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Corruption, Tax Burden, and Demand for Redistribution in African Countries

Andualem Assefa Welde  *

July 2025

Abstract

What triggered the widespread public backlash against tax reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa, echoing the scale and intensity of the Arab Spring? Economic factors, such as income and inequality, appear to be weak predictors of public attitudes toward redistribution. This study empirically examines corruption as a key factor shaping perceptions of tax burden and redistributive preferences. The analysis draws on newly available data from the 8th round of the Afrobarometer survey (2019–2021), which includes relevant questions for the first time. This period coincided with a wave of anti-tax protests across several African countries. The findings suggest that corruption is strongly associated with higher perceived tax burdens. The results also indicate that corruption diminishes the demand for and willingness to support redistributive taxation. The policy implications include tax compliance, inequality and governance issues on the continent

Keywords: Preference for Redistribution, Tax Burden, Corruption, Sub-Saharan Africa
JEL Classification: D73, H26, O12

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1 Introduction

Economic policies introduced by African governments to raise tax revenue have faced public opposition in recent years. In June 2024, Kenya experienced one of the largest protests in its history, sparked by a proposed tax hike ([ACLEDA, 2024](#)). The anti-tax demonstrations ultimately forced the government to withdraw the finance bill ([Usher and Chothia, 2024](#)). In Uganda, a few months earlier, in April 2024, citizens across the country shut down their businesses to protest high interest rates and a new tax regime ([VOA News, 2024](#)). Similar protests occurred in several other African countries, including Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, Malawi, and Senegal, driven by a common concern: “a political class they don’t trust” ([Savage, 2024](#)). This study critically examines how institutional weaknesses, particularly government corruption, shape public perceptions of the tax burden and economic inequality.

Inequality, primarily determined by tax policies, has become a central topic of public discourse, too important to be left solely to experts ([Piketty, 2017](#)). According to the latest estimates from the World Inequality Report, the global bottom 50 percent captures only 8.5% of total income. Wealth inequality is even more pronounced, with the bottom 50 percent owning virtually no assets. At the other extreme, the top 10 percent of the global population holds 76% of total household wealth and receives 52% of total income ([Chancel et al., 2022](#)). Inequality is also more concentrated in certain regions. In particular, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America, and Southeast Asia, exhibit the most imbalanced distributions. In these regions, the poorest 50 percent earn only 9–12 percent of national income. They are also the only regions where the richest 10 percent account for more than 50 percent of total income ([Chancel et al., 2022](#)).

This study focuses on the perception of inequality, redistribution, and taxation in the SSA region, where inequality is high and redistribution is almost non-existent (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2017; Welde, 2022). Recent Afrobarometer surveys reveal that people in this region express the highest levels of dissatisfaction, compared to other regions, concerning how governments handle economic disparities (El Rafhi, 2020). Beyond the high level of inequality, the number of people living in poverty continues to rise, increasing from an estimated 284 million in 1990 to 433 million in 2018 (Schoch and Lakner, 2020). In 2018, approximately 40 percent of the population lived below the \$1.90-a-day poverty line, representing only a minor reduction from 56 percent in 1990. Afrobarometer's Wave 7 survey (2016–2018) indicates a further deterioration, reversing moderate progress in poverty reduction and revealing a surge in lived poverty (Mattes, 2020). The limited impact of economic growth on reducing poverty is strongly related to the unbalanced income distribution over the past two decades. During this period, economic growth disproportionately affected different income groups, leading to the hollowing out of the middle class in many SSA countries (Clementi et al., 2018, 2019, 2022).

Given that high inequality is harmful, redistribution has become one of the principal roles of governments, especially in industrialized countries (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). However, questions of redistribution are acknowledged as some of the most contentious issues, often leading to political divisions (Rehm, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2017). Individual redistribution preferences arise from various factors, including the level of current inequality (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015) and inequality of opportunities (Aiyar and Ebeke, 2020). The question of redistribution preference is notably less clear in developing countries (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2017).

This study contributes to the debate by demonstrating how citizens' relations with

the state affect their attitudes toward inequality in Africa. The issue of tax burden is also a significant concern on the continent, leading to many protests against government reform efforts to raise revenue in recent years. Therefore, this study aims to examine the effects of government involvement in corruption on individuals' perceived tax burden and redistribution preferences. The study also highlights the role of economic self-interest. For this purpose, individual economic status, the countries' level of development, and objective inequality measures are linked to subjective individual perceptions and preferences. The analysis benefits from a set of novel questions on redistributive taxation introduced in the 8th round of the Afrobarometer cross-country survey, collected between 2019 and 2021.

The findings indicate that citizens who have experience with and attitudes toward corruption in government offices exhibit a higher perceived tax burden. As a result, they are more likely to say that both the rich and ordinary people in their country pay too much in taxes. The results align with other studies, which show that negative perceptions of government are correlated with a greater perceived tax burden and lower tax morale (Yamamura, 2014; Boly et al., 2021; Hauk et al., 2022; Jahnke and Weisser, 2019).

In terms of the demand for redistribution, corruption is associated with a lower individual demand for redistributive policies, demonstrated by lower support for taxing the rich to subsidize the poor. Corruption also diminishes individual willingness to contribute to redistributive taxation, such as support for youth programs. On the other hand, it increases support for unemployment aid, demonstrating a mixed effect. The results presented in this study are more descriptive than purely causal. Nonetheless, the results remain consistent across various specifications, supporting that unobserved factors are unlikely to be a significant source of statistical bias.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. **Section 2** provides the context

of the study by briefly reviewing the literature on key factors influencing redistribution preferences and tax burden. [Section 3](#) describes the data sources and methods. [Section 4](#) presents summaries and analyses of the key findings. Finally, [Section 5](#) provides the concluding remarks.

2 The key drivers of redistribution preferences

2.1 Inequality

The benchmark Meltzer-Richard (MR) model applies the principles of the median voter mechanism to the redistribution analysis as part of a democratic exercise ([Meltzer and Richard, 1981](#)). The model relies on the rational choice of economic self-interest ([Corneo and Grüner, 2002](#)). According to this hypothesis, people in the lower income bracket support redistribution since they benefit from it. The rich, on the other hand, oppose redistribution. In a typical relationship between macroeconomic variables, the proposition implies that higher inequality leads to higher redistribution in a majority vote democracy as the income of the median citizen falls below that of the mean. In practice, however, the level of inequality is a weak predictor of redistribution preference ([Pecoraro, 2017](#); [Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005](#)).

The empirical literature identifies alternative mechanisms to explain the weak relationship between inequality and redistribution in cross-country comparative analysis. [Bobzien \(2020\)](#) found an association between the perception of inequality and redistribution. [Choi \(2019\)](#) also demonstrates that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is associated with redistributive preferences. [Ahrens \(2022\)](#) stressed that the unfairness measure of inequality (unfairness Gini) strongly correlates with redistribution preferences. [Dion and](#)

[Birchfield \(2010\)](#) emphasised the role of social context, especially concerning countries' development stage and inequality level. They found evidence that the role of individual income is weaker in developing countries and more unequal countries, and country-level average support for distribution varies by region. They also attributed the historical, social, and political factors in shaping the degree of inverse relationship between income and redistribution.

2.2 Social mobility

It is not only the current income but also the past and expected future income trajectory that is crucial in shaping redistribution preference. [Piketty \(1995\)](#) hypothesized that there are more pro-redistribution individuals in the lower class and more anti-redistribution individuals in the middle class in a steady state based on their belief in mobility. Consequently, regardless of income, mobility learning plays a concrete role in determining the preference for redistribution. [Benabou and Ok \(2001\)](#) formalized the “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM), where less redistribution by people experiencing poverty is a function of their expected future income. [Alesina and La Ferrara \(2005\)](#) found empirical support for this hypothesis, showing that Americans who believe that their country is “a land of opportunity” do not see government redistribution favorably.

2.3 Institutional quality measures

While previous paradigms have primarily been studied in the context of redistribution, institutional quality measures also play a role in shaping perceptions of the tax burden. Several studies have examined the role of trust in government. For instance, [Martorano and Günther \(2023\)](#) establishes a positive relationship between trust and support for redis-

tribution. The present study is particularly aligned with [Yamamura \(2014\)](#), whose findings indicate that trust in government is associated with a lower perceived tax burden and greater support for redistribution in Japan. In other words, in contexts where trust in government is higher, people are less likely to feel overburdened by taxes and are more supportive of income redistribution from the rich to the poor. The effect of corruption on redistribution is highlighted by [Alesina and Angeletos \(2005\)](#), who argue that corruption increases the demand for larger governments. Similarly, [Hauk et al. \(2022\)](#) provides empirical evidence of a positive relationship between corruption and redistributive demand in Latin American countries.

In sum, individual preferences for redistribution and perception of tax burden are derived from various economic and social variables. A significant portion of the literature is devoted to understanding these factors in the context of high-income countries. This study focuses on Africa, where research on redistribution preferences remains limited. I believe this study is the first to examine individual perspectives on tax burden issues across African countries. With regard to redistribution, aside from [Cabeza and Decancq \(2018\)](#), which highlighted how the Ebola outbreak increased support for taxation to fund development, the topic has received relatively little scholarly attention in the region.

3 Methods

3.1 Main data source

The study is based on data from the 8th round of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted between July 2019 and July 2021. The Afrobarometer survey holds public opinion on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and associated matters across the African




Figure 1: Afrobarometer round 8 survey locations: each point represents a cluster continent. In the 8th round of the survey, 48,000 respondents were interviewed from 34 countries, 32 from SSA. The 32 SSA countries are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The North African countries of Morocco and Tunisia are excluded from the main analysis, as the study focuses on SSA countries. The number of respondents ranges from 1,200 in smaller countries to 2,400 in larger ones (see Table 16 in the appendix). One individual from each household is interviewed to represent the adult population at least 18 years of age in each country. The 8th round introduces novel questions on redistributive taxation, including attitudes toward welfare taxes aimed at supporting the poor and assisting young people. Afrobarometer surveys are geo-referenced. Figure 1 shows the locations of the sampling clusters for SSA countries in this survey round.

3.2 Tax burden

The initial rows in Table 1 summarize the four outcome variables utilized in the main analysis. The first two pertain to individual perceptions of tax burdens on the rich and the poor. In this study, perceived tax burden refers to an individual's subjective assessment of the level of tax obligations (Yamamura, 2012). The survey prompts respondents to evaluate whether the tax burden on the poor and the rich is insufficient, appropriate, or excessive within their respective countries. Regarding the tax burden on the rich, the survey measures citizens' perceptions of "the amount of taxes that rich people are required to pay to the government", using an ordinal scale with five response options: 1 (far too little), 2 (too little), 3 (about the right amount), 4 (too much), and 5 (far too much). A binary variable is constructed to indicate perceived excessive tax burden on the rich, taking one if the respondent selected 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the survey measures citizens' perception regarding "the amount of taxes that ordinary people are required to pay to the government", using the same 1 to 5 scale. A binary variable is constructed to denote a high tax burden on ordinary citizens, which equals one if the response is 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise.

3.3 Redistribution preference

The remaining variables capture the demand for and willingness to contribute to redistributive taxation. The *poor subsidy* variable captures the level of support for taxing the rich to benefit the poor. The survey records responses on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) to the statement: "It is fair to tax rich people at a higher rate than ordinary people to help fund government programs benefiting the poor." A dichotomous variable is created for the main analysis, coded as one if the response was either 4 (agree) or 5 (strongly agree), and zero otherwise. Responses of 3 (neither) were infrequent.

The second indicator measures support for redistribution aimed at supporting youth. The variable includes initiatives for job creation, education, job training, business loans, and social services to prevent drug abuse. Most respondents identify youth unemployment as the primary concern. The survey reports preferences using the question, “If the government decided to make people pay more taxes to support programs to help young people, would you support this decision or oppose it?” The responses are: 1 (Strongly oppose), 2 (Somewhat oppose), 3 (Neither support nor oppose), 4 (Somewhat support), and 5 (Strongly support). Similar to the other questions, a dichotomous variable is created that equals one if the response is either 4 (Somewhat support) or 5 (Strongly support), and zero otherwise.

Table 1: Description and measurement scales of the main variables

Variable	Description	Scale
<i>Outcome variables I</i>	Perception of tax burden	
Taxes for the rich	Taxes the rich are required to pay	5
Taxes for ordinary people	Taxes ordinary people are required to pay	5
<i>Outcome variables II</i>	Redistribution preference	
Poor subsidy	Fair for the rich to pay higher taxes to subsidize the poor	5
Youth support	Willing to pay higher taxes for young people	5
<i>Main variables of interest</i>	Corruption measures	
Bribe for education	Pay bribe for public school services	4
Bribe for permit	Pay bribe for permit or identity document	4
Bribe for police	Pay bribe to avoid problem with police	4
Bribe for police assistance	Pay bribe to get police assistance	4
Bribe for health	Pay bribe for medical care	4
Corruption attitude	The President and Officials in his Office	4
Senior partner	Most powerful ethnic group in the executive	2
Coethnic president	Share ethnicity as the president	2

3.4 Corruption

The primary variable of interest is the prevalence of corruption. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the different corruption measures. The hypothesis is that perceived corrup-

tion increases the perceived tax burden and boosts support for redistribution. The baseline measure is individuals' perception of corruption at the highest level of government. The survey asks respondents whether they believe leaders, such as the president or prime minister and officials in their office, are involved in corruption. Perception of corruption is measured using responses to the following question: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption: The President and officials in his office?" Response options are coded as: 0 (None), 1 (Some of them), 2 (Most of them), and 3 (All of them). A binary variable that equals one if the responses are 2 or 3 and 0 otherwise is created.

The study also examines the effect of corruption using alternative measures, focusing on ethnic alignment with influential political leaders. Ethnic similarity with leaders such as the president or ministers can be linked to more favorable views of the government, demonstrating lower perception of corruption (Boly et al., 2021). The study follows two approaches to identify respondents' proximity to political leaders. The first involves assessing whether respondents share ethnic similarity with the president. For the 8th round of the Afrobarometer, respondents are matched with the president who was in power one year prior to the individual country surveys. Data on the ethnic affiliation of presidents are drawn from Bandyopadhyay and Green (2025) and Bomprezzi et al. (2024). A list of presidents, their years in office, and their ethnic affiliations is presented in Table 14 in the appendix. Secondly, the study employs a variable that indicates sharing a similar ethnic identity with the senior partner of the government. The variable indicates ethnic groups' access to power, adopting the classification of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) (Vogt et al., 2015).¹ Table 15 in the appendix shows access to power during the survey period.

¹The dataset includes data for all politically relevant groups in countries with at least 500,000 inhabitants in 1990 from 1946 onwards. The EPR dataset measures power access by examining the involvement of individuals from relevant ethnic groups in executive roles such as the presidency, cabinet, and senior

These measures are expected to have the opposite sign to the attitude toward corruption.

Further evidence is provided by examining bribery victimization. The survey asked respondents whether they had paid bribes to obtain government services. For example, one question states: "How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour for a health worker, clinic, or hospital staff to get the medical care you needed?" Similar questions were asked about school services, getting assistance from or avoiding problems with police, and obtaining permits or identity documents. Responses were recorded on a four-point scale: 0 (Never), 1 (Once or twice), 2 (A few times), 3 (Often).

These individual questions are aggregated to derive three measures of corruption experience, following [Jahnke and Weisser \(2019\)](#) and [Bukari et al. \(2024\)](#). The first is a binary indicator of *corruption experience*, which equals one if a respondent reports involvement in any of the five domains. The second measure, referred to as *corruption spread*, captures the number of domains in which an individual experienced corruption, ranging from 0 (none) to 5 (all domains). Lastly, the *corruption frequency* indicator captures the highest level of corruption exposure a respondent reports across any of the five domains, ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (often).

administrative positions, including the military. This data is categorized into seven subgroups: discriminated, powerless, self-excluded, junior partner, senior partner, dominant, and monopoly. These categories assess the extent of representation within the executive ([Welde, 2025](#)). For instance, if an ethnic group is classified as having a monopoly, elite members from that group hold exclusive power in the executive. In contrast, other ethnic groups in that country are excluded. Conversely, if the group is a junior partner, representatives from that group share access with others (the senior partner). I create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ethnic group holds senior partner or dominant power in the executive, and zero otherwise.

3.5 Empirical strategy

The study employs a probit regression model to test the main hypotheses regarding tax burden and preference for redistribution. The baseline equation is:

$$Y_{ij}^* = \beta_0 + \delta_j + \beta_1 \text{Corruption}_{ij} + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}. \quad (1)$$

Here, Y_{ij}^* denotes a latent variable, while Y_{ij} is an observable measurement indicating the perceived level of tax burden and preference for redistribution for individual i in country j . β_0 is a constant, and δ_j captures country fixed effects. Corruption_{ij} captures the prevalence of corruption. \mathbf{X}_{ij} is a vector of individual-level control variables, and ϵ_{ij} represents the error term.


4 Results

4.1 Descriptive statistics


The proportion of respondents in each category of the outcome variables' original scale is provided in the figures below. Figure 2a shows that 40 percent of the respondents perceive that the rich in their country are not paying enough in taxes. Around one-third of the respondents believe that the rich are paying the appropriate amount of taxes. Only about 20 percent say that the rich are required to pay too much in taxes. Figure 2b, on the other hand, shows the opposite, with more than half of the respondents reporting a tax burden on ordinary people. See the summary statistics for all variables in Table 13.

Figure 3 represents the outcome variables reflecting the two redistribution preferences. Figure 3a indicates an overwhelming support for redistributive taxation by taxing the

rich to subsidize the poor. 71 per cent of the respondents support higher taxation on the rich to subsidise the poor. Figure 3b, on the other hand, highlights a noticeable divide among respondents on taxation for youth support. It shows that approximately 60 percent of respondents are willing to accept higher taxes if the government allocates additional revenue to youth programs.




(a) Taxes for the rich: too little, the right amount or too much




(b) Taxes for ordinary people: too little, the right amount or too much

Figure 2: Perceptions of tax burden




(a) Fair for rich to pay higher taxes to benefit the poor (poor subsidy)




(b) Support more taxes for youth programs
 Figure 3: Preference for redistribution

Figure 4 presents the relationship between selected macroeconomic variables and average responses regarding tax burden and redistribution preferences. The author obtained the national-level Gini index and poverty headcount corresponding to the survey from the World Bank. The author also applied the closest figures from the years before and after the survey when data for the survey year was unavailable. The poverty headcount indicates the share of the population living on less than \$2.15 per day. Figure 4a shows a positive relationship between the perceived tax burden on the rich and the Gini index. Figure 4b also highlights a stronger positive relationship between a country's poverty headcount and the average perceived tax burden on the rich. The association suggests that the perceived tax burden on the rich is higher in poorer and more unequal countries, contrary to what one would expect.


Figure 4c shows a modest negative relationship between average support for redistributive taxation and inequality, suggesting that the share of respondents who support taxing the rich to subsidize the poor is lower in more unequal countries. Similarly, Figure 4d shows a negative relationship between average support for taxing the rich to subsidize the poor and the poverty headcount. This result implies that demand for redistribution is stronger in wealthier countries than in poorer ones.




(a) The rich pay too much or far too much



(b) The rich pay too much or far too much



(c) Fair to tax the rich higher to subsidize the poor



(d) Fair to tax the rich higher to subsidize the poor

Figure 4: Relationship between objective measures and average responses

4.2 Main results

4.2.1 The effect of perceived corruption in the executive

The main results are estimated using a probit model. Table 2 presents the baseline estimates. The first two columns display perceptions of the tax burden on ordinary people and on the rich, while the last two columns report variables related to redistribution preferences. The coefficients indicate the marginal effects from the probit specification. Estimations using the ordered probit model yield similar results and are available upon request. The Afrobarometer 8th round survey overlapped with the COVID-19 pandemic. The fieldwork of this round was conducted in 11 countries in 2019, 12 in 2020, and 11 in 2021. The results concerning corruption remain stable, accounting for differences by countries' year

of fieldwork, whether before or after the pandemic.

The coefficient of perceived corruption in the president's office shows a significant positive association with the perceived tax burden on ordinary people and the rich. Corruption is therefore linked to a higher perceived tax burden (see columns 1 & 2). The marginal coefficients indicate that individuals who perceive high corruption at the executive level of government are 5 percentage points more likely to believe "ordinary people too much or far too much" in taxes. The effect on the perceived tax burden of the rich is about 2 percentage points. This strong effect is evident for instance in recent anti-tax protests in Kenya and Uganda, where the objection is directly linked to government corruption ([VOA News, 2024](#)). The findings also align with [Yamamura \(2014\)](#)'s conclusions regarding the negative effect of favorable views of the government on the perceived tax burden. In terms of redistribution preferences, the impact of corruption on subsidies for the poor is negligible, while the willingness to contribute to higher taxation for youth support decreases significantly by 7 percentage points.

Among socio-economic and demographic factors, monetary poverty is strongly linked to a higher perception that ordinary people are overtaxed. It is also positively correlated with support for government subsidies for the poor and taxing the rich. Education is associated with a reduced perceived tax burden on the rich and a higher willingness to contribute to taxes that support youth programs.

The effect of corruption perception based on alternative measures is presented in [Table 3](#). It shows the impact of ethnic alignment with the most powerful party in the executive (senior partner), reflecting more favorable views of the government. The coefficient for senior partnership shows a significant negative correlation with the perceived tax burden and a positive correlation with support for youth-targeted taxation by percentage points.

Table 4, on the other hand, demonstrates the effect of a respondent sharing the same ethnic background as the president. Coethnicity specifically reduces the perceived tax burden on ordinary people and the rich by 2 percentage points. It also increases respondents' willingness to contribute to youth support by 2 percentage points. The coefficients are smaller than those for ethnic alignment with the senior partner, possibly because some presidents may be practically powerless in executive decision-making.

Table 2: The effect of high perceived corruption attitude in executive

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Corruption in the executive	0.093*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.065*** (0.007)
Monetary poverty	0.045*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.008)	0.052*** (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)
Education status				
At most secondary	0.008 (0.008)	-0.020*** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.008)
At least post-secondary	0.001 (0.010)	-0.052*** (0.008)	-0.020** (0.009)	0.018* (0.010)
Female	-0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)
Age	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Age squared	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Rural resident	-0.028*** (0.007)	0.015** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.023*** (0.007)
Employed full-time	-0.005 (0.009)	0.017** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.03
Observations	36195	34016	38575	38838
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3: The effect sharing ethnicity with the powerful leaders in executive

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Share ethnicity with the executive	-0.051*** (0.009)	-0.024*** (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	0.038*** (0.008)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.02
Observations	31368	29178	33840	34232
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: The effect of sharing ethnic similarity with the president of the country

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Share ethnicity with president	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.024*** (0.009)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.02
Observations	31723	29183	34290	34630
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

4.2.2 Corruption experience

The previous paragraphs discussed the effects of high corruption perception in the executive branch of the government. In this section, the study provides evidence by showing a significant relationship between corruption experience and the outcome variables. The first focus is on the respondent's experience of corruption in any form. To capture this, the study evaluates the effect of bribery victimization across various government services, including whether the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain a government document or permit, receive medical treatment at a public clinic or hospital, avoid problems with the police, secure police assistance, or ensure a child could attend public school. These five corruption measures are explained in Section 3.4. The hypothesis is that such experiences directly lead to a higher perception of corruption.

Table 5 shows the effect of experiencing at least one instance of corruption in any of the five bribery domains. The coefficients suggest that corruption increases the perceived tax burden and diminishes redistribution preferences. Experiencing at least one instance of bribery in any domain is associated with a 5 percentage point higher perceived tax burden for ordinary people, compared to individuals without corruption experience. Similarly, it is linked to a 2 percentage point higher perceived tax burden on the rich. In terms of redistribution, it is associated with a 1 percentage point lower level of support for subsidies for the poor. At the same time, this experience of corruption is associated with a 5 percentage point lower willingness to contribute to taxes for youth programs. These results are consistent with the findings of [Moro-Egido and Solano-García \(2020\)](#), who showed that perceptions of benefit fraud are associated with lower support for taxation and public spending. In sum, the results further cement those obtained by corruption perception in the executive branch of government.

Table 6, on the other hand, presents the effect of each of the five separate bribery victimization channels. The results indicate that no single domain is conclusively stronger than all others. However, bribery experiences related to obtaining a permit or ID document and avoiding problems with the police are the only domains strongly associated with a higher perceived tax burden on both the rich and the ordinary people. Corruption experienced in accessing medical services, on the other hand, significantly increases the perceived tax burden only for ordinary people. In terms of redistribution, while none of the individual domains significantly influence support for subsidies for the poor, most are associated with lower support for youth-targeted tax programs.

The magnitudes of the coefficients are particularly high when corruption is related to health services. The negligible effects of corruption in obtaining police assistance and not avoiding a problem with them may reflect the nature of loopholes in policing. Accessing school services is also weakly related to the outcome variables, which may suggest that governments provide such services for free, such as primary education, in most countries.

Table 5: The effect of corruption experience

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Corruption experience	0.052*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.047*** (0.007)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.02
Observations	40198	37271	43502	43946
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: The effect of specific corruption experience

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Get document or permit	0.029*** (0.011)	0.020** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)
Get medical services	0.041*** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.048*** (0.010)
Avoid problem with police	0.025** (0.010)	0.023*** (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.021** (0.009)
Get assistance from police	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.006 (0.014)
Get public school services	0.005 (0.013)	0.009 (0.011)	0.010 (0.011)	-0.045*** (0.012)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.02
Observations	40198	37271	43502	43946
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

4.2.3 Corruption prevalence

Table 7 presents the effect of corruption prevalence, accounting for the number of domains in which a respondent experienced corruption. This may range from none to all of the five bribery channels. The results suggest that the spread of corruption further shapes its association with the outcome variables. For instance, bribery victimization in only one of the domains is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the perceived tax burden on ordinary people, compared to someone who did not experience it in any domain (column 1). Experiencing corruption in four domains, on the other hand, increases the perceived tax burden by 7 percentage points, before declining when the experience spans all five domains. Similarly, the effect on the perceived tax burden on the rich increases from 2 percentage points in one domain to 3 percentage points in three domains, before declining in the fourth.

The coefficient for poor subsidy shows that the effect is limited to corruption in just one domain, reducing support by 2 percentage points. The spread of corruption to additional domains has a negligible effect. Interestingly, column 4 indicates a consistently stronger effect of the spread of corruption on respondents' willingness to pay more taxes for youth support. While corruption experience in only one domain is associated with a 4 percentage point decline in support for youth programs, the coefficient increases considerably to a 11 percentage point when a respondent experiences corruption in all five domains.

Table 8 shows the effect of corruption frequency in any of the domains. Similar to corruption spread, the results suggest that the effects increase as frequency rises, albeit non-monotonically. Column 1 shows that a respondent who engaged in bribery once or twice is 3 percentage points more likely to say that ordinary people are overtaxed, compared to someone with no corruption experience. A respondent who often pays bribes

in any of the five domains, on the other hand, is 12 percentage points more likely to say that ordinary people are overtaxed. The effect on the perceived tax burden on the rich is significant only when a respondent experiences corruption repeatedly. The effects on poor subsidy and youth support increase gradually but plateau after a certain point (columns 3 and 4).

Table 7: The effect of corruption spread

	Perception of Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Bribery exposure domains				
One	0.046*** (0.008)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.008)
Two	0.066*** (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	-0.052*** (0.012)
Three	0.066*** (0.018)	0.030* (0.016)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.094*** (0.019)
Four	0.067** (0.026)	0.019 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.057** (0.026)
Five (All)	-0.074* (0.038)	0.045 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.035)	-0.106*** (0.039)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.02
Observations	40198	37271	43502	43946
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 8: The effect of corruption frequency

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Highest corruption frequency				
Once or twice	0.028*** (0.010)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.009)
A few times	0.013 (0.011)	0.033*** (0.010)	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.052*** (0.011)
Often	0.124*** (0.011)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	-0.051*** (0.011)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.02
Observations	34305	31733	36994	37341
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A robustness check analysis on the effects of corruption is provided by incorporating countries macroeconomic indicators. Table 9 accounts the effect of inequality measure of Gini index, ethnic fractionalization, poverty level and unemployment level. Unemployment rate for the corresponding survey year of each country is obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is obtained from [Alesina et al. \(2003\)](#). The impact of corruption experience remains consistent and stable across the baseline model, except in its effect on the perceived tax burden on the rich. Interestingly, inequality is positively correlated with lower perceived tax burden on both ordinary people and the rich. Inequality is also associated with lower support for subsidies for the poor. This negative relationship is illustrated in Figure 4a. The effect of the poverty headcount and unemployment on redistribution are positive, except in the case of support

for the poor. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is negatively correlated with tax burden and positively correlated with youth support.

Table 10 further shows the effect of citizens' beliefs about whether the government spends tax money on public well-being. The results suggest that individuals who believe taxes are used for public benefit perceive a lower tax burden, particularly on ordinary people. This belief is also positively associated with support for poor subsidies and youth programs.

Table 9: The effect of corruption experience

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Corruption experience	0.054*** (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.060*** (0.007)
Gini index	-0.242*** (0.055)	-0.205*** (0.046)	-0.126*** (0.048)	-0.053 (0.051)
Poverty headcount	0.040* (0.023)	0.358*** (0.019)	-0.137*** (0.019)	0.096*** (0.021)
Unemployment rate	0.004*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.055** (0.022)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.012 (0.020)	0.058*** (0.021)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01
Observations	39276	36525	42470	42925
Mean of dep. Variable	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.59

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 10: Effect of perceived government use of taxes for public well-being

	Tax Burden		Redistribution Preference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ordinary people overtaxed	The rich overtaxed	Poor subsidy	Youth support
Tax spent on wellbeing	-0.104*** (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.186*** (0.005)	0.100*** (0.006)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R ²	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.03
Observations	38120	35675	41022	40961
Mean of dep. Variable	0.51	0.22	0.70	0.60

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for gender, age, age squared, urban-rural status, monetary poverty and employment status. The sample includes all 32 SSA countries in the 8th Afrobarometer survey. Regressions are weighted using both within-country and across-country weights, ensuring equal importance for all countries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

The study complements the results by using data from the 7th round of the World Values Survey (2017–2022), which coincides with round 8 of the Afrobarometer. The dependent variables measure whether respondents consider poor subsidy by taxing the rich, unemployment aid, and equalizing income to be “essential characteristics of democracy” on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates “Not an essential characteristic of democracy.” These variables are transformed into binary forms, with values of 6 or higher coded as one and responses from 1 to 5 coded as zero.

Perceived corruption in the country, shown in Table 11, is based on responses to the question about “corruption in my country,” measured on a scale from 1 (There is no corruption in my country) to 10 (There is abundant corruption in my country). A binary variable for high perceived corruption is created, coded as 1 if the response is greater than 5, and 0 otherwise. Corruption in government, reported in Table 12, is based on responses to the statement “The government is generally free of corruption,” ranging from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). A binary variable is created to indicate high perceived

government corruption, coded as one for responses of 4 or 5, and zero otherwise.

The results presented in both tables are consistent with those of the baseline model on redistribution. While corruption is a weak predictor of support for poor subsidies and income equalization, it is significantly associated with higher support for unemployment aid. The coefficient of corruption on youth support in the Afrobarometer survey is negative, reflecting a greater willingness to pay higher taxes for youth programs.

Overall, the study effectively demonstrates the crucial role of corruption in shaping perceived tax burden and redistributive policies. The analysis is not, however, without limitations that may affect interpretation. Firstly, the results rely on cross-sectional data, which is less effective than panel data in mitigating endogeneity and omitted variable biases. The results indicate correlations rather than causal relationships. Secondly, although the study is based on novel questions introduced in the Afrobarometer survey—particularly regarding perceptions of the tax burden—the redistributive preference questions lack some essential features for comparison with other studies. The most commonly employed redistributive question, which is unavailable in the survey, is: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between families with high incomes and those with low incomes.” Accurate interpretation of variables, considering the question framing, is therefore crucial. Despite these shortcomings, the author is confident in the stability of the results, supported by sensitivity checks, and believes the study will contribute to discussions about perceptions of taxation, inequality, and institutional quality issues in Africa.

Table 11: The effect of high perceived corruption in a country

	Essential characteristics of democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Poor subsidy	Unemployment Aid	Equalize income
High perceived corruption in a country	0.018 (0.021)	0.070*** (0.019)	-0.019 (0.021)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.03	0.04
Observations	4777	4777	4777
Mean of dep. Variable	0.57	0.69	0.69

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for income, education, gender, age, age squared, urban-rural residence, marital status and religion. The sample includes all 4 SSA countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe) in the 7th world value survey. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 12: The effect of perceived government involvement in corruption

	Essential characteristics of democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Poor subsidy	Unemployment Aid	Equalize income
High perceived government corruption	0.014 (0.020)	0.096*** (0.018)	-0.023 (0.020)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observations	2976	2976	2976
Mean of dep. Variable	0.57	0.69	0.69

Notes: The results are marginal effect estimates from a probit model. Regressions control for income, education, gender, age, age squared, urban-rural residence, marital status and religion. The sample includes all 4 SSA countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe) in the 7th world value survey. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

5 Concluding remarks

This study aims to test the hypothesis that government malpractices or institutional quality indicators are crucial in explaining redistributive taxation. To this end, it investigates the effects of corruption on the perceived tax burden and preferences for redistribution. The analysis provides one of the first pieces of cross-country evidence in Africa, using newly introduced questions from the 8th round of the Afrobarometer Survey. The timing of the data collection (2019–2021) aligns with a surge of anti-tax protests in several African countries, underscoring the relevance of the study.

The first dimension of the study concerns examining individuals' perceived tax burden. As expected, perceptions and experiences of corruption play significant roles in explaining differences in tax burdens for the rich and ordinary people. Corruption is consistently associated with a higher perceived tax burden. On the one hand, respondents who perceive high levels of corruption in government are more likely to say that people are overtaxed in their respective countries. More intuitively, the experience, spread, and frequency of corruption are associated with a higher perceived tax burden.

The findings of study have important implications for tax evasion, tax compliance, and tax morale. Individuals with a higher perceived tax burden are likely to exhibit greater tendencies toward tax evasion and lower levels of tax compliance and tax morale. Previous research supports these results, indicating that perceptions of corruption and low trust in government are strongly correlated with such behaviors.

In a similar approach, the study examines redistribution preferences. The two indicators of redistribution preferences are subsidies for the poor and youth support. In this regard, corruption experiences diminish support for poor subsidies financed by taxing the rich.

It is also significantly correlated with a lower willingness to pay higher taxes for youth support across all specifications. In contrast, it increases support for unemployment aid. The effect of corruption on redistribution preferences is therefore mixed in African countries. It reduces individuals' willingness to pay taxes and diminishes the perceived fairness of poor subsidies on the one hand, while increasing support for unemployment aid on the other, in line with the findings of other studies (Hauk et al., 2022).

In sum, the study highlights how corruption influences redistributive taxation in a cross-country analysis. While most cross-country studies on redistribution rely on surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Values Survey (WVS), their limited coverage of African countries leaves a significant gap in understanding these dynamics within the continent. The ISSP includes only South Africa, and the WVS collects data from very few African nations, resulting in a dearth of cross-country studies focused on Africa. This paper addresses this gap by leveraging new questions introduced in the 8th round of Afrobarometer, providing fresh insights into redistributive taxation in the African context.

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Table 13: Summary Statistics

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Ordinary people overtaxed	41102	0.51	0.50	0	1
The rich are overtaxed	38089	0.22	0.42	0	1
Poor subsidy	44507	0.70	0.46	0	1
Youth support	44986	0.59	0.49	0	1
High corruption attitude in the executive	40061	0.38	0.49	0	1
Share ethnicity with president	35676	0.24	0.43	0	1
Share ethnicity with the executive	35678	0.29	0.45	0	1
Corruption experience	45692	0.29	0.45	0	1
Corruption frequency	38771	0.63	1.01	0	3
Corruption spread	45692	0.47	0.90	0	5
Get medical services	45692	0.11	0.32	0	1
Get document or permit	45692	0.10	0.30	0	1
Get assistance from police	45692	0.05	0.22	0	1
Avoid problem with police	45692	0.13	0.34	0	1
Get public school services	45692	0.07	0.26	0	1
Gini index	45676	0.42	0.08	0	1
Poverty headcount	45676	0.28	0.16	0	1
Government spends tax on citizens wellbeing	42123	0.56	0.50	0	1
Cash poverty	45457	0.82	0.39	0	1
education	45503	1.68	0.74	1	3
Female	45676	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age	45665	36.86	14.74	18	120
Age squared	45665	1575.82	1311.50	324	14400
Rural resident	44964	0.57	0.50	0	1
Employed full-time	45692	0.21	0.41	0	1

Table 14: Countries presidents and their ethnic affiliation

Country	President	Tenure in Office	Ethnic group
Benin	Patrice Talon	4/2016 – present	Fon
Botswana	Mokgweetsi Masisi	4/2018 – present	Tswana
Burkina Faso	Roch Marc Christian Kabore	12/2015 – 01/2022	Mossi
Cameroon	Paul Biya	11/1982 – present	Beti
Ivory Coast	Alassane Ouattara	12/2010 – present	Malinke
Ethiopia	Abiy Ahmed	4/2018 – present	Oromo
Gabon	Ali Bongo Ondimba	10/2009 – 08/2023	Bateke
The Gambia	Adama Barrow	1/2017 – present	Fula
Ghana	Nana Akufo-Addo	1/2017 – present	Akan
Guinea	Alpha Conde	12/2010 – 09/2021	Malinke
Kenya	Uhuru Kenyatta	4/2013 – 09/2022	Kikuyu
Malawi	Peter Mutharika	5/2014 – 05/2020	Lomwe
Mali	Ibrahim Boubacar Keita	9/2013 – 8/2020	Bambara
Mozambique	Filipe Nyusi	1/2015 – present	Makonde
Namibia	Hage Geingob	3/2015 – 02/2024	Damara
Niger	Mahamadou Issoufou	4/2011 – 04/2021	Hausa
Nigeria	Muhammadu Buhari	5/2015 – 05/2023	Fulani
Senegal	Macky Sall	4/2012 – present	Pulaar
Sierra Leone	Julius Maada Bio	4/2018 – present	Sherbro
Tanzania	John Magafuli	11/2015 – 3/2021	Sukuma
Togo	Faure Gnassingbe	5/2005 – present	Kabiye
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	1/1986 – present	Banyankole
Zambia	Edgar Lungu	1/2015 – 8/2021	Bemba
Zimbabwe	Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa	11/2017 – present	Shona

Table 15: Access to power dataset

Country	From	To	Group	Size	Status
Angola	2003	2021	Mbundu-Mestico	0.26	Dominant
Benin	2017	2021	South/Central (Fon)	0.33	Senior Partner
Botswana	1966	2021	Tswana	0.57	Senior Partner
Cameroon	1983	2021	Beti (and related peoples)	0.18	Senior Partner
Cote D'Ivoire	2012	2021	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	0.34	Senior Partner
Ethiopia	2020	2020	Oromo	0.3439	Senior Partner
Ethiopia	2020	2020	Tigry	0.0608	Senior Partner
Gabon	2006	2021	Mbede (Nzebi, Bateke, Obamba)	0.2	Senior Partner
Ghana	2018	2021	Asante (Akan)	0.15	Senior Partner
Kenya	2018	2021	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb	0.24	Senior Partner
Kenya	2018	2021	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu	0.19	Senior Partner
Liberia	2019	2021	Kru	0.06	Senior Partner
Malawi	1995	2020	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao)	0.46	Senior Partner
Mali	2013	2021	Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)	0.9	Senior Partner
Mauritius	2017	2021	Hindi-speaking Hindus	0.4	Senior Partner
Mozambique	2015	2021	Makonde-Yao	0.067	Senior Partner
Namibia	2015	2021	Ovambo	0.498	Senior Partner
Namibia	2015	2021	Damara	0.045	Senior Partner
Niger	2017	2021	Hausa	0.56	Senior Partner
Senegal	2013	2021	Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)	0.23	Senior Partner
Sierra Leone	2019	2021	Mende	0.3	Senior Partner
Togo	2016	2021	Kabre (and related groups)	0.27	Dominant
Zambia	2017	2021	Bemba speakers	0.43	Senior Partner
Zambia	2017	2021	Nyanja speakers (Easterners)	0.3	Senior Partner
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	2011	2021	Shona	0.82	Senior Partner

Table 16: Afrobarometer survey round 8

Country Name	Number of Samples
Angola	2400
Benin	1200
Botswana	1200
Burkina Faso	1200
Cabo Verde	1200
Cameroon	1200
Cote d'Ivoire	1200
Eswatini	1200
Ethiopia	2378
Gabon	1200
Gambia, The	1200
Ghana	2400
Guinea	1200
Kenya	2400
Lesotho	1200
Liberia	1200
Malawi	1200
Mali	1200
Mauritius	1200
Morocco	1200
Mozambique	1110
Namibia	1200
Niger	1199
Nigeria	1599
Senegal	1200
Sierra Leone	1200
South Africa	1600
Sudan	1800
Tanzania	2398
Togo	1200
Tunisia	1200
Uganda	1200
Zambia	1200
Zimbabwe	1200
<i>Total sample</i>	48,084