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# Monopsony Power and Creative Destruction: Static Loss, Faster Growth

# Preliminary Version, April 2025

Isabella Maassen, Filip Mellgren, Jonas Overhage

#### Abstract

Monopsonistic labor markets create misallocation of labor while generating profits. These in turn incentivize firms to innovate, which drives aggregate growth. This paper explores the trade-off between static efficiency and growth by developing a tractable endogenous growth model with heterogeneous firms and upward sloping labor supply curves. We show that monopsony can rationalize the prevalence of unproductive yet innovating firms that would otherwise be crowded out by more productive competitors. Our model calibrated to U.S. data confirms previous findings that imperfectly competitive labor markets distort static efficiency. However, we find that monopsony also leads to higher growth. On balance, we estimate that a 1% narrowing of the markdown increases the present value of output by about 1.08%.

# 1 Introduction

Monopsonistic labor markets distort static allocative efficiency and provide a source of economic profits. In turn, profits incentivize firms to innovate, giving rise to a tradeoff between aggregate static allocative efficiency and economic growth. While product market power has been studied extensively by the endogenous growth literature, other sources of economic profit have received less attention. Meanwhile, the empirical evidence for monopsonistic labor markets is mounting, making monopsony a topic for regulation.<sup>1</sup> To examine how monopsony affects the interplay between growth and productivity, this paper develops a tractable endogenous growth model featuring monopsonistic labor markets.

To this end, we introduce monopsonistic labor markets to a Schumpeterian model of economic growth. This key feature causes the labor supply curves that firms face to be upward sloping. In the model, firms produce a variety of goods with product-specific quality. There are two types of firms, which differ in their physical productivity. Firms choose research effort to improve upon the quality of competitors' products, and compete under Bertrand competition for demand in each product line. In equilibrium, demand for any given product is fulfilled by the highest quality producer at a price depending on competitors' marginal costs, and a markup due to its quality advantage. As the degree of monopsony influences the size penalty of growing large, it brings rich implications for the distribution of firm size, marginal costs, and markups.

In turn, the distributions of firm size and markups determine growth and productivity. Allocative efficiency improves with labor market competitiveness as process efficient firms are able to set wages that crowd out firms with a low process efficiency. In the case of perfectly competitive labor markets, the only active producer type has the highest process efficiency. Meanwhile, research costs are calibrated to be convex, implying that research is more effective at a small scale. As monopsony enables the survival of many firms that choose to stay small, it stimulates the amount of aggregate innovation. The interaction between monopsony and product market power provides a second channel that stimulates innovation; monopsony enables firms with a high marginal cost to stay active, which results in higher markups for competitors with low marginal costs under limit-pricing .

To quantify these insights, we calibrate the model to match U.S. data, with the firm-level labor supply elasticity to match micro-level evidence. We then compare the fully calibrated model to a restricted version of the model without monopsony. Targeted moments for remaining parameters include the unemployment rate, key labor market elasticities, markups, the growth rate, and the revenue share of the top 10% largest firms. We then validate the monopsonistic model against the competitive benchmark using untargeted data moments, such as the research and profit shares, as well as relative process efficiencies and wages. With regards to firm-level productivity – or process efficiency as we designate it in this paper – the monopsonistic model is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For example, the 2023 Merger Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission [FTC], 2023), considers monopsony as a source of harm when evaluating mergers.

able to more closely match the disparity observed in the data. This occurs because monopsonistic producers with a low productivity can keep marginal costs relatively low by staying small, which is not possible when all firms pay the same market wage, as in the perfectly competitive case.

We use the calibrated model to investigate how the degree of monopsony affects the present value of aggregate output. We separate effects into four components: growth, average process efficiency, markup dispersion, and employment. We find that the average process efficiency and the rate of creative destruction are the biggest drivers of the overall effects. A one percent increase in markdowns leads to a 1.97% increase in average process efficiency, and a 1.16% reduction in the present value of future output due to lower growth. Decreasing markup dispersion improves output by 0.26%, and aggregate employment increases modestly by about 0.01%.

We connect to the policy debate by extending the model to feature progressive income taxes. We first show that lower income tax progressivity increases the firm-level labor supply elasticity. We then apply the model to a historical tax reform and estimate that the tax cuts in the 1980s increased the firm-level labor supply elasticity by about 2.3%, contributing to modest improvement in U.S.output. Next, we perform a hypothetical policy exercise where we fix the level of tax revenue at a base level. We find that, similar to directly setting the elasticity, a low-progressivity regime with high market concentration maximizes the net present value of output at the cost of its long-run growth rate.

Altogether, we obtain a rich framework that allows us to understand how the firmlevel labor supply elasticity shapes aggregate output through its effect on entry, the firm size distribution, misallocation, and employment. Furthermore, we speak to how these elasticities can be affected by tax policy. Our framework can also be used to study questions related long-run developments in labor markets.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, the relevant literature is discussed in Section 1.1. Then, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 shows how the equilibrium can be characterized. Next, Section 4 discusses the analytical results before turning to a quantification of the model. The extension with a progressive tax schedule is introduced and discussed in Section 5, before we conclude in Section 6.

# 1.1 Related literature

Our paper first and foremost relate to the literature on endogenous growth, building on seminal work such as Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Klette and Kortum (2004). In particular, we base our model on Aghion et al. (2023) and adapt it in several ways, with the main difference being the addition of monopsonistic labor markets. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to incorporate monopsony power in the labor market for production workers in this class of models featuring endogenous growth from creative destruction.

Closely related work to our paper are given by Peters (2020) and De Ridder (2024). Peters (2020) develops a growth model in which markups arise endogenously following risky own-innovations that improve the quality of products already under control of the producer. De Ridder (2024) develops an alternative model in which firms adopt intangible technology that lowers the marginal cost of production. The main similarity between our paper and these two contributions is that low marginal cost firms are able to charge higher markups which provide incentives to innovate. Another parallel is that as the economy becomes increasingly dominated by a few large firms, growth falls following decreasing returns to research. In contrast to these contributions, marginal costs in our model are not determined by previous innovations or investments, but increase directly with output as a result of monopsony. In addition, markups arise endogenously in our model depending on the equilibrium firm size distribution.

Other recent contributions to the literature on creative destruction and market power include Peters and Walsh (2021), Liu et al. (2022), Akcigit and Ates (2023), and Weiss (2023). Peters and Walsh (2021) study how population growth affects productivity growth and find that decreasing population growth reduces competition and increases markups. Liu et al. (2022), study how a low interest environment can increase market concentration and its effect on productivity growth. Focusing on business dynamism, Akcigit and Ates (2023) document a number of trends such as increased markups and concentration, and a fall in the labor share, and build a general equilibrium model featuring creative destruction to jointly explain these trends. In particular, they emphasize the role of a decrease in the intensity of knowledge diffusion between frontier and laggard firms. Finally, the work by Weiss (2023) analyzes large firm innovation incentives and find that increasing large firm profitability help explain the recent growth slowdown in the U.S.

Studies on monopsony that consider economic growth include work by Garibaldi and Turri (2024) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2025). The former study monopsony in a neoclassical growth model and corroborate the finding that monopsony lowers the level of output while increasing growth. The latter investigate how monopsony in the market for researchers affects growth when incumbent producers have a strategic capacity to protect their product lines from entrants. In relation to their contribution, our paper instead focuses on the effects of monopsony in the market for production workers.

On the macroeconomic consequences of market power, several studies point to the harm on static allocative efficiency. Berger et al. (2022) study oligopsony in a general equilibrium model and find that aggregate output is about 20.9% lower due to labor market power compared to a competitive benchmark. Baqaee and Farhi (2019), and Edmond et al. (2023) quantify large costs to allocative efficiency arising from markups due to the level, dispersion, and effects on entry. Bachmann et al. (2022) study variation in labor market power between East and West Germany, and find that variation in labor market power can explain about 40% of the difference in productivity between the two regions. Relative to these papers, our paper contributes by developing a structural model that can be used to study product innovation and growth in addition to static output. Due to this feature, the model is also able to quantify the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency that arises.

The empirical evidence for monopsonistic labor markets has seen a recent surge.

Notably, Sokolova and Sorensen (2021) synthesize a large body of micro-level studies which estimates the labor supply elasticity firms face when posting wages and arrive at a point estimate around 7.1 implying wage markdowns arising from monopsony around 88%. Another comprehensive study that attempts to identify the firm-level labor supply elasticity from the worker separation responses to firm wage policies is Bassier et al. (2022), which find a firm-level labor supply elasticity around 4.2 and wage markdowns around 81%.

A different strand of the literature finds empirical evidence for labor market power in matched employer-employee data, e.g. Lamadon et al. (2022); or using a production function approach, Chen et al. (2022), Kirov and Traina (2023) for the case of U.S. manufacturing, and Estefan et al. (2024) in the case of Mexican manufacturing. A recurring theme is substantial and widespread wage markdowns.

In modeling the labor market, we build on Card et al. (2018), where the source of wage setting power is workers' idiosyncratic preferences over workplaces. These idiosyncratic preferences give rise to an upward sloping labor supply curve for each firm, as workers weigh wages and non-wage preferences. This approach to modeling monopsony is what Manning (2021) classifies as "new classical monopsony." A distinctive feature of this framework is wage posting; employers post wages and hire any worker willing to work for them at this wage. There is no scope for wage bargaining. Consequently, each employer sets a firm-wide wage. Moreover, workers observe all wage offers and don't have to draw a subset of offers as is common in search models. Finally, this approach also contrasts other models where firms' wage setting power comes from local labor market power, that is a firms' hiring share in the local labor market with a (small) finite amount of employers, as in Azkarate-Askasua and Zerecero (2024).

One feature of our model is that equilibrium wage inequality between workers stems from firm-wide wage premia, which is consistent with empirical studies such as Abowd et al. (1999), Bonhomme et al. (2019), Bonhomme et al. (2023) or Wong (2023). We additionally speak to the literature on developments in the labor share, such as work by Elsby et al. (2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) or Rodriguez and Jayadev (2013). It may seem intuitive that higher monopsony power would lead to a decrease in the labor share. However, our model of creative destruction uncovers another channel: while monopsony increases the profit share for any given firm, it also shifts economic activity towards firms with a relatively low profit share. Accounting for both channels makes the relation between monopsony and the labor share ex-ante ambiguous.

# 2 Model

Like standard models of creative destruction, our model features monopolistic firms with production of intermediate goods along a quality ladder. Intermediate goods are bundled by a competitive final goods producer. Households value final good consumption and have idiosyncratic preferences over different employers. Thus, households make a discrete choice regarding their workplace and employment status. The economy grows as a result of firms' innovation efforts that lead to an increasing quality level of goods.

#### 2.1 Final good producers

There is a competitive final goods producer that aggregates differentiated intermediate goods from a unit interval according to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator:

$$Y_t = \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_{it} y_{it}) di, \quad i \in [0, 1],$$
(1)

where  $Y_t$  is final output,  $q_{it}$  is the quality level of good *i*, and  $y_{it}$  is the quantity of that good. This set-up implies that demand for each differentiated good follows:

$$p_{it}y_{it} = P_t Y_t, \quad P_t \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(p_{it}/q_{it}) di, \tag{2}$$

where we normalize  $P_t \equiv 1$ . For a detailed derivation of intermediate good demand, refer to Appendix A.1. We further introduce a quality index  $Q_t \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_{it}) di$ , such that aggregate output can be interpreted as a combination of quality level and physical output:  $Y_t = Q_t \exp \int_0^1 \ln(y_{it}) di$ .

This demand specification makes intermediate goods in the same product line i produced by different firms perfect substitutes and the final goods producer purchases from the firm j with the lowest quality-adjusted price, i.e.  $p_{it}/q_{it} = \min_{j \in \mathcal{J}} p_{ijt}/q_{ijt}$ . To break ties between intermediate goods producers posting equal quality-adjusted prices, we assume that the good with the higher quality is preferred.

For technical details on the good demand, refer to Appendix A.2. Essentially, intermediate goods producers compete in a Bertrand manner within each product market, and product demand for good i facing firm j is formally expressed as:

$$y_i(p_{ijt}, q_{ijt}, Y_t) = \begin{cases} \frac{Y_t}{p_{ijt}} & \text{if } \frac{p_{ijt}}{q_{ijt}} < \frac{p_{ij't}}{q_{ij't}}, \forall j' \in \mathcal{J} \setminus j \\ \frac{Y_t}{p_{ijt}} & \text{if } \frac{p_{ijt}}{q_{ijt}} \le \frac{p_{ij't}}{q_{ij't}}, \forall j' \in \mathcal{J} \setminus j \land q_{ijt} > q_{ikt}, \forall k : \frac{p_{ijt}}{q_{ijt}} = \frac{p_{ikt}}{q_{ikt}} \quad (3) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

#### 2.2 Households

A mass  $\mathcal{L}$  of households derive utility from private consumption and make a discrete choice over workplaces and home production in each period. They can choose to seek employment (g = e) in a company  $j \in \mathcal{J} = \{1, ..., J\}$ , or engage in home production (g = u). Households, indexed by o, have preferences for consumption as well as working at different firms and home production,

$$u_{ojt} = \beta \ln C_{ojt} + \xi_{ogt} + (1 - \sigma)\epsilon_{ojt}, \tag{4}$$

where  $C_{ojt}$  is household consumption. Households do not save, but fully consume the wage earned at firm j, which implies  $C_{ojt} = W_{ojt}$ . In our model, wages will differ

only across firms j, not across households working within a single firm. We thus drop the o subscript for the wage, and can state household utility as:

$$u_{ojt} = \beta \ln(W_{jt}) + \xi_{ogt} + (1 - \sigma)\epsilon_{ojt},\tag{5}$$

where  $\epsilon_{ojt}$  is independently and identically extreme value type 1 distributed. Similarly,  $\xi_{ogt} + (1 - \sigma)\epsilon_{ojt}$  is also i.i.d. extreme value type 1 distributed. If the household works at a firm, they earn the firm j specific wage  $W_j$ . If they engage in home production, they instead receive  $\omega Y_t$ . The presence of the outside option helps identifying the wage level.

Households compare all options available to them and choose to work where they receive the highest utility. The formulation thus captures, in addition to wages, individual preferences over working at any given firm  $(\epsilon_{ojt})$  and being employed at all  $(\xi_{ogt})$ , which does not depend on the workplace.

The parameter  $\beta$  captures how sensitive a household's utility is to consumption. In the limiting case where  $\beta \to \infty$ , households care only about consumption and choose their workplace based on where they earn the highest wage. This case represents perfect competition and the economy's labor market can be said to be perfectly competitive.

The parameter  $\sigma$  determines the weight  $1 - \sigma$  a household places on idiosyncratic workplace preferences. In the limiting case where  $\sigma \to 1$ , households choose a workplace based on the wage alone, similar to the case  $\beta \to \infty$  discussed above. Labor markets are competitive in either case, but with different implications for unemployment as discussed below.

Having the ability to choose the outside option of engaging in home production serves as an anchor for the wage level. Moreover, one intuition for this set-up is that a lower wage level at their preferred firm means workers become more likely to opt for home production instead of employment, where the parameter  $\sigma$  measures the sensitivity of this trade-off with respect to idiosyncratic preferences over firms.

The nested logit set-up follows the model outlined in McFadden (1977). We formulate the model with an outside option allowed to grow along a balanced growth path, which ensures a unique equilibrium. The implied labor supply facing firm j is given by:

$$L_j(W_{jt}) = \mathcal{L} \frac{W_{jt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{(\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}},$$

For details on solving the nested discrete choice problem, refer to Section A.3 in the Appendix. The labor supply depends on the amount of workers  $\mathcal{L}$ , and the wage of firm j relative to other firms' wages and the outside option  $\omega Y$ . Labor

supply increases in the own wage, and decreases in competitors' wages. The ownwage elasticity of labor supply is  $\beta/(1-\sigma)$ . We define  $D_{e,t} \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{J} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}$  and  $z_t \equiv \mathcal{L}/\left(D_{e,t}^{\sigma} \cdot (\omega Y)^{\beta} + D_{e,t}\right)$ . The labor supply facing firm j is then given by:

$$L_j(W_{jt}) = z_t W_{jt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}},\tag{6}$$

where  $z_t$  is an equilibrium object taken as given by firms, assuming that each individual firm considers itself small enough to not have an influence on  $z_t$ . Firms hence do not take the effect of their wage on the labor market into account, making the model a model of monopsony as opposed to oligopsony. The ratio  $\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$  measures the labor supply elasticity that firms face and a lower value corresponds to a greater degree of monopsony.

To build intuition about why both  $\sigma$  and  $\beta$  are introduced, we derive the elasticity of the share of workers choosing home production with respect to the value of the outside option,  $\omega Y$ . Summing up the labor employed at all firms yields the rate  $u_t$  of workers choosing the outside option  $u_t \equiv 1 - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} L_j / \mathcal{L}$ . Applying this, the sensitivity of the home employment rate with respect to the outside option value is given by:

$$\varepsilon_{u,\omega Y} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial (\omega Y)} \frac{(\omega Y)}{u} = \beta (1-u).$$
(7)

That is,  $\beta$  controls how strongly the home employment rate responds to changes in the value of the outside option, where the response becomes less sensitive for higher values of  $\beta$ . More details about the derivation of this elasticity can be found in Appendix A.4.

#### 2.3 Intermediate goods producers

Intermediate goods producers,  $j \in \mathcal{J}$ , set prices for intermediate goods, and decide how much to invest into research. The firm problem can conceptually be divided into two optimization problems: a static and a dynamic one. Statically, setting prices for intermediate goods determines production quantities and profits within a period. Dynamically, the firm decides how much to invest in research today, which leads to quality innovations in the next period. In the Bertrand Nash equilibrium, the firm that produces the highest quality of an intermediate good, is able to sell it at a marked-up price. In the following, the two parts of the firm problem are described in more detail.

Within a period, firms maximize their static profit by setting their quality-adjusted price for each intermediate profit,  $p_{ijt}/q_{ijt}$ , taking as given the current state of product quality in each line,  $q_{ijt}$ , as well as the quality adjusted prices of rival firms. As competitors prices follow from their own marginal costs and qualities, firm profits

depend on the distributions of  $mc_j, q_j$ , denoted  $\Gamma_{mc,t}$  and  $\Gamma_{q,t}$  respectively. Firms produce physical output using a single input referred to as labor using a firm-specific production technology,  $y_j = s_j f(l_j)$ , which depends on the firm's process efficiency  $s_j$ . A firm's process efficiency is the only source of heterogeneity in this model. As described above, intermediate product demand is given by Equation 3. Setting intermediate prices hence determines how much the firm produces, which in turn implies the required labor input. The wage is then set via the labor supply facing the firm, such that the labor input is matched. Formally, the static problem is given as:

$$\Pi_{j}(Y_{t}, \{q_{ijt}\}_{i \in [0,1]}, \Gamma_{mc,t}, \Gamma_{q,t}) = \max_{\{p_{ijt}\}_{i \in [0,1]}} \int_{0}^{1} p_{ijt} y_{ijt} di - W_{jt} L_{jt},$$
(8)

s.t. 
$$L_{jt} = \frac{1}{s_j} \int_0^1 f^{-1}(y_{ijt}) di, \quad W_{jt} = \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{z_t}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}$$
 (9)

Intermediate product demand as in (3). (10)

To impact its future ability to make static profits via  $\{q_{ijt}\}_{i\in[0,1]}$ , the firm can choose to engage in research. Denote the last firm to innovate upon product line *i* as j(i)and the firm with the second-highest quality as j'(i). We refer to these firms as "(quality) leader" and "(quality) follower." Innovation is modeled as a  $\gamma > 1$  step over the highest existing quality level of a good, i.e.,  $\gamma = q_{j(i)}/q_{j'(i)}$ . Research is undirected in the sense that firms do not decide which product lines to innovate in. However, we assume that firms do not innovate on product lines where they are already the leading quality producer, and that they do not draw the same product line as someone else in the same period. Research costs  $C^R$  are a function of the mass of product lines  $x_{jt}$  the firm wishes to become the quality leader in. The full firm problem is:

$$V_{jt}(\{q_{ijt}\}_{i\in[0,1]}) = \max_{x_{jt}} \prod_{j} \left( Y_t, \{q_{ijt}\}_{i\in[0,1]}, \Gamma_{mc,t}, \Gamma_{q,t} \right) - C^R \left( Y_t, x_{jt} \right)$$
(11)

$$+ R_t V_{t+1}(\{q_{ijt+1}\}_{i \in [0,1]}).$$
(12)

Where  $\Gamma_{x,t}$  is a distribution objects containing the full time t distribution of firms' expansion choice x. Note that  $\Gamma_{mc,t}$ ,  $\Gamma_{q,t}$  are co-determined with  $Y_t$  within-period in general equilibrium. On the other hand,  $\Gamma_{x,t}$  follows a law of motion:

$$\Gamma_{q,t+1} = H(\Gamma_{q,t}, \Gamma_{x,t}). \tag{13}$$

With each firm owning a mass of product lines, its own quality levels  $\{q_{ijt}\}_{i \in [0,1]}$  and the distributions  $\Gamma_{q,t}, \Gamma_{x,t}$  are sufficient to make decisions about research,  $x_{jt}$ .

#### 2.3.1 Firm entry and ownership

Firms are owned by absentee capitalists with discount factor  $\rho$ . This implies that firms' value functions are discounted at rate  $R_t = \rho/g_t$ . For details on this, refer to Appendix A.5.

When a firm enters, it pays a cost  $\zeta Y_t$  and draws its type b. It additionally becomes the quality leader in a mass of lines equal to  $n_b^*$ , mirroring the average firm of its type in the economy. Note that households now draw idiosyncratic preference shocks for working at that firm. The firm starts producing output and can invest in R&D to grow. Firms will hence enter as long as the expected firm value is greater than the entry cost:

$$\zeta Y_t \le E_t \left[ V_{bt}(n_{bt}^*) \right]. \tag{14}$$

With this set-up, entry costs scale with output following Klenow and Li (2025). An effect of this modeling choice is that policies that improve aggregate output by making labor markets more competitive will not see increased entry. We further assume that firms enter at their optimal size upon paying the entry costs. Note that there are no firm-level shocks. This property, combined with the output-scaling of the entry cost implies that there will be no entry on the BGP. In such an equilibrium, the number of firms is thus constant.

#### 2.4 Market clearing

Final output  $Y_t$  is used for research expenditure  $\tilde{C}_t$  and consumption, which occurs in the form of wage-financed private consumption  $C_t$ , and rents  $E_t$ . The following identity must hold:

$$Y_t = \tilde{C}_t + C_t + E_t. \tag{15}$$

In this model, there are rents due to non-zero entry costs  $\zeta Y_t$ . We can express research costs as:

$$\tilde{C}_t = \sum_j C_t^R(X_t n_{jt}).$$
(16)

Private consumption is the sum of all net wages paid:

$$C_t = \sum_{jt} W_{jt} L_{jt},\tag{17}$$

and rents are the sum over profits in production minus research costs:

$$E_t = \sum_j \left( \Pi_j(Y_t, \{q_{ijt}\}_{i \in [0,1]}, \Gamma_{mc,t}, \Gamma_{q,t}) - C^R(X_t n_{jt}) \right).$$
(18)

# 3 Characterizing the Equilibrium

In this section, we show how to solve the model and how to characterize key equilibrium objects, including wages, total factor productivity and aggregate employment. We begin by introducing three assumptions making the analysis tractable. First, we assume that the intermediate goods production is linear in labor, that is  $y_j(l_{ijt}) = s_j l_{ijt}$ .

Second, we assume that research costs can be approximated by the following function:

$$C^{R}(Y_{t}, x_{jt}) = \psi Y_{t}(x_{jt})^{\phi}, \qquad (19)$$

where  $\phi$  governs the returns to scale of R&D investment. In our calibration, we will find  $\phi > 1$  matches the firm size distribution and relative markups, i.e. research costs are convex and smaller firms are endogenously more productive at doing research.<sup>2</sup>

Third, we assume that there are two types of intermediate goods producers that differ in their process efficiency,  $s_j \in \{s_L, s_H\}, s_L < s_H$ . Allowing for different firm types enables us to showcase how imperfect competition in the labor market affects aggregate output by enabling less process efficient firms to survive. We denote the share of type H firms by  $\alpha$ , and the share of product lines held by them as  $h_t$  at time t, or  $h^*$  along a balanced growth path. Note that  $\alpha$  is a parameter determining the share of firms that belong to either type, and that  $h^*$  measures market concentration in equilibrium. We will later consider equilibrium solutions where  $\alpha < h^* \leq 1$ , i.e. the more process efficient firms are larger than the less process efficient firms.

The focus in the remainder of this section is on the economy's steady state. Although the model admits firm dynamics and short run transitions between the intermediate producers' state variables, we are going to focus on a steady state in which the economy grows along a balanced growth path (BGP) defined as:

**Definition 1** (Balanced growth path equilibrium). A balanced growth path equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all variables and prices grow at constant rates, and the number of active firms is constant.

We will proceed by first discussing implications of this definition for the withinperiod (static) optimization, before solving for the dynamic optimization and BGP equilibrium conditions.

# 3.1 Within-period optimization

In the Bertrand equilibrium, intermediate goods producers have the ability to earn positive profits in the mass  $n_{jt}$  of lines where they are currently product leaders by setting the price in each line where they are quality leaders equal to the quality improvement times the marginal cost,  $mc_j$ , of the quality follower:  $p_{it} = \gamma \cdot mc_{j(i)t}^3$ . Quality followers set prices equal to their quality-adjusted marginal cost. In Appendix A.2 we show that this is a Nash equilibrium. Pricing according to the scheme described above attracts demand for goods in each line equal to  $y_{it} = PY/p_{it}$ , which means the intermediate producer's revenue is given by the mass where the firm is a quality leader times the size of the economy  $n_{jt}Y_t$ . The line-level price depends on the probabilities that the follower is of either firm-type and will in expectation equal  $\mathbb{E}(p_i) = \gamma \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} n_j mc_j$ . Assuming there is no uncertainty over the future state of the economy, i.e. the path of  $Y_t$  and  $R_t$  is known, firms will only engage in costly research if there is something to gain from being a quality leader in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In Appendix F we analytically solve the model for  $\phi = 1$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>See Appendix A.6 for derivations of marginal cost.

additional lines. In other words, firms do not invest into gaining a quality advantage if they do not plan to use that advantage to generate (static) profits. This implies that firms will produce in all lines in which they are quality leaders, given that they behaved optimally in their dynamic optimization.

**Definition 2** (Static Equilibrium). Taking quality levels and prices as given, firms maximize profits by choosing firm-level employment and how to allocate it and households maximize utility by selecting where to work.

In all lines *i*, the quality leader j(i) sets the quality-adjusted price equal to his follower's quality-adjusted marginal costs, that is  $p_{ij(i)t} = \gamma m c_{ij'(i)t}$ , and fulfills the implied product demand  $y_{it}$ . The firm size in terms of the number of varieties produced  $n_{jt}$  is hence given as:

$$n_{jt} = \int_0^1 \mathbf{1}(q_{ijt} > q_{ikt}, \forall k \in \mathcal{J} \setminus j) di.$$
(20)

From here, revenue is simply given as  $n_{jt}Y_t$  as revenue per line is  $Y_t$  from intermediate goods demand:  $p_{ijt}y_{ijt} = Y_t$ . The quantity that needs to be produced in each line is then  $y_{ijt} = Y_t/(\gamma m c_{j'(i)t})$ . Total physical output that the firm needs to produce is hence given as:

$$Y_{jt} = \int_0^1 \mathbf{1}(q_{ijt} > q_{ikt}, \forall k \in \mathcal{J} \setminus j) \cdot Y_t / (\gamma m c_{j'(i)t}) di = n_{jt} \frac{Y_t}{\gamma} m_t^{-1}, \qquad (21)$$

where  $m_t$  is the harmonic mean of marginal costs:

$$m_t^{-1} \equiv h_t / mc_{h,t} + (1 - h_t) / mc_{l,t}.$$
 (22)

From the firm-level quantity, the flow profit function given  $n_{j,t}$ ,  $m_t$  can now be simplified to:

$$\Pi_{j}^{BGP}(Y_{t}, n_{jt}, m_{t}) = n_{jt}Y_{t} - L_{jt}W_{jt}, \qquad (23)$$

s.t. 
$$Y_{jt}$$
 given by Equation 21, (24)

$$L_{jt} = \frac{Y_{jt}}{s_j}, \quad W_{jt} = \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{z_t}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}.$$
 (25)

(26)

Where  $z_t$  is a function of  $Y_t$  according to its definition.

# 3.2 Dynamic optimization

The dynamic firm problem amounts to choosing  $n_{jt+1}$ . Note that other firms will become quality leaders in some of the product lines included in  $n_{jt}$  in the next period. To take into account this creative destruction by other firms, we introduce the aggregate variable  $X_t = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} x_{jt}$ , and the stock  $n_{jt}$  of lines that firm j is the quality leader in decreases at that rate.

Along its BGP, growth in this model is driven by creative destruction through quality improvements. As shown below, the level of aggregate quality  $Q_t \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_i) di$ , depends on the quality step size  $\gamma$  and the aggregate rate of creative destruction,  $X_t$ :

$$g_Q = \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_{it+1}/q_{it}) di = \exp[X_t \ln(\gamma) + (1 - X_t) \ln(1)] di = \gamma^{X_t}, \quad (27)$$

meaning that the rate of creative destruction,  $X_t$ , must be constant on the BGP.

Growth in final output,  $Y_t$ , is denoted by  $g_t \equiv Y_{t+1}/Y_t$  and is entirely driven by quality improvements. Rewriting Equation 1, we can express the growth of final output as:

$$g = \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} = \frac{Q_{t+1}}{Q_t} \frac{\int_0^1 \ln(y_{jt+1}) di}{\int_0^1 \ln(y_{jt}) di} = g_Q.$$
 (28)

Note that a requirement is that average production per intermediate product stays constant on the BGP, which is the case if the producer type distribution  $h^*$  is constant. We solve for growth rates of all other variables in Appendix A.9 and summarize our findings below:

$$g_z = g^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}},$$
  

$$g = g_Y = g_Q = g_m = g_w = \gamma^X.$$

These insights on BGP conditions also imply that  $\Gamma_q$  is no longer needed in the profit function, as firms only need to know the share of followers of either type to determine prices, and therefore profits. Recall that the share of *H*-type followers is  $h_t$ , and the share of *L*-type followers is  $1 - h_t$ . As this distribution is stable for all firms on BGP, only the index of marginal costs  $m_t^{-1}$ , is needed, rather than the whole distribution. On a balanced growth path, intermediate producers maximize the following:

$$V_{jt}(n_{jt}) = \max_{x_{jt}} \prod_{j}^{BGP} (Y_t, n_{jt}, m_t) - C^R (Y_t, x_{jt}) + R_t V_{jt+1}(n_{jt+1})$$
(29)

s.t. 
$$n_{jt+1} = (1 - X_t)n_{jt} + x_{jt}.$$
 (30)

To continue solving for the balanced growth path equilibrium, it will be helpful to solve for the intermediate goods producers' firm-level markups, which are aggregated up from the markups in product lines. These are equal to the product line price relative to the intermediate good producer's marginal cost,  $\mu_{ijt} \equiv p_{ijt}/mc_{jt}$ . We can

therefore define markups at the firm-level,  $\mu_{jt}$ , as the quantity-weighted average price over the firm's marginal cost:

$$\mu_{jt} \equiv \frac{\int_{0}^{n_{jt}} y_{it} p_{it} di}{m c_{jt} \cdot \int_{0}^{n_{jt}} y_{it} di} = \frac{\gamma m_t}{m c_{jt}}.$$
(31)

Markups are constant along a balanced growth path and we denote their BGP values as  $\mu_L^*$  and  $\mu_H^*$  respectively.

Recall that  $m_t^{-1}$  is defined as a harmonic mean of marginal costs  $m_t^{-1} \equiv h_t/mc_{h,t} + (1 - h_t)/mc_{l,t}$ . This definition can be rewritten to provide an equation linking markups and the firm size distribution. Being a definition, it holds regardless of whether the economy is on the BGP and we rewrite it as follows<sup>4</sup>:

**Lemma 3.1.** The marginal cost index,  $m_t$ , can be rewritten in terms of markups and the firm size distribution in the following way:

$$-\frac{\gamma - \mu_{Lt}}{\gamma - \mu_{Ht}} = \frac{h_t}{1 - h_t}.$$
(E1)

For parameters where  $\alpha < h^* < 1$ , we have the following relation between the markups:  $1 < \mu_L^* < \gamma < \mu_H^*$ . In the case where  $h_t \to 1$ , the economy is controlled entirely by the producer type with the highest process efficiency.

With both firms active in equilibrium, the relative wage  $W_H^*/W_L^*$  is well defined along the BGP. In addition, due to upward sloping labor supply curves, the relative wage is informative of the relative firm size, and we can use the ratio to obtain another equation which links the three equilibrium outcomes  $h^*, \mu_L^*, \mu_H^*$ .

There are two ways to solve for wages. First, we can use the Bertrand Equilibrium to obtain the firm size which gives a wage expression. In the Bertrand Nash equilibrium, the quality leader choose to always fulfill demand at the price determined by the quality follower's marginal cost, marked up by the constant factor  $\gamma$ . See Appendix A.2 for details. Combined with the assumption of firm productivity, we obtain total labor input at the firm-level:  $L_{jt} = \int_0^1 y_{ijt}/s_j di$ . From intermediate goods demand, we know  $y_{it} = Y_t/p_{it}$  and from the static problem, we have the line level price given by  $p_{ij(i)t} = \gamma m c_{ij'(i)t}$ . Firm-level labor can be aggregated according to the following:

$$L_{jt} = \frac{Y_t}{\gamma s_j} \int_0^1 \frac{1}{m c_{j'(i)t}} di = \frac{Y_t n_{jt}}{\gamma s_j} m_t^{-1}.$$
 (32)

Via the labor supply function, this implies wages are given by:

$$W_{jt} = \left(L_{jt}/z_t\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} = \left(\frac{Y_t n_{jt}}{\gamma s_j m_t z_t}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}.$$
(33)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See Appendix B for proofs of all lemmata.

The size of a firm is thus determined by the mass of products they span and the marginal costs of competitors. When competitors' marginal costs are high, firms will hire fewer workers due to their ability to charge higher prices and therefore produce less.

Second, firm-level marginal costs are defined as the change in cost as firm-level output increases.<sup>5</sup> Taking the derivative of firm costs with respect to  $Y_{jt}$  yields marginal cost:

$$mc_{jt} = \frac{\partial C_{jt}}{\partial Y_{jt}} = \left(\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta} + 1\right) W_j \frac{1}{s_j}.$$
(34)

The marginal cost expression above can be rearranged for a second expression of the firm-level wage:

$$W_{jt} = s_j \cdot mc_{jt} \cdot \frac{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{1+\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(35)

This expression shows how the labor supply elasticity facing intermediate goods producers affects the wage markdown. Note that the total markdown is given by  $\lambda_j \equiv W_j/mrpl_j$ , where  $mrpl_j$  is the marginal revenue product of labor. In this model, the marginal revenue product of labor depends on both the productivity  $s_j$ , and the markup:

$$\lambda_j = \mu_j^{-1} \frac{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{1+\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(36)

Since part of the wedge between the wage and the marginal revenue product of labor comes from the fact that producers can set a markup over marginal cost,  $\mu$ , on the product market, we define a 'pure' monopsony markdown  $\nu$ , which is only driven by the fact that the labor supply curve is upward sloping:

$$\nu \equiv \mu \lambda = \frac{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{1+\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(37)

In the following, we refer to  $\nu$  as the markdown or "net markdown."

Combining the two wage expressions gives the second relation between  $h^*$ ,  $\mu_L^*$ ,  $\mu_H^*$ . Using equation 35 and the identities  $\alpha n_H J = h$ ,  $(1 - \alpha)n_L J = 1 - h$ , we establish Lemma 3.2 as shown in Appendix B.

Lemma 3.2.

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{s_H}{s_L}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}+1} \cdot \left(\frac{\mu_{Lt}}{\mu_{Ht}}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} = \frac{h_t}{1-h_t}$$
(E2)

<sup>5</sup>Details on deriving marginal costs are in Appendix A.6.

Notice that this is the key equation where the degree of monopsony  $\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$  enters into the determination of  $(\mu_L^*, \mu_H^*, h^*)$ .

Next, we restate the dynamic problem of the intermediate producers in Equation 29, and use the objective function's first order condition to arrive at a third equilibrium condition. We rewrite the problem by first substituting the constraint,  $x_t = n_{t+1} - (1 - X_t)n_t$ , and then dividing both sides by  $Y_t$ . Moreover, we note that  $R_t = \rho/g^6$  and arrive at a simplified value function in detrended terms, where  $\tilde{V}_j = V_{jt}/Y_t$ . In the following, we drop the time subscripts to emphasize that all variables are detrended:

$$\tilde{V}_{j}(n_{j}) = \max_{n'_{j}} n_{j} - \left(\frac{n_{j}}{s_{j}\gamma m}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{\beta}} \left(\frac{Y}{z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} - \psi(n'_{j} - (1-X)n_{j})^{\phi} + \rho \tilde{V}_{j}(n'_{j}).$$

$$(38)$$

Notably, monopsonistic labor markets affect the firm problem via the shape of the production cost function. This value function implies that that the firm chooses a markup and firm size, which depend on the labor supply parameters  $\sigma$ ,  $\beta$ , to balance out the research costs necessary to be paid to be of that size. As shown in Appendix B, rearranging the first order condition of the BGP firm problem in Equation 38 yields an expression for optimal firm size:

#### Lemma 3.3.

$$n_j^* = \left(\frac{\mu_j^* - 1}{\mu_j^*} \cdot \frac{1}{\phi\psi} \cdot \frac{1}{(X^*)^{\phi} + (X^*)^{\phi-1} \cdot \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}}.$$
 (FOC<sub>j</sub>)

Similar to the discussion of the value function above, the first order condition reveals a tight relationship between markups  $\mu_j$ , the firm size  $n_j$ , and the rate of creative destruction X. All else equal, higher X (and thus higher growth) depresses a firm's optimal size, as it is more likely to face creative destruction by its competitors.

In addition, notice that the intermediate good producers' optimal size is positively related to markups for  $\phi > 1$ . By taking ratios, we obtain a third relation between  $\mu_L, \mu_H$ , and h stated in the following Lemma<sup>7</sup>:

#### Lemma 3.4.

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{\frac{\mu_{H}^{*}-1}{\mu_{H}^{*}}}{\frac{\mu_{L}^{*}-1}{\mu_{L}^{*}}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}} = \frac{h^{*}}{1-h^{*}}$$
(E3)

Along a balanced growth path, the three equations E1, E2, and E3 define a system of three equations in three unknowns,  $h^*, \mu_L^*, \mu_H^*$  which are solved for numerically. Together, these values determine static allocative efficiency as shown below in Proposition 3.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>See Appendix A.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>See Appendix B for derivations.

To proceed, we take as given markups and the size distribution, and use those outcomes to solve for marginal costs for the respective firm types. We continue with the definition of the price index P together with the line level prices,  $p_i = \gamma m c_{j'(i)}$ , which depend on marginal costs:

$$P = \exp \int_0^1 \log \frac{p_i}{q_i} di = \frac{\gamma}{Q} \exp \int_0^1 \log mc_{j'(i)} di.$$
(39)

Plugging in the two firm types and using the price level normalization  $P \equiv 1$ , we get

$$Q/\gamma = (mc_H^*)^{h^*} (mc_L^*)^{(1-h^*)} = \left(\frac{\mu_L^*}{\mu_H^*}\right)^{h^*} mc_L^*,$$
(40)

which means we can solve for  $mc_L^*, mc_H^*$  in terms of  $Q_t^*$ , which varies along the balanced growth path. With marginal costs solved for, we recover equilibrium wages using Equation 35.

Using the Equation  $FOC_j$  for both firm types together with the free entry condition yields a system of three equations in the three unknowns  $n_H^*$ ,  $n_L^*$ , and  $X^*$ . The third equation in this system is derived from the firm-level profit shares:

$$\pi_j^* \equiv 1 - \frac{1}{\mu_j^*} \cdot \frac{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} - \psi(X^*)^{\phi} (n_j^*)^{\phi-1}.$$
(41)

Recall that the firm-level revenue is  $Y_t n_j^*$ , we can therefore get rid of  $Y_t$  and express the somewhat simplified free entry condition as:

$$\zeta = \frac{\alpha \cdot n_H^* \cdot \pi_H^* + (1 - \alpha) \cdot n_L^* \cdot \pi_L^*}{1 - \rho}.$$
 (FE)

For a given X, we solve for  $n_j$ , and verify whether  $X = X^*$  using Equation FE. Notice that the labor supply elasticity facing firms  $\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$  influences  $X^*$  directly through the free entry condition, and indirectly through its effect on equilibrium markups.

Since the mass of product lines is one, we can solve for the number of firms active in equilibrium:

$$J^* = \frac{1}{\alpha n_H^* + (1 - \alpha) n_L^*}.$$
(42)

To solve for total output, we can make use of Equation 33 which contains the unknown equilibrium outcomes  $Y_t^*$  and  $z^*$ . Since  $z_t^*$  is a function of the only unknown  $Y_t^*$ , we search numerically for the  $Y_t^*$  that satisfies the equation. We then compute  $z_t^*$  using

its definition which recovers  $L_j^*$  and therefore also aggregate employment, which is the last equilibrium outcome we need for characterizing aggregate output.

Aggregate output can now be characterized using a decomposition as in Boppart and Li (2021). A proof is given in Appendix C.

**Proposition 3.5.** Aggregate output can be decomposed as follows:

$$Y_t = Q_t \cdot S_t \cdot M_t \cdot L_t.$$

Where the first factor  $Q_t$  denotes the quality index and is given by:

$$Q_t \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_{it}) di.$$

The second factor  $S^*$  measures aggregate process efficiency as a geometric average across product lines:

$$S_t \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(s_{j(i,t)}) di.$$

The third factor  $M^*$  measures misallocation from employment dispersion which arise due to differences in line-level prices and process efficiencies:

$$M_t \equiv \frac{\exp \int_0^1 \ln \left(\frac{1}{mc_{j'(i,t)}s_{j(i,t)}}\right) di}{\int_0^1 \frac{1}{mc_{j'(i,t)}s_{j(i,t)}} di}.$$

The final factor L is aggregate employment and is defined as:

$$L_t \equiv \sum_{j \in J} L_j.$$

Starting with average process efficiency, S, we have that  $S \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(s_j(i)) di$  which is a geometric average that can is fully determined by the firm size distribution measured by  $h^*$ . It is therefore stationary along a balanced growth path and is given by  $S^* = s_H^{h^*} s_L^{1-h^*}$ .

With additional knowledge of firm-level marginal costs or markups, we can recover the misallocation measure M. This is the geometric mean of line level employment relative to the arithmetic mean of line level employment and therefore decreases as variance in employment across product lines increases. In our case, there are four combinations that arise from two possible leader- and follower-types. These outcomes depend on the share of the economy held by a given firm type, which is given by  $h^*$ . This outcome is also stable along a balanced growth path since balanced growth path marginal costs scale with  $Y_t^*$ . Intuitively, the factors S,Mboth boil down to a misallocation of labor. For the former, this is misallocation across firms, with production allocated toward unproductive firms. M on the other hand captures the effects arising from dispersion in prices, or the misallocation of labor across goods. Since  $Q_t$  is growing along the balanced growth path, the contribution of quality on output can be described by the present value of future quality levels,  $\{Q_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , which is a geometric series given by  $Q_0/(1-\rho g)$  that depends on an initial arbitrary quality level  $Q_0$ , and the growth rate g.

#### 3.3 Competitive labor markets as a limit case

The model nests perfect competition in the labor market as a limit case when  $\varepsilon = \beta/(1-\sigma) \to \infty$ . Perfectly competitive labor markets can be recovered by either letting  $\beta \to \infty$ , in which case households' utility is infinitely sensitive to changes in consumption; or by letting  $\sigma \to 1$ , in which case households don't gain any utility from workplace amenities. In this section, we will discuss both cases and build intuition for the implications of the model. Detailed derivations are in Appendix A.8.

In the case when  $\sigma \to 1$ , the firms face a common labor supply curve:

$$\lim_{\sigma \to 1} L_j = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists k \in \mathcal{J} : W_j < W_k \\ \mathcal{L} \left( \tilde{J} \left( 1 + (\omega Y/W_j)^{\beta} \right) \right)^{-1}, & \text{if } W_j \ge W_k, \forall k \in \mathcal{J} \end{cases}$$

where  $\tilde{J} \equiv \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \mathbb{1}(W_k = W_j)$ . Intuitively, if the wage of a given firm  $j, W_j$  is lower than at any other firm, all workers will go to that firm. Among all  $\tilde{J}$  firms that pay the same wage, workers are split equally. That means there is a market wage  $\bar{W}$ , which is paid by any firm with positive size. The only choice margin that remains is between market labor at  $\bar{W}$  and home labor at  $\omega Y$ .

When instead  $\beta \to \infty$ , the labor supply facing firm j is:

$$\lim_{\beta \to \infty} L_j = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists k \in \mathcal{J} : W_j < W_k \lor \omega Y > W_j \\ \mathcal{L}(\tilde{J} + \tilde{J}^{\sigma})^{-1}, & \text{if } W_j \ge W_k \forall k \in \mathcal{J} \land \omega Y = W_j \\ \mathcal{L}(\tilde{J})^{-1}, & \text{if } W_j \ge W_k \forall k \in \mathcal{J} \land \omega Y < W_j. \end{cases}$$

Similarly, if  $\beta \to \infty$  there is a market wage  $\overline{W}$  which is paid by all firms that produce output. However, with  $\beta \to \infty$ , workers care about the wage much more than amenities or their relative preference over market labor and home production. A fraction or workers will chose the outside option if it pays the same as market labor, but not if it pays less.

Both cases imply that workers are indifferent between working for various firms. This means in equilibrium, a firm can hire as many workers  $L_j$  at market wage  $\bar{W}$  as it wants, and the market wage  $\bar{W}$  will be such that labor markets clear.

Turning to how this affects the model predictions, a common wage W implies that marginal costs are given by  $mc_j = W/s_j$ , which can also be derived from taking the limit of Equation 35. Limit pricing then implies line level markups are given by  $\gamma s_{j(i)}/s_{j'(i)}$ , and firm-level markups are given by  $\mu_j = \gamma \cdot m \cdot s_j/W =$  $\gamma \cdot s_j/(h^*s_H + (1 - h^*)s_L)$ . In the present value decomposition, an increase in the share of H-type firms,  $h^*$ , under perfect competition increases the average efficiency S. At the same time, the misallocation from the employment dispersion, M, is increasing in  $h^*$  if  $h^* < .5$ , and decreasing otherwise. This is because having both types of firms decreases the average markup. Moreover, an increase in  $h^*$  implies that research is more costly due to convexity in the cost curve.

If  $\gamma < \frac{s_H}{s_L}$ , which is what we find in the data, h = 1, i.e. only the *H*-type firms produce output. This is not in line with the data, as firms exist which are less efficient in production. With perfect competition on the labor market, a firm distribution featuring active firms at different productivity levels hence requires  $\gamma \geq \frac{s_H}{s_L}$ . Introducing monopsony allows for a more flexible calibration, as the equivalent parameter restriction is

$$\gamma \ge \left(\frac{s_{j'}}{s_j}\right) \left(\frac{s_{j'}}{s_j} \frac{n_j}{n_{j'}}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}},\tag{43}$$

as derived in A.2. We will come back to this point in the quantitative part of this paper.

# 4 Quantitative Results

This section first describes the calibration strategy, including externally set parameters and targeted data moments. We also comment on a number of untargeted moments. To build intuition, we carry out the calibration for a case with competitive labor markets (denoted PC), and one with monopsony. Finally, we comment on how the model performs in matching untargeted moments and examine how outcomes change with the labor supply elasticity by varying  $\sigma$ .

#### 4.1 Calibration

In this section, we describe the process used to calibrate the model's parameters. One set of parameters is assigned directly based on values commonly used in the literature or normalized. Another set of parameter values is obtained by using the equilibrium conditions of the previous section, combined with target values that allow us to obtain parameter values as residuals. This approach allows us to fit targeted moments exactly. We describe the procedure in the following text and summarize target moments and model outcomes in Table 1, and a summary is included in Appendix D.1.

For the first set of parameters, we assign them directly by normalizing or taking estimates from the literature. Normalized values include the initial quality level,  $Q_0 = 1$ ; the process efficiency of the less process efficient firms,  $s_L = 1$ ; and the population,  $\mathcal{L} = 1$ . We let  $\rho = 0.95$ , in line with commonly used values for the discount rate. We let the labor supply elasticity facing firms,  $\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$ , match the point estimate of a meta-regression of best-practice estimates of the elasticity reported by Sokolova and Sorensen (2021), Table 5. By centering our results around the

Definition	Monopsony	$\mathbf{PC}$	Data
Labor supply elasticity Unemployment rate	$7.13 \\ 5.76\%$	$1000 \\ 5.76\%$	$7.13 \\ 5.76\%$
Firms per capita $J$ Markup $\mu_H$ Markup $\mu_L$	$0.11 \\ 1.29 \\ 1.14$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \\ 1.29 \\ 1.14 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \\ 1.29 \\ 1.14 \end{array}$
Top 10% output share Growth rate Unemp. elasticity $\varepsilon_{u,\omega Y}$	$75.92\%\ 1.078\%\ 0.10$	75.92% 1.078% 0.10	$75.92\% \\ 1.078\% \\ 0.02-0.32$

Table 1: Targeted moments

"PC" refers to perfectly competitive labor markets, here approximated by setting the labor supply elasticity to 1000. Markup targets come from Edmond et al., 2023 Table 3, and correspond to their estimate of aggregate markup of 1.15, implied by the U.S.Census of Manufactures from 1972 to 2012. For  $\mu_H$  we use the mean of reported markups for the 90th and 99th percentile of the markup distribution. For our main specification, we set  $\varepsilon_{u,\omega Y} = 0.1$ .

Parameter	Monopsony	Competitive	Description
ε	7.133	1000	Labor supply elasticity facing firms
$\alpha$	0.100	0.100	Share H-type firms
ho	0.950	0.950	Discount rate
$s_L$	1	1	Low process efficiency
$s_H$	1.682	1.135	High process efficiency
$\Phi$	1.181	1.181	Research cost convexity
$\psi$	1.520	1.520	Research cost
$\mathcal{L}$	1	1	Population
$\gamma$	1.254	1.254	Innovation step
$\zeta \cdot (1-\rho)$	2.105	1.164	Entry cost
ω	$1.7 \cdot 10^{-12}$	$3.0 \cdot 10^{-12}$	Outside option
$\beta$	0.106	0.106	Utility sensitivity to consumption
$1 - \sigma$	0.015	0	Utility sensitivity to workplace

Table 2: Calibrated parameter values

emerging consensus estimate of the elasticity, our results speak to the aggregate effects of local variation in the elasticity. Finally, we define the share of highly process efficient firms as  $\alpha = 0.1$ . The choice of  $\alpha$  affects choices for calibration targets in what follows.

Applying our chosen value for  $\alpha$ , we find the relative process efficiency of the two firm types,  $\frac{s_H}{s_L} = 1.49$ , in the data. We don't need to target this value and save it for model validation. From the same data source, we compute the average sales held by the  $\alpha$  largest firms found in Compustat (Standard & Poor's, 2020) over the period 1954–2007 as h = 75.92%.

Markups associated with the calibrated sales share h are obtained from Edmond et al. (2023), Table 3, and correspond to the column where their aggregate markup, estimated from the U.S. Census of Manufactures from 1972 to 2012, is 1.15. For  $\mu_L$ , we use the median reported value. For  $\mu_H$ , we use the mean of reported markups for the 90th and 99th percentiles of the markup distribution. The third equilibrium condition stated in Equation E3 now allows us to solve for  $\phi$ .

Continuing to use the equilibrium conditions, we note that the first equilibrium condition stated in Equation E1 implies a value for the quality step parameter,  $\gamma = h \cdot \mu_H + (1 - h)\mu_L$ , i.e., the output-weighted average markup. In turn, a value of  $\gamma$  means that a gross growth rate target, g = 1.01078, can be used to identify the equilibrium value of X using  $\gamma^X = g$ . In turn, X is used in the free entry condition, Equation FE, to solve for the entry cost parameter.

By additionally targeting the number of firms per worker found in Compustat Standard & Poor's, 2020, we can use the first-order condition, Equation  $FOC_j$ , to solve for  $\psi$ .

To identify the level of  $\sigma$  and  $\beta$ , we use an estimate of the elasticity of unemployment with respect to the outside option,  $\varepsilon_{u,\omega Y} = \beta(1-u)$ , together with the unemployment rate. The elasticity of unemployment with respect to the outside option is challenging to estimate in the data. Nevertheless, there have been a number of natural experiments providing variation in unemployment insurance benefits that the literature has exploited to identify it. A good overview is found in Landais et al. (2018), who summarize estimates from such quasi-experimental settings. Most estimates are in the range of 0.02–0.32, and we take a middle stance, targeting 0.1 for our main specification. With  $\beta$  given,  $\sigma$  follows as a residual from the ratio  $\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$ .

The final parameter that needs to be calibrated is  $\omega$ . This parameter follows from previous moments and equilibrium conditions, the idea is that we can obtain an expression for z without knowledge of  $\omega$ . To obtain z, we start by calculating the relative firm-level labor using relative firm sizes,  $s_H L_H / (s_L L_L) = n_H / n_L$ , which gives firm-level labor from total employment:

$$L_L = \frac{L}{\alpha \frac{L_H}{L_L} + (1 - \alpha)}, \quad L_H = \frac{L_H}{L_L} \cdot L_L.$$

$$(44)$$

With wages and firm-level labor, we can back out z using Equation 6 which describes

Moment	Monopsony	PC
High-type Firms	5	
Labor share	0.680	0.774
Research share	0.090	0.090
Profit share	0.230	0.135
Low-type Firms		
Labor share	0.769	0.876
Research share	0.049	0.049
Profit share	0.181	0.074
Aggregate		
$\frac{W_H}{W_T}$	1.486	1.003
$\frac{s_H}{s_L}$	1.682	1.135

 Table 3: Untargeted moments

Wage and productivity numbers are taken from Compustat (Standard & Poor's, 2020).

the labor supply facing firms. We use the definition of z to back out  $\omega$ . Y, which is another necessary equilibrium object inside z, is obtained from inverting Equation 32.

The calibrated model implies the untargeted moments summarized in Table 3. What stands out are the profit share, relative wages, and the relative process efficiencies. As mentioned previously, the competitive calibration fails to match the relative process efficiency measured in the data. This is because if  $\gamma < \frac{s_H}{s_L}$ , the *L*-type firms cannot produce when labor markets are competitive, as they pay the same wage and will end up without a markup sufficient to sustain profitable production. However, we also match a data moment with h < 1, as less process efficient firms have positive size in reality, in which case the model with competitive labor markets cannot match a realistic ratio of  $s_H/s_L$ . This demonstrates that monopsonistic labor markets are one channel that can rationalize the existence of firms with different constant process efficiencies, while also matching markup size and relative productivities.

Regarding the research and profit shares, the model seems to generate reasonable, although high, numbers when compared to aggregate measures. Looking at more granular data, such as Damodaran, 2025a for profit margins and Damodaran, 2025b, suggests that these shares vary widely by industry. For example, the pre-tax profit share ranges from close to zero up to over 40%. Similarly, while there seems to be very little R&D spending in some industries, in others firms seem to invest almost half of their revenue in R&D. Our model outcomes match these shares roughly for industries such as electronics, healthcare products, and entertainment.

 Table 4: Elasticities

	$d\log PVY$	$d \log S$	$d\log PVQ$	$d\log M$	$d \log L$
$d\log\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$	0.13	0.24	-0.14	0.03	0.00
$d\log\sigma$	8.76	16.01	-9.47	2.10	0.12
$d\log md$	1.08	1.97	-1.16	0.26	0.01

This table shows model elasticities around the calibrated value for  $\beta$  and  $\sigma$ . md refers to the markdown resulting from monopsony and is given by  $md := \frac{\beta}{\frac{1-\sigma}{1-\sigma}}$ .

#### 4.2 Comparative statics

Having calibrated a labor supply elasticity of  $\varepsilon = \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma} = 7.133$ , we vary  $\sigma$  holding other parameters constant. How a changing  $\sigma$  affect the components that make up aggregate output is shown in Figure 1. Key elasticities around the calibrated labor supply elasticity are shown in Table 4. We next turn to discussing the different forces driving these results.

Towards the competitive extreme where  $\sigma \to 1$ , allocative efficiency increases and is the driving force of aggregate output. As the model moves away from imperfect competition on the labor market, economic activity reallocates towards more process efficient firms. As demonstrated in Figure 2, only more process efficient firms are active in perfectly competitive labor markets, as  $\gamma < \frac{s_H}{s_L}$  according to the calibration. This condition implies that firms with a low process efficiency are not able to operate profitably. At the extreme distribution where  $h^* = 1$ , these firms do not produce at all. In turn, this implies uniform markups  $\mu_H = \gamma$ , i.e. no misallocation, M = 1, and that allocative efficiency  $S = s_h$  is maximized, as shown in Figure 1.

In the case where  $\gamma \frac{s_L}{s_H} > 1$ , both firm types earn profits where they are quality leaders and are able to survive. The solution is therefore interior and we can use Equation E3 to find a value for  $h^*$ . What enables the less process efficient firms to survive under imperfectly competitive labor markets is their ability to keep relative marginal costs low by staying small enough so as to sustain a markup greater than 1. In other words, it is the ability of small firms to recruit employees with preferences for their specific work place that allows them to pay a lower wage and survive amidst competition of more process efficient firms.

That economic activity is reallocated towards the most process efficient firms is corroborated by Figure 2. The top left pane of the figure shows that the markup of intermediate producers with a low process efficiency decreases towards one. Meanwhile, the same figure shows that markups for the most process efficient firms initially increase with  $\sigma$ , until they eventually decrease toward  $\gamma$ . The non-monotonic relation is the result of stable output prices, and two forces that pull the marginal costs in opposite directions. First, increasing the labor supply elasticity facing firms is equivalent to decreasing the elasticity of wages with respect to size, meaning that wages increase slower with size and thereby create less upward pressure on





Balanced growth path outcome for counterfactual values of  $\sigma$ . Effect on  $\ln PV\{Y\} = \ln \frac{Q_0}{1-\rho g} + \ln S + \ln M + \ln L$  following changes in  $\sigma$ .



Figure 2: Outcomes for varying  $\sigma$ .

*Note:* The markdown is given by  $\frac{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{1+\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}$ . The vertical line indicates the point to which the model was calibrated.

marginal costs. Second, reallocation of economic activity towards the most process efficient firms raises wages, thereby increasing marginal costs. Since the harmonic mean, m, of marginal costs tends to be stable, the expected output price given by  $\gamma m$  is stable as well. This results in declining markups for both firm types with  $\sigma \rightarrow 1$ . This within-firm effect is mostly compensated by the between-firm effect of reallocation toward high markup firms, (sales-weighted) average markups thus barely move, implying that the profit share stays largely constant.

Quantitatively, the second strongest force is the effect on growth. As  $\sigma \to 1$ , a producer's marginal product line becomes less profitable due to declining markups. For low values of  $\sigma$ , this effect is additionally related to declining entry, see Figure 2, bottom left pane. Over the range of  $\sigma$  we consider, the two main effects work in the same direction resulting in a monotonic decline of the contribution of growth on the present value of total output that is quantitatively weaker than the effect of reallocation for  $\sigma \to 1$ .

The third most important contribution is driven by increasing employment. While the number of firms are declining, leaving households with fewer workplace options, the increasing wages fully offset this effect across the distribution of  $\sigma$ .

Finally, misallocation from dispersion in the marginal revenue product plays a minor role in determining aggregate output.

The combined effect is that aggregate output is increasing nearby our calibrated value of  $\sigma$ , and exhibits a non-monotonic shape due to competing forces that vary in their respective strength.

# 5 Extension: Progressive Income Taxation

In this section, we extend the model to incorporate progressive income taxation. The previous section demonstrated that introducing a finite firm-level labor supply elasticity affects economic aggregates. Here, we examine how tax policy can alter this elasticity. Specifically, we show that progressive income taxes influence the labor supply elasticity with respect to a firm's gross wage when the elasticity is finite, in line with Berger et al. (2024). After describing the extension, we turn to a discussion of how the extended model can be applied to evaluate tax reforms, such as those under the Reagan administration. Refer to Appendix E for technical details.

We begin by assuming that a government raises revenue for government consumption from a wage bill tax at the firm-level<sup>8</sup>. The government provides each household with  $G_t$  units of a public good. Household preferences are then given by:

$$u_{ojt} = \beta \ln C_{ojt} + \xi_{ogt} + (1 - \sigma)\epsilon_{ojt}$$

$$\tag{45}$$

$$= \underbrace{\beta\eta}_{\tilde{\beta}} \ln(W_{jt}) + \beta(1-\eta)\ln(G_t) + \xi_{ogt} + (1-\sigma)\epsilon_{ojt},$$
(46)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>This is equivalent to raising taxes on the worker side, for details refer to Appendix E.1

where total consumption  $C_{ojt}$  is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of private  $(C_{ojt}^p)$  consumption paid for with wage income, and government consumption  $(G_t)$  enjoyed by the household:  $C_{ojt} = W_{jt}^{\eta} G_t^{1-\eta}$ . The modified utility results in labor supply similar to the formulation in the base model, with the labor supply curves increasing in the net wage offered by a firm:

$$L_j(W_{jt}) = z_t W_{jt}^{\frac{\tilde{\beta}}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(47)

Market clearing now features a term for the tax-financed government consumption, given by  $\mathcal{L}G_t$ , and reads as follows:

$$Y_t = \tilde{C}_t + C_t^p + \mathcal{L}G_t + E_t, \tag{48}$$

where private consumption is the sum of all net wages paid, and government expenditure is the sum of all taxes paid:

$$C_t^p = \sum_{jt} W_{jt} L_{jt}, \quad \mathcal{L}G_t = \sum_j T(W_{jt}/\bar{W}_t) W_{jt} L_{jt}.$$
(49)

We assume that the government commits to a tax schedule  $T(W_j/\bar{W})$ , where  $\bar{W}_t \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{jt} L_{jt} / \sum_{j=1}^{\mathcal{J}} L_{jt}$  is a reference wage. The government's objective is then simply to spend such that its budget constraint binds in each period.

With the income tax levied in full on the firm, we obtain a formulation that shows how progressive taxes directly impact a firm's marginal cost. Due to the crucial role of marginal costs in the model, this will feed through into markups, research decisions and aggregate outcomes. The full firm problem becomes:

$$\Pi_{j}(Y_{t}, \{q_{ijt}\}_{i \in [0,1]}) = \max_{\{p_{ijt}\}_{i \in [0,1]}} \int_{0}^{1} p_{ijt} y_{it} di - (1 + T(W_{jt}/\bar{W}_{t})) W_{jt} L_{jt}, \quad (50)$$

s.t. 
$$L_{jt} = \int_0^1 f^{-1}(y_{ijt}) di, \quad W_{jt} = \left(\frac{L_{jt}}{z_t}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}$$
 (51)

Intermediate product demand as in (3). (52)

We now define the tax rate following Borella et al. (2022). This is in line with standard formulations in the literature, as used by Berger et al. (2024). For simplicity, we reformulate this set-up such that (1) the tax transaction is paid by the firm rather than the worker<sup>9</sup> and (2) the tax rate is based on the wage relative to the average net wage, not median gross wage. The average net wage  $W_t$  can be interpreted as a reference wage, or the average wage employed workers receive. The parameter  $\lambda$ , similar to Borella et al. (2022), governs the base level of the tax. More importantly

 $<sup>^{9}\</sup>mathrm{Note}$  that this tax set-up is equivalent to one where the tax is levied on the worker as shown in Appendix E.1.

for us,  $\tau$  pins down income tax progressivity, with  $1 - \tau$  being the elasticity of post tax income w.r.t. pretax income. The tax schedule is represented by:

$$T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{\bar{W}_t}\right) = \left(\frac{W_{jt}^{\tau}}{1-\lambda}\frac{1}{\bar{W}_t^{\tau}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\tau}} - 1, \quad \bar{W} = \frac{J_h L_{ht} W_{ht} + J_l L_{lt} W_{lt}}{J_h L_{ht} + J_l L_{lt}}.$$
 (53)

A key channel through which income tax progressivity acts in the model is then through the firm-level labor supply elasticity with respect to the gross wage. In addition to an upward-sloping labor supply curve due to idiosyncratic preferences, the elasticity now has a component resulting from tax policy:

$$\frac{\partial \log(L_j)}{\partial \log(1 + T(W_{jt}/\bar{W}_t))W_{jt}} = \underbrace{\frac{\tilde{\beta}}{1 - \sigma}}_{\text{Preferences}} \underbrace{\frac{(1 - \tau)}{\text{Policy}}}.$$
(54)

Through this elasticity, tax progressivity influences aggregate variables similarly to the discussion in Section 4.2. In the next section, we apply the model to a historic tax reform and quantitatively solve the model with taxes in order to discuss the effect of progressivity.

### 5.1 Policy application: 1980s tax reform

We now turn to a policy application of the extended model. The goal is to gain a quantitative understanding of the importance of the firm-level labor supply elasticity when considering changes to tax policy. As shown in the previous section, the firm-level labor supply elasticity is affected by tax policy. The way in which taxes are raised therefore matters for the degree of monopsony: changing the average tax level  $\lambda$  has no effect on the firm-level labor supply elasticity, whereas changing the income tax progressivity through  $\tau$  does.

Building on the estimation results by Borella et al. (2022), the 1980s tax cuts under the Reagan administration reduced both the average level and the progressivity of income taxes. Table 5 summarizes key changes to tax policy. Equation 54 then suggests the firm-level labor supply elasticity would have increased by about 2.3%.

Parameter	1981	1988
Tax average $\lambda$ Tax curvature $\tau$	$0.113 \\ 0.084$	$0.096 \\ 0.063$

Table 5: Parameter changes in tax reform

In order to compare the state of the economy before and after the reform, we consider the tax cuts in isolation as if they were a single reform which brought the economy from one balanced growth path (pre-1981) to another (post-1988). Since the underlying tax rates on real incomes fluctuate significantly due to inflation and irregular reforms, the approach serves not to evaluate the reform per se, but rather to gain a quantitative notion of how monopsonistic labor markets might have contributed to the final outcome. For this purpose, Table 6 lists model outcomes next to observed outcomes. Note that the increase in output from the model is due to both increases in static efficiency, and the (largely unaffected) rate of productivity growth. The "no reform" row refers to the model prediction of the changes between 1981 and 1987 without the tax reform, i.e. remaining on the previous balanced growth path.

Definition	TFP growth	Growth in $Q$	Growth in $S$
Data Model with reform Model without reform	$\begin{array}{ c c c } 7.74\% \\ 7.45\% \\ 6.93\% \end{array}$	${ m N/A}\ 6.85\%\ 6.93\%$	${ m N/A}\ 0.56\%\ 0.00\%$

Table 6: Tax reform: Changes 81 – 87

Note: Data, model and no reform values are all changes in percentages.

Our comparison between model and data is based on an annual productivity time series from BLS (2024) data. Despite simply adding the taxation on top of the calibration described in the previous section, the model matches overall TFP growth in the period of study quite well. We find that the reform did lead to an increase in the post-period productivity. However, this came at the cost of a slightly decreased rate of quality growth. Macnamara et al. (2024) argue that income tax cuts may boost growth in the long run, but our model suggests that a lower rate of income tax progressivity may reduce growth by increasing competition and stifling incentives to innovate.

# 5.2 Alternative tax schemes

Largely, the previous reform makes it seem like income taxation has little effect on productivity growth. In this section, we aim to show that this is mainly due to the specific tax reform in question, which affects both the average level and progressivity. For this purpose, we consider once more the base scenario as calibrated in Section 4. In this exercise, we consider a budget-neutral tax reform, i.e. we fix the detrended level of government spending G at the BGP level. We then consider those combinations of average tax rate,  $\lambda$ , and progressivity,  $\tau$ , that generate the same revenue for the government, and look at outcomes along that path. Around its calibrated value, a 1% decrease in  $\tau$  increases the labor elasticity by approximately 0.1%.



Figure 3: Outcomes at different  $(\lambda, \tau)$ , fixed G

Results from a budget-neutral tax reform. In each graph, tax progressivity  $\tau$  decreases from left to right, while the tax level  $\lambda$  increases. The number of firms is relative to base calibration.

The effects here are mainly driven by the change in  $\tau$ , which can be seen in Figure 3. The increased labor supply elasticity in from lowering  $\tau$  increases concentration as process efficient *H*-type firms expand. As in the previous section, this will increase static productivity, as more production labor is allocated to firms with high process efficiency. However, it will also affect the long-run growth rate negatively as research is less efficient at larger firms, and lower markups additionally make innovation less valuable to the firm.

As in Section 4, the effect on the present value of output can be decomposed into the different channels from Proposition 3.5. Figure 4 shows the present value of output per capita and its components. Similarly to the change in  $\sigma$  considered in the previous section, the main trade-off is between static TFPQ and long-run



Figure 4: PV decomposition

All components are relative to their values in the base calibration, values at different  $(\lambda, \tau)$ , fixed G.

growth. Again, the high elasticity (low  $\tau$ ) case maximizes the productivity level in production, TFPQ, at the cost of long-run growth.

# 6 Conclusion

This paper explores the role of monopsony power in a growth model with product market power and creative destruction. For one, we find that this allows matching data moments models of this class may otherwise be unable to fit. Primarily, our main finding is that the presence of monopsonistic labor markets implies a tradeoff between current output and long-run growth. Monopsony power reallocates labor towards smaller, less productive firms, which reduces static output, while simultaneously increasing invectives to innovate. Further, when research costs are convex, this reallocation enhances innovation activity, as it directs resources towards smaller firms.

We also demonstrate that the monopsony-induced finite labor supply elasticity is

policy-relevant. We show that, to some extent, it is directly affected by the level of tax progressivity. We quantify the relationship between monopsony power, income taxation, and aggregate outcomes. Our model illustrates how monopsony power, and tax progressivity, influence labor allocation, output, and research efficiency. Broadly, our findings suggest that monopsony power should be considered in the context of economic growth. To find an 'optimal' level of monopsony which maximizes discounted output, the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is crucial. In The framework we develop also serves as a foundation for future investigations to determine this optimal level.

For future research, we suggest incorporating discrete product lines, closer in line with Klette and Kortum (2004) and Peters (2020). With discrete product lines, research effort yields stochastic outcomes, which induce a distribution of firm sizes. In this set-up, the state space becomes potentially very large as the marginal cost distribution matters for firms' decisions and outcomes. Minimum wages could also be an avenue for future research. In our set-up, minimum wages would force low process efficiency firms to decide between operating at a higher wage – or not at all. A minimum wage thus potentially drives these firms out of the market. Similarly to changes in labor supply elasticities, this would then affect both static- and dynamic efficiency. In this context, it may be desirable to allow firms to choose employment at or below the supply implied by a given wage, such that minimum wages do not impose a minimum firm size.

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# A Model Derivations

#### A.1 Intermediate Good Demand from CD Aggregator

The final goods producer maximizes profit by choosing the amount of each variety purchased and used in production. The production technology is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the quality-adjusted inputs:

$$Y = \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_i y_i) di, \quad i \in [0, 1]$$
(55)

The optimization problem of the final goods producer is:

$$\max_{\{y_i\}_{i\in[0,1]}} P\left(\exp\int_0^1 \ln(q_i y_i) di\right) - \int_0^1 p_i y_i di$$
(56)

The first order condition is given as:

$$P \underbrace{\exp \int_{0}^{1} \ln(q_{i}y_{i}) di}_{=Y} \frac{1}{q_{i}y_{i}} q_{i} - p_{i} = 0$$
(57)

$$\Leftrightarrow PY = p_i y_i \tag{58}$$

Finally, plugging the solution for intermediate goods demand into the production function gives an expression for the price index P:

$$Y = \exp \int_0^1 \ln\left(q_i P Y/p_i\right) di \tag{59}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow P = \exp \int_0^1 \ln(p_i/q_i) di.$$
(60)

### A.2 Nash equilibrium in the pricing game

The equilibrium concept we use to solve the model is Bertrand, which means that within each differentiated intermediate good market, firms set prices to maximize profit taking all other firms' prices as given. Within a product line, goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes, which means the firm that posts the lowest quality-adjusted price attracts all demand for output in a given product line. Note that posted prices are binding and whoever attracts demand produces to fulfill that demand.

Within each intermediate good market i, demand by the final goods producer is

$$p_i y_i = PY. (61)$$

Note that we assumed that the final goods producer only buys one (quality) type of each variety. This requires two assumptions: (i) the final goods producer has one preferred variety, and (ii) the producer is able to fulfill all market demand.

The first condition translates into a tie-breaking rule, i.e. we assume that if the quality-adjusted prices are equal, the final goods producer prefers the higher quality

product. This assumption also allows us to rule out collusive equilibria wherein firms split product markets at a collusive price.

For the second condition to hold, we need to make sure that the prices posted by the quality leaders are always greater than their respective marginal cost. A sufficiently large quality step size ensures this is the case when calibrating our model, i.e.  $\gamma > \frac{mc_k}{mc_l}, \forall k, l \in \{1, ..., \mathcal{J}\}$ . Note that this condition is equivalent to:

$$\gamma \ge \left(\frac{s_{j'}}{s_j}\right) \left(\frac{s_{j'}}{s_j} \frac{n_j}{n_{j'}}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \tag{62}$$

In one equilibrium of the model, the quality leader sets the quality-adjusted price equal to his follower's quality-adjusted marginal cost and the quality follower sets its price equal to its marginal cost. <sup>10</sup> Under this pricing, the quality adjusted prices of the firms are equal. Due to the tie-breaking rule, the quality leader produces the full demand for products in the given product line i and the follower produces nothing and earns zero surplus.

The price in a given product line is thus given by:

$$\frac{p_{j(i)}}{q_{j(i)}} = \frac{mc_{j'(i)}}{q_{j'(i)}} \Leftrightarrow p_{j(i)} = \gamma mc_{j'(i)}, \tag{63}$$

where j'(i) indexes the 'follower' in a given market *i*, and j(i) the quality leader.

The follower has no profitable deviation, since lower prices imply selling below marginal cost, and higher prices generate no sales. Meanwhile, there is no profitable unilateral deviation by the quality leader since a higher price loses all demand, and a lower price reduces the price without affecting output.

#### A.3 Labor Supply: Nested Discrete Choice

The labor supply choice is modeled as a nested discrete choice problem. For technical details of the derivation of choice probabilities, refer to Train, 2009 or McFadden, 1977. In the following we drop time subscripts for wages for readability.

The idea is that households o choose between employment (g = e) and home production (g = u), and conditional on choosing employment, they will pick a firm j to work for. If the household chooses to work at a firm, they earn wage  $W_j$ . If they choose to engage in home production, they instead receive  $\omega Y$ . Households maximize indirect utility

$$u_{oj} = \beta \ln(W_{gj}) + \xi_{og} + (1 - \sigma)\varepsilon_{oj}, \tag{64}$$

where  $\varepsilon_{oj}$  follows an i.i.d. EVT1 distribution. Similarly,  $\xi_{og} + (1 - \sigma)\varepsilon_{oj}$  is i.i.d. EVT1 distributed.  $\xi_{og}$  is common for all workplaces within a nest g for worker o. This means that within each nest, draws are independent, but not across nests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>There is a continuum of Nash equilibria where the quality leader posts a lower price and followers posts prices below their marginal cost.

Specifically, for a given worker, the non-wage preferences of one workplace vs. another is independently drawn, but through  $\xi$ , all jobs have a common relative attractiveness compared to unemployment.

Households compare all options available to them and choose to work at the workplace that gives them the highest indirect utility, i.e. they make a discrete choice over workplaces. The formulation thus captures, in addition to wages, individual preferences over working at any given firm  $(\varepsilon_{oj})$  and being employed at a firm at all  $(\xi_{og})$ , which does not depend on the workplace.

It is possible to solve this as a two-step choice problem. First, conditional on choosing to work, the household chooses their preferred employer  $j^*$ . This can be written as:

$$j^*: \beta \ln(W_{j^*}) + \xi_{oe} + (1 - \sigma)\varepsilon_{oj^*}$$
 (65)

$$\geq \beta \ln(W_k) + \xi_{oe} + (1 - \sigma)\varepsilon_{ok}, \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{J}$$
(66)

Since  $\xi_{oe}$  is shared across jobs, these terms drop out. Further, we can divide by  $(1 - \sigma)$  and get:

$$j^*: \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma} \ln(W_{j^*}) + \varepsilon_{oj^*} \ge \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma} \ln(W_k) + \varepsilon_{ok}$$
(67)

$$\Leftrightarrow \varepsilon_{oj^*} - \varepsilon_{ok} \ge \frac{\beta}{1 - \sigma} \ln(W_k / W_{j^*}) \tag{68}$$

The conditional choice probability for firm  $j^*$  is then given as:

$$p_{j^*,e} = P\left(\varepsilon_{oj^*} \ge \varepsilon_{ok} + \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}\ln(W_k/W_{j^*}), \forall k \in \mathcal{J}\right)$$
(69)

$$=\frac{W_{j*}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k\in\mathcal{J}}W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}.$$
(70)

The last equality follows from the assumption on the distribution of  $\varepsilon_{oj}$ . There is a second choice the worker can make: engaging in home production (g = u) and earning the outside option  $\omega Y$ . This will be chosen if the utility from it is higher than the utility level from the best possible employment the worker could choose. The probability of choosing any job over home production is hence given as:

$$p_{g=e} = \frac{\left(\sum_{k\in\mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\sum_{k\in\mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{1-\sigma} + ((\omega Y)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{1-\sigma}}$$
(71)

The unconditional choice probability of choosing a given employer is equal to the product of the probability of choosing employment, g = e, and the conditional

probability of choosing firm j given g = e:

$$p_{j*} = p_{g=e} * p_{j*,e} = \frac{\left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{1-\sigma} + \left((\omega Y)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{1-\sigma}} \frac{W_{j*}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}$$
(72)

$$=\frac{W_{j*}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{\left(\sum_{k\in\mathcal{J}}W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)+(\omega Y)^{\beta}\left(\sum_{k\in\mathcal{J}}W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{\sigma}}$$
(73)

To get to the labor supply  $L_j(W_j)$  facing firm j, we simply multiply by the mass of households in the economy,  $\mathcal{L}$ :

$$L_j(W_j) = \mathcal{L} \frac{W_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{(\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}},$$

We further define:

$$D_e \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_k^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}, \quad z \equiv \frac{\mathcal{L}}{D_e^{\sigma}(\omega Y)^{\beta} + D_e}$$
$$\Rightarrow L_j(W_j) = z W_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}},$$

where each firm j takes the equilibrium 'labor market density', represented by z, as given, i.e. we assume firms are small enough that they don't need to consider the effect of their wage setting on the aggregate labor market via  $D_e$ .

# A.4 Elasticity of the outside option

Note that the mass of workers that choose the outside option is given as

$$U_t = \mathcal{L} - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} L_j \tag{74}$$

$$= \mathcal{L} - \mathcal{L} \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{(\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}$$
(75)

$$= \mathcal{L}\frac{(\omega Y)^{\beta}}{(\omega Y)^{\beta} + (\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{1-\sigma}}.$$
(76)

From here, the unemployment rate is found by dividing by  $\mathcal{L}$ . Taking the derivative w.r.t. ( $\omega Y$ ) then gives:

$$\varepsilon_{u,\omega Y} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial (\omega Y)} \frac{(\omega Y)}{u} = \beta (1-u).$$
(77)

### A.5 Capital Demand

Firms make profits that are paid out to firm owners via interest rates, and therefore discount future profits at rate  $\frac{1}{1+r_t}$ . Firms are owned by capitalists, who allocate consumption and investment to maximize lifetime utility.

$$\max_{\{c_t,k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \rho^t \ln(c_t)$$
(78)

s.t. 
$$k_{t+1} = (1+r_t)k_t - c_t$$
 (79)

Taking first order conditions yields the Euler equation

$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = (1+r_t)\rho \tag{80}$$

Since consumption grows at a constant rate on a BGP, we have a constant interest rate  $r^* = \frac{g_c}{\rho} - 1$ , where  $g_c$  is the growth rate of consumption, and  $R^* = \frac{\rho}{q}$ .

#### A.6 Marginal cost

Marginal costs of production, as relevant for the intermediate product market competition, is derived from the following cost function:

$$C(Y_{jt}) = W(L(Y_{jt}))L(Y_{jt}), \quad L(Y_{jt}) = \frac{Y_{jt}}{s_j}, \quad W(L) = \left(\frac{L}{z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}$$
(81)

$$mc_{jt} \equiv C'(Y_{jt}) = \frac{1 + \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \left(\frac{Y_{jt}}{s_j z_t}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \frac{1}{s_j}$$
(82)

Moreover, we have  $Y_{jt} = \frac{n_{jt}Y_t}{\gamma m_t}$ , and therefore:

$$\frac{\partial C_{jt}}{\partial n_{jt}} = mc_{jt} \frac{Y_t}{\gamma m_t} \tag{83}$$

#### A.7 Labor supply elasticity

The labor supply elasticity faces by the firm is:

$$\frac{\partial L_j/L_j}{\partial W_j/W_j} = \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$$

#### A.8 Perfectly competitive labor markets

In the case when  $\sigma \to 1$ , the size of a firm paying wage  $W_j$ , is given by the labor supply equation given by Equation 6, evaluated in the limit. First, rewrite the labor supply equation by dividing through the numerator. Then, we distinguish different cases:

$$\lim_{\sigma \to 1} L_j = \lim_{\sigma \to 1} \mathcal{L} \frac{W_{jt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{\left(\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} W_{kt}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}$$
$$= \lim_{\sigma \to 1} \mathcal{L} \frac{1}{\left(\sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} \left(\frac{W_{kt}}{W_{jt}}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)^{\sigma} \left(\frac{\omega Y}{W_{jt}}\right)^{\beta} + \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} \left(\frac{W_{kt}}{W_{jt}}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}$$

We can distinguish three cases to evaluate the expression  $(W_{kt}/W_{jt})^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}$  in the limit for  $\sigma \to 1$ :

$$\lim_{\sigma \to 1} (W_{kt}/W_{jt})^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } W_k < W_j \\ 1, & \text{if } W_k = W_j \\ \infty, & \text{if } W_k > W_j \end{cases}$$

Having made this observation, the labor supply in the limit is:

$$\lim_{\sigma \to 1} L_j = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists k \in \{1, ..., \mathcal{J}\} : W_j < W_k \\ \mathcal{L} \left( \tilde{J} \left( 1 + (\omega Y/W_j)^\beta \right) \right)^{-1}, & \text{if } W_j \ge W_k, \forall k \in \{1, ..., \mathcal{J}\} \end{cases},$$

where  $\tilde{J} \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{\mathcal{J}} \mathbb{1}(W_k = W_j)$ . Essentially, labor supply is split between all  $\tilde{J}$  firms paying a market wage  $\bar{W}$ , and the outside option. Firms that pay below market wage do not get any workers. If instead we let  $\beta \to \infty$ , which also means infinite labor supply elasticity, we get the following:

$$\lim_{\beta \to \infty} L_j = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists k \in \{1, .., \mathcal{J}\} : W_j < W_k \lor \omega Y > W_j \\ \mathcal{L}(\tilde{J} + \tilde{J}^{\sigma})^{-1}, & \text{if } W_j \ge W_k \forall k \in \{1, .., \mathcal{J}\} \land \omega Y = W_j \\ \mathcal{L}(\tilde{J})^{-1}, & \text{if } W_j \ge W_k \forall k \in \{1, .., \mathcal{J}\} \land \omega Y < W_j \end{cases}$$

#### A.9 Growth rates

Consider a balanced growth path for which all growth stems from quality improvements, i.e.  $\frac{Q'}{Q} = \frac{Y'}{Y} = g$ . Assume that  $n_j$  is constant on BGP, and so is the number of firms and the revenue share of *H*-type firms, *h*. First, consider wage growth:

$$(W): g_w = \frac{\left(\frac{Y'}{m'z'}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}}{\left(\frac{Y}{mz}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}} = \left(\frac{g}{g_m g_z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}$$

The growth rate of the marginal cost index is defined as

$$g_m \equiv \frac{\left(\frac{h}{mc'_H} + \frac{1-h}{mc'_L}\right)^{-1}}{\left(\frac{h}{mc_H} + \frac{1-h}{mc_L}\right)^{-1}}.$$

As this growth rate has to be constant on a BGP, it must hold that marginal costs of either firm type grow at the same rate, and the marginal cost index m grows at that rate as well:

$$g_m = \frac{mc'_L}{mc_L} = \frac{mc'_H}{mc_H}$$

So we can look to either firm type j to figure out the growth rates:

$$g_m = \frac{mc'_j}{mc_j} = \frac{W'_j}{W_j} = g_w$$

Next, the growth rate of z is defined as follows:

$$g_{z} = \frac{z'}{z} = \frac{\left[ \left( \sum_{k} W_{k}^{'\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\sigma} (\omega Y')^{\beta} + \sum_{k} W_{k}^{'\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}{\left[ \left( \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}} \\ = \frac{\left[ \left( g_{w}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\sigma} g^{\beta} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + g_{w}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}{\left[ \left( \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}$$

From this we can see that, for  $g_z$  to be a constant, we need to have

$$(Z): g_w^{\frac{\sigma\beta}{1-\sigma}}g^\beta = g_w^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \Leftrightarrow g_w = g$$

Putting together (Z) and (W), we get:

$$g_z = g^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}$$
  
$$g = g_Y = g_Q = g_m = g_w = \gamma^X$$

Note that costs also grow over time:

$$\frac{C'}{C} = \frac{W'_j}{W_j} = g_w = g$$

# **B** Proofs of Lemmata

# B.1 Proof Lemma 3.1

*Proof.* Multiply both sides of  $m_t^{-1} \equiv \frac{h_t}{mc_{Ht}} + \frac{1-h_t}{mc_{Lt}}$  with  $\gamma m_t$ , note the definition of markup  $\mu_{jt} = \frac{\gamma m_t}{mc_{jt}}$  and rearrange:

$$\gamma m_t m_t^{-1} = \frac{h_t \gamma m_t}{m c_{Ht}} + \frac{(1 - h_t) \gamma m_t}{m c_{It}}$$
(84)

$$\Leftrightarrow \gamma = h_t \mu_{Ht} + (1 - h_t) \mu_{Lt} \tag{85}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow h_t(\gamma - \mu_{H_t}) = -(1 - h_t)(\gamma - \mu_{H_t}) \tag{86}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow -\frac{\gamma - \mu_{Lt}}{h_t} = \frac{h_t}{h_t} \tag{87}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow -\frac{\gamma - \mu_{Ht}}{\gamma - \mu_{Ht}} = \frac{n_t}{1 - h_t} \tag{87}$$

### B.2 Proof Lemma 3.2

Using the expression for the optimal wage, which is an outcome of the static firm choice:

$$W_{jt} = s_j \cdot mc_{jt} \cdot \frac{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}{1+\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}.$$
(88)

and the identities:

$$n_H \alpha J = h, \quad n_L (1 - \alpha) J = (1 - h),$$
(89)

the expression in Lemma 3.1 is derived as follows.

Proof.

$$\frac{s_H}{s_L} \frac{mc_{Ht}}{mc_{Lt}} = \left(\frac{\frac{n_{Ht}}{s_H}}{\frac{n_{Lt}}{s_L}}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \tag{90}$$

$$\implies$$
 (91)

$$\left(\frac{s_H}{s_L}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}+1} \cdot \left(\frac{\mu_L}{\mu_H}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} = \frac{n_H}{n_L} \tag{92}$$

$$\equiv \frac{h(1-\alpha) \cdot J}{\alpha(1-h) \cdot J} \tag{93}$$

This can be rearranged to conclude the proof.

#### B.3 Proof Lemma 3.3

**Lemma B.1.** With research costs given by  $C^R(x_{jt}, X_t, Q_t) = \psi Q_t(n_{jt+1} - (1 - X_t)n_{jt})^{\phi}$ , the rate of creative destruction X is characterised by:

$$(X^*)^{\phi} + (X^*)^{\phi-1} \cdot \frac{1 - \rho(g^*)}{\rho(g^*)} = \frac{Y}{Q} \cdot \frac{1}{\phi\psi} \cdot \frac{\mu_j^* - 1}{\mu_j^*} \cdot \frac{1}{(n_j^*)^{\phi-1}}.$$

along the balanced growth path. Equivalently:

$$n_{j}^{*} = \left(\frac{\mu_{j}^{*} - 1}{\mu_{j}^{*}} \cdot \frac{\frac{Y}{Q} \cdot \frac{1}{\phi\psi}}{(X^{*})^{\phi} + (X^{*})^{\phi-1} \cdot \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}}$$

*Proof.* For a given firm type j, the dynamic value function is given by:

$$V_{j,t}(Y_t, Q_t, X_t, n_{jt}) = \max_{n_{jt+1}, x_{jt}} \prod_{j=1}^{*} (Y_t, n_{jt}) - C^R (x_{jt}, Q_t, X_t) + \rho V_{t+1}(Y_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, X_{t+1}, n_{jt+1}) \text{s.t.} \quad n_{jt+1} = (1 - X_t)n_{jt} + x_{jt}.$$

Plugging in the binding constraint and using the first order condition, we obtain:

$$0 = \rho \cdot \left(\frac{\partial \Pi_j(Y_{t+1}, n_{j,t+1})}{\partial n_{j,t+1}} - \frac{\partial C^R(x_{j,t+1})}{\partial n_{j,t+1}}\right) - \frac{\partial C^R(x_{j,t})}{\partial n_{j,t+1}}$$

Revenue is given by  $n_{j,t} \cdot Y_t$ . Form marginal cost using chain rule. Plug in research costs:

$$0 = \rho \cdot \left( Y_{t+1} - mc_{j,t+1} \cdot \frac{\partial Y_{j,t+1}}{\partial n_{j,t+1}} - \phi \psi Q_{t+1} (X_{t+1} - 1) \left( n_{j,t+2} - (1 - X_{t+1}) \cdot n_{j,t+1} \right)^{\phi - 1} \right) - \phi \psi Q_t \left( n_{j,t+1} - (1 - X_t) n_{j,t} \right)^{\phi - 1}$$

Impose BGP. Use that  $Y_{jt} = \int_0^1 y_{ijt} di = \int_0^1 \frac{Y_t}{p_{i(j'),t}} di = \frac{n_{j,t}Y_t}{\gamma m_t}$ :

$$\begin{split} &t0 = \rho \cdot \left( Y' - mc_j^* \cdot \frac{Y'}{\gamma m^*} - \phi \psi Q'(X^* - 1) \left( X^* n_j^* \right)^{\phi - 1} \right) - \phi \psi Q \left( X^* n_j^* \right)^{\phi - 1} \\ &= \rho \cdot Y' \cdot \frac{\mu_j^* - 1}{\mu_j^*} - \phi \psi Q \left( X^* n_j^* \right)^{\phi - 1} \left( 1 + \rho(g^*)(X^* - 1) \right) \end{split}$$

Rearranging yields:

$$\Leftrightarrow (X^* n_j^*)^{\phi - 1} \cdot \frac{(1 + \rho(g^*)(X^* - 1))}{\rho(g^*)} = \frac{Y'}{Q'} \cdot \frac{1}{\phi\psi} \cdot \frac{\mu_j^* - 1}{\mu_j^*} \Leftrightarrow (X^*)^{\phi} + (X^*)^{\phi - 1} \cdot \frac{1 - \rho(g^*)}{\rho(g^*)} = \frac{Y'}{Q'} \cdot \frac{1}{\phi\psi} \cdot \frac{\mu_j^* - 1}{\mu_j^*} \cdot \frac{1}{(n_j^*)^{\phi - 1}}.$$

### B.4 Proof Lemma 3.4

Proof. Form  $\frac{n_H}{n_L}$  using Equation  $\ref{eq:result}$  which cancel out the aggregate variables, which yields

$$\frac{n_H}{n_L} = \left(\frac{\frac{\mu_H - 1}{\mu_H}}{\frac{\mu_L - 1}{\mu_L}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\phi - 1}}.$$
(94)

Moreover, by definition of  $h_t$ , the following holds:

$$\frac{h \cdot (1 - \alpha)}{(1 - h) \cdot \alpha} = \frac{n_H}{n_L},\tag{95}$$

(96)

Setting the two expressions for  $n_H/n_L$  equal concludes the proof.

# C Decomposition of output and TFP

Here, we show how to decompose aggregate TFP in an accounting exercise.

# C.1 Proof for 3.5

Proof.

$$Y \equiv \exp \int_0^1 \ln(q_i y_i) di \tag{97}$$

$$= \exp \int_{0}^{1} \ln(q_{i}) di \cdot \exp \int_{0}^{1} \ln(s_{j(i)}) di \cdot \exp \int_{0}^{1} \ln l_{i} di$$
(98)

$$= Q \cdot S \cdot \frac{\exp \int_0^1 \ln l_i di}{\int_0^1 l_i di} \cdot \int_0^1 l_i di$$
(99)

$$= Q \cdot S \cdot \frac{\exp \int_0^1 \ln \left(\frac{Y}{\gamma m c_{j'(i)} s_{j(i)}}\right) di}{\int_0^1 \frac{Y}{\gamma m c_{i'(i)} s_{j(i)}} di} \cdot \sum_{j \in J} L_j$$
(100)

$$= Q \cdot S \cdot M \cdot L \tag{101}$$

### C.2 Building intuition

$$Y := \exp \int_0^1 \ln q_i y_i di \tag{102}$$

$$= Q \cdot \exp \int_0^1 \ln y_i di \tag{103}$$

$$= Q \cdot \exp \int_0^1 \ln s_{j(i)} di \cdot \exp \int_0^1 \ln l_i di$$
(104)

From here, we can define  $S := \exp \int_0^1 \ln s_{j(i)} di$ .

Furthermore, we can derive a relation between the geometric and arithmetic means by starting from the log of the geometric mean and then use a second order Taylor approximation of log  $l_i$  around the arithmetic mean of  $l_i$ :

$$\begin{split} \int_{0}^{1} \ln l_{i} di &\approx \ln \bar{l} + \int_{0}^{1} \frac{1}{l_{i}} (l_{i} - \bar{l}) - \frac{1}{2\bar{l}^{2}} (l_{i} - \bar{l})^{2} di \\ &= \ln \bar{l} - \left( \frac{\int_{0}^{1} (l_{i} - \bar{l})^{2} di}{2\bar{l}^{2}} \right) \\ &= \ln \int_{0}^{1} l_{i} di - \frac{CV^{2}}{2} \end{split}$$

Where CV denotes the Coefficient of Variation as it relates the standard deviation to the mean of the distribution of the line level employment  $l_i$ .

As a last step, take exponents of both sides and use the relation that  $e^{-x} \approx 1 - x$  for small x. Then  $\exp \int_0^1 \ln l_i di \approx \int_0^1 l_i di(1 - \frac{CV^2}{2})$ . Use this relationship to isolate the labor input in each product line and plug in the labor supply facing the intermediate producers:

$$Y \approx Q \cdot S \cdot \int_0^1 l_i di \left(1 - \frac{CV^2}{2}\right) \tag{105}$$

$$= Q \cdot S \cdot (1 - \frac{CV^2}{2}) \cdot \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \int_0^1 l_{ij} di$$
(106)

Plug in labor supply: 
$$= Q \cdot S \cdot (1 - \frac{CV^2}{2}) \cdot \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \mathcal{L}\left(\frac{z}{\mathcal{L}}\right) W_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right)$$
 (107)

$$= Q \cdot S \cdot \left(1 - \frac{CV^2}{2}\right) \cdot \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \frac{z}{\mathcal{L}} \cdot W_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}\right) \cdot \mathcal{L}$$
(108)

$$=\underbrace{Q\cdot S\cdot (1-\frac{CV^2}{2})}_{TFP}\cdot \frac{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{J}}L_j}{\mathcal{L}}\cdot \mathcal{L}$$
(109)

This gives us a microfoundation for aggregate output as in Boppart and Li, 2021. Aggregate TFP depends on the quality index, Q, which grows over time, and allocative efficiency which can be summarised as the geometric average of producer productivity, S, multiplied by the dispersion in line level employment, CV, and the employment rate.

The dispersion of line level employment is akin to a dispersion in revenue productivity, as it depends on the producer, which defines  $s_j$ , and the follower, which defines the price in equilibrium. To understand it better, we next rewrite it in terms of parameters and equilibrium objects known after solving the dynamic problem:

$$\begin{split} &\int_{0}^{1} (l_{i} - \bar{l})^{2} di \\ &= \sum_{j \in \{L,H\}} \sum_{j' \in \{L,H\}} \int_{0}^{1} l_{i,j,j'}^{2} di - \bar{l}^{2} \\ &= h^{2} \int_{0}^{1} l_{i,H,H}^{2} di + (1 - h)^{2} \int_{0}^{1} l_{i,L,L}^{2} di \\ &+ h(1 - h) \int_{0}^{1} l_{i,L,H}^{2} + l_{i,H,L}^{2} di - \bar{l}^{2} \\ &= h^{2} \int_{0}^{1} \left(\frac{Y}{s_{H} \gamma m c_{H}}\right)^{2} di + (1 - h)^{2} \int_{0}^{1} \left(\frac{Y}{s_{L} \gamma m c_{L}}\right)^{2} di \\ &+ h(1 - h) \int_{0}^{1} \left(\frac{Y}{s_{L} \gamma m c_{H}}\right)^{2} + \left(\frac{Y}{s_{H} \gamma m c_{L}}\right)^{2} di - \bar{l}^{2} \\ &= \left(\frac{Y}{\gamma}\right)^{2} \left(\left(\frac{h}{s_{H} m c_{H}}\right)^{2} + \left(\frac{1 - h}{s_{L} m c_{L}}\right)^{2} \\ &+ h(1 - h) \left(\left(\frac{1}{s_{L} m c_{H}}\right)^{2} + \left(\frac{1}{s_{H} m c_{L}}\right)^{2}\right)\right) - \bar{l}^{2} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \end{split}$$

$$\frac{\int_{0}^{1} (l_{i} - \bar{l})^{2} di}{\bar{l}^{2}} = \frac{\left(\frac{h}{s_{H}mc_{H}}\right)^{2} + \left(\frac{1-h}{s_{L}mc_{L}}\right)^{2} + h(1-h)\left(\left(\frac{1}{s_{L}mc_{H}}\right)^{2} + \left(\frac{1}{s_{H}mc_{L}}\right)^{2}\right)}{\left(\frac{h^{2}}{s_{H}mc_{H}} + \frac{(1-h)^{2}}{s_{L}mc_{L}} + h(1-h)\left(\frac{1}{s_{L}mc_{H}} + \frac{1}{s_{H}mc_{L}}\right)\right)^{2}} - 1$$

Taken together with the aggregate output expression above, this means TFP equals:

$$TFP = Q \cdot S \cdot \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} - \frac{\frac{h^2}{(s_H m c_H)^2} + \frac{(1-h)^2}{(s_L m c_L)^2} + h(1-h)\left(\left(\frac{1}{s_L m c_H}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1}{s_H m c_L}\right)^2\right)}{2\left(\frac{h^2}{s_H m c_H} + \frac{(1-h)^2}{s_L m c_L} + h(1-h)\left(\frac{1}{s_L m c_H} + \frac{1}{s_H m c_L}\right)\right)^2\right)}_{M}\right)}_{M}$$
$$= Q \cdot S \cdot \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} - \frac{\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1}{(s_j m c_{j'})^2}\right)}{2 \cdot \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1}{s_j m c_{j'}}\right)^2\right)}_{2 \cdot \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1}{s_j m c_{j'}}\right)^2\right)}}_{M}$$

This shows that, apart from initial assumptions of  $s_H, s_L$ , it is the equilibrium dispersion of marginal costs, and the equilibrium firm size distribution h that explain the misallocation factor.

# D Additional details quantitative part

#### D.1 Calibration

#### **BGP** Equations

- 1. Workers
  - (a)  $L_j = z W_j^{\epsilon}$
  - (b)  $\epsilon \equiv \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$

#### 2. Firms: Static and dynamic optimization

- (a)  $L_j = \frac{n_j}{s_j} \frac{Y}{\gamma m}$ , Production function and demand (static optimization)
- (b)  $W_j = s_j m c_j \frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon}$ , Marginal cost definition
- (c)  $\mu_j \equiv \frac{\gamma m}{mc_j}$ , Output weighted mark-up

(d) 
$$n_j = \left(\frac{1 - \frac{mc_j}{\gamma m}}{\psi \phi(X^{\phi-1} \frac{1-\rho}{\rho} + X^{\phi})}\right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}}$$
, FOC dynamic optimization

3. Definitions and Aggregates

(a) 
$$z \equiv \mathcal{L}((\sum_{j} W_{j}^{\epsilon})^{\sigma} (\omega Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{j} W_{j}^{\epsilon})^{-1}$$

(b)  $m \equiv \left(\frac{h}{mc_H} + \frac{1-h}{mc_L}\right)^{-1}$ 

(c)  $h \equiv \mathcal{J}\alpha n_H$ ,  $1 - h = \mathcal{J}(1 - \alpha)n_L$ (d)  $L = \mathcal{J}(\alpha L_H + (1 - \alpha))$ (e)  $u \equiv \frac{\mathcal{L} - L}{\mathcal{L}}$ (f)  $\frac{1}{\gamma} = mc_H^h mc_L^{1-h}$ (g)  $g = \gamma^X$ 

4. System of equations E1, E2, E3:

- (a)  $E1: \quad -\frac{\gamma-\mu_L}{\gamma-\mu_H} = \frac{h}{1-h}$ , using 3b and 2c
- (b)  $E2: \quad \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{s_H}{s_L}\right)^{\epsilon+1} \left(\frac{\mu_L}{\mu_H}\right)^{\epsilon} = \frac{h}{1-h}$ , using 1a, 2a, b, 3c

(c) 
$$E3: \quad \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{\mu_H - 1}{\mu_L - 1} \frac{\mu_L}{\mu_H}\right)^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}} = \frac{h}{1-h}, \text{ using 2d, 3c}$$

Calibration summary:

- Externally set parameters:  $\alpha, \rho$
- Normalizations:  $s_L = 1, Q_0 = 1, P = 1, \mathcal{L} = 1$
- Calibrated parameters:  $s_H, \gamma, \psi, \phi, \omega, \sigma, \beta, \zeta$ , and  $\epsilon = \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}$
- Moments:  $u, \frac{L}{\mathcal{L}}, \frac{s_H}{s_L}, \mu_H, \mu_L, h, g, \varepsilon_{u,\omega Y}$

# D.2 Productivity and top 10% revenue share from Compustat

We use compustat data (Standard & Poor's, 2020) from 1954 to 2016, and take averages of various time periods for different applications. We focus on firms in the U.S. manufacturing sector by filtering the dataset to include only firms under NAICS codes starting with '31', '32', or '33', and reporting in U.S. dollars. Missing values were addressed by excluding firms without key variables like sales and employment, and only firms with positive sales and employment values were kept. Firms were categorized annually into the top 10% by sales and the remaining 90%. We calculate two key metrics: the revenue share of the top 10%, and the relative average revenue per employee, which compares the production efficiency of the top 10% with the bottom 90%. How these measures vary over time is depicted in Figure 5.

# **E** Extension with wage taxes

#### E.1 Equivalence of tax setups

This is a brief note on the equivalence of two tax set-ups: (i) the firm pays a wage bill tax  $T^f$  on the net wage the worker receives,  $W^w$ , or (ii) the worker pays a wage tax  $T^w$  on the gross wage the firm pays,  $W^f$ . The relationship between the gross



Figure 5: Time trends in top 10% revenue share and relative labor productivity.

and net wages under the two tax regimes are summarized as follows:

$$W^{f} = W^{w}(1 + T^{f}(W^{w}))$$
(110)

$$W^{w} = W^{f}(1 - T^{w}(W^{f}))$$
(111)

Rearranging then yields a mapping between the two tax schedules:

$$T^{w}(W^{f}) = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + T^{f}(W^{w})} = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + T^{f}(W^{f}(1 - T^{w}(W^{f})))}$$

Note that this holds because a firm has exactly one wage rate, on the basis of which the tax schedule is built. If there were multiple wage rates within the same company, this mapping is not as straightforward. We chose to model the tax as a tax on the wage bill for algebraic clarity.

# E.2 Marginal cost

Marginal costs of production, as relevant for the intermediate product market competition, is derived from the following cost function:

$$C(Y_{jt}) = (1 + T(W(L(Y_{jt}))))W(L(Y_{jt}))L(Y_{jt})$$
(112)

$$mc_{jt} = C'(Y_{jt}) \tag{113}$$

Moreover, we have  $Y_{jt} = \frac{n_{jt}Y_t}{\gamma m_t}$ , and therefore:

$$\frac{\partial C_{jt}}{\partial n_{jt}} = mc_{jt} \frac{Y_t}{\gamma m_t} \tag{114}$$

### E.3 Labor supply elasticity

$$\begin{split} & \frac{d\log(L_{jt})}{d\log(W_{jt}\cdot(1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right)))} \\ &= \frac{dzW_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{d(W_{jt}(1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right)))} \cdot \frac{W_j\cdot(1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right))}{zW_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}} \\ &= \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma} \cdot zW_j^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}-1} \cdot \frac{1}{1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right)+W_j\cdot\frac{d(1+T)}{dW_j}} \cdot \frac{W_j\cdot(1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right))}{zW_j^{\beta/(1-\sigma)}} \\ &= \frac{\beta}{1-\sigma} \cdot \frac{1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right)}{1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right)+(1+T\left(\frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}\right))\frac{\tau}{1-\tau}} \\ &= \frac{\beta(1-\tau)}{1-\sigma} = \varepsilon. \end{split}$$

#### E.4 Growth rates

Consider a balanced growth path for which all growth stems from quality improvements, i.e.  $\frac{Q'}{Q} = \frac{Y'}{Y} = g$ . Assume that  $n_j$  is constant on BGP, and so is the number of firms and the revenue share of *H*-type firms, *h*. First, consider wage growth:

$$(W): g_{\bar{W}} = g_w = \frac{\left(\frac{Y'}{m'z'}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}}{\left(\frac{Y}{mz}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}} = \left(\frac{g}{g_m g_z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}$$

The growth rate of the marginal cost index is defined as

$$g_m \equiv \frac{(\frac{h}{mc'_H} + \frac{1-h}{mc'_L})^{-1}}{(\frac{h}{mc_H} + \frac{1-h}{mc_L})^{-1}}.$$

As this growth rate has to be constant on a BGP, it must hold that marginal costs of either firm type grow at the same rate, and the marginal cost index m grows at that rate as well:

$$g_m = \frac{mc'_L}{mc_L} = \frac{mc'_H}{mc_H}$$

So we can look to either firm type j to figure out the growth rates:

$$g_m = \frac{mc'_j}{mc_j} = \frac{w'_j [1 - \sigma + \beta + (1 - \sigma + \beta)T(\frac{w'_j}{W'}) + (1 - \sigma)T'(\frac{w'_j}{W'})\frac{w'_j}{W'}]}{W_j [1 - \sigma + \beta + (1 - \sigma + \beta)T(\frac{W_j}{W}) + (1 - \sigma)T'(\frac{W_j}{W})\frac{W_j}{W}]}$$

Using the (W) result from above:

$$(M): g_m = g_w \frac{[1 - \sigma + \beta + (1 - \sigma + \beta)T(\frac{g_w W_j}{g_{\bar{W}}\bar{W}}) + (1 - \sigma)T'(\frac{g_w W_j}{g_{\bar{W}}\bar{W}})\frac{g_w W_j}{g_{\bar{W}}\bar{W}}]}{[1 - \sigma + \beta + (1 - \sigma + \beta)T(\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}}) + (1 - \sigma)T'(\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}})\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}}]} = g_w \frac{[1 - \sigma + \beta + (1 - \sigma + \beta)T(\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}}) + (1 - \sigma)T'(\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}})\frac{g_w W_j}{g_{\bar{W}}\bar{W}}]}{[1 - \sigma + \beta + (1 - \sigma + \beta)T(\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}}) + (1 - \sigma)T'(\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}})\frac{W_j}{\bar{W}}]}$$

Next, the growth rate of  $\boldsymbol{z}$  is defined as follows:

$$g_{z} = \frac{z'}{z} = \frac{\left[ (\sum_{k} W_{k}^{'\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} (\bar{W}Y')^{\beta} + \sum_{k} W_{k}^{'\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}{\left[ (\sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} (\bar{W}Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}} \\ = \frac{\left[ (g_{w}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} g^{\beta} (\bar{W}Y)^{\beta} + g_{w}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}{\left[ (\sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{1-\sigma}{1-\sigma}})^{\sigma} (\bar{W}Y)^{\beta} + \sum_{k} W_{k}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}}$$

From this we can see that, for  $g_z$  to be a constant, we need to have

$$(Z): g_w^{\frac{\sigma\beta}{1-\sigma}}g^\beta = g_w^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \Leftrightarrow g_w = g$$

Putting together (Z) and (W), we get:

$$g_z = g^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}$$
  
$$g = g_Y = g_Q = g_m = g_w = \gamma^X$$

Note that costs also grow over time:

$$\frac{C'}{C} = \frac{\left(1 + T\left(\frac{w'}{\bar{W}'}\right)\right)}{\left(1 + T\left(\frac{w}{\bar{W}}\right)\right)}\frac{w'}{\bar{W}} = g_w = g_w$$

Set-up, wage

$$\bar{W} = \int_0^1 W_{o,j(o)} \, do = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{J_H L_H}{L} W_{o,j(o)=h} + \frac{J_L L_L}{L} W_{o,j(o)=l} \right) do \tag{115}$$

Here,  $L = J_H L_H + J_L L_L$ . Using that  $Y_j = \frac{n_j Y}{\gamma m}$ , we can rewrite

$$\bar{W} = \frac{J_H L_H W_H + J_L L_L W_L}{L} = \frac{\frac{Y}{\gamma m} \left( J_H \frac{n_H}{s_H} W_H + J_L \frac{n_L}{s_L} W_L \right)}{\frac{Y}{\gamma m} \left( J_H \frac{n_H}{s_H} + J_L \frac{n_L}{s_L} \right)} = \frac{\frac{h}{s_H} W_H + \frac{1-h}{s_L} W_L}{\frac{h}{s_H} + \frac{1-h}{s_L}}$$
$$= f_w(h, W_H, W_L)$$

#### Set-up, marginal cost

$$C(n_j) = \left(1 + \tau \left(\frac{1}{\bar{W}} \left[\frac{Y_j}{s_j z}\right]^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}}\right)\right) \left[\frac{Y_j}{s_j z}\right]^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \frac{Y_j}{s_j}$$

which results in the marginal cost as a function of  $n_i$ :

$$\begin{split} mc_{j} = & \frac{1}{\beta} \left( \frac{n_{j}Y}{\gamma mz} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \left[ \frac{1}{s_{j}} \right]^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{\beta}} \left[ (1-\sigma+\beta) \left( 1+\tau \left( \frac{1}{\bar{W}} \left[ \frac{n_{j}Y}{\gamma ms_{j}z} \right]^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \right) \right) \right. \\ & \left. + (1-\sigma)\tau' \left( \frac{1}{\bar{W}} \left[ \frac{n_{j}Y}{\gamma ms_{j}z} \right]^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \right) \frac{1}{\bar{W}} \left[ \frac{n_{j}Y}{\gamma ms_{j}z} \right]^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \right] \end{split}$$

Or:

$$mc_j = f_{mc}\left(n_j, s_j, \frac{Y}{mz}, \bar{W}\right) \tag{116}$$

# F Analytical BGP Solution

We consider a BGP equilibrium with two types of firms: h, l. The number of h-type firms is  $J_H$ , and in equilibrium they hold a share h of all product lines. To derive the BGP solution, the firm problem is simplified to reflect BGP conditions. First, we consider equilibria where the number of firms is  $1 < J < \infty$ . Under this condition, we must have that firm size stays constant for each type of firm, i.e.  $n_{jt} = n_{jt+1}$ . Moreover, output  $Y_t$  grows at a constant rate g, i.e.  $gY_t = Y_{t+1}$ . Capitalists imply that the firm discounts future profits at  $\rho/g$ , for details refer to Section A.5. Finally, since research is costly, the firm will not choose to conduct more research than necessary for their desired firm size  $n_{jt}$ . Therefore, firm size  $n_{jt}$  will be equal to the number of lines where the firm is the quality leader.

This solution to the static firm problem (Equation 50) implies for prices where the firm is a quality leader:

$$p_{ijt} = \gamma m c_{ij'(i)t},\tag{117}$$

where j'(i) yields the index of the quality-follower (second highest quality producer) of product *i*.

Plugging in the law of motion of product lines  $n_{jt+1}$ , the dynamic firm problem with

linear taxes and research costs is then given by:

$$V_{jt}(Y_t, n_{jt}) = \max_{n_{jt+1}} n_{jt} Y_t - (1 + \bar{\tau}) W_{jt} L_{jt}$$
(118)

$$-\psi Q_t (n_{jt+1} - (1 - X_t) n_{jt})^{\phi}$$

$$+ \frac{\rho}{V_{it+1}} (Y_{t+1}, n_{it+1}),$$
(119)
(120)

$$g^{\prime}_{jt+1}(r_{t+1}, r_{jt+1}), \qquad (120)$$

s.t. 
$$L_{jt} = \frac{n_{jt}Y_t}{s_j\gamma m_t}$$
 &  $W_{jt} = \left(\frac{n_{jt}Y_t}{s_j\gamma m_t z_t}\right)^{-\beta}$ , (121)

where we define

$$m_t \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 \frac{1}{mc_{jt}} dj \right]^{-1}.$$
 (122)

Next, we simplify the firm problem by taking into account growth rates that have to hold on a BGP: Growth rates are:

$$g_z = g^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}}$$
  $g = g_Y = g_Q = g_m = g_w = \gamma^X$ 

Refer to Section E.4 for a note on how to derive them. We also assume linear research costs, that is,  $\phi = 1$ . As a first step, we divide the firm problem by  $Y_t$  to redefine it as  $v_{jt} = V_{jt}/Y_t$ :

$$v_{jt}(Y_t, n_{jt}) = \max_{n_{jt+1}} n_{jt} - (1 + \bar{\tau}) \left(\frac{n_{jt}Y_t}{s_j \gamma m_t z_t}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \frac{n_{jt}}{s_j \gamma m_t}$$
(123)

$$-\psi(n_{jt+1} - (1 - X_t)n_{jt}) \tag{124}$$

$$+\rho v_{jt+1}(Y_{t+1}, n_{jt+1}) \tag{125}$$

We can now drop time subscripts, and thus interpret aggregates as detrended variables, and get a recursive problem:

$$v_j(n_j) = \max_{n'_j} n_j - (1 + \bar{\tau}) \left(\frac{n_j Y}{s_j \gamma m z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \frac{n_j}{s_j \gamma m}$$
(126)

$$-\psi(n'_j - (1 - X)n_j) \tag{127}$$

$$+\rho v_j(n'_j) \tag{128}$$

Taking the first order condition, imposing  $n_j = n'_j$  on BGP, and rearranging:

$$\frac{\psi}{\rho} = 1 - (1 + \bar{\tau}) \frac{1 - \sigma + \beta}{\beta} \left( \frac{n_j Y}{s_j \gamma m z} \right)^{\frac{1 - \sigma}{\beta}} \frac{1}{s_j \gamma m} + \psi (1 - X) \tag{129}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{n_j}{s_j^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}}} = \left( \left[ 1 + \psi(1-X-\frac{1}{\rho}) \right] \frac{\beta\gamma m}{(1+\bar{\tau})(1-\sigma+\beta)} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\sigma}} \frac{\gamma mz}{Y}$$
(130)

Since the r.h.s. of this expression does not depend on the firm type, we must have

$$\frac{n_j}{n_i} = \left(\frac{s_j}{s_i}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}} \tag{131}$$

# F.1 Solution Firm Problem

From here, we can directly determine the firm sizes. The sum of all product lines held by all firms must equal 1. Using this, we get:

$$\sum_{k \text{ types}} J_k n_k = 1 \Leftrightarrow n_j = \frac{s_j^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{\sum_{k \text{ types}} J_k s_k^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}}}$$
(132)

Similarly, the market share held by a specific type of firm j is given as  $h_j = J_j n_j$ :

$$h_j = \frac{J_j s_j^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}}}{\sum_{k \text{ types}} J_k s_k^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}}}$$
(133)

With two firm types, h and l, this boils down to:

$$1 = J_H n_H + J_L \left(\frac{s_L}{s_H}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}} n_H \tag{134}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow n_H = \left[ J_H + J_L \left( \frac{s_L}{s_H} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}} \right]^{-1}, \quad n_L = \left[ J_H \left( \frac{s_H}{s_L} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{1-\sigma}} + J_L \right]^{-1}$$
(135)

Moreover, we get that the share of product lines where the h-type produces is

$$h = J_H \left[ J_H + J_L \left( \frac{s_L}{s_H} \right)^{\frac{1 - \sigma + \beta}{1 - \sigma}} \right]^{-1}$$
(136)

The marginal cost  $mc_j$  is given as the derivative of production cost w.r.t. total firm output  $Y_j$ :

$$C(Y_j) = (1 + \bar{\tau}) \left(\frac{Y_j}{s_j z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \frac{Y_j}{s_j}$$
(137)

$$\Rightarrow mc_j = C'(Y_j) = (1 + \bar{\tau}) \frac{1 - \sigma + \beta}{\beta} \left(\frac{Y_j}{s_j z}\right)^{\frac{1 - \sigma}{\beta}} \frac{1}{s_j}$$
(138)

$$= (1+\bar{\tau})\frac{1-\sigma+\beta}{\beta} \left(\frac{n_j Y}{s_j \gamma m z}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\beta}} \frac{1}{s_j}$$
(139)

Plugging this into the first order condition of the recursive (BGP) firm problem yields:

$$\frac{mc_j}{\gamma m} = 1 + \left(1 - X - \frac{1}{\rho}\right)\psi\tag{140}$$

Note that marginal cost according to this must be equal across firm types. With this, we can solve for wages and the level of marginal costs, starting with the following observation:

$$Y = Q \exp \int_0^1 \ln(y_i) d_i = Q \exp \int_0^1 \ln(Y) - \ln(\gamma) - \ln(mc_{j'(i)}) d_i, \qquad (141)$$

and since  $mc_j = m$ , we have:

$$mc_H = mc_L = m = \frac{Q}{\gamma}.$$
(142)

Using the definition of marginal costs and rearranging in terms of the wage then gives rise to:

$$W_j = s_j \frac{\beta Q}{\gamma (1 + \bar{\tau})(1 - \sigma + \beta)} \tag{143}$$

### F.2 Solution BGP Aggregates

From the firm problem FOC we have:

$$\frac{mc_j}{\gamma m} = 1 + \left(1 - X - \frac{1}{\rho}\right)\psi\tag{144}$$

Plugging this into the definition of m:

$$m = \left(\int_0^1 mc_{j(i)}^{-1} di\right)^{-1} = \gamma m \left[1 + \left(1 - X - \frac{1}{\rho}\right)\psi\right]$$
(145)

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{\gamma} = 1 + \left(1 - X - \frac{1}{\rho}\right)\psi \tag{146}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow X = \frac{\gamma - 1}{\psi\gamma} + \frac{\rho - 1}{\rho} \tag{147}$$

This yields the aggregate rate of innovation, that is  $X = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} x_j$ , which also determines the growth of the economy, as  $g_Y = \gamma^X$ . Moreover, we can calculate average wages and the labor share. Starting from adding up the total wage bill  $\tilde{W}$ , and noting that  $L_j = Y n_j / (\gamma m s_j)$ :

$$\tilde{W} = \sum_{j=1}^{\mathcal{J}} L_j W_j = Y \frac{\beta}{\gamma(1+\bar{\tau})(1-\sigma+\beta)}$$
(148)

Then, the labor share (of output) is the given as:

$$\alpha_w = \frac{\tilde{W}}{Y} = \frac{\beta}{\gamma(1+\bar{\tau})(1-\sigma+\beta)},\tag{149}$$

and the average wage is simply total wages divided by the number of workers. Simplifying yields:

$$\bar{w} = Q \frac{\beta}{\gamma(1+\bar{\tau})(1-\sigma+\beta)} \left(\frac{h}{s_H} + \frac{1-h}{s_L}\right)^{-1}$$
(150)