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Research Report

Ukraine support after three years of war: Aid remains low but steady and there is a shift toward weapons procurement

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Ukraine Support After Three Years of War: Aid remains low but steady and there is a shift toward weapons procurement

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Executive Summary

- This report takes stock of international support for Ukraine. It is based on almost 3 years of data collection from the Ukraine Support Tracker, stretching from January 22nd, 2022 to December 31st, 2024.
- Over the past 3 years, Ukraine has received a low but steady inflow of foreign aid, with Europe taking the lead. On military aid, Europe's support of EUR 62 billion is on a similar level to that of the United States, which has allocated EUR 64 billion in total. However, Europe has long surpassed the US when it comes to financial and humanitarian aid allocations (EUR 70 billion vs. 50 billion). Total aid allocations by all donor governments to Ukraine amount to EUR 267 billion as of Dec 2024, or about EUR 80 billion per year.
- In percent of GDP, only Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, plus the Netherlands, have made a significant effort to support Ukraine. Major donors such as Germany, the US or the UK have allocated less than 0.2% of their GDP on aid to Ukraine per year. This is comparable to minor and questionable domestic subsidy programs such as for diesel fuel or company cars. Southern European countries like France, Spain or Italy have done even less, with just around 0.1% of GDP mobilized for Ukraine per year. Through the lens of Western governments' fiscal budgets, aid to Ukraine thus looks more like a minor political "pet project" rather than a major fiscal effort.
- The Russia-Ukraine war has become a battle of procurement and military production. In 2022, more than 70% of foreign military aid came from national stockpiles, with little industry procurement. By 2024, that ratio had reversed, as two-thirds of all arms and equipment allocated to Ukraine now come directly from defense industries. This trend underscores the growing relevance for ramping up defense production in Europe.

¹ The authors would like to thank Annalena Tetzner for her excellent research assistance in data collection, visualization, and drafting.

- European donors are increasingly collaborating through multilateral procurement initiatives to jointly produce and deliver weapons to Ukraine. Our dataset records a total of EUR 5 billion in military procurement initiatives, including ad-hoc coordinated projects or more institutionalized multilateral funding mechanisms, such as the International Fund for Ukraine, the Czech Ammunition Initiative, and the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package. While these initiatives remain relatively small, they could become a blueprint for the future of aid for Ukraine.
- Donors such as Denmark have started to purchase weapons directly from Ukrainian producers, in particular drones. Looking ahead, this “Danish model” could help to deliver weapons that are cheaper and delivered more quickly.

1 Introduction

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has tested the resilience of Ukraine and its partners for three years. Since February 2022, Western leaders have pledged to stand with Ukraine and announced major military, financial, and humanitarian support. The Ukraine Support Tracker has documented these promises and flows from 41 donor countries and the EU institutions in our database of aid for Ukraine. On the eve of the third anniversary of the invasion, we take stock of the international support for Ukraine, highlighting important facts and developments.

We structure this report in three sections. First, we present an overview of aid to Ukraine, focusing on both military and non-military aid. Our data shows that the average flow of support has remained low but surprisingly stable over the past years. The United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom have remained the largest individual providers of military aid in billions of Euros. In percent of donor GDP, however, only Eastern European and Scandinavian countries, plus the Netherlands have made a significant effort to support Ukraine.

In the second part, we focus on the increasingly dominant role of defense industry procurement for Ukraine. In 2022, two thirds of military aid came from national defense stockpiles, with only little coming from industry sources. In 2024, this ratio had reversed, with two thirds of military aid being new weapons and equipment acquired from defense industries. The Russia-Ukraine war has become a battle of defense procurement.

In the third section, we demonstrate how a growing phenomenon has emerged among donors to pursue defense procurement cooperatively, including with Ukraine. While these initiatives make up a minority of procurement efforts, the role of the International Fund for Ukraine and the expansion of investment in Ukrainian industry have the potential to sustain Ukraine's future defense needs.

Most of this report builds on the metric of 'aid allocations', which is defined as aid that has either already been delivered or has been specified and designated for delivery.

For methodology, sources, and definitions, we refer to our earlier reports, particularly:

- *Long 2023 working paper* with key results and methodology:
 - o Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Schramm, S. (2023). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which Countries Help Ukraine and How? Kiel Institute Working Paper, 2218, [download here](#)
- *Research Note of June 2024* – Introducing the measurement of “aid allocation” and conducting benchmarking and data validation:
 - o Bomprezzi, P., & Kharitonov, I., Trebesch, C., (2024). Ukraine Support Tracker – Methodological Update & New Results on Aid “Allocation” (June 2024) – Research Note, [download here](#)
- *Dataset Documentation*:
 - o Bomprezzi, P., & Kharitonov, I., Trebesch, C., (2024). Dataset Documentation for the Ukraine Support Tracker: Definitions, Sources, Methods, [download here](#)


2 Aid to Ukraine 2022-2024: A summary

2.1. Dynamics of support: US vs. Europe

Over the last three years, Europe and the United States have allocated EUR 132 billion and EUR 114 billion, respectively, totaling EUR 246 billion in aid to Ukraine. Of this amount, roughly half—over EUR 120 billion—has been military assistance.

Europe's military support has remained relatively steady over time, and in early 2024, it had caught up with the US after initially trailing behind. The US remains the single most important donor country in absolute terms, by a large margin, but its support slowed considerably during the “aid crisis” between mid-2023 and early 2024, when the US Congress blocked new support to Ukraine.


Figure 1: Military aid (cumulative) to Ukraine provided by the US and Europe (February 2022 – December 2024, in Billion Euros)



The US “aid crisis” is even more visible when it comes to financial and humanitarian support, as shown in Figure 2. While European aid has followed a steady upward trend, US non-military aid has not increased for 9 months, resuming only in late 2024—largely driven by the disbursement of a USD 20 billion loan—the so called “Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan” sourced from frozen Russian assets. Humanitarian aid was particularly affected. In 2022, the United States allocated over EUR 1.89 billion for humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). However, this amount shrank to roughly one-third—around EUR 0.65 billion—in 2023, and stood at EUR 0.87 billion in 2024.

These observations highlight the uncertainty associated with future U.S. aid. President Trump has repeatedly signaled reluctance to continue foreign assistance, as demonstrated by his administration's executive order freezing all U.S. aid for 90 days upon his inauguration on January 20, 2025.²

Figure 2: Non-military aid (cumulative) to Ukraine provided by the US and Europe (February 2022 – December 2024, in Billion Euros)




2.2. The European donor countries – total and percent of GDP

This growing significance of European aid naturally raises the question: which are the main European donor countries? Figure 3 shows the ranking of total allocated aid in billions of Euros, summing up all allocations from February 2022 to December 2024. Germany is the single most important donor, providing EUR 17 billion in total, closely followed by the UK with EUR 15 billion and Denmark with EUR 8 billion.

² See <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/>


Figure 3: European donors- bilateral aid allocations by type
(January 2022 – December 2024, in billion Euros)



While Figure 3 shows the total magnitude of support for Ukraine, some donor countries are much larger (in terms of GDP) than others. Figure 4 therefore scales aid allocated as a share of 2021 GDP. In addition, we now account for aid allocated via EU institutions.³

³ To account for “aid allocated through EU institutions”, we estimate the portion of total aid provided by EU institutions that can be attributed to each member state based on their relative contribution to the EU budget. See our Dataset Documentation for more details.

Figure 4: Total bilateral allocations by type – Europe
(January 2022 – December 2024, % 2021 GDP)



The data show that the Baltic and Nordic states have allocated the highest share of aid as a percentage of their pre-war GDP. Estonia and Denmark, for example, have allocated over 2.5% of their 2021 GDP, and Lithuania and Latvia around 2%. These shares include both bilateral aid and aid channeled through the various EU donor mechanisms.

On the other end of the spectrum are Southern European donors such as Italy, Spain, Portugal or Greece, as well as Hungary, which have allocated only minor amounts of bilateral aid for Ukraine. The United States has allocated 0.53% of its 2021 GDP in bilateral support to Ukraine. This is a larger share in bilateral support compared to many European donors, including Germany and the United Kingdom.

2.3. The bigger picture – is Ukraine aid large or small?

In the bigger picture, the sum of aid remains comparatively low, as we have shown in earlier reports, in particular in Trebesch et al. (2023).⁴ If we measure new aid per year, Germany, the UK, and the US have mobilized less than 0.2% of GDP to support Ukraine, while other rich donor countries like France, Italy or Spain only allocated about 0.1% of GDP annually (in each 2022, 2023, and 2024). This is not a major effort, as even small domestic policy priorities are many times more expensive than what is being done for Ukraine. For example, Germany's tax subsidies for diesel fuel ('diesel privilege') cost taxpayers three times more per year than Germany's military aid for Ukraine. Also, the annual tax subsidies of company cars or the newly introduced so-called 'mothers' pension' is many times more expensive per year (see Trebesch et al. 2023 and Binder and Schularick 2024 for details).⁵

In Trebesch et al. (2023) we also make comparisons to earlier wars and conflicts. The sums of support for Ukraine are tiny when compared to the aid flows in WW2. But even when compared to more recent conflicts and proxy wars, Ukraine support is comparatively small. The US, for example, has mobilized considerably more money per year during the Korean, Vietnam or Iraq wars, while the annual flows for Afghanistan are comparable in size to those for Ukraine.

More surprisingly, we show in Trebesch et al. (2023) that Germany has mobilized more funds, more quickly to support and free Kuwait in 1990/91 than it mobilized to support Ukraine. Specifically, total German aid allocations to Ukraine 2022-2024 amount to 0.4% of German 2021 GDP compared to 0.6% of GDP for Kuwait in 1990/91 (channeled through the US). The annual flows of support were thus considerably lower, because the Iraq war was over after 6 months, while the Ukraine war is entering its 4th year.

⁴See The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which Countries Help Ukraine and How? – Kiel Institute Working Paper, 2218, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/87bb7b0f-ed26-4240-8979-5e6601aea9e8-KWP_2218_Trebesch_et_al_Ukraine_Support_Tracker.pdf.

⁵See Binder, J., & Schularick, M., (2024). The Cost of Not Supporting Ukraine – Kiel Institute Working Paper, 179, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/2a62f762-49a1-410a-8225-ca50193faa38-KPB_179_EN.pdf.


3 From stocks to procurement: The growing trend of producing new weapons for Ukraine

3.1. From stocks to procurement

One of the most notable developments in military aid over the past three years is a gradual shift from relying on donors' stockpiles to procuring newly produced weapons and equipment.

The shift to procurement is not a surprise. Already in September 2022, particularly within the EU, it was clear that member states' arsenals were being severely "depleted" by large-scale transfers of weapons to Ukraine.⁶ More generally, there is a growing recognition for the need of revitalizing defense industries and designing new and efficient procurement mechanisms, although progress has been slow, as a previous Kiel Report documents in detail.⁷

Figure 5: Sources of military aid: procurement vs. stocks



⁶ In September 2022, Josep Borrell, then High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, warned during a debate in the European Parliament that member states' arsenal were severely "depleted" by the large transfers of military items to Ukraine. See <https://www.politico.eu/article/borrell-warn-eu-countries-running-out-weapons/>

⁷ See Wolff, G. B., Burilkov, A., Bushnell, K., & Kharitonov, I. (2024). *Fit for war in decades: Europe's and Germany's slow rearmament vis-à-vis Russia*. Kiel Institute for the World Economy. <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/fit-for-war-in-decades-europes-and-germanys-slow-rearmament-vis-a-vis-russia-33234/>

Given these developments, we have begun tracking the sources of military aid to Ukraine, categorizing them into two broad groups: “procurement”, which encompasses funding and in-kind donations through purchases from the defense industry, and “stocks”, which refers to equipment supplied directly from the arsenals of donor or third-country armed forces.

Figure 5 illustrates how military aid to Ukraine has shifted over time in terms of its sources. In 2022, only around 27% of military aid came from defense industry purchases. However, as the conflict continues, the reliance on newly procured weapons and equipment has grown. In 2024, at least 66% of the military aid allocated to Ukraine was sourced through procurements from the defense industry.

3.2. Procurement through multilateral initiatives

While the majority of procurement funding for weapons and military equipment is organized bilaterally between donor governments and Ukraine, we observe the rise of institutionalized and ad-hoc joint procurement initiatives to deliver assistance to Ukraine. During the period between the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, our data registers a growing presence of procurement funding allocated multilaterally. Because several of these initiatives have only recently been established, categorizing them within precise boundaries is not always straightforward. Nevertheless, we have broadly identified three main types of multilateral procurement efforts:

Ad-hoc multilateral procurement initiatives

In the first category, donors engage in ad-hoc, case-by-case collaboration to jointly procure weapons. These efforts can involve co-funding arrangements, where multiple countries pool their resources, or a division of responsibilities, where one partner provides funding and another oversees procurement. For example, in the Denmark–Netherlands joint procurement—the smallest of these initiatives—both countries share the cost to acquire 14 overhauled Leopard 2-A4 tanks, illustrating a co-funding approach. By contrast, the Czechia–Denmark–Netherlands (EUR 1.1 billion allocated) and Denmark–Sweden (EUR 0.7 billion allocated) collaborations use a division of responsibilities model: Denmark provides the funds, while the other Ministries of Defense manage the contracting and procurement with their respective national arms industries. In total, our dataset records over EUR 1.8 billion in such ad-hoc multilateral procurement initiatives.

Institutionalized multilateral procurement initiatives

In other instances, donors employ a more structured, institutionalized funding mechanism to jointly procure military equipment. Typically, these arrangements are carried out through a pooled fund administered by one or a group of countries and are designed for multilateral procurement across multiple, sequential aid packages. We have identified three such institutionalized multilateral procurement initiatives: the International Fund for Ukraine, the Czech Ammunition Initiative, and NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine (NATO CAP).

The International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) is a UK-led funding mechanism that mobilizes financial contributions from international partners to rapidly procure priority military equipment for Ukraine. As of December 2024, IFU has announced nine military aid packages providing various weapon systems and equipment—including artillery ammunition, drones, and electronic warfare systems—with a total value of EUR 1.6 billion. The primary contributor to this fund is the United Kingdom, which has contributed more than EUR 1.1 billion, accounting for 70% of the total funds allocated through IFU. The remaining finances are provided by Norway (14%), the Netherlands (8%), Denmark (4%), and additional contributions from Australia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Sweden, and Iceland.

The Czech Ammunition Initiative is a Czechia-led effort, originally announced by Czech President Pavel at the Munich Security Conference in February 2024. The initiative aims to procure 500,000 rounds of 155 mm and 300,000 rounds of 122 mm artillery shells for Ukraine from producers outside the European Union. Nearly EUR 900 million has been allocated under this initiative, with procurement efforts focused primarily on artillery munitions—particularly the critically needed 155 mm shells. Belgium is the most significant donor in this framework, contributing at least with EUR 200 million.


NATO CAP is a broad support framework introduced in 2016 after the Russian annexation of Crimea. NATO CAP supplies Ukraine with funding for non-lethal military items through its CAP Trust Fund. In our dataset, we track EUR 564 million of military procurement value dedicated to this channel. Top donors are the UK (EUR 129 million), the Netherlands (EUR 100 million), and Japan (EUR 62 million).

Joint procurement mechanisms within broader frameworks

In the third category, donors jointly procure weapons within a broader framework designed to enhance coordination and effectiveness in military support for Ukraine. A key example is the Capacity Coalition mechanism, established under the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein Group). So far, eight Capability Coalitions have been formed to streamline and mobilize military support across key domains, including Armour, Air Force, Demining, Maritime Security, Drones, and IT. While these coalitions primarily serve as coordination platforms for bilateral military aid, some have also introduced joint funding mechanisms for procurement. For instance, the Drone Capability Coalition, led by Latvia and the UK, has mobilized EUR 0.5 billion for the procurement of various drones and drone-related equipment. However, because these coalitions primarily function as coordination bodies rather than direct procurement entities, distinguishing between funds allocated to a “pooled fund” for multilateral procurement and those designated for coordinated bilateral aid remains challenging.

Given the complexities in tracking joint procurement within broader frameworks, our analysis focuses on ad-hoc multilateral procurement initiatives and institutionalized mechanisms, where the multilateral nature of procurement is clearly identifiable. Figure 6 summarizes the total value of military aid provided through these multilateral procurement initiatives, which collectively account for EUR 5 billion.

Figure 6: Procurement through multilateral donor initiatives
(total allocations in billion Euros, 2022-2024)



Notably, 95% of military aid procured through these multilateral initiatives is funded by European countries. Donors such as the UK, Czechia, the Netherlands, or Denmark are playing a leading role in both ad-hoc and institutionalized multilateral procurement initiatives. This trend also reflects the growing European emphasis on multilateral procurement—a priority underscored by the EU’s 2024 European Defense Industrial Strategy, which sets an ambitious goal to procure “at least 40% of defense equipment in a collaborative manner by 2030.”⁸ Currently, procurement for Ukraine through multilateral initiatives remains small —accounting for only around 9% of total Ukraine-focused procurement. However, this approach could potentially shape the future trajectory of aid to Ukraine.

3.3. Made in Ukraine: Foreign donors have started to procure weapons from Ukraine’s defense industry

Over the last year, several European countries have signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Ukraine, including France and Germany as well as Luxembourg and Lithuania.⁹ EU officials have also emphasized the potential for learning opportunities for European weapon production as Ukrainian-produced equipment is continuously tried and tested on the battlefield.¹⁰

Our data tracks the evolution of this increased EU-Ukrainian cooperation as we include foreign government procurement orders with Ukrainian military companies. Our data on Ukraine military aid is thus extended to cases which donor governments order weapons and military

⁸See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1321

⁹ See https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ARES_2024_12_107_Ukraine_Defence_Industry_PolicyPaper.pdf

¹⁰ See https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-press-release-eu-ukraine-defence-industries-forum-bolsters-cooperation-between-ukrainian-and-2024-05-06_en

equipment from Ukrainian locally rather than relying solely on the production by EU- or US-based defense companies.

Overall, the sums of foreign orders to Ukrainian defense companies remain small. As of December 2024, our data record EUR 1 billion in foreign government orders to the Ukrainian defense industry, which represents less than 2% of total donor procurement efforts of EUR 54 billion. In other words, more than 95% of the newly procured arms to support Ukraine have been, and continue to be, produced in the donor countries themselves.

In the following, we focus on two notable examples of the so-called “Danish model”, starting with Denmark, which pioneered the idea of local weapon acquisition in Ukraine.

Denmark

In mid-2024, the government of Denmark became the first donor to order locally produced, Ukrainian weapons for delivery to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In our dataset, we track a total of EUR 870 million of Danish purchases of artillery and drones produced in Ukraine, including for 18 Bohdana howitzers that were delivered in September 2024.

In addition, in October 2024, Denmark also announced the establishment of a “Defense Industry Hub” at the Danish embassy in Kyiv to bring together the public and private sectors of both countries.¹¹ The hub, which will consist of Ukrainian defense industry specialists, Danish defense industry attachés, and possibly business organizations, will seek to establish production with Ukrainian defense companies, cooperate on innovation in technology such as drones, and support the development of software within the defense industry.

Netherlands

In October 2024, the Netherlands unveiled a drone action plan to purchase EUR 400 million in advanced drones for Ukraine, including reconnaissance, offensive and defensive drones. The novelty was that half of this sum is to be spent in Ukraine and other countries, with the other half procured in the Netherlands. The plan seeks to bring together Dutch pioneering of unmanned systems with Ukrainian experience in the field in order to quickly scale up Ukraine’s drone industry, potentially unlocking larger Dutch investments down the road.

¹¹ See <https://ukraine.um.dk/en/news/denmark-establishes-defence-industry-hub-in-kyiv>

4 Conclusion

This report has examined aid to Ukraine over the past three years, highlighting key trends and takeaways. First, the flow of aid to Ukraine has been surprisingly steady, in aggregate, with annual allocations of about EUR 80 billion in each 2022, 2023 and 2024. Europe has been and remains the main source of aid to Ukraine, with Scandinavian and Eastern European donors making the largest contribution, by far, when scaled by donor country GDP. After almost a year of minor aid flows, the US returned to play a major role in 2024, accounting for almost half of total new allocations. This underscores the large uncertainty on Ukraine aid with Donald Trump's return to the White House.

Second, in the bigger picture, the support for Ukraine appears low. Most large donors, including Germany, the US, or the UK, only allocate around 0.2% of their annual GDP to Ukraine, while Italy, Spain, or France allocated only around 0.1% of GDP per year. These numbers are small from a historical perspective (earlier wars and crises) and can be compared to minor domestic spending priorities. In most Western countries, questionable subsidy programs, e.g. for company cars or diesel fuel, consume much larger sums of taxpayer money per year than what has been mobilized for Ukraine. Through the lens of Western governments' fiscal budgets, aid to Ukraine thus looks more like a minor political "pet project" than a major fiscal effort.

Third, we document a shift away from sending weapon aid from national stockpiles towards procuring newly produced material from industry. In 2024, almost two-thirds of donor countries' military aid allocations for Ukraine were industry orders. As the war in Ukraine drags on, Western leaders increasingly recognize the necessity of rebuilding their defense industries. Policy initiatives such as the EU's European Defence Industrial Strategy and NATO's Defence Production Action Plan have been introduced to enhance production and defense capacities and facilitate long-term military support for Ukraine. Our data confirms that this shift is not just a policy discussion but a tangible development, albeit a slow one.

Fourth, we observe the emergence of new multilateral procurement initiatives aimed at streamlining the procurement process for Ukraine, as well as the growing interest in ordering weapons directly from Ukrainian manufacturers. The "Danish model" of closely cooperating with and buying from the Ukrainian defense industry may well be a way forward to increasing the efficiency and reducing costs for aid to Ukraine. Although the share of weapons procured through these initiatives remains marginal, they could have significant ripple effects on the future trajectory of aid to Ukraine.