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# Working Paper Do politicians affect firm outcomes? Evidence from connections to the German Federal Parliament

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# Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament\*

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#### Abstract

We study how connections to German federal parliamentarians affect firm dynamics by constructing a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effect of access to political power, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Our results reveal that connections lead to reductions in firm exits, gradual increases in employment growth without improvements in productivity. Adding information on credit ratings, subsidies and procurement contracts allows us to distinguish between mechanisms driving the effects over the politician's career.

Keywords: Politicians, Firm Performance, Identification, Political Connections.

JEL classification: O43, L25, D72

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# 1 Introduction

The business and political sector have many joint interests and connections between firms and political power are a common phenomenon across the world (Faccio 2006). While political connections could in principle have social value, for instance, by overcoming market frictions, they mostly raise concerns regarding inefficient resource allocation, political favoritism, and corruption. In modern democracies, the recent rise in the number of prominent business politicians whose involvement benefits corporate interests has been particularly viewed with suspicion (Babenko et al. 2023). More generally, it is important to understand how high-profile political connections are selected and how they affect firm outcomes and the economy.

In this paper, we study the effects of members of the federal parliament in top executive or supervisory positions on firm outcomes in Germany. While a large literature examines the effects of political connections on financial outcomes such as firm value or access to government loans, we focus on economic outcomes including employment, labor productivity, and firm survival. We add information on credit ratings, large scale subsidies and EU procurement contracts as additional outcomes for a comprehensive analysis of involved mechanisms. So far, economic firm outcomes have been mostly studied in the context of firm connections to local government contracts to connected firms and thus improve their competitive market position. In contrast, we focus on connections to members of the federal government, who are strongly monitored by transparency regulations and have less direct access to local finances.<sup>1</sup> We ask the questions how top level politicians in a country with strong institutions and rigid transparency regulations are selected and whether they can influence firm outcomes?

To answer our research questions, we compile a novel data base combining information from multiple administrative sources. We start with collecting detailed information on all members of the German *Bundestag*, the federal parliament, since 1949 and of all candidates on party lists for federal elections since 1998. We merge these individuals to the universe of German firms, exploiting firm-level ownership information and their position and identity members in the executive leadership team, such as CEO/owner, executive and advisory board member. The firm data, provided by *Cred-itreform* and organized by the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research in Mannheim, contains comprehensive information on firm outcomes such as credit scores, employment, sales, firm entry and exit dates. At the firm level, we link data on economic subsidies provided by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and European-wide public procurement data from Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) provided by the European Commission.

The data allow us to exploit the timing of political mandates and firm-level positions and implement two research designs that rely on events at which we can identify causal effects of a change in political connection on firm outcomes. Our first identification strategy is an event study design

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>In Germany, disclosure requirements only exist for national and, more recently, for state-level politicians. Local politicians at the county- and municipal-level are not obliged to disclose their activities outside of parliament.

which analyzes new appointments of active or former parliamentary members. Specifically, we compare firms appointing a politician with similar firms appointing a non-politician in their executive leadership team using a difference-in-differences strategy with a matched control group. This strategy identifies the causal effect of the political appointment unless firms choose the timing of political appointments over non-politician appointments conditional on expected outcomes.

Our second strategy develops a framework that relies on election outcomes in which the winner of the election is arguably random. In particular, we focus on ranked lists of candidates that are submitted in advance of each election by each party and in each federal state. State-level party vote shares determine the number of candidates from each list who enter parliament. This system creates a marginal seat on each list with a winning candidate who just enters parliament and the candidate on the next seat who just loses. We exploit this discontinuity along the ranking on the party list, pooling 256 local discontinuities in a regression discontinuity design (RDD). This exceptional situation allows us to compare companies who have a political candidate in one of their executive positions and become connected to parliament once this candidate wins the marginal seat with companies in the same situation whose candidate misses the marginal seat. We also consider an analogous situation with an incumbent candidate who is up for re-election and either keeps the mandate or loses it.

To start out, we exploit the discontinuity in election outcomes around the marginal seat to study how firms select politicians. In particular, we compare future career outcomes of candidates who just enter parliament and those who just miss the marginal mandate, studying new executive appointments formed after the election as well as terminations of existing appointments. In our setup, we observe different types of candidates depending on whether or not they hold a political mandate at the election date or whether or not they have an executive position at the time of the election. The results of this analysis show which types of candidates are preferred by firms if they narrowly win or lose an election.

In terms of firm outcomes, our identification strategies define a series of events spread over the politician's career. Given that the identification assumptions hold, we can thus learn from the estimation results how the effects of a political connection vary over the political life cycle. We first observe the start of the political career when a political candidate with a position in the firm wins an election and enters parliament. At a later career stage, we observe active members of parliament, who are appointed to an executive or supervisory position. At the end of the political career, we observe the exit from a government mandate when an incumbent politician with a position in the firm loses the election. Finally, we observe a former politician who has already resigned from their government mandate entering a firm in an executive or supervisory position.

Together with the rich set of outcome variables observed in the data, the identification of different events over the political career allows us to distinguish between potential mechanisms by which a connection to a national politician can affect firm outcomes. One mechanism by which top executives affect firm outcomes is *management quality*. Our analysis can address the question whether parliamentary politicians are better managers than non-politicians. Empirical evidence from Sweden shows that politicians are positively selected in terms of leadership skills (Dal Bó et al. 2017). In addition, politi-

cians collect experience of political decision processes and form contacts that may be valuable for firms. These arguments suggest that the entry of an active or former politician into executive ranks might improve firm outcomes, whereby the latter may be more experienced and has more time to devote to the firm. In contrast, an election win should not affect management quality at the firm, at least in the short-run, because the candidate already had the executive position before the election. We expect management quality to be reflected in all our outcome variables, least of all (short-run) credit ratings from rating agencies.

Related to credit rating, the connection to a prominent politician can serve as a *positive market signal*, enhancing the firm's reputation as a reliable business partner. The market signal mechanism is likely to be directly reflected in improved credit ratings. Additionally, such signals may have short-term effects on firm survival, potentially reversing the fortunes of struggling businesses. We expect that this effect is particularly pronounced when candidates win elections or when active politicians are appointed to high-ranking positions, as these events may get attention and improve market perceptions.

The third mechanism results from gaining a connection to politics and the power to influence decisions in favor of connected firms. The politician's *direct intervention* in decision processes should primarily impact the likelihood that a firm wins subsidies and procurement contracts, and it may amplify the impact on employment and productivity growth. Specifically, active politicians with political power and experience should be able to directly intervene in favor of their connected firms. Thus, we expect to find positive impacts from appointments of active politicians and candidates winning an election (and the negative impacts for incumbents losing an election).

In our main specifications, we estimate short-term impacts in a period of two years after the new appointment or the election year. The empirical analysis results in three main findings. First, our data reveal that firm connections to parliamentary politicians are not uncommon in Germany and the share of firms connected to politicians has almost doubled over the last two decades. Second, we find evidence for selection of politicians based on their political and executive experience. Our results show that careers of candidates without a political mandate are unaffected by an election win or loss. In contrast, incumbent candidates who exit parliament because they miss the marginal seat are also more likely to exit their current firm position. But in turn, they are more likely to start a new appointment with a different firm. This is, however, not the case for incumbents without executive experience. Once they exit parliament their chances of a firm appointment drop significantly relative to incumbents who keep their government seat.

Third, we document significant effects of political connections on several firm outcomes, even though the German environment is strongly regulated. In particular, we find that gaining access to parliament improves credit ratings and leads to reductions in firm exit rates. We find increases in employment growth for firms appointing active and, especially, former politicians, but we do not find corresponding increases if a candidate wins an election. We also find positive effects on the probability of winning subsidies and procurement contracts for appointments of politicians and for candidate election wins, not all of which are statistically significant. If an incumbent loses an election, we generally find smaller impacts on firm dynamics. A potential explanation for this result is that firms tend to appoint new active members of parliament or future candidates after an incumbent loss.

Our evidence is consistent with all three of the mechanisms we introduced above in determining firm outcomes. In line with the *signal mechanism*, we find positive impacts of appointments of active or former politicians on credit ratings. Similarly, we find positive impacts on credit ratings after an election win and a negative impact after election losses. Short-run reductions in firm exits after appointments of politicians and election wins are also compatible with the signal mechanism. Evidence in favor of *management quality* of politicians in top executive positions is provided by the increase in employment growth and to a lesser extent productivity growth after a political appointment. Importantly, we do not see corresponding positive effects if a candidate wins an election, which is expected because in this case the new connection to politics is not related to a change in management quality. Finally, positive impacts on gaining access to subsidies and procurements can be affected by both the *management quality* and the *direct intervention* mechanisms in case of new appointments of active or former politicians. But, as management quality remains constant in the event of election wins, the positive impact on subsidies and procurement contracts in the RDD analysis provides evidence that direct intervention in favor of connected firms plays a role.

We draw three conclusions from the analysis of mechanisms. First, parliamentary politicians improve the quality of management in connected firms. Second, new political connections formed from appointments of parliamentary politicians or election wins of candidates who are already in the firm send positive signals about the firm to the market. Third, there is evidence that connected politicians affect firm outcomes by direct intervention in decision processes favoring these firms.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and highlights our contributions. Section 3 describes the institutional details of Germany's electoral system and transparency regulations for activities outside of parliament. In Section 4, we describe the data and the corporate governance structure and provide descriptive statistics for different types of connections. The empirical strategies are introduced in Section 5. Section 6 examines how firms select politicians. Section 7 documents the effect of appointing a politician in an event study design on firm-level outcomes. Section 8 develops reduced-form identification exploiting election results and submitted party lists and shows the results on winning and losing political power. Section 9 provides evidence on additional firm outcomes. Section 10 concludes.

# 2 Related Literature

An active literature investigates the connection between the political and business sector and analyzes the impacts of these connections on the economy. To review this literature and clarify our contribution, we have assembled a list of 25 recent studies examining the effects of political connections on the outcomes of connected firms in Table A.1 in the Appendix. We categorize these studies by the type of connection, distinguishing whether the firm is directly connected to an active politician who holds a position in the firm and a position in government (in Panel A), whether the firm is directly connected to a former politician, who holds a position in the firm but no longer has a position in government (in Panel B), or whether the connection is indirect and firm representatives and politicians interact outside the firm (in Panel C). This is the case, for example, when politicians and firm representatives belong to the same family or the same social network, or when companies donate to political campaigns.

These distinctions can be further categorized into studies investigating connections to the national (in Panels A.1, B.1, C.1) and local governments at state or district level (in Panels A.2 and C.2). Overall, there is a relatively even split of studies across these categories. But we found only two studies explicitly investigating firm connections to former politicians both of which study connections to the national government (Goldman et al. 2013, 2009). In this scheme, our paper contributes evidence on firm connections to active and former politicians in the national government (Panels A.1 and B.1).

Column (5) in Table A.1 lists the main outcome variables considered in the respective study and column (6) shows the direction of the estimated effects. The table clearly shows that most studies investigate financial firm outcomes, analyzing the effects of a political connection on stock returns, stock prices, or returns on assets. Starting with the seminal study by Fisman (2001) these studies unambiguously document positive effects from a connection to political power on firm value across a wide range of countries. Niessen & Ruenzi (2010) contribute positive effects on stock returns for Germany. Another prominent set of outcomes concerns firm access to financing via stimulus grants (Choi et al. 2024, Duchin & Sosyura 2012) or government bailout (Faccio et al. 2006), loans and procurement contracts (Khwaja & Mian 2005, Schoenherr 2019, Brown & Huang 2020, Goldman et al. 2009), and foreign investment (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee 2006). Again, the findings across studies strongly support the hypothesis that political connections help firms in getting access to financing at the local or national level.

A few studies focus on savings banks in Germany, a special type of firms, which are strongly politically connected by legal rules mandating that a senior local politician has to serve as the supervisory board chairman. Comparing savings banks to other local banks without political connections, Englmaier & Stowasser (2017) find that local politicians push for savings bank lending prior to elections to improve local economic outcomes and their own reelection chances. Using a similar strategy, Koetter & Popov (2021) show that saving bank lending strongly increases after local elections that result in changes in political power. Haselmann et al. (2018) exploit indirect connections via a German service club and find that club members who are elected as mayors and become heads of savings banks increase lending to the other club members. The extra lending has lower returns, however, and does not result in increased investment of loan-receiving firms.

Compared to the large number of studies analyzing outcomes related to firm value or financing, relatively few studies focus on the effects of political connections on economically relevant outcomes such as sales, employment, productivity, or firm survival. Importantly, these outcomes are so far only studied for direct political connections to local governments or for indirect connections to politics. We could not find previous work that studies economic outcomes in the context of connections to active or former politicians in the national government, as we do in our analysis.

The direction of the effects on economic outcomes found in the literature are more ambiguous than those for financial outcomes. Several studies report positive effects of political connections on sales (Schoenherr 2019, Akey & Lewellen 2017, Amore & Bennedsen 2013) which is often interpreted as a consequence of the preferential access to government funding. Two studies in Italy find zero effects of connections to active politicians in the local government on labor productivity (Cingano & Pinotti 2013, Akcigit et al. 2023). Bertrand et al. (2018) focus on firms with connected CEOs who served as cabinet members in France and analyze abnormal employment and sales responses in election years. Similarly to Englmaier & Stowasser (2017), they find that connected firms increase hiring in election years with the aim of generating support for local election results of their party friends. But these extra hires do not reflect other firm outcomes as sales remain stable and firms do not get improved access to loans or tax reductions.

The literature provides even fewer results on the effects of political connections on employment dynamics or firm exit and the existing estimates exclusively refer to connections to local governments. Akcigit et al. (2023) and Bertrand et al. (2018) find positive employment effects but Choi et al. (2024) report negative effects for firms donating to local government candidates. Besides our paper, Akcigit et al. (2023) are the only ones studying firm exit and find that political connections tend to increase firm survival. We advance on the identification of the causal effects by exploiting political candidates in our RDD specification, a setting that is not possible in the Italian case.

This overview of the literature makes it clear where our paper contributes. First, we study firms directly connected to active or former politicians at the level of the national government in Germany based on large scale data covering a period of 20 years and the universe of German firms, parliamentary politicians, and election candidates. Second, our results are based on rigorous identification designs exploiting appointments to executive and supervisory firm positions and quasi-random election results. Third, we study a wide range of outcomes that have been less investigated in the literature and for which we lack clear evidence.

## 3 Institutional Details

To explain the institutional background and to motivate our identification strategy based on election outcomes, this section first provides information on disclosure requirements for politicians' outside activities beside their mandates and second, describes the German system of federal elections.

**Disclosure Requirements.** Members of the German federal parliament are obliged to follow the rules of conduct at the federal level that were first formulated in the Act of Parliament (*Abgeord-netengesetz*) and in the Rules of Procedure (*Geschäftsordnung*) of the German *Bundestag* which were first passed in 1972. These rules stipulate that the main focus of the activities of a member of the federal parliament is the execution of the political mandate. But activities of a professional or other nature are generally allowed alongside the mandate.

With regard to these activities, members of the federal parliament have comprehensive duties

of disclosure. They are obliged to notify the president of the *Bundestag* of any remunerated activities beside their mandate, along with their positions in companies, corporations and institutions under public law. Functions in clubs, associations and foundations are also subject to notification, as are shareholdings in corporations or partnerships and agreements on future activities or pecuniary advantages. In 2007, the constitutionality of these rules was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*).<sup>2</sup> Since then, each parliamentarian publishes online and in the *Amtliches Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestags* (part II) the name of the firm or cooperation, the position, and the income (in three income brackets). A subsequent reform in 2021 obliges members of the federal parliament to publish the exact amount of income from their outside activities if they exceed 1,000 euros per month or 3,000 euros per year.<sup>3</sup> According to information from the online government portal, the following types of membership positions are disclosed by politicians: board of directors, advisory board, advisory council and shareholder.<sup>4</sup> These are the positions that can be matched to the firm data for our empirical analysis.

Transparency regulations in Germany are stricter at the level of the national government than on the state or municipal levels. Over the recent years, disclosure requirements have been introduced by single states, starting with Bavaria in 2013, followed by Lower-Saxony, Hesse, Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg in 2014. So far, there are no disclosure requirements at the district or municipal level.

In Germany, connections between politicians and firms are systematically more prevalent in sectors with a high level of state involvement or regulation, such as the energy sector, transportation/infrastructure or the banking sector. This practice facilitates the representation of interests and objectives of public authorities. For instance, politicians represent their parties in municipal bodies like the board of directors of public banks (e.g., *Sparkassen, Volksbanken, Landesbanken*) or the supervisory board of water and energy providers (e.g., *Stadtwerke*, E.ON or RWE). Politicians are also on the supervisory boards of formerly state-owned companies such as *Deutsche Bahn* and *Deutsche Telekom*, which were privatized in the 1990s. A further prominent and historically rooted example is the state of Lower Saxony which, as a co-owner, has two supervisory mandates at *Volkswagen* one of which is reserved for the Minister President of Lower Saxony. According to information from the online government portal, politicians also hold connections to welfare organizations (e.g., *Caritas, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Arbeiterwohlfahrt*). As a consequence of these types of political representation, political connections are particularly frequent among associations (see Table 2 on page 15).

**Federal Elections in Germany.** According to the electoral system for the German *Bundestag* each voter has two votes. Based on the first vote – also called the direct vote – the candidate with the highest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Niessen & Ruenzi (2010) evaluate this law and find that the gap in stock market performance between connected and non-connected firms declined following the implementation of income disclosure rules.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>In 2015, the Federal Cabinet passed a draft law according to which active or former ministers and parliamentary state secretaries must report their intentions to move from politics to business. The decision will then be made by the government on the basis of a recommendation from an advisory committee. If the committee sees a conflict of interest, it can impose a waiting period of twelve months, or up to 18 months in exceptional cases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>For more information, see https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/nebentaetigkeit/nebentaetigkeit-213826.

number of votes in each of 299 election districts (boundaries as of 2017)<sup>5</sup> enters parliament with a direct political mandate.<sup>6</sup> With the second vote, citizens vote for a political party. The second vote is therefore decisive for party representation in parliament and decides on the number of seats each party gets. Parties below a 5% vote share threshold do not enter parliament unless at least three party candidates win a direct political mandate in their respective election districts (*Grundmandatsklausel*). After parliamentary mandates have been assigned, parties start governmental negotiations. Unless one party holds an absolute majority of mandates, two or more parties form the government.

Our empirical strategy exploits results based on the second vote. Prior to each election, parties submit a ranked list of candidates in each of the 16 federal states (*Landesliste*). These party lists are submitted for approval to the respective local election authorities at least 69 days before the election and cannot be changed later. At the state level, party vote shares determine each party's number of parliamentary mandates.<sup>7</sup> The first mandates in each party and state are assigned to winners of direct votes (if they have a party affiliation) and the remaining mandates are assigned to candidates on the respective party lists starting with the highest ranked candidates. If a party in a certain state wins more election districts via the first vote than assigned mandates based on the second vote, no candidate formally enters from the party list.

This system creates a marginal seat on each party list where the candidate on the marginal seat enters parliament and the candidate on the next seat does not enter. Our identification strategy exploits the discontinuity around marginal seats on party lists. Appendix Table D.1 shows characteristics of party lists of the six parties that enter the German parliament over the election cycles from 1998 to 2017. The six parties are the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Liberals (FDP), the Greens (Die Grünen), the Left (Die Linke) and the right-wing party AFD. The average number of submitted candidates per list is around 21 and varies across political parties. As shown in the third row of the table, the average marginal seat varies around 6 by party and time. For example, the marginal seat for the CDU/CSU was about 14 in the elections of 2013 and 2017, while for the SPD the marginal seat was about 9. For the smaller parties, the marginal seat varies between 3 and 6. The share of listed candidates with a firm connection (for a definition of connections see Section 4) has been increasing over election cycles; in the last two election cycles more than half of the candidates on the average list were connected to a firm. But there is also strong variation across parties.

The placement of candidates on the respective party lists has a strategic component (Buisseret et al. 2022). Typically, prominent party members are placed at the top of the party list to maximize chances of entering parliament. But it is also the case that some candidates with high chances of winning the election district on the direct vote are not placed on the party list.<sup>8</sup> Due to the preference that is given to the first vote when assigning mandates, it is difficult to predict the marginal seat on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The number of election districts was 328 in the election year 1998.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Candidates on the district ballots are not required to be affiliated with a political party. But typically, the biggest party wins the direct political mandates. In the election year 2017, the Christian Democrats (CDU with its sister party in Bavaria CSU) won 73.5% and the Social Democrats (SPD) won 18.4% of all election districts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>The number of individual mandates per state is determined by population size.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Over the six election cycles between 1998 and 2017, we observe 1,728 candidates who are not placed on the party list but enter parliament via the direct mandate and 8,690 political candidates on party lists.

the party lists. An additional complication with implications for marginal seats on all party lists arises due to the so-called *Überhangmandate*. If a party wins more direct mandates than entitled mandates based on the vote share from the second vote, all candidates winning their election districts still enter parliament via the direct mandate. The resulting imbalance in party representation is compensated by increasing the total number of seats in parliament. Additional mandates are equalized via so-called *Ausgleichsmandate* and assigned to the other parties. These additional seats are in turn filled with candidates from the respective party lists.<sup>9</sup>

To document the variation in marginal seats across election cycles, Appendix Figure D.2 Panel B shows the correlation between the change in vote shares and the change in the marginal seats across elections and state party lists which is with 0.78 positive but not perfect.<sup>10</sup>

## 4 Data & Measurement

#### 4.1 Data

**Firm-Level Data.** The basis of our firm-level data is the *Mannheim Enterprise Panel* (MUP), an annual panel dataset generated and hosted by the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research. The data are provided by *Creditreform e.V.*, the largest credit rating agency in Germany. Besides the official Business Register of the Federal Statistical Office, the MUP is the most comprehensive micro database of companies in Germany with full coverage of all firms starting around 2000. Bersch et al. (2014) provide detailed information on data collection, processing and the definition of variables. For our analysis, we use wave 56 with the latest available year being 2019. More detailed information on the MUP, the number of observations and further descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B.1.

The MUP contains a large number of firm characteristics. Most importantly, we observe firm size, total sales, the industry affiliation at the five-digit industry code according to NACE rev. 2, local municipality code, the legal form, as well as the date of incorporation and closure.<sup>11</sup> In addition to information related to firm performance, we are able to exploit detailed information on the ownership structure and individual members of the executive leadership team. As these are the individuals we can then link to political candidates and parliamentary members, we focus on individuals who are involved in all decisions of fundamental importance to the corporation. In particular, the following

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Over time, this system led to a substantial increase in the total size of the German *Bundestag*. Between the election years 1998 to 2009, there were 58 *Überhangmandate* (32 among the CDU/CSU and 26 among the SPD).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>To further support the existence of the random component of the marginal seat, Panel A of Appendix Figure D.2 shows that there exists high residual variation. Specifically, we run the following regression: marginal seat<sub>tsp</sub> =  $\theta_t + \omega_{sp} + \epsilon_{tsp}$ , where the marginal seat is the cutoff seat number at the election year – state – party level and  $\theta_t$ ,  $\omega_{sp}$  represent election year and federal state × party fixed effects, respectively. After taking out the fixed effects, the standard deviation is estimated to be 2.36, which shows the importance of factors that determine the cutoff seat beyond year, state and political party effects. Including election polls two months before the election in the specification increases  $R^2$  slightly from 0.75 to 0.77. Including the actual vote share instead of the polls increases the  $R^2$  to 0.81. This shows the limited possibility to predict the marginal seat with election polls.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The raw data contain missing values for employment and sales information. We impute some of the missing values in both cases if we observe a gap of up to two years and assign values based on linear interpolation. We further impute missing values with the last observed variable entry for up to two years if the firm did not exit during these two years. Appendix Table B.1 provides the overall number of observations as well as the number of observations with employment and sales information at the yearly level.

types of positions are of interest: (i) owner, (ii) CEO, (iii) member of the executive board, (iv) member of the supervisory board, and (v) partners.<sup>12</sup>

The type of executive position and therefore the corporate governance structure is determined by the legal form of the company. Table 1 shows the available executive positions by the main legal form of corporations where Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), stock corporations, small businesses (combining single-owned companies, liberal professions and commercial companies), civil law partnerships, and associations amount to about 97% of all firms in the data.<sup>13</sup> The bottom of the table shows the main characteristics of firms in each group and also lists the share of firms with political connections to the federal government.

Executive Position	Involvement	LLC	Stock	Small	Civil Law	Association
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Owner	Managing/ day-to-day			$\checkmark$		
CEO	Managing/ day-to-day	$\checkmark$			$(\checkmark)$	(√)
Executive Board	Managing/ day-to-day		$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$
Supervisory Board	Supervising/ monitoring		$\checkmark$			
Partner	Supervising/ monitoring	$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$	
Share of firms		33.3	0.42	52.1	8.20	2.50
Share of employment		61.7	5.87	23.9	2.93	2.63
Average firm size		9.22	67.09	2.24	3.79	9.16
Share politically connected	ł	0.38	9.22	0.03	0.13	3.86

TABLE 1: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BY LEGAL FORM

*Small businesses* represent with about 52% the majority of all firms in Germany and they are governed by owners, mostly a single owner. *LLCs* represent about one third of all firms and 62% in terms of employment. They are governed by a CEO who manages the day-to-day business and by partners, who have limited control over the day-to-day business but are involved in fundamental decisions of the company and typically appoint a CEO.<sup>14</sup> *Stock corporations* represent the largest firms, on average, that are also most likely to be politically connected. We can identify a political connection for 9% of German stock corporations. Their corporate governance structure consists of an executive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>The data also contain official functions of administrator/trustee in case the company went bankrupt and capital provider. In terms of the latter, the data contain the main stock holder for stock corporations and the limited partner for limited partnerships (*Kommandist*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>The remaining legal forms are limited partnerships, general partnerships, and registered cooperatives.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Partners in the data differ by the legal form of the company. In the case of LLCs, which are the majority of cases, the German coding refers to *Gesellschafter*. In the case of limited partnerships, the general partner (*Komplementär*) is responsible for the day-to-day business.

board that is the managing body and a supervisory board that gets elected by the shareholders of the company. The second group of firms with a high share of political connections due to reasons discussed in the previous section are *associations*, for 3.9% of which we identify a political connection. Associations are represented and managed by an executive board which is elected by the members of the association.

**Outcome Measures.** To measure the effects of political connections on firm outcomes, we consider several outcome variables which we observe at an annual frequency in the MUP data. Based on the year of closure, we construct an indicator of market exit. We further define firm-level employment and employment growth rates. When considering employment growth, we follow Davis & Haltiwanger (1999) and calculate the growth rate between two points in time as:  $(L_{t+k} - L_t)/0.5(L_{t+k} + L_t)$  where  $L_t$  denotes employment in year *t*. Next, we derive firm-level productivity from a standard labor productivity measure by sales per employee.<sup>15</sup>

Because the MUP data originate from a credit rating agency, we also have detailed information on the firm's annual credit rating score, ranging from 100 (highest creditworthiness) to 600 (default). This rating is based on information about the payment behavior, the credit opinion, company development, industry and order situation. The score has been analyzed in a number of papers, including Cremers & Schliessler (2015) and Höwer (2016). A significant part, about a quarter of the overall score, consists of a normative judgment on the question whether a business relation is approved or the relationship with a business partner is not recommended, i.e., one should use collateral when providing credit.<sup>16</sup>

**Data on Public Procurement Contracts & Subsidies.** The annual MUP panel data can be linked to two additional data sources. We first explore the *IWH Subsidy Database* that contains information on subsidized projects including a firm name (see Brachert et al. 2018 for a detailed data documentation).<sup>17</sup> The projects available in the database come from various programs and they typically either aim to support innovative activities or – through capital investment subsidies – maintaining/increasing employment.<sup>18</sup> We link the projects via record linkage using firm names to obtain information at what point in time a firm receives subsidies.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Note that the MUP data can be linked to BvD's Orbis data that allow for more sophisticated productivity measures. After linking the data, value added is observed for only about 4% of politically connected firms, preventing a full analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Using the MUP data, Bersch et al. (2020) analyze firm-bank relationships during times of crisis. They first show that bank distress is orthogonal to initial firms' credit risk. They further provide evidence that the expected probability of default of a firm increases if the bank is under distress, indicating a negative association between the credit rating score and lending possibilities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>The two largest programs are (i) the *Förderkatalog*, which represents 59.4% of all covered projects that are organized and supervised by federal ministries. The database does not contain all subsidized projects. The corresponding special units (*Fachreferate*) within each ministry decide on publishing the projects, and the largest place-based subsidy program in Germany representing 23.3% of all covered projects (*GRW - Gemeinschaftsaufgabe "Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruk-tur"*). The data further cover EU projects (13.7%) coming from the funding periods 6 and 7. The remaining 3.5% of the projects are smaller programs related to subsidizing innovative projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>There is a relatively large literature that studies *GRW* subsidies in general at the regional and firm level. These include, among others, Becker et al. (2010), Brachert et al. (2019), and Etzel et al. (2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>In the IWH Subsidy Database, we observe over 697,539 projects with names and regional information for the record linkage. The success rate of the record linkage is 77.7%, which represents 48,694 unique firm IDs in the MUP.

Second, we explore project-level public procurement data available to us between 2006 to 2016 from Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) to analyze public procurement contracts by the political connection status of the firm. The data are provided by the European Commission and contains contracts whose value exceeds a certain threshold described in the EU Public Procurement Directives 2014/23/EC and 2014/24/EC (see European Commission 2020 for technical details). The data provide information on the winning bidder including the name and the address. We use the information and link the contracts via record linkage to the firms in our main dataset.<sup>20</sup> <sup>21</sup>

**Data on Political Candidates.** Our candidate-level data originate from two sources. First, we make use of publicly available data on the online government portal to obtain all members of the German *Bundestag* between the first election term in 1949 and the election term that started in 2018. We downloaded the list of politicians in January 2021 which covers politicians up to the 19th election term (election year of 2017). In total, there are 4,084 unique politicians who served in parliament over this period and 1,790 individuals who served between the election terms 14 to 19, which corresponds to the election year 1998 and 2017 and covers the main period with firm-level information. The dataset further includes baseline information such as the name and surname of the politician, gender, marriage and parental status, birth date, death date and nationality. It further provides information on the party affiliation and the mandate (party list (*Landesliste*) or direct mandate), as well as whether the politician is part of a ministry (information available since election term 14).

The second data source covers all political candidates between election term 14 and 19 provided to us by the *Bundeswahlleiter* in November 2021. In total, the data contain 24,360 candidate-election year observations with 20,715 unique candidates and 93 unique political parties. Over the six election terms between 1998 and 2017, we observe six major parties that are at least once represented in parliament. Among these parties, we observe 8,690 unique candidates and 13,002 candidate-election year observations. Besides information on party affiliation, the data also contain the first and the last name, gender, the year of birth, the election district and the placement on the respective party list.

**Merging Political Candidates to Firms.** We identify political connections of firms by merging politicians and political candidates to the data on executive positions in the MUP based on the full name and the date of birth. Note that this merge provides information on the exact timing of the start and end years of an individual's executive position in a firm over the period 2000 to 2019. In addition, the election data provide the start and end dates of individual mandates. This means that we can identify politicians who hold an active mandate during their position in the firm and former politicians who have already left parliament when they start a firm position. At the firm level, the procedure results in 3,842 firms that are connected to an active or a former politician and 14,078 firms with a connection to a person who was at some point a political candidate. Appendix B.2 provides a detailed description

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>In the TED data, we observe over 400,000 entries and conduct a record linkage based on the firm names and the address. The success rate of the record linkage is 89.6%, which corresponds to 58,507 unique firm IDs in the MUP.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Using the TED data, Havlik (2020) documents evidence for political election cycles by showing that public procurement contracts increase prior to national parliamentary elections.

of the merge. For the construction of a comparison group, we make use of a 50% random sample of unconnected firms.

Our strategy of matching individual politicians and firms has several advantages over the information in online reports of politicians' outside activities. First, online reports of politicians with an active mandate that is subject to public disclosure were only introduced in 2007. Our linked firmpolitician dataset provides information over a longer time horizon covering the years since 2000. More importantly, we are also able to observe connections to firms after the political mandate has ended. Second, we have exact information on the timing, as we can observe the start and end years of political mandates and of the executive position at a firm. Third, we are able to merge successful and unsuccessful political candidates to the firm dataset. A cross-validation with hand-collected data from online disclosures for the election term 2017 shows that 53 out of 58 politicians who are connected to firms during this election term according to our linked MUP dataset can also be found in the online government portal. Among the remaining five politicians, one had an official job position in the previous election term. Overall, this indicates that a very high share of the merged politicians in our data indeed provide public disclosure statements which guarantees a high degree of representatives of our data.

#### 4.2 Descriptive Statistics

How do political connections of firms evolve over time? Figure 1 shows the share of connected firms, measured as the number of firms observed with a connection at time t relative to all firms weighted by firm size, over time. We distinguish between all connections (blue line) and connections to active politicians during an election term (red line). The figure shows a sizable increase in the connection share between 2000 and 2018. This is not only true for all possible connections, which might increase mechanically because the number of politicians is increasing over time. Also when conditioning on politicians who hold an active mandate, the share of connected firms doubles over the course of the last two decades. The spikes in the red line correspond to the start of each election term when the share of connected firms is highest.<sup>22</sup>

How different are connected firms from unconnected firms? We compare the main characteristics of a 50% random sample of all firms (around 1.28 million firms) in Germany in column (1) of Table 2 with our two main analysis samples of firms with political connections. These are, first, firms in the *appointment sample* who appoint a politician to one of their executive positions where we distinguish between appointments of active and former politicians, shown in columns (2) and (3), respectively. Firms appointing active or former politicians are relatively evenly split with 44% versus 56%. Second, we consider firms in the *election sample* who either have a political candidate in one of their executive positions who runs for a new office in parliament or an incumbent politician who runs for re-election,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Appendix Figure B.2 shows the connection intensity over the firm size distribution, indicating a u-shaped association. The connection intensity among small firms with fewer than 10 employees is as high as the connection intensity among firms in the highest two firm size categories. The reason for this shape is that we typically observe one politician at the firm level, but this is different for the largest firms. Large firms can also be connected to multiple politicians at each point in time.



*Notes:* The figure shows the share of connected firms over the time period between 2000 and 2018. The blue line shows the share of all connections, including connections to former politicians, relative to the firm population, whereas the red line conditions on connections to active politicians.

FIGURE 1: POLITICAL CONNECTED FIRMS OVER TIME

shown in columns (4) and (5). Here the sample of firms with a candidate who is about to newly enter parliament is larger than the sample of firms with incumbent politicians with 65% versus 35%. The construction of the samples of connected firms is explained in Section 5.1. In Table 2, we measure firm characteristics of unconnected firms as an average over the years 2000 - 2019, firms appointing politicians in the year before the appointment, and firms with political candidates in the election year.

Table 2 Panel A presents baseline firm characteristics. It shows that firms appointing either an active or a former politician are larger in size (in terms of the number of employees and firm sales) than the average firm in Germany. This is also the case for firms with a political candidate who is up for re-election. Firms that place a candidate without a political mandate are, however, smaller in terms of the number of employees but larger in terms of sales than unconnected firms. Overall, connected firms are more productive as measured by labor productivity.

The yearly exit rate of average German firms amounts to 6.1%, but it is substantially lower among connected firms. Consistent with this observation, Panel B shows that connected firms also have better credit ratings (here lower numbers in the rating index indicate a higher creditworthiness) and a lower share of connected firms have a rating in the highest default category. This is particularly true for connected firms with a candidate who is running for re-election. Only around 0.4% of these firms have a credit rating in the highest default category, implying a rather low market exit risk. Part of the credit rating is the judgement by *Creditreform* whether or not a business relation is approved or needs collateral. The share of firms where a business relation is not recommended correlates strongly with the highest default probability category.

Panel C of Table 2 shows that the overall share of firms receiving a subsidy or a procurement

	Unconnected	Appointing		Candid	ates
	firms	active politician	former politician	without mandate (4)	with mandate
A: Baseline firm-level chard	acteristics	(=)	(0)	(1)	(8)
Log employees	1.259	2.554	2.251	1.112	1.754
Log sales	13.069	15.053	14.911	13.932	14.791
Log(sales/employment)	11.818	12.488	12.651	12.638	12.290
Average yearly exit rates	0.061	0.015	0.020	0.028	0.020
Firm age	21.800	36.753	27.272	19.598	32.533
B: Credit rating					
Credit rating index	289.6	245.7	249.9	273.7	246.7
Credit rating (default risk)	0.089	0.012	0.009	0.037	0.004
Relation not recommended	0.084	0.012	0.008	0.030	0.005
C: Subsidies/procurement	01001	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000
Any economic subsidies	0.009	0.057	0.062	0.028	0.036
Any procurement contracts	0.006	0.034	0.024	0.035	0.042
D: Sector classification	0.000	0.001	0.021	0.000	0.012
Manufacturing	0.083	0.030	0.040	0.052	0.036
Energy	0.003	0.011	0.016	0.017	0.007
Water	0.005	0.009	0.015	0.015	0.012
Construction	0.137	0.008	0.010	0.044	0.015
Retail trade	0 224	0.026	0.039	0.100	0.046
Accommodation	0.074	0.012	0.016	0.021	0.015
ICT	0.029	0.030	0.010	0.041	0.030
Banking insurance	0.027	0.074	0.063	0.050	0.042
Technical service	0.115	0.154	0.198	0.241	0.209
Business service	0.058	0.029	0.046	0.053	0.029
Other service	0.061	0.391	0.259	0.145	0.356
E: Legal form	01001	0.071	0.207	01110	0.000
Small Business	0.521	0.023	0.025	0 189	0.067
LLC	0.333	0.245	0.378	0.466	0.339
Stock Corporation	0.004	0.168	0.183	0.044	0.086
Civil Law Partnership	0.082	0.021	0.020	0.050	0.041
Association	0.025	0.495	0.346	0.000	0.419
Other	0.019	0.035	0.033	0.073	0.048
F: Function in firm	0.017	0.000	0.000	0.070	0.010
Managing	_	0.657	0.582	0.653	0.589
Supervision	_	0.343	0.418	0.347	0.411
G: Party affiliation		0.010	0.110	0.017	0.111
CDU/CSU	_	0 497	0 479	0 239	0.399
FDP	_	0.127	0.131	0.390	0.188
SPD	_	0.291	0.305	0.156	0.100
Greens	_	0.044	0.050	0.095	0.038
Left	_	0.038	0.031	0.069	0.072
AfD	_	0.002	0.004	0.050	0.000
Government	_	0.594	0.580	0.546	0 749
Close to election district	_	0.224	0.200	0.310	0.395
crose to election distillet		0.201	0.211	0.010	0.070
Ν	1.3m	662	852	2,564	1,355

 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Notes: The table shows means for unconnected firms (averaged over the years between 2000 and 2019) and different samples of connected firms. Unconnected firms consist of a 50% random sample of all firms in the MUP. Columns (2) and (3) provide the means for firms appointing an active or a former politician measured in the year before the appointment event. Columns (4) and (5) provide the means for firms that place a candidate without a political mandate in the year of the election and for firms with a politician who is up for re-election.

contract is low, as less than 1% ever receive those over the full observation period. This is consistent with the fact that we only observe large contracts in the data. However, the share of firms with subsidies or procurement contracts is substantially higher among connected firms. Among connected

firms theses shares are between 2.4% and 6.2% in the year before the appointment or the election year, respectively.

Panel D indicates also major differences with respect to the sector affiliation. Throughout the different samples, connected firms are under-represented in manufacturing, construction, retail trade, and in the hotel/accommodation sector and over-represented in services, banking & insurance, and energy and water (although at low absolute levels). While the majority of connected firms are in the service sector, the share of unconnected firms in this sector is only 23%. Panel E provides information on the legal form. In all samples of connected firms, the share of firms labeled as small business is lower than in the overall population of firms, whereas stock corporations and especially associations are strongly over-represented among connected firms.

Regarding the function of politicians within the connected firm and their party affiliation, Panel F shows that roughly two-thirds of politicians or political candidates have a managing function in the firm. Panel G shows that, except for candidates without a mandate, the share of firms with connections to the CDU/CSU amounts to 40 to 50%. This is not surprising as this is also the party with the highest number of parliamentary members over the sample period. Relative to the party size in parliament, the share of firm connections to the Liberals (FDP) is relatively large. This is particularly the case for firms with candidates running for a political mandate, where 39% of the firms have a connection to the FDP. Moreover, firms are disproportionately often connected to politicians in government parties, which is particularly the case for firms with connection (75%). The last variable in the panel shows the proximity between the firms' location and the politician's election district (dummy variable equal to 1 if distance is below 50km). Firms with a candidate who runs for election are more likely to have a local connection as compared to firms that appoint an active or a former politician.

# 5 Empirical Strategies

#### 5.1 Events over the Political Career

Our empirical strategy exploits the interplay in the timing of firm appointment and the start and end dates of political mandates. Figure 2 illustrates how these events evolve along a time-line of a politician's career, where the vertical lines mark the start and end dates of a political mandate and the horizontal lines show different scenarios of jobs in executive positions. The crosses in the figure indicate the events we exploit.

We focus first on the blue crosses marking the start of politician appointments in a firm. Here we distinguish between the case of an appointment of an active politician which starts during their political mandate in the left blue cross and the case of an appointment of a former politician which starts after the politician has left parliament in the right blue cross. We use an event study design to compare firms appointing either type of politician with similar firms appointing a new member in their executive leadership team who is not a politician.

Second, we focus on events around election dates which start or terminate a political mandate



FIGURE 2: TIMING OF EVENTS: CONNECTION TO FIRM AND TO PARLIAMENT

and are indicated by the red crosses. In the case of the cross at the bottom left of the figure, a person who holds an executive position with a firm runs for election and has the chance to win which means the firm will become connected at this point. Here, we compare firms with a candidate who wins the election with firms with a candidate who loses. For identification we can exploit the discontinuity created by marginal seats on the party list. This means we zoom in on the party list and compare a firm with a candidate who marginally wins the election by getting the mandate on the marginal seat and a firm with a candidate who marginally loses because he/she is ranked below the marginal seat on the party list.

The red cross at the end of the political mandate corresponds to the case where a firm executive with a political mandate is up for re-election. The incumbent can either be re-elected or drop out of parliament which means that the firm loses the political connection. Analogous to the above case we exploit the marginal seat and compare a firm with a candidate who just wins re-election at the marginal seat and a firm with a candidate who just loses because he/she ranks below the marginal seat on the party list.

## 5.2 Event Study Design

To identify the effect of appointing a politician (blue crosses in Figure 2), we make use of a combined matching and dynamic difference-in-differences (DiD) design which exploits variation in political connections within firms over time. Specifically, we follow Imai et al. (2021) and match *treated* firms before the start of the political appointment to *control* firms who appoint a non-politician based on observable firm characteristics such as age, employment structure, legal form, industry affiliation and region. Most importantly, we advance the identification of the nexus between firms and politicians by exploiting the detailed information in the MUP data on the composition of the firm's leadership team and select control firms with a similar leadership structure. In particular, we condition on control firms that appoint a new member to the leadership team in the same year and in the same position

as the treated firm and that have the same number of overall entries and exits from the leadership team in this year. In our staggered DiD design, we have a large pool of never-treated firms that allows to overcome the presence of negative weights in case treatment effects are heterogeneous (e.g. De Chaisemartin & d'Haultfoeuille 2020; Callaway & Sant'Anna 2021).

Comparing firm outcomes of both groups of firms before and after the start of a political connection in a DiD setting, allows us to identify the effect of the event "becoming a politically connected firm" on different outcome variables over time. Identification relies on two assumptions. First, we assume that absent the political connection outcomes would have followed similar trajectories in treated and control firms. To justify this assumption, parallel trends in firm-level outcomes prior to the start of the connection are crucial. Second, we assume that firms do not anticipate the start of the political connections for example, by strategically appointing a politician to the leadership team when the firm benefits most from this connection. This assumption is hard to test empirically, which is why we rely on the second identification strategy based on the discontinuity around marginal seats on election lists. The firm-level responses caused by the appointment events are discussed in Section 7.

#### 5.3 Regression Discontinuity Design

To exploit discontinuities in election results around the marginal seat on the party list, we apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD). The intuition follows the literature on close elections (Lee 2008) which is based on the assumption that the winner and the runner up in a close election are as good as randomly assigned. In our case, we compare the firm with a connection to the candidate on the marginal seat who wins a mandate with the firm that has a candidate on the next seat who does not enter parliament. The discrete running variable in our design is thus defined as the rank of the candidate on the party list (where rank 1 corresponds to the top ranked candidate) minus the marginal seat.<sup>23</sup> The main identification assumption is that there is no manipulation around the marginal seat on the party list. We argued in Section 3 that it is hard to predict the marginal seat due to the interaction of the first and second vote in German elections. In addition, we will show that predictions based on election polls are very imprecise. Further, we will discuss standard density tests and balancing checks of pre-election firm and politician characteristics. Detailed results of the RDD analysis are presented in Section 8.

# 6 How are Politicians Selected by Firms?

Firms do not appoint a random politician to their executive positions in order to gain a political connection, but most likely they select this person carefully. The quasi-random assignment of candidates into and out of parliamentary mandates around the marginal seat on candidate lists allows us to examine this selection process. We observe four types of political candidates around the discontinuity who are at risk of winning or losing the marginal seat: political candidates with or without a position

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>An alternative to our RDD approach with a continuous running variable is the approach proposed by Folke (2014) which measures the distance to the seat threshold as the minimum total vote change across all parties that would be required for a party to experience a seat change. See also Fiva & Smith (2018).

in a firm who will become active politicians in case they win the mandate - we call them candidates with and without executive experience. In addition, we observe incumbent candidates with or without a firm position, or executive experience, who will become former politicians in case they miss the marginal mandate. In Table 3 we examine whether the election outcomes triggers exits from their firm positions for candidates with executive experience and if it leads to new appointments among the different types of candidates.

Column (1) presents results for job terminations of candidates with executive experience. Panel A shows that political candidates without mandate are not more likely to exit their position if they lose the election than if they win. If anything, the positive but insignificant coefficient indicates that election winners are more likely to leave their position than losers. Newly elected active politicians might be more likely to be poached by other companies than unsuccessful candidates, as the positive (insignificant) coefficient in column (2) suggests. An election loss has stronger consequences for incumbent candidates who are up for re-election as can be seen in Panel B. Incumbent candidates with executive experience are significantly more likely to leave their positions in case of an election loss. But they are also more likely than re-elected politicians to be appointed as a former politician to a new position in a different firm.

If we compare outcomes for candidates who do not hold a position with a firm at the point of the election in column (3), we see that just winning an election does not make the newly active politicians who lack executive experience more attractive to firms (see Panel A). Incumbents without executive experience are also less likely to be appointed to a firm position after their mandate has ended than incumbents who manage to stay in parliament (see Panel B).

	Job	New appointm	ents, candidate level	New a	ppointments,	firm level
	termination (1)	/w position (2)	w/o position (3)	Current (4)	Former (5)	Candidate (6)
Panel A: Candida	tes without man	date ("Staying unco	nnected (=0) vs. winnin	g (=1)")		
Indicator	0.0486	0.0654	-0.0292	0.0180	0.0075	-0.0037
	(0.0485)	(0.0610)	(0.0839)	(0.0196)	(0.0160)	(0.0255)
	674	674	463	674	674	674
F-Statistic	1083	1083	1005	1083	1083	1083
Mean outcome	0.075	0.230	0.264	0.0076	0.0044	0.006
Panel B: Candida	tes with mandate	e ("Staying connecte	d (=0) vs. dropout (=1)'	<i>'</i> )		
Indicator	0.199**	0.248**	-0.2044*	0.0715**	0.0204	0.0607*
	(0.0839)	(0.0980)	(0.1237)	(0.0360)	(0.0203)	(0.0329)
Observations	616	616	332	616	616	616
F-Statistic	250.1	250.1	130.3	250.1	250.1	250.1
Mean outcome	0.108	0.0312	0.3382	0.0085	0.0017	0.005
Election Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

TABLE 3: FUZZY RDD RESULTS - JOB TERMINATION/NEW APPOINTMENT

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications. All specifications are based on a bandwidth selection of 6 below and above the cutoff. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Outcome variables are job end after the election (column 1), new appointments of the politician during the following election term (column 2), new appointment of politicians without a job position at the time of the election (column 3), and the appointment of a politician with an active or former mandate post election (columns 4 and 5) as well as with individuals who become a candidate in the future (column 6). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

Columns (4) to (6) in Table 3 show appointment outcomes in the years following the election at the firm level. In Panel A we investigate whether a firm that just wins a political connection due to a successful candidate is more or less likely to appoint a new active or former politician, or hires a future political candidate than a firm with a candidate who did not make the marginal seat. The coefficients show that none of these outcomes is affected by the election win versus a loss. In contrast, Panel B shows that firms where an incumbent politician missed the marginal seat are more likely to renew the political connection by appointing an active politician after the election or by appointing a political candidate who will to run in the next election.

**Summary.** These results at the candidate and the firm level provide strong evidence that firms carefully select politicians for executive positions. Around the marginal seat where we do not find the most prominent politicians, executive experience appears to be an important complement to the political capital and is highly relevant for the firm's appointment decision. Firm connections to politicians with persistent executive careers appear to be more common than the entry of executive outsiders with a political mandate. Our results thus provide support for career patterns that start with political candidates in an executive position and eventually evolve into connections to active and former politicians with long-term executive experience.

# 7 Impact of Appointing a Politician on Firm-Level Dynamics

Now we turn to the evaluation of the effects of political appointments on firm outcomes.

# 7.1 Sample Definition and Matching Strategy

**Selection of Treated Firms.** In the following, we concentrate on treated firms defined as firms appointing an active or a former politician to an executive position in the years 2001-2019. We further require that firm outcomes are observed in at least one pre-treatment year and one post-treatment year. These restrictions result in 1,514 treated firms which form the appointment sample (columns (2) and (3) of Table 2). In our empirical analysis, we allow for multiple treatment events per firm. In most cases, however, the appointment event represents a single event at the firm level: in 88% of the cases a firm appoints only one (active or former) politician during the whole observation period.

**Selection of Control Firms.** The construction of a sample of comparable control firms involves the following selection steps. First, we keep only firms for which at least two yearly observations are available. Next, we perform a successive pre-selection of firms based on observable characteristics such as industry, region, size, and firm board composition to obtain a manageable size of the control group (for details on the variables and the pre-selection, see Table C.1 and the description thereof in the Appendix). Most importantly, we require the control firms to employ individuals in one of the top executive positions and that an entry or exit in the respective job position takes place in the same calender year as observed for treated firms. All in all, this results in a sample of 274,610 potential

control firms. To further ensure comparability of treatment and control group, we estimate propensity scores.<sup>24</sup>

**Propensity Score Estimation.** We directly match groups of treated and control firms with the same year of appointment and then estimate the propensity of having a political connection separately for each year based on probit regressions controlling for a set of pre-treatment observables: firm age in groups, sales in t - 1 and t - 2 (including missing category), employment in t - 1 and t - 2 (including missing category), the general existence of specific job positions (CEO/owner, executive board, supervisory board and other) as well as the number of entries and exits in the respective position in t, firm type such as LLC, stock corporation and association, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects. Appendix Table C.2 contains a definition of the control variables used in the propensity score estimation. In a second step, we use the inverse propensity score weighting (IPW) to weight control observations by the inverse of the fitted values of propensity scores.

#### 7.2 Validity Checks

Table C.3 in the Appendix compares the means of firm characteristics for firms that appoint a politician and control firms that appoint non-politician in the same year based on IPW. The last column reports the standardized differences  $\Delta_X$  between treated and re-weighted control firms as a scale-free measure of balancing.<sup>25</sup> Since there is no universally agreed criterion for how small the standardized difference must be to provide balance, we lean on the rule of thumb of  $\Delta_X < |0.1|$  as suggested by Austin (2011). The standardized differences point to no significant differences between treatment and control group after IPW.<sup>26</sup>

With the matching approach, we aim to find a comparable control group for which the parallel trends assumption is likely to hold. This assumption is, however, only partly testable. Appendix Figure C.1 shows that the employment dynamics of treated and weighted control firms follow a similar trend before the start of the treatment event.

#### 7.3 Estimation Results

**Market Exit.** We start our analysis by studying the impact of appointing a politician on market exit and estimate the following equation separately for each event horizon  $\tau$  after the start of the political connection:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>We apply further sample restrictions on the treatment and control group to adequately analyze the effects of appointing a politician in a dynamic setting. In particular, we only keep firms for which the connection starts before 2018 and the respective control firms in order to observe at least one post-treatment period. Moreover, we condition on observing employment information in at least two periods before treatment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>The standardized difference is defined as  $\Delta_X = (\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_0) / ((S_1^2 + S_0^2)/2)^{0.5}$ , where  $\bar{X}_w$  is the sample mean of treated (w = 1) or control (w = 0) firms and  $S_w^2$  are the respective sample variances (Austin 2011). The advantage of  $\Delta_X$  over the usual *t*-statistic is that it does not mechanically increase with the sample size and therefore avoids exaggerating small imbalances that would still appear significant in a *t*-test.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>In order to guarantee sufficient overlap between treatment and control group, we drop 24 treated firms with propensity score values above the maximum value of the control firms (Lechner & Strittmatter 2019). These are mainly extremely large stock corporations where we have difficulties to find suitable control firms (see Appendix Table C.3).

$$y_{i,\tau} = \alpha_{\tau} + \gamma_{\tau} I(T_i = 1) + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{i,\tau}, \tag{1}$$

where  $y_{i,\tau}$  is an indicator equal to one if firm *i* exits the market within  $\tau$  years after the appointment, with  $\tau$  ranging from 1 to 5.  $\delta_c$  denotes calendar year fixed effects and  $\varepsilon_{i,\tau}$  is an idiosyncratic error term. We estimate equation (1) weighting by the inverse propensity score.

Figure 3 shows the estimated effects of appointing an active or a former politician on the probability of exiting the market within one to five years. In the first year after the appointment, firms connected to an active politician have the same exit probability as unconnected firms. Firms appointing a former politician have a significantly lower exit probability in the first year: the probability to leave the market within the next year is reduced by 2.7% points compared to the control group. Over time, however, both types of connections come along with reduced market exit rates. Five years after the appointment, the effect on the probability to have left the market amounts to 8.0% points for firms appointing a politician with an active political mandate and 6.7% points for firms appointing a politician whose political mandate has already ended.



Notes: The figure shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on market exit one to five years after the appointment event. Market exit is equal to 1 if the firm is exiting the market within  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=1$  to 5, years after the appointment. Estimates are based on equation (1). All regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

Figure 3: The effect of appointing a politician on market exit

In order to compare the magnitude of estimated effects of appointing an active or a former politician with the effects of gaining or losing political connections in a RDD framework in Section 8, we report effects on firm outcomes two years after the appointment event in Table 4 on page 25. Column (1) in the table shows the estimate of  $\gamma_2$  in equation (1). Compared to the sample mean of control firms, the estimated effect of an appointment on firm exit is large in magnitude: the probability to exit the market within two years decreases by about 35% for firms that appoint a former politician. **Employment Dynamics.** Appendix Figure C.1 shows the development of employment levels in firms appointing a politician and in the weighted sample of control firms. The figure suggests that both groups of firms are on a declining track prior to the start of the new appointment. After the event, this trend is reversed in both treated and control firms. However, the number of employees increases more strongly in connected firms over the following years.

To quantify the effect on employment, we estimate the following event study model in the sample of surviving firms weighted by the inverse propensity score:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \sum_{\tau \neq -1} \beta_\tau I(t=\tau) + \sum_{\tau \neq -1} \gamma_\tau I(t=\tau) I(T_i=1) + x_{i,t} + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$
(2)

where  $y_{i,t}$  is the log employment level of firm *i* at time *t*,  $\alpha_i$  represents firm fixed effects,  $T_i$  the treatment dummy which takes the value 1 for connected firms,  $x_{i,t}$  captures time-varying firm characteristics (in our specifications we include dummies for firm age),  $\delta_c$  calendar year fixed effects and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  the idiosyncratic error term. Event time  $\tau$  runs from -3 to 5 and event time 0 indicates the start of the appointment. For a fixed event year  $\tau$ ,  $\beta_{\tau}$  is the average log employment level in the control group relative to the reference period -1 (conditional on fixed effects) and  $\gamma_{\tau}$  is the average difference between the treatment and the control group in this event year.

Figure 4 shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician on log employment conditional on survival based on equation (2). We do not observe any pre-treatment trends between the treatment and the weighted control group in both panels, which indicates that our matching procedure is successful. One year after appointing a politician, however, the employment levels start to diverge. For both types of connections, appointing an active or a former politician, we see a significant increase in employment of around 0.08 log points. In subsequent years employment grows further, especially in firms appointing an active politician. Overall, the appointment of a politician results in an average employment change of 0.11 log points between the pre- and post-period for both types of appointments (see column (2) in Appendix Table C.5).

Table 4 shows in column (2) the coefficient estimate of  $\beta_t$  in event year t = 2 from equation (2) as well as the estimated effect on the growth rate between the year before the appointment and two years after in column (3) separately for firms appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician. In both specifications, we document a positive and significant impact of appointing a politician on employment. In terms of size, the coefficient in Panel A corresponds to 3.4% of the mean of log employment of control firms in t = 2 and to 5.4% in Panel B, respectively. In terms of the employment growth rate from t = -1 to t = 2, results show 8.6% points higher growth in Panel A and 11.1% points higher growth rates of connected firms in Panel B.

**Productivity Dynamics.** Finally, we provide evidence on productivity dynamics relating firm-level sales to employment. Specifically, we look at labor productivity defined as *log(sales/employment)*. Given the documented reduction in market exit and positive impacts on employment growth conditional on survival, the effects of a political connection on productivity dynamics can be informative



A: Appointing active politician

**B:** Appointing former politician

*Notes:* The figure shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on log employment in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5. The black point estimates are based on equation (2). The regression is weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The red bar gives the effect on the average change in log employment between the pre-period = -3 to 0 and the post-period 1 to 5. The number of observations with employment information are shown in Figure C.2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

FIGURE 4: THE EFFECT OF APPOINTING A POLITICIAN ON EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS

about the underlying growth process in surviving firms. A decline in firm-level productivity relative to the control group would be indicative of low productive firms being selected into survival and experiencing faster employment growth which would point to dynamic inefficiency induced by the connection.

Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 show the estimated coefficients for the appointment of an active or a former politician on firm-level productivity measured after two years. Estimates for the effect of appointing an active or former politician on labor productivity are small compared to the control group means and not significantly different from zero, while the effect of appointing a former politician on productivity growth is positive and marginally significant. This suggests that the induced survival advantage is not selective in productivity and the employment growth process is accompanied by a roughly proportional growth in sales.

**Summary.** Together, the event study results suggest that the entry of an active and former politician who bring new managerial talent with a different set of skills into executive ranks improves firm outcomes measured by market exit rates and employment growth. Appointing former politicians, who are more experienced and potentially devote more time to the firm, leads to stronger firm-level improvements with a marginally significant increase in labor productivity growth.

#### 7.4 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity Analysis

**Robustness Checks.** We test the robustness of our findings with respect to different empirical specifications and samples. Specifically, Appendix Tables C.4, C.5 and C.6 show the market exit, employment and productivity results based on 5 nearest-neighbor matching and concentrating on the first

	Market exit	Emplo	Employment		oductivity
	at <i>t</i> + 2	Event Study $\beta_{\tau-2}$	Growth $t-1 \rightarrow t+2$	Event Study $\beta_{\tau-2}$	Growth $t-1 \rightarrow t+2$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Appointing active politician					
Connection	-0.012	0.091**	0.086**	-0.090	-0.034
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.065)	(0.037)
Mean in $t=2$	0.084	2.694	-0.038	12.457	-0.052
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	125,050	125,050	125,050	125,050
Treated observations in $t=0$	400	400	400	400	400
Panel B: Appointing former politician					
Connection	-0.029***	0.145***	0.111***	0.021	0.067*
	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.036)
Mean in $t=2$	0.084	2.694	-0.038	12.457	-0.052
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	125,050	125,050	125,050	125,050
Treated observations in $t=0$	466	466	466	466	466

TABLE 4: THE EFFECT OF APPOINTING A POLITICIAN ON MARKET EXIT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY

*Notes:* The table shows the effect of appointing an active (panel A) or a former politician (panel B) at time t=0 on market exit, employment and labor productivity two years after the appointment event. Labor productivity is defined as log(sales/employment).  $\beta_{\tau=2}$  is based on equation (2). The growth rate is calculated between the year before the appointment and two years after. Market exit is equal to 1 if the firm is exiting the market within two years after the appointment. All regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The mean refers to the outcome level of the control group measured two years after the appointment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

treatment per firm only. In addition, the employment and productivity effects are also provided for a sample with employment information in at least one pre-treatment year, instead of at least two years as in the baseline specification. Figure C.3 in the Appendix further presents the employment results based on the estimator proposed by De Chaisemartin & d'Haultfoeuille (2020) and weighted by the inverse propensity score weights. Overall, our estimated coefficients are robust to different sample sizes and estimation approaches.

**Heterogeneity Analysis.** Figure C.4 in the Appendix provides heterogeneous estimates by subsamples showing point estimates along with 95% confidence intervals. We first test whether specific legal firm types such as small businesses and associations defined in Table 1 are driving the documented effects by excluding these legal forms from the sample. Second, we provide evidence distinguishing between party affiliation and government-/opposition-party connections.<sup>27</sup> Third, we make sample splits in the initial firm size (below/above median), broader sector affiliation (manufacturing/service) and politicians' management or supervisory function in the firm.

The heterogeneity analysis broadly confirms our baseline results which are shown at the left of the graphs. No single sub-sample is driving the overall results. Point estimates are negative for firm exits, larger in absolute magnitude and more likely significant for former politician appointments than for active politicians. Employment effects are positive for all samples and, again, more pronounced

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Unless one party has the absolute majority of mandates in parliament, a coalition of parties form the government. Connections of parliamentarians to firms might influence the formation of a governmental coalition. For this reason, the distinction between government-/opposition-party connections potentially suffers from endogeneity issues.

for former politician appointments. Coefficient estimates for labor productivity are close to zero in most samples and slightly more negative for appointments of active politicians. The caveat is that confidence intervals are large for all estimates, so it is not possible to make statements about statistically significant differences between samples or between types of appointments.

# 8 The Impact of Winning and Losing Political Connections

## 8.1 Sample Definition and Identification

**Party List Discontinuities.** Our election data cover information on all political candidates from the six national elections between 1998 and 2017. Among the six parties that were represented in parliament at least once, we observe in total 8,690 political candidates (13,002 candidate-year observations).<sup>28</sup> To exploit the discontinuity in the probability of entering parliament around the marginal seat on a party list, we pool all available lists and center each one at the marginal seat. In total, we have party lists from 16 states, six elections and six political parties which results in 576 potential discontinuities. The effective number of discontinuities is lower, however, because not all parties have candidates in each state and each election and from some party lists no candidate enters parliament. Furthermore, not all party lists include a candidate with an executive position in a firm. We further drop all lists from which only the first or second candidate enters parliament. This is because we want to have a symmetric window in the running variable around the marginal seat. Furthermore, the top seat on the list is often very strategically chosen and dropping those reduces concerns about manipulation (see Section 8.2). Our final sample thus exploits 254 discontinuities and consists of 2,233 firm, candidate, election year observations from 1,694 unique firms and 947 individual candidates.<sup>29</sup>

**Fuzzy RDD.** Due to the first vote in German national elections where candidates can also win a direct seat, the firm's connection status is not exclusively determined by the marginal seat on the party list. Therefore, we adopt a fuzzy RDD approach for analyzing the effect of a connection to parliament on firm outcomes. In particular, we specify local linear models for the first stage, estimating the jump in the firm's probability of being connected at the marginal seat cutoff and the reduced form estimating the change in the firm outcomes at the cutoff (Hahn et al. 2001). Our first stage model takes the following form:

$$connect_{i(m)} = \pi \mathbb{1}(placement_{i(p)} \ge marginal_{i(p)}) + g(\cdot) + \lambda_m + \epsilon_i,$$
(3)

where  $connect_{i(m)}$  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm *i*'s candidate on party state list *p* wins a political mandate for the next election term in election year *m*. The cutoff value is determined by the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Throughout the covered time period, the government was formed by a coalition of two parties. These coalitions were formed as follows. 1998: Social Democrats and the Greens; 2002: Social Democrats and the Greens; 2005: Christian Democrats and Social Democrats; 2009: Christian Democrats and Liberals; 2013: Christian Democrats and Social Democrats; 2017: Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Appendix Figure D.1 shows the number of observations by the marginal seat and Appendix Table D.2 shows the number of observations for mass points close to the cutoff.

marginal seat at the election year and party level. The indicator function therefore is equal to 1 for all firms connected to candidates placed at the marginal seat or below. The function  $g(\cdot)$  is a continuous linear function of the normalized relative placement of the candidate that allows a slope change above the cutoff:

$$g(threshold_{i(p)}) = g_0 + g_1(marginal_{i(p)} - placement_{i(p)}) + g_2(marginal_{i(p)} - placement_{i(p)}) \times \mathbb{1}[(placement_{i(p)} \ge marginal_{i(p)})]$$
(4)

Similarly, the reduced-form specification models the jump in the outcome variable as:

$$y_{i(m+k)} = \delta \mathbb{1}(placement_{i(p)} \ge marginal_{i(p)}) + h(\cdot) + \lambda_m + \kappa_i,$$
(5)

where  $y_{it(m+k)}$  refers to firm performance of firm *i*, *k* years after election *m* and  $(placement_{i(p)} \ge marginal_{i(p)})$  is equal to 1 if the firm is connected to a successful candidate. The function  $h(\cdot)$  is a piece-wise linear function analogous to equation (4). All specifications include election year fixed effects,  $\lambda_m$ , and we report results for different sets of control variables, e.g., party and state fixed effects or initial firm-level observables (Table D.5). The causal effect of a connection to the federal parliament among firms with candidates close to the marginal seat is given by  $\hat{\beta} = \frac{\hat{\delta}}{\hat{\pi}}$ . We estimate model parameters using a standard two-stage least square estimator with the indicator  $\mathbb{1}(placement_{i(p)} \ge marginal_{i(p)})$  as the instrument for  $connect_{i(m)}$ . As baseline, we provide robust standard errors.

The choice of bandwidth is crucial for the approximation of the conditional expectation function. Our baseline results are estimated with a symmetric bandwidth of 6 seats around the marginal seat. As our running variable is discrete, we follow Card et al. (2023) and report results for a selection of bandwidths. For discussion of alternative bandwidth choices see Section 8.4.

#### 8.2 Validity Checks

**Density of Observations around the Cutoff.** Appendix Figure D.3 Panel A shows the number of (candidate, firm, election year) observations around the marginal seat cutoff in the pooled election data, separately for the sample of new candidates and incumbents shown by blue dots and red diamonds, respectively. In this graph, observations to the right of the cutoff correspond to candidates winning a mandate. We can see that for both types of candidates the probability to be placed on a seat with a sure win, at the very right of the x-axis, is low. The number of candidate placements is increasing the closer one moves towards the marginal seat. To the left of the cutoff towards seats with low chances of winning, the mass remains high for new candidates. Incumbents running for re-election, are more concentrated around the marginal seat. Most importantly, we do not see a discontinuity in the number of observations at cutoff for either of the two samples. The visual evidence is confirmed by McCrary density tests which are shown in Panel B of Appendix Figure D.3. These tests support the validity of our research design.

**Predicting the Marginal Seat.** To further support the random nature of the cutoff, we predict the marginal seat based on polls conducted by *Politbarometer* three months before the election, which is

the deadline by which parties have to submit their final party lists and can no longer adjust them. Polls refer to the national-wide party, which does not allow us to differentiate at the state level. Thus we estimate an implied marginal seat using the following procedure. We first estimate the total number of votes per party and election year based on the poll and taking into account the number of eligible voters

$$\#votes_{p(m)}^{poll} = polls_{p(m)} imes \#actual voters_m,$$

where  $polls_{p(m)}$  is the vote share for party p in election m predicted share from *Politbarometer* and *#actual voters<sub>m</sub>* is the number of eligible voters in election m. Then we allocate this national party vote estimate to the state level based on the actual party vote share in each state, which results in an estimate of the number of votes at the party-election year-state level.<sup>30</sup> The implied marginal seat is then calculated by dividing the estimated number of party votes in each state by the number of actual votes per seat, which represents a prediction of the marginal seat based on the polls.

Based on this approximation using polls, we can correctly predict just 39.5% of the marginal seats. The prediction is generally more precise for party lists from which only few candidates enter parliament. Once we restrict the analysis to election lists for which actual marginal seat is three or higher – as it is the case in our estimation sample – the share of correct predictions based on polls drops to 30.6%.

**Balancing of Pre-Election Characteristics.** In order to support the random nature of the cutoff, we check whether predetermined characteristics of firms and political candidates are balanced around the marginal seat cutoff. Table D.3 in the Appendix provides evidence of balancing tests for the two different candidate samples. The first two columns show average differences of observed characteristics between firms with candidates who land on a seat to the right and the left of the cutoff. Specifically, each line represents a separate regression of the observed characteristic on an indicator equal to 1 if the candidate wins the mandate and 0 otherwise. For the sample of firms that place a new candidate, the table shows that becoming connected in the next term is associated with a larger initial firm size, firm age and legal type (stock corporation). At the candidate-characteristic level, being successful during the election also correlates with age. Thus, firms that become connected in the next term are different along many observables from those who stay unconnected. For firms connected to a candidate with an active mandate, observable characteristics are rather balanced in the year of the election.

Columns (3) and (4) show differences between the observable characteristics at the normalized cutoff estimated by the reduced form RD specification in equation (5). The results show that firm-level variables related to the quality of the firm such as size, years since foundation and labor productivity are precisely estimated with point estimates close to zero. Also, the characteristics of the candidates at the cutoff do not differ between candidates at the cutoff and just below. Figure D.4 in the Appendix

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>For example, if the CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg received 10% of all actual votes for the nation-wide CDU during the election in 2017, we allocate 10% of  $#votes_{CDU(2017)}^{poll}$  to Baden-Wuerttemberg. This takes into account that the party vote shares are unequally distributed across Germany.

provides the graphical counterpart of the regression specification in column (3) pooling both samples. The results provide further evidence for quasi-random assignment of firms to political candidates at the cutoff and support the continuity assumption of potential outcomes.

## 8.3 Results on Market Exit, Employment Growth & Productivity Growth

**Graphical Evidence - First Stage.** Figure 5 visualizes the jump in the probability of gaining or keeping a seat in parliament during the next election term at the marginal seat cutoff. Due to the centering of the running variable at the marginal seat, all firms at *0* and to the right of it will have a connection to parliament during the next parliamentary term. Thus, the probability of connecting to an active member of the German federal parliament is *1* without any variation. To the left of the threshold, we observe firms with candidates whose placement on the party list is below the marginal seat. For these, we see a large and significant drop in the probability of being in parliament during the next term by 80 and 90 percentage points, depending on whether candidates run for re-election or first-time election, respectively. The probability does not drop to zero, however, because some candidates enter parliament via a direct political mandate by winning their election district. Panel A



A: CANDIDATE WITHOUT POLITICAL MANDATE B: CANDIDATE WITH POLITICAL MANDATE *Notes:* The figure shows the probability of connecting to the federal parliament by the normalized party list placement of the candidates. Panel A provides the results for candidates without an active political mandate at the time of the election. Panel B provides the results for candidates with an active political mandate at the time of the election. Firms connected to candidates at the threshold seat and above will all be connected to parliament in the following term. Firms connected to candidates below the threshold seat have a lower probability of being connected. The green and blue lines represents local linear fits on both sides of the cutoff with 6 and 7 seat bandwidth, respectively. The black line represents a local polynomial smoothing with degree 1.

FIGURE 5: PROBABILITY OF PARLIAMENT CONNECTION

shows the results for candidates without an active political mandate, whereas Panel B shows the results for candidates who run for re-election. First-time candidates who just end up one seat below the marginal seat have a probability of entering parliament of around 10%. Thus, the probability of becoming politically connected jumps by 90% points when moving just one seat above. In turn, politicians with an active mandate have a probability of remaining in parliament of around 20% if their party list seat is just one seat below the marginal seat. Thus, the probability of staying politically

connected drops by 80% points when moving just one seat below the threshold.

**Graphical Evidence - Reduced Form.** We start by plotting mean firm outcomes two years after the election by placement on the centered party list in Figure 6.<sup>31</sup> The left panels show market exit within two years after the election, the middle panels show employment growth between the year before and two years after the election and the right panels provide results for productivity growth. We distinguish between new candidates who run for parliament without an active political mandate (Panels A1 to A3) and incumbents who are up for re-election (Panels B1 to B3).

Candidates with a placement above the marginal seat to the right of the cutoff (vertical dashed line) enter parliament while candidates to the left of the cutoff do not gain a mandate via the party list. Dots represent conditional means of the firm outcomes. The solid black lines display local polynomial regressions with degree 1 using a triangular kernel weighting with the 90% confidence intervals. The red and blue lines represent local linear regressions on each side of the cutoff with different bandwidths.



B1: ACTIVE MANDATE - EXIT B2: ACTIVE MANDATE - EMPLOYMENT B3: ACTIVE MANDATE - PRODUCTIVITY *Notes:* The figure shows market exit, employment growth and labor productivity growth two years after the election against the normalized party list threshold. Panels A1 to A3 show the results for firms connected to candidates without an active political mandate who run for parliament. Panels B1 to B3 shows the results for firms connected to candidates with an active mandate who want to get re-elected. Observations to the right of the party list cutoff (vertical dashed line) represent firms connected to candidates with a placement on the party list at the marginal seat or above. Likewise, negative values depict firms that are connected to candidates who did not won a seat via the party list. The solid black line represents local linear regressions on each side of the cutoff. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The dots represent conditional means of the outcomes. The blue and red lines present linear regressions with different bandwidths.

FIGURE 6: EMPLOYMENT, EXIT AND PRODUCTIVITY DYNAMICS AFTER ELECTION

Among firms with candidates winning a political mandate, we observe a large negative jump in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>Typically four years after each election, a new election takes place. Therefore, focusing on two years after the election provides the best trade-off in terms of sample selectivity and measuring responses at the firm level.

the probability of firm exit in Panel A1. Firms at the cutoff or just above have an exit rate of around 2%, whereas firms just below have an exit rate of, on average, 10%. Likewise, Panel A3 shows that the growth in labor productivity drops significantly for those firms at the cutoff. Reduced form results for firms with incumbent candidates that lose a political connection (Panels B1 to B3) are more imprecise and do not show discrete jumps at the cutoff.

**Fuzzy RDD Results.** Next, we turn to fuzzy RDD results described in Section 5.3. Table 5 reports the benchmark results on market exit, employment growth and productivity growth within two years for connections to candidates without an active mandate and candidates who run for re-election, i.e., candidates with an active political mandate. For the ease of interpretation, we code the treatment indicator equal to 1 if a candidate wins a new mandate (0 otherwise). For incumbents, we code treatment equal to 1 if the candidate loses the current mandate. Treatment therefore represents a change from the baseline state.

Each specification in Table 5 is estimated including election year fixed effects. Panel A provides first stage estimates. For firms connected to a candidate without an active mandate, the probability of entering the national parliament jumps at the threshold *c* by about 90% points. In contrast, firms with a political connection in the election year experience a drop in the probability of staying connected by about 80% points at the cutoff. The F-Statistic refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic and takes in most specification values above 100. Thus, weak identification issues do not apply in our setting.

TABLE 5. FUZZI KDD RESULTS - EMILOTMENT, MARKET EATT AND FRODUCTIVITI							
	Winning a mandate "Staying unconnected (=0) vs. winning (=1)"			Losing a mandate "Staying connected (=0) vs. dropout (=1)"			
	Market exit Employment Lab. prod. growth growth		Market exit	Employment growth	Lab. prod. growth		
	at <i>t</i> + 2	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	at <i>t</i> + 2	$t-1 \rightarrow t+2$	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Panel A: First stage							
Indicator	0.917***	0.849***	0.821***	-0.797***	-0.676***	-0.652***	
	(0.0245)	(0.0472)	(0.0552)	(0.0463)	(0.0817)	(0.0881)	
Panel B: 2SLS							
Indicator	-0.117***	-0.198	-0.425*	0.0478	-0.294	0.311	
	(0.0421)	(0.133)	(0.224)	(0.0506)	(0.187)	(0.256)	
Mean at threshold	0.0270	0.0690	-0.161	0.0571	0.139	-0.0762	
Mean one seat below	0.0946	0.134	0.0350	0.0962	-0.0582	-0.0768	
Initial firm size	64.95	69.74	69.74	154	160.3	154	
Observations	733	314	277	624	278	252	
F-Statistic	1399	322.5	220.9	296.3	68.47	54.81	
Bandwidth <i>h</i>	6	6	6	6	6	6	

TABLE 5: FUZZY RDD RESULTS - EMPLOYMENT, MARKET EXIT AND PRODUCTIVITY

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications. Outcome variables are market exit at t + 2, employment growth from  $t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$  and labor productivity growth from  $t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$  relative to the election years. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. The outcome means in the middle part of the table refer to averages for firms that enter parliament in the next term at the threshold seat and for firms that are out of parliament just one seat below the threshold. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

The Fuzzy RD estimates in Panel B confirm the visual impression from reduced form results in Figure 6. For firms winning political mandate, we find a highly significant negative effect on the

probability of market exit of about 12% points in column (1), a negative but insignificant effect on employment growth, and a marginally negative effect on productivity growth (columns (2) and (3)). For firms with an incumbent who loses the election effects on firm exit and productivity growth have the opposite sign, but point estimates are small and statistically insignificant (columns (4) and (6)).

Appendix Table D.4 informs about dynamics in the effects of political connections, estimating RD specifications for outcomes after one, two, and three years post election. In general, the point estimates remain fairly stable over different horizons and given the size of the standard errors we do not find significant changes in the effect sizes.

**Summary.** The results from the RD analysis partly confirm findings from the event study design, which is in line with our preferred interpretation of the three different mechanisms that are at play. According to this interpretation, the negative effect on firm exits in the event study setup is driven by improvements in management quality as a new politicians with a different set in management skills is appointed to the executive team. On the other hand, the decline in firm exits after an election wins cannot be explained by a change in management quality but rather by a positive market signal or an increase in decision making power at the government level. We also find that election losses are generally associated with smaller effect sizes. A potential explanation are firm responses to election losses where unsuccessful candidates are replaced with new appointments of active politicians or future candidates, see Section 6.

#### 8.4 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity Analyses

**Covariates and Bandwidth Selection.** We provide a set of robustness checks in the Appendix. Table D.5 shows results from specifications including different sets of covariates such as party and state fixed effects, firm age and firm size at the time of the election, and the function of the politician in the firm. None of those changes the main empirical findings. Appendix Table D.6 shows results with different bandwidth selections. We provide specifications with relative bandwidths of 50%, i.e., depending on the absolute number of the marginal seat, we allow the bandwidth to move 50% of that number to the left and to the right. Again, our results prove to be robust. We also perform robustness checks based on optimal bandwidth selection criteria. Table D.7 in the Appendix illustrates robustness to the choice of the kernel function and bandwidth selection criteria.

**Local Randomization.** To provide local randomization evidence, we first manually select the estimation window. Specifically, we estimate  $\mathbb{E}[Y_i(1)|threshold_+] - \mathbb{E}[Y_i(0)|threshold_-]$ , where *threshold*<sub>+</sub> represents the marginal seat (and one seat above due to low sample size) and *threshold*<sub>-</sub> is the seat up to two seats below the marginal seat. Appendix Table D.8 shows the results for the group of firms that win access. The local randomization results presented in Panel A are rather close to our preferred baseline specification in Table 5. Firms becoming political connected compared to firms that just stay out by two party list seats have a lower probability to exit and have lower labor productivity growth rates. Likewise, firms that just drop out have no differential effect on firm performance.

**Placebo Checks.** Table D.9 in the Appendix further conducts placebo analyses by analyzing employment and productivity dynamics prior to the election. Point estimates are small and insignificant providing evidence that these firms perform similarly before the election. Alternatively, we run randomization inference (Appendix Figure D.5) in order to overcome potential imprecision problems (Young 2019). Specifically, we follow Fouka & Voth (2016) and perform 2,999 random permutations of the dependent variable and the baseline model for each permutation. This approach reshuffles the dependent variable and randomly assigns an outcome to each firm. To calculate *p*-values, we combine these with the non-permuted estimates. Figure D.5 in the Appendix confirms the results with a higher precision.

**Heterogeneity Analyses.** Figure D.6 in the Appendix shows results for market exit, employment and productivity by sub-samples. The heterogeneity analysis confirms the main findings in Section 7.4. No single sub-sample is driving the overall results and confidence intervals are wide for all estimates, which prevents us from detecting statistically significant differences between them. Point estimates generally confirm the direction of the baseline estimates. For election wins, we find negative and mostly significant effects on firm exits, and negative but insignificant effects on employment and productivity growth. Point estimates for incumbent losses tend to be insignificant and of the opposite sign from election wins, except for employment growth.

# 9 Additional Firm Outcomes: Credit Ratings, Subsidies & Procurement Contracts

Next, we provide evidence on additional firm outcomes that provide more information on potential mechanisms driving the effects of political connections. In particular, we investigate responses in credit indicators, large scale subsidies and public procurement contracts. Table 6 presents estimation results for these three outcomes in Panels A - C. We show event study estimates of the effects of appointing an active or former politician in columns (1) and (2) and RDD estimates for the effects of a candidate winning an election or an incumbent losing their mandate in columns (3) and (4).

**Credit Ratings.** We measure credit ratings based on the assessment of the credit rating agency. Specifically, we construct by an indicator variable equal to one if engaging in a business relation with the firm is not recommended and collateral is needed. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the appointment of an active and especially a former politician have negative effects on the index, which means that political connections improve the firm's credit rating within the first two years after the appointment. The point estimates indicate an 1.6% point reduction of a negative credit rating in case of the appointment of a former politicians, which is quantitatively large compared to the overall sample mean. The analysis of election outcomes, shows that a candidate winning an election by obtaining the marginal seat has an even larger positive (but insignificant) impact on credit ratings, while the loss of an incumbent candidate is related to a decline in credit ratings (also insignificant).

These findings are in line the interpretation that short-run credit rating effects reflect market signals without changes in the firm fundamentals.

**Subsidies and Procurement Contracts.** To measure receipt of subsidies or procurement contracts we construct indicator variables equal to one if the firm receives a subsidy or a public procurement contracts within two years after the appointment or election event. The estimation results in Panels B and C of Table 6 show that appointing a politician with an active political mandate (column (1)) increases the probability of receiving an economic subsidy by 1.4% points, while the effect of appointing a former politician is smaller and statistically insignificant. Election wins are also associated with higher probability of receiving a subsidy and incumbent losses are followed by a decline in subsidies. Both effects are not statistically significant. Winning an EU-level procurement contract is a very rare event in our samples, in the 2 year pre-event period we only find 1% of firms gaining a procurement contract. Consequently, we find small and mostly insignificant effects from political appointments or election wins. But the signs of the estimates are in line with the results for subsidies and suggest that procurement contracts become more likely after a political appointment and after an election win and negative after an incumbent loses their governmental mandate.

**Summary.** The effects on credit ratings overall confirm the findings from the analysis of firm exits. In the short run, it appears that appointments of active or former politicians as well as candidates winning an election on the marginal seat act as positive signal to the market, resulting in an improved perception of the reliability of the firm as a business partner and potentially opening new sources of financing that help prevent the closure of struggling firms. In terms of large scale subsidies and procurement contracts we find that political connections tend to improve the probability of a firm's access to those financing options, while we find the opposite effects if an incumbent loses their mandate. This implies that the political connection comes with access to power and influence over decision making processes. While we cannot exclude that the effects on subsidies and procurement contracts are driven by improved management quality in the case of new political appointments, election wins leave the managerial quality at the firm unchanged. This means that direct intervention by newly elected politicians is the most likely source of an access to subsidies and procurement contracts.

# 10 Conclusions

Efforts to regulate the interplay between political and business power rank high on the political agenda, especially in countries with well developed institutions. It is, however, unclear whether the regulatory efforts are fully successful, as the literature provides examples of preferential treatment and unfair advantage among companies who are closely connected to political power. We study this question in Germany, which is known for low levels of corruption and a strict legal framework of disclosure policies on the one hand, while it provides an environment where close interaction

	Event St Appointm	udy, $\beta_{\tau=2}$ nent sample	RDD, Election	t + 2 sample
	Appointing an active politician (1)	Appointing a former politician (2)	Without active political mandate (3)	With active political mandate (4)
Panel A: P(Business	relation not recommend	ed)	(*)	(-)
Indicator	-0.0121*	-0.0164***	-0.0554	0.0678
	(0.0074)	(0.0055)	(0.0471)	(0.0596)
Observations	944,494	944,972	277	261
Mean	0.0293	0.0293	0.0265	0.0134
F-Statistic	-	-	301.5	60.52
Panel B: P(Subsidies)	)			
Indicator	0.0138**	0.0051	0.0113	-0.0073
	(0.0068)	(0.0101)	(0.0122)	(0.0164)
Observations	971,356	971,894	733	624
Mean	0.0303	0.0303	0.0165	0.0181
F-Statistic	-	-	1398	296.2
Panel C: P(Public Pro	ocurement)			
Indicator	0.0036	0.0007	0.0383**	-0.0187
	(0.0045)	(0.0062	(0.0193)	(0.0310)
Observations	795,004	795,435	399	311
Mean	0.0099	0.0099	0.0078	0.0096
F-Statistic	-	-	372.7	158.7

TABLE 6: RESULTS - CREDIT RATING, SUBSIDIES & PROCUREMENT

Notes: The table presents in columns (1) and (2) the effect of appointing an active or former politician at time t=0.  $\beta_{\tau=2}$  is based on equation (2). All regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person/non-politician in t=0. The mean refers to the outcome level of the control group measured two years after the appointment. Columns (3) and (4) present fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications with bandwidth selection of 6. All specifications control for the outcome variable measured before the election. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

between politicians and firms is highly prevalent on the other hand.

We construct a novel database from multiple administrative sources to uncover firm-level connections to parliamentary politicians at the highest level of the German government. The data contain detailed information on the timing of parliamentary mandates and appointments to executive positions in German firms which allows us to identify the effects of a political connection at different events over the life cycle of a politician and specify two identification designs. We further evaluate the effect on a rich set of outcome variables, which allows us to distinguish between major mechanisms driving the effects.

The data reveal that the share of firms connected to parliamentary politicians has been strongly growing over the last 20 years. Examining election results around the marginal seat in party lists, we further document that firms carefully select politicians for executive positions. A selection criteria for a political appointment is the experience in executive positions which seems to complement the parliamentary connection and becomes increasingly important over the politician's career.

Despite strict transparency regulations, we find that political connections have significant impacts on outcomes of German firms. Our results also provide evidence on three mechanisms that potentially drive the estimated effects. First, we find that appointments of politicians to executive positions as well as election wins on the marginal seat lead to improved credit ratings and reduced firm exits over the next two years. This strongly suggests that the new political connection improves the perception of the firm's creditworthiness among business partners, even if firm fundamentals have not changed yet.

Second, our results are in line with the interpretation that appointments of parliamentary politicians bring new managerial skills to connected firms and thus improve management quality. This results in improved economic outcomes such as employment growth. Importantly, we do not find these changes when the connection is established by the election win of a candidate who is already in an executive position which helps us to identify the management quality channel. Third, we also find that the access to political power might come with advantages for connected firms via direct intervention into political decision processes. The most direct evidence comes from the finding that a political connection is established from a candidate who wins a mandate on the marginal seat. In this case management quality at the firm remains constant which makes it more plausible that the subsidies result from direct intervention.

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# Supplementary Appendix

# A Literature Overview

Study	Country	Connection	Method	Main Outcomos	Effects	
A 1 Compositions in A ti	Dalit	to National Community	Method	Main Outcomes	Effects	
A.1. Connections via Active Politicians to National Government						
Babenko et al. (2023)	U.S.	Corporate executives elected to federal office	Event study	Stock return	↑	
Green & Homroy (2022)	UK	Members of Parliament as directors or consultants	DiD	Stock return	1	
Acemoglu et al. (2018)	Egypt	Firm's major shareholders or board members belong to incumbent regime	Event study	Stock return (during protests)	Ļ	
Niessen & Ruenzi (2010)	Germany	Active national politicians with paid jobs	DiD	Stock return	1	
Faccio (2006)	35 countries	Large shareholder or top officer is member of parliament or minister	Event study	Stock price	1	
Faccio et al. (2006)	35 countries	Large shareholder or top officer is member of parliament or minister	Event study	Bailout / Leverage	↑ / ↑	
A.2. Connections via Active Politicians to Local Government						
Akcigit et al. (2023)	Italy	Active local politicians employed in firm	RDD Cox / FE	Employment / LP Exit / TFP / VA	$\begin{array}{c}\uparrow/\rightarrow\\\downarrow/\downarrow/\uparrow\end{array}$	
Koetter & Popov (2021)	Germany	Savings banks headed by local politicans	DiD	Lending / Default post election	↑ / ↑	
Englmaier & Stowasser (2017)	Germany	Savings banks headed by local politicans	DiD	Lending / Default pre election	↑ / ↑	
Cingano & Pinotti (2013)	Italy	Active local politicians employed in firm	Firm FE	Sales / Productivity	$\uparrow / \rightarrow$	
Khwaja & Mian (2005)	Pakistan	Directors running for office at national or provincial level	Firm FE	Loans / Default rate	↑/↑	
B.1. Connections via Form	ner Politicians	to National Government				
Goldman et al. (2013)	U.S.	Former national political position as board member	DiD	Procurement	↑	
Goldman et al. (2009)	U.S.	Former national political position as board member	OLS	Stock return	1	

#### TABLE A.1: STUDIES ON POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRMS DYNAMICS

Brown & Huang (2020)	U.S.	White House visits of Executives	OLS PS Matching	Stock return Procurement	↑ ↑
Schoenherr (2019)	Korea	Members of president's network appointed as CEO in SOEs	Firm FE	Sales/ Investment/ Loans/ Procurement	↑ / ↑ / ↑ / ↑
Akey & Lewellen (2017)	U.S.	Donation to congressional candidates	triple Diff	ROA/ Sales/ Investment/ Volatility/ Leverage	↑/↑/↑ /↓/↓
Akey (2015)	U.S.	Firm donation to congressional candidates	RDD	Equity return	1
Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006)	Indonesia	Firms with connections to former president	OLS/IV	Foreign securities	Ļ
Johnson & Mitton (2003)	Malaysia	Officers with close relationships to key government officials	OLS	Stock price	1
Fisman (2001)	Indonesia	Connection Index	OLS	Stock price	$\uparrow$
C.2. Indirect Connections	to Local Gove	ernment			
Choi et al. (2024)	U.S.	Firm donations to candidates	Election yr FE	Grant / Employment	$\uparrow$ / $\downarrow$
Bertrand et al. (2018)	France	CEO with government connection supports local politician	Election yr FE	Employment / Sales pre election Taxes / Subsidies	$\uparrow/\rightarrow$
Haselmann et al. (2018)	Germany	CEO in same service club as local politicians	Event Study DiD	Loans/ Investment	↑/↓
Amore & Bennedsen (2013)	Denmark	Firms with family ties to local active politicians	DiD	OROA/ Sales/ Cash/ Leverage	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow \ / \uparrow \ / \uparrow \\ / \rightarrow \end{array}$
Duchin & Sosyura (2012)	U.S.	Directors with active or former political positions	OLS	Government funds	1

C.1.	Indirect	Connections	to National	Government

Note: Abbreviations: LP: Labor Productivity, TFP: Total Factor Productivity, VA: Value Added, ROA: Returns on Assets, OROA: Operating Return on Asset.

# **B** Data Addendum

# **B.1** Firm-Level Data

The basis of our firm-level data is the *Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP)*, a panel dataset generated and hosted by the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research. The data stem from *Creditreform e.V.*, the largest credit rating agency in Germany. Besides the official Business Register of the Federal Statistical Office, the *MUP* is the most comprehensive micro database of companies in Germany with full coverage of all firms starting in 2000.<sup>32</sup> Due to sample size restrictions, we make use of a 50% random sample of all available firm identifiers and construct a yearly firm panel dataset between 2000 to 2019. The latest available year is 2019. However, Table B.1 shows that coverage significantly declines for the last year in the sample, for the other years the number of observations ranges between 580 and 770 thousand.

	Observations	Obs. with labor	Obs. with sales
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2000	667,793	504,362	494,169
2001	700,587	535,613	530,044
2002	719,318	603,557	601,588
2003	731,622	621,824	619,111
2004	745,198	633,774	630,501
2005	754,134	643,828	639,258
2006	761,797	652,075	645,924
2007	766,215	656,756	647,294
2008	767,501	656,838	641,003
2009	768,663	656,025	631,941
2010	767,694	656,552	627,392
2011	765,838	657,242	621,324
2012	756,435	650,505	613,655
2013	742,473	637,092	599,045
2014	726,169	618,332	578,863
2015	704,442	592,822	550,936
2016	676,366	562,880	517,154
2017	640,017	535,294	489,598
2018	579,116	492,219	436,540
2019	209,228	188,742	153,059

THEE DIT TO MEEK OF ODDER THEORY OF ER TIME	TABLE B.1:	Number	OF	OBSERVATIONS	OVER	TIME
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*Notes:* The table reports the number of observations between 2000 and 2019. Column (1) reports the total number of observed firms per year. Columns (2) and (3) report numbers conditional on non-missing labor and sales observations in each year, respectively.

The MUP contains a large number of firm characteristics. Most importantly, we observe firm size, total sales, the industry affiliation at the five-digit industry code according to NACE rev. 2, the legal form, the number of patents<sup>33</sup> as well as the date of incorporation and closure. The mean values of log employment, log sales and firm age over time are presented in Table B.2. In addition to the performance-related information, we are able to exploit detailed regional information on the firm (municipality code), the shareholder structure and personal information on the involved individuals. In particular, we observe, at the individual level, information on the function of the individuals in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Bersch et al. (2014) provide detailed information on data collection, processing and the definition of variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>Patent information are provided by the ZEW and represent a merge from PATSTAT to the firm via record linkage. Doherr (2016) provides a detailed discussion about the heuristic approach with an application to patent data and inventor mobility across firms.

f	firm, e.g., ow	ner. CEO. :	supervisory c	or executive [	board	member.
-		101, 010, 1	Supervisory c	n checulive	ooura	member.

		E AVERAGES OVER TIME	
	Log employment	Log sales	Firm age
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2000	1.45	13.00	21.45
2001	1.43	13.06	21.86
2002	1.37	13.08	22.34
2003	1.34	13.12	22.89
2004	1.32	13.12	23.36
2005	1.31	13.11	23.81
2006	1.31	13.12	24.27
2007	1.31	13.14	24.58
2008	1.32	13.15	24.62
2009	1.33	13.17	23.18
2010	1.34	13.18	25.65
2011	1.36	13.19	26.63
2012	1.39	13.20	27.06
2013	1.42	13.23	27.38
2014	1.45	13.28	27.68
2015	1.49	13.33	27.96
2016	1.55	13.39	28.20
2017	1.64	13.46	28.57
2018	1.71	13.57	28.98
2019	1.85	13.67	28.24

TABLE B.2: FIRM-LEVEL AVERAGES OVER TIME

*Notes:* The table reports means between 2000 and 2019.

## **B.2** Merging Political Candidates to Firms

The merge between the *Bundestag* candidates and the MUP data requires four major steps. Table B.3 shows an overview of the merging procedure. We have baseline information on the full name (first and second name) as well as the birth date of the candidates (precise birth date is available for all candidates with at least one political mandate, whereas the data only provide information on the year of birth for candidates without any mandate) and firm representatives (e.g. CEO, advisory board members, partner), respectively (see Panel A of Table B.3). We use these information to identify individuals in the person data file of the MUP.<sup>34</sup> In total, the MUP person file contains 9.5 million individuals. Panel B of Table B.3 shows that the record linkage of both datasets generates a match for 1,489 politicians and 7,232 political candidates. Among those who become a member of parliament at some point, only 5 individuals are found twice in the MUP environment with the same name and date of birth, whereas for 999 candidates we find multiple matches. The reason is that the birth date information of candidates only contains the year of birth, which results in matches that cannot be distinguished from each other.

With the identified unique linked individuals, we move on to the ownership part of the data infrastructure which identifies for each individual one or several links to firm IDs, including information on the timing and the type of the job (Panel C of Table B.3).<sup>35</sup> Among the politicians, we observe 4,882 firm IDs, whereas among the candidates who did not enter parliament, 14,864 firm IDs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>After name cleaning in both datasets, we use Stata's reclink2 command with first name, last name and birth information to combine the datasets with a minimum linkage score of 0.97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Precise start and end dates in the data are often missing. We are able to make use of each wave (bi-annual) to approximate the start and end year of the connection.

	Politicians (1)	Candidates (2)
Panel A: Baseline information		
Election years	1949-2017	1998-2017
Name information	Fist & last name	Fist & last name
Birth date information	Date of birth	Year of birth
Number of individuals	4,084	16,631
Panel B: Record linkage to person file		
Linked to MUP person file	1,489	7,232
Multiple matches	5	999
Panel C: Ownership file		
Identified firm IDs	4,882	14,864
Panel D: Firm vanel file		
Panel firm IDs	4,666	14,078

#### TABLE B.3: MERGING POLITICAL CANDIDATES TO FIRMS

### are identified.36

The firm IDs can then be linked to the firm-level panel of the data infrastructure. This part contains, among others, information on employment, sales and the credit rating score. Among both individual groups – politicians and candidates – around 95% of the identified firm IDs are observed in the panel file of the MUP. At this stage, the linked IDs of firms to political candidates are unrelated to start and end dates of the political mandate of the individual and the position in the firm.

We then perform several further steps of selection. We start with the 1,484 politicians identified in the person file of the MUP and drop firms, if (*i*) the firm is exiting the market before the political mandate starts. This reduces the sample of politicians to 1,446. We then (*ii*) drop observations because the firm is exiting before 1998, which reduces the sample by 156 firms and 26 politicians. Although the 50% random sample of unconnected firms starts in 2000, we apply the year 1998 for politically connected firms because of the election in 1998. This allows us, for example, to calculate the share of politicians with outside activities for the election term 1998-2002. These two major selection steps generate a sample of politician-firm connections for 1,420 politicians and 4,374 unique firms. At the politician-firm level, we observe 5,554 connections due to multiple spells.

In order to construct a panel of connected firms, we move on to the firm panel file of the data infrastructure. For 95 firms, we have no information in the panel part of the data which reduces the firm sample to 4,279 firms. For the remaining firms, we can define treatment status by taking into account the start and end dates of the jobs at the firm and the political mandate. Conceptionally, connections are either simultaneous, meaning that the job at the firm and the political mandate overlap (at least partly), or activities in parliament and in the firm are strictly distinct. Figure 2 of the paper provides a graphical representation. We mainly distinguish between three groups to identify the start of the political connection. The start of a political connected if it places a member of the firm as a political candidate. There exists a fourth group of firms, where the firm member drops out of the firm and then enters parliament.

Following this treatment definition, for 436 firms the connection period is fully censored in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>There are 235 firm IDs where – at some point – a politician and a candidate is connected to.

panel file of the MUP, i.e. no observations are available. After dropping these firms, we have 3,842 firms left.<sup>37</sup> An additional number of 67 firms drop out either in 1998 or in 1999, leaving us with 3,755 unique connected firms between 2000 and 2019.

![](_page_47_Figure_2.jpeg)

Notes: Figure shows the number of firms with only one observation in the panel dataset (N=170). Source: Firm panel sample. Figure B.1: Only one year observed

Table B.4 provides an overview on the number of observations over the sample period between 2000 and 2019 and the number of unique firms. Overall, our sample contains 1.28 million firms with almost 14 million firm  $\times$  year observations (column (1)). Columns (2) and (3) provide the same information conditional on having at least one non-missing employment entry (column (2)) or non-missing employment and sales entry (column (3)). Conditional on non-missing information, the sample size reduces only slightly by about 2.3% when considering the number of unique firms, whereas the reduction is 20.5% in terms of firm  $\times$  year observations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>We also drop one firm that is the only firm in the industry classification "Organizations". 170 firms are only observed once in the yearly panel dataset. Figure B.1 shows the distribution over the observation window. The majority of the single observations happen at the end of the observation window; with 28 firms only in 2018 and 33 firms only in 2019. In total, 759 treatment start observations are left-censored, i.e. the year of the start of the treatment is not observed in the data.

	All firms	Firms with employment	Firms with
			employment & sales
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Full sample			
First year	2000	2000	2000
Last year	2019	2019	2019
Firm $\times$ year observations	13,950,606	11,089,519	10,440,870
Unique firms	1,284,033	1,255,931	1,226,806
Panel B: Political connected firms			
Connected firm $\times$ year obs.	24,093	16,969	15,810
Unique connected firms	3,755	3,077	2,957

#### TABLE B.4: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY SAMPLE

*Notes:* The table reports the number of observations between the start and the end of the sample period which corresponds to the time span 2000-2019. The firm  $\times$  year observations refer to total number of available observations. Unique firms are the number of firms in the dataset. Panel A shows the observations for the full representative sample. Panel B shows the observations for the sample of firms with a political connection. Among the politically connected firms, 67 drop out before 2000. For this reason, the number of unique firms become 3,755 instead of 3,842.

Table B.5: Definition of treatment events					
Туре	Description	Comparison			
Appointing active politician	Firm appoints a person who has cur- rently a political mandate.	Firms appointing active politi- cian vs. firms appointing non- politician			
Appointing a former politician	Firm appoints a person who had a po- litical mandate.	Firms appointing former politi- cian vs. firms appointing non- politician			
Candidate becomes elected	Political candidates with a position within the firm without an active man- date runs for <i>Bundestag</i> .	Firms with successful vs. unsuc- cessful candidates in election			
Politician gets re-elected	Political candidates with a position within the firm and with an active mandate runs for re-election.	Firms with successful vs. unsuc- cessful candidates in election			

![](_page_49_Figure_1.jpeg)

*Notes:* The figure shows the connection intensity over the firm size distribution. We estimate the connection intensity at the firm level by calculating the number of connected politicians relative to the number of employees for each year and, in a second step, average this intensity measure at the firm level.

FIGURE B.2: POLITICAL CONNECTED FIRMS OVER THE FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION

#### Additional Empirical Results of Appointing a Politician С

# **Matching Control Firms to Connected Firms**

Selection of Treated and Control Firms. Treated firms are defined as firms that appoint a former or an active politician. We additionally require to observe at least one pre-treatment year per firm. This results in 1,524 observations. As we perform exact matching on the year of appointment, we also include firms that place a candidate that becomes elected as treated firms for the matching to increase treated observations and to be able to run separate propensity score estimations per year. This group consists of 535 firms that employ a person in a leading position before the election.

In order to construct a sample of comparable control firms, we implement several selection steps. First, we keep only firms for which at least two observations are available. Next, we perform a successive pre-selection of firms based on observable characteristics such as industry, region, size, and firm board composition (see Table C.1). Specifically, our data situation allows us to a priori exclude firms that do not possess certain characteristics. First, we exclude 5-digit industries as well as labor market regions that are not represented by treated firms in the pre-treatment year. In the next step, we only keep firms that belong to the same broad employment size category in the pretreatment year and experience similar dynamics in the firm board composition in the following year as treated firms. To be precise, we require the control firms to employ CEOs, owners, executive and supervisory board members, partners and main shareholders as well as that an entry or exit in the respective job position takes place as observed for treated firms in the treatment start year t. All in all, this results in a sample of 274,610 potential control firms.<sup>38</sup>

Pre-treatment variables measured in year	Pre-treatment variables measured in year $t - 1$				
Employment groups	Number of employees of the firm in groups: $1 \ge 9$ employees"; $2 \ge 49$ employees"; $3 \ge 50-249$ employees"; $4 \ge 249$ employees"; $5 \ge 100$ Number of employees is missing"				
Job composition in <i>t</i>	Incidence, entry and exit of job positions: <i>1</i> "Owner"; <i>2</i> "CEO"; <i>3</i> "General partner"; <i>4</i> "Executive board"; <i>5</i> "Supervisory board"; <i>6</i> "Partner"; <i>7</i> "Stille partner"; <i>8</i> "Main shareholder"				
Sector type	5-digit industry of the firm				
Labor market regions	254 labor market regions based on firms municipality identifier following the definition of the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR)				

TABLE C.1: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES FOR PRE-SELECTION

*Notes: t* denotes the year of treatment start.

**Propensity Score Estimators.** We estimate the propensity of having a political connection separately for each year based on probit regressions controlling for a set of pre-treatment observables: firm age in groups, sales in t-1 and t-2 (including missing category), employment in t-1 and t-2(including missing category), the general existence of specific job positions (CEO/owner, executive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>As some treatment starts included in the matching do not come along with a new appointment (see above), we randomly chose the same proportion of control firms as observed treated firms without an entry and include also them in the matching.

board, supervisory board and other) as well as the entry and exit in the respective position in t, firm type such as LLC, stock corporation and association, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects. Table C.2 contains a definition of the control variables used in the propensity score estimation.<sup>39</sup>

Pre-treatment variables measured in year	ar $t-1$
Age groups	Age of the firm in groups: $1 \leq 1$ years"; $2 \leq 2-5$ years"; $3 \leq -15$ years"; $4 \leq -30$ years"; $5 \leq -75$ years"; $6 \leq -75$ years"; $7 \leq -15$ years"; $4 \leq -15$ years
Log employment in $t - 1$ and $t - 2$	Log number of employees of the firm in $t - 1$ and $t - 2$
Log sales in $t - 1$ and $t - 2$	Log sales of the firm in $t - 1$ and $t - 2$
Job composition in <i>t</i>	Incidence, entry and exit of job positions: 1 "CEO/Owner"; 2 "Ex- ecutive board"; 3 "Supervisory board"; 4 "Other";
Firm type	Firm type: 1 "Limited liability company ( <i>Gesellschaft mit beschränk-ter Haftung</i> , GmbH)"; 2 "Stock corporation ( <i>Aktiengesellschaft</i> , AG)"; 3 "Association"; 4 "Firm type is other business or missing"
Sector type	19 indicators for 1-digit industry of the firm
State	16 states based on firms municipality identifier
<i>ivotes: t</i> denotes the year of treatment start.	

TABLE C.2: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES FOR PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATION

 $<sup>^{39}</sup>$ We restrict the set of control variables in case of very low cell occupancy. Low cell occupancy is defined as observing for a dummy variable the value 1 for no treated firms at all, a share of treated firms that is above 95% or below 5% and the number of treated firms equals at least 4 or a share of treated that is above 90% or below 10% and the number of treated firms is less than 4.

	Treated		Con	Controls		
	On	Off	Un-	Re-		
	support	support	weighted	weighted	<i>P</i> -value	Std. Diff.
		( <b>- - - - -</b>	• 1 100			2.2.12
Firm age	31.120	45.792	24.489	29.628	0.253	0.042
Log employment	2.322	5.657	1.286	2.317	0.954	0.003
Employment missing	0.232	0.083	0.147	0.229	0.767	0.008
Log employment in t-2	2.482	6.086	1.408	2.507	0.814	-0.013
Employment in t-2 missing	0.360	0.167	0.380	0.357	0.827	0.006
Log sales	14.882	19.554	13.444	14.891	0.936	-0.004
Sales missing	0.257	0.083	0.168	0.258	0.944	-0.002
Log sales in t-2	15.008	19.398	13.711	15.041	0.795	-0.015
Sales in t-2 missing	0.381	0.167	0.398	0.378	0.830	0.006
CEO/owner in t	0.415	0.042	0.772	0.403	0.447	0.023
CEO/owner entry in t	0.256	0.000	0.633	0.249	0.559	0.016
CEO/owner exit in t	0.113	0.000	0.225	0.127	0.121	-0.042
Executive board member in t	0.607	1.000	0.192	0.589	0.245	0.036
Executive board member entry in t	0.507	0.708	0.179	0.468	0.012	0.078
Executive board member exit in t	0.284	0.625	0.086	0.263	0.133	0.048
Supervisory board member in t	0.177	0.958	0.017	0.187	0.463	-0.027
Supervisory board member entry in t	0.165	0.958	0.015	0.174	0.518	-0.023
Supervisory board member exit in t	0.090	0.583	0.007	0.099	0.397	-0.033
Other job position in t	0.315	0.250	0.397	0.321	0.685	-0.012
Other job position entry in t	0.253	0.167	0.273	0.250	0.784	0.008
Other job position exit in t	0.089	0.042	0.094	0.097	0.315	-0.027
Legal type: llc	0.325	0.000	0.533	0.349	0.092	-0.050
Legal type: stock company	0.164	0.958	0.011	0.172	0.563	-0.022
Legal type: association	0.417	0.042	0.165	0.390	0.082	0.057
Legal type: other	0.094	0.000	0.290	0.090	0.619	0.014
Sector: Agriculture mining	0.004	0.000	0.006	0.002	0.196	0.046
Sector: Manufacturing	0.001	0.000	0.056	0.035	0.956	0.002
Sector: Energy water	0.030	0.042	0.000	0.020	0.214	0.002
Sector: Construction	0.027	0.000	0.011	0.020	0.214	-0.101
Sector: Rotail trade	0.007	0.000	0.070	0.022	0.000	-0.007
Sector: Transportation storage	0.034	0.000	0.093	0.031	0.795	-0.007
Sector: Hotolling	0.056	0.230	0.023	0.031	0.191	0.058
Sector: Hotening	0.015	0.000	0.037	0.008	0.004	0.004
Sector: ICI	0.021	0.042	0.044	0.032	0.009	-0.069
Sector: Danking, insurance	0.000	0.208	0.045	0.061	0.134	-0.039
Sector: Real estate	0.070	0.042	0.078	0.072	0.824	-0.006
Sector: lechnical service	0.177	0.333	0.205	0.189	0.276	-0.033
Sector: Business service	0.039	0.000	0.045	0.029	0.094	0.053
Sector: Other service	0.321	0.042	0.128	0.294	0.081	0.059
Sector: Public admin, education	0.024	0.000	0.021	0.018	0.141	0.043
Sector: Social, health	0.077	0.042	0.084	0.076	0.917	0.003
Sector: Other	0.043	0.000	0.051	0.056	0.028	-0.061
Observations	1.490	24	213.541	213.541		

Table C.3: Balancing of treatment and re-weighted control group with a new appointment in t

*Notes:* Std. Diff. = standardized difference. t denotes the year of treatment start. The table shows mean values of pre-treatment (in t-1) firm characteristics for firms that appoint a politician, the un-weighted the re-weighted control group of firms that appoint another person by applying inverse propensity score weighting. The p-values and standardized differences refer to the differences between the treatment and re-weighted control group.

## Additional Analyses on the Effect of Appointing a Politician

![](_page_53_Figure_2.jpeg)

*Notes:* The figure shows the log employment levels in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5 for firms that appoint a politician at time t=0 and control firms between 2001-2017 conditional on survival and year fixed effects. The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0 and weighted by the inverse propensity score. The propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates. FIGURE C.1: DEVELOPMENT OF LOG EMPLOYMENT FOR TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP

![](_page_53_Figure_4.jpeg)

A: TREATED OBSERVATIONS

**B:** CONTROL OBSERVATIONS

*Notes:* The figure shows the number of treated (Panel A) and control (Panel B) observations underlying the effect of appointing an active or a former politician at time t=0 on firm-level log employment in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5 between 2001-2017 conditional on survival ( estimates are presented in Figure 4).

Figure C.2: The effect of appointing a politician on employment dynamics - Number of observations

	Baseline	5NN	First	
	t+2		treatment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Panel A: Appointing active politicia	n			
Connection	-0.012	-0.011	-0.001	
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	
Mean in $t=2$	0.084	0.084	0.084	
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	4,043	125,050	
Treated observations in $t=0$	400	400	332	
Panel B: Appointing former politicia	in			
Connection	-0.029***	-0.029**	-0.026**	
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	
Mean in $t=2$	0.084	0.084	0.084	
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	4,043	125,050	
Treated observations in $t=0$	466	466	428	

Table C.4: The effect of appointing a politician on market exit - robustness checks

*Notes:* 5NN: 5 nearest neighbor matching. The table shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on market exit two years after the appointment event. Market exit is equal to 1 if the firm is exiting the market within two years after the appointment. Estimates are based on equation (1). Regressions in columns (1) and (3) are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Estimates in column (2) are based on 5 nearest neighbor matching. Column (3) includes only the first treatment. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The mean refers to the outcome level of the control group measured two years after the appointment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

	Baseline	DiD	5NN	First	$\geq$ 1 pre-obs
	$\beta_{\tau=2}$			treatment	of outcome
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Appointing active po	litician				
Connection	0.091**	0.108**	0.074	0.086*	0.048
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.039)
Mean in $t=2$	2.694	2.694	2.638	2.694	2.474
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	125,050	4,043	125,050	179,032
Treated observations in $t=0$	400	400	400	313	493
Panel B: Appointing former po	olitician				
Connection	0.145***	0.110***	0.132***	0.146***	0.149***
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Mean in $t=2$	2.694	2.694	2.638	2.694	2.474
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	125,050	4,043	125,050	179,032
Treated observations in $t=0$	466	466	466	419	601

TABLE C.5: THE EFFECT OF APPOINTING A POLITICIAN ON EMPLOYMENT - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

*Notes:* 5NN: 5 nearest neighbor matching. The table shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on employment two years after the appointment event.  $\beta_{\tau=2}$  is based on equation (2). Column (2) shows the effect on the average change in log employment between the pre-period = -3 to 0 and the post-period 1 to 5. Regressions in columns (1), (2) and (4) - (5) are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Estimates in column (3) are based on 5 nearest neighbor matching. Column (4) includes only the first treatment. The sample in column (5) is restricted to observing the outcome variable at least once in the pre-period = -3 to -1. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The mean refers to the outcome level of the control group measured two years after the appointment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

	D 1'	D'D		E: (	> 1 1
	Baseline	DiD	5ININ	First	$\geq$ 1 pre-obs
	$\beta_{\tau=2}$			treatment	of outcome
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Appointing active po	litician				
Connection	-0.090	-0.087	-0.058	-0.071	-0.036
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Mean in $t=2$	12.457	12.457	12.432	12.457	12.466
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	125,050	4,043	125,050	173,865
Treated observations in $t=0$	400	400	400	313	465
Panel B: Appointing former po	litician				
Connection	0.021	0.054	0.045	0.021	0.002
	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.057)
Mean in $t=2$	12.457	12.457	12.432	12.457	12.466
Control observations in $t=0$	125,050	125,050	4,043	125,050	173,865
Treated observations in $t=0$	466	466	466	419	584

TABLE C.6: THE EFFECT OF APPOINTING A POLITICIAN ON PRODUCTIVITY - ROBUSTNE	S CHECKS
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*Notes:* 5NN: 5 nearest neighbor matching. The table shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on labor productivity two years after the appointment event. Labor productivity is defined as log(sales/employment<sup> $\alpha$ </sup>) with  $\alpha = 0.7$ .  $\beta_{\tau=2}$  is based on equation (2). Column (2) shows the effect on the average change in log labor productivity between the pre-period = -3 to 0 and the post-period 1 to 5. In column (3) labor productivity is defined as log(sales/employment<sup> $\alpha$ </sup>) with  $\alpha = 1$ . Regressions in columns (1) - (3) and (5) - (6) are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Estimates in column (4) are based on 5 nearest neighbor matching. Column (5) includes only the first treatment. The sample in column (6) is restricted to observing the outcome variable at least once in the pre-period = -3 to -1. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The mean refers to the outcome level of the control group measured two years after the appointment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

![](_page_55_Figure_4.jpeg)

A: Appointing active politician

**B:** Appointing former politician

*Notes:* The figure shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on log employment in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5. Estimates are based on equation (2). The regression is weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The light grey results are based on the estimator proposed by de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020). 100 bootstrap replications are used in the computation of the standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

Figure C.3: The effect of appointing a politician on employment dynamics - Estimator by de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020)

![](_page_56_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_56_Figure_2.jpeg)

*Notes:* The figure presents the effect in t + 2 ( $\beta_{\tau=2}$ ) of appointing an active or former politician on market exit, log(employment) and labor productivity at time t=0.  $\beta_{\tau=2}$  is based on equation (2). All regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint in t=0. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

FIGURE C.4: EFFECTS BY SUB-SAMPLES

# **D** Additional Empirical Results on Election Discontinuities

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$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	tandard eviation
All partiesNumber of seats22.66918.81722.38118.04820.960Share no entry through party list0.3000.4600.1440.3520.210Marginal winning seat7.5369.0595.5265.5356.691Share elected0.2540.1590.2540.1240.305Number of connected seats8.7826.26011.0107.28212.159 $CDU/CSU$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats31.81320.93230.75022.56230.250Marginal winning seat11.10010.1867.0008.03114.500Share candidate last election0.3920.1160.4470.1110.464Share elected0.3290.1320.2420.1250.391Number of connected seats11.6327.46017.5439.01220.915 $SPD$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats33.09422.04428.65621.37627.813Marginal winning seat19.20011.6819.3046.8859.464Share elected0.4070.2350.2840.1120.321Number of seats9.6885.61611.6294.84411.312FDP $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats21.93816.77922.34417.66520.625Marginal winning seat3.2143.0354.9684.923 <t< th=""><th>(6)</th></t<>	(6)
Number of seats22.669 $18.817$ 22.381 $18.048$ 20.960Share no entry through party list0.3000.4600.1440.3520.210Marginal winning seat7.5369.0595.5265.5356.691Share elected0.2540.1590.2540.1240.305Number of connected seats8.7826.26011.0107.28212.159CDU/CSUNumber of seats31.81320.93230.75022.56230.250Marginal winning seat11.10010.1867.0008.03114.500Share candidate last election0.3920.1160.4470.1110.464Share elected0.3290.1320.2420.1250.391Number of connected seats11.6327.46017.5439.01220.915SPDNumber of seats33.09422.04428.65621.37627.813Marginal winning seat19.20011.6819.3046.8859.464Share candidate last election0.4610.1430.5020.1640.383Share elected0.4070.2350.2840.1120.321Number of seats9.6885.61611.6294.84411.312FDPNumber of seats21.93816.77922.34417.66520.625Marginal winning seat3.2143.0354.9684.9235.333Share elected0.1300.0500.2100.099 <t< td=""><td></td></t<>	
Share no entry through party list $0.300$ $0.460$ $0.144$ $0.352$ $0.210$ Marginal winning seat $7.536$ $9.059$ $5.526$ $5.535$ $6.691$ Share elected $0.254$ $0.159$ $0.254$ $0.124$ $0.305$ Number of connected seats $8.782$ $6.260$ $11.010$ $7.282$ $12.159$ $CDU/CSU$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $31.813$ $20.932$ $30.750$ $22.562$ $30.250$ Marginal winning seat $11.100$ $10.186$ $7.000$ $8.031$ $14.500$ Share candidate last election $0.392$ $0.116$ $0.447$ $0.111$ $0.464$ Share elected $0.329$ $0.132$ $0.242$ $0.125$ $0.391$ Number of connected seats $11.632$ $7.460$ $17.543$ $9.012$ $20.915$ SPD $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $33.094$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDP $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ <td< td=""><td>17.667</td></td<>	17.667
Marginal winning seat       7.536       9.059       5.526       5.535       6.691         Share elected       0.254       0.159       0.254       0.124       0.305         Number of connected seats       8.782       6.260       11.010       7.282       12.159         CDU/CSU            12.159         Number of seats       31.813       20.932       30.750       22.562       30.250         Marginal winning seat       11.100       10.186       7.000       8.031       14.500         Share candidate last election       0.392       0.116       0.447       0.111       0.464         Share elected       0.329       0.132       0.242       0.125       0.391         Number of connected seats       11.632       7.460       17.543       9.012       20.915         SPD       Number of seats       33.094       22.044       28.656       21.376       27.813         Marginal winning seat       19.200       11.681       9.304       6.885       9.464         Share candidate last election       0.461       0.143       0.502       0.164       0.383         Share elected       0.407       0.235	0.409
Share elected       0.254       0.159       0.254       0.124       0.305         Number of connected seats       8.782       6.260       11.010       7.282       12.159         CDU/CSU	7.387
Number of connected seats $8.782$ $6.260$ $11.010$ $7.282$ $12.159$ CDU/CSUNumber of seats $31.813$ $20.932$ $30.750$ $22.562$ $30.250$ Marginal winning seat $11.100$ $10.186$ $7.000$ $8.031$ $14.500$ Share candidate last election $0.392$ $0.116$ $0.447$ $0.111$ $0.464$ Share candidate last election $0.392$ $0.116$ $0.447$ $0.111$ $0.464$ Share candidate last election $0.329$ $0.132$ $0.242$ $0.125$ $0.391$ Number of connected seats $11.632$ $7.460$ $17.543$ $9.012$ $20.915$ SPDNumber of seats $33.094$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share candidate last election	0.145
Number of seats $31.813$ $20.932$ $30.750$ $22.562$ $30.250$ Marginal winning seat $11.100$ $10.186$ $7.000$ $8.031$ $14.500$ Share candidate last election $0.392$ $0.116$ $0.447$ $0.111$ $0.464$ Share elected $0.329$ $0.132$ $0.242$ $0.125$ $0.391$ Number of connected seats $11.632$ $7.460$ $17.543$ $9.012$ $20.915$ SPD $SPD$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $33.094$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of connected seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDP $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.232$ Number of connected seats $7.719$ $3.665$ $10.225$ $4.788$ $11.691$	8.389
Marginal winning seat11.10010.1867.000 $8.031$ 14.500Share candidate last election $0.392$ $0.116$ $0.447$ $0.111$ $0.464$ Share elected $0.329$ $0.132$ $0.242$ $0.125$ $0.391$ Number of connected seats $11.632$ $7.460$ $17.543$ $9.012$ $20.915$ SPD $8.001$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of connected seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDP $FDP$ $FDP$ $FDP$ $FDP$ $FDP$ $FDP$ Number of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share elected $0.130$ $0.050$ $0.210$ $0.099$ $0.232$ Number of connected seats $7.719$ $3.665$ $10.225$ $4.788$ $11.691$	22.519
Share candidate last election $0.392$ $0.116$ $0.447$ $0.111$ $0.464$ Share elected $0.329$ $0.132$ $0.242$ $0.125$ $0.391$ Number of connected seats $11.632$ $7.460$ $17.543$ $9.012$ $20.915$ SPD $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $33.094$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of connected seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDPVVV $V$ $V$ $V$ Number of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share elected $0.130$ $0.050$ $0.210$ $0.099$ $0.232$ Number of connected seats $7.719$ $3.665$ $10.225$ $4.788$ $11.691$	14.100
Share elected       0.329       0.132       0.242       0.125       0.391         Number of connected seats       11.632       7.460       17.543       9.012       20.915         SPD                 20.915         Number of seats       33.094       22.044       28.656       21.376       27.813          Marginal winning seat       19.200       11.681       9.304       6.885       9.464         Share candidate last election       0.461       0.143       0.502       0.164       0.383         Share elected       0.407       0.235       0.284       0.112       0.321         Number of connected seats       9.688       5.616       11.629       4.844       11.312         FDP             20.625         Marginal winning seat       3.214       3.035       4.968       4.923       5.333         Share candidate last election       0.208       0.145       0.265       0.139       0.255         Marginal winning seat       3.214       3.030       0.050       0.210       0.099       0.232 <td>0.111</td>	0.111
Number of connected seats $11.632$ $7.460$ $17.543$ $9.012$ $20.915$ SPDNumber of seats $33.094$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of connected seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDPNumber of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.232$ Number of connected seats $7.719$ $3.665$ $10.225$ $4.788$ $11.691$	0.204
Number of seats $33.094$ $22.044$ $28.656$ $21.376$ $27.813$ Marginal winning seat $19.200$ $11.681$ $9.304$ $6.885$ $9.464$ Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of connected seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDPNumber of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share elected $0.130$ $0.050$ $0.210$ $0.099$ $0.232$ Number of connected seats $7.719$ $3.665$ $10.225$ $4.788$ $11.691$	9.081
Marginal winning seat19.20011.6819.3046.8859.464Share candidate last election $0.461$ $0.143$ $0.502$ $0.164$ $0.383$ Share elected $0.407$ $0.235$ $0.284$ $0.112$ $0.321$ Number of connected seats $9.688$ $5.616$ $11.629$ $4.844$ $11.312$ FDPNumber of seats $21.938$ $16.779$ $22.344$ $17.665$ $20.625$ Marginal winning seat $3.214$ $3.035$ $4.968$ $4.923$ $5.333$ Share candidate last election $0.208$ $0.145$ $0.265$ $0.139$ $0.255$ Share elected $0.130$ $0.050$ $0.210$ $0.099$ $0.232$ Number of connected seats $7.719$ $3.665$ $10.225$ $4.788$ $11.691$	21.297
Share candidate last election       0.461       0.143       0.502       0.164       0.383         Share elected       0.407       0.235       0.284       0.112       0.321         Number of connected seats       9.688       5.616       11.629       4.844       11.312         FDP                Number of seats       21.938       16.779       22.344       17.665       20.625         Marginal winning seat       3.214       3.035       4.968       4.923       5.333         Share candidate last election       0.208       0.145       0.265       0.139       0.255         Share elected       0.130       0.050       0.210       0.099       0.232         Number of connected seats       7.719       3.665       10.225       4.788       11.691	7.371
Share elected       0.407       0.235       0.284       0.112       0.321         Number of connected seats       9.688       5.616       11.629       4.844       11.312         FDP                 Number of seats       21.938       16.779       22.344       17.665       20.625         Marginal winning seat       3.214       3.035       4.968       4.923       5.333         Share candidate last election       0.208       0.145       0.265       0.139       0.255         Share elected       0.130       0.050       0.210       0.099       0.232         Number of connected seats       7.719       3.665       10.225       4.788       11.691	0.150
Number of connected seats         9.688         5.616         11.629         4.844         11.312           FDP         1 <th< td=""><td>0.129</td></th<>	0.129
FDP       FDP       FDP         Number of seats       21.938       16.779       22.344       17.665       20.625         Marginal winning seat       3.214       3.035       4.968       4.923       5.333         Share candidate last election       0.208       0.145       0.265       0.139       0.255         Share elected       0.130       0.050       0.210       0.099       0.232         Number of connected seats       7.719       3.665       10.225       4.788       11.691	4.902
Number of seats21.93816.77922.34417.66520.625Marginal winning seat3.2143.0354.9684.9235.333Share candidate last election0.2080.1450.2650.1390.255Share elected0.1300.0500.2100.0990.232Number of connected seats7.7193.66510.2254.78811.691	
Marginal winning seat       3.214       3.035       4.968       4.923       5.333         Share candidate last election       0.208       0.145       0.265       0.139       0.255         Share elected       0.130       0.050       0.210       0.099       0.232         Number of connected seats       7.719       3.665       10.225       4.788       11.691	16.560
Share candidate last election         0.208         0.145         0.265         0.139         0.255           Share elected         0.130         0.050         0.210         0.099         0.232           Number of connected seats         7.719         3.665         10.225         4.788         11.691	5.394
Share elected         0.130         0.050         0.210         0.099         0.232           Number of connected seats         7.719         3.665         10.225         4.788         11.691	0.161
Number of connected seats 7.719 3.665 10.225 4.788 11.691	0.084
	6.663
Greens	0.000
Number of seats 15.156 13.735 13.625 8.511 17.344	13.985
Marginal winning seat 3.483 3.169 3.774 3.603 4.000	3.919
Share candidate last election 0.204 0.152 0.340 0.148 0.255	0.116
Share elected 0.224 0.102 0.259 0.124 0.210	0.069
Number of connected seats 2.375 1.338 4.316 2.016 6.377	3.235
Left	0.200
Number of seats 11.344 5.672 16.531 9.632 11.906	6 1 4 0
Marginal winning seat 3 200 2 394 4 032 2 373 4 094	2 607
Share candidate last election 0.240 0.157 0.221 0.180 0.382	0.208
Share elected 0.239 0.149 0.277 0.146 0.343	0.148
Number of connected seats 3 000 1 832 4 355 2 052 2 969	1 274
AfD	1.2/1
Number of seats 11 688	8 877
Marginal winning seat 5.875	4 544
Share elected 0.372	0.140
Number of connected seats 5.936	3 072

*Notes:* The table shows means and standard deviations at the election year – party – federal state level.

![](_page_58_Figure_1.jpeg)

*Notes:* The figure shows the number of candidates by the identified marginal cutoff seat at the regional (federal state) and political party level. For example, there are about 312 candidates at the state-party level where only the first candidate enters parliament via the party list (*Landesliste*).

FIGURE D.1: NUMBER	OF	OBSERVATIONS	PER	CUTOFF	SEAT
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Threshold	Treatment status	Number of observations								
		All	Unique firms	Unique politicians						
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)						
÷										
-6	Control	80	80	46						
-5	Control	87	87	50						
-4	Control	93	93	51						
-3	Control	95	94	60						
-2	Control	92	90	49						
-1	Control	113	113	61						
0	Treated	108	102	49						
1	Treated	119	110	55						
2	Treated	110	100	55						
3	Treated	94	91	49						
4	Treated	130	125	58						
5	Treated	92	90	38						
6	Treated	67	64	30						

TABLE D.2: OBSERVATIONS AT CLOSEST MASS POINTS

*Notes:* The total number of observations across all mass points is 2,233, with 1,694 unique firms, 947 unique politicians and 98 unique mass points.

![](_page_59_Figure_1.jpeg)

B: Association between Vote and Cutoff

*Notes:* Panel A shows the distribution of residuals from the regression equation:  $marginal seat_{tsp} = \theta_t + \omega_{sp} + \epsilon_{tsp}$ . The regression is organized at the election year – party – federal state level and is constructed based on all 13,002 political candidate–election year observations. The marginal seat is identified if at least one candidate enters parliament from the submitted party list. Panel B shows the change in the identified marginal seat (circle) from the previous election to the current election at the party – state level (along with the 95% confidence intervals) and the change in the second vote for the respective party (diamond). Each color represents a political party: CDU/CSU - black; SPD - red; Greens - green; FDP - yellow; Left - purple. AfD is not shown in the Panel B.

FIGURE D.2: MARGINAL SEAT VARIATION

![](_page_60_Figure_1.jpeg)

B: MC Test

*Notes:* Panel A shows the number of firms for the normalized party list where 0 represents the marginal seat that just enters parliament. The blue dots represent firms connected to a candidate without an active mandate. The red dots represent firms connected to candidates with an active mandate. Panel B shows the McCrary test for manipulation pooling both groups.

FIGURE D.3: TEST FOR MANIPULATION OF THE CUTOFF

	Indep. variable				Dep. variables	
	Connectior	n indicator	RDD cu	utoff		
	Coefficient	<i>P</i> -value	Coefficient	P-value	Mean	SD
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<u>Candid</u>	lates <i>without</i> an	active mandate			
Firm size, age, productivity						
Log initial firm size	0.602	0.001	0.032	0.928	1.619	1.608
Initial firm size > 100	0.097	0.001	0.007	0.906	0.056	0.230
Firm age	7.810	0.125	8.542	0.183	21.530	37.944
Log initial labor productivity	-0.190	0.334	0.184	0.629	12.239	1.627
Legal form						
Small business	-0.103	0.003	-0.065	0.345	0.184	0.388
LLC	-0.048	0.295	-0.084	0.372	0.455	0.498
Stock corporation	0.055	0.017	0.002	0.970	0.051	0.219
Civil public partner	-0.025	0.185	0.001	0.980	0.052	0.223
Association	0.082	0.042	0.064	0.417	0.198	0.399
Major industries						
Manufacturing	-0.016	0.403	-0.060	0.146	0.054	0.226
Finance & insurance	-0.024	0.272	0.045	0.295	0.052	0.223
Technical service	0.030	0.469	-0.068	0.418	0.252	0.434
Other service	0.092	0.012	0.107	0.140	0.152	0.360
Candidate characteristics						
Female candidate	-0.029	0.453	0.019	0.803	0.161	0.368
Age	4.373	0.000	0.829	0.620	48.488	9.820
Years in firm	0.241	0.630	-1.105	0.246	6.631	23.210
Match characteristics						
Multiple connections	0.008	0.582	0.020	0.539	0.012	0.109
Competing party connection	0.005	0.317	0.007	0.322	0.005	0.068
	Candi	dates with an a	ctive mandate			
Firm size, age, productivity						
Log initial firm size	0.253	0.356	0.142	0.797	2.411	2.052
Initial firm size > 100	0.034	0.479	-0.036	0.711	0.160	0.366
Firm age	2.806	0.393	-2.492	0.713	33.376	31.232
Log initial labor productivity	0.216	0.406	0.685	0.177	12.346	1.694
Legal form						
Small business	-0.059	0.064	0.021	0.641	0.067	0.251
LLC	0.008	0.882	-0.206	0.064	0.339	0.474
Stock corporation	-0.004	0.884	0.048	0.424	0.079	0.270
Civil public partner	0.005	0.744	0.055	0.179	0.037	0.190
Association	0.004	0.939	0.036	0.748	0.427	0.495
Maior industries						0
Manufacturing	0.053	0.020	0.029	0.526	0.039	0.194
Finance & insurance	0.046	0.057	0.053	0.158	0.044	0.205
Technical service	-0.039	0.404	0.008	0.925	0.199	0.399
Other service	0.029	0.585	0.112	0.288	0.362	0.481
Candidate characteristics	0.02)	0.000	0.112	0.200	0.002	0.101
Female candidate	0.027	0 593	0.064	0 520	0.260	0 439
Ασρ	1 612	0 104	-0.099	0.958	54 169	8 158
Years in firm	0.354	0.567	-1 704	0.125	5 766	5 355
Match characteristics	0.001	0.007	1.7 01	0.120	0.700	0.000
Multiple connections	0.002	0 940	-0.050	0 363	0 091	0 287
Competing party connection	-0.019	0.571	-0.047	0.372	0.068	0.252

#### TABLE D.3: BALANCING TEST AROUND THE CUTOFF - FIRM CHARACTERISTICS

*Notes:* Columns (1) to (4) show regression results using a symmetric bandwidth selection of 4 seats below and above the cutoff seat. Connection indicator is 1 if the firm is connected to parliament and zero otherwise. RDD cutoff refers to the reduced-form estimate at the marginal seat. Columns (5) and (6) show the mean and standard deviation of the respective outcome variable. *p*-values are based on robust standard errors. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

![](_page_62_Figure_1.jpeg)

*Notes:* The figure shows firm, candidate and match-specific variables across the party list threshold. All variables represent normalized values conditional on party, state, and election year fixed effects. Positive values denote firms connected to candidates who won a seat in the German federal parliament. Likewise, negative values depict firms that are connected to candidates who did not won a seat via the party list. The solid red line represents local linear regressions on each side of the cutoff. The grey area represent 95% confidence intervals. The blue dots represent conditional means. Baseline selected bandwidth of 6 below and above the cutoff.

FIGURE D.4: BALANCING AT THE CUTOFF (POOLED)

TABLE D.4: 2SLS RESULTS - POST ELECTION YEARS       Evit in     Employment growth to 1 and gro										
		Exit in		Employ	ment growt	h $t - 1 \rightarrow$	Lab. pro	Lab. prod. growth $t - 1 \rightarrow$		
	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+1	t+2	t+3	t+1	t+2	t+3	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	
Panel A: No n	nandate at e	election ("Sta	ying unconn	ected (=0) v	rs. winning	(=1)")				
Indicator	-0.106***	-0.117***	-0.119*	-0.0961	-0.160	-0.227	-0.335**	-0.425*	-0.389*	
	(0.0350)	(0.0421)	(0.0700)	(0.103)	(0.127)	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.224)	(0.235)	
F-Statistic	1399	1399	501.9	410	314.9	280.7	407.4	220.9	246.3	
Observations	733	733	504	357	300	240	351	277	240	
Mean below	0.0723	0.0964	0.172	0.0909	0.110	0.164	0.0347	0.0605	0.149	
Mean above	0.0154	0.0385	0.112	0.00954	0.0262	-0.0291	-0.151	-0.219	-0.179	
Panel B: Mano	date at elect	ion ("Staving	connected (	(=0) vs. droj	oout (=1)")					
Indicator	0.0366	0.0478	-0.0255	-0.0550	-0.272	-0.328*	0.0929	0.311	0.343	
	(0.0374)	(0.0506)	(0.0724)	(0.121)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.211)	(0.256)	(0.308)	
F-Statistic	296.3	296.3	222	70.92	55.40	61.97	62.60	54.81	48.78	
Observations	624	624	483	320	268	227	301	252	213	
Mean below	0.0357	0.0893	0.111	0.0183	-0.0364	-0.0277	-0.182	-0.0890	-0.0103	
Mean above	0.0286	0.0571	0.111	0.111	0.147	0.164	-0.0874	-0.0743	-0.0253	

# Additional Results on the Effect of Winning and Losing Political Connections

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Panel A provides the results for the candidates without an active political mandate, whereas Panel B provides the results for candidates with an active political mandate. All specifications are based on a bandwidth selection of 6 below and above the cutoff and include election year FE. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

TRUE D.S. ZOLO RESOLIS ADDITIONAL COVARIATES										
	Exit i	in $t + 2$	Employme	Employment growth $t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$		growth $t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Panel A: No mandate at election ("Staying unconnected (=0) vs. winning (=1)")										
Indicator	-0.127***	-0.133***	-0.152	-0.134	-0.608**	-0.653**				
	(0.0454)	(0.0461)	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.259)	(0.263)				
F-Statistic	946.5	1079	176	193.6	135.3	145.6				
Observations	731	731	298	298	261	261				
Panel B: Mandate at election ("Staying connected (=0) vs. dropout (=1)")										
Indicator	0.0377	0.0383	-0.209	-0.214	0.252	0.232				
	(0.0531)	(0.0535)	(0.186)	(0.195)	(0.291)	(0.296)				
F-Statistic	297.8	301.4	63.18	59.40	49.02	46.48				
Observations	621	621	265	265	240	240				
Election Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Initial Employment	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes				
Initial Firm Age	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes				
Job Type	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes				

 TABLE D.5: 2SLS results - additional covariates

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Panel A provides the results for the candidates without an active political mandate, whereas Panel B provides the results for candidates with an active political mandate. All specifications are based on a bandwidth selection of 6 below and above the cutoff. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

	A	Absolute bandwidth			Relative bandwidth			
	bw: 4 (1)	bw: 8 (2)	bw: 10 (3)	bw: 50% (4)	bw: 50% & bw: 6 (5)	bw: 50% & bw: 8 (6)		
Panel A1: No ma	ndate at ele	ection ("Stayin	g unconnecte	d (=0) vs. win	ning (=1)"), exit t+2			
Indicator	-0.152**	-0.110***	-0.0705*	-0.0617**	-0.134***	-0.128***		
	(0.0601)	(0.0392)	(0.0360)	(0.0283)	(0.0506)	(0.0441)		
Mean outcome	0.0945	0.0871	0.0907	0.0972	0.0942	0.0938		
Observations	506	917	1079	1007	571	648		
Panel A2: No ma	andate at ele	ection ("Stayin	g unconnecte	d (=0) vs. win	ning (=1)"), employmen	t growth t+2		
Indicator	-0.131	-0.176	-0.134	-0.171**	-0.204	-0.159		
	(0.211)	(0.134)	(0.117)	(0.0789)	(0.177)	(0.149)		
Mean outcome	0.0945	0.0871	0.0907	0.0972	0.0942	0.0938		
Observations	506	917	1079	1007	571	648		
Panel A3: No ma	andate at ele	ection ("Stayin	g unconnecte	d (=0) vs. win	ning (=1)"), Lab. prod. §	growth t+2		
Indicator	-0.626*	-0.326	-0.210	-0.0465	-0.703**	-0.441*		
	(0.359)	(0.205)	(0.171)	(0.125)	(0.287)	(0.240)		
Mean outcome	-0.0332	-0.00726	0.000246	-0.0261	0.00117	-0.00545		
Observations	199	342	406	402	212	239		
Panel B1: Manda	ite at electio	n ("Staying co	onnected (=0)	vs. dropout (=	=1)"), exit t+2			
Indicator	0.0329	0.0495	0.0132	-0.0153	0.0569	0.0316		
	(0.0677)	(0.0479)	(0.0461)	(0.0317)	(0.0544)	(0.0534)		
Mean outcome	0.0500	0.0558	0.0584	0.0533	0.0540	0.0577		
Observations	436	714	785	880	534	586		
Panel B2: Manda	ite at electio	n ("Staying co	onnected (=0)	vs. dropout (=	=1)"), employment growt	:h t+2		
Indicator	-0.196	-0.133	-0.00553	-0.0928	-0.124	-0.133		
	(0.189)	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.0875)	(0.185)	(0.184)		
Mean outcome	0.0882	0.0685	0.0480	0.0402	0.0886	0.0775		
Observations	182	314	350	410	234	254		
Panel B3: Manda	te at electio	n ("Staving co	onnected (=0)	vs. dropout (=	=1)"), Lab. prod. growth	t+2		
Indicator	-0.503*	0.329	0.405*	0.169	0.237	0.235		
	(0.299)	(0.222)	(0.216)	(0.151)	(0.274)	(0.269)		
Mean outcome	0.0413	0.0122	-0.00134	0.0481	0.0336	0.0321		
Observations	167	277	309	379	219	233		
Election Vear FE	Voc	Ves	Voc	Voc	Vos	Ves		

Table D.6: Fuzzy RDD results - variation in the bandwidth choice

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications with different bandwidths. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

	"Staving	Winning a mandate "Staving unconnected $(-0)$ vs. winning $(-1)$ "			Losing a mandate "Staving connected $(-0)$ vs. dropout $(-1)$ "			
	Jaying	g unconnected (=0) v	s. while $(-1)$	"Staying connected (=0) vs. dropc		ulopoul (=1)		
	Exit	Employment	LP	Exit	Employment	LP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Panel A: Triangu	ılar kernel							
Connection	-0.119***	-0.0816	-0.526**	0.0349	-0.182	0.345*		
	(0.0438)	(0.0894)	(0.247)	(0.0442)	(0.119)	(0.190)		
Bandwidth <i>h</i>	6.824	14.91	6.908	11.10	12.10	11.49		
Panel B: Uniforn	n kernel							
Connection	-0.134**	-0.0743	-0.471**	0.0410	-0.218	0.384*		
	(0.0519)	(0.0891)	(0.237)	(0.0446)	(0.137)	(0.201)		
Bandwidth <i>h</i>	4.668	11.10	5.034	8.181	9.141	8.348		
Panel C: Two-sid	led MSE-opti	mal bandwidth						
Connection	-0.0860***	-0.0741	-0.368**	0.0361	-0.179	0.327*		
	(0.0319)	(0.0895)	(0.159)	(0.0448)	(0.120)	(0.186)		
Bandwidth $-h$	13.55	15.34	12.80	10.73	11.35	11.31		
Bandwidth $+h$	8.450	13.34	7.824	10.79	13.98	14.70		
Panel D: CE-opti	imal bandwid	lth						
Connection	-0.111**	-0.106	-0.650**	0.0437	-0.282**	0.253		
	(0.0542)	(0.104)	(0.322)	(0.0514)	(0.135)	(0.213)		
Bandwidth $h$	4.659	10.64	4.952	7.768	8.812	8.405		
Election Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

#### TABLE D.7: FUZZY RDD RESULTS - CONTINUITY-BASED OPTIMAL BANDWIDTH SELECTION

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications with different optimal bandwidth selection criteria. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Robust bias-corrected *p*-values are shown in parentheses. \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table D.8:	Local ra	ANDOMIZATIO	N RESULTS	- MARGINAL	SEAT VS.	SEAT BELOW	

	Cand "Wini	lidates without m ning: marginal sea	andate at (=1)"	Candidates with mandate "Dropout: seat below (=1); unlucky (=1)"			
	Market exit	Employment growth	Lab prod growth	Market exit	Employment growth	Lab. prod. growth	
	at <i>t</i> + 2	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	at $t+2$	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	$t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Indicator	-0.097***	-0.153	-0.225	0.017	-0.090	0.148	
	(0.003)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.620)	(0.342)	(0.292)	
Mean marginal seat	0.038	-0.012	-0.165	0.057	0.139	-0.076	
Mean below	0.135	0.139	0.060	0.074	0.049	0.069	
Observations	278	120	99	235	101	93	

*Notes:* The table presents local randomization results comparing the outcome variables for firms with candidates at the marginal seat and one seat below. Outcome variables are market exit at t + 2, employment growth from  $t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$ , and labor productivity growth from  $t - 1 \rightarrow t + 2$  relative to the election years. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Finite p-values shown in Panel A. Robust standard errors are shown in Panel B. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

	Candidates without mandate "Staying unconnected (=0) vs. winning (=1)"			Candidates with mandate "Staying connected (=0) vs. dropout (=1)"			
	bw = 4	bw = 6	bw = 8	bw = 4	bw = 6	bw = 8	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Panel A: Average	yearly em	ployment grow	with, $t - 5$ to $t - 1$				
Indicator	-0.0171	-0.0567	-0.0395	-0.0576	-0.0558	-0.0226	
	(0.0490)	(0.0348)	(0.0294)	(0.0662)	(0.0605)	(0.0492)	
Observations	308	438	554	267	392	449	
F-Statistic	337.8	719.5	1150	137.3	154.9	163.8	
Mean outcome	0.0304	0.0281	0.0282	0.00737	0.0150	0.0160	
Panel B: Average	yearly lab.	prod. growth,	t - 5 to $t - 1$				
Indicator	0.0349	0.0823	0.0429	0.0543	0.0644	0.0486	
	(0.0626)	(0.0558)	(0.0456)	(0.0726)	(0.0659)	(0.0530)	
Observations	289	413	525	254	367	415	
F-Statistic	314.6	668.5	1050	119.3	137	150	
Mean outcome	-0.0031	-0.0089	-0.00593	0.0274	0.0233	0.0203	
Election Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

*Notes:* The table presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications with different bandwidths. Outcome variables are employment growth (Panel A) and labor productivity growth (Panel B) before the election. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01

![](_page_66_Figure_4.jpeg)

*Notes:* The figure shows the distribution of the treatment effect coefficients for 2,999 permutations of the dependent variables. The red lines show the baseline 2SLS coefficients.

FIGURE D.5: PERMUTATION RESULTS

![](_page_67_Figure_1.jpeg)

C: LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN t + 2Notes: The figure presents fuzzy RDD estimates from local linear regression discontinuity specifications with bandwidth selection of 6 on market exit, employment growth and labor productivity growth in panels (A), (B) and (C), respectively. Election years covered are 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.

FIGURE D.6: EFFECTS BY SUB-SAMPLES

![](_page_68_Figure_1.jpeg)

# E Additional Empirical Results on the Mechanism

![](_page_68_Figure_3.jpeg)

B: Appointing former politician

*Notes:* The figure shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on credit rating in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5. The black point estimates are based on equation (2). The regression is weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The red bar gives the effect on the average change in credit rating between the pre-period = -3 to 0 and the post-period 1 to 5. The number of observations with employment information are shown in Figure C.2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

![](_page_68_Figure_6.jpeg)

![](_page_68_Figure_7.jpeg)

#### A: Appointing active politician

B: Appointing former politician

*Notes:* The figure shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or a former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on subsidies in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5. The black point estimates are based on equation (2). The regression is weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The red bar gives the effect on the average change in subsidies between the pre-period = -3 to 0 and the post-period 1 to 5. The number of observations with employment information are shown in Figure C.2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

![](_page_68_Figure_11.jpeg)

![](_page_69_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_69_Figure_2.jpeg)

B: Appointing former politician

*Notes:* The figure shows the effect of appointing an active (Panel A) or former (Panel B) politician at time t=0 on public procurement in  $t=\tau$ ,  $\tau=-3$  to 5. The black point estimates are based on equation (2). The regression is weighted by the inverse propensity score. Propensity score estimation is performed by year and includes firm age in groups, sales in t=-1 and t=-2, employment in t=-1 and t=-2, composition of job positions in t=0, firm type, 1-digit industry and state fixed effects (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The control group is restricted to firms that appoint a person in t=0. The red bar gives the effect on the average change in public procurement between the pre-period = -3 to 0 and the post-period 1 to 5. The number of observations with employment information are shown in Figure C.2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.

FIGURE E.3: THE EFFECT OF APPOINTING A POLITICIAN ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DYNAMICS