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Working Paper

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Working Paper, No. 333

Provided in Cooperation with:

Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

Suggested Citation: Perlmann, Joel (2001) : Toward a population history of the second generation:
birth cohorts of Southern-, Central- and Eastern-European origins, 1871 - 1970, Working Paper, No.
333, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31595>

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Working Paper No. 333

Toward a Population History of The Second Generation: Birth Cohorts of Southern-, Central- And Eastern- European Origins, 1871-1970

by
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June 2001

This research was funded, in part, by the Russell Sage Foundation.

INTRODUCTION

Will the children of today's immigrants manage to improve on the socio-economic conditions of their parents and repeat the pattern of earlier waves of immigration, namely a slow but steady ascent over several generations? The baseline--the past--is most usefully discussed in terms of the last great wave of immigration, which roughly covers the years 1890-1920. During this period, new peoples arrived in great numbers to a modern, industrial, America from southern, central, and eastern Europe, a group that I, following Stanley Lieberson's example, refer to as SCE immigrants (Lieberson 1980). Today, the descendants of that immigration and the descendants of much earlier arrivals to America--such as the English or the Scandinavians--hardly differ at all in socioeconomic characteristics (Lieberson and Waters 1988).

Concern about the offspring of today's immigrants has been expressed most influentially in the theory of segmented assimilation suggested by Alejandro Portes and his colleagues (Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes and Rumbaut 1996). They warn that the offspring of middle-class immigrants will probably assimilate fairly easily, but the children of immigrants entering American society at the bottom will have more trouble than did the children of immigrants who entered at the bottom in past eras. Today's second-generation poor will have more trouble because i) they are non-white and American society is a long way from ignoring race; ii) the nature of the economy has changed so that industrial-economy jobs requiring relatively little skill, but still a step above the least-desirable work, do not exist in as great numbers as they did in the past; iii) extended education (necessary for today's better jobs) is out of the reach of immigrant families that enter at the bottom; and finally iv) an alienated, inner-city, non-white, youth culture will appeal to these new lower-class, second-generation youth who encounter blocked mobility.

This formulation of segmented assimilation has been questioned by noting that i) race divisions are socially constructed and tended to work against the immigrant stocks of 1890-1920 too; ii) low-skill work is not as scarce as claimed; iii) educational attainment may be adequate for notable upward mobility; iii) concerns about youth culture are hardly new to today's inner city minorities and in any case depend on the first three concerns for their force (Perlmann and Waldinger 1996, 1997; Waldinger and Perlmann 1998).

One problem with the past-present comparisons has been the vague references to the specifics of the past. This essay first seeks to contribute some specificity by defining the older-generation groups that make for theoretically meaningful comparisons; second, by showing when these relevant groups of second generation members grew up; and third, by calling attention to important shifts within any given ethnic group over time in the social composition of second-generation cohorts. Finally, these compositional shifts also suggest the need to reanalyze some of Stanley Lieberson's work with ethnic cohorts in *A Piece of the Pie* (1980), a reanalysis that I carry out and that confirms his fundamental conclusion.

THE SOURCES AND THE ETHNIC INFORMATION THEY CONTAIN

Data on Immigrant Arrivals

The statistical record of the 'new' (SCE) immigration is imperfect, but it is detailed enough to have supported extensive analysis over a century. The United States Commissioner of Immigration annually published figures on the number of immigrants entering the United States by country of origin. In addition, beginning in 1899, the Commissioner's report also listed the number of immigrants by 'race or people.' Whatever ethnological understandings and racialized thinking underlay these latter categories, the fact is that they have proven invaluable to historians of immigration. For experiences during the fifteen crucial years that followed its introduction, the race or people classification scheme makes it possible to distinguish among the peoples of Europe's pre-War multinational empires - Austro-Hungary, Germany, Russia and Turkey. In addition, figures for those *leaving* the United States are also available by 'race or people' for 1908 and later years, providing our best evidence on remigration. Convenient summaries of the Commissioner's reports have appeared in various compendia. In particular, the figures by country of origin are published in *Historical Statistics* and those figures as well as the immigrants classified by race or people (1899-1924) appeared in *International Migrations*, published by the NBER in the late 1920s (Perlmann 2001, Carter et al. 1997, Wilcox 1929).

Data on the Second Generation--Native-Born Children of Immigrants

The basic numerical parameters of the second generation are harder to come by. The decennial U. S. Census publications often list the 'native-born of foreign parentage' and reasonably frequently these publications also present the counts by specific parental origins. Nevertheless, a published time series for the birth cohorts of the second generation, especially by specific parental origins, has, to the best of my knowledge, never been published. Today, however, we can exploit the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS), huge national samples drawn by teams of scholars and armies of research assistants from the manuscript schedules of the decennial censuses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (generally 1% of the national population). The IPUMS datasets are available for every decennial census from 1850 through 1970, with two exceptions (1890 and 1930).⁽¹⁾

The Census officials and the Commissioner of Immigration defined groups somewhat differently. The census asks for country of birth; while that is often the same as country of last permanent residence (the immigration authorities' most widely used measure of origin), it is, of course, not always so (consider the Russian immigrant who stayed for several years in England, France or Canada). Moreover, like the Commissioner of Immigration, the census officials were aware of the limitations of relying on country of birth when the 'country' involved was a multinational empire. They did not resort to the race or people criterion; however, beginning in 1910 they did supplement country of birth with information on mother tongue. Thus we have two criteria in the statistics of immigration--country of last permanent residence and (for 1899-1924) race or people--and two criteria in the census datasets--country of birth and mother tongue (1910-1940, 1970). For the second generation information, of course, we rely only on the census; the mother tongue data are available for the children of the foreign-born in these years too.

Mother Tongue As A Proxy For Ethnicity: Complications

Ironically, the 'race or people' information, however vaguely defined, is probably as reliable as the mother tongue data, and is surely simpler to use. A larger concern with the comparability of the censuses involves the mother tongue data. First, the wording of the question varied from year to year: 'mother tongue' in 1910 and 1920, 'language spoken in the home in childhood' in 1940 and 'language spoken in the home in childhood other than English' in 1970 (Ruggles and Sobek et al. 1997). The differences in formulations did make for differences in responses--especially the change from 1940 to 1970, which prompted more people to report an ancestral language. Second, a considerable number of second generation children--as early as 1910--are listed with English as their mother tongue (or else with the answer to the question left blank). Thus, if (like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and other 'racial' theorists of 1910), we want clear guidance on 'ethnological' differences through the mother tongue question, we will be only partially satisfied. In 1910 and 1920, three in ten young children of immigrants from central and eastern Europe are listed with English (or 'blank') as their mother tongue, in 1940 fully six in ten, and in 1970 five in ten.⁽²⁾

This imperfection in the mother tongue data will typically lead us to assume 1) that the

characteristics of people who did not provide mother tongue data were similar to those who did, in terms of their origins in specific groups (e.g., Poles or Jews); and 2) that the social characteristics of the group members who did not provide the mother tongue data were similar to the social characteristics of the group members who did (e.g., the proportion of Poles or Jews with white collar jobs). Yet these can turn into heroic assumptions. For example, retention of the ancestral language may well have been more common among immigrant families living in densely-packed ethnic neighborhoods; and the proportion that lived in this way may well have differed across groups, and also been related to the families' economic well-being. Especially in connection with the censuses of 1940 and after, this point will require attention.

WHICH GROUPS TO STUDY

One might, of course, begin by asking if ethnicity is really our proper subject at all. If our questions are about socioeconomic advance, we might instead focus on those immigrants coming in at the bottom of the American class structure. No; for one thing, the data over time are better for studying ethnic group change than for studying social class mobility directly. More important, it is simplistic and crude to argue that simply studying all those who came in at the bottom will be enough to understand the outcomes. Individuals banded together, created communal institutions along ethnic lines, shared ethnic cultures; also, their specific reasons for coming and conditions of immigration all are shaped by the national and ethnic parameter, not merely by economic conditions upon arrival; so too, the way different groups are received by the host society are not merely a matter of economic entry level, however much entry level matters. We do not, then, study national origins only as a poor proxy for class origins; at a minimum, we study ethnic origins as an important additional factor that significantly altered the impact of class origins upon individuals.

Second, one might ask, why not study the Asians of 1900? After all, if we want to study the experience of alien groups that were new in 1900, we could choose to study the case of Asian arrivals (and perhaps for the Mexicans who came in greater number after 1910--notwithstanding their presence of the group in the Southwest throughout American history). However, the Asian immigration was very sharply restricted by American immigration law or by American pressure on the sending country (most critically, legislating bars against the Chinese in 1882 and pressuring Japan in 1907)--so that before our own times, the Asian immigration never reached numbers remotely comparable to the numbers of SCE arrivals (for other reasons, the Mexican immigration also remained small before 1910).

Moreover, the Asians that did arrive during most of the century after 1850 were subjected to such virulent racial discrimination that their experience of socioeconomic opportunity and limitation cannot be meaningfully compared to that of the southern, central and eastern Europeans. Nor can it be compared to the experience of Asian immigrants in the United States in our own time; the latter comparison would rest on a foolish oversimplification of conditions, namely, that 'the social construction of race' has remained essentially invariant since the 1850s (e.g.: for the Chinese). Thus we begin with the new places and peoples of southern, central and eastern Europe, partly because of their great numeric predominance among the immigrants and partly because, while they were 'new' immigrant groups, they were not in fact so different as to be as forcefully stigmatized as the Asians of the time.

Among the European immigrants, the new IPUMS datasets would permit us to distinguish among many groups. Indeed, the ethnic information in these datasets is substantially more detailed and flexible than the data on which scholars typically relied prior to the past half dozen years. The better data, however, do not dictate a system of classifying the plethora of ethnic groupings we could consider. The place of birth and mother tongue codes in the IPUMS run to over a hundred for Europeans. Moreover, country boundaries changed dramatically, especially after the collapse of the multinational empires with the First World War. On the other hand, for many of the available classifications, even a 1% national sample would not provide us with numbers large enough to undertake relevant study--even if we had the time and energy to undertake such study. So choices about aggregation are necessary for various practical reasons.

More important, we are by no means interested in all the fine distinctions possible among the arriving groups. Rather, we want to address questions about the nature and pace of socioeconomic progress among the second generations of the past in order to have some sort of benchmarks by which to assess contemporary second generation patterns. We may certainly find, for example, that the specifics of this story of socioeconomic advance would differ a bit among Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, but we are willing to risk losing those subtleties in

the interest of the big picture, and generalizations that will help us contrast past and present in enlightening ways. But what of the difference between these Baltic peoples and Finns? Or between all these and Slovaks (from farther south and farther west), or between all these and Serbs (from still farther south)--or between all the groups I've mentioned and Greeks (who dwelt no farther apart from Serbs than the distances between various Baltic groups)? And for that matter, were Serbs and Greeks more different from each other than northern and southern Italian immigrants? For well over a quarter of a century, the Commissioner of Immigration dutifully recorded northern and southern Italian immigrants as members of two different 'races or peoples,' just as each was distinguished from Poles in those reports. Obviously, we need some sense of historical conditions and some theoretical guidelines if we are to sift through the materials in a meaningful way. Sample size and scholarly energy will affect our choices, but they are far from determinative with data so rich.

OUTLINE OF ETHNICITIES TO BE STUDIED

Given the goals of this analysis, I have grouped the immigrants in the following way.

A. SCE groups

A1. From Central and Eastern Europe

- Jews
- Poles
- Others

A2. From Southern Europe

- Italians
- Others

B. Non-SCE groups:

- Germans
- Northwestern Europeans and Canadians
- All others

It will not always be possible to classify people unambiguously in terms of this scheme; in particular the groups from Central and Eastern Europe will not always be perfectly distinguishable from each other, since the distinctions require not only place of birth data but also the additional criterion of mother tongue.⁽³⁾ Nevertheless, keeping this scheme in mind will make the efforts that follow more easily understood, for even when the data do not permit the full realization of this classification, we will try to approximate it.

Table 1 derives from the 'race or people' criterion used from 1899, and as such it ignores the earlier years. Columns a1 and a2 follow the outline of groups just presented. Column a1 details the counts for groups that are to be aggregated into more general ethnic categories. Column a2 details the counts for the individual groups and the aggregates that will be studied. Columns a3 and a4 present these counts as percentages of the entire immigration. Note first of all the small proportion of immigrants from the groups that today make up the great majority of the immigrants; overall, the third world contributed some 6% of the immigrants. The SCE groups contributed 63%, and in fact three groups--Poles, Jews and Italians--alone accounted for 42%. Most of the rest were from the east, not the south of Europe (16% as against 6%). Finally, the groups that at that time comprised the 'older' immigrant groups continued to be important in the immigration flows with 31% of the total immigration--those from Northwest Europe and Canada (23%), and the Germans (8%).⁽⁴⁾

The second set of columns, b1-4, present the impressive efforts of Thomas Archdeacon to gauge the demographic impact of remigration. There were vast differences in remigration rates among immigrant groups in the period; a group with a high propensity to remigrate, and some remigration rates were over 80%, contributed fewer people to the 'permanent' immigration into the United States--and less to the magnitude of the second generation--than a group with the same number of immigrants but a lower remigration rate.

The remigration data are crude (see the table notes) but the direction and the approximate magnitude of the shift from the proportions in column a3 to b3 and a4 to b4 must be roughly accurate. The largest impact of remigration was upon the largest group's contribution: the Italians comprised 22% of the immigrants but 17% of the permanent immigration. By contrast, the Jews comprised 11% of the immigrants but about 14% of the permanent immigration. Similarly, while the older immigrant sources of Northwest Europeans and Germans comprised 31% of the immigrants, they comprised 35% of the permanent immigration.

Distinctions Among Central and Eastern Europeans

Recall that before the first World War, most people in this region lived within one of the three multinational empires, Austro-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. After the War, these empires were gone, but the successor states were also far from homogeneous in terms of ethnicity.

The Jews

Anyone with even a glancing familiarity with European immigration will want to distinguish the east-European Jews from other peoples coming from that part of the world. In terms of minority status and religion, and especially in their economic position, the Jews of central and eastern Europe were 'a people apart.' They were much more likely to have been tradesmen and artisans, much less likely to have been farmers or farm laborers than were members of other groups. So too, the Jews were also much more likely to have had experience of towns and cities, and of related experiences, such as literacy. Whatever other differences may have mattered to their future in the west, these differences surely did. All this might be ignored if the Jews had been a small immigrant group in the period; however, in fact, the Jews were the second-largest SCE immigrant group, and comprised nearly one quarter of the entire SCE 'permanent immigration.'⁽⁵⁾ The differences between them and other peoples will distort the experience we record for other immigrants from central and eastern Europe unless we keep track of it. The 'race or people' classification scheme for immigrant arrivals distinguished the Jews from fellow countrymen as of 1899; prior to that we have only counts of Jewish immigrant arrivals made by Jewish voluntary associations based at major ports. When we turn our attention from the immigrants to their children, we rely on the censuses, none of which explicitly distinguished Jews from others; nevertheless, the mother-tongue question available in 1910, 1920, 1940 and 1970 will allow us to distinguish the Yiddish-mother-tongue population. This criterion is of decreasing use in studying the young second generation members in the later censuses, because many claimed English as their mother tongue. Scholars have often used the alternative strategy of identifying the 'Russian-born' as Jews; after World War I, when Poles were most likely to report that they (or their parents) had been born in Poland, this strategy is better than for the pre-War period. Nevertheless, it is far from perfect. An analysis of Table 2 will provide a more satisfactory approach.

Table 2 shows the Jews and Poles (by 'race or people') among the arriving immigrants from the Empires. Very few Jews came from any country except those of eastern and east-central Europe; in particular, the German Empire, including German Poland, can be ignored as sources of Jewish emigration in the years 1899-1924 (and other evidence shows the same for the nineties, eg., Kuznets 1975, Joseph 1914). Russian Jews comprised about half of all pre-War immigrants from Russia, the largest numbers of Jews from any land. Yet between two and three Jews in ten were coming from elsewhere, and between four and five immigrants from Russia were not Jews.

On the other hand, among the large miscellaneous group I classify as 'other' immigrants of the region, the Jews typically make up 10% or less. So interpreting whether or not the 'Russians' were Jews would be ambiguous; but among the huge group of 'all other central and eastern Europeans,' very few were Jews.⁽⁶⁾ When we need to define only by country of origin, then, one strategy will be to ignore or at least isolate those from Russia, and to focus attention on the aggregated group of 'all others,' being confident that these include relatively few Jews.

Poles

Though they constituted the next largest single group of east-European immigrants, the Poles too are difficult to identify. Poland as a state did not exist between Napoleonic times and the First World War, Poles then living under German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian rule. Consequently, census information as well as Commissioner of Immigration *Reports*, deal inconsistently and incompletely with 'Poland' as a 'country of origin.' Then too, for all peoples in the region, but dramatically so for the Poles, the national boundaries of the states that did emerge after World War I was only an imperfect guide to places inhabited by nationals in east-central Europe. Nevertheless, insofar as we can, we would like to identify Poles as a separate group. The Poles comprised the largest Slavic immigrant group, and isolating them from the others provides us with one homogeneous group of Slavs, and another group that is less heterogeneous in it than it would be were it augmented by the Poles. The point is not that we have a clear expectation that the Poles will differ from other (non-Jewish) eastern Europeans in behavior; rather, it is simply that at least in this one case we can reduce ethnic

heterogeneity and still deal with large samples.

Others from Central and Eastern Europe

For the moment we content ourselves with breaking out these two groups of central and eastern Europeans--Jews and Poles. All other 'new immigrant' peoples of eastern and central Europe we aggregate into one miscellaneous category. This strategy seems justified both because each of the other individual immigrant groups were much smaller than the Jewish or Polish groups, and also the lack of a compelling reason to make distinctions among these smaller immigrant groups.

Germans

Germans had always comprised an important immigrant presence in America, and we therefore place the Germans among the non-SCE groups. However, by no means all Germans lived in 'Germany', even if in that term we include all the lands of the German Empire in 1914 and by no means all who lived in Germany were ethnically German. Nevertheless, to the extent that we can sort out the Poles (as well as the small number of Jews) from other immigrants arriving from Germany, we will have made the major refinement required. In any case, mother-tongue data will often allow us to sort out other ethnic groups from Germans as well. When it is, I place 'Germans' (those of German mother tongue) who emigrated from the other countries of Europe I aggregate with Germans from Germany--with one exception. The Germans from Russia had lived in the Russian lands for several centuries, and while not assimilated into the Russian world, they also were not in close touch with Germans in the German or Austro-Hungarian empires. There is no perfect decision to be made with regard to these Germans from Russia, and they are far too small to be isolated as a separate group; I have opted to place them with 'all other Central and Eastern European immigrants.'

Classifying Second-Generation Jews, Poles, Germans and Others From Central and Eastern Europe

When mother-tongue information is available, in the census data for 1910-40 and 1970, all peoples from the region can be classified first on that basis. Those not reporting an ancestral mother tongue, can be classified by place of birth into one of four categories, as German, Polish, Russian or (non-Jewish) 'other' in terms of place of birth. This two-step strategy for classifying those from east-central Europe (first by mother tongue, and the rest by place of birth), will not work as well for the children of Russian immigrants because there is about a 50-50 probability that these immigrants were Jews, and many of the others may have been Poles. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, we can isolate these Russians from all other sample members, in order to be clear that the other ethnic categories we employ are overwhelmingly comprised of non-Jews. This classification scheme is shown in Table 3, using the cohort 0-9 years of age in 1920 as an example.

Defining The Second-Generation Birth Cohorts

Choosing young-age cohorts from IPUMS datasets

I have selected young second generation members from each IPUMS dataset, in most cases children 0-9 years of age in the census year. During the years 1891-1940, when most of the relevant second-generation children of the great immigration members were born, the tables present five-year birth cohorts; during other years, ten year birth cohorts. Table 4 shows the cohorts and the IPUMS census datasets from which they are drawn. Note that the samples for several birth cohorts are not drawn from the census in which the cohort would have been 0-9 years of age, but from a later census when the cohort was 10-19 years of age. No IPUMS sample was available from the 1890 and 1930 census, so the sample members for these birth cohorts come from the next-later IPUMS census samples (from 1900 and 1940 respectively). Also, the cohort that would have been 0-9 years of age in 1900 is drawn from the 1910 IPUMS census sample; the 1910 dataset includes mother-tongue information, and is also much larger than the 1900 dataset. [\(7\)](#)

Inflating to population size and 'correcting' for mortality

In Table 4 I have inflated the sample sizes by the sampling ratio, so that *the sizes of the cohorts shown serve as an estimate of their actual number in the American population.* This

method of presentation has the great advantage of permitting us to compare magnitudes across cohorts -- showing, for example, when the largest cohort was born, or reached school-leaving age. I also made slight adjustments in the size of these age cohorts to take into account the mortality that might be expected across the relevant ages, centering all cohorts on ages 5-9. Thus I weighted down slightly the numbers of those of age 0-1 and 1-4 years of age in the census year, and weighted up slightly the numbers of those 10-14 and 15-19 years of age in the census year. To be precise, then, *the number in the cohort can be thought of as a count of its membership when they reached age 5-9*. On the other hand, making any correction for mortality is largely an effort in false precision; the sampling variability no doubt creates more imprecision than child mortality (at least child mortality of those who had passed their first birthday), and in any case child mortality surely varied across the immigrant groups and across the many decades in which the second-generation cohorts were being born. [\(8\)](#)

TIMING

The Flow of Immigration

The figures in Table 1 treat the whole period 1899-1924 as one unit. We have yet to consider a more fine-grained analysis of that quarter century, as well as the years before and after. We do not have the race or people data for such a time series, but we can see the main outlines by considering immigrant arrivals classified only in terms of country of origin, and indeed in the case of central and eastern Europe, only in terms of region of origin--except those in the German state (Table 5). However, if we used data on race or people by five-year intervals for 1899-1930, we would see that trends in emigration from these areas do not differ very sharply by ethnic group, and that therefore the simplified presentation in Table 5 not only is necessary given the state of the data but probably does not overlook important distinctions in timing.

The SCE 'wave' is often dated 1891-1920, or 1881-1920. It clearly began in the eighties, and indeed by 1890 nearly 2 million immigrants from SCE groups had come to the United States (including over 300,000 in the 1870s). While return migration was also plentiful, communities were clearly forming by the eighties.

Nevertheless, the striking feature of these figures is the compressed nature of the immigration. No less than 68% of the SCE immigrants arrived between 1901 and 1915. By contrast, only 2% of the SCE group members that came between 1871 and 1930 arrived in the 1870s, 7% more in the eighties and 14% in the nineties.

After the outbreak of World War I, the immigration period which we have in mind was, in a real sense, over. Only one tenth of the total SCE immigration that occurred between 1871 and 1930 occurred after 1915. During the war years, little emigration was possible, and during the early twenties, Congress passed severe restrictions on immigration generally and on the SCE immigrants in particular. The pattern, of course, differed slightly among groups; thus, 8% of the central and eastern Europeans, and 14% of the Italians who arrived between 1871 and 1930 arrived after 1915. Among the other southern Europeans, the pattern was different, with almost a third arriving after 1915, however, the total number of immigrants from these groups was far fewer than the numbers of central and eastern Europeans or Italians; consequently, the distinctive pattern of these other southerners has little impact on the overall generalizations about the SCE groups. After 1914, there was not a single year in which SCE immigration flows reached the level of SCE arrivals counted in *every* year between 1910 and 1914.

The War, followed by immigration restriction, brought down the numbers for all immigrants, but it is easy to see that it affected the SCE groups especially. During 1911-15, 67% of the immigrants were from SCE groups, during 1916-20 only 29% were from these groups. [\(9\)](#) The SCE proportion rose modestly in 1921-25 and then fell to 14% the the last half of the twenties. In all, the SCE groups comprised a majority (63-71%) of all immigrants only during a twenty year period--1896-1915. Parenthetically, any talk about the state's inability to control immigrant flows should at a minimum be couched in language that recognizes temporal change: the state did just that in the early twenties.

We cannot simply say that the relevant immigration ended in 1914; the period of 1915-1924 requires careful attention. Moderately large-scale SCE immigration did resume for the years 1920-1924; during those five years 1.1 million SCE immigrants arrived. This is but 'moderate' immigration, because during *each* of the years 1910-1914, SCE immigration fluctuated between 562,000 and 894,000. Also, a peculiarity of the immigration in 1920-24 is that a great

deal of it, nearly half, arrived in the single year 1921; in no other year after 1914 did immigration from SCE groups reach 160,000 (see Table 5D). When we consider the second generation then, we will have to be aware of this pattern, because the children of later arrivals differed from the children of earlier arrivals in important ways. I will return to this issue in detail shortly, but first it is important to have a feel for the timing of the second-generation birth cohorts generally.

Second-Generation Cohorts: Timing in General

Table 6 shows the number of second generation members born in the century 1871-1971--thirty-four million of them. For a crude first cut, we can regard this population as the entire second generation and ask about the size and composition of each birth cohort within this group. Note first that of all these young people, only one-third--11.6 million--were in fact members of the SCE groups. The others included well over 6 million Germans, and over 13 million Northwest Europeans and Canadians--and 2.2 million from everywhere else in the world including Mexico.

Only 1% of SCE-second generation members were born in the 1870s, and only 3% more in the 1880s. At the other end of the period, only 13% were born in the thirty years after 1940; another 10% were born in 1931-40. Most second generation members, then, were born between 1891 and 1930. Eight percent were born in the 1890s, 16% in the first decade of this century, 28% in 1911-20 and 23% in 1921-30--75% of them in a forty-year period, and indeed 41% of them in the fifteen years between 1911 and 1925, an echo boom, we might say, of the fifteen years of the mass immigration, 1900-14. However, whereas during the boom years of the migration the SCE group comprised 63-71% of immigrants, their children never exceeded 61% of all second-generation births. The difference is not so large; but when we consider that the fertility levels of the SCE families were in all likelihood higher than that of immigrants from more modern countries (Germany, Northwest Europe and Canada), we would expect a gap in the opposite direction--i.e. with the SCE groups comprising *more than* 63-71% of all second-generation births, not less than that amount. One reason such expectations are not confirmed is surely due to much higher remigration rates among the SCE compared to non-SCE immigrants (recall the contrast between immigration and 'permanent immigration' in Table 1). Similarly, insofar as the sex imbalance of the SCE groups was greater than among non-SCE groups, and insofar as it was not balanced out by intermarriage, there may have been more single immigrant men in the SCE group who, while resident here for many years, nonetheless did not start a family. There is some evidence of that pattern among the Italians (Perlmann 2000). Finally, those immigrants arriving in the space of a decade and a half nevertheless gave birth to their children over a fairly extended period, some marrying early, others later. Thus, while the SCE second-generation members never comprise 63-71% of all the second generation births, still they comprise more than half of all second-generation births over a period of 25 years--longer, in other words, than the 15 years in which the SCE immigrants comprised the majority of all arrivals.

Another reason why the SCE groups comprised fewer of the second-generation than we might have expected concerns intermarriage. The number of second-generation children produced depends not only on the number of people in a group who marry and have a family but also on whom they marry. If 100 group members in-marry, *two* group members produce a family unit and in all the 100 group members are to be found in 50 family units. By contrast, if group members out marry, *one* group member ends up in each family unit, along with an additional person from outside the group, and in all 100 group members are to be found in 100 family units. In sum, if one group heavily in-marries and another group heavily out-marries, the out-marrying group will be represented in far more families. Just such a contrast can be observed among the SCE and non-SCE immigrants and their children. For much of the period under review, the first generation members of the SCE group were nearly all marrying their compatriots, but the same was not true of the Germans, Irish, British, and Scandinavians who predominated in the non-SCE migration. These non-SCE immigrants often intermarried with the native-born; typically, no doubt, the native-born spouse was of the same ethnic origin as the non-SCE immigrant, or from a similar background--for example, when an English immigrant married a native-born person of part English and part Scandinavian or German descent. However, our concern here is only with the implications for the next generation: these differences between SCE and non SCE out-marriage patterns in the first generation help explain the relative magnitudes of SCE and non-SCE second generations. It makes a difference, then, whether we define the second generation member as a child of two immigrant parents (the "native-born of foreign parentage") or as a child of at least one immigrant parent (the

"native-born of foreign or mixed parentage"). In 1911-30, we noted that the SCE groups comprised 53% of the second generation birth cohorts; the definition there (Table 6) included native-born of foreign and mixed parentage. If we instead restrict attention to the native-born of foreign parentage we find that the SCE group comprises 67% of the second generation born during this period (Table 7).

Later in the century, especially in the second-generation SCE cohorts born after 1925, the proportion with mixed parentage rose quickly, from 20% in the 1921-25 cohort to 57% in the 1936-40 cohort (Table 7). With this observation we come to the changing composition of the later second generation cohorts, a product of the late years of the immigration itself, to which we must now devote more careful attention.

The Changing Composition of the Later SCE Second-Generation Cohorts

There were several features that distinguished the later cohorts of SCE second-generation members, all related to their being the children of people who arrived during the last stages of an immigration wave. These features deserve more attention from immigration historians, and they should hold the attention of students of the contemporary immigration as well, because they will find reflection in every new wave of immigration--although their precise nature will depend on the particular pattern of immigrant ebb and flow during each period.

1) *Time of arrival.* Some SCE immigrants must have come in every decade of American history--before 1871 and after the 1940s, for example. However, when we speak of the the second generation of the great immigration wave do we really mean to include the children of SCE immigrants regardless of when those immigrants arrived? Consider, in particular, the immigrants who arrived after 1914, and especially those who arrived after 1924. Their late departure from Europe (in the face of restriction here) suggests that they may have come from somewhat different social circumstances than the earlier arrivals; and certainly they faced a somewhat different process of incorporation into American society. Rather than competing with millions like themselves, they were especially likely to profit from the connections of the much greater numbers who had come before them.⁽¹⁰⁾ With these considerations in mind, the group who arrived 1919-1922 appear as an in-between case, more like the prewar immigrants, surely, than like those who arrived in the late twenties through the thirties; but still arriving at a distinctive, surely somewhat atypical, moment.

2) *Child immigrants.* The SCE immigration was dominated by young working men; yet it included many children as well. In an earlier paper, I showed in some detail how this pattern operated in the case of the Italians. Nearly a million Italians arrived in the five years preceding 1914, and about 15% of them were children under 10--some 150,000 child arrivals. This group reached ages 25-34 between 1925 and 1940. By contrast, during the period 1925-30 the entire number of immigrants arriving from Italy numbered about 85,000; during the thirties another 70,000 came. During the 1930s, then, a majority of the Italian-born who reached the age range 25-34 were probably not recent arrivals who had come in their late teens or early twenties, but Italian-born people who had arrived in the United States as children in the 1909-14 period, the '1.5 generation' coming of age.⁽¹¹⁾ We may be interested in how the children of these '1.5ers' fared in American society, but if so we should understand the difference between those children and the American-born children of adult immigrants.

3) *Marriage with non-immigrants.* We can state more generally the earlier observations about intermarriage and the first generation of SCE and non-SCE immigrants. Immigrants arriving late in the process of immigration are more likely to marry the native-born than those who came before. On a purely random numerical basis, more of the available spouses will be native-born. Also, the tail-end of an immigrant wave is less likely to encounter perceptions of being quite as alien as earlier arrivals from the same country. Finally, there is a greater chance that they can find second-generation members of the same group with whom to intermarry than was the case when earlier compatriots arrived.⁽¹²⁾

The Immigrant Parents of the Later Cohorts: Evidence on the Prevalence of these Three Characteristics (Late Arrivals, Child Arrivals, and Intermarriage with Natives)

We can do a certain amount of careful work on the actual composition of the later second generation cohorts. The crucial SCE second-generation cohorts are those drawn from the 1940 census IPUMS dataset: the second-generation birth cohorts of 1921-25, 1926-30, 1931-35 and

1936-40. First notice the sharp decline in the size of the cohorts. Those of 1921-25 and 1926-30 are among the largest second-generation birth cohorts; the next two are very much smaller, reflecting the timing of the immigration. However, even the 1936-40 birth cohort includes over 400,000 members; thus social scientists can certainly find enough sample members from these years to study--if they decide that the cohort has theoretical importance. Before reaching that decision, we will have to ask how compositional changes across cohorts may distort the comparisons we want to make across those cohorts. The first step, to repeat, is a careful look at the compositional changes themselves.

Unfortunately, the 1940 census was the first after many decades to abandon a question about immigrants' year of arrival; that question did not reappear in the decennial census until 1970, when it came back in the form of period (i.e.: a range of years) rather than year of arrival. We can still make use of the 1970 data, however, by examining the period of arrival of elderly SCE immigrants in that year. For our purposes the relevant periods are before 1915, 1915-24 and 1925-34. Thus the 1970 evidence is imperfect, but we can still do a good deal with some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we assume that among those elderly SCE immigrants of 1970, the proportion arriving before 1915, in 1915-24 and in 1925-34 is the same--or those born in each single calendar year as it was for the parents of the second generation cohorts generally. The assumptions and estimates are detailed in the notes to Table 9. In brief, we can then use the 1970 evidence on immigrant's period of arrival by year of birth and relate it to the 1940 evidence on immigrant parent's year of birth--to arrive at an estimate of the proportion of 1940 parents who had arrived in each period. We can also use the information in the 1920 census on the specific year of arrival for all who arrived before 1915 - by single calendar year of birth. This additional evidence from 1920 allows us to arrive at an estimate of the number arriving as children (defined here as before age 14). Finally, these estimations are unnecessary for the cohorts drawn from the earlier birth cohorts, drawn from the censuses of 1900-1920, since those censuses include questions on year of arrival and age. [\(13\)](#)

Table 8 shows some preliminary results of considerable interest, especially in the proportion of immigrants who had arrived as children among all immigrants born after 1890. Table 9 then draws on this evidence to detail the composition of second generation birth cohorts in terms of the three parental characteristics discussed: arrival after 1925, arrival as a child, marriage to a native-born individual. The huge cohorts of the 1910s provide a baseline for appreciating that even then 20-25% of cohort members had a parent who had arrived as a child, or had married a native-born American. Thereafter, however, the relevant proportion rises quickly: to 36%, 53%, 65% and 81% in succeeding cohorts. Should we chose to focus only on conditions of arrival - on immigrants who arrived as children or after 1924 - we find that they comprised 14-15% in the 1910s, 23% and 36% in the two birth cohorts of the 1920s, and 48% and 64% in the two birth cohorts of the 1930s. [\(14\)](#)

A cohort in which nearly two-thirds are the children of child-arrivals, or post-1925 arrivals, and in which another sixth had a native-born parent dramatically different from a cohort in which these proportions stand at 14 and 20%. And when we are asked whether the present-day cohorts resemble those children of the 'last wave of immigration' does the questioner have in mind a cohort in which 80% have the characteristics indicated? For many purposes, we may wish to exclude the cohorts born after a certain year--or example after 1930. However, the chief point is not to urge an arbitrary cutpoint but to urge sensitivity to the implications of changing cohort composition.

RECONSIDERATION OF TWO IMPORTANT STUDIES IN THE LIGHT OF CHANGES IN COHORT COMPOSITION

Liebersohn's Comparisons of Education Among SCE and Black Cohorts: A Reanalysis

Whatever unites all 'second generation experiences' is surely partly undercut by such differences across cohorts. A particularly important case in point pertains to the use of succeeding cohorts of 'second generation members' to make a point about change over time, concluding that the changes are due to differences in historical periods, rather than in the cohorts themselves, because the cohort from one set of birth years and the cohort from a later set of birth years both include 'second generation members.' A central feature of Stanley Liebersohn's *A Piece of the Pie* is a comparison of the educational attainments of SCE second-generation members and northern-born blacks. Did the children of laborers from rural, less-developed to urban, more-developed societies end up with comparable schooling regardless of American race relations, or did the racial differences swamp the similarities? Liebersohn

makes the comparison across several birth cohorts and finds that on the whole, black educational attainments held up reasonably well in this comparison - until the most recent birth cohort that he studied, the 1925-35 cohort, when the SCE second generation pulled well ahead of the black cohort. Lieberman concludes that there was a hardening of racial barriers during the years that this last cohort was growing up. The timing fits reasonably well with increases in the black populations of northern cities. The conclusion is certainly not implausible; however, one can easily imagine a series of explanations for why the opposite finding would not have seemed implausible either (that educational gaps had been greater in earlier cohorts and narrowed in the the forties). To put it differently, the result of the empirical analysis of birth cohort data leads Lieberman to search for the historical changes in this period. But do the birth cohort data take the form they do because of changes for the worse in the social realities facing the black birth cohorts or because of unobserved changes in the composition of the SCE second-generation cohorts?

In the 1916-25 cohort, 3/10s had a parent with one or more of the three characteristics I have been discussing; in the 1926-35 cohort, the comparable figure is nearly double (58%). We cannot fully explore the impact of these differences upon the outcomes Lieberman so carefully explored, because we do not know, for the adult members of the cohort, which ones were the children of immigrants who had themselves arrived in the United States as children. On the other hand, we can distinguish native-born of foreign parentage (nbfp) from native-born of mixed parentage (nbmp); and with the help of the 1960 IPUMS, we can conduct an analysis very similar to Lieberman's (see Table 10). I limit attention to the three most numerous of the SCE second generation groups I have defined (excluding the Jews): the Italians, Poles and 'all others' from central and eastern Europe (a category which, it will be recalled, is constructed in a way that excludes both the Germans and the Russians).

In each of the 12 comparisons, the mean educational attainment of the native-born of mixed parentage exceeds (as expected) that of the native born of foreign parentage (Table 10, Panel A, col. c). However, for Lieberman's argument, the crucial issue is whether the *improvement across birth cohorts* in attainments is reduced if we examine only the native-born of foreign born parentage rather than the native-born of foreign born and mixed parentage. The crucial comparison, then, is found in the six rows marked 'diff: cohorts' in columns a and d. These comparisons show that Lieberman was not misled by studying the native-born second generation of both foreign and mixed parentage. Three of the comparisons show negligible differences, three others show quite modest differences, only two in the expected direction. The same conclusion follows from a comparison of the mean educational attainment of blacks born in the north with these SCE second generation groups.⁽¹⁵⁾ The increase in mean black educational attainment across the two cohorts is quite similar for males and females: .44 and .35 respectively; however, the smallest increase among the native born of foreign parentage is .73. And finally, Panel B of Table 10 shows the comparisons in terms of the net difference index, the measure which Lieberman used in this context. The same conclusions emerge. In each of the twelve comparisons of an SCE group and blacks, the ND favors the SCE group more when the native born of mixed parentage are included; yet it is also true that the *improvement* in the SCE advantage over time is actually *greater* among males and almost unchanged among females when the comparison is limited to the native born of foreign parentage; the native born of mixed parentage differed less across cohorts than did the native born of foreign parentage.

Insofar as I can reanalyze the Lieberman conclusions, then, they hold up despite the changing proportion of mixed parentage members in the cohorts. The test I offer is incomplete because it does not capture the impact of the other changes in the parental composition of the cohorts, namely the proportions of second-generation members born to immigrants who arrived as children or arrived after 1925. However, the unmeasured changes in the composition of the cohorts (to judge by row 2c of Table 9) affect only about a fifth of the cohort (comparing the columns for 1916-25 and 1926-35). Also many in this fifth are in fact also the ones who are the native-born of mixed parentage, whom we were able to isolate from the others in the preceding analysis (compare proportions in rows 2c and 2d.1 and 2d.2). So I would not expect dramatically different results with perfect data; the partial tests that I could undertake, to repeat, leave his conclusion intact.

Alba's Discussion of Cohorts and Generations

Richard Alba's discussion of cohort differences, in *Italian Americans* as well as in a later paper, stresses historical changes across cohorts that go well beyond what one can capture with the notion of 'generation' (as distance in family time from immigration) or ancestry (single vs.

mixed) (Alba 1985, 1988). For example, controlling for generation and ancestry, SCE second-generation members born after 1960 were 3.66 times as likely as those born before 1916 to have English (rather than an ancestral language) as their mother tongue. Alba emphasizes that cohort differences are related to 'historical change;' but it is important, I think, to distinguish here between two types of historical changes (Alba mentions them both, but his larger goals do not require him to distinguish between them). One type of change is due to major historical events in the social context generally: the Great Depression, the Second World War. The other type of change has to do with the composition of the cohorts: more second-generation children grow up in intermarried households, or with immigrant parents who had come to the United States as children themselves.

Now these latter changes too result indirectly from 'major historical changes,' for example, changes in immigration laws; but do the mother-tongue changes derive directly from major historical shifts such as the changes in American openness to ethnics after World War II or experiences of geographic mobility in depression and war, or do they derive from the fact that more later-cohort members were in effect members of the 2.5 generation, the children of child immigrants?⁽¹⁶⁾

THE SCE SECOND GENERATION AND THE HISTORICAL CATAclysms OF 1930-45

Whether we take the most expansive definition of the SCE second generation, the 11.6 million born 1871-1970, or a narrower one covering the 8.7 million born 1891-1930, the years 1930-45 were pivotal in the history of the group. However, even with the narrower definition, it will be hard to generalize about how these people encountered depression and war. Nearly 3 in ten were under the age of 10 in 1930; 37% more were 10-20 years of age, the largest group. The oldest third were over 20: about twice as many of them were 20-30 in age as those 30-40 years (Table 6b). Thus, only the oldest eighth or so entered the Depression when they were over 30 years of age, and two thirds entered it when they were under 20. War caught each of these age groups some ten years older; about a quarter must have been under 18 at the time, and another tenth over 40 years of age. Nearly 60% of the men must have been of military age. By the end of the Second World War, perhaps a fifth were still under 18, an eighth over 40, and nearly two thirds between 20 and 40. The long boom years after the war thus touched them all in the labor force, and a very considerable majority of them went through those years somewhere between ages 20 and 40.

Thus, some experienced the Depression as young workers, some as children. Most experienced the boom years (if they got through the War) as young adults. Considering the scale of the immigration, it is impressive that 85% of the more narrowly-defined second generation (born 1891-1930) were born in a mere three decades. However, considering, that the transformations of 1930-45 occurred in a mere 15 years, the way in which our subjects passed through the crises of those years and after will have varied in important ways across the birth cohorts, and we will understand their experiences only if we seek generalizations sensitive to the differences among a seemingly narrow band of birth cohorts.

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NOTES

1. The 1890 manuscript schedules were destroyed in a fire, and the 1930 schedules have not yet been made available to researchers.
2. That more are so listed in 1940 than in 1970 (when, given the decline of ancestral languages over time, we might have expected the reverse) is a nice demonstration of the impact of the shifting formulations of census questions: the 1970 question (which asked about a language in the home in earliest childhood *other than English*) elicited more responses indicating an ancestral language had been present than the 1940 formulation of the question did (which asked merely about a language in the home in earliest childhood).
3. The same is true to a lesser extent for the Germans.
4. Among the Canadians, only 1% came from French Canadian background, which one might want to object should not be considered an 'old immigration' group. So too, among the Germans some, no doubt, came from further east than Germans had come in the past; but these are nevertheless Germans defined by race or people (Poles, even if living within the German Empire, for example, would not be classified here).
5. From Table 1, column b4. The Jews comprised 14% and the entire SCE group 58% of total

permanent immigration 1899-1924; $.14/.58=.24$.

6. Later, during and after World War I, the proportion of Jews among these 'other' immigrants increases somewhat, but the total contribution of these later years to the number of immigrants is simply not large enough to undercut the strategy of identifying the children of 'other' central and eastern Europeans as non-Jews in the censuses. Another complication arises in connection with the post-War arrivals from the new state of Poland, a very high proportion of whom were Jews; but with regard to identifying second generation members, the same point applies: the late immigration is simply too small to reduce our confidence in identifying those born in 'Poland' as non-Jews. This is especially so for those born earlier rather than later, for example, before 1935.

7. I could also have used the 1910 rather than the 1900 dataset to draw sample members for the cohort born in the 1880s; however I did not do so, for two reasons. First, the cohort members would have been still further from their childhood (20-29 in 1910, older than any sample members included in this analysis) and second, so few relevant second-generation members were born before the 1890s that it hardly seemed worth gaining the refinement of the mother tongue data for their consideration.

8. The correction factors for mortality, derived from summary data on American infant and child mortality in Bogue (1985), were: under age 1, .91; ages 1-4, .96; ages 10-14, 1.01; and ages 15-19, 1.02.

9. Moreover, the SCE proportion was only as high as it was because during these years alone, the 'other southern' Europeans comprised a large fraction of the total SCE group (about two fifths of all SCE immigrants in the period--see Table 5B).

10. My point is not that the later arrivals necessarily had an easier time of it; after all, arrivals in the thirties began their stay during the the Great Depression. But if one were to model the process of early and later arrival, the Depression would be an exogenous variable.

11. In theory, this pattern could exist at any point after an immigration stream has existed for some time - a decade or two. However, in fact the pattern is only of interest in connection with the very end of the SCE immigration wave. The SCE immigration was concentrated in a fifteen year period, and it grew in magnitude from year to year. Thus *before 1915* the numbers from a particular birth cohort who had arrived as children was always tiny in comparison to the number of immigrants from the same birth cohort who arrived in a later year (but still before 1915) as adults. However, in other immigration waves, the pattern could be different.

12. Less troubling is another factor that will distinguish the latter second generation cohorts: they may include more children of parents who delayed childbearing and more younger children from large families. These factors may sometimes be worth attention, but they are not factors that might lead us to think that the parents are not part of the group we had in mind in speaking of members of the immigration wave.

13. I could have selected any age - those arriving by age 6, or by age 17; but 14 seems a good single indicator for a dichotomous classification, if reasonably conservative -- arrival in childhood/arrival as an adult. Note too that in considering the year of parent arrival, I assumed that all parents arriving by the 1940 census had arrived by 1934; I could not get evidence on arrival between 1935-40 from the 1970 census since that census dealt with 1935-44 as one period. Had I estimated arrivals for 1935-40, the conclusions drawn from Table 9 about late arrivals would be that much stronger.

14. Note also that in these are conservative methods of estimation, both because they assume that none of the parents arrived between 1935 and 1940 (an assumption made because of the way the 1970 census per iodization of arrival times was construction) and because the estimations treat the 1915-24 period like the pre-1915, rather than like the post-1924, period.

15. Because of the way the census publication was constructed, Lieberman's comparison was actually limited to nonwhites (rather than only blacks) born in the northeast and the northcentral regions (Lieberman 1980,161-2); I have constructed my comparison group of blacks in the same way. The NDs presented here differ slightly from those in Lieberman's study since they derive from the IPUMS datasets, not from census publications which were based on somewhat different subsets of the population (different numbers of respondents to the long

form of the census questionnaire).

16. The distinction changes of a broad historical nature and those in cohort composition is sometimes harder to maintain than in the preceding example; for example, consider the immigrant parents who arrived after 1924. Assume that, as I speculated earlier they, as part of the small group of late arrivals, advanced more rapidly than those who preceded them. These would be the results of compositional changes but those changes were due directly to the major shift in American immigration restriction after World War I.

Table 1. Overview of Immigration to the United States, by 'Race or People', 1899-1924 (in 000s)								
'Race or People'	Immigration				Estimated permanent immigration (net of remigration)			
	Number		group as % of all		Number		group as % of all	
	counts for groups aggregated in col. a2	counts for groups studied			counts for groups aggregated in col. b2	counts for groups studied		
	(a1)	(a2)	(a3)	(a4)	(b1)	(b2)	(b3)	(b4)
ALL GROUPS (SCE + NON-SCE)		17291		100		12309		100
SCE GROUPS		10912		63		7138		58
A1. Central and Eastern Europe								
Polish		1483		9		934		8
Hebrew		1838		11		1759		14
All other Central and Eastern European		2795		16		1856		15
Russian	259		1		91		1	
Slovak	537		3		341		3	
Croatian/Slovenian	485		3		309		3	
Magyar	492		3		263		2	
Ruthenian	265		2		221		2	
Lithuanian	263		2		210		2	
Finnish	227		1		177		1	
Bohemian/Moravian	159		1		135		1	
Rumanian	148		1		50		0	
Dalmatian/Bosnian/Herzogovian	52		0		38		0	
Bulgarian/Serbian/M Montngrn	165		1		21		0	
A2. Southern European								
Italian		3821		22		2079		17
All Other Southern Europeans		975		6		511		4
Greek	500		3		232		2	
Armenian	76		0		62		1	
Portuguese	186		1		121		1	
Spanish	191		1		92		1	
Turkish	22		0		4		0	
NON -SCE GROUPS		6378		37		5172		42

German		1317		8		1136		9
NW Europe and Canada		3938		23		3282		27
Scandinavian	956		6		809		7	
British	984		6		785		6	
Irish	809		5		737		6	
Canadian -- Anglo	568		3		467		4	
Canadian --French	257		1		236		2	
Dutch/Flemish	206		1		167		1	
French	158		1		82		1	
All Other immigrants		1124		6		753		6
Mexican	447		3		339		3	
African	135		1		99		1	
Japanese	260		2		193		2	
Syrian	98		1		75		1	
Cuban	77		0		39		0	
West Indian	29		0		15		0	
Korean	9		0		8		0	
East Indian	8		0		5		0	
Pacific Islander	0		0		0		0	
Chinese	59		0		-19		0	

NOTES.

1. This table is a reorganization of Table V-3 in Thomas J. Archdeacon, *Becoming American: An Ethnic History* New York, 1983.

Archdeacon in turn used the data in Imre Ferenczi, comp., *International Migrations*, vol. 1: Statistics (New York, 1929), Tables 13 and 19).

2. Note that figures in column a were only available from 1899, although the new immigration is commonly dated from a decade earlier.

3. Figures in column b are an estimate derived by Archdeacon as follows.

col b = col a * (1-[r/v]) where r= the average annual emigration (1908-1924) and v=the average annual immigration (1899-1924).

Table 2. Immigrants Defined by 'Race or People' as Poles or Hebrews, by Country of Origin, 1901-24

Country of origin	'Race or people'	Time period				
		1901-05	1906-10	1911-15	1916-20	1921-24
<i>A. Poles and Hebrews as percentage of all immigrants from country</i>						
Russia	All	100	100	100	100	100
	Poles	27	28	31	3	2
	Hebrews	44	44	35	43	55
Other CEEur	All	100	100	100	100	100
	Poles	17	17	17	11	1
	Hebrews	11	6	7	14	21
Germany	All	100	100	100	100	100
	Poles	11	8	8	2	0
	Hebrews	1	2	3	4	3
Poland	All					100
	Poles					28
	Hebrew					69
<i>B. Number of all immigrants from these countries (000s)</i>						
Russia	All	659	939	894	28	100
Other CEEur	All	997	1320	974	18	265
Germany	All	177	165	138	6	154
Poland	All					179
All the above	All	1833	2424	2006	52	698
<i>C. Estimated total immigrants, 1881-1924:</i>		(millions)				
All	Poles		1.63			
All	East.+Centr. European Jews		2.33			

Panel C includes immigrants from all countries (not just the four shown above).

NOTES.

Panels A and B From *International Migrations (IM)*. See also notes to Table 1.

Panel C. Jews: estimated from S. Joseph, *Jewish Immigration for 1881-1898* and on *IM* for 1899-1924. See also S. Kuznets, "Immigration of Russian Jews."

Poles: estimated from *Historical Statistics* for 1881-1898 and *IM* for 1899-1924. While most Poles arrived after 1900, the figure estimated for 1881-1898 (0.15 million) probably understate Polish arrivals -- since some were listed only as from Russia, Austro-Hungary, or Germany.

Table 3. Classifying the Second Generation of Central and Eastern-European Origin Using Parental Birthplace and Mother Tongue, Using the Cohort 0-9 in 1920

Mother Tongue		Parents' Countries of Origin (Numbers in 000s)											
		Poland	Finland	Austria	Bulgaria	Czechslv.	Hungary	Rumania	Yugoslavia	Latvia	Lithuania	Russia	Germ
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
1	Blank	28	5	31	0	7	5	9	3	2	5	54	41
2	English												
3	nec	1	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
4	Yiddish	30	0	28	1	0	6	10	0	2	9	260	1
5	Polish	524	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	25	5
6	Russian (+Ukr.)	28	0	19	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	116	0
7	Rumanian	0	0	1	0	0	1	11	0	0	0	0	0
8	Czech	2	0	6	0	52	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	Slovak	3	0	80	0	71	22	0	4	0	0	0	0
10	Serbocroatian	0	0	15	0	0	1	0	30	0	0	0	0
11	Slovenian	0	0	14	0	3	1	0	20	0	0	0	0
12	Lithuanian	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	70	22	0
13	Slavic, n.s.	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	Armenian												
15	Finnish	0	54	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	Hungarian	0	0	15	0	2	103	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	German	13	0	58	0	2	33	0	1	0	0	50	13
18	Total	630	64	315	1	138	173	29	59	4	88	538	18

Rules for coding ethnicity:

1) When mother tongue data available
Poles : row 5 and cells a1-a3.
Jews from the region: row 4.
Russians, n. e. c. (many Jews): cells k1-k3
Germans : row 17 *except* cell k17 and cells l1-l3.
All other central and eastern Europeans : all other cells
 = (shaded cells)

2) When mother tongue data not available (detailed in Table 4)
Poles: Column a
Jews: n. a.
Russians, n.e.c.: Column k
Germans: Column l
Other CEEur.: Columns b-j

NOTE: Table based on the 1920 IPUMS sample, including native-born children, 0-9 years of age, of foreign or mixed parentage

Table 4. Availability of Census Data for Studying Young Second-Generation Birth Cohorts
 Shaded datasets used; datasets in bold include mother tongue information

Age of birth cohorts	Second-generation birth cohorts:										
	1871-80	1881-90	1891-95	1896-1900	1901-10	1911-20	1921-30	1931-40	1941-50	1951-60	1961-70
in IPUMS datasets											
Relevant IPUMS datasets that could be considered for each cohort:											
age 0-9	1880	n. a.	1900	1900	1910	1920	n. a.	1940	1950	1960	1970
age 10-19	n. a.	1900	1910	1910	1920	n. a.	1940	1950	1960	1970	n. a.

Note:
 The precise formulation of the mother tongue question varied over time. See text for details.

Table 5. Immigrants to the United States by Country of Origin for Five-Year Periods, 1871-1930.

Five-year period	Countries (figures in 000s)							
	Central and Eastern Europe, excluding Germany	Italy	Other south Eur.	ALL SCE immigrants (cols a, b, c)	Germany	NWEur+Can	All other	Total
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
A. Numbers of immigrants expressed in 000s								
1871-5	57	27	10	94	508	1041	84	1727
1876-80	69	29	11	109	210	695	72	1086
1881-86	232	110	11	353	960	1587	77	2977
1886-90	395	198	14	607	493	1132	40	2272
1891-95	616	288	26	930	398	746	50	2124
1896-00	595	364	26	985	108	396	76	1565
1901-05	1656	960	91	2707	177	769	181	3834
1906-10	2259	1086	174	3519	165	979	299	4962
1911-15	1868	939	199	3006	138	1007	309	4460
1916-20	51	171	152	374	6	589	308	1277
1921-5	513	372	101	986	194	1048	410	2638
1926-30	104	84	20	208	218	748	295	1469
total	8415	4628	835	13878	3575	10737	2201	30391
B. Percentage of period's immigrants from each country								
1871-5	3	2	1	5	29	60	5	100

1876-80	6	3	1	10	19	64	7	100
1881-86	8	4	0	12	32	53	3	100
1886-90	17	9	1	27	22	50	2	100
1891-95	29	14	1	44	19	35	2	100
1896-00	38	23	2	63	7	25	5	100
1901-05	43	25	2	71	5	20	5	100
1906-10	46	22	4	71	3	20	6	100
1911-15	42	21	4	67	3	23	7	100
1916-20	4	13	12	29	0	46	24	100
1921-5	19	14	4	37	7	40	16	100
1926-30	7	6	1	14	15	51	20	100
total	28	15	3	46	12	35	7	100

C. Percentage of country's immigrants arriving in each period

1871-5	1	1	1	1	14	10	4	6
1876-80	1	1	1	1	6	6	3	4
1881-86	3	2	1	3	27	15	3	10
1886-90	5	4	2	4	14	11	2	7
1891-95	7	6	3	7	11	7	2	7
1896-00	7	8	3	7	3	4	3	5
1901-05	20	21	11	20	5	7	8	13
1906-10	27	23	21	26	5	9	14	16
1911-15	22	20	24	22	4	9	14	15
1916-20	1	4	18	2	0	5	14	4
1921-5	6	8	12	7	5	10	19	9
1926-30	1	2	2	1	6	7	13	5
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Notes to panels A-C.
Column a Includes Poland (counted separately before 1899 and after 1919), the Russian Empire and after 1919 U.S.S.R., Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland), Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Europe, Austro-Hungarian Empire (and after 1919 Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia)
Column c Includes Spain, Portugal, Greece, and other Europe, n.e.c.
Column f Includes Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and France.
 Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland.

D. The post-1914 immigration in detail

Year	SCE immigrants (000s)	Year	SCE imm.	Year	SCE imm.
1915	119	1920	159	1925	23
1916	95	1921	514	1926	29
1917	95	1922	137	1927	42
1918	18	1923	151	1928	42
1919	7	1924	161	1929	44
				1930	50

Table 6. The Size and Composition of Second-Generation Birth Cohorts, 1871-1970

A. Population counts: native-born children of one or two foreign-born parents ("foreign-born or mixed parentage")

Birth Cohort	Second-generation ethnic group (defined by parental birthplace and, for groups in cols. 1-4, by mother tongue when available)											
	1.Poles	2. Jews	Russia, n.e.c.	4. Other CEEur	5. Italy	6. Other S. Europe	7.Germans	8.NW Eur Canada	9. All Other	All SCE (cols 1-6)	Non-SCE (cols. 7-9)	Total (cols. 1-9)
1871-80	32		11	69	16	8	1222	2050	41	136	3312	3448
1881-90	66		50	130	49	16	1408	2102	48	312	3558	3870
1891-95	79	72	18	138	80	13	680	1130	43	400	1854	2254
1896-1900	95	98	28	178	111	16	607	1087	52	527	1746	2273
1901-05	126	115	36	240	184	18	523	978	71	720	1572	2292
1906-10	198	169	54	352	316	28	447	911	87	1117	1446	2563
1911-15	325	187	52	513	460	44	346	842	90	1582	1278	2860
1916-20	376	152	77	513	475	66	253	710	130	1658	1094	2752
1921-25	324	98	114	374	542	83	167	605	211	1536	983	2519
1926-30	213	58	117	251	470	74	134	514	216	1183	864	2047
1931-35	110	38	85	159	306	54	91	428	185	752	703	1455
1936-40	53	21	48	103	157	33	70	313	157	413	540	953
1941-50	89		112	114	222	49	118	557	411	586	1086	1672
1951-60	81		36	132	177	46	162	614	569	472	1345	1817
1961-70	25	6	4	56	79	38	118	274	461	207	853	1061
TOTAL	2192	1015	842	3322	3644	586	6347	13116	2772	11600	22235	33835

B. Each cohort as percentage of all second generation from group

1871-80	1		1	2	0	1	19	16	1	1	15	10
1881-90	3		6	4	1	3	22	16	2	3	16	11
1891-95	4	7	2	4	2	2	11	9	2	3	8	7
1896-1900	4	10	3	5	3	3	10	8	2	5	8	7
1901-05	6	11	4	7	5	3	8	7	3	6	7	7
1906-10	9	17	6	11	9	5	7	7	3	10	7	8
1911-15	15	18	6	15	13	8	5	6	3	14	6	8
1916-20	17	15	9	15	13	11	4	5	5	14	5	8
1921-25	15	10	14	11	15	14	3	5	8	13	4	7
1926-30	10	6	14	8	13	13	2	4	8	10	4	6
1931-35	5	4	10	5	8	9	1	3	7	6	3	4
1936-40	2	2	6	3	4	6	1	2	6	4	2	3
1941-50	4		13	3	6	8	2	4	15	5	5	5
1951-60	4		4	4	5	8	3	5	21	4	6	5
1961-70	1	1	1	2	2	6	2	2	17	2	4	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

C. Each group as percentage of entire second-generation birth cohort (based on panel A, FBMP)

1871-80	1		0	2	0	0	35	59	1	4	96	100
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1881-90	2		1	3	1	0	36	54	1	8	92	100
1891-95	4	3	1	6	4	1	30	50	2	18	82	100
1896-1900	4	4	1	8	5	1	27	48	2	23	77	100
1901-05	5	5	2	10	8	1	23	43	3	31	69	100
1906-10	8	7	2	14	12	1	17	36	3	44	56	100
1911-15	11	7	2	18	16	2	12	29	3	55	45	100
1916-20	14	6	3	19	17	2	9	26	5	60	40	100
1921-25	13	4	5	15	22	3	7	24	8	61	39	100
1926-30	10	3	6	12	23	4	7	25	11	58	42	100
1931-35	8	3	6	11	21	4	6	29	13	52	48	100
1936-40	6	2	5	11	16	3	7	33	16	43	57	100
1941-50	5		7	7	13	3	7	33	25	35	65	100
1951-60	4		2	7	10	3	9	34	31	26	74	100
1961-70	2	1	0	5	7	4	11	26	43	20	80	100
TOTAL	6	3	2	10	11	2	19	39	8	34	66	100

Table 7. Second-generation of Mixed Nativity (one native-born, one foreign-born parent)

A. Percentage mixed in each cohort of each group

Birth Cohort	Second-generation ethnic group											
	1.Poles	2. Jews	Russia, n.e.c.	4. Other CEEur	5. Italy	6. Other S. Europe	7.Germans	8.NW Eur Canada	9. All Other	All SCE (cols 1-6)	Non-SCE (cols. 7-9)	Total (cols. 1-9)
1871-80	8		6	14	23	37	26	34	33	14	31	31
1881-90	6		0	20	9	24	38	41	63	12	40	38
1891-95	2	0	28	13	9	26	40	41	52	9	41	35
1896-1900	1	0	32	11	9	24	44	44	42	8	44	36
1901-05	1	0	43	12	8	21	48	49	33	9	48	36
1906-10	0	0	50	11	8	28	53	51	30	9	50	32
1911-15	13	0	58	13	10	15	54	53	28	12	51	30
1916-20	13	0	58	15	11	16	53	59	25	14	54	30
1921-25	17	4	42	22	18	23	55	60	27	20	52	32
1926-30	31	14	52	34	30	28	50	60	30	32	51	40
1931-35	40	11	55	45	41	34	57	66	37	42	57	49
1936-40	58	22	54	66	57	55	57	69	45	57	61	59
1941-50	63		50	68	65	55	62	77	47	62	64	63
1951-60	54		47	58	75	64	78	84	71	63	78	74
1961-70	51	22	71	59	54	56	76	77	54	55	65	63
TOTAL	19	2	46	23	26	33	43	51	47	24	48	40

B. Percentage SCE among

	All 2nd gen (NBFMP)	NBFP	NBMP	
1871-80	4	5	2	
1881-90	8	11	3	
1891-95	18	25	4	
1896-1900	23	33	5	
1901-05	31	45	8	
1906-10	44	59	12	
1911-15	55	69	22	
1916-20	60	74	28	
1921-25	61	72	37	
1926-30	58	65	47	
1931-35	52	59	44	
1936-40	43	45	42	
1941-50	35	36	34	
1951-60	26	36	22	
1961-70	20	24	17	
TOTAL	34	43	20	

NOTE: NBFMP= Native-born of foreign or mixed parentage (the counts and percentages for this group are shown in Table 6 as well as in the first column of this panel; also they comprise the denominator in panel a of this table. NBFP= Native-born of foreign parentage (both parents foreign-born) NBMP= Native-born of mixed parentage (one parent foreign-born, the other native-born)

Table 8. Timing of Arrival: Female SCE Immigrants by Age and Date of Arrival

Immigrant's year of birth	Immigrant's highest possible age upon arrival				Year in which these immigrants reached age				Proportion of all immigrants born in this year (from 1970 census)				
	arrived by 1914	arrived 1915-24	arrived 1925-34	arrived 1935-44	21	28	35	40	arrived by 1914	arrived 1915-24	arrived 1925-34	arrived 1935-44	Total: pre '14-'44
1890	25	35	45	55	1911	1918	1925	1930	81	14	5	1	100
1891	24	34	44	54	1912	1919	1926	1931	82	13	3	2	100
1892	23	33	43	53	1913	1920	1927	1932	79	15	4	2	100
1893	22	32	42	52	1914	1921	1928	1933	78	16	4	2	100
1894	21	31	41	51	1915	1922	1929	1934	78	17	4	2	100
1895	20	30	40	50	1916	1923	1930	1935	78	18	4	1	100
1896	19	29	39	49	1917	1924	1931	1936	73	20	4	3	100
1897	18	28	38	48	1918	1925	1932	1937	68	26	5	2	100
1898	17	27	37	47	1919	1926	1933	1938	66	25	5	3	100
1899	16	26	36	46	1920	1927	1934	1939	61	27	9	3	100
1900	15	25	35	45	1921	1928	1935	1940	54	34	9	3	100
1901	14	24	34	44	1922	1929	1936	1941	53	37	10	3	100
1902	13	23	33	43	1923	1930	1937	1942	51	36	10	3	100
1903	12	22	32	42	1924	1931	1938	1943	49	36	10	4	100
1904	11	21	31	41	1925	1932	1939	1944	48	35	11	6	100
1905	10	20	30	40	1926	1933	1940	1945	48	34	13	5	100
1906	9	19	29	39	1927	1934	1941	1946	49	31	15	5	100
1907	8	18	28	38	1928	1935	1942	1947	49	29	15	7	100
1908	7	17	27	37	1929	1936	1943	1948	44	30	18	8	100
1909	6	16	26	36	1930	1937	1944	1949	45	29	19	7	100
1910	5	15	25	35	1931	1938	1945	1950	42	32	20	6	100
1911	4	14	24	34	1932	1939	1946	1951	33	35	24	8	100
1912	3	13	23	33	1933	1940	1947	1952	34	37	19	10	100
1913	2	12	22	32	1934	1941	1948	1953	31	43	16	10	100
1914	1	11	21	31	1935	1942	1949	1954	18	52	21	9	100

Table 9. Composition of the Second-Generation SCE Cohorts Born During 1911-40: Their Parents' Immigration Experiences NBFMP

	SCE Second-generation birth cohorts					
	1911-5	1916-20	1921-5	1926-30	1931-5	1936-40
1. Population size (000s)	1582	1658	1536	1183	752	413
2. Percentages of cohort (est. for 1921-40)						
(a) with foreign-born parent who arrived after 1924	0	0	3	5	7	11
(b) with foreign-born parent who arrived by 1924, but at age 0 - 13	14	15	20	31	41	53
(c) subtotal: 2a+2b	14	15	23	36	48	64
(d) who were nbmp (had one native-born parent)	12	14	18	32	43	59
(d.1) who were nbmp and also found in rows 2a or 2b	6	6	5	15	26	42
(d.2) who were nbmp and not found in rows 2a or 2b	6	8	13	17	17	17
(e) Total: rows 2a+2b+2d.2	20	23	36	53	65	81

NOTES to Table 9.

nbmp= native-born of mixed parentage (one foreign-born, one native-born parent)

Row 1: From the appropriate cohorts found in the 1920 IPUMS (ages 0-4, 5-9) and in the 1940 IPUMS (ages 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19)

Rows 2a -2e:for the cohorts taken from the 1920 IPUMS, calculated from parents' age, year of arrival and place of birth. The year of arrival question was not asked in the 1940 census. So, for the cohorts taken from that census, rows 2a-f are estimated as follows.

In each of the four SCE second-generation cohorts selected from the 1940 IPUMS let Pfy=proportion of all fathers born in a given year (1940 IPUMS)

Pmy=proportion of all mothers born in a given year (1940 IPUMS)

Wf=proportion of all second-generation members whose ethnicity is based on the father (weight for fathers: the default)

Wm= proportion of all second-generation members whose ethnicity is based on the mother (weight for mothers: used when father is native-born or absent) and let, for each year of birth and each sex:

a, b c= proportion of all SCE immigrants who arrived by 1914, 1915-24, 1925-34 respectively (1970 IPUMS, 5% questionnaire)

d = proportion of all immigrants who arrived when they were less than 14 years of age and arrived by 1914 (1920 IPUMS)

e =proportion of all immigrants who arrived when they were less than 14 years of age and arrived 1915-24

(proportions for arrivals by 1914 are used as proxy).

then:

Sfc = sum, across all years of fathers' birth, Pfy*c

Smc=sum, across all years of mother's birth, Pmy*c

Sfab=sum, across all years of father's birth, Pfy*(a*d +b*e)

Smab=sum, across all years of mothers' birth, Pmy*(a*d+b*e)

and

row 2a= Wf*Sfc + Wm*Smc

row 2b=Wf*Sfab+Wm*Smab

row 2c= row 2a+row 2b

row 2d available directly from the 1940 IPUMS

row 2d.1 calculated as in rows 2a and 2b, but with the IPUMS sample restricted to nbmp cohort members

row 2d.2=row2d-row2d.1

row 2e=row 2a + row 2b + row 2d.2

Figures in row 2d differ slightly from the comparable cells in Table 7C, because in this table only sample members living with a parent are included, and because of rounding

Table 10. Differences in the 1960 Census between the Educational Attainments of the 1926-35 and 1916-25 Birth Cohorts SCE groups by nbfp vs nbmp

<i>A. Differences in highest grade completed (mean)</i>						
Group	Sex	cohort	type of second generation members			
			nbfp (a)	nbmp (b)	diff: a-b (c)	all (d)
Italians	Male	1916-25	10.638	11.119	0.481	10.726
		1926-35	11.37	11.793	0.423	11.524
		diff: cohorts	0.732	0.674		0.798
	Female	1916-25	10.184	10.795	0.611	10.298
		1926-35	11.061	11.45	0.389	11.194
		diff: cohorts	0.877	0.655		0.896
Poles	Male	1916-25	10.754	10.987	0.233	10.79
		1926-35	11.939	12.109	0.17	11.995
		diff: cohorts	1.185	1.122		1.205
	Female	1916-25	10.308	10.689	0.381	10.375
		1926-35	11.513	11.7	0.187	11.575
		diff: cohorts	1.205	1.011		1.2
Other CEE	Male	1916-25	11.308	11.845	0.537	11.423
		1926-35	12.237	12.638	0.401	12.395
		diff: cohorts	0.929	0.793		0.972
	Female	1916-25	10.843	11.643	0.8	11.009
		1926-35	11.763	11.933	0.17	11.828
		diff: cohorts	0.92	0.29		0.819
blacks	Male	1916-25				10.311
		1926-35				10.751
		diff: cohorts				0.44
	Female	1916-25				10.543
		1926-35				10.892
		diff: cohorts				0.349

NOTE: all standard deviations are between 2 and 3.1.

B. Indices of net difference: SCE grps to blacks

			Poles	othercee	Italians
SCE	Male	191625	0.068	0.199	0.07
nbfmp		192635	0.239	0.331	0.165
		diff: cohorts	0.17	0.131	0.095
	Female	191625	-0.039	0.119	-0.044
		192635	0.175	0.238	0.086
		diff: cohorts	0.214	0.119	0.13
SCE	Male	191625	-0.02	0.104	-0.032

nbf		192635	0.23	0.306	0.133
		diff: cohorts	0.25	0.202	0.165
	Female	191625	-0.054	0.082	-0.07
		192635	0.165	0.219	0.053
		diff: cohorts	0.219	0.137	0.123
