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Optimal Search Auctions

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Optimal Search Auctions\textsuperscript{1}

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Abstract

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.
1 Introduction

Almost all the auction literature assumes that the set of bidders is either exogenous or determined in advance before the auction begins. However, auctions based on this assumption are in general suboptimal if the seller incurs costs when contacting prospective bidders. In this paper we study profit maximizing auctions in the presence of these costs. We characterize the order in which bidders are approached, and study the inefficiencies that arise due to the sequential nature of the process and due to the bidders’ private information about their values.

We consider a seller of a single indivisible good who faces a finite set of bidders. The types of the bidders are independently drawn, with ex post valuations interdependent across bidders as in Myerson [11]. Initially, prospective bidders are not even aware of the seller’s intention to sell the good. To attract their attention and allow them to participate, the seller must contact them and provide them with all the necessary information—in Section 2 we discuss several interpretations of this assumption. After being contacted by the seller and informed about the good for sale, each bidder privately learns his type before deciding whether or not to participate in the seller’s mechanism. Given that contacting prospective bidders is costly, it is generally not optimal to contact all bidders at once. For instance, if the expected valuation of an early bidder turns out to be sufficiently high, it is best to end the mechanism immediately and sell him the good without incurring further costs. Hence the seller designs a search mechanism that, contingent on history, specifies the order in which prospective bidders are contacted, the time at which the process ends, and the payments made by the participating bidders.

In Section 2, we introduce the model and notations for search mechanisms. In Section 3.1, we prove one of the main results, Theorem 1: the seller’s problem can be reduced to a standard search problem in which the payoff from search is measured in terms of the winner’s’ virtual utility rather than his actual utility. This result is nontrivial despite its well known counterpart in the static framework; the main complication in the proof is that the bidders’ incentive constraints depend on the dynamic stochastic nature of the seller’s optimal search problem.

The optimal search mechanisms we study here give rise to new types of distortions that are

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1Our model can be interpreted as a procurement model where a buyer wishes to buy a good from one of several suppliers whose types are independently drawn from bidder-specific distributions, and whose costs are interdependent.
completely absent in static mechanism design problems. In Sections 4.1–4.3, we present three of these distortions: we show that asymmetry of information leads to fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.

Section 4.4 presents another feature of optimal search auctions: When the ex post values of bidders are interdependent, the seller wants to delay the participation of “influential” bidders, whose types have a strong effect on the willingness of others to pay for the good.

Our findings extend existing results in traditional mechanism design theory by endogenizing the set of participants through a stochastic, history-contingent, search procedure.² Myerson [11] has characterized the optimal (profit maximizing) auctions in the case where the seller incurs no search cost when contacting potential bidders, so there is no loss to assume that they all participate. Hence his solution arises as a special case in our framework. McAfee and McMillan [9] characterize optimal search mechanisms in the special case where bidders are ex ante symmetric in terms of the search cost and the distribution of their types. Hence the sequence of entry and the resulting distortions which play a major role in our paper do not matter in their model. We allow bidders to be ex ante asymmetric so the sequence of entry is important, and we find some features of the optimal sequence in Sections 3.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Moreover, McAfee and McMillan assume that there is no discounting so that it does not hurt the seller to contact only one bidder at a time. We allow discounting so the seller may need to conduct parallel search.

Two other papers have also applied search theory to auction design. Burguet [4] considers a procurement model with private-value ex ante symmetric bidders who must decide whether or not to participate before knowing their types. In Crémer, Spiegel, and Zheng [6], we generalize Burguet’s results, in the context of an auction model, by allowing for the entry of multiple bidders at each stage and allowing for both interdependent valuation and asymmetric bidders. Unlike these two papers, which assume ex ante participation constraints, this paper uses interim participation constraints, as bidders are privately informed about their types during their participation decisions.

²Our analysis may also contribute to the optimal search literature by highlighting a new parallel search problem where the ex post social surplus from selling the good to a bidder depends on the signals of other potential bidders, whether they have participated or not. We have not found any work in that literature that considers this problem. Weitzman [16] and Vishwanath [15] considered only private values. Even for private values, the literature has no general characterization of optimal search procedures that allow multiple entrants per period, which we consider.
Other than McAfee and McMillan [9] and Burguet [4], we are the only ones optimizing over the rules of the auctions (as opposed to comparing specific auction formats) given the constraints of costly participation. Other important works on mechanism design with information acquisition or costly participation include Bergemann and Pesendorfer [1], Bergemann and Välimäki [2], Levin and Smith [8], and Ye [18]. (See Bergemann and Välimäki [3] for a recent survey.) Unlike these papers, which assume that the agents’ participation decisions are made independently of each other, this paper allows an agent’s entry decision to depend on the history of a mechanism. With this dynamic feature, our paper is somewhat related to Compte and Jehiel [5] and Rezende [13], who analyze the effect of information acquisition conducted during an exogenous bidding process.

There are a few other interesting papers on exogenous mechanisms with information acquisition or costly participation, including Gal, Landsberger, and Nemirovski [7], Stegeman [14], Pesendorfer and Wolinsky [12], and Wolinsky [17]. Unlike this paper and the aforementioned mechanism design literature, the participation or information acquisition decisions in these papers are not coordinated by a principal.

2 The Model

2.1 Search costs

A seller wants to sell an indivisible good to one out of a finite set $I$ of prospective bidders. Initially, bidders do not know the seller’s intention to sell the good and are not aware of the auction setting (the rules in the seller’s mechanism, who the other bidders are, how their valuations are distributed, etc.). In order to bring this information to a bidder $i$’s attention, the seller incurs a bidder-specific fixed cost $c_i > 0$, which we call search cost. While learning the information, the bidder also privately learns his type (which affects his ex post valuation for the good).

The cost $c_i$ has several possible interpretations. First, if the seller’s good is very complex (e.g., the controlling block of a state-owned enterprise), the seller may need to meet potential bidders in person and describe the good in detail. Moreover, the seller may need to pre-screen potential bidders to make sure that they meet certain criteria (e.g., ensure that the privatized state-
owned enterprise will be controlled by a qualified buyer who will be able to manage it properly). Second, although we consider an auction environment, our framework can be easily modified to a procurement environment in which a procurer wishes to procure an indivisible good from a set of potential suppliers. If the procurer’s needs are complex and hard to describe, he would need to understand exactly what each supplier can offer. For instance, consider a firm that wants to outsource a custom-made component; in some cases, rather than sending the description to a prospective supplier and asking for a price quote, it could be more efficient to ask for a description of the supplier’s manufacturing facilities and explain what type of steps need to be taken with these specific facilities in order to produce the good. The supplier can then provide a quote.\(^3\)

### 2.2 Utility functions and types

The value of the good to the seller is \(x_0\). For each bidder \(i\), nature draws a *type* \(x_i\) from a commonly known distribution \(F_i\), with density \(f_i\) and support \(X_i = [x_i, x_i]\), with \(f_i > 0\) over the interior of \(X_i\). Types are independent across \(i\). A vector of realized types

\[
x := (x_i)_{i \in I} \in \times_{i \in I} X_i := X
\]

is called a *realized state*. As in Myerson [11], given any \(x\), bidder \(i\)’s value of the good is equal to

\[
u_i(x) := x_i + \sum_{j \in I \setminus i} e_{ij}(x_j),
\]

where \(e_{ij}\) is a commonly known real function that reflects bidder \(j\)’s influence on bidder \(i\)’s value. Hence, bidder \(i\)’s value for the good depends not only on his own type, \(x_i\), but also on the types of other bidders through the functions \(\{e_{ij}(\cdot)\}_{j \in I \setminus i}\). Everyone’s discount factor is \(\delta \in (0, 1]\). If bidder \(i\) pays \(p_i^t\) dollars in period \(t\), then his utility from the viewpoint of period \(s\) is \(\delta^{t-s} u_i(x) - \sum_{i=s}^{\infty} \delta^{i-s} p_i^t\) if he gets the good in period \(t' \geq s\), and \(-\sum_{i=s}^{\infty} \delta^{i-s} p_i^t\) if he never gets it. The seller uses the same discount factor to evaluate his present discounted profit.

\(^3\)Another example might be a movie producer looking for a location to shoot a new movie. In order to get price quotes from the various potential locations, the producer needs to examine the exact facilities that each location can offer. Only then can the producer tell which facilities it would need and obtain a price quote.
2.3 Search mechanisms

When the seller needs to incur costs when contacting specific bidders, it is in general suboptimal (both socially and from the seller’s viewpoint) to commit in advance to a fixed set of participants without knowing the bidding history. Hence the seller picks a contingent plan that, based on the incumbents’ messages, specifies whether the seller should stop the mechanism and keep the good or to allocate it to an incumbent bidder, or whether the seller should continue and invite new bidders. Coupled with a payment scheme, such a contingent plan is called search mechanism. Note that parallel search is allowed since the seller can invite several entrants at once.

At the start of a search mechanism, in period 1, the seller contacts a set of entrants. If an entrant agrees to participate, he signs with the seller a binding contingency contract. Since he is privately informed before signing the contract, a bidder’s participation constraint is interim. Each period-1 entrant then sends the seller a message. Given these messages, either the mechanism stops and the seller keeps the good or allocates it to one of the period-1 entrants, or the mechanism continues to period 2 and more entrants are invited. Depending on the information disclosure policy that the seller adopts as part of the mechanism design problem, each period-2 entrant is told none, or part, or all of the messages sent by previous entrants. Given this information, each period-2 entrant decides whether to participate; if he does, he sends the seller a message. Depending on the messages sent in periods 1 and 2, the mechanism either continues and a new set of entrants is invited to participate in period 3, or the mechanism stops. In the latter case, the seller keeps the good or allocates it to one of the period-1 or period-2 entrants. The mechanism continues in a similar fashion until it stops and the good is allocated.

A revelation search mechanism is a search mechanism in which each bidder i’s message space is i’s type space. A search mechanism, as a multistage game, is equilibrium feasible if it has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A revelation search mechanism is incentive feasible if it has a PBE where every invited bidder participates and is truthful.

The next lemma allows us to restrict attention to revelation search mechanisms without loss. Its proof is similar to the proof of the standard revelation principle and hence is omitted.

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4We assume that a seller cannot make a buyer commit to a payment plan before the buyer knows his type. Otherwise, the buyer would be besieged by dishonest sellers selling him fake projects or goods of no value whatsoever.
Lemma 1 (Revelation Principle for Search Mechanisms). There exists an incentive feasible revelation search mechanism that replicates the equilibrium outcome of any equilibrium feasible search mechanism.

2.4 The notations and sequential nature of search mechanisms

Let a revelation search mechanism be given. Suppose the realized state is $x \in X$ and every invited bidder participates and is truthful. Then the mechanism induces the following objects. (The formal definitions are straightforward and hence are omitted for brevity.)

\[
\begin{align*}
E^t(x) & := \text{the set of potential bidders who enters the mechanism in period } t; \\
q_i(x) & := \text{the probability with which player } i \text{ (bidder or seller) consumes the good; } \\
p_i(x) & := \text{the total payment made by bidder } i \text{ discounted back to the period at which } i \text{ enters the mechanism; } \\
H_i(x) & := \text{the event (set of possible states) that bidder } i \text{ knows has occurred when } i \text{ is entering the mechanism; } \\
\tau(x) & := \text{the period at which the search terminates; } \\
I^t(x) & := \bigcup_{s=1}^t E^s(x) = \text{the set of incumbents up to the end of period } t.
\end{align*}
\]

A revelation search mechanism is denoted $((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q, (p_i, H_i)_{i \in I})$. A search procedure is the operation-research part of a revelation search mechanism; it determines the set of entrants in each period and the identity of the winner of the good but not how much to charge or what information to disclose. Denote a search procedure by $((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q)$.\(^5\)

The sequential nature of a search mechanism is formulated into the following constraints:

1. $E^1$ is constant on $X$, i.e., the set of entrants in period 1 is determined before any message is sent.

2. If two realized states $x$ and $x'$ generate the same history up to period $t \geq 1$, i.e., $E^s(x) = E^s(x')$ for all $s = 1, \ldots, t$, and if $x_i = x'_i$ for all incumbents $i \in I^t(x)$, then $x$ and $x'$ induce

\(^5\)Note: $((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty)$ determines the period $\tau(x)$ in which the search ends: $\tau(x) = \max\{s = 1, 2, \ldots : E^s(x) \neq \emptyset\}$. 
the same decision for period $t + 1$:

a. The set of entrants in period $t + 1$ is the same and this set is a subset of potential bidders who have not yet entered, i.e., $E^{t+1}(x) = E^{t+1}(x') \subseteq I \setminus I^t(x)$.

b. If $t = \tau(x)$, then $q(x) = q(x')$ and $p_i(x) = p_i(x')$ for all potential bidder $i$; i.e., if the mechanism stops at period $t$, then the allocation rule is the same for $x$ and $x'$, and the payment is the same for $x$ and $x'$.

c. For any $i$ who enters the mechanism in period $t + 1$, $H_i(x) = H_i(x')$, i.e., the news disclosed to entrant $i$ is the same for $x$ and $x'$.

3. The good cannot go to bidders who do not participate in the mechanism, nor can the seller collect payments from such bidders, i.e., $i \notin I^{t(x)}(x) \Rightarrow q_i(x) = p_i(x) = 0$.

For each potential bidder $i \in I$ and every $t = 1, 2, \ldots$, let

$$\mathbb{H}^{t+1}_i := \text{the set of all states such that with strictly positive probability bidder } i \text{ enters in period } t + 1.$$ 

Naturally we assume:

4. For every $i$ who enters in period $t + 1$, $H_i(x) \subseteq \mathbb{H}^{t+1}_i$, i.e., in addition to the rules of the mechanism, $i$ knows at least the fact that he is a period-$t + 1$ entrant.

The functions $(H_i)_{i \in I}$ constitute the disclosure policy of the mechanism. In a non-disclosure policy, a bidder upon entry learns only the fact that the mechanism is contacting him at the current period, i.e., $H_i(x) = \mathbb{H}^t_i$ for any state $x$, any period $t$ and any entrant $i$. In a full disclosure policy, for any realized state $x$ and in any period $t$, every entrant knows the sequence $(E^s(x))^t_{s=1}$ of entry up to now, as well as the reported type $x_j$ of every incumbent $j \in I^{t-1}(x)$.

Whatever the disclosure policy, the bidders are told the mechanism. A bidder makes the participation decision only after he has been informed of his type and whatever the disclosure policy reveals to him, including all the rules of the mechanism.

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Constraint 2.c implies that a participant cannot learn about the types of those who have not participated. To prove that, suppose at state $x$, $i$ enters in period $t + 1$ and $j$ has not entered by the end of period $t + 1$ (i.e., $i \in E^{t+1}(x)$ and $j \notin I^{t+1}(x)$). For any possible type $x'_j$ of $j$, denote $(x_{-j}, x'_j)$ for the state such that the type of $j$ is $x'_j$ and the type of everyone else is the same in $x$. By 2.c, $H_i(x) = H_i(x_{-j}, x'_j)$, hence $i$ has no way to update about $j$’s type.
2.5 Notions of optimal search mechanisms

Given any search procedure \(((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q), if all invited bidders participate in the mechanism and are truthful, and if the seller gets to extract the entire surplus, then the seller’s expected profit from the viewpoint of period 1 is equal to

\[
\Pi \left( (E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q \mid (u_i)_{i \in I} \right) := \mathbb{E}_x \left[ \delta^x(x) \left( \sum_{i \in I} q_i(x) (u_i(x) - x_0) \right) - \sum_{t=1}^\infty \delta^{t-1} \sum_{i \in E^t(x)} c_i \right]. \tag{1}
\]

Note that there is no need to quantify the first sum by the restriction \(i \in I^x(x)\) (i.e., \(i\) participates in the mechanism) because if \(i \notin I^x(x)\) then \(q_i(x) = 0\) by constraint 3 in the previous subsection.

In traditional search theory there is no asymmetric information once the search cost has been incurred. Hence, optimal search amounts to maximizing \(\Pi \left( (E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q \mid (u_i)_{i \in I} \right)\) over all search procedures. We call this unconstrained maximization problem symmetric-information search problem relative to payoffs \((u_i)_{i \in I}\) and say that its solution is symmetric-information optimal relative to payoffs \(u_i\). In our auction environment, by contrast, after the seller incurs a search cost and contacts a bidder, the bidder becomes privately informed about his type. Hence the seller needs to design a search mechanism that induces the bidders to reveal their private information truthfully. We call a search procedure \(((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q)\) optimal (profit maximizing) if \(\Pi \left( (E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q \mid (u_i)_{i \in I} \right)\) is maximized over all search procedures subject to interim participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Similarly, a search mechanism is optimal if it implements an optimal search procedure.

3 Optimal search mechanisms

For every potential bidder \(i \in I\) and any possible realized state \(x := (x_i)_{i \in I}\), define the (ex post) virtual utility of bidder \(i\) to be

\[
V_i(x) := x_i - \frac{1 - F_i(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)} + \sum_{j \in I \setminus i} e_{ij}(x_j). \tag{2}
\]

Following most of the optimal auction literature, we make the following assumption which extends the usual monotone hazard rate assumption to the case of interdependent values.
**Assumption 1.** For any potential bidders $i$ and $j$, $x_i - \frac{1-F(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)}$ and $e_{ji}(x_i)$ are differentiable functions of $x_i$ on $X_i$, their derivatives are uniformly bounded, and $\frac{d}{dx_i} \left( x_i - \frac{1-F(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)} \right) > e'_{ji}(x_i) \geq 0$ over the interior of $X_i$.

**Theorem 1.** If Assumption 1 holds, then (a) disclosure policies do not affect the seller’s expected profit, and (b) there is an optimal search mechanism that uses the symmetric-information optimal search procedure relative to virtual utility functions $(V_i)_{i \in I}$.

Theorem 1 says that a profit-maximizing seller just needs to solve a *distorted symmetric-information search problem*, where real utilities $(u_i)_{i \in I}$ are replaced by virtual utilities $(V_i)_{i \in I}$. Moreover, the seller can pick any disclosure policy ranging from non-disclosure to full disclosure. Once he finds a search procedure that solves the distorted problem and arbitrarily picks a disclosure policy, the seller just needs to implement them with a payment scheme specified by the familiar envelope formula.

### 3.1 The proof of the theorem

We prove Theorem 1 in three steps. First, in Subsection 3.1.1, we show that the seller’s optimal discounted expected profit is bounded from above by the optimal payoff from the distorted symmetric-information search problem. Second, we show in Subsection 3.1.2 that the solution for this distorted symmetric-information problem is incentive compatible given full disclosure policy. Finally, based on step two, we show in Subsection 3.1.3 that the seller can achieve the upper bound in step one via full disclosure. Since other disclosure policies cannot yield less expected profit than full disclosure, any disclosure policy, coupled with a solution for the distorted symmetric-information search problem, is optimal for the seller.

#### 3.1.1 Step one: Finding necessary conditions for incentive feasibility and optimality

By Lemma 1, we can confine attention to revelation search mechanisms. Consider a revelation search mechanism, described by the notations $E^t_i$, $p_i$, $q_i$, $H_i$ and $\tau$ introduced in Section 2.4.

Assume that bidder $i$ enters the mechanism in period $t$. Let $H_i$ be the news disclosed to
bidder $i$ before he reports his type. If he reports that his type is $\hat{x}_i$, then from the viewpoint of period $t$, the discounted expected value of his winning probability is

$$Q_i(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) = \mathbb{E}_{x-i} \left[ \delta^t(\hat{x}_i, x_{-i})^{-t} q_i(\hat{x}_i, x_{-i}) \mid \mathbb{H}_i = H_i(\hat{x}_i, x_{-i}) \right],$$

and the discounted expected value of other bidders’ influence on bidder $i$’s utility is

$$e_{-i}(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) = \mathbb{E}_{x-i} \left[ \delta^t(\hat{x}_i, x_{-i})^{-t} q_i(\hat{x}_i, x_{-i}) \sum_{j \in I \setminus i} e_{ij}(x_j) \mid \mathbb{H}_i = H_i(\hat{x}_i, x_{-i}) \right].$$

The discounted expected value of bidder $i$’s payment from this viewpoint is calculated analogously and denoted by $P_i(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i)$. If bidder $i$’s realized type is $x_i$, then his discounted expected utility from the viewpoint of period $t$ is

$$u_i(\hat{x}_i \mid x_i, \mathbb{H}_i) = x_i Q_i(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) + e_{-i}(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) - P_i(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i).$$

Given the independence of bidders’ types, none of $Q_i(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i)$, $P_i(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i)$ and $e_{-i}(\hat{x}_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i)$ vary with bidder $i$’s actual type. Thus, each bidder $i$’s objective function takes the quasilinear form $x_i A_i(\hat{x}_i) + B_i(\hat{x}_i)$, standard in auction theory. This quasilinear form, coupled with standard techniques (e.g., Myerson [11, Lemma 2]), yields the next lemma.

**Lemma 2.** The seller’s problem is equivalent to maximizing his discounted expected profit among all pairs of search procedures $((E^t)_{t=1}^{\infty}, q)$ and disclosure rules $(H_i)_{i \in I}$ subject to the following constraints for any $i \in I$, any $x_i \in X_i$, and any $\mathbb{H}_i$ in the range of $H_i$ (i.e., $\{H_i(x) : x \in X\}$):

- the function $Q_i(\cdot \mid \mathbb{H}_i)$ is nondecreasing;  
- $u_i(x_i \mid x_i, \mathbb{H}_i) = u_i(x_i \mid z_i, \mathbb{H}_i) + \int_{z_i}^{x_i} Q_i(z \mid \mathbb{H}_i) dz$;  
- $u_i(\mathbb{E}_i \mid z_i, \mathbb{H}_i) = 0$.  

A revelation search mechanism $((E^t)_{t=1}^{\infty}, (p_t, H_i)_{i \in I}, q)$ is incentive feasible if (6) is satisfied and the payment scheme satisfies the envelope formula,

$$P_i(x_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) = x_i Q_i(x_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) + e_{-i}(x_i \mid \mathbb{H}_i) - \int_{x_i}^{\infty} Q_i(z \mid \mathbb{H}_i) dz$$

for any $i \in I$, any $x_i \in X_i$, and any $\mathbb{H}_i$ in the range of $H_i$.

The next lemma is similar to the “integration by parts” routine in optimal auction theory.
Lemma 3. If \(((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, (p_i, H_i)_{i \in I}, q)\) is incentive feasible and employs the non-disclosure policy, then the seller’s discounted expected profit is equal to \(\Pi ((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q \mid (V_i)_{i \in I})\).

**Proof:** Assume that bidder \(i\) enters in period \(t\) in a realized state \(x\). Given the non-disclosure rule, the bidder merely knows the news \(\bar{H}_t^i\), i.e., that he is a period-\(t\) entrant. By Eqs. (5), (7), and (8), the seller’s expected net profit extracted from bidder \(i\), viewed from period \(t\), is
\[
\mathbb{E}_{x_i} \left[ (x_i - x_0)Q_i(x_i \mid \bar{H}_t^i) + e_{-i}(x_i \mid \bar{H}_t^i) - \int_{x_i}^{x} Q_i(z \mid \bar{H}_t^i)dz - c_i \right].
\]
By a standard argument (e.g., Myerson [11, Lemma 3]), this is equal to
\[
\mathbb{E}_x \left[ \delta^{t(x)} - t q_i(x) (V_i(x) - x_0) - c_i \mid \bar{H}_t^i = H_i(x) \right],
\]
where we used Eqs. (2), (3), and (4). Viewed from period 1, the period \(t\) at which bidder \(i\) enters the mechanism is a random variable uniquely determined by the realized state \(x\): it is the \(t\) such that \(i \in E^t(x)\). Thus, viewed from period 1, the seller’s expected profit extracted from bidder \(i\) is
\[
\mathbb{E}_{\bar{H}_t^i} \left[ \mathbb{E}_x \left[ \delta^{t(x)} - t q_i(x) (V_i(x) - x_0) - c_i \mid \bar{H}_t^i = H_i(x) \right] \right] = \mathbb{E}_x \left[ \delta^{t(x)} - t q_i(x) (V_i(x) - x_0) - \sum_{t} \delta^{t-1} 1_{i \in E^t(x)}c_i \right]. \tag{10}
\]
Summing the right-hand side (10) over all \(i \in I\), we get
\[
\mathbb{E}_x \left[ \delta^{t(x)} - \sum_{i \in I} q_i(x) (V_i(x) - x_0) \right] - \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta^{t-1} \sum_{i \in E^t(x)} c_i \right], \tag{11}
\]
which is equal to \(\Pi ((E^t)_{t=1}^\infty, q \mid (V_i)_{i \in I})\), defined in Eq. (1), with \(V_i\) replacing \(u_i\). \(\blacksquare\)

**Remark:** We would have obtained the traditional recipe of optimal auction by now had search costs been zero: for every state \(x\), set \(q_i(x) := 1\) for the bidder \(i\) whose virtual utility is highest among all bidders and exceeds \(x_0\). This, however, is in general infeasible for a search mechanism, because the seller does not know the realized types of bidders who have not yet been contacted.

### 3.1.2 Step two: Verifying the incentive feasibility condition

The purpose of the second step is to show that the solution for the seller’s distorted symmetric-information problem is incentive compatible given full disclosure policy. To this end, recall that,
in the distorted symmetric-information search problem, the seller tries to maximize the discounted expected value of virtual utility of the winner of the good minus search costs. Denote:

\[
((\hat{E}^t)_{t=1}^\infty, \hat{q}) := \text{a search procedure that solves the distorted symmetric-information search problem.}
\]

Next, at any period, denote:

\[
J := \text{the set of bidders who have entered the mechanism;}
\]

\[
x_J := (x_i)_{i \in J}; \quad x_{-J} := (x_i)_{i \notin J};
\]

\[
\pi(J, x_J) := \text{the seller’s optimal discounted expected payoff given the state variable } (J, x_J);
\]

\[
\pi_+(J, x_J) := \text{the seller’s optimal discounted expected payoff from continuing the search given } (J, x_J);
\]

\[
= \delta \max_{K \subseteq I \setminus J} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{x_K} \pi(J \cup K; x_J, x_K) - \sum_{k \in K} c_k \right].
\]

(12)

The above objects are well defined because a straightforward proof by induction implies that the search procedure \(((\hat{E}^t)_{t=1}^\infty, \hat{q})\) exists and the function \(\pi\) is well defined.

At each period, given the state variable \((J, x_J)\) for distorted symmetric-information search problem, the seller’s alternatives, described relative to any incumbent \(i \in J\), are: (i) sell the good to \(i\) right now, getting \(\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J})\), (ii) sell to another incumbent \(j \neq i\) right now, getting \(\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_j(x)\); (iii) continue search thus getting \(\pi_+(J, x_J)\); or (iv) stop and consume the good, getting \(x_0\). The next lemma says that alternative (i) is more likely to be the best option if \(i\)'s type \(x_i\) is high.

**Lemma 4.** If \(i \in J\), then \(\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J})\) and \(\pi_+(J, x_J)\) are absolutely continuous functions of \(x_i\); whenever their derivatives exist,

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J}) > \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \max_{j \in J \setminus i} \mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_j(x_J, x_{-J}) \quad \text{and} \quad (13)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J}) \geq \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \pi_+(J, x_J),
\]

(14)

and if (14) holds with equality then \(\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J}) \geq \pi_+(J, x_J)\).

**Proof:** By Eq. (2),

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J}) = \frac{d}{dx_i} \left[ x_i - \frac{1-F_i(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)} \right],
\]

and, for all \(j \neq i\), \(x_i\) enters \(V_j(x)\) only through \(e_{ji}(x_i)\). Hence Assumption 1 implies (13).
To prove (14), we use a revealed-preference argument. Let \((J, x_J)\) be given. Denote
\[
\tilde{\tilde{Q}}_k(x_J) := \text{the discounted expected probability that } ((\tilde{E}_t^i)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q}) \text{ awards the good to bidder } k \text{ (who need not have entered) given } (J, x_J).
\]

Assume that the seller follows the search procedure \(((\tilde{E}_t^i)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q})\) as if the type of an incumbent \(i \in J\) is \(\hat{x}_i \neq x_i\). (The seller knows the realized value of \(x_i\) because this is a symmetric-information search problem.) Let \(\hat{\pi}_+(J, x_J, \hat{x}_i)\) be the expected payoff of the seller from this deviant plan, discounted back to the current period \(t\); \(x_i\) enters \(\hat{\pi}_+(J, x_J, \hat{x}_i)\) only in the term
\[
\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} \sum_{k \in I} \delta^t(x_{J\setminus i}, \hat{x}_i, x_{-J}) - t V_k(x_{J\setminus i}, x_i, x_{-J}) \tilde{q}_k(x_J, x_{-J}).
\]

Hence (remember that \(x_i\) is one component of \(x_J\))
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \hat{\pi}_+(J, x_J, \hat{x}_i) = \tilde{Q}_i(\hat{x}_i, x_{J\setminus i}) \frac{d}{dx_i} \left[ x_i - \frac{1 - F_i(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)} \right] + \sum_{k \in I \setminus i} \tilde{Q}_k(\hat{x}_i, x_{J\setminus i}) e'_{ki}(x_i).
\]

As \(((\tilde{E}_t^i)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q})\) solves the dynamic programming problem given the state variable \((J, x_J)\),
\[
\pi_+(J, x_J) = \hat{\pi}_+(J, x_J, \hat{x}_i) = \max_{\hat{x}_i} \hat{\pi}_+(J, x_J, \hat{x}_i).
\]

Thus, the Milgrom-Segal envelope theorem ([10]) implies that \(\pi_+(J, x_J)\) is an absolutely continuous function of \(x_i\) and that, whenever its derivative exists,
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \pi_+(J, x_J) = \tilde{Q}_i(x_i, x_{J\setminus i}) G_i'(x_i) + \sum_{k \in I \setminus i} \tilde{Q}_k(x_i, x_{J\setminus i}) e'_{ki}(x_i).
\]

Thus, Assumption 1 implies (14). If (14) holds with equality, bidder \(i\) wins almost surely in subsequent periods if the search were to continue. But since search is costly, this implies in turn that awarding the good to bidder \(i\) immediately dominates the option of continuing the search. Hence \(\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J}) \geq \pi_+(J, x_J)\). 

We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this subsection.

**Lemma 5.** If Assumption 1 holds, then the search procedure \(((\tilde{E}_t^i)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q})\) operated under the full disclosure policy satisfies the monotonicity condition (6), i.e., \(Q_i(\cdot | H_i)\) is nondecreasing.

**Proof:** Let \(J \subseteq I\) be the set of incumbents and let \(i \in J\). It suffices to prove that \(\tilde{Q}_i(x_J)\), defined by (15), is weakly increasing in \(x_i\). We shall prove this claim by induction on the size of \(I \setminus J\).
The case of $J = I$ follows directly from (13). Pick any $n = 1, 2, \ldots$ and suppose the claim is true if the size of $I \setminus J$ is less than or equal to $n - 1$. We shall prove the claim when $I \setminus J$ is of size $n$. Since the search procedure $((\tilde{E}^t)_{t=1}^\infty, \tilde{q})$ solves the problem

$$\max \left\{ x_0, \mathbb{E}_{x_{-I}} V_i(x_I, x_{-I}), \max_{j \in J \setminus i} \mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_j(x_J, x_{-J}), \pi_+ (J, x_J) \right\},$$

Lemma 4 implies that the probability that bidder $i$ wins in the current period is weakly increasing in $x_i$. The induction hypothesis implies that the probability (discounted back to next period) that he wins later, conditional on him not winning in the current period, is weakly increasing in $x_i$. Thus, the total discounted winning probability of bidder $i$ is weakly increasing in $x_i$, as desired. ■

3.1.3 Step three: The irrelevance of disclosure policies

To complete this final step of the proof, we show that the full-disclosure mechanism identified in 3.1.2 is optimal among all incentive feasible mechanisms under any disclosure policy. That is true because the full-disclosure mechanism by definition achieves the upper bound identified in 3.1.1 if the mechanism is incentive feasible, and we have proved in 3.1.2 that it is indeed incentive feasible. Thus, disclosure policies are irrelevant because, as we will show below, other disclosure policies cannot yield smaller expected profit than full disclosure.

Formally, denote:

$$\Pi_{ND}, \Pi_{FD}, \Pi_{ANY} := \text{the seller’s optimal discounted expected profit among all incentive feasible search mechanisms using, respectively, } ND, FD, ANY;$$

$$ND, FD, ANY := \text{non-disclosure, full disclosure, any disclosure policy.}$$

Since bidders are assumed to be risk neutral, incentive feasibility with a fine disclosure policy implies incentive feasibility with a coarse disclosure policy. (Incentive feasibility means a set of inequalities, one for each event that the disclosure policy can possibly reveal to a bidder; integration across these events preserves the direction of the inequalities.) Hence

$$\Pi_{ND} \geq \Pi_{ANY} \geq \Pi_{FD}.$$ 

Lemma 3 implies that $\Pi_{ND}$ is bounded from above by the optimal discounted expected payoff in the distorted symmetric-information search problem. Since $((\tilde{E}^t)_{t=1}^\infty, \tilde{q})$ is a solution for this
distorted problem, we have

\[ \Pi \left( (\tilde{E}^t)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q} \mid (V_i)_{i \in I} \right) \geq \Pi_{ND}. \]

Lemma 5, coupled with Lemma 2, implies that the search procedure \((\tilde{E}^t)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q}\) is incentive feasible when it is supplemented by the full disclosure policy. Hence

\[ \Pi_{FD} \geq \Pi \left( (\tilde{E}^t)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q} \mid (V_i)_{i \in I} \right). \]

Thus, we obtain the equation that immediately implies the theorem:

\[ \Pi_{ND} = \Pi_{ANY} = \Pi_{FD} = \Pi \left( (\tilde{E}^t)_{t=1}^{\infty}, \tilde{q} \mid (V_i)_{i \in I} \right). \]

\[ \textit{3.2 An optimal mechanism with private values and no discounting} \]

In this subsection we illustrate Theorem 1 by fully characterizing the optimal mechanism for the case where the bidders have private values \((e_{ij} = 0 \text{ for all } i, j \in I)\) and there is no discounting \((\delta = 1)\). Since the distributions of bidders’ types and the cost of contacting each bidder are not necessarily the same across bidders, the results in this subsection generalize the results in McAfee and McMillan [9] where the bidders are assumed to be ex ante identical.

By Theorem 1, the seller needs to solve the distorted symmetric-information search problem, where his reward from selling the good to a bidder is the bidder’s virtual utility. With private values, a bidder’s virtual utility depends only on his own type (hence we write \(V_i(x_i)\) instead of \(V_i(x)\)):

\[ V_i(x_i) = x_i - \frac{1 - F_i(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)}. \]

(17)

This symmetric-information search problem is similar to Weitzman’s [16] Pandora problem. In that problem, Pandora searches for the highest reward from \(n\) boxes under the assumption that only one box can be opened in any single period and opening each box is costly. Weitzman proved that the solution to Pandora’s problem is as follows. First, Pandora computes a cutoff value for each box—this cutoff value depends only on the characteristics of the box itself. Then, if the highest cutoff value falls short of Pandora’s initial fallback reward, Pandora does not search and simply gets the fallback reward. Otherwise, Pandora opens the box with the highest cutoff value. In every period, the search continues if the highest cutoff among all closed boxes exceeds the updated fallback reward which is the maximum between the initial fallback reward and the highest reward among all opened boxes. If search ends, Pandora gets the updated fallback reward.

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In our case, the boxes are the potential bidders, and since they are privately informed about their types after being contacted by the seller, the seller’s reward from each bidder is the bidder’s virtual utility. The initial fallback reward is just \( x_0 \). Since we assume away discounting, there is no loss of generality in inviting only one entrant (i.e., “opening one box”) in each period as Weitzman’s Pandora problem. The relevant cutoff level \( v^*_i \) for bidder \( i \) is the solution of

\[
\mathbb{E}_{x_i} \left[ (V_i(x_i) - v^*_i)^+ \right] = c_i. \tag{18}
\]

This equation is analogous to Eq. (7) in Weitzman [16]. It says that, if the seller’s updated fallback payoff is \( v^*_i \), then the seller is indifferent between (i) stopping the search and getting \( v^*_i \) immediately, and (ii) contacting bidder \( i \) at a cost of \( c_i \) and then stopping the search and getting a payoff equal to either \( V_i(x_i) \) or \( v^*_i \), whichever higher. When the seller invites bidder \( i \) to participate, the bidder makes a report \( \hat{x}_i \) and commits to paying, in expected value, an amount \( P_i(\hat{x}_i \mid H_i) \) specified by Eq. (9). The seller keeps searching as long as the highest cutoffs among all bidders who have not yet been contacted exceeds the updated fallback reward. Otherwise the seller stops searching and allocates the good to the bidder with the highest virtual utility among all incumbent bidders, provided that this virtual utility exceeds the seller’s value, \( x_0 \), or keeps the good otherwise.

Note that, in the above procedure, a participating bidder \( i \) can end the search and buy the good immediately if he reports his type as \( \hat{x}_i \) such that \( V_i(\hat{x}_i) \) is greater than both the virtual utilities of the incumbents and the cutoffs of those not yet contacted. Denote \( \hat{x}_i \) for the infimum of such types \( \hat{x}_i \). We may call the expected payment \( P_i(x^*_i \mid H_i) \) specified by Eq. (9) the buy-now price, as if the bidder were given a buy-now offer to buy the good immediately at the price equal to \( P_i(x^*_i \mid H_i) \).

One way to construct such buy-now prices is as follows: Every participating bidder makes a once-and-for-all bid. Bids are compared to one another in terms of virtual utilities. If a bidder rejects the buy-now offer but eventually wins the good, his payment is equal to the amount which, in terms of virtual utilities, matches the highest losing bid or the seller’s own value, whichever is larger. To compute the buy-now prices, suppose the bids collected up to the end of period \( t - 1 \) are \( x_1, \ldots, x_{t-1} \), with \( x_s \) submitted by the period-\( s \) entrant, bidder \( s \). The seller’s fallback reward is

\[
v^{t-1} := \max \left\{ x_0, \max_{s < t} V_s(x_s) \right\}.
\]

Suppose that bidder \( t \) enters in period \( t \). There are only two possible cases:

i. \( v^*_t \leq v^{t-1} \): the cutoff \( v^*_t \) for contacting the next bidder is below the seller’s current
fallback reward $v^{t-1}$, so the search will end no matter what bidder $t$ reports. If bidder $t$ wants to win right now, all that he needs is to submit a bid $x_t$ such that $V_t(x_t) \geq v^{t-1}$, i.e., $x_t \geq V^{-1}_t(v^{t-1})$. Hence the buy-now price for bidder $t$ is $V^{-1}_t(v^{t-1})$.

ii. $v^*_t + 1 > v^{t-1}$: the cutoff for continuing the search is above the seller’s current fallback reward, so the search may end or continue, depending on bidder $t$’s report. If his virtual utility is above $v^*_t + 1$, then bidder $t$ beats all incumbents and ends the search; yet if his virtual utility is merely equal to $v^{t-1}$, the search will continue. Thus, the buy-now price, in terms of virtual utilities, should lie between $v^*_t + 1$ and $v^{t-1}$. To compute it, first calculate the probability $Q^*_t(z)$ with which bidder $t$ eventually wins in the above search procedure if he reports $z$, then use Eq. (9) to obtain the buy-now price as

$$V^{-1}_t(v^*_t + 1) - \int_{V^{-1}_t(v^{t-1})}^{V^{-1}_t(v^*_t + 1)} Q^*_t(z) dz.$$  

When all bidders have the same distribution for their types (although the search costs of contacting them may be different), it is possible to implement the optimal search mechanism with a sequence of second-price auctions with period-specific reserve prices. The next subsection illustrates this idea by a two-bidders example, whose extension to the $n$-bidder case is straightforward.

A further special case in which the search costs are also the same across bidders (i.e., the bidders are ex ante identical) has been analyzed by McAfee and McMillan [9]. Since the bidders are ex-ante identical, the cutoffs $v^*_i$ defined by Eq. (18) are identical across bidders. Thus, unlike in most of our paper, the sequence in which the bidders are contacted is irrelevant. Search continues if and only if the highest virtual utility among all incumbent bidders is less than the cutoff. When all bidders have been invited, the good is sold via a conventional second-price auction with reserve.

### 3.3 A two-bidder example with private values and no discounting

In this subsection we examine a specific two-bidder example that illustrates how the optimal mechanism can be computed. Suppose there are only two potential bidders and $x_i \sim [0, 1]$ for $i = 1, 2$. The cost of contacting bidder $i$ is $c_i$, with $c_1 < c_2 < \frac{1}{4}$. As in Section 3.2, we assume that

The inverse function $V^{-1}_i$ exists by Assumption 1.
\(e_{12} = e_{21} = 0\) (private values), and \(\delta = 1\). Hence, the profit optimal search auction is a Weitzman search procedure with the bidders’ values replaced by their virtual utilities

\[V_i(x) = 2x_i - 1.\]  

(19)

The seller will not sell the good to bidder \(i\) if \(V_i(x) \leq 0\); hence a bidder with \(x_i \leq 1/2\) has a zero probability of winning the good.

Using (18), the cutoffs, \(v_1^*\) and \(v_2^*\) are defined by

\[\int_{1+\frac{c_i}{2}}^{1} \left[2x - 1 - v_i^*\right] dx = c_i, \quad \iff \quad v_i^* = 1 - 2\sqrt{c_i}.\]

Since \(c_1 < c_2 < 1/4, v_1^* > v_2^* > 0\), it is optimal to invite bidder 1 in period 1, and if the search continues, to invite bidder 2 in period 2.

Bidder 1 wins the good immediately if \(V_1(x_1) \geq v_2^*\), i.e., if \(x_1 \geq 1 - \sqrt{c_2}\). Otherwise, the mechanism continues to period 2, and bidder 1 wins if and only if \(x_1 > \max\{x_2, 1/2\}\). Since \(x_2 \sim [0, 1]\), the probability that bidder 1 wins is 0 if \(x_1 < 1/2, x_1\) if \(1/2 \leq x_1 < 1 - \sqrt{c_2}\), and 1 if \(x_1 \geq 1 - \sqrt{c_2}\). Using (9), the expected payment of bidder 1 is

\[p_1(x_1) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x_1 < \frac{1}{2}; \\ x_1^2 - \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^{x_1} zdz = \frac{x_1^2}{2} + \frac{1}{8}, & \text{if } \frac{1}{2} \leq x_1 < 1 - \sqrt{c_2}; \\ x_1 - \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^{1-\sqrt{c_2}} zdz - \int_{1-\sqrt{c_2}}^{x_1} dz = \frac{1-x_1}{2} + \frac{1}{8}, & \text{if } x_1 \geq 1 - \sqrt{c_2}. \end{cases}\]  

(20)

Conditional on being invited to participate, bidder 2 wins the good if and only if \(V_2(x_2) \geq \max\{V_1(x_1), 0\}\), i.e., \(x_2 > \max\{x_1, 1/2\}\). By (9), the expected payment of bidder 2 is

\[p_2(x_2, x_1) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x_2 \leq \max\{x_1, 1/2\}; \\ x_2 - \int_{\max\{x_1, 1/2\}}^{x_2} dz = \max\{x_1, 1/2\}, & \text{if } x_2 > \max\{x_1, 1/2\}. \end{cases}\]

The optimal mechanism can be implemented with the following procedure. Bidder 1 is offered the good at price \((1 - c_2)/2 + 1/8\) in period 1; if he rejects the offer, he and bidder 2 participate in period 2 in a second price auction with a reserve price equal to \(1/2\).\(^8\) Since both bidders bid their values in the second price auction, bidder 2 wins if and only if \(x_2 > \max\{x_1, 1/2\}\)

\(^8\)Note that the procedure is equivalent to a sequence of two second price auctions, with period-specific reserve prices. The first auction in the sequence is degenerate as only bidder 1 participates.
and his payment if he wins is $\max\{x_1, 1/2\}$. Hence, we only need to verify that bidder 1’s optimal strategy in our procedure is aligned with the optimal mechanism.

In our procedure, bidder 1 has to pay at least $1/2$ if he wins. Thus, if $x_1 \leq 1/2$, he does not want to win, and it is dominant to bid his true type in both periods. In period 2, bidder 1 wins if and only if $x_1 > \max\{x_2, 1/2\}$, and if he wins, he pays $\max\{x_2, 1/2\}$; his expected payment is

$$\int_{0}^{1/2} \frac{1}{2} \, dx_2 + \int_{1/2}^{x_1} x_2 \, dx_2 = \frac{1}{8} + \frac{x_1^2}{2}.$$  

This expression is equal to the second line in Eq. (20).

Finally, to verify that bidder 1 accepts the offer in period 1 if and only if $x_1 \geq 1 - \sqrt{c_2}$, we note that bidder 1 has two options: (i) agree to pay $\frac{1-c_2}{2} + \frac{1}{8}$ and obtain the good immediately, or (ii) participate in the second price auction with bidder 2. Bidder 1’s payoff from option (i) is

$$x_1 \left( \frac{1-c_2}{2} + \frac{1}{8} \right).$$

With option (ii), bidder 1 wins with probability $x_1$ and his expected payment is $\frac{x_1^2}{2} + \frac{1}{8}$; his expected payoff is

$$x_1 x_1 \left( \frac{x_1^2}{2} + \frac{1}{8} \right) = \frac{x_1^2}{2} - \frac{1}{8}.$$ 

Comparing bidder 1’s expected payoff under the two options shows that he will choose option (i) if and only if $x_1 \geq 1 - \sqrt{c_2}$. Hence bidder 1’s strategy is consistent with the optimal mechanism.

## 4 Properties of profit maximizing search mechanisms

In standard auction theory, asymmetric information leads to inefficiencies in the form of no trade in some states of nature, and, sometimes, biased allocations. In our search-theoretic framework, asymmetric information leads to a third form of inefficiency: inefficient search procedures. In Subsection 4.1, we show that the optimal mechanism may completely exclude some bidders who would be invited to participate in the (socially) efficient mechanism. In Subsection 4.2, we show an opposite effect: the optimal mechanism gives the seller an excessive incentive to search relative to the efficient mechanism. In Subsection 4.3, we show that the order in which bidders are approached need not be the same as the efficient mechanism.
In order to explore these kinds of inefficiency, we shall consider the private values case where \( e_{ij} = 0 \) for all \( i, j \in I \) and there is no discounting.\(^9\) Given these assumptions, the seller’s optimal search mechanism is fully characterized in Subsection 3.2. In particular, the optimal search procedure is generated by Weitzman’s solution with the cutoffs being implicitly defined by Eq. (18). By contrast, the cutoffs for a (socially) efficient procedure are defined by the equation

\[
\mathbb{E}_{x_i} [x_i - x_i^*]^+ = c_i.
\] \(^{(21)}\)

This difference arises because the payoff in the associated search problem is measured in virtual utilities in the former mechanism and is measured in actual utilities in the latter. In Crémér, Spiegel, and Zheng [6] we proved that the efficient search procedure can always be implemented by a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.\(^{10}\)

### 4.1 Fewer participants

Because a bidder’s actual value exceeds his virtual utility, the benefit of inviting a bidder to participate is lower in an optimal search mechanism for the seller than it is in an efficient mechanism for the economy if the fallback payoffs are the same. In fact, the optimal mechanism may completely exclude a bidder even before the search begins, even though that bidder has a positive probability of participation in an efficient mechanism. The consequences of this fact are described in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** From the standpoint of period 1, every bidder \( i \)'s probability of participation in a socially efficient mechanism is positive if his probability of participation in an optimal mechanism is positive, but the converse is not necessarily true.

**Proof:** For \( z \leq x_i \), \( \mathbb{E}_{x_i} [V_i(x_i) - z]^+ \) and \( \mathbb{E}_{x_i} [x_i - z]^+ \) are strictly decreasing functions of \( z \) and \( \mathbb{E}_{x_i} [V_i(x_i) - z]^+ \leq \mathbb{E}_{x_i} [x_i - z]^+ \). Hence, \( v_i^* < x_i^* \) for all \( i \in I \). The proof is completed by noting that a bidder \( i \) has a positive probability of participating in the socially efficient mechanism if \( x_i^* > x_0 \) and a positive probability of participation in the optimal mechanism only if \( v_i^* \geq x_0 \).

\(^9\)By continuity, the inefficiencies that we identify still hold if these assumptions are slightly relaxed.

\(^{10}\)Although the participation constraint is ex ante in that paper, its efficiency result is applicable here because interim participation constraints can always be satisfied by transfers from the seller.
4.2 Longer search

As virtual utilities are below actual utilities, the seller’s fallback value in the optimal mechanism is smaller than his fallback value in a socially efficient mechanism. This leads to an effect opposite to the previous one, as the lower fallback value makes it more attractive to continue the search. A simple case for this effect is that bidders’ types are i.i.d., so their virtual utility functions are the same, say $V$, though their participation costs may still be different. While the cost of an additional searching period is the same in both the efficient and optimal mechanisms, the gains are different. To see that, suppose that an additional search increases the highest reported value and hence the social surplus by $\Delta x$. The resulting effect on the seller’s revenue, measured in virtual utilities, is approximately $V'(x)\Delta x$. Under Assumption 1, $V'(x) \geq 1$. Thus, other things equal, the seller is more willing to continue searching than a social planner would.

**Proposition 2.** Assume that types $x_i$ are identically distributed across bidders, with $V$ denoting their common virtual utility function (though their participation costs $c_i$ may be different). If Assumption 1 holds and if $v^*_i > x_0$ for all $i \in I$, then an optimal search lasts at least as long as, and with a positive probability strictly longer, a socially efficient search.

**Proof:** First, recall that $\pi_i$ is the upper bound of the support of $x_i$ and let

$$\phi(z) := \int_z^{\pi_i} (x_i - z) dF_i(x_i); \quad \varphi(z) := \int_z^{\pi_i} (V_i(x_i) - V_i(z)) dF_i(x_i).$$

The solution of $\varphi(z) = c_i$ is $V_i^{-1}(v^*_i)$. By assumption $V' > 1$, $\varphi' < \phi' < 0$ throughout their common domain. Then the fact that $\phi(\pi_i) = 0 = \varphi(\pi_i)$ implies $V^{-1}(v^*_i) > x^*_i$ for all $i \in I$.

Second, the order of entry is the same in both mechanisms: with i.i.d. bidders, $x^*_i > x^*_j$ if and only if $c_i < c_j$ if and only if $v^*_i > v^*_j$. Thus, we can relabel the bidders so that $v^*_1 \geq v^*_2 \geq \cdots \geq v^*_n$ and $x^*_1 \geq x^*_2 \geq \cdots \geq x^*_n$. Because $v^*_i > x_0$, the optimal mechanism invites bidder 1 to participate. We show that it continues from period $t$ to period $t + 1$ with a higher probability than the socially efficient procedure. To see that, let $(x_1, \ldots, x_t)$ be the sequence of realized values up to period $t$. If the efficient search continues to period $t + 1$, then $\max\{x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_t\} < x^*_t+1$; because $V^{-1}(v^*_i) > x^*_i$ and $v^*_i > x_0$,

$$v^*_{t+1} > \max\{x_0, V_1(x_1), \ldots, V_t(x_t)\}.$$
Hence the optimal search continues to period $t + 1$. Thus, it continues whenever the efficient procedure continues. The converse, however, is false: when

$$x_{t+1}^* < \max\{x_1, \ldots, x_t\} < V^{-1}(v_{t+1}^*),$$

which occurs with a positive probability, the efficient search stops while the optimal search procedure continues. This proves the proposition. ■

4.3 Inefficient order of entry

Determined by different sets of cutoffs, the order in which the bidders enter the optimal mechanism may differ from the order in the socially efficient mechanism. The following example shows this distortion with two bidders. The seller’s value, $x_0$, is zero; bidder 1’s type $x_1$ is uniformly distributed on $[x_1, x_1]$ and bidder 2’s type $x_2$ is drawn from an exponential distribution $F_2(x_2) := 1 - \exp(-\lambda x_2)$. Given these assumptions, the virtual utility functions and cutoffs are

$$V_1(x_1) = 2x_1 - x_1; \quad V_2(x_2) = x_2 - 1/\lambda;$$
$$x_1^* = x_1 - \sqrt{2c_1(x_1 - x_1)}; \quad x_2^* = -\ln(\lambda c_2)/\lambda;$$
$$v_1^* = x_1 - 2\sqrt{c_1(x_1 - x_1)}; \quad v_2^* = -(1 + \ln(\lambda c_2))/\lambda.$$

Since $x_1^* > v_1^*$, there exist two numbers $a$ and $b$ such that $v_1^* < a < b < x_1^*$. Let $\lambda := 1/(b - a)$ and $c_2 := \exp(-\lambda b)/\lambda$. Then $x_1^* > x_2^*$ and $v_1^* < v_2^*$: bidder 2 enters first in the optimal mechanism, whereas bidder 1 enters first in the socially efficient mechanism.

4.4 Delayed participation of influential bidders

When bidders’ values are interdependent, we can address the following question: If bidder $i$’s type has a stronger influence on the valuations of other bidders than bidder $j$’s type, should the seller let $i$ enter before $j$ or vice versa? For simplicity, we address this question under the assumption that, for all $j \in I$, there is a number $\alpha_j$ such that $e_{ij}(x_j) = \alpha_j x_j$ for all $x_j$ and $i \neq j$, with $\alpha_i \in [0, 1)$. We can therefore regard bidders with higher $\alpha$’s as more influential. We show that the more influential bidders will enter later than less influential bidders. As we will see, this is a
property linked to the sequential nature of the search mechanism, and not, as in Subsections 4.1 to 4.3, a distortion due to asymmetry of information.

**Proposition 3.** Assume $V_i \geq 0$ and $x_i \geq 0$ for all $i$, and $e_{ji}(x_i) = \alpha_i x_i$ for all $j \neq i$. Also assume that search costs and type-distributions are identical across $i \in I$. Then the larger $\alpha_i$ is, the later and less probable is $i$’s entry in an optimal or a socially efficient search mechanism.

**Proof:** For every $i \in I$ and every $x_i \in X_i$, let

$$W_i(x_i) := x_i - \frac{1 - F_i(x_i)}{f_i(x_i)} - \alpha_i x_i.$$ 

Note that $V_i(x) = W_i(x_i) + \sum_{j \in I} \alpha_j x_j$. Thus, for any state variable $(J, x_J)$,

$$\mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_i(x_J, x_{-J}) > \mathbb{E}_{x_{-J}} V_j(x_J, x_{-J}) \iff W_i(x_i) > W_j(x_j). \tag{22}$$

Since $V_i \geq 0$ by assumption, the optimal mechanism never results in no sale. Hence (22) implies that the search procedure is equivalent to a standard Weitzman search with payoff from search being $W_i(x_i)$. In this search procedure, the cutoffs $w^*_i$ are implicitly defined by

$$\mathbb{E}_{x_i} [W_i(x_i) - w^*_i]^+ = c_i.$$ 

$\mathbb{E}_{x_i} [W_i(x_i) - w^*_i]^+$ is strictly decreasing in $w^*_i$ and $W_i(x_i)$ is strictly decreasing $\alpha_i$ (since $x_i \geq 0$ by assumption). Thus, $w^*_i$ is strictly decreasing in $\alpha_i$, as claimed.

The proof for the socially efficient mechanism is analogous and can be deduced by simply setting $W_i(x_i) := x_i - \alpha_i x_i$ for every $i \in I$ and every $x_i \in X_i$. ■

The basic intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows: if there is a very influential bidder, a change in his type will increase the value of other bidders nearly as much as it increases his own value. Hence, inviting this bidder to participate in the mechanism early on will not reduce the set of states of nature in which it would also be optimal to invite other bidders to participate and will therefore not save on search costs. To illustrate, assume that there are two bidders, with $\alpha_1 = 1$, $\alpha_2 = 0$ and $x_0 = 0$. Bidder 1 is therefore “influencial” as a change in $x_1$ has a positive effect on bidder 2’s value but not vice versa. Since bidder 2’s value, $x_2 + x_1$, always exceeds bidder 1’s value, $x_1$, it is clear that if the good is allocated, it is certainly allocated to bidder 2; thus, only bidder 2 will be invited to participate. The influential bidder, bidder 1, is excluded.
5 Conclusion

We have studied a single unit auction environment in which the set of bidders is endogenously determined through a dynamic search process. We showed that with independent bidders’ types, an optimal mechanism for the seller is equivalent to an optimal search with symmetric information, where the utilities are replaced by virtual utilities. That is, the seller conducts a costly search for the bidder with the highest virtual utility. In standard auction theory, the information rents that the seller concedes to the bidders create inefficiencies in the form of no trade in some states of nature and, sometimes, biased allocations. Our search-theoretic framework gives rise to a third form of inefficiency: inefficient search procedures. In the case of private values with no discounting, this inefficiency results in fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry, relative to the socially efficient mechanism.

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