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Reforming federalism German style: A first step in the right direction

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Reforming Federalism German Style -
A First Step in the Right Direction

von

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Stefan Voigt

Nr. 87/06

Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge
Reforming Federalism German Style – A First Step in the Right Direction

The German version of federalism, often called „cooperative federalism“, has been identified by many as one of the root causes for Germany becoming Europe’s new sick man. Now, a number of changes in the institutions defining the relationship between the federal, the state and the local level have been passed. This contribution describes the most important changes and evaluates them from the point of view of fiscal federalism. It concludes that the changes are only a first step in the right direction, but a number of important steps have yet to follow.

For a number of decades after WW II, Germany was a sort of European “Wunderkind”. It enjoyed virtually full employment, high growth rates and fiscal policy was sound. This has substantially changed: unemployment has been around ten percent for a number of years, Germany’s growth rates have been consistently the lowest among all members of the Euro-area, and Germany has not complied with the deficit criteria of the Maastricht-treaty for four consecutive years. At least as alarming: its medium and long-term prospects seem to be pretty dim if one accepts the evaluation of the PISA studies concerning the quality of Germany’s education system. Although all this is common knowledge in Germany, very few of the necessary reforms have been brought about and the question is: why?

Many argue that Germany’s particular form of federalism, often called “cooperative federalism” is one of the root causes of the German disease. In practice, cooperative federalism would mean that reforms could only be brought about if the relevant actors on both the federal and the state level agree on reforms. This has been coined “joint decision-trap”¹ and would explain the incapacity of passing

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necessary reforms. Many of the current economic and political problems in Germany can be interpreted as a consequence of a less-than-satisfactory allocation of competences among the various levels of the federal system. The system as a whole contains numerous faulty provisions which distort both (political as well as economic) competition and decision-making, and hence cause lasting damage on the operation of federalism and democracy in Germany. Often, benefits and costs of political decisions do not accrue on the same level anymore. Small wonder, then, that the reform of the underlying institutions is often named as the most important single reform, in a sense “the mother of all reforms”.

The “grand coalition” currently ruling Germany has just passed a first federalism reform. Its implementation will lead to changes in a number of articles of the German Constitution (the “Grundgesetz”). This contribution describes the most important changes and offers first evaluations of their likely effects. It concludes that the changes are only a small first step in the right direction, but additional ones need to follow suit. Before describing the changes, two preliminary steps will be taken: the basic notions of fiscal federalism are very shortly summarized; these notions then serve as a normative benchmark for the evaluation of both the current institutions and the proposed changes. Secondly, the institutions constituting German federalism are shortly described and criticized on the basis of the criteria of fiscal federalism.

Fiscal Federalism

The economic theory of federalism is interested in the optimal allocation of tasks on to the various possible levels of provision.\(^2\) A very simple criterion is used as a benchmark: what allocation allows citizens to have their preferences best satisfied? Assuming that preferences concerning the provision of public goods can vary from region to region, a regional provision seems best suited to satisfy citizen preferences. This insight has been transformed into a general rule, namely the subsidiarity principle which starts from the assumption that a decentralized provision of public goods ought to be the rule. If ever there are arguments against a decentralized provision, it is the higher, more centralized level, that carries the burden of proof. Other arguments in favor of a decentralized provision point at a dynamic aspect: \textit{ex ante}, the “best” ways to provide public goods cannot be known.

If this insight is taken seriously, then simultaneous attempts to find good institutional solutions can induce a better average quality of institutions by way of non-central innovations.

Of course, citizens would be best off if they could consume a high quantity of excellent public goods without ever having to pay for them. Unfortunately, such an arrangement is not sustainable. It is, hence, important to take the citizens’ willingness to pay for public goods explicitly into account when deciding on their provision. The rule that those who consume a public good should be identical to those who pay for its provision and who decide upon its provision is called the principle of institutional congruence in public finance. Fiscal equivalence as introduced by Olson into public finance is a direct consequence of that principle. The principle of institutional congruence implies another principle, namely that of autonomy. The relevant actors ought to have the right to decide autonomously on the goods that they want to be provided with (after all, they also pay for them). “Joint tasks” are, hence, incompatible with the principle of institutional congruence.

So what are the arguments in favor of centralization? The most important single argument is the presence of externalities or spill-overs. If activities in state A negatively affect citizens in state B, there is some need for coordination between the two states. Representatives of traditional public finance have then argued that a provision on the next higher level on which both benefits and costs accrue simultaneously would be warranted. Alternatively, and based on Ronald Coase, it has been argued that decentralized coordination can be welfare-maximizing given that some initial endowment with rights exists and that the costs of coordination between the states are sufficiently low. Assuming that coordination costs between 16 states are not huge, there is still a role for the federation even in this more decentralization-friendly view of the world as it is the federation that would have to define the initial rights endowment. Economies of scale are another argument. According to it, centralization might be warranted if per unit provision costs are lower if the good is provided on a higher, rather than on a lower level of government. These insights from the economic theory of federalism are the benchmark against which both the current institutions of German federalism as well as those that will be the valid ones after the reform has been implemented are measured.

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Federalism German Style: the cooperative version of federalism

The starting point of all competence is art. 30 of the German Constitution (the “Grundgesetz” [GG]) which allocates the exercise of governmental powers to the states (the “Länder”). Deviations from this general rule need an express provision or permission on the level of the constitution. Consistently, the basic principle with regard to legislative competence is that all competence is with the states (art. 70). The areas in which the federal level has exclusive competence are enumerated in art. 73 GG. Although these two articles seem to assign a strong role to the states, their importance has continually diminished since the Constitution was passed. Art. 72 proved to be the main instrument for the factual centralization of ever more competence onto the federal level. This article establishes the so-called “concurrent legislation” that allocates competence to the states as long as the federal level remains inactive. It has, however, the right to become active, if its activity is needed in order to establish “equal living conditions”, or preserve “legal and economic unity” (the so-called enabling clause). Another kind of legislation, also based on the requirements just named, is called “framework legislation”. Here, the federal level defines the common frame within which the states can pass their own legislation (art. 75 GG).

Table 1: Types of Legislation in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type:</th>
<th>Exclusive Legislative Power of the States (Art. 70)</th>
<th>Exclusive Legislative Power of the Federation (Art. 71)</th>
<th>Concurrent Legislation (Art. 72)</th>
<th>Framework Legislation (Art. 75)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions for Application:</td>
<td>General Principle</td>
<td>List enumerated in Art. 73</td>
<td>“Federation has legislation is and insofar as the establishment of equal living conditions … or the preservation of legal and economic unity necessitates …”; List enumerated in Art. 74</td>
<td>(1) Legal status of persons in public service; (2) Principles governing higher education; (3) Legal status of the press; (4) Hunting, nature conservation, landscape management; (5) Land distribution; regional planning, management of water resources; (6) Registration of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Examples for) Areas of Application</td>
<td>Foreign affairs, defence; Citizenship; Freedom of movement, passport matters, immigration, emigration; Currency, money, weights, measures; Unity of customs and trading area; Air transport; Traffic of railroads; Postal affairs; ...</td>
<td>Civil law, criminal law and execution of sentences, judicial organization; Registration of births, deaths, marriages; Association and assembly; Residence, settlement of aliens; Weapons, explosives; Public welfare; Economic matters; ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 In translating terms of the German Constitution into English, the authors have largely followed the translation proposed by Tschentscher, A. (2002): The Basic Law (Grundgesetz); The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, Würzburg: Jurisprudentia Verlag.
The key to understanding the federal system in Germany and, hence, also its shortcomings, is the manner in which functional competences are divided between the various government levels. In the German version of federalism, legislative competence is overwhelmingly allocated to the federal level, whereas the states are responsible for the execution of legislation, i.e. carry the administrative burden. This is why the system is also called “executive” or “administrative federalism”. In order to be passed, many laws need, however, the consent of the chamber representing the states (the “Bundesrat”). Yet, this does neither apply to the federal budget nor to the power to pass tax laws. According to the Constitution, states do not have at their disposition the competence to levy substantial taxes. Their competences are confined to the levying of rather marginal local consumption and expense taxes (like the beverage tax, the dog tax, the hunting tax, the entertainment tax; see art. 105 sec. 2a GG). Although factually, the power to tax is overwhelmingly allocated to the federal level, all three levels of the federal structure have a right to their own sources of income in order to ensure a certain financial autonomy. In Germany, a distinction is made between a “separation system” (Trennystem) and a “connex system” (Verbundsystem). The proceeds of taxes that belong to the former are allocated to one single level of the federal system, whereas various levels share in the proceeds of the latter (these are also called joint taxes). Materially, the connex system is more important than the separation system as some 70 percent of the entire tax receipts of the state belong to this category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type:</th>
<th>States execute federal statutes as matters of their own concern (Art. 83)</th>
<th>State Execution With Federal Supervision (Art. 84)</th>
<th>State Execution as Federal Agency (Art. 85)</th>
<th>Direct Federal Administration (Art. 86)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Principle</td>
<td>States provide for establishment of requisite authorities and the regulation of administrative procedures. The Federal government may issue general</td>
<td>Establishment of requisite authorities remains concern of the states unless otherwise provided. The Federal government may issue general</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term “cooperative federalism” used above refers to the necessity of the federal and the state level to cooperate when passing new legislation which is the case in some 60% of all new laws. The term “executive federalism” used here refers to the role of the states in the implementation of existing legislation. Here, the states function as executors of federal legislation.

More precisely, the Bundesrat represents the executives of the states.
A number of characteristics are not in line with the principles of fiscal federalism outlined above:  

- Drawing on the instrument of concurrent legislation, the federal level has centralized an ever larger number of tasks. The two reasons that the federal level can offer as a justification for centralization (namely equal living conditions and legal and economic unity) have been misused as a tool to justify just about anything. The current form of centralization of public tasks ensures a rather high degree of homogeneity in the supply of public services across the country. This could be regarded as positive from the viewpoint of equalization. However, from the perspective of allocation objectives, this amounts to an offence against the subsidiarity principle.

- A large number of tasks are either carried out jointly or financed jointly; as competence has become diffuse, it has become ever more difficult to make specific actors responsible for certain outcomes. Turned around, this means that it is also difficult to make actors accountable for non-action. The high need for consensus related to the joint fulfilment of public functions often leads to inefficient political bargaining outcomes or to mutual policy deadlock, in a way thus also an inefficient outcome of political bargaining. This amounts to a non-observance of the principle of institutional congruence.

- Autonomy presupposes that each level has a number of exclusive competences. Currently, some 2/3 of all laws passed on the federal level need to be consented to by the states which means that they can create gridlock. Many revenues of the states and the communes are decided upon on the federal level, the lower levels are thus heteronomous. It has been estimated that

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some 15% of the states’ expenditures and only some 2% of their revenues can be called autonomous. This amounts, hence, to a contempt of the principle of autonomy.

- State and local authorities enjoy only a low degree of tax autonomy. More than three-quarters of the total German tax revenue is accounted for by joint taxes (income tax, corporate tax, value added tax and local business tax).

- Relatedly, expenditure decisions of the state and local authorities are frequently prescribed by federal laws and hence externally determined. One much-debated example for this practice is that the federal level decides on the content of the Federal Welfare Act, but it is the state governments and above all the local authorities which have to bear the resulting costs. This contradicts the principle of fiscal equivalence.

These are only a number of examples where the principles of fiscal federalism have been disregarded. We now turn to present the most important aspects of what is called federalism reform in Germany.

The Reform Measures – an Overview

The reform measures aim at reducing the joint decision problems which can be achieved by attributing more exclusive competence to either the federal or the state level. In fact, both of these measures will be used: on the one hand, the ratio of federal laws to which the states have to consent is to change from about 2/3 to only 1/3. On the other, the areas in which the states can pass legislation on their own are also to increase. The mixed financing of policies via financial grants is also predicted to decrease as a consequence of the reforms. It is noteworthy that it takes a grand coalition to correct some of the consequences of the reform of federalism that were implemented in 1969 – a period in which the last grand coalition was active.

Table 3: An Overview Over the Main Reform Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Planned Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framework Legislation (Art. 75 GG)</td>
<td>Framework legislation will be abolished and the compe-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 This applies to the disbursement of funds statutes in the German Constitution (art. 104a sec. 3), fiscal assistance by the federal level (art. 104a sec. 4), and above all to the general gearing of expenditure responsibility towards administrative competences an not towards legislative competences (art. 104 sec. 1).
Concurrent Legislation (Art. 74 and 74a GG)  
Part of concurrent legislation will be allocated exclusively to the federal level (law relating to weapons and explosives, law on nuclear energy) or the state level (e.g. law of association and assembly, on closing hours of shops). Part of concurrent legislation can be exercised by the federal level even without having given proof for its necessity (Art. 72 Abs. 2 GG).

Necessity of consent of Bundesrat with regard to legislation executed by states under federal supervision (Art. 84 sec. 1 GG)  
Consent of the Bundesrat only necessary if federal laws have financial consequences for the states (Exception: the federal level demands an uniform execution by the Länder).

Joint Tasks between the Federation and the States (Art. 91a und 91b GG)  
Abolishment of two joint tasks, namely “extensions and construction of higher institutions, including university clinics” and “educational planning”.

Financial Grants of the Federation to the States and the Communes (Art. 104a sec. 4 GG)  
Conditions for financial grants spelled out in more detail (Art. 104b new GG).

Domestic Distribution of Payments resulting from non-compliance with supranational or international treaties (Art. 104a sec. 6 new GG)  
New rule on the distribution of payments in case of financial sanctions pursuant to the non-compliance with international/supranational treaties (Art. 109 sec. 5 new GG).

From an economic point of view, most of the general ideas behind the reform seem laudable: increase the autonomy as well as the responsibility of both the federal and the state level, reduce mixed decision-making that blurs responsibilities. This could result in a supply of public goods more in line with the preferences of the citizens. The degree of institutional competition might increase which could, in turn, induce a higher level of institutional innovation. In the next sections, we will have a closer look at some of the details of the reform.

**Modification of Competences in Legislation**

The current reform provides for

- the abolishment of framework legislation (art. 75);
- the reassignment of tasks organized as concurrent legislation (art. 74);
- the reduction of areas to which the enabling clause can be applied (art. 72, sec. 2);
- the introduction of a right of the states to explicitly deviate from federal legislation (art. 72, sec.3 new).

Over the past few years, the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide a number of cases in which the states quarreled with the federation over the extent of the competence that the framework legislation assigned to the federal level with regard to higher education, given that education has been one of the main competences of the states. The existence of framework legislation created, hence, uncer-
tainties concerning the allocation of competences between the federal and the state level. Its abolishment is only straightforward – and should reduce uncertainty. Most of the competences enumerated in art. 75 were moved to art. 74, i.e. belong to the area of concurrent legislation now. Since the consent of the upper house will not be necessary with regard to many laws anymore, this would have meant less influence of the states. The states were “compensated” by the introduction of a right to explicitly deviate from federal legislation (art. 72, sec. 3 new).

How do these abstract changes translate into concrete competences? The federal level will have the exclusive competence concerning matters relating to the registration of residence and to identity cards and to the protection against transfer of items of German culture to foreign countries (these two competences are moved from art. 75 to art. 73). Further, the law relating to weapons and explosives, benefits to war-disabled persons and to dependents of those killed in the war as well as assistance to former prisoners of war, and the production and utilization of nuclear energy will also become exclusive competences of the federal level (these competences used to be part of concurrent legislation and are, hence, moved from art. 74 to art. 73). Additionally, the competence of protection against international terrorism is newly created. In order to pass new laws in this area, the consent of the Bundesrat is, however needed (art. 73, sec. 2 new).

What are the areas, then, that will be the exclusive competence of the states? Among others, these will be the execution of prison sentences, the fees of notaries, the law of assembly, the law regulating senior-citizen homes and the like, parts of trade law (closing hours, restaurants and the like), and the law of land consolidation. Technically, these competences are explicitly exempted from concurrent legislation in art. 74, implying that they are the exclusive competence of the Länder.

There is a political consensus in favor of the re-allocation of most of these tasks. This cannot be said regarding a number of tasks that are allocated to the states which are still quite controversial\(^\text{12}\): remuneration and pensions of members of the public service, (higher) education, and nature conservation. These tasks will be

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part of concurrent legislation. What is new, however, is the deviation clause (art. 72, sec. 3 new) that allows the Länder to deviate from federal legislation with regard to nature conservation and higher education.

Having the states decide how they want to remunerate their public servants can be interpreted as an increase in the autonomy of states. After all, costs for personnel are the single most important position in the budgets of the states and it seems only straightforward to increase their autonomy in this area. This solution could also be termed “institutional renovation”: It re-establishes the competences the states held until 1971.

Preferences concerning higher education might deviate from state to state which would be an argument for the provision on that level. Additionally, negative spill-overs beyond the states seem unlikely. The argument that the public good education could be consumed by students from other states and that the congruence principle would, hence, be broken will be mitigated by the possibility to demand tuition fees. Pundits of the new allocation of competences point to the danger of a balkanization of degrees. This could, however, be prevented by the mutual recognition of degrees. In fact, the mutual recognition of university degrees is already secured via European legislation.

Finally, giving the Länder the option to pass legislation on nature conservation seems to be the most controversial point. Clearly, it seems, this is an area in which potential spill-overs could be huge and some observes stress the danger of a “race to the bottom”. Yet, this fear seems largely unfounded: first, European legislation does not only bind the federal level but the states as well. Secondly, the basics of environmental protection will be largely harmonized between states as so-called “deviation-free cores” were created, meaning that core-areas of environmental protection will not be subject to the right of the Länder to deviate from federal legislation.

Reducing the number of laws to which the Bundesrat needs to consent

One of the most obvious manifestations of the joint-decision trap is that some 2/3 of all laws passed on the federal level need the consent of the Bundesrat. Politicians claim that after the implementation of the reforms, this should be down to about 1/3 of all laws. As explained above, federalism German style does not only contain a cooperative component but also an executive component: Legislation is often passed on the federal level, but it is then executed by the Länder since the federation does not have a vast bureaucracy at its disposal. This means that laws passed on the federal level can create costs on the state level and, following the
principle of institutional congruence, asking for the consent of the Länder seems justifiable. The reform attempts to correct some problems of the current institutional set-up: Passing laws on the federal level creating costs on the local level will be outright prohibited (art. 85, sec. 1 new). If states execute laws by order of the federation and these put monetary burdens on the states, the states will have to consent to such laws (art. 104a, sec. 4 new). Here, consent of the Länder is newly introduced, not abolished. The hopes of the politicians who predict that the number of laws that the Bundesrat will have to consent to will dramatically decrease is evidently based on a change in art. 84 which deals with the execution of laws by the Länder as their own affair. Here, the Bundesrat will not have to consent to new legislation in the future.

In the past, the joint-decision trap has been particularly severe with regard to laws concerning the so-called fiscal constitution, i.e. in particular laws having to do with tax revenues and their distribution. But changes with regard to income and corporate taxes will need to secure the consent of the Bundesrat even in the future. This also holds with regard to changes in the value added tax. It seems, hence, doubtful whether the reform is indeed a way out of the joint-decision trap.

Reducing the Mixed Financing of Tasks

The German constitution envisages that a number of tasks are jointly financed by the federal and the state level (so-called joint tasks, art. 91a and b). From an economic point of view, these joint tasks are problematic because they lead to a blurring of responsibilities. It would, hence, only be consistent to abolish them entirely. The present reform does not go that far but does go into the right direction. The “extension and construction of institutions of higher education including university clinics” as well as educational planning will be abolished as joint tasks. As should have become apparent, the reform aims at making the states more fully responsible for education, including higher education. It is only straightforward to make them also responsible for the costs of constructing and extending universities. It is, however, hard to understand why the other joint tasks were not abolished simultaneously: the “improvement of regional economic structures” and the “improvement of the agrarian structure and of coast preservation” will remain joint tasks. Both are clearly, even by definition, regional tasks with specific regional preferences playing a potentially important role. This part of the reform stops, hence, half-way.

A second way of mixed financing of tasks is by way of financial assistance from the federation to the states. Such assistance is possible for particularly important investments provided that they are necessary to avert a disturbance of the overall
economic equilibrium, to equalize differences of economic capacities within the federation, or to promote economic growth. These conditions will remain unchanged (they will, however, be moved from art. 104a, sec. 4 to art. 104b new). On top of these, three conditions that read as if they were taken out of an economics textbook will be added, namely that (1) resources are granted for a limited period of time, (2) that their adequate use has to be checked periodically, and that (3) the means dedicated to these tasks decreases over time. These additional conditions make eminent sense. It remains, however, to be seen how easy it is to circumvent them, e.g. by creating substantially identical assistance programs under new names etc.

Extending decentralized Tax Autonomy

A higher degree of autonomy of both the states and the communes with regard to fulfilling their tasks should logically be combined with a higher autonomy in terms of their revenues. The autonomy principle indicates that they should not only be able to decide what they want to do – and how exactly they want to do it – but also how to finance it. It has already been mentioned above that only 2% of all revenues of the Länder can be called “autonomous”. It would therefore be apt to increase their tax autonomy.

The reforms do allocate the competence of determining the rate of the tax on land acquisition to the states. This is, however, only a very small first step as the importance of this tax is rather limited: in 2005, the entire revenues out of this tax amounted to 4.8 billion Euro (in comparison, in 2005, the sum of revenues of the states was more than 235 billion Euro and the proceeds of the tax on land acquisition thus constituted only some 2% of their entire proceeds).

Time and again, economists have emphasized the urgent need to reform Germany’s fiscal constitution. Most politicians now claim that the current reform is only part one of a more extensive reform, and part two would then be dealing with

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13 This seems to be a very low number. Stegarescu has recently proposed a new indicator for measuring the degree public sector decentralization and has presented numbers for 23 OECD countries. He finds that the common claim according to which federal countries are more decentralized than unitary ones is unfounded. One of his indicators measures the degree of tax revenue decentralization. Unsurprisingly, Canada and Switzerland find themselves on top of the list with more than 52%. The autonomous own tax revenue of sub-national governments in Germany is calculated to be 7.61%. This includes, however, not only the states but also the communes. This number is stunning if compared to the number for France, often assumed to be the archetype of a centralized system. There, it is calculated to be 19.53% (all values for 1998). Cf. Stegarescu, Public Sector Decentralization: Measurement Concepts and Recent International Trends, Discussion Paper 04-74, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim, 2004.
the fiscal constitution. It remains to be seen whether the grand coalition will produce sufficient momentum to bring this second part of the reform about.

Creating Rules for a National Stability Pact

Germany’s fiscal problems have been widely reported. It has not complied with the deficit criterion of the European Stability and Growth Pact for the last four years. If it does not comply with the maximum deficit of 3% of its GDP next year, sanctions of up to 10 billion Euro would loom large. There needs to be a rule indicating who would have to pay that bill.

Under the current constitutional rules, the states would participate in the sanction according to their share in the overall deficit. This implies that only those states would be sanctioned that contribute to the deficit. After the implementation of the reform, this will change: Now, the federal level will pay 65% of the sanctions, the states the remaining 35%. Out of these 35%, 65% (i.e. 22.75% of the entire sanction) will have to be borne by those states having caused the deficit. That means, in turn, that the remaining 35% of the entire 35% (i.e. 12.25% of the entire sanction) will have to be borne by the states in their entirety. These 12.25% thus constitute some “solidarity principle” between the states.

The evaluation of this reform is highly ambivalent: on the one hand, it is to be welcomed that precise rules are introduced. On the other, it is unclear why states that chose a sound fiscal policy should participate in paying the fines for those who chose unsound policies. True, there is an incentive to constrain oneself, yet, states with unsound policies can still create considerable spill-overs. More generally, the rule now implemented presupposes that a number of more general issues have been settled which have, at least until now, not been settled at all. These issues are (1) how to allocate the permissible deficit between the federation and the states, (2) how to calculate the permissible deficit amongst the states based on a number of economic indicators, and (3) how to domestically sanction those states that do not comply with the domestic allocation rules. None of these issues has, however, been settled.

Conclusion and Outlook

In Germany, there is a broad consensus that a reform of federalism is a precondition for solving, or at least reducing, some of Germany’s most pressing problems like the high unemployment rate, the low growth rate, the high deficit or the reform of the welfare state. The current reform is one step into the right direction, but some more steps need to follow suit. From an economic point of view, the
most important reform would modify the institutions of the fiscal constitution. More specifically, the fiscal autonomy of both the states and the local authorities needs to be strengthened.

How likely is this reform? The reason for not including the fiscal constitution into the current reform was simply that consensus seemed impossible to reach. The majority of states are financially rather weak and any move towards a stricter separation system would mean new problems for them. Their incentives to be against any such reform are thus obvious. What is more, it is highly unlikely that some of the most important issues of the fiscal constitution will be part of a second reform (if it ever comes about): a coalition of East German and small West German states succeeded in securing that a number of issues would not be part of federalism reform. Among these is the current fiscal equalization scheme which is to continue unchanged until 2019. As the degree of fiscal equalization between the states is extremely high, it discourages the richer states to increase their efficiency further (because most of the gains would be transferred to the poorer states) but it also discourages the poorer states to improve efficiency (as that would reduce the amount of transfers received). In sum, the current reform is a small step into the right direction, but it seems likely that it will also be the last one for years to come.

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