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State survival bureaucracy (SSB): state sustainability after Arab revolutions

State survival
bureaucracy

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Abstract

Purpose – Non-politicized bureaucracy plays a fundamental role in the survival of states during times of transition and drastic change. Moreover, non-politicized bureaucracy protects state institutions from failing. In fact, state survival bureaucracy (SSB), as an alternative to Deep State, obtains all mechanisms for the sustainability of the state, both its entity and identity. In case of resistance to the elected officials and executives' abrupt decisions, professionals and experts came up with Deep State to reflect the elements of rejection.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses both system and function approaches in analyzing the role of bureaucracy in states going through transition. It also draws comparisons from the harsh experiences in the Arab region after Arab revolutions where most of the states collapsed while Tunisia and Egypt survived. The authors will use the available literature in reviewing different arguments regarding the role of bureaucracy in addition to the own observations as scholars who were engaged in the political process in Egypt for sometimes and during the drastic changes since January 25, 2011 and the knowledge about political process in Tunisia and other Arab states.

Findings – In the study of the collapse of a number of Arab states and the survival of Tunisia and Egypt, it was found out that it is SSB which holds state together in cases of drastic changes or tangible threats. SSB includes bureaucrats and policy implementing agencies that are committed to both entity and identity of the state. The role of SSB emerges clearly in a state of utmost survival crisis of the state. SSB does inherently obtain self-correcting mechanisms that help states face, experience drastic change and cope with it.

Originality/value – Non-politicized bureaucracy plays a fundamental role in the survival of states during times of transition and drastic change. Moreover, non-politicized bureaucracy protects state institutions from failing. In fact, SSB as an alternative to Deep State, as defined in this paper, obtains all mechanisms for the sustainability of the state, both its entity and identity. The analysis will show how SSB is a constructive mechanism for the survival of the state when its entity and identity as well as well-established national interests are under tangible threats.

Keywords Bureaucracy, Deep state, Non-politicized bureaucracy, Politicized bureaucracy, State survival bureaucracy, State sustainability

Paper type Research paper

Introduction

Arab revolutions, starting with Tunisia in December 2010, took the world by surprise and almost a shock after years of despotic regimes and deep conviction that Arab



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masses are incapable of comprehending or motivating change. Upper-middle class young Arabs went in millions into the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Arab States, accordingly, were exposed to drastic changes caused by the imbalance which took place among competing political forces. In fact, such changes presented a serious challenge to both the entity and the identity of the state to the extent that in some cases there was almost disarray. Some of the states, on top of which are Tunisia and Egypt, were able to survive, while others, such as Libya, Yemen and Syria, almost failed to cope with these dramatic changes. The discrepancy between those who survived and the ones which failed motivated scholars, analysts, observers and even critics to try to find out what went wrong in the failed states and what held Egypt and Tunisia and moved both forward as entities and warranted identities.

In the studies of political systems, modernization scholars (Parsons, 1964) advocate that political systems could go through change, however not drastic, and are able to adapt to it by both institutionalization and functioning bureaucracy. They emphasize the inevitable role played by institutions such as executive, legislature and judiciary to the degree that they coin modernization with building institutions. At the same time, they reiterate that public administration, in its core is the bureaucracy, plays essential role in providing basic public services and sustaining legitimacy. In this regard, political scientists and public administration specialists, especially in the USA, in studying the inability of the state to cope with change and the complaint of elected officials that some organs of the state hinder the implementation of their responsibilities, came up with major debate on three main issues: first, the nature of the relationship between politics and bureaucracy, second, the functions of bureaucracy in the case of states in transition, and third, deep state as an obstacle in implementing elected personnel agendas.

This paper acknowledges that lots of research and progress in public administration and bureaucracy have been achieved by American scholars. However, such progress has also been colored by the American Federal system which in many cases doesn't necessarily apply to different systems. We are using the term bureaucracy in our analysis in a scientific rather than a pejorative sense referred to in "bureaucratic red tape". We will show in our analysis that for us and in spite of the fact that bureaucracy in Third World countries, especially in the Arab World, is characterized by nepotism and certain level of corruption; however, it plays a major role in the sustainability of the state.

Hypothesis

Non-politicized bureaucracy plays a fundamental role in the survival of states during times of transition and drastic change. Moreover, non-politicized bureaucracy protects state institutions from failing. In fact, state survival bureaucracy (SSB) as an alternative to Deep State, as defined in this paper, obtains all mechanisms for the sustainability of the state, both its entity and identity. Authors do appreciate the work of their colleagues and professionals in different countries and eras about which is better in terms of the relationship between politics and bureaucracy whether it is dichotomy or a mix between both. The work of experts and professionals is highly appreciated in the area of fragile states where they put public services and legitimacy as indicators of state strength[1]. This study believes that deep state, as an American concept which was drawn from the Turkish traditions in the 1920s, has been used by policymakers and elected officials, on the top of who is President Donald Trump, is really closer to conspiracy theory. According to Cambridge Dictionary, "the idea that

there is a deep state governing behind the scenes is dismissed by some as a conspiracy theory” (Cambridge Dictionary). We also believe that advocates of Deep State mix between institutions and bureaucracy on one hand and interest groups on the other. In fact, mixing up between both colors their analysis by conspiracy theory. The analysis will show how SSB is a constructive mechanism for the survival of the state when its entity and identity as well as well-established national interests are under tangible threats.

In testing our hypothesis and in our attempt to refute deep state concept as publicized by US professionals and advocates, we will try our best to answer major questions concerning our contribution in presenting a new concept to the study of bureaucracy; SSB. Questions related to what is best for bureaucracy to effectively perform its duties and responsibilities; neutral bureaucracy, politicized bureaucracy or dominant one. We do believe that bureaucracy in its best status has to be non-politicized. We will see that politicized bureaucracy did not help in sustaining states in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Contrary to this, non-politicized bureaucracy in both Tunisia and Egypt protected both entities and identities. Another question of great importance goes around the role of bureaucracy in protecting the state as institution from fragility and failure. Again non-political committed bureaucracy to consensual national interests as defined by the citizens of the state, not by the elected officials and politicians who accompany newly established regime, is guarantor of state survival. Moreover, non-politicized committed bureaucracy which is keen about state and people’s identity, which believes in the permanence of the state and the short live term of any regime, is a solid base to tolerate drastic change, manipulate it and let it pass by with less losses and long-term wins.

Methodology

The paper uses both system and function approaches in analyzing the role of bureaucracy in states going through transition. It also draws comparisons from the harsh experiences in the Arab region after Arab revolutions where most of the states collapsed while Tunisia and Egypt survived. We will use the available literature in reviewing different arguments regarding the role of bureaucracy in addition to our own observations as scholars who were engaged in the political process in Egypt for sometimes and during the drastic changes since January 25, 2011 and our knowledge about political process in Tunisia and other Arab states.

The analysis of SSB goes as follows:

- Which Comes First: Non-politicized or politicized bureaucracy? Who Manages Change?
- Politicized Bureaucracy and Fragile States- Failure to Manage Change.
- SSB: Newly Developed Alternative Concept to Deep State.
- State Survival in Tunisia and Egypt as Function of SSB.

Which comes first: non-politicized or politicized bureaucracy? Who manages change?

The relationship between bureaucracy and politics is a critical one both academically and empirically based on which model of relationships is adopted. Bureaucracy tolerance of and adaptation to change would be explained and understood.

Empirical models evidently asserted the absence of dichotomy, i.e. fire wall, between politics and administration/bureaucracy where both are interrelated. Although there are different forms of interactions between politics and bureaucracy based on power position of

each, yet theories of political control of bureaucracy indicate that political control over bureaucracy is relatively limited. The interactions between elected officials and bureaucrats was explained by James H. Savara using "Council-Manager" form of government where council represents elected officials and politicians whereas the other side represents bureaucrats working for a manager. Savara presented different models illustrating the relations between the two bodies, politics and bureaucracy, which are significant to our study in this paper. These models explain bureaucracy responses to political control based on their power positions.

On one hand is the case of a strong bureaucratic apparatus, in which interactions could be described by the "Strong-Manager Council's Sphere" where the council/elected officials approve the policy for legitimacy purpose while the bureaucratic body is highly involved in policymaking and has a wide range of discretion in implementation/administration, and hence bureaucracy is described by this model as the dominant power. However, despite of the power position, both have to cooperatively interact within an integrated policy system. On the other hand, a completely opposite case is clear in the "Council Dominant Model" which describes dominant elected officials who are more involved in both policymaking and administration (Frederickson, 2003).

Judith Gruber's and James D. Thopson's researches on bureaucratic actions and attitudes in response to political control indicate that bureaucrats resist change and strive to maintain status quo. In light of this, bureaucrats could be described as self-serving and have significant discretion, preferring outside actors with limited range of power as they believe that political control should be limited to "winning elections, passing statutes, making policy, and approving budgets" (Frederickson, 2003). Research findings reiterate that bureaucracy influence both policymaking as well as discretion in policy implementation and management (Frederickson, 2003). This is further emphasized by Michael Lipsky who studied client responsiveness theory which holds that bureaucrats are "captured by their clients"; i.e. responsive to their clients rather than being captured by the political arm. Lipsky came up with the so-called "Street-Level Bureaucracy" which indicates that in an environment where there is scarcity of resources, as well as unclear and conflicting goals, bureaucrats tend to adapt by exercising control over their work (Frederickson, 2003). However, this does not mean that bureaucracy is out of control. In fact, bureaucrats operate in conformance to legal and policy framework (Frederickson, 2003).

In addition, a number of scholars highlighted many reasons why bureaucracy has become increasingly influential in policy process. There are several internal and external sources of bureaucratic power emphasized by Robert Denhardt. On one hand, internal sources include the massive expertise of bureaucrats in public agencies in their areas of interests as well as the amount of information in these agencies which are incomparable to any expertise a president or legislator could have. In addition, degree of cohesion is another internal source of power as the more the staff within the organization are committed to the organization and its goal the more there is unity within the organization and hence the more the ability to function effectively and gain credibility. Strong and effective leadership also render the organization more power and influence. On the other hand, external sources of power include support from other similar organizations; clientele groups who benefit from the agency's actions; and members of the legislature. The more the support is, the more powerful the agency is likely to be (Denhardt *et al.*, 2014).

Despite the fact that non-politicized bureaucracy has been supported by well-known scholars in the fields of political science and public administration as the guarantee for

the survival of the state, many scholars opted for different type of analysis regarding bureaucratic and related institutions negative role in the political process; i.e. Deep State.

In this regard, there are four main characteristics that describe how bureaucracy functions procedurally. Despite the fact that many use now the term bureaucracy pejoratively, earlier scholars like Max Weber introduced more technical use of the term with nonnegative connotation (Denhardt, 2014). The first “special virtues” as Max Weber calls it, is being impersonal or dehumanizing as a machine which indicates that bureaucracy functions in a rational manner with the a minimal, if any, emotional element in administrators’ behavior and actions as well as in the work system of the organization as a whole (Rosebloom and Kravchuk, 2005). In fact, Ralph Hummel viewed bureaucracy as a system where actions originate from an office rather than humans to meet values and rules of higher offices with superior control (Rosebloom and Kravchuk, 2005). “Formalistic” is the second attribute as written formal structure and operations are considered to be the building block of all bureaucratic procedures. In addition, written communications take place among offices and positions rather than individuals. Furthermore, “rule-bound” comes as the third major feature where bureaucracy and bureaucrats function in accordance to formal rules and regulations to achieve three goals; take proper office procedures; ensure impersonality; and reinforce hierarchy and regularity in communicating with other organizations or clienteles. These three attributes lead to the fourth which labels bureaucracy as highly disciplined as bureaucrats’ actions are controlled by rules and lines of authority dictated by bureaucracy (Rosebloom and Kravchuk, 2005). Weber argued that bureaucracy is the most efficient way of organization:

Experience tends to universally show that the purely bureaucratic type of administration is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings (Denhardt, 2014).

In addition, Frederick W. Taylor developed the term “scientific management” which is an organizational approach based on “laws, rules, and principles.” He argued that “smooth-running” organizations are highly mechanical, with the human element is strictly controlled for the purpose of contributing the efficiency of the organization and managers’ job is to ensure the efficiency of the system (Denhardt, 2014).

The aforementioned structural and procedural characteristics are envisaged as sources of power to bureaucracy conferring efficiency and ever-expansion. Operating with rationality, expertise, discipline as well as continuity render bureaucracy not only efficiency but also legitimacy. Above all, well-developed bureaucracy self-maintains its power as it becomes, through time, more and more uncontrollable by any outside factors. Bureaucracy evolves to “engulf the society” and becomes its master as societies depend on bureaucracy for basic services provision and meeting the continuously increasing needs which persistently call for organized tool and structured administration. In fact, Weber describes the world, one day, to be filled up with “cogs” continuously striving for higher positions until bureaucracy turns into a way of life (Rosebloom and Kravchuk, 2005) and hence is built into the culture of a society. Although New Public Management (NPM) criticized this ideal form of bureaucracy accusing it by lack of responsiveness to clienteles claiming that the main concern of bureaucracy is rather to avoid mistakes, this criticism confirms that the bureaucratic system is designed to be efficient (Rosebloom and Kravchuk, 2005). Moreover, there were some concerns about drawbacks of fully developed bureaucratic power and

expertise which could rise to “overtower or surpass democratic controls” (Denhardt, 2014). One might add that bureaucracy has its own self-correcting mechanisms which, in case of threats and challenges provide it with the necessary flexibility to adapt. This is really important in light of the stereotypes of bureaucrats as being rigid in responding to change.

Arab revolutions which started December 2010, called for transparency, access to public information, meeting basic needs and services, human dignity as well as freedom and justice. The message was directed toward both decision makers and bureaucrats. These drastic changes and consequent demands added pressures and created serious debates in the USA and other corners of the world regarding the question of what is best for bureaucracy to function under these exceptional conditions. In one of the most recent and meaningful initiatives, comes the Open Government Partnership (OGP) which was launched in 2011 by the US President Barak Obama and the Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. The inauguration of this initiative was attended by heads of states from each of the eight founding governments where each country announced its action plan (Sherif, 2015)[2]. In 2018, members of this initiative reached around 80 countries (www.opengovpartnership.org/countries/list/u). We believe that this initiative is more relevant to bureaucracy and government at large in implementing policies initiated by the Executive, ratified and monitored by the Legislature. There has to be merit appointed professional and permanent bureaucrats to handle all this, they are state vehicle in providing its services, managing its resources and guarantor citizens both trust and satisfaction. In implementing these policies and providing public services, identification and loyalty questions are raised. As indicated earlier, non-politicized bureaucracy is the core for both efficiency and generating citizens satisfaction.

On the contrary of the previous argument, under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, bureaucracy is not only under control but also totally politicized and too dependent on the will of one-party or dominant party systems. In this case, bureaucracy adopts and assembles the regimes’ ideology both in implementing policies and public services provision. Loyalty, under these regimes precedes efficiency. In fact, cases of state failure took place under such regimes once they are faced with drastic changes as a result of high level of citizens’ dissatisfaction. State failure and the collapse of the state wipe out both institutions and bureaucracies. In the next sections, we will draw examples and lessons for different cases and levels where bureaucracies were unable to hold states together.

Politicized bureaucracy and fragile states – failure to manage change

A quite good number of scholars call for non-politicized bureaucracy as a means for efficient public services delivery and implementations of public policies. However, in ideology laden regimes where powers are exclusively at the hands of the Executive, there is always a need to create public service provider across the country loyal to it. Hence, ideological and politicized bureaucracy would be implanted to implement initiatives and policies coming from top to bottom and as guarantor to public satisfaction. Moreover, when the Executive establishes its one-party system or a dominant party system, bureaucrats are either urged and/or convinced to join such party. Consequently, the fate of bureaucracy, which is supposed to be permanent, neutral/impersonal and rational, has been coined with the regime’s fate. In this case also, bureaucracy losses its well-known aforementioned characteristics as it has become totally controlled/captured by politics. In 1991, the politicized Soviet bureaucracy, members of the Soviet Communist Party, failed to hold the Soviet Union

together against the drastic ideological, political and economic changes facing it. With the collapse of Berlin Wall, the Soviet bureaucracy was unable to guarantee the survival of the state. It took Vladimir Putin at least two presidential terms to re-establish a solid Russian bureaucracy able to handle his vision of renovating greater Russia.

In addition, it is well-known in the literature that political order is based on legitimacy. Territorial sovereignty and control of the domestic polity imply the general acceptance of the widely shared national narrative and of the state and as authoritative administrative super structure based on the identification of the population/society with the national project (Mühlberger, 2015). However, in the Arab region, politicized bureaucracies under authoritarian and despotic regimes failed in asserting regimes' legitimacy and providing basic services and needs. In both Syria and Iraq, bureaucrats were forced to be the members of the Baath Party. With the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of Saddam Hussein regime, Iraqi bureaucracy, politicized the way it was, collapsed as well. Moreover, with religious, ethnic and sectarian divisions of Iraq between Sunni, Shiites and Christians, Arabs and Kurds, traditionally politicized bureaucracy expressed its bias toward one or another of these divisions and least to Iraq as a state. This explains the inability of executives and legislators in Iraq to hold its territories together notwithstanding achieving its national interests and national security or even providing services. In the case of Syria, politicized bureaucracy was unable as well to hold the state together. If it were not for the Russian military and the Iranian intervention for the support of the Assad regime, Syria would have been totally divided and collapsed. Again, the Syrian politicized bureaucracy has been shuttered in its loyalty between the state of Syria on one hand and the religious and ethnic communities on the other. It will take the Iraqi and Syrian Governments at least one decade, as the case in Russia, to re-establish bureaucracy with loyalty to the state and based on some of the aforementioned attributes.

After Arab revolutions and due to political control over bureaucracy in Gadhafi Libya and Saleh Yemen, both countries were unable to survive. While the first was divided between confronting fanatic religious and some civil/military groups, the second fell into severe conflict between Houthis aided by Iran on one hand and installed government supported by the Gulf States especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other. Both states completely failed. In addition, due to the politicized and totally inefficient bureaucracies in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen and their inability to provide public services, people left their states and looked for states where services are available in the neighboring Arab countries, Europe and North America. Millions of them became refugees, i.e. stateless, while others seek political asylum (Almashat, 2017). As in both Iraq and Syria, going back to the state as a solid entity requires, on the top of other things, re-establishing non-politicized bureaucracy capable of running policies and services in just and efficient way. The failure of Arab State system to adapt to and manage change could not be explained by the so called Deep State. On the contrary, failed and collapsing states in the Arab region have to be examined against its inability to provide public services and lack of legitimacy, two indicators of fragile states.

It is clear that politicized bureaucracy in non-Arab and Arab states, including Somalia which collapsed before Arab revolutions, was coopted there by fanatic Islamic groups was unable to neither maintain regime's legitimacy nor provide public services and basic needs which are required for loyalty and satisfaction. In all these cases, state's entity withered away. It is also clear that politicized bureaucracy was unable to face and confront drastic change which took place across the Arab region starting December 2010. How could

politicized bureaucracy survive a change shock which led to the collapse of its master regime?

State survival bureaucracy: newly developed alternative concept to deep state

When elected officials face obstacles in implementing their initiatives and public policies, they start to blame the determination of a set of predatory extractive elite of sabotaging their initiatives and policies. Some call this Deep State. Some argue that:

[...] multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence (Blunden, 2014).

We looked into a number of dictionaries and research about the definition of deep state and found out that Deep State is "a body of people, typically influential members of government agencies or the military, believed to be involved in the secret manipulation or control of government policy" (Oxford Dictionaries). Cambridge Dictionary defines it as "organizations such as military, police, or political groups that are said to work secretly in order to protect particular interests and to rule a country without being elected" (Cambridge Dictionary). Others put details into the concept and consider Deep State as an "outcome of the interaction between formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions are made and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official, whereas, informal institutions do not" (Söyler, 2013). Hans Joachim Lauth categorizes informal institutions in different forms of: specific relationships – clientelism, autocratic cliques, clientelist parties and mafia; material exchange (corruption), violent exertion of influence- putsch threat, guerrilla warfare, riots and organized crime; civil resistance- civil disobedience; and legal practice- custom law" (Lauth, 2000). In most cases, deep state means the presence of groups or organizations or individuals who work secretly to protect special interests and control the course of interactions without being elected. They talk about the industrial military complex, certain bureaucrats, banking sector and secret intelligence agencies. In President Trump's attempt to instate his own doctrine "America First", he accuses a good number of selected officials by his own campaign managers, the media and other active agencies by hindering his own policies and initiatives. In fact, when he fired Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and his National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, he argued that both, and others, were too soft against his international adversaries, especially North Korea, to assist him in his endeavor. People think that the appointment of both National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, as hawkish as they are, (Financial Times Weekend, March 24, 2018), represent a revolt against moderate figures of US elements of Deep State. Paradoxically, upon the appointment of these two hawkish executives, the USA President, Donald Trump and North Korea President, Kim Jong-Un, agreed to meet. It seems that the US bureaucracy, out of concern about USA survival, was able to convince the US President that negotiations, not confrontation, with North Korea is the best way to achieve its national interests and national security.

In developing countries, especially in the Arab world, politicians and writers coined deep state with corrupt bureaucracy and extended security apparatus. However, it is our belief that using deep state as a concept to indicate that some groups try to pursue their interests before the interests of the state is totally false. In fact, those who use deep state concept were subconsciously driven by two major errors. On one hand, they consider these groups with their networks working secretly against elected officials as conspirators against democratic values. On the other hand, these advocates mix, may be consciously, between deep state and interest groups.

Most of those who believed in the conspiracy theory and some of those who believe in sabotage groups drew their arguments from American political experience. US President Eisenhower in 1961 announced that the nation has to be protected against any informal influence which is pursued by the military industrial complex ([Garvin, 2018](#)). Glenn adds that if President Trump faces resistance from bureaucracy against his programs, this is true, if we believe that bureaucracy has its own agenda, this is also true. Rich Higgins, while serving as National Security Council Director for Strategic Planning in Trump Administration, wrote a memo where he used intensively the concept Deep State which highlights a seemingly bizarre alliance bringing together the Hard Left, Islamist organizations, mega corporations, the bureaucracy and more ([Newman, 2018](#)).

In all these cases, people talk about the difference between formal and well-known organizations on one hand and informal influence pursued by other groups on the other. As we learned from the first course in political science that there are formal organizations such as elected officials to the Executive and Legislature as well as the structure of the Judiciary on one hand, and informal organizations such as the military, industry, corporations and media on the other. We learned that the second group represents interest groups where they lobby for the interests of the groups they work for[3]. This is legitimate in a democratic system where each group tries to identify someone to pursue pressure on the government to achieve its interests especially when it is related to allocation of financial resources.

In the case of President Trump who came up with ideas which are reflected in Presidential Decrees, for the US bureaucracy, it seems as if there is a threat to both US identity as the main capitalist state and to the well-established US national interests as the main world super power. Imposing new tariffs against imported iron and steel, building wall between US and Mexico on the borders, changing the regulations of NAFTA, getting out of Paris Agreement on Climate Change, anti-immigration policies and more would transform the US reputation as the main advocate of Laissez Faire Laissez Passer to protectionist entity. In addition, Mr Trump's doctrine "America First" which presents a shift in US foreign policy from active engagement in world politics to isolationist policy that reduces its role in global affairs. While this takes place, Mr Trump escalates US position against North Korea, intensifies military attacks against Syria while supporting the Kurds in their zeal toward autonomy and recognizes Jerusalem as the permanent capital of the State of Israel including the transfer of US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. There is no doubt that such major changes in Mr Trump's priorities and policies agitated US bureaucracy to the degree that bureaucrats started blocking his policies for fear of changing US identity and affecting US interests. These definitely are not interest groups in its traditional definition nor are they any deep state as advocated by American practitioners and writers. The aforementioned memo by Higgins accuses democratic leadership that it "protects cultural Marxist programs of action and facilitates the relentless expansion of the deep state." Higgins was so obsessed by the Deep State to the extent that he believed that Republican leadership in cooperation with globalists, corporatists and international financial interests is willing to service the Deep State ([Newman, 2018](#)). The role of American bureaucracy here is to protect the state as a solid entity and the interests of the American people as the main stakeholders. It is clear that there is no conspiracy theory behind this protective role of bureaucracy. In cases where both the state's entity and identity are at stake and bureaucracy stands as a firewall, decision makers try to find an escape coat to throw blame on invisible hands for the failure of their policies. We are

negating the using the concept of Deep State as the invisible ghosts behind the failure of plans imposed by the political arm.

This type of bureaucracy we call SSB. It includes non-politicized bureaucrats and policy implementing agencies that are committed to both entity and identity of the state. The role of SSB emerges clearly in a state of utmost survival crisis of the state and cases of drastic changes which would threaten the existence and performance of individuals, institutions and communities and their ability to public services delivery and responsiveness to citizens' needs. SSB does inherently obtain self-correcting mechanisms that help states to face, experience drastic changes and cope with it. This might be called institutional equilibrium.

The role of SSB in its professional form is more responsive and effective in maintaining state entity and identity conditioned by a number of interrelated elements. On one hand, it definitely has to be non-politicized as this conforms to basic characteristics of any professional and efficient bureaucracy. We might argue for bureaucratic neutrality, however, in reality it is very difficult to achieve. What is really needed in this context is altruistic bureaucracy where state interests come at the forefront of its functions. Second, SSB functions have to be based on transparency, integrity, free access to information, accountability and discretion. Here, we might call for autonomy; however, sometimes it will be hard goal to reach. Third, SSB in detecting threats to state survival has to generate solid anti-corruption strategies. Corrupt bureaucracy is similar to cancer cells which damage body functions and by the end annihilate human life. Moreover, corruption looks like Termites which not only spoil wood but also cause the collapse of well-built houses. Anticorruption strategies are integral ingredient of SSB.

Figure 1 illustrates an integrated SSB system. It presents the roles and inter-organizational interactions in case of the existence of a non-politicized bureaucracy. We emphasize in this diagram the roles of bureaucratic/executive agencies represented by non-politicized SSB, Legislature, Judiciary, clientele groups and the media as well as the impact of their interactions on sustaining states' entity and identity. The relative power position of the bureaucratic apparatus has a decisive role in determining its span of influence in both




Figure 1.
SSB system

policymaking process and implementation and accordingly its contribution in sustaining the states' entity and identity. As aforementioned, there are internal and external bureaucratic sources of power. The figure identifies the internal sources of power to include: level of expertise, degree of cohesion, access to information, autonomy and discretion, accountability, transparency and style of leadership. Whereas the external sources of power encompass the level of support from clientele groups determined by the degree of responsiveness to beneficiaries needs where the more the responsive bureaucracy is the more credible and legitimate it becomes. In addition, media, both traditional and new, acting as watchdogs for bureaucratic performance, is considered as an important source of power since it influences shaping public opinion as a main source of information. Moreover, Legislature's support is another external source of power. In case of SSB, the role of the Legislature is to approve policies and allocate budgets as well as oversee bureaucratic agencies performance to ensure that the bureaucratic apparatus meet policies objectives. The more powerful, i.e. non-politicized, the bureaucratic apparatus is, the more influential it is in the public policy process. Well-developed powerful SSB system functions resiliently and efficiently not only to achieve responsiveness to clientele needs but also to sustain states' entity and identity.

State survival in Tunisia and Egypt as function of state survival bureaucracy

This section provides cases where professional, efficient and committed non-politicized bureaucracy plays an inevitable role in states' survival. Contrary to failed Arab states which went through Arab revolutions, Egypt and Tunisia were able to survive due to the role of SSB. Both bureaucracies, rigid as they are, nontransparent in nature and self-encircled, were really able to let the state function under severe political and security conditions. Schools were running, universities were operating, hospitals and clinics were functioning as usual with more frequent utilization of emergency rooms, civil services were provided, birth certificates and death certificates were issued on time and travel permits were granted with no delay. In fact, the Government Tahrir Complex (Mogamaa El Tahrir) which resembles state bureaucracy in Egypt was never shut down in providing its daily services to hundreds of thousands of the public and foreign visitors. It was interesting and amazing in the same time to see demonstrations on Fridays and evenings of weekdays in Tahrir Square while bureaucracy in the whole country as well as in Mogamaa is functioning and providing public services. Moreover, transportation services as well as international flights have not been interrupted. In both countries, elections took place, institutions were built and constitutions were voted for. Despite the collapse of state security apparatus, citizens, by their free will, formed informal community security check points to protect people and properties.

Too much political anarchy took place especially in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood newly legalized Freedom and Justice Party dominated the legislative elections held in December 2011 and January 2012. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won the Presidential elections in 2012 by 52 per cent (Faris, 2013). However, and instead of representing the whole Egyptian society and people, he abandoned calling Egyptians "citizens" and started using the term "my clan" to indicate total bias towards a religious minority against the whole society including the Salafis. Contrary to Egypt's well-defined identity as an Arab and Egyptian State, Morsi and his clan started advocating Egypt as Islamic Nation. Moreover, he released imprisoned fanatics and terrorists and allowed them to settle in Northern Sinai in order to establish the so called Sinai Islamic Imamate. He adopted the concept of borderless Islamic Nation which means the negation of Nation State that has been in existence

since Westphalia Convention in 1648. He was about to give up the triangle of Halayeb and Shalateen to Sudan while abandoning part of Sinai to Israel. They did not believe in the importance of the political role of women and completely rejected a quota system in the parliamentary electoral law and as a result female representatives in the Egyptian Parliament 2012 were only 2 per cent, the lowest in the history of Egypt. Threats to both Egyptian integral entity over history and its solid identity infuriated Egyptian bureaucracy and motivated bureaucrats to sabotage his destructive plans. The Muslim Brotherhood accused the so called Deep State, as defined by American professionals and experts, of disobedience and resistance. They reiterated their accusations that bureaucrats allowed the interruption of electricity and fuel supplies to create artificial shortages and line queues throughout the country (Momani, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood was negotiating a deal with International Monetary Fund (IMF), one of the conditions to proceed with the deal was to rationalize the provision of energy and fuel supplies and due to bureaucratic resistance, they were scared that energy supplies would be totally interrupted and prices would go up to non-precedent degree. If this took place, the Egyptians would have, according to them, gone through the streets and revolted against their rule. Similar to Trump, Muslim Brotherhoods intensively used the term Deep State to blame institutions opposition. However, it was very clear that Egyptian bureaucracy from state survival perspective did its best to protect both the integrity of Egypt's territory and maintaining its unique identity. Egyptian bureaucracy sabotaged Muslim Brotherhoods plans through what we could call a civil strife.

It seems that the Tunisian bureaucracy, as rigid as it is and as self-centered as it was and as frightened from change as it is well-known played a similar role as Egyptian bureaucracy in sustaining the state of Tunisia after December 2010 revolution. It is well understood and taken that Tunisian scholars accuse Tunisian bureaucracy of being irresponsible with lack of willingness to make decisions (Al-Yaaqoubi, 2016); however, we would like to shed the light on the positive role played by Tunisian bureaucracy in carrying out its responsibilities in delivering public services in a time where a good number of institutions were under attack or even absent. The brilliance of Tunisian bureaucracy was very obvious in the election of Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi in 2014. He previously served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981 to 1986 and as Prime Minister from February 2011 to December 2011. Essebsi is the founder of the Nidaa Tounes political party, which won a plurality in the 2014 parliamentary election (BrillOnline). His election was a clear manifestation of the power of Tunisian bureaucracy in its attempt to create national consensus regarding the sustainability and survival of Tunisia as a State. In order to adapt the Tunisian bureaucracy to December revolution 2010, the Tunisian 2014 constitution in its article 15 talked positively about Tunisian bureaucracy and set the basis for efficient bureaucracy:

Public Administration is at the service of the citizens and the common good. It is organized and operates in accordance with the principles of impartiality, equality and the continuity of public services, and in conformity with the rules of transparency, integrity, efficiency and accountability (Tunis's Constitution 2014).

In Egypt, as well, the 2014 Constitution in Article 218 outlines anticorruption measures as follows:

The state is committed to fighting corruption, and the competent control bodies and organizations are identified by law. Competent oversight bodies and organizations commit to coordinate with one another in combating corruption, enhancing the values of integrity and transparency in order

to ensure sound performance of public functions, preserve public funds, and develop and following up on the national strategy to fight corruption in collaboration with other competent control bodies and organizations, in the manner organized by law (Egypt's Constitution of, 2014).

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It is clear that from the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in the work of SSB that non-politicized bureaucracy in both states was able independently to hold the state together; i.e. institutions, society, formal and informal organizations, in times of drastic change. SSB in both countries was capable to deliver public services, while the army and police forces, and in some cases civilians, were under terrorists attacks aiming at the collapse of the state and the creation of state of anarchy. When guns started to fall silent, both countries initiated policies of transparency, integrity and took anticorruption measures to improve the characteristics of their bureaucracies as indicated in Diagram 1. In fact, especially in the case of Egypt, there is a call to penetrate the stagnant bureaucracy by active, alive and well trained youth who might have participated in January 2011 revolution and June 30 revolution calling for equality, justice, transparency, human dignity and freedom.

From US experience and Tunisian and Egyptian experiences, it is very clear that there is nothing called Deep State. What takes place in cases of dramatic change which would negatively affect the entity and identity of the state is that non-politicized bureaucracy would take the necessary actions and decisions to protect the state and its institutions from collapse. This does not mean that interest groups such as military, industry complex, security apparatus, corporates, media and other organizations with special interests will stop pressuring the political system and bureaucracy to achieve their parochial interests. These are not and should not be coined with the so called Deep State which for us does not exist in reality or even as a concept.

Conclusion

We are introducing SSB as a concept for efficient and resilient bureaucracy which adapts to drastic change and fight for the survival of the state. SSB has its own tools and mechanisms to resist attempts by elected officials and/or the Executives as well as other authorities which threaten the entity and the identity of the state. Hence, in cases of revolutions, severe disasters, wars, tangible threats or similar dramatic phenomena, researchers, professionals and experts should look for bureaucratic agencies and bureaucrats who work diligently to protect the state from collapse. Politicians, elected or non-elected, in case of making decisions to alter state's identity or affect the territorial integrity of the state, agitate authentic bureaucracy to strive for the survival of the state. This is not by any means a Deep State as outlined by American professionals. Rather it is SSB in its sincere commitment, and nationalistic obligation to sustain the state and make it function in a very antagonistic environment. The experience of Tunisia and Egypt during and after December 2010, January 2011 and June 30 revolutions respectively confirms that SSB sustained both States.

We are aware that our novel concept; SSB, will create a sincere debate in both fields of political science and public administration regarding its validity and applicability in different political and administrative systems. We are also aware that advocates of deep state concept would be furious to have serious academic and practical challenges to that concept. In fact, one of our objectives behind writing this paper is not only to provide a sound explanation of the survival of the states in severe environments through SSB but also to create a lively debate among academicians, professionals and politicians as well, which would positively reflect on students and researchers who are interested in the most recent literature concerning the role of bureaucracy in sustaining Nation-State.

Notes

1. The Fund for Peace, Fragile State index. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/p1/>
2. Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, The Philippines, South Africa, the UK and the USA.
3. We also learned that there are pressure groups in a democratic system where they defend the interests of foreign entities.

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