschelt (1994), and Flanagan and Lee (2003), they describe a change in social values towards a higher significance of individual well-being and quality of life and set these libertarian values in contrast to conservative values. This contrast forms the opposite ends of the second axis. The first end of this axis emphasizes attitudes on policies that address support for an individual’s capacity to participate and thrive on labour markets as well as a greater desire for individual life courses. On the opposite end of this axis are conservative attitudes that promote conceptions in which the individual is embedded in a collective heritage, complying to existing traditions.

### 3.4 Hypotheses

The demand for a reduction of working time constitutes a traditional conflict between labour and capital. Both aspects of this demand, the right to reduce working time and the wage compensation, indicate that the essential line of conflict between labour and capital lies in the sense of a distributional conflict over the power to decide on the use of time as well as the level of remuneration. However, we also expect that the second line of conflict—an individual’s

right to strengthen personal autonomy over individual time use—is decisive as it represents the conflict between conservative norms of the ideal worker and libertarian values that focus on self-determination and a better work-life balance.

Hence, we firstly expect that *trade union members are more likely to agree with the demand for a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation (Hypothesis 1)*, as they support regulation and redistribution. In contrast, we place persons in leading professional positions with personnel responsibility towards market liberalism, being generally critical of additional rights for employees at the expense of employer and manager decision-making authority. We therefore expect that *persons in leadership positions are more likely to reject the demand for a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation (Hypothesis 2)*.

Furthermore, on the distributive axis, Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) identified income as an important predictor. As other studies confirm, people with high earnings are generally more opposed to state intervention or redistribution (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Curtis & Andersen, 2015; Naumann, 2018). In addition, as outlined in chapter 2.2, feared income loss is an important reason for people with low earnings not to opt for shorter working hours. As the demand by *IG Metall* explicitly included wage compensation by the employer, we assume accordingly that *approval of the union's demand is higher, the lower someone's income is (Hypothesis 3)*.

On the socio-cultural axis, education, class and age are relevant predictors (Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015). Among these, age is the only predictor that is not located on the state-market axis at the same time. Consequently, we assume that the preferences regarding the demand of the union can be explained in the light of the change in social values, which is driven by economic developments. Again, economic conditions have been different for different generations, or, as Inglehart (1997) puts it, value change takes place with a generational time lag. Therefore, we expect cohort differences in attitudes towards the demand, with the younger individuals giving more weight to the values of individual life design and work-life balance, challenging the ideal worker norm. Thus, *we expect that approval of the union's demand for working time reduction with partial wage compensation is higher the younger someone is (Hypothesis 4)*.

On the one hand, high education is found to be a strong predictor of libertarian attitudes. At the same time, it is also a predictor for the support of market liberalism, but with a much weaker relation. Low education, on the other hand, is a predictor for conservative attitudes and regulation (Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015). Considering that the demand points towards libertarian attitudes but also towards (state) regulation and redistribution, *we expect that both the highly and the low educated support the demand more than those with medium educational level (Hypothesis 5)*.

Furthermore, we can assume for Germany that supporters of the Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) are oriented towards libertarian values, whereas people who reject libertarian attitudes are more inclined towards the conservative parties, such as the Christian-Democratic and Christian-Social Union (CDU/CSU) and to some extent also right-wing “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). On the axis for regulation vs. market liberalism, especially the Left party (Die Linke) as well as the Social Democrats (SPD) stand for state regulation, whereas the CDU/CSU, and to a greater extent the Liberal party (FDP), support market freedom. In addition, the Greens, the Social Democrats and the Left all advocate a reduction or more even distribution of working hours in their respective basic party programmes (2020; 2007; 2011).

Consequently, we expect that *supporters of the Greens, The Left, and the Social Democrats approve IG Metall's demand for a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation more than supporters of Christian Parties and that the lowest approval exists among supporters of the Liberals and the AfD (Hypothesis 6).*

*IG Metall's demand explicitly aims to improve the compatibility of family and work and addresses mothers and fathers alike. However, we need to take the gendered differences in working hours into account that are particularly high between mothers and fathers as described above. The possibility of temporarily reducing working hours on the basis of a full-time contract with partial wage compensation could lead mothers and fathers to support the demand, as financial losses of working less would be cushioned. Accordingly, we assume that persons with care responsibilities for children show a higher support for the trade union demand (Hypothesis 7). However, considering the high share of part-time work among mothers and the satisfaction of many fathers with working full-time, it might also be the case that many parents are already satisfied with their current working hour arrangement. The IG Metall's demand might rather appeal to those who are in fact dissatisfied with their work-life balance irrespective of their actual family circumstances. Therefore, we expect that people who are dissatisfied with their work-life balance approve the demand for a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation to a larger extent than those who are satisfied (Hypothesis 8).*

## 4 Data and method

The data collection took place in the German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 36 in July 2018 (Blom et al., 2019). The GIP is based on a strict random probability sample of the general population in private households aged between 16 and 75 years at the time of the first recruitment, drawn as a three-stage area probability sample with random sampling among listed households in a sampled area. Selected households were invited to participate in face-to-face interviews. In order to account for inclusion of both online and offline population, those households who decided to participate in the study were, if necessary, equipped with internet access and computers specifically developed for persons without prior computer experience and trained in their use (Blom et al., 2015). Recruitments were made in 2012 and 2014. Surveys in the GIP are implemented every other month. The random population sample should lead to representativeness, but the GIP, like other panel studies, tends to have a bias towards low educated and older persons aged 65 and more (Blom et al., 2015; Cornesse et al., 2021).

Attitudes towards working time reduction were measured with the following question (translated from German): "In the metalworking industry's collective bargaining disputes in January and February of this year, the trade union *IG Metall* demanded not only wage increases but also a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation by the employers. What is your position on the union's demand for a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation?" Respondents could answer on a five-point scale ranging from strong support (1) to strong rejection (5). For the analysis we reversed the scale so that higher values indicate a greater approval. A total of N=2,426 persons answered the question in the survey. As we are interested in the relationship of work-related characteristics and the

attitude towards the working time reduction demand, we restrict our sample for the multi-variate analysis to employed individuals up to 67 years of age and those who are expected to return to work in the foreseeable future, such as persons on parental leave or on retraining, which reduces the sample to  $N=1,423$ . Missing values for personal income were imputed based on education, gender, age and working hours. The exclusion of cases with a missing value on any other of the variables results in a further reduction of the sample to  $N=1,010$ . Where indicated, variables used for the regressions are taken from previous GIP waves. The respective response rates were 49.4 (Wave 36), 53.6 (Wave 31) and 56.5 (Wave 28) percent (German Internet Panel, 2021). Due to the higher response rates in earlier waves, the sample is hardly reduced because of attrition.

In our cross-sectional data, controlling for birth cohort is not possible, thus we use age as proxy. Information on the occupational status is taken from GIP wave 28 (Blom et al., 2017) in the field in March 2017 and coded in five levels from 0 “no leadership responsibility (reference category)” to 1 “specialist position,” 2 “lower management,” 3 “middle management” 4 “top management.” Satisfaction with the work-life balance, work and family life each ranged on an 11-point scale from “totally dissatisfied” to “totally satisfied.” In addition, the data from wave 31 (Blom et al., 2018) of the GIP regarding trade union membership were summarized in a dummy variable “(no)/trade union membership” and party affiliation was included as a categorical variable distinguishing those with no party affiliation, those who lean towards Christian Union parties, Social Democrats, Liberals, The Greens, The Left, and right-wing AfD. We excluded respondents with a tendency for other parties from the sample due to the small number of cases and the high heterogeneity. To allow meaningful interpretation, we set Christian Union supporters as the reference category in the regression models, as these are the largest subgroup within people with party affiliation. Controlling for no party affiliation at the same time ensures that differences in attitudes are not primarily based on the presence or absence of a party preference. Table 1 provides an overview of all variables.

*Table 1:* Sample statistics, ( $N=1,010$ )

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Agreement on demand for right of working time reduction w. partial wage compensation	3.423	1.142	1	5
Age	45.855	10.999	20	67
Female	.443	.497	0	1
Children	.272	.445	0	1
Educational level				
low	.123	.328	0	1
middle	.351	.478	0	1
high	.526	.5	0	1
Personal income	6.257	2.404	1	15
Working time/day in hours incl. commuting and training	9.168	2.471	0	15
Self-employed	.053	.225	0	1
Residency former East Germany	.204	.403	0	1
Trade union membership	.187	.39	0	1
Political party affiliation				
No party affiliation	.437	.496	0	1

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Christian Union, CDU/CSU	.249	.432	0	1
Social Democrats, SPD	.133	.339	0	1
The Greens, Bündnis90/Die Grünen	.082	.275	0	1
The Left, Die Linke	.037	.188	0	1
Liberals, FDP	.03	.17	0	1
Alternative for Germany, AfD	.034	.18	0	1
Satisfaction with family	7.359	2.339	0	10
Satisfaction with work-life balance	5.6	2.64	0	10
Satisfaction with work	6.533	2.467	0	10
Occupational status (hierarchical level)				
No leadership position	.641	.48	0	1
Specialist position/Head of project	.105	.307	0	1
Lower management	.119	.324	0	1
Middle management	.092	.289	0	1
Top-Management	.044	.204	0	1
Public service	.256	.437	0	1
Fixed-term working contract	.061	.24	0	1
Hours/day children and chores	2.332	2.381	0	15

Source: German Internet Panel, waves 36, 31, 28; own calculations.


We calculated four linear regression models with the dependent variable “approval of the working time reduction demand.” Model 1 contained only socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. In Model 2, we included the variables on party affiliation and union membership. In Model 3, we added variables associated with working life, for example satisfaction with work-life balance and work, and position in the professional hierarchy. In Model 4, we controlled for fixed-term working contracts and employment in the public sector. In all models, we controlled for gender, age, own children under the age of 16 years in the household, education, personal monthly net income, daily working hours including hours for training and commuting, self-employment and place of residence in East or West Germany. We coded the educational level in three groups according to the highest level of school diploma: (1) Persons with primary, general secondary school diploma or without any school diploma; (2) persons with secondary school diploma (reference group), (3) persons with university entrance diploma. Responses to the highest educational attainment in text form were also assigned to this three-level coding. Personal income is divided into 15 income categories ranging from “under 150 euros” to “7500 euros and more.” Furthermore, we created dummy variables for self-employment, fixed-term working contracts and employment in the public sector. Basic personal information is surveyed once a year in the GIP and is therefore taken from Wave 31, conducted in September 2017. This applies to variables on gender, children in household, income, education, East or West residency, trade union membership, party affiliation, self-employment, public sector employment and status of employment contract (fixed-term or permanent). In Model 5, we combine all variables in one model. Finally, in the appendix, we added a table containing all models calculated for parents only (see table A1). In these models, we replace the control for children with a variable that

accounts for the actual hours per day spent on childcare and housework, coded from zero to a maximum of 15 hours per day.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Descriptive results

*Figure 1: Attitudes towards a right to working time reduction with partial wage compensation by age group*



Response categories “totally against” and “rather against” combined to “against,” “totally in favour” and “rather in favour” combined to “in favour.”

Source: German Internet Panel, waves 36, 31, 28; own calculations.

Overall, there is a high level of approval with the unions’ demand: 61 percent of respondents in our sample either “fully” (18 per cent) or “rather” (43 per cent) agree with it. Figure 1 presents the mean approval of the union’s demand separated into four age groups. Approval gradually decreases from the youngest group to the oldest group of respondents. These descriptive differences between the age groups may indicate a change in attitudes in inter-generational comparison, but may also be due to a different socio-economic composition of the age groups. We examine this further in the following multivariate analyses.

**Table 2: Results of the multivariate linear regressions**

Dependent variable: agreement to the demand on a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5
Age	-0.0070* (0.0031)	-0.0086** (0.0032)	-0.0060+ (0.0034)	-0.0061+ (0.0032)	-0.0074* (0.0035)
Female	-0.0219 (0.0737)	0.0120 (0.0737)	-0.0914 (0.0788)	-0.0253 (0.0739)	-0.0556 (0.0796)
Children	-0.0578 (0.0749)	-0.0164 (0.0752)	-0.0190 (0.0790)	-0.0438 (0.0752)	0.0182 (0.0797)
Educational level (Ref.: medium)					
low	0.2845** (0.1094)	0.2515* (0.1085)	0.1845 (0.1154)	0.2832** (0.1093)	0.1805 (0.1148)
high	0.1445+ (0.0742)	0.1250+ (0.0749)	0.1009 (0.0788)	0.1240+ (0.0748)	0.0592 (0.0805)
Personal income	-0.0721** (0.0168)	-0.0609** (0.0170)	-0.0486** (0.0186)	-0.0701** (0.0170)	-0.0370+ (0.0192)
Working time/day in hours	0.0068 (0.0129)	0.0045 (0.0129)	-0.0027 (0.0160)	0.0070 (0.0129)	-0.0062 (0.0162)
Self-employed	-0.4635** (0.1163)	-0.3642** (0.1170)	-0.5500** (0.1593)	-0.4282** (0.1183)	-0.3955* (0.1632)
East Germany	0.0564 (0.0808)	-0.0014 (0.0823)	-0.0128 (0.0861)	0.0595 (0.0808)	-0.0521 (0.0886)
Trade union membership		0.3926** (0.0853)			0.3698** (0.0894)
Party affiliation (Ref.: Christ. Union, CDU/CSU)					
No party affiliation		0.3761** (0.0822)			0.2577** (0.0872)
Social Democrats (SPD)		0.5339** (0.1106)			0.4234** (0.1169)
The Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen)		0.7156** (0.1285)			0.6153** (0.1372)
The Left (Die Linke)		0.6340** (0.1744)			0.5565** (0.1964)
Liberals (FDP)		-0.1717 (0.1861)			-0.2864 (0.2102)
Alternative for Germany (AfD)		0.0354 (0.1948)			-0.0901 (0.1989)
Occupational status (hierarchical level)			-0.1304** (0.0320)		-0.1144** (0.0323)
Satisfaction with work			-0.0370* (0.0153)		-0.0328* (0.0154)
Satisfaction with family			0.0266+ (0.0157)		0.0345* (0.0158)

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5
Satisfaction with work-life balance			-0.0451** (0.0150)		-0.0492** (0.0150)
Public service (Ref.: private sector)				0.0929 (0.0749)	0.0862 (0.0792)
Fixed-term working contract				0.2176+ (0.1297)	0.2686+ (0.1460)
Constant	4.0841** (0.2150)	3.7159** (0.2246)	4.4350** (0.2753)	3.9955** (0.2195)	4.0365** (0.2888)
Observations	1,237	1,181	1,056	1,237	1,010
R-squared	0.0535	0.1149	0.0934	0.0569	0.1488

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: German Internet Panel, waves 36, 31, 28; own calculations.


Original sample size including pensioners and long-term unemployed: N=2,426

## 5.2 Multivariate results

Table 2 shows the results of the regression models with approval of *IG Metall's* demand for a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation as dependent variable. The first model included only socio-demographic characteristics. Age, personal income, and self-employment show a significant negative relation with support for the demand, while both low and high education are positively related with support for the demand, the latter significant at the 0.1 level. In the subsequent models, we examine this further and add more control variables. The results of Model 2 largely confirmed our expectations regarding party affiliation and union membership (Hypothesis 1 and 6). As expected, trade union members have a significantly higher support of *IG Metall's* demand than non-members with a difference of 0.393 (SE=0.085) scale points. We depict the results for the relationship of party affiliation and support for the union's demand for *a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation* in Figure 2. The greatest approval of the demand for *a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation* exists among supporters of the Greens with a difference of 0.716 (SE=0.129) scale points compared to the reference category supporters of the Christian Union. This is followed with slightly lower approval among supporters of The Left and then the Social Democrats as well as those without party affiliation. No significant differences exist between supporters of the Liberals and AfD and the reference category supporters of the Christian Union.



Figure 2: Coefficients of the variables for party affiliation with 95 % confidence intervals



Note: Dependent variable: agreement to the demand for a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation.

Source: German Internet Panel, waves 36, 31, 28; own calculations based on Model 2 (Table 2).

In Model 3, we controlled for occupational status and satisfaction with work and family. As expected regarding the occupational status according to Hypothesis 2, there is a negative relationship towards the demand. For each category of the occupational position, support for the demand decreases by 0.130 (SE=0.032) scale points. Also, the relationship of income and the support of the demand is negative with a decrease in support of 0.049 scale points (SE=0.019) for each income category which confirms Hypothesis 3. We found a negative relationship between age and the support of the demand with a decrease in support of 0.006 scale points (SE=0.003) for each year of age, confirming our Hypothesis 4. Controlling for more general characteristics of the individual working conditions in Model 4, we found a positive relation, significant at the 0.1 level, for a fixed-term working contract, but no relation with public service employment. Regarding education, in Model 1, 2 and 4, the expected increased support can be found for low and highly educated as outlined in Hypothesis 5, whereas for the highly educated results are significant at the 0.1 level. For both the highly and the low educated, the increased support becomes insignificant in Models 3 and 5, which include controls for the position in the professional hierarchy and work-family satisfaction. Apart from that, Model 5, including all variables, overall yields similar results as Models 1–4. Self-employment is in a negative relation to the demand with a decrease of 0.396 (SE=0.163) scale points. No significant differences exist between men and women and between those with and without care responsibility for children, thus Hypothesis 7 is to be rejected.

For the relationship between work-family satisfaction and support for the union's demand, we found in part the expected negative relationship, as outlined in Hypothesis 8: the

lower satisfaction with work and work-life balance, the higher is the support for the demand for a right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation, while there is a significant positive relationship between satisfaction with family life and support for the demand in Models 3, here at the 0.1 level, and in Model 5. The strongest link exists between satisfaction with work-life balance and approval of the demand. Due to the expected different effects on the work-life balance of employed parents depending on the duration of their daily care work for children and household, we calculated additional models which include only parents of dependent children and a control for their daily care and housework hours (see Table A1 in the Appendix).

## 6 Discussion and conclusion

On the background of unions' strategies to attract new groups of members, our study investigated individual attitudes towards the demand for a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation, which was brought forward by *IG Metall* in the 2017/18 collective bargaining negotiations. The results show that the demand meets a broad support in the working population. Our analysis proves the existence of traditional conflict lines: union members are in favour of the demand, while high earners, managers and self-employed reject it. However, support for the demand is also based on individual preferences for a better work-life balance, rated especially high among young people and supporters of the Green party and indicating the relevance of a second conflict line between libertarian and conservative values. Furthermore, the results of our analysis confirm the role of the social partners in Germany as "providers of occupational welfare" (Yerkes and Tijdens, 2010) by creating opportunities in addition to regulation by laws.

Our multivariate results show that the classical conflict lines in labour relations are also relevant to explain support for this specific *IG Metall* demand for a *right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation*: union members support the demand, whereas those in leading positions reject it. Similarly, self-employed are also opposed to the demand, which is either related to the fact that self-employed could not benefit from it, or, as owners of a business, oppose this kind of regulation. With respect to income, our results support the importance of the distributional or regulatory conflict on the state-market axis, as we find a higher approval of *IG Metall's* demand among those with low income, for whom the explicit inclusion of partial wage compensation by the union may have been important. It needs to be mentioned here that the introduction to the survey question mentioned the position of *IG Metall* as a trade union and wage compensation by employers. While it is important in questions that require some expertise to provide some context for participants who are less familiar with the topic, this introduction may have contributed to the outcome that the conflict regarding this demand can be clearly located on the labour capital axis. However, it becomes apparent that support of the right to reduce working hours with partial wage compensation, seems to go beyond the market-state conflict line. In terms of party affiliation, the highest level of support for the trade union demand is not to be found among supporters of the traditionally trade union-oriented Social Democrats or The Left, but among those affiliated with The Greens. These results indicate that the second conflict dimension, libertarian vs.

conservative values, is important to understand the support for *IG Metall's* demand of an individual right to working time reduction with partial wage compensation. This aspect is also supported by the fact that results reveal a strong age gradient in approval of the union's demand with younger people being more supportive. This may be a sign of a fundamental change in values in the generational comparison towards a greater importance of work-life balance in the younger generation. However, we cannot test on the basis of our cross-sectional data whether there has been a generational change in values of work and work-life balance, or whether we observe a life-cycle effect. According to Häusermann and Kriesi (2015), belonging to the class of "socio-cultural professionals" (Oesch, 2015) is an important predictor of both support for state regulation and libertarian values. This class consists of highly educated, high-income individuals who are more in favour of a strong role for the state than for market liberalism due to their employment in the public or quasi-public sector. In this regard, it would be particularly interesting to test the influence of class with a more fine-grained categorization of occupation and education, which is however not possible with our data due to low case numbers and therefore, opens possibilities for further research. Considering the low participation of low educated people in the present sample of the GIP, which is a problem in many panel studies, as well as the 0.1-significance-level for the results of the highly educated, it is even more important for the following interesting aspects that future research further investigates the influence of education. The support pattern we find for educational level appears particularly interesting: both, highly educated individuals, presumably leaning more towards liberal cultural values, and low educated individuals, presumably benefitting more from regulation and redistribution, support the demand for working time reduction to a larger extent than medium educated. This result highlights the importance of both axes. The fact that educational differences are no longer significant in the models with controls for the status in the occupational hierarchy and work(-family) satisfaction, suggests that values associated with occupational responsibility and the everyday experience of the work(-family) situation are more decisive than, for example, knowledge about the topic.

Regarding the individuals' family situation, our results show that also among parents, support for the demand increases with dissatisfaction about the work-life balance (Table A1, Model 5). However, there is no significant relation with hours spent per day on care work. In our sample, the number of working parents with very young children might be low. More detailed information on the child's exact age and an overall larger sample of working parents could provide more insight into attitudes of this group. Despite public childcare and existing opportunities to reduce working hours, the needs of those providing unpaid care work might not be sufficiently addressed with the current possibilities of working time regulation. The legal right to return to full-time work, which came into force shortly after the survey was conducted, could be helpful in this context and, despite some limitations in scope, is an important complement to existing rights to part-time work. Apart from that, there is a strong relationship between dissatisfaction with one's work-life balance and approval of the union's claim for both parents and those without children. Consequently, it is the individual perception of time arrangements that drives attitudes towards the demand for working time reduction, and support is not only driven by the presence of children.

What do the results of our study tell us about the success of *IG Metall's* member recruitment strategy? Support for the trade union demand is strongest among younger persons and Green Party supporters—stronger than among supporters of the Left whose party representatives have in the past been the most outspoken public supporters of a general reduction

in working hours, and stronger than among supporters of the Social Democrats, the traditional ally of the unions. These are strong indicators that, based on the argument of changing values of Häusermann and Kriesi (2015), libertarian values are particularly important in explaining support for the trade union demand and, in this sense, working time autonomy. This means that individual decision-making possibilities regarding both the reduction and the extension of one's own working time might be more important than working time regulation, which defines the scope of working hours and applies equally to all employees in a regulatory area. In this respect, a further orientation of the trade unions from the individual option of reducing working time to a general reduction in working time might have the potential to conflict with these values.

The outbreak of the Corona-virus pandemic led to an unprecedented proportion of German workers having to work fewer hours than usual, similar to an involuntary trial period of working hour reduction. These circumstances might have triggered both: more or less support for additional opportunities for individuals to reduce working hours or even for a general reduction in working hours. Short-time work is associated with increased concerns about job loss (Möhring et al., 2020a; 2020b), which suggests that short-time workers are also more likely to experience existential concerns. Considering that Inglehart's modernization theory assumes that the change towards more libertarian values takes place after a long period of satisfaction of basic needs, increased concerns about living expenses may, on the one hand, lead to the change in values being slowed down. On the other hand, the (involuntary) experience of more free time may have also led to a higher satisfaction with work-life balance. Results by Möhring et al. (2021) show that fathers who transitioned to short-time work in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic have an increased family satisfaction. Further research is necessary to investigate the development of working time attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic.

When interpreting the results, it should be born in mind that negotiations in the metal-working sector had already been concluded at the time the survey was conducted. This might have led to some disappointment or resignation, especially among those who had supported the original demand because of the partial wage compensation, as ultimately this aspect was dropped for most employees covered by this agreement (see chapter 2.1). Even though the partial wage compensation was explicitly included in the survey question, this may have reduced the support of, for example, low-paid workers, trade union members or affiliates of Social Democrats or the Left.

## 7 References

- Addison, J. T., Teixeira, P., Evers, K., & Bellmann, L. (2016). Is the erosion thesis overblown? Alignment from without in Germany. *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society*, 55(3), 415–443. <https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12144>
- Allmendinger, J., & Haarbrücker, J. (2017). *Arbeitszeiten und die Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie: Ergebnisse der Beschäftigtenbefragung der IG Metall 2017*. Retrieved from <https://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2017/p17-002.pdf> (10.01.23)

- Andreß, H.-J., & Heien, T. (2001). Four worlds of welfare state attitudes? A comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States. *European Sociological Review*, 17(4), 337–356. <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/17.4.337>
- Beramendi, P., Häusermann, S., Kitschelt, H., & Kriesi, H. (2015). Introduction: The politics of advanced capitalism. In P. Beramendi, S. Häusermann, H. Kitschelt, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The politics of advanced capitalism* (pp. 1–64). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316163245.002>
- Bispinck, R., & Schulten, T. (2017). *WSI Arbeitszeitkalender 2017*. WSI Tarfarchiv. Retrieved from [https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p\\_ta\\_elemente\\_84\\_2017.pdf](https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_ta_elemente_84_2017.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Blom, A. G., Bruch, C., Felderer, B., Gebhard, F., Herzing, J., Krieger, U., & SFB 884 'Political Economy Of Reforms', Universität Mannheim. (2017). *German Internet Panel, Welle 28 (März 2017)* [Data set]. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6902 Datenfile Version 1.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12890>
- Blom, A. G., Felderer, B., Höhne, J. K., Krieger, U., Rettig, T., & SFB 884 'Political Economy Of Reforms', Universität Mannheim. (2018). *German Internet Panel, Welle 31—Core Study (September 2017)* [Data set]. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6905 Datenfile Version 1.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13011>
- Blom, A. G., Fikel, M., Friedel, S., Höhne, J. K., Krieger, U., Rettig, T., Wenz, A., & SFB 884 'Political Economy Of Reforms', Universität Mannheim. (2019). *German Internet Panel, Welle 36 (Juli 2018)* [Data set]. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6956 Datenfile Version 1.0.0. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13389>
- Blom, A. G., Gathmann, C., & Krieger, U. (2015). Setting up an online panel representative of the general population: The German Internet Panel. *Field Methods*, 27(4), 391–408. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X15574494>
- Blyton, P. (1987). The working time debate in Western Europe. *Industrial Relations*, 26(2), 201–207.
- Boguslawski, N., & Zitzelsberger, R. (2019). Arbeitszeiten, die zum Leben passen! Die Tarifbewegung 2017/2018 in der Metallund Elektroindustrie in Baden-Württemberg. In J. Hofmann, S. Schaumburg, & T. Smolenski (Hrsg.), *Miteinander für morgen: Für Arbeitszeiten, die zum Leben passen*. Bielefeld: transcript.
- <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839446850-005>
- Bonoli, G. (2005). The politics of the new social policies: Providing coverage against new social risks in mature welfare states. *Policy & Politics*, 33(3), 431–449. <https://doi.org/10.1332/0305573054325765>
- Bosch, G. (1999). Working time: Tendencies and emerging issues. *International Labour Review*, 138(2), 131–149. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.1999.tb00063.x>
- Bosch, G. (2017). Paradigmenwechsel in der gewerkschaftlichen Arbeitszeitpolitik. *Wirtschaftsdienst* 2017, 97(8), 530–531. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-017-2173-7>
- Brauner, C., Wöhrmann, A. M., & Michel, A. (2018). *BAuA-Arbeitszeitbefragung: Arbeitszeitwünsche von Beschäftigten in Deutschland*. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin.
- Buhl, J., & Acosta, J. (2016). Work less, do less? Working time reductions and rebound effects. *Sustainability Science*, 11(2), 261–276. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-015-0322-8>
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (2020). “...zu achten und zu schützen...Veränderung schafft Halt.” *Grundsatzprogramm. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*. Retrieved from [https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/20200125\\_Grundsatzprogramm.pdf](https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/20200125_Grundsatzprogramm.pdf) ( 10.01.23)
- Carney, T., & Junor, A. (2014). How do occupational norms shape mothers' career and caring options? *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 56(4), 465–487. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185614538442>
- Cornesse, C., Krieger, U., Sohnus, M., Fikel, M., Friedel, S., Rettig, T., Wenz, A., Juhl, S., Lehrer, R., Möhring, K., Naumann, E., Reifenscheid, M., & Blom, A. G. (2021). From German Internet Panel to Mannheim Corona Study: Adaptable probability-based online panel infrastructures during the

- pandemic. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)*, rssa.12749. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12749>
- Crimmann, A., Wießner, F., & Bellmann, L. (2012). Resisting the crisis: Short-time work in Germany. *International Journal of Manpower*, 33(8), 877–900. <https://doi.org/10.1108/01437721211280362>
- Curtis, J., & Andersen, R. (2015). How social class shapes attitudes on economic inequality: The competing forces of self-interest and legitimization. *International Review of Social Research*, 5(1), 4–19. <https://doi.org/10.1515/irsr-2015-0002>
- Devetter, F.-X., & Rousseau, S. (2011). Working hours and sustainable development. *Review of Social Economy*, 69(3), 333–355. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00346764.2011.563507>
- Die Linke. (2011). *Programm der Partei die Linke*. Retrieved from [https://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/grundsatzdokumente/programm\\_format/programm\\_der\\_partei\\_die\\_linke\\_erfurt2011.pdf](https://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/grundsatzdokumente/programm_format/programm_der_partei_die_linke_erfurt2011.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Ebbinghaus, B., & Visser, J. (1999). When institutions matter: Union growth and decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995. *European Sociological Review*, 15(2), 135–158. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018257>
- Ehing, D. (2014). Unter- und Überbeschäftigung in Deutschland: Eine Analyse der Arbeitszeitwünsche von Erwerbstätigen vor dem Hintergrund des demografischen Wandels. *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform*, 60(3), 247–272. <https://doi.org/10.1515/zsr-2014-0303>
- Eurofund. (2015). *Third European Company Survey – Overview report: Workplace practices – patterns, performance and well-being*. Publication Office of the European Union. Retrieved from [https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef\\_publication/field\\_ef\\_document/ef1502en\\_0.pdf](https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1502en_0.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Eurostat. (2019). *Average number of usual weekly hours of work in main job, by sex, professional status, full-time/part-time and occupation (hours)*. Retrieved from [http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa\\_ewhuis&lang=de](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_ewhuis&lang=de) (10.01.23)
- Flanagan, S. C., & Lee, A.-R. (2003). The new politics, culture wars, and the authoritarian-libertarian value change in advanced industrial democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(3), 235–270. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414002250664>
- Flecker, J., & Schönauer, A. (2010). Neue Politikfelder für eine Renaissance der Arbeitszeitpolitik. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 36(3), 349–374.
- German Internet Panel. (2021). *German Internet Panel. Response Rates*. Retrieved from [https://www.uni-mannheim.de/media/Einrichtungen/gip/Response\\_Rates/German\\_Internet\\_Panel\\_Response\\_Rates.pdf](https://www.uni-mannheim.de/media/Einrichtungen/gip/Response_Rates/German_Internet_Panel_Response_Rates.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Gesamtmetall (2018). *Einigung in der Tarifrunde 2018 erreicht – Arbeitszeit kann nach unten und nach oben schwanken*. 10 February 2018. Arbeitgeberverband Gesamtmetall. Retrieved from <https://www.gesamtmetall.de/aktuell/pressemitteilungen/einigung-der-tarifrunde-2018-erreicht-arbeitszeit-kann-nach-unten-und> (10.01.23)
- Grahl, J., & Teague, P. (2004). ‘The German Model in Danger’. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 35(6), 557–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2004.00333.x>
- Groß, H., & Seifert, H. (2010). *Zeitkonflikte. Renaissance der Arbeitszeitpolitik*. Bielefeld: transcript.
- Gunderson, R. (2019). Work time reduction and economic democracy as climate change mitigation strategies: Or why the climate needs a renewed labor movement. *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences*, 9(1), 35–44. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-018-0507-4>
- Haipeter, T. (2020). Digitalisation, unions and participation: The German case of ‘industry 4.0’. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 51(3), 242–260. <https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12291>
- Haipeter, T., & Lehdorff, S. (2005). Decentralised bargaining of working time in the German automotive industry. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 36(2), 140–156. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2005.00350.x>
- Hassel, A. (2007). The curse of institutional security: The erosion of German trade unionism. *Industrielle Beziehungen*, 2(14), 176–191.

- Hassel, A., & Schulten, T. (1998). Globalization and the future of central collective bargaining: The example of the German metal industry. *Economy and Society*, 27(4), 484–522. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085149800000031>
- Haug, F. (2011). *Die Vier-in-einem-Perspektive: Politik von Frauen für eine neue Linke* (3rd edition). Hamburg: Argument.
- Häusermann, S. (2006). Changing coalitions in social policy reforms: The politics of new social needs and demands. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16(1), 5–21. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928706059827>
- Häusermann, S., & Kriesi, H. (2015). What do voters want? Dimensions and configurations in individual-level preferences and party choice. In P. Beramendi, S. Häusermann, H. Kitschelt, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The politics of advanced capitalism* (pp. 202–230). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316163245.009>
- Hellmich, P., & Lesch, H. (2018). *IW-Report Tarifpolitischer Halbjahresbericht*. Retrieved from [https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Studien/Report/PDF/2018/IW-Report\\_Tarifpolitischer\\_Halbjahresbericht\\_1\\_2018.pdf](https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Report/PDF/2018/IW-Report_Tarifpolitischer_Halbjahresbericht_1_2018.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Huber, E., & Stephens, J. D. (2006). Combating old and new social risks. In K. Armingeon & G. Bonoli (Eds.), *The politics of post-industrial welfare states: Adapting post-war social policies to new social risks*. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203099520-15>
- Hübler, O. (2018). Flexible Arbeitszeit—Forderungen, Fakten, Einschätzungen und Alternativen. *Wirtschaftsdienst*, 98(2), 115–121. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10273-018-2250-6>
- IG Metall. (2018). *Ein starker Tarifaabschluss: Mehr Geld und mehr Selbstbestimmung bei der Arbeitszeit*. 6 February 2018. IG Metall. Retrieved from <https://www.igmetall.de/presse/pressenmitteilungen/ein-starker-tarifaabschluss-mehr-geld-und-mehr-selbstbesti> (10.01.23)
- IG Metall. (2020). *Jörg Hofmann will Kurzarbeit verlängern und schlägt 4-Tage-Woche vor*. IG Metall. September 9, 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.igmetall.de/tarif/tarifunden/metall-und-elektro/4-tage-woche-als-wahlmoeglichkeit> (10.01.23)
- Inglehart, R. (1971). The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies. *American Political Science Review*, 65(4), 991–1017. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1953494>
- Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Institute for Work, Skills and Training, IAQ. (2020). *Teilzeitquote insgesamt und nach Geschlecht 1991–2019*. Institut für Arbeit und Qualifikation der Universität Duisburg-Essen. Retrieved from [http://www.sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/tl\\_files/sozialpolitik-aktuell/\\_Politikfelder/Arbeitsmarkt/Datensammlung/PDF-Dateien/abbIV8d.pdf](http://www.sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/tl_files/sozialpolitik-aktuell/_Politikfelder/Arbeitsmarkt/Datensammlung/PDF-Dateien/abbIV8d.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Iwer, F., & Jänicke, S. (2019). Eine Frage der Gerechtigkeit. Zur Angleichung der Arbeitszeit in der ostdeutschen Metall- und Elektroindustrie. In J. Hofmann, S. Schaumburg, & T. Smolenski (Hrsg.), *Miteinander für morgen: Für Arbeitszeiten, die zum Leben passen* (pp. 80–88). Bielefeld: transcript.
- King, L. C., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2017). Worktime reduction as a solution to climate change: five scenarios compared for the UK. *Ecological Economics*, 132, 124–134. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.10.011>
- Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The transformation of European social democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knudsen, K. (1989). Shorter working hours, lower retirement age or longer vacations? Ambivalences in public attitudes on alternative working-time reforms in Norway. *Acta Sociologica*, 32(4), 375–387. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000169938903200404>
- Kurz-Scherf, I., & Breil, G. (2014). Wem gehört die Zeit? Ein Lesebuch zum 6-Stunden-Tag. In I. Kurz-Scherf & T. Jung (Hrsg.), *In Arbeit, Emanzipation: Feministischer Eigensinn in Wissenschaft und Politik: Festschrift für Ingrid Kurz-Scherf* (pp. 200–208). Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Lehndorff, S. (2003). The long good-bye? Tarifvertragliche Arbeitszeitregulierung und gesellschaftlicher Arbeitszeitstandard. *Industrielle Beziehungen*, 10(2), 273–295.

- Lehndorff, S. (2004). *Wirksamkeit und Krise der tarifvertraglichen Arbeitszeitregulierung in Deutschland*. ISWT/SITT Conference, 26–28/02/2004. Retrieved from <https://www.iat.eu/aktuell/veroeff/2004/lehndorff01.pdf> (10.01.23)
- Lehndorff, S. (2010). Arbeitszeitpolitik nach der Kurzarbeit. In H. Schwitzer, K. Ohl, R. Rohnert, & H. Wagner (Hrsg.), *Zeit, dass wir was drehen! Perspektiven der Arbeitszeit- und Leistungs politik*. (pp. 39–62). Hamburg: VSA.
- Lewis, J., & Plomien, A. (2009). 'Flexicurity' as a policy strategy: The implications for gender equality. *Economy and Society*, 38(3), 433–459. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140903020622>
- Lott, Y. (2015). Working-time flexibility and autonomy: A European perspective on time adequacy. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 21(3), 259–274. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680114543604>
- Möhring, K., Heinemann, F., Naumann, E., Reifenscheid, M., Blom, A. G., Wenz, A., Rettig, T., Lehrer, R., Krieger, U., Juhl, S., Friedel, S., Fikel, M., & Cornesse, C. (2020a). *Die Mannheimer Corona-Studie: Schwerpunktbericht zum subjektiven Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko der Beschäftigten in Deutschland*. Universität Mannheim. Retrieved from [https://www.uni-mannheim.de/media/Einrichtungen/gip/Corona\\_Studie/MCS\\_Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko\\_Bericht.pdf](https://www.uni-mannheim.de/media/Einrichtungen/gip/Corona_Studie/MCS_Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko_Bericht.pdf) (10.01.23)
- Möhring, K., Naumann, E., Reifenscheid, M., Blom, A. G., Wenz, A., Rettig, T., Lehrer, R., Krieger, U., Juhl, S., Friedel, S., Fikel, M., & Cornesse, C. (2020b). Inequality in employment during the Corona lockdown: Evidence from Germany. *JESP European Social Policy Blog*. July 10/2020. Retrieved from <https://rb.gy/jp2kmv> (10.01.23)
- Möhring, K., Naumann, E., Reifenscheid, M., Wenz, A., Rettig, T., Krieger, U., ... Blom, A. G. (2021). The COVID-19 pandemic and subjective well-being: Longitudinal evidence on satisfaction with work and family. *European Societies*, 23(sup1), S601–S617. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2020.1833066>
- Naumann, E. (2018). Tax constraints, social policy preferences, and support for redistribution. *Societies*, 8(3), 46. <https://doi.org/10.3390/soc8030046>
- Pollmann-Schult, M. (2016). What mothers want: The impact of structural and cultural factors on mothers' preferred working hours in Western Europe. *Advances in Life Course Research*, 29, 16–25. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.alcr.2015.11.002>
- Pullinger, M. (2014). Working time reduction policy in a sustainable economy: Criteria and options for its design. *Ecological Economics*, 103, 11–19. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.04.009>
- Rinne, U., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2012). Another economic miracle? The German labor market and the Great Recession. *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, 1(1), 3. <https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9004-1-3>
- Sánchez, R. (2017). Does a mandatory reduction of standard working hours improve employees' health status? *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society*, 56(1), 3–39. <https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12163>
- Schäfer, H. (2018). Arbeitszeitwünsche von Arbeitnehmern im Längsschnitt. *IW-Trends*, 3/2018, 61–78.
- Schroeder, W. (2018). Strategien der Tarifvertragsparteien zur Stärkung ihrer Mitgliederbasis. *Sozialer Fortschritt*, 67(10), 887–906. <https://doi.org/10.3790/sfo.67.10.887>
- Schroeder, W., & Karch, H. (2001). Optionen der Arbeitszeitpolitik zwischen den Zeiten. *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 27, 16–27.
- Schulten, T. (2017). Tarifpolitischer Monatsbericht November 2017. *WSI Tarifarchiv*, 19.
- Seifert, H. (2019). Optionen als neues Gestaltungsprinzip der Arbeitszeitpolitik. *WSI-Mitteilungen*, 72(4), 305–308. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0342-300X-2019-4-305>
- Sopp, P., & Wagner, A. (2017). Vertragliche, tatsächliche und gewünschte Arbeitszeiten. *SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research*, 909(2017), 73.
- SPD. (2007). *Hamburger Programm. Das Grundsatzprogramm der SPD*. Retrieved from [https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Grundsatzprogramme/hamburger\\_programm.pdf](https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Grundsatzprogramme/hamburger_programm.pdf) (10.01.23)



- Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004). New social risks in postindustrial society: Some evidence on responses to active labour market policies from Eurobarometer. *International Social Security Review*, 57(3), 45–64. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-246X.2004.00194.x>
- Tüselmann, H., & Heise, A. (2000). The German model of industrial relations at the crossroads: Past, present and future. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 31(3), 162–176. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2338.00155>
- Walwei, U. (2014). Times of change: What drives the growth of work arrangements in Germany? *Journal for Labour Market Research*, 47(3), 183–204. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12651-013-0136-z>
- Wetzel, D. (2014). Die Mitgliederoffensive: Kopernikanische Wende in der deutschen Gewerkschaftspolitik. In W. Schroeder & S. Greef (Hrsg.), *Handbuch Gewerkschaften in Deutschland* (2., überarbeitete, erweiterte und aktualisierte Auflage, pp. 47–58). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Williams, J. (2000). *Unbending gender: Why family and work conflict and what to do about it*. Oxford University Press.
- WSI. (2018). *Tarifbindung der Beschäftigten 1998–2018*. WSI Tarifarchiv. Retrieved from <https://www.wsi.de/de/tarifbindung-15329.htm> (10.01.23)
- Yerkes, M., & Tijdens, K. (2010). Social risk protection in collective agreements: Evidence from the Netherlands. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 16(4), 369–383. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680110384608>
- Zitzelsberger, R. (2018). Mehr Wahlrecht bei der Arbeitszeit—Der Tarifabschluss in der Metall- und Elektroindustrie 2018. *WSI-Mitteilungen*, 71(4), 326–330. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0342-300X-2018-4-326>

## 8 Appendix

**Table A1: Results of the multivariate linear regressions, only parents with dependent children**

Dependent variable: agreement to the demand on a right to reduce working time with partial wage compensation

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5
Age	-0.0083 (0.0093)	-0.0082 (0.0093)	-0.0061 (0.0098)	-0.0086 (0.0093)	-0.0063 (0.0098)
Female	-0.1044 (0.1666)	-0.0760 (0.1670)	-0.0825 (0.1785)	-0.1022 (0.1663)	-0.0931 (0.1805)
Daily hours children and chores	0.0196 (0.0234)	0.0215 (0.0233)	0.0275 (0.0269)	0.0214 (0.0234)	0.0393 (0.0269)
Educational level (Ref.: middle)					
low	0.5036** (0.2538)	0.4807+ (0.2478)	0.3991 (0.2603)	0.4743+ (0.2534)	0.3567 (0.2550)
high	0.0296 (0.1503)	0.0125 (0.1478)	-0.0617 (0.1576)	0.0131 (0.1503)	-0.0860 (0.1563)
Personal income	-0.0333 (0.0325)	-0.0183 (0.0329)	-0.0104 (0.0351)	-0.0260 (0.0326)	0.0064 (0.0362)
Working time/day in hours	-0.0095 (0.0302)	-0.0167 (0.0298)	-0.0170 (0.0376)	-0.0122 (0.0301)	-0.0392 (0.0376)

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4	(5) Model 5
Self-employed	-0.4435** (0.2205)	-0.3557 (0.2237)	-0.7939** (0.3255)	-0.4765** (0.2233)	-0.5940+ (0.3446)
East Germany	0.2607 (0.1586)	0.1858 (0.1606)	0.2044 (0.1651)	0.2697+ (0.1585)	0.1847 (0.1675)
Trade union membership		0.2766 (0.1916)			0.4655** (0.1959)
Party affiliation (Ref.: Christ. Union, CDU/CSU)					
No party affiliation		0.5803*** (0.1516)			0.5093*** (0.1588)
Social Democrats (SPD)		0.6384** (0.2473)			0.6407** (0.2623)
The Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen)		0.8536*** (0.2267)			0.7086*** (0.2458)
The Left (Die Linke)		1.1731*** (0.4289)			0.5774 (0.5100)
Liberals (FDP)		-0.1307 (0.3565)			0.0126 (0.3966)
Alternative for Germany (AfD)		0.0751 (0.3918)			-0.1921 (0.4306)
Occupational status (hier- archical level)			-0.0705 (0.0615)		-0.0334 (0.0615)
Satisfaction with work			0.0108 (0.0288)		0.0162 (0.0293)
Satisfaction with family			0.0114 (0.0304)		0.0199 (0.0300)
Satisfaction with work-life balance			-0.0613** (0.0293)		-0.0697** (0.0292)
Public service				-0.2159 (0.1492)	-0.1619 (0.1569)
Fixed-term working contract				0.4549 (0.2833)	0.5770* (0.2984)
Constant	3.9321*** (0.5465)	3.4249*** (0.5452)	4.0572*** (0.6682)	3.9502*** (0.5483)	3.6074*** (0.6723)
Observations	330	315	288	330	275
R-squared	0.0588	0.1511	0.0955	0.0715	0.1916

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, + p<0.1;

Source: Own calculations based on data of the German Internet Panel, waves 36, 31, 28.

Original sample size including pensioners and long-term unemployed: N=2,426