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Temporary Internal Displacement and Receiving Communities' Voting Behavior

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Temporary Internal Displacement and Receiving Communities' Voting Behavior

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of a temporary forced internal migration on the voting behavior in the receiving municipalities. During World War I, around 500,00 thousand displaced nationals were resettled from the Italian government within the country and stayed in the receiving place for less than two years. Leveraging on the quasi-random relocation policy and the short stay of displaced individuals, I evaluate whether hosting a large share of forced migrants affects voting behavior in the subsequent elections. Findings indicate that an increase in the share of hosted displaced individuals corresponds to a decrease in the vote share for the Italian Popular Party (PPI), the Catholic party. This aligns with historical evidence highlighting the significant role of Catholic associations in assisting displaced people at arrival. The negative impact on the Catholic party persisted for two consecutive elections, 1919 and 1921, before dissipating in 1924. Anti-competitive behavior for public services is likely to explain the voting behavior.

JEL-Codes: D720, H530, I380, N340.

Keywords: displaced people, political outcomes, public spending, resettlement policies.

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1 Introduction

Over the past decade, Europe has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of forcibly displaced persons, rising from 3.42 million in 2011 to 19.5 million in 2023 (UNHCR, 2024). This unexpected influx has led to a notable change in voting behavior within receiving communities. Specifically, in areas hosting a higher proportion of displaced individuals relative to their population size, residents have increasingly shifted their political support from pro-integration to anti-immigration parties (Bratti et al., 2020; Bredtmann, 2022; Campo et al., 2024; Dustmann et al., 2019). Although cultural diversity and permanent settlement intentions of recent forced migrants in Europe may partially explain the change in the electoral support, the political backlash against pro-integration parties may be independent from displaced individuals' characteristics and common to all the displacement events. Indeed, individuals may exhibit stronger anti-immigration attitudes and/or anti-competitive behaviors if they perceive societal changes or economic threats resulting from the arrival of forced migrants in their communities. However, the limited research on other types of displacement events makes it difficult to determine whether the political effects observed in the context of recent forced migration are unique or indicative of a more general response to hosting displaced individuals. To contribute to the debate on common versus context-based effects of hosting displaced individuals, this paper examines a unique historical event: the temporary internal displacement of Italians during World War I.

Following the Italian army's defeat at the Battle of Caporetto, October-November 1917, in WWI, the Italian government resettled randomly around 500,000 internally displaced people (IDPs), primarily children, women and the elderly, from war territories to other Italian municipalities. Upon the arrival of forced migrants in the receiving communities, *Azione Cattolica*, the movement of the Catholic associations, mitigated the initial lag in governmental financial as-

sistance by appealing to worshipers for aid in the receiving communities. While the immediate response showed a high degree of solidarity, the economic distress of the 1918 spring fueled public discontent, leading many to blame IDPs for soaring prices and food shortage (Battistello, 2007). The hostile environment in the receiving communities, coupled with the end of the governmental financial assistance, pushed displaced individuals to return to their hometowns at the end of the Great War. Almost all IDPs returned to their hometowns before the 1919 general elections.

This historical setting offers several advantages for comparing the political effects of different displacement events. First, the return of displaced individuals to their hometowns before the 1919 elections provides a unique opportunity to isolate the electoral outcomes of host communities from any potential bias caused by the votes of internally displaced persons. Second, the contrasting characteristics of this event compared to the recent European refugee crisis allow for an investigation into whether displacement events generate common political effects across different contexts. Finally, since the Italian Popular Party (PPI) represented *Azione Cattolica* in the 1919 elections, this setting enables an examination of the political backlash against a pro-integration party in a political environment devoid of anti-immigration parties.

To perform the analysis, empirical strategy leverages on the quasi-random resettlement of displaced people across municipalities, facilitated by the ban on internal movements imposed during the Spanish Flu outbreak and the reluctance of provincial authorities to accept additional displaced individuals. The Italian government, within a month, assigned destinations based on two criteria: proximity to the battlefield and the minimization of displaced individuals in large urban areas (Emercora 2007, 451). To address the endogeneity arising from these resettlement criteria, I interact district fixed effects, where districts are administrative areas larger than municipalities but smaller than provinces, and population-decile fixed effects to capture

the heterogeneity in the geographical resettlement and the urbanization of receiving places, respectively. To test the validity of the research design, I perform a set of empirical tests to check the self-selection of displaced people across municipalities. Finally, to improve the reliability of my estimates, I add step-by-step a large set of controls to check the robustness of my results.

Main findings show that hosting a large share of IDPs, relatively to the population size in the receiving municipalities, has a negative effect on the vote share for PPI in 1919. Estimates are quite stable in magnitude and precision across specifications. The electoral punishment towards PPI lasts also in the 1921 general elections even if the size and the precision of the estimates are lower than 1919 elections. Results hold to falsification tests and robustness checks.

Since the negative effect may stem from both anti-immigration and anti-competitive behaviors, I investigate three possible mechanisms: cultural distance (measured as geographical distance), job competition, and public service competition. Cultural distance is more likely to proxy an anti-immigration behavior as residents may fear changes in the society, while job and public service competition are more likely to proxy anti-competitive behaviors as people could lose, either in absolute or relative terms, the benefits of a lower competition.

My findings reveal that the negative impact of hosting displaced people is greater in municipalities with a lower public spending per capita. Cultural distance and job competition appear to play less significant roles in shaping voting preferences. The empirical results on job competition align with the demographic characteristics of the displaced people as children, elders, and women are less likely to participate in the labor market and affect the job competition. Additionally, the relatively short duration of the displacement may have limited any societal transformation in the receiving places.

This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, I exploit a novel temporal dimension for studying the political effects of hosting forced migrants. While the electoral impact

of passing-through asylum seekers (Dinas et al. (2019), Gessler et al. (2022), Hangartner et al. (2019) and Steynmair (2021)) and of permanent, or perceived as such, displaced people (Bratti et al. (2020), Campo et al. (2021), Gamalerio et al. (2023), Fremerey et al. (2024) and Vertier et al. (2023)) have been widely investigated (see Hangartner et al. 2021, for a survey), the effects of a temporary displacement on political outcome have received less attention. My context differs significantly from the passing-through asylum seekers (Hangartner et al. 2019), even both contexts share the short-run exposure to forced migrants, as the temporary permanence of displaced people may foster interactions between newcomers and residents in host communities lowering the losses of political support for pro-integration parties (Allport, 1954). Although I do still find negative effects on the electoral support for the PPI, results are consistent with the recent literature that suggest a null or positive effect on the vote shares of pro-integration only if the level of analysis is more granular than municipality (Achard et al. (2024); Fremerey et al. (2024)) or governments consider the characteristics of both displaced individuals and the host communities in the resettlement policy (Gamalerio et al. (2023), Vertier et al. (2023)).

Second, this study relates also to the literature on economic and non-economic motivations for demanding stricter anti-immigration policies, which I proxy with a political backlash against PPI, (see Alesina and Tabellini 2024, for a survey). Barone et al. (2016) and Halla et al. (2017) show that voting behavior depends on local dimensions like cultural diversity and competition in labor market and public services, while Mayda et al. (2022) display that immigrants' skill level has heterogeneous effects on political outcomes. Other papers, like Dustmann et al. (2019) and Mendez and Cutilla (2014), focus on peoples' attitudes towards migrants highlight that cultural distance plays a key role in the perceiving migrants as future residents. This paper shows that public spending per capita has a leading role in shaping voting preferences when the pool of displaced people is not participating in the labor market and does not lead to society's

changes.

Finally, my findings add to a recent literature on the effect of forced internal displacement on host communities from an historical perspective (see Becker (2022) and Becker et al. (2019) for a survey). Related papers look at the effect of permanent internal resettlement on voting behavior following the end of Word War II. In Germany, Chavalier et al. (2024) display a larger support for pro-redistribution parties in communities which hosted greater shares of expelled Germans in 1953 Federal elections. In the same context, Braun et al. (2020) show that a larger share of resettled individuals increases the vote share for parties that do not back up on expelled Germans' claims in 1950 Bavarian elections. Ochsner et al. (2022) show that Austrian regions with a large presence of Nazis in the aftermath of the WWII display a large support for far-right parties in both short and long-run. While all the mentioned papers look at the effect of a permanent internal resettlement, I focus on the effect of a temporary internal displacement.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Great War and the displacement

On the 23rd of May 1915, the Italian army entered in the Word Word I (WWI) attacking the Austrian-Hungarian army to seize the Italian-rooted territories. Up to October 1917, the Italian army conquered a large share of the targeted territories moving the Italian front up to the north-east of the Gorizia province. However, the advance of the Italian army stuck in the Giulian Alps due to the great number of fatalities. The temporary stop led Austrian-Hungarian army to prepare the counterattack with the help of the German army. On the 24th of October 1917, the joint attack of the two armies forced Italian army to withdraw beyond the Piave river (Battle

of Caporetto).¹

During the withdrawal of the Italian army, around 500,000 people living between the Isonzo river and Piave river fled from their hometown. Both the fear of living under Austrian occupation and the occupation of the Italian army on the western side of the Piave river pushed around 500,000 individuals to escape from their hometowns (Mondini and Frizzera 2017, 183). People left the Veneto by train and temporarily stopped at the train stations of Bologna, Florence and Milan. Immediately after their arrival in these three train stations, Italian government implemented a dispersal policy relocating forced migrants across Italian municipalities (Ceschin 2016, 36-37).

The dispersal policy followed two main criteria: distance from the evacuated areas and avoiding massive inflows of displaced individuals in urban areas (Emercora 2007, 96-97). The first criterion aimed at reallocating as soon as possible displaced individuals.² The second criterion aimed at avoiding problems of public order in urban municipalities that would have further increased the public discontent against the war (Emercora 2007, 451).³ As a result, the dispersal policy was fast and confused without considering family links or socio-demographic characteristics of displaced people. Indeed, the head of the High Commissioner of the commission of war refugees' management, Giuseppe Girardini, wrote down a report on the management of forced migrants (Girardini, 1919).⁴ In the report, the deputy describes the dispersal policy highlighting the lack of economic criteria.

“..., the distribution of displaced people in Italy happened hastily, without any logical criteria from the government. [...], family members were quite often relo-

¹Figure 1 shows the dates of the counterattack and the Italian front before and after the defeat.

²The 1918 census shows that only the 20% of displaced individuals were hosted in Southern regions.

³A large concentration of displaced people in the urban municipalities would have shown the extent of the catastrophic defeat at Caporetto leading dissatisfaction against the ruling government.

⁴In 1918, the Italian government appointed the deputy Giuseppe Girardini who replaced Luigi Luttazzi as the High Commissioner of the commission of war refugees' management.

cated in different municipalities, [...], displaced individuals coming from different municipalities and having different cultural background were mixed together multiplying the assistance problems; [...], for instance, fishermen from Grado were resettled in Potenza (inland), while the mountaineers from Carnia were resettled on the Ligurian Riviera (seaside), leading difficulties to the labor market integration of displaced people in the host municipalities.” Giardini(1919, p. 10-11)

The High Commissioner was committed to resettling forced migrants to reunite families and improve their labor market integration. However, the Spanish flu outbreak led the government to restrict internal movements, halting the resettlement plan. Since the pandemic did not stop to circulate in Italy until the end of the conflict, the deputy Giardini could not fulfill his resettlement plan.

“ The General Direction of Public Health invited to suspend the resettlement plan because of hard flu epidemic arisen. The epidemic was still aggressive at the end of the World War I leading to substitute the resettlement plan with the writing of the return-to-home plan.” Giardini(1919, p. 11)

At the end of the WWI, almost all the displaced people returned to their homes before the 1919 general elections.

2.2 The reception and the Catholic Church

Immediately after the arrival of displaced individuals, local parishes organized collections of donations to help forced migrants in the host municipalities.⁵ To manage the redistribution of

⁵The large diffusion of catholic associations across Italy helped to reach all the displaced people in the receiving communities, while socialist organizations, as *Società Umanitaria*, organized donations at local level but they could not cover the same area of catholic organizations.

donations, local authorities and catholic communities established committees.⁶ The decree of the January 10 1918 established that local committees, *Comitati* and *Patronati*, paid in advance a subsidy and, following the payment, local offices of the Ministry of Interior, *Prefettura*, refund *Comitati* and *Patronati*⁷. However, *Comitati* and *Patronati* often needed the help of local authorities to pay subsidies since the refund from *Prefettura* was slow⁸.

The financial assistance provided by the government to displaced people triggered public discontent among inhabitants in the host municipalities in 1918 when the vexations of the war reached their peak. Forced migrants became the scapegoats of the food rationing scheme imposed by the government (Emercora 2017, 100). Furthermore, locals started to blame displaced individuals for stealing food and for soaring prices (Ceschin 2006, p. 190). As consequence, large groups of displaced people had been living segregated from the inhabitants of the host municipalities (Ceschin 2006, p. 200).

Only Catholic organizations and the representatives of Catholic Church, parishioners and bishops, kept on providing moral and financial assistance to forced migrants in the host communities for the whole displacement period (Ceschin 2006, p. 75-77). While the humanitarian help of the Catholics was intended as a duty of good worshipers, Catholic associations aimed at showing governing skills for gathering public approval at the next elections (Ceschin 2006, p. 75). Indeed, at the end of the WWI, the Catholic Church repealed the *Non Expedit* policy, which forbade Catholics to run for elections, and funded the first mass catholic political party,

⁶Figure A1 in Appendix A shows a sheet that includes information on the date of the establishment of the Catholic Committee, its offices and duties and some warnings regarding the functions not under its competence.

⁷However, government left a discretionary power to the local office on who should receive the subsidy and on the amount of the subsidy.

⁸The following documents report evidences on the expenses bore by some municipalities: Turin: *La Stampa*, December 27 1917, http://www.archiviolaStampa.it/component/option,com_lastampa/task,search/mod,libera/action,viewer/Itemid,3/page,2/articleid,0025_01_1917_0358_0002_24237667/; Piacenza: Antonini C., *Appunti per una storia di Piacenza nella Grande Guerra*, 2016, https://www.istitutostoricopiacenza.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2009_5_antonini.pdf; Foligno: Comitato di soccorso per i profughi di guerra <Foligno>, *Relazione / Patronato di Foligno per i profughi di guerra*, 1920, http://www.14-18.it/opuscolo/BNCF_CFI0823798/001?search=37a6259cc0c1dae299a7866489dff0bd&searchPos=1.

the *Italian Popular Party* (PPI), on January 18 1919. However, since the presence of displaced people was perceived as an economic burden among host communities' inhabitants over the last year of the war, voters of the most exposed municipalities to the forced migration may have decided not to support Catholics in the next elections.⁹. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, historical documents showing public discontent against Catholic Church in the destination municipalities are not available. To overcome this problem, I evaluate empirically the relationship between the share of hosted displaced people and the vote share for the Catholic party.

3 Empirical Strategy

The main specification is:

$$y_{m(dp)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DP_m + \gamma_{dp} + X'_m \phi + \varepsilon_m \quad (1)$$

where $y_{m(dp)}$ denote the share of votes for a political party in the municipality m within a district d and the population decile p . DP_m is the share of displaced people relative to 1911 population size in the municipality m . Finally, γ_{dp} and X'_m are district-population fixed effects and a set of municipal-level controls, respectively. Since the resettlement policy follows the criterion of the closest less-populated municipalities, the inclusion of the population-district fixed effects is key to adjust for the selection criteria of the resettlement policy and, thus, to estimate the causal effect of hosting displaced people on the vote shares¹⁰. I do not include the distance from the battlefield to the hosting municipalities since districts are small enough to

⁹The PPI was the most voted party in Veneto collecting around 35% and around 40% votes at 1919 general elections and at 1920 municipal elections, respectively (COMPENDIO DELLE STATISTICHE ELETTORALI ITALIANE dal 1848 al 1934)

¹⁰To compute the population-district cells, I interact population deciles dummies and district dummies.

fully capture the variation in the distance. Finally, I include a set of covariates to control for omitted variable bias.

The estimated coefficient is the continuous average treatment effect (CATE) of hosting displaced people on voting preferences. To estimate the CATE parameter, the following assumption must hold: no selection into treatment, quasi-random reallocation of force migrants across municipalities. Selection into the treatment would have occurred if the government resettled displaced individuals according to their labor market skills and/or according to the labor demand at municipal level. Historical documents, mentioned above, show that displaced individuals were resettled across municipalities without considering individual skills and the opportunity to integrate forced migrants in the local labor market. Therefore, once controlled for the two criteria, the residual variability in the main regressor, the share of displaced individuals, should not largely depend on omitted variables bias. To further improve the reliability of the empirical design, I will provide some empirical exercises to test the exogeneity of the regressor after adjusting for district-population fixed effects.

4 Data and Identification Tests

4.1 Data

I compile a new dataset by merging existing datasets with new digitized historical archives. First I use the 1918 census data to collect the number of displaced people hosted in each municipality. The dataset is available from the digital library of University of Padua. The dataset includes the following variable: i) the number of families hosted in each Italian municipality; ii) the number of repatriates from countries involved in the war before Italy joined the Great War; iii) the number of displaced people following the defeat of the battle of Caporetto; iv) the number of

defectors from Austrian-Hungarian empire, (*irredenti*). I will use the third category to perform the analysis. Unfortunately, the 1918 census of displaced people has information at moment of the data collection since the government does not collect all the movements of displaced people across municipalities during the displacement period. However, the break of the Spanish-flu and the unwillingness of provincial government officials to accept new forced migrants prevented people to move out from the assigned municipality. Therefore, the 1918 census is very likely to be representative of the number of displaced individuals hosted in each municipality.

Second I use the Acemoglu et al. (2022) data on the political outcomes in 1913, 1919, 1921 and 1924 and municipal level variables. The dataset includes the vote shares of the main parties for the elections in 1919, 1921 and 1923 for more than 5,000 municipalities out of around 8,000. Furthermore, I use municipal data on geographical characteristics, 1911 population, 1911 industrial firms and workers, 1913 vote shares of the socialist party, 1911 literacy rate as controls and for heterogeneity analyses.

Third, I collect the 1918 census of auxiliary establishments at municipal level from (Ricci and Scardaccione, 1991) to test the correlation between the share of displaced individuals and the number of auxiliary establishments. During the Great War, the Italian government signed several deals with more than 500 Italian private companies in the several industries, defined as auxiliary establishments, to provide a continuous supply of materiel, military equipment and food to the army. I use these data to check whether the distribution of displaced individuals is skewed towards municipalities with a large number of auxiliary establishments.

Fourth, I collect microdata on forced migrants hosted in the province of Naples from the State Archive of Naples to check whether the individual characteristics match with historical narratives. The State Archive of Naples has published on its website the microdata of more than 7,000 displaced individuals in Naples. The dataset includes name, surname, age, and mu-

nicipality of origin for more than 4,000 individuals. Unfortunately, only the State Archive of Naples has published microdata. However, given that Naples was one of the most important province to host displaced people, the descriptive statistics coming up from the data should be consistent with the descriptive statistics of the overall population of forced migrants.¹¹

Fifth, I collect the information on the 1912 municipal spending for each municipality. The data on 1912 municipal spending are published in volume *Bilanci Comunali per l'anno 1912* digitized by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Since voting behavior may depend on the increase in the competition for public services, the municipal spending per capita is a good proxy for studying the heterogeneity of voting behavior across different degrees of competition.¹²

Finally, I collect the total number of parishes and priests at municipal level from the 1884 Census of the Italian Ecclesiastic Statistics (Bertolotti 1885) to test whether greater shares of displaced individuals have been hosted in municipalities with greater share of priests relative to the 1881 municipality's total population. The census includes information on the municipality and the number of churches and priests affiliated with each parish for all the Italian parishes¹³. I use the number of priests, instead of the number of churches, to proxy the influence of the Catholic Church at municipal level since the parish census displays a large number of empty parishes.

¹¹Following the internal displacement, Naples hosted more than 70,000 temporary displaced individuals who were later resettled in the southern regions. The province of Naples hosted more than 20,000 individuals for the whole displacement period.

¹²In 1912, municipalities cannot borrow money without the authorization of the provincial offices of the Ministry of Interior, Prefettura, because of the balanced budget amendment.

¹³The definitions of church and parish are the following: a church is the place of worship within a parish community; parish is the principal church in a parish community. A parish community is an administrative unit.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Evidence for Identification Assumption

The final sample includes more than 4,000 municipalities. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the outcome variables, the main regressor and the covariates in the Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. Panel A shows the vote share for each party in each election year¹⁴. Panel B shows the summary statistics for the share of displaced people in October 1918. The share of displaced individuals is the ratio of October 1918 refugees to the 1911 population in each municipality. Municipalities host 8 forced migrants per 1 000 inhabitants on average. Panel C shows the summary statistics of the covariates at municipal level.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the share of displaced individuals at district level with and without controlling for district fixed effects. The Panel (a) of the Figure 2 displays the first criterion of the dispersal policy, the distance from the battlefield. To check whether the inclusion of district fixed effects as control leads to random dispersion of the share of displaced individuals across Italian districts, I predict the residuals from a regression between the share and district fixed effects and plot the residuals within districts. The Panel (b) of the Figure 2 displays adjusted shares across districts showing that inclusion of district fixed effects captures the first criterion of the dispersal policy leading to a quasi-random geographical distribution of refugees across the country.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of the share of displaced people by population deciles. The second criterion of the resettlement policy is the population since the government tried to avoid the mass resettlement of individuals in the urban areas. Panel (a) show the distribution of the share by population decile without adjusting for district and population-decile fixed effects. Panel (b) shows the distribution of share by population deciles adjusted for district fixed effects

¹⁴Social party and Popular party were the two mass parties in 1919 and 1921, while Traditionalist includes all the traditional political parties (for instance Nationalist, Liberal, Liberal Democrat, and Agrarian Parties). The Fascist party run the 1921 elections with Traditionalist parties, while fascists run alone in 1924. I refer to Acemoglu et al. (2022) for a detailed explanation on the 1919, 1921 and 1924 elections.

. The inclusion of district fixed effects is unable to capture the population criterion. Panel (c) shows that the share of displaced people is randomly distributed around zero following including population decile fixed effects.

To test the exogeneity of the share at local characteristics, I follow two-stage procedure. First, I predict the vote share of the Popular Party in 1919 using the municipal covariates to obtain the joint distribution of the outcome given a set of controls. Then, I regress the predicted values on the share of displaced people to test whether the main regressor predicts the joint distribution of covariates. Table 2 shows that the share of forced migrants has a strong correlation with the demographic characteristics in Column (1). However, Columns (2)-(3)-(4)-(5) show that the correlation fades away when I add other covariates to predict the 1919 Popular Party's vote share. Even if the correlation is not meaningful, the negative sign of the estimates may hide a negative selection in the host municipality. In other words, Popular party does not collect many votes where refugees have been resettled. To test whether this is the case, in the main analysis I add step-by-step controls to the main specification and perform a test to measure how large must be the bias to confound estimates.

Another concern is the potential decision of the government to increase the production of military equipment by resettling displaced individuals in municipalities with a large defense industry. During wartime, the massive production of military equipment may increase the labor demand in the defense industry leading some places to be short in the labor supply. As a consequence, the government may decide to resettle forced migrants to fill the excess demand of labor in such municipalities. Since the suppliers of military equipment, which belong to the manufacturing sector, tend to be larger and more likely to be unionized, the higher concentration of displaced people may show a spurious negative relationship with the vote share for the Popular Party (and positive with the Socialist Party). To test whether the resettlement policy

was driven by economic reasons, I compute the mean of the municipal share by the number of auxiliary firms to see whether the distribution is skewed towards municipalities with a greater defense industry.¹⁵ Figure 4 shows that the distribution is not skewed towards places with a greater defense industry confirming the low correlation between governmental economic interests and the dispersal policy.

To verify the demographic composition of displaced individuals, I use microdata on people hosted in the province of Naples to study their demographic characteristics. Using the information on the municipality of origin, I select more than 4,000 forced migrants. Around 56% of them are females confirming the gender composition described in the historical documents. Table 3 shows the share of females and males in six age classes¹⁶. Women dominate the age classes between 19 and 38 years old, while men are mainly distributed in the extreme age classes. The age distribution confirms the fact that displaced individuals were mainly women followed by children and old people.

Finally, I test whether municipalities with a greater influence of Catholic Church experience a higher probability of hosting a larger share of forced migrants. I test this relationship by using the following Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood model (PQML):

$$DP_m = \exp[\omega_0 + \omega_1 CathInfl_m + X'_m \Phi + \varepsilon_m] \quad (2)$$

where DP_m is the share of displaced people in the municipality m , $CathInfl_m$ is the share of priests in the municipality m .¹⁷ Table 4 shows a positive relationship between the share of forced migrants and the catholic influence with and without including demographic and

¹⁵The definition of defense industry includes all the firms which signed a contract with the government to produce goods (for instance food, garments, weapons) for the Italian army

¹⁶Unfortunately, many folders do not include the age of birth leading to a drastic drop in the number of observations. The total sample including the age information is 1,243.

¹⁷Since the share of displaced individuals has a large fraction of zeros (44%), the PQML has the advantage to provide unbiased estimates of the coefficients (Santos Silva and Tenreiro, 2006).

geographic covariates. This evidence suggests that a greater influence of Catholic Church at municipal level, measured as the share of priests, leads to a higher likelihood of hosting a greater share of displaced people.

5 Results and Robustness Checks

5.1 Main Results

Table 5 shows the effect of hosting a greater share of displaced people, relative to the municipal population size, on the vote share for Popular Party in 1919 including step-by-step further controls. Column (1) shows that hosting displaced people has a negative significant effect on the vote share for the Popular Party in 1919 including only district-population fixed effects. The magnitude of the estimates lowers when I include further controls even if estimates are significantly different from zero and precisely estimated. In particular, demographics, labor demand and 1913 socialist vote share controls are important to narrow the estimation bias. Column (6) shows the result for the main specification highlighting the negative selection in the baseline specification in Column (1). However, point estimates do not vary a lot across specifications. To test whether the selection on unobservables does not invalidate my estimates, I run δ test (Oster 2016) on the coefficient in the column (6) of Table 5. Figure 5 shows the values of Oster δ over several values of R^2 starting from the optimal value, $1.3R^2_{med}$, to the maximal value, 1. All the δ s are above the cut-off, $\delta=1$. Therefore, we can claim that the unobservable component of the regression should be almost twice of the observable component to lead the coefficient towards zero.

To test the reliability of the causal effect of the share on the vote share for the Popular Party, I use the same specification substituting the vote share for the Popular Party with the vote share

for other parties. If the share affects only the vote share for the Catholic party, I should not observe a significant effect on the vote share for other parties. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C of Table 6 show the effect of the hosting a greater share of forced migrants on the vote share for Socialist Party, Fascist Party, and traditional parties, respectively. Panel A estimates confirm a omitted variable bias since the share of displaced people has a positive correlation with the vote share for the Socialist Party without including controls. Following the inclusion of the full set of controls, estimate goes towards zero. Panel B shows the null effect of the treatment on the vote share for the Fascist Party. Finally, Panel C show a low significant positive effect of hosting greater shares on the vote share for the traditional parties in Column (6). However, the positive effect may stem from the high substitution between the Popular Party and the traditional not-mass parties which are a huge collection of parties. Since the sum of the shares must be equal to one, the result displayed in the Column (6) of Panel 3 mirrors the loss of votes for the Popular Party even if there is no a specific party which gains votes following the internal displacement.

5.2 Placebo Test

To test whether hosting a greater share of displace individuals does not capture general vote preferences in the hosting municipalities, I perform two placebo tests using two other indicators as main regressor: *irredenti* and repatriated Italians. *irredenti* are defectors of the Austro-Hungarian empire living in Italian-rooted territories and wished to be Italians. Repatriated Italians are natives who had been living abroad for at least four years. The 1918 Census of forced migrants provides data on the number of *irredenti* and repatriated individuals hosted in each municipality. The pool of both *irredenti* and repatriated is very tiny and many of them decided to live in urban areas to find good job opportunities. Therefore, the arrival of these two groups in the host municipality should not have any meaningful impact on the vote for the Popular

Party.

Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the placebo tests using *irredenti* and repatriated Italians as treatment, respectively. Estimates are not different from zero even if they display a negative sign that highlights the negative selection already shown in Table 6. However, large standard errors show the lack of a significant relationship between the fake treatments and the vote share for the Popular Party in 1919.

5.3 Robustness Checks

The choice of using population deciles and provincial clustered standard errors may affect the magnitude and the statistical significance of the results. To exclude the two concerns, I run a two separated models where I use population quintiles and standard errors clustered at district level.

Panel A of Table 8 shows the effect of hosting a greater share of displaced individuals on the vote share for Popular Party in 1919 when population quintiles are used to compute district-population fixed effects. Looking only at Column (6), the effect is quite similar to Column (6) in Table 4 showing the lack of difference between using population deciles and population quintiles to compute district-population fixed effects. Panel B of Table 8 shows the standard errors using district clustered standard errors. Standard errors are little bit larger than the main specification that uses province clustered standard errors. However, the statistical significance of the results do not change.

5.4 1921 and 1924 Elections

Next, I explore whether the lower electoral support for the Popular Party in the most exposed communities lasts also in the 1921 and 1924 general elections. The short stay of displaced

people in the host municipalities allows to study whether the public discontent against the Popular Party persists years after the return of displaced people to their hometowns.¹⁸

The Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 show the impact of hosting greater shares of displaced individuals on the Popular Party's vote share in 1921 and 1924 general elections, respectively. Panel A shows that the effect is negative also in 1921, even if smaller and noisier than the effect estimated in 1919, while Panel 2 shows no effect in 1924, almost 5 years following the internal displacement.¹⁹ To provide some insights on the motivations behind the decline in the electoral support for the PPI, the next section tests the heterogeneity of the voting behavior across potential channels.

6 Mechanisms and Discussion

This section provides a discussion on the heterogeneity of the political backlash against the PPI across three dimensions: cultural distance, job competition, competition for public services. Cultural distance should proxy the fear of inhabitants to experience societal changes following the arrival of displaced individuals with a very different cultural background in their communities. Job and public service competition should proxy the economic concerns of inhabitants since greater share of displaced individuals may have negative effects on labor market outcomes and/or per-capita public service provision.

¹⁸Municipalities have hosted displaced people only for less than a couple of years from November 1917 to January-May 1919. The vast majority of forced migrants came back to their origin municipalities before 1919 elections. However, Ceschin (2016) documents that there was a tiny share of displaced individuals who left hosting municipalities at the beginning of 1920.

¹⁹Results in 1921 are much more reliable than the results in 1924 since the violence of the Fascist party affected the 1924 elections.

6.1 Cultural Distance

To check whether the political backlash varies with cultural differences, I split the sample in border regions, Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy, and non-border regions. Emilia Romagna and Lombardy do not share only the border with Veneto but historically they have been culturally close to each other. In particular, Lombardy and Veneto have been part of the Austrian Empire until 1859.

Panel A and Panel B in Table 10 show the effect of hosting a greater share of displaced individuals on the Popular party in 1919 for the border and non-border regions, respectively. The magnitude of the effect is larger in Panel A even if estimates are noisier. The greater effect for border regions than non-border regions shows that cultural distance does not play a key role in voting preferences since, if any, the magnitude of the estimates should be bigger in regions with a wider cultural distance. Unfortunately, I cannot establish whether anti-immigration behavior, lower support for PPI due to cultural distance, is the same for both border and not-border regions since I do not have data on the attitudes of people towards displaced individuals. However, estimates show that cultural distance does not lead voters to further decrease their electoral support for the Catholic party.

6.2 Job Competition

Inhabitants of host municipalities may lower their electoral support for the PPI if the increase in the job competition due to supply of labor from displaced individuals led to a decrease in wages and employment. Unfortunately, I cannot test directly job competition since data on municipal labor market outcomes (yearly wages and unemployment) and on skill level of displaced people do not exist. To proxy different degrees of competition at local level, I use population density - as a measure of labor supply - and the concentration of manufacturing

firms relative to the male population size - as a measure of labor demand - to compare the magnitudes of the estimates in more and less competitive markets. Greater population density proxies greater labor supply, while a higher concentration of industrial firms proxies a greater number of job vacancies during WWI.

Panel A and Panel B in Table 11 show the effect of hosting displaced people on the 1919 vote share for the Popular party above and below the median of 1911 population density, respectively. Estimates are quite similar in two groups showing lack of a greater electoral punishment in municipalities with a greater labor supply.

Panel A and Panel B in Table 12 show the effect of hosting a greater share of forced migrants on the vote share for Popular party in 1919 above and below median of 1911 industrial firms, respectively. Point estimates in Panel A are a larger than in Panel B by less than .16. This results may indicate that an increase in the job competition for the best paid jobs leads to an electoral punishment for the Popular party. However, estimates are not meaningful different since the confidence intervals of the two coefficients overlap and the Chow test does not reject the null hypothesis of indifference between means at 5% (p-value =0.43). Therefore, job competition using industrial firms as a proxy for the labor demand seems not to play a role in changing voting preferences.

6.3 Public Spending

Finally, I discuss the last measure of potential heterogeneity: public spending per capita. The food rationing scheme and the provision of subsidies to forced migrants may trigger public discontent in host municipalities since the presence of displaced individuals may have lowered the food ration per capita and subsidies often have been paid using the municipal budget. Since Catholic associations had a leading role in helping forced migrants during the displacement

period, inhabitants of most exposed municipalities may have decided not to support the PPI to express their dissatisfaction for the increase in public service competition.

Panel A and B in Table 13 show estimates for municipalities below and above the median of the 1912 public spending per capita. Coefficients are greater and more precise for municipalities below the median of the 1912 public spending per capita. These findings display that the public spending competition has a prominent role in shaping the voting preferences in 1919 general elections. In particular, the attitude of the Catholics to promote the redistribution towards the poorest part of the population, displaced individuals in our case, may have feared inhabitants leading voters of the most exposed municipalities with a low level of public spending per capita not to support the PPI. My findings are similar to Rozo and Vargas (2021) who show an increase in the vote share for right-wing parties and a greater redistribution from natives to refugees in the receiving communities that host a greater share of refugees relative to the population size.

7 Conclusions

This paper investigates the political effects of hosting temporary internal displaced people exploiting the different degrees of exposure to forced migrants across host municipalities in Italy during World War I. Findings show that inhabitants of most exposed communities vote less for the Italian Popular Party, the Catholic party, in 1919 and 1921 general elections. Since articles studying the internal displacement report the prominent role of the Catholic associations in helping forced migrants in the receiving communities, estimates are very likely to proxy a political backlash against the pro-integration behavior of the Catholics.

Results highlight that even if the characteristics of this displacement event - the short duration of stay in the receiving communities and the within-nation resettlement - differ from those of the recent European refugee crisis - long duration of stay and between-nation resettlement -

the political response is similar. Inhabitants of receiving communities that host a large share of displaced people relative to their population size vote less for pro-integration parties.

In the context studied, voting behavior depends on distributional effects of hosting forced migrants, probably depending on the hardship witnessed by voters during the WWI. However, potential mechanisms may affect differently voting behavior depending on the type of displacement and the status of the economy. Indeed, many other dimensions may influence the voting behavior as the skill level of displaced individuals, the economic cycle, or the openness of hosting communities. Therefore, future research should focus more on different types of displacement events to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the political effects common to all displacement events and of those specific of the context. A deeper knowledge of voting behaviors in the receiving communities could help to prevent anti-immigration voting and implement context-based resettlement policies.

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
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
8 Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Battle of Caporetto




Notes: The Figure 1 shows the chronology of the Battle of Caporetto and the Italian front before and after the defeat.

Figure 2: Distribution of the Shares of Displaced People at District Level with and without controlling for District Fixed Effects




Notes: Figure 2 shows the actual and the adjusted shares of displaced individuals in subfigure (a) and (b), respectively. Adjusted shares of displaced people are the residuals from the regression between the share of displaced individuals and the district fixed effects.

Figure 3: Share of Displaced People by Population Deciles




Notes: Figure 3 shows the distribution of the actual and adjusted shares of displaced people by population deciles. Panel (a), Panel (b), Panel (c) shows the share of displaced people by population deciles without adjusting for district fixed effects and population deciles fixed effects, by adjusting for district fixed effects and without adjusting for population decile fixed effects and adjusting for both district and population deciles fixed effects, respectively.

Figure 4: Average Share of Displaced People by Number of Auxiliary Firms



Notes: Figure 4 shows the mean of the shares of displaced individuals by municipal number of auxiliary firms.

Figure 5: Oster δ values over the interval $[1.3R_{med}^2, 1]$



Notes: Figure 5 shows the values of the Oster δ over the interval from Oster's rule of thumb, $1.3 * R_{med}^2$, to the maximum $R^2, 1$. The underlying hypothesis is that β in the column (6) of Table 5 is equal to zero.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Panel A: Outcomes</i>				
Popular Party 1919	.268	.228	0	1
Popular Party 1921	.287	.223	0	1
Popular Party 1924	.132	.149	0	1
<i>Panel B: Further Outcomes</i>				
Fascist 1919	.005	.036	0	.656
Socialist Party 1919	.335	.272	0	1
Traditionalist 1919	.334	.272	0	1
<i>Panel C: Treatment</i>				
Share of Displaced People	.008	.021	0	.615
<i>Panel D: Controls</i>				
Altitude	865.925	858.830	1	4810
Altitude of the major centre	328.398	274.860	1	1816
Auxiliary Firms	.240	3.276	0	161
Log Area	7.369	1.185	2.303	12.243
Literacy rate	.760	.204	.101	1
Log Pop 1911	7.558	1.114	3.97	13.427
Presence of Army suppliers	.0837	.277	0	1
Public Spending per Cap	23.906	24.447	.803	412.885
Share of Industrial Firms	.013	.011	0	.138
Share of Industrial Workers	.126	.236	0	6.028
Share Pop below 6	.154	.030	.0537	.864
Socialist Party 1913	.171	.232	0	1
N	4,517	4,517	4,517	4,517

Table 2: Exogeneity Test

	Fitted 1919 Popular Party Vote Share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DP	-0.120*** (0.038)	0.021 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.036 (0.044)	-0.083 (0.068)
Demographic predictors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic predictors		✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban predictors			✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand predictors				✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913 predictor					✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: The Table 2 shows whether a set of covariates helps to predict both the vote share of the Popular Party in 1919 and the share of displaced people. The outcome variables is the predicted vote share for the PPI. The regressor is the share of displaced individuals. Column (1) includes demographic predictors (quartic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (2) additionally includes geographic predictors (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds urban predictors (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (4) adds labor demand predictors (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (5) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as predictor. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Gender Distribution of Displaced Individuals by Age Classes

	Females	Males
<i>Age Class:</i>		
Less than 16	53	47
Between 16 and 18	48	52
Between 19 and 28	80	20
Between 29 and 38	72	28
Between 39 and 48	49	51
More than 48	47	53
Total	59	41

Notes: The total sample includes 1,243 observations.

Table 4: Relationship between Catholic Influence and Share of Displaced People at Municipal Level

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CathInfl	43.975** (17.104)	43.840** (17.076)	48.297*** (18.673)
Demographic controls		✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓
N	3613	3613	3613

Notes: The outcome variable is the share of displaced people. The main regressor, *CathInfl*, is the share of priests relative to the municipal population size in 1881. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes population in 1881 as control. Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Regressions are estimated using Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood models. Standard errors are clustered at *circondario* level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919

Dependent variable: 1919 Vote Share for the PPI						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DP	-0.463*** (0.086)	-0.421*** (0.083)	-0.413*** (0.082)	-0.389*** (0.078)	-0.365*** (0.085)	-0.318*** (0.076)
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517
Adjusted R-squared	0.552	0.555	0.560	0.563	0.565	0.579

Notes: The dependent variable is the vote share for PPI at municipal level in 1919 general elections. The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Other Running Parties in 1919

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Socialist Party						
DP	0.370** (0.170)	0.351** (0.164)	0.190 (0.146)	0.168 (0.145)	0.155 (0.146)	0.055 (0.119)
Adjusted R-squared	0.651	0.652	0.666	0.666	0.667	0.709
Panel B: Fascist Party						
DP	0.000 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)
Adjusted R-squared	0.312	0.313	0.314	0.315	0.315	0.316
Panel C: Traditionalist Parties						
DP	0.032 (0.109)	0.022 (0.114)	0.191* (0.100)	0.193** (0.096)	0.185* (0.097)	0.225** (0.092)
Adjusted R-squared	0.649	0.651	0.674	0.674	0.675	0.682
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displace individuals at municipal level. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 7: Falsification Test on the Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: <i>Irredenti</i>						
Irr/Pop	-0.311 (0.210)	-0.247 (0.205)	-0.231 (0.193)	-0.180 (0.187)	-0.129 (0.170)	-0.128 (0.174)
Panel B: Repatriated Italians						
Rep/Pop	-0.166 (0.345)	-0.224 (0.345)	-0.163 (0.361)	-0.045 (0.356)	-0.063 (0.352)	-0.065 (0.373)
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: The independent variables are the share of *Irredenti* and the share of repatriated individuals at municipal level in Panel A and B, respectively. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 8: Robustness Checks

Dependent variable: 1919 Vote Share for the PPI						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Population Quintiles						
DP	-0.492*** (0.079)	-0.434*** (0.069)	-0.439*** (0.069)	-0.410*** (0.069)	-0.390*** (0.070)	-0.350*** (0.061)
N	4647	4647	4647	4647	4647	4647
Panel B: District Cluster Standard Errors						
DP	-0.463*** (0.104)	-0.421*** (0.097)	-0.413*** (0.102)	-0.389*** (0.099)	-0.365*** (0.102)	-0.318*** (0.095)
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. Panel 1 use population quintiles to compute district-population fixed effects, while Panel 2 use population deciles. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level in Panel 1. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 9: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1921 and 1924

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Vote Share for Popular Party in 1921						
DP	-0.434** (0.164)	-0.392** (0.157)	-0.375** (0.154)	-0.356** (0.159)	-0.337** (0.152)	-0.277** (0.126)
<i>N</i>	4082	4082	4082	4082	4082	4082
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.510	0.513	0.518	0.520	0.521	0.541
Panel B: Vote Share for Popular Party in 1924						
DP	-0.146* (0.082)	-0.122 (0.079)	-0.134 (0.083)	-0.126 (0.084)	-0.114 (0.079)	-0.096 (0.072)
<i>N</i>	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517
Adjusted R-squared	0.461	0.465	0.470	0.472	0.473	0.478
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 10: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 by Geographical Distance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna						
DP	-0.574*** (0.084)	-0.504*** (0.082)	-0.504*** (0.082)	-0.462*** (0.073)	-0.478*** (0.068)	-0.392*** (0.082)
N	2101	2101	2101	2101	2101	2101
Adjusted R-squared	0.522	0.526	0.531	0.538	0.542	0.568
Panel B: No-Border Regions						
DP	-0.335** (0.122)	-0.307** (0.115)	-0.280** (0.110)	-0.250** (0.105)	-0.215** (0.103)	-0.200** (0.095)
N	2416	2416	2416	2416	2416	2416
Adjusted R-squared	0.385	0.387	0.400	0.403	0.403	0.408
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 11: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 Below and Above the Median of 1911 Population Density

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Below Median of Population Density						
DP	-0.487*** (0.147)	-0.466*** (0.153)	-0.470*** (0.162)	-0.433** (0.164)	-0.437** (0.173)	-0.415** (0.189)
N	2135	2135	2135	2135	2135	2135
Adjusted R-squared	0.513	0.513	0.521	0.522	0.523	0.528
Panel B: Above Median of Population Density						
DP	-0.387*** (0.095)	-0.309*** (0.091)	-0.305*** (0.092)	-0.294*** (0.088)	-0.269*** (0.098)	-0.242*** (0.079)
N	2163	2163	2163	2163	2163	2163
Adjusted R-squared	0.593	0.601	0.603	0.607	0.612	0.628
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 12: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 Below and Above the Median of 1911 Industrial Firms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Below Median of Industrial Firms						
DP	-0.565*** (0.162)	-0.557*** (0.156)	-0.600*** (0.175)	-0.565*** (0.186)	-0.546*** (0.172)	-0.507*** (0.159)
N	2096	2096	2096	2096	2096	2096
Adjusted R-squared	0.578	0.578	0.582	0.583	0.584	0.591
Panel B: Above Median of Industrial Firms						
DP	-0.527*** (0.159)	-0.429*** (0.132)	-0.429*** (0.115)	-0.399*** (0.109)	-0.385*** (0.119)	-0.341*** (0.106)
N	2105	2105	2105	2105	2105	2105
Adjusted R-squared	0.530	0.538	0.542	0.545	0.548	0.571
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

Table 13: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 Below and Above the Median of 1912 Public Spending Per Capita


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Below Median of 1912 Public Spending Per Capita						
DP	-0.503*** (0.070)	-0.489*** (0.074)	-0.488*** (0.071)	-0.402*** (0.066)	-0.418*** (0.070)	-0.392*** (0.090)
N	2149	2149	2149	2149	2149	2149
Adjusted R-squared	0.591	0.592	0.597	0.604	0.607	0.623
Panel B: Above Median of 1912 Public Spending Per Capita						
DP	-0.311** (0.139)	-0.239** (0.118)	-0.221* (0.115)	-0.208* (0.121)	-0.182 (0.123)	-0.156 (0.110)
N	2086	2086	2086	2086	2086	2086
Adjusted R-squared	0.513	0.515	0.522	0.522	0.522	0.531
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: The independent variable is the share of displaced individuals at municipal level. All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ *

A Appendix

A.1 Informative paper on the Catholic Committee

Figure A1: Informative paper on the Catholic Committee for the Assistance and the Help of Displaced People from Invaded Area



Source: https://www.14-18.it/foglio/RML0341365_01?search=37a6259cc0c1dae299a7866489dff0bd&searchPos=1.