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Groups Are More Libertarian than Individuals

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Groups Are More Libertarian than Individuals

Abstract

Using a series of controlled laboratory experiments involving decisions to intervene in others' choice opportunities; we find that groups grant more autonomy to others than individuals. This finding is robust across two decision contexts, one involving individual decision-making (Internality) and one involving social decision-making (Externality). Analyses of the group chat logs and two additional experiments show that participants tend to shy away from proposing interventions in social contexts, even when they intervene individually. We conclude that interventions differ systematically between individual and social contexts, and that transferring decision-making power to groups can lead to a "liberal shift".

JEL-Codes: C920, D700, D910, M210.

Keywords: teams, decision making, autonomy, interventions, experiment.

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1. Introduction

The governance of societies and organizations regularly requires leaders to make decisions about the degree of individuals' choice autonomy. Such decisions are often made by groups, for example management boards or employee teams. In this paper, we study when, why, and how groups are willing to restrict the choice autonomy of others and examine how group interventions compare to those of individuals. Recent literature has investigated the extent to which *individuals* are willing to respect the decision autonomy of others, revealing considerable heterogeneity in individuals' views and attitudes. While some individuals fully respect the decision autonomy of others, other individuals exhibit a willingness to (paternalistically) intervene in others' decisions (Uhl, 2011; Krawczyk and Wozny, 2017; Ackfeld and Ockenfels, 2021; Ambuehl et al., 2021; Bartling et al., 2023; Kölle et al., 2024). However, little is known about how *groups* resolve these conflicting views on decision autonomy and how collective decisions aggregate the individual intervention preferences.

To shed light on these questions, we conduct pre-registered laboratory experiments (with mostly student subjects) in which participants act either as *Decision Makers* (DM) or *Choice Architects* (CA). CAs can intervene in each of two decisions that DMs have to make: an *Internality* decision where the CA decides how much impatience she is willing to accept when the DM allocates money between today and six months later, and an *Externality* decision where the CA decides how much selfishness she is willing to accept when the DM allocates money between himself and a sustainability purpose. *Internality* interventions only affect the DM and can thus be characterized as purely “paternalistic” (Ambuehl et al., 2021), whereas *Externality* interventions involve positive externalities and can thus be driven by other concerns, including sustainability preferences of the CAs (Ackfeld and Ockenfels, 2021). To avoid that CAs simply intervene because they have no other way to give advice or communicate their opinion, they also have the opportunity to recommend against certain choices.

We study these two intervention decisions under two conditions using a between-subjects design. In the *Individual* treatment, CAs decide individually whether and how to intervene in DMs' choices. In the *Group* treatment, two CAs are randomly assigned to a group and are required to make a joint (unanimous) intervention decision which they can discuss using a free-form chat. Neither individuals nor groups can rely on a default option for when groups cannot agree on a decision; they must make active choices. In both treatments, we have an initial decision (stage 1) where all participants make individual intervention choices to elicit their

intervention preferences. Based on these individual decisions, we classify participants as either liberals or interventionists.²

We discuss predictions based on a rational choice benchmark as well as alternative considerations that we base on the previous literature on group decision-making, autonomy and intervention behavior (e.g., Charness and Sutter, 2021; Bartling et al., 2014; Ambuehl et al., 2021). While the rational choice benchmark suggests that groups and individuals display a similar willingness to intervene in both decision situations, alternative (non-rational choice) considerations suggest several reasons of why interventions may differ between groups and individuals (see Section 2.3).

Our results reveal strong and significant differences in the propensity of groups and individuals to intervene in the choices of others. On aggregate, individuals are about twice as likely as groups to intervene into the DM's choice set (51% vs. 26%). The finding of fewer group interventions is prevalent and significant in both decision contexts, *Internality* and *Externality*. Because the actual fraction of group interventions is significantly lower than what would be expected based on the individual preferences of the group members, we conclude that individual preferences for interventions are not fully reflected in group decisions, which tend to settle on the libertarian view.

The experimental data show that the difference between groups and individuals cannot be explained by a mechanism in which groups seek to avoid coordination costs by agreeing on the seemingly easy option of not intervening at all. Indeed, groups do incur coordination costs by agreeing on recommendations against certain options. Moreover, the chat logs from the group discussions suggest that the observed differences can neither be explained by the exchange of arguments between group members and learning during the group discussion, nor by a selection mechanism whereby liberals are more persistent or persuasive in enforcing their preference. Instead, the chat logs show that already the first proposal made in the group discussion contains significantly fewer intervention proposals than interventions observed in the *Individual*

² From a methodological perspective, our experimental design overlaps with, and contributes to, studies using so-called spectator designs (Cappelen et al., 2013) to investigate third-parties' willingness to intervene in others' outcomes (rather than choices), most often in redistribution settings (Ackfeld and Ockenfels, 2021). Studying how groups aggregate individual preferences, our paper also relates to recent work that studies situations in which an external spectator is required to aggregate the preferences from a group of individuals (Ambuehl and Bernheim, 2021; Ambuehl et al., 2023).

treatment. These results suggest that CAs with an individual preference for intervening tend to shy away from proposing an intervention when having to decide in the social context of a group.

To test the robustness of this finding, we conduct two additional experiments. The first experiment consists of two stages. In stage 1, as before, we elicit participants' individual intervention decisions, and in stage 2, we let participants choose whether they want to make another intervention decision. In one treatment, the second stage decision is again an individual decision, while in the other treatment this decision must be made as a group. The second experiment only consists of one individual intervention stage in which we manipulate social image concerns, following the methodology of standard social image experiments such as Ewers and Zimmermann (2015). Specifically, in one treatment CAs decide about their individual intervention decisions privately, while in the other treatment they must publicly announce their decisions to the other CAs in the same session.

In the first experiment, we find that participants with a preference for intervening in others' choices are less likely to opt into making a second decision when this additional decision must be made as a member of a group than when it must be made individually. No such difference is found for participants who prefer not to intervene. In the second experiment, we find that individuals intervene less often when they must publicly disclose their decisions. Overall, these results show that one channel through which (part of) the difference in intervention behavior between groups and individuals can be explained is the social context of the group decision, which discourages interventions. We discuss our findings and potential alternative explanations in Section 5.1.

Our finding that groups are more libertarian than individuals captures a general behavioral phenomenon with specific management implications. In recent years, organizations have increasingly relied on group decision-making to manage and organize tasks (Deloitte, 2016; Cross et al., 2016; O'Neill and Salas, 2018). At the same time, there has been a growing trend towards greater decision-making autonomy for employees, particularly evident in agile organizations (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Bass, 2009; Rigby et al., 2018; Doz and Guadalupe, 2019). We identify a mechanism that relates these two major trends: more managerial team decision-making may increase the level of autonomy granted to employees.³ Our results indicate that allocating more decision-making power to groups may causally prompt a "liberal

³ Of course, in managerial contexts other motivations may also be relevant for people's motivation to intervene in others' choices. We discuss this point in Section 5.2.

shift” in the governance of organizations, possibly leading to less hierarchical organizational structures and less interventionist leadership styles.⁴ Generally, the degree of employee decision autonomy within an organization can have important implications: it may improve employees’ motivation and job satisfaction, but it may come at the cost of less control possibilities for supervisors (Spector, 1986; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Seibert et al. 2011). Our findings suggest that managers contemplating an increase in group decision-making within their organization should consider possible, and perhaps unforeseen, impacts on employee autonomy when designing management practices, as these can play a significant role in business success (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). Section 5.2 further discusses the external validity of our findings with respect to business contexts.

Our paper further speaks to the behavioral economics literature that studies preferences for autonomy and paternalism (see, e.g., Ambuehl et al., 2021; Bartling et al., 2023 and references therein). We add to this literature by showing that in social contexts, i.e., when decisions must be made in groups or when they can be observed by peers, individuals become more liberal and less willing to interfere with the decisions of others. This effect may have implications beyond organizations, suggesting, for example, that policy preferences for a strong state or leadership are less likely to be expressed in public than in private.

Finally, our findings highlight that the social context created by group decision making may *per se* explain differences between groups and individuals. A similar mechanism may be at work in other contexts where groups and individuals have been shown to behave differently (see Charness and Sutter, 2012, Kugler et al., 2012, and Kocher et al., 2020 for reviews), and where perhaps decision making is influenced by judgments of others (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015; DellaVigna et al., 2017; Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2017; Bursztyn et al., 2020).

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the design (2.1) and procedures (2.2) of our main experiment, and discuss theoretical considerations (2.3). Section 3 presents the results of our main experiment. In Section 4, we present empirical evidence (including two additional experiments) to shed light on potential mechanisms to explain the main experiment’s findings. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the internal validity of our

⁴ To this end, we contribute to a literature studying the implications of group decision-making in business contexts (e.g., Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Salas et al., 2008; Mathieu et al., 2008; Chen and Lim, 2013; Maciejovsky et al., 2013).

experiment (5.1), the external validity with respect to business contexts (5.2), and the implications of our findings for decision-makers and welfare (5.3).

2. The Experiment

2.1 Experimental Design

General Setup. We build on established designs from the literature on group decision-making and intervention behavior, such as Luhan et al. (2009), Kocher et al. (2018), and Ambuehl et al. (2021), and set up an experiment with two types of players: ‘Decision Maker’ (DM - *he*) and ‘Choice Architect’ (CA – *she*). Our interest in this study is in the choices of the CAs who can decide whether or not to intervene in the DM’s choices. In this study, similar to Ambuehl et al. (2021), an intervention is defined as a factual choice restriction in the sense that people have fewer choice options in case of an intervention.⁵ The sole function of the DMs in our experiment is to render the CAs’ decisions consequential.

We first present the details on the DMs choices. We then describe the context of the intervention decision and our treatment manipulation.

Decision Makers. Each DM faces two decisions, one where he chooses between different amounts of money now and later (*Internality*), and one where he chooses between different amounts of money for himself and a non-profit organization (*Externality*). The DM’s task is to rank all options within each decision situation from the best to the worst option. The choice options are shown in Table 1.

In the *Internality* decision (left panel), the DM faces four choice options that pay him different amounts of money at two different points in time – immediately after the experiment or six months later. The options are constructed such that the more money the DM wants to receive immediately, the less money he will receive in total. The parameterization of the decision is inspired by Menu 1 of the main study in Ambuehl et al. (2021), adding an additional intermediate option to allow for more heterogeneous responses.

In the *Externality* decision (right panel), the DM faces four choice options that differ in the amount of money he receives himself and the amount of money that is transferred to *Atmosfair*,

⁵ Bartling et al. (2023) study paternalism and in particular focus on soft (a recommendation) vs. hard interventions (a choice restriction) and find that people are far more reluctant to implement a hard than a soft restriction. In this study, we provide participants with the opportunity to provide a recommendation to avoid that CAs do only intervene to provide some information to DMs (see below).

a non-profit organization that uses the money to fund projects in developing countries to reduce CO₂ emissions (www.atmosfair.de). The options are designed such that the more money the DM keeps for himself, the less money is distributed in total. Specifically, we provide i) an option in which the total distributed monetary amount is maximized and everything is allocated to *Atmosfair*, ii) a ‘fair’ option where both get the same monetary amount, iii) a selfish option where the distributed monetary amount is lowest and everything goes to the DM, and iv) a typical average distribution of payments in a dictator game (Engel, 2011). This paradigm is known to trigger heterogeneous responses in individual decision-making contexts (e.g., Andre et al., 2024a, Kölle et al., 2024).

We chose these two experimental paradigms with the aim to (i) cover a wide range of decision contexts (that also offer implications for management decisions), (ii) learn about the robustness of interventions decisions of groups and individuals, (iii) provide different potential hypotheses about the underlying motives for interventions across treatments (as discussed below), (iv) generate sufficient heterogeneity in intervention behavior to leave room for finding differences between groups and individuals, and (v) capture contexts in which the role of interventions is subject to an ongoing debate among (behavioral) economists and in broader societal discourse.⁶

The order in which the two situations, *Internality* and *Externality*, are presented to CAs was randomized and we provided multiple options to avoid that CAs do not avoid intervention, because they do not want to determine the final decision. We do not provide the same values in the *Internality* and *Externality* situations as we do not aim to compare the two decision contexts directly. Instead, our focus is on the comparison of group and individual decisions within the respective decision context. The values are chosen to make the fourth option in *Internality* particularly inefficient and particularly selfish in *Externality*.

After determining his preferred ranking over the four options in both decision situations, one of the two situations is randomly selected to be payoff-relevant. As a payment, the DM receives the best option from his ranking over the options that are made available to him by the CA (see below).

⁶ For example, if we had chosen an abstract Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm for our *Externality* treatment, it would have been fairly uncontroversial not to allow defection to improve all participants' payoffs without sacrificing fairness, and this would have left little room for studying differences between groups and individuals.

TABLE 1: DECISION SITUATION OF THE DECISION MAKERS

<i>Internality</i>		<i>Externality</i>	
Option	Rank	Option	Rank
0€ today, 15€ in 6 months		0€ self, 15€ Atmosfair	
3€ today, 10€ in 6 months		3€ self, 10€ Atmosfair	
4€ today, 6€ in 6 months		6€ self, 6€ Atmosfair	
5€ today, 1€ in 6 months		9€ self, 0€ Atmosfair	

Choice Architects. The CA’s task is to decide whether to intervene in the DM’s choice options. To this end, the CA is informed that her decisions may affect the payoffs of another participant from the same subject pool, whose decisions will be elicited in a future experiment (the DM). The CA learns that for each of the options in the two decision situations as shown in Table 1, she can either choose to make it ‘available’, i.e., the DM will be able to choose that option, or ‘not available’, i.e., the DM will not be able to choose that option. The CA makes an active choice for each option in the two decisions, i.e., neither making an option available nor making it unavailable is a default. She is also told that there are no right or wrong answers and is asked to make her decisions based on her genuine views. The only restriction for the CA is that she must leave at least one of the four options available to the DM in each decision situation.

TABLE 2: THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT OF THE CHOICE ARCHITECTS (INTERNALITY DECISION)


Option	Available	Not available	Not recommended
0€ today, 15€ in 6 months	☐	☐	☐
3€ today, 10€ in 6 months	☐	☐	☐
4€ today, 6€ in 6 months	☐	☐	☐
5€ today, 1€ in 6 months	☐	☐	☐

Before taking her intervention decisions, the CA learns about the exact decision procedure of the DM. In particular, the CA is informed that the DM will have to provide a complete preference ranking over the four choice options, and that, in the end, he will be paid according

to the highest ranked option from his ranking that is available to him. This procedure ensures that the CA can only affect the DM's outcomes but not his decision process. In particular, the CA's decisions do not alter the number of options the DM need to rank and, thus, have no effect on the complexity of the DM's task. Table 2 provides an overview of the decision-making environment of the CA using the example of the *Internality* decision.

To avoid that participants in the role of the CA simply intervene because they have no other way of giving advice or communicating their opinion, the CA can send a message to the DM stating that she does 'not recommend' choosing the respective option. The CA is told that if making use of this opportunity, the DM will be informed upon his decision situation that a participant of a previous part of the experiment (the CA) has thought about the option and decided to not recommend choosing it.

FIGURE 1: THE FLOW OF THE EXPERIMENT



Each CA makes intervention decisions in random order for both kinds of decision situations that the DM faces. CAs act in the role of (impartial) spectators in the sense that they have no direct personal stakes in the decisions of the DM: they receive a fixed payment for their participation.

Treatments. We consider two treatments, *GROUP* and *IND*, using a combination of a within- and a between-subjects design. Figure 1 provides an overview. The between-subjects part provides a clean comparison between the intervention behavior of individuals and groups. The within-subjects part serves as a means to shed light on the mechanisms that drive the decision-making process within groups. We explain the details of our design in turn.

In the *GROUP* treatment, two participants in the role of a CA are randomly matched into a group to make a joint intervention decision (in Stage 2 of the overview figure). To arrive at a joint group decision, the two group members are given the possibility to discuss their decisions using a free-form chat. They are not allowed to discuss unrelated issues during the chat sessions

and are asked to focus on coming up with a joint decision. Groups are required to make an unanimous decision, and only if both members enter the exact same decision for their group on their decision screen, they can proceed with the experiment. In case the two group members do not enter the same decision, they remain on the chat screen and are given the opportunity to discuss their decision.

Prior to the group decision stage, we elicit participants' individual intervention preferences in Stage 1. The options for the CAs and DMs are the same as in the second (group) stage of the experiment, but intervention decisions are made individually by all future group members. This feature allows us to investigate how individual intervention preferences relate to group interventions.

To investigate the extent to which groups and individuals differ in their intervention decisions, we implement the *IND* treatment in which intervention decisions in both stages of the experiment are taken individually. The comparison of Stage 2 choices across *IND* and *GROUP* allows us to cleanly identify differences in intervention choices between individuals and groups using a between-subjects design.

2.2 Procedures

All experimental sessions were conducted online (due to Covid-related restrictions) using the facilities and the standard subject pool of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). Student participants from various disciplines were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and implemented using z-Tu (Duch et al., 2020). The experiment received ethics approval from the Ethics Committee of the Economics Department of the University of Cologne (Reference: 200029FK) and was pre-registered under AEARCTR-0006953 (<https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6953>).

In total, we collected data from $n = 303$ choice architects, $n = 192$ in the *GROUP* treatment and $n = 111$ in the *IND* treatment. Participants were invited to take part in the online experiment in real-time sessions with about 30 participants. That is, they arrived at the same time in an online room to take part in the experiment and to receive the instructions. Shortly after the appointed time of a session, the experiment was started by displaying the experimental instructions on-screen. Appendix C1 provides the original German and an English translation of the instructions. The instructions explained the two-part nature of the experiment, the task of the

DMs as well as their own task. The instructions further explained that one of the CA's decisions, either from the first or the second stage, will be randomly selected to be relevant for the DMs. After reading the instructions, but before taking their decisions, participants were required to answer several comprehension questions to make sure that they understood the rules of the experiment and the impact of their decisions on future participants. Only after all questions were answered correctly by all participants, the experiment started. After the end of stage 2, sessions concluded with a brief demographic questionnaire in which we elicited CAs' beliefs about the DMs' choices. Sessions lasted for about 35 minutes and participants earned on average 11.85€, including a show-up fee of 2.50€, a lump-sum payment of 7.50€, and a payment for the incentivized beliefs. All payments were sent via PayPal.

We also elicited choices from $n = 83$ participants in the role of DMs. DMs faced both the internality and the externality decision and were asked to rank the four options from the most to the least preferred one. In case their respective CA decided to recommend not choosing a particular option, this was shown to the DM. At the end of the experiment, one of the two decision situations was randomly selected, and DMs were paid according to their highest-ranked option that the CA left available in that situation. All payments were carried out via PayPal, either shortly after the experiment (in case of the donation decision or when choosing the sooner payment in the intertemporal decision) or after six months (in case the later payment in the intertemporal decision was chosen). Sessions lasted about 10 minutes and DMs earned on average 9.98€. A further total of 229€ was donated to *Atmosfair* and verification of this transaction was published on a prespecified homepage that was announced to the participants at the beginning of the experiment. We collected fewer observations for the DMs. CAs knew that only the decisions of a randomly selected subset of CAs would be implemented for DMs.

2.3 Theoretical Considerations

We select our decision situations, *Internality* and *Externality*, to represent potentially different motivations and decision-making processes underlying interventions. What behavior should one expect in the two situations and how may the intervention choice differ between individuals and groups? We discuss potential predictions based on a rational choice benchmark as well as alternative considerations based on the previous literature on group decision-making (e.g., Charness and Sutter, 2012), intervention behavior (e.g., Ambuehl et al., 2021) and (value of granting) autonomy (e.g., Bartling et al., 2014).

Rational Choice. In the case of the *Internality* decision, an intervention does not affect the CA's own outcome. Under rational choice assumptions, both CAs and DMs make rational decisions. This implies that DMs maximize their own utility, and thus, an intervention can only diminish DM's welfare. Since interventions do not affect the CA's own outcome and can only reduce the welfare of the DMs, CAs have no reason to intervene. Thus, from a rational choice perspective, we do not expect interventions in the *Internality* situation.

In the *Externality* decision, reducing CO₂ emissions is a contribution to a global public good – although we acknowledge that the global externality from individual CO₂ abatement in our experiment is extremely small. However, to the extent the DM's climate action is perceived to benefit the environment and thus the CAs, and since a rational and selfish DM will take all the money for himself, rational CAs want to restrict the choice set of the DM such that the DM is forced to invest in climate action (Kölle et al., 2024).

With standard rational choice reasoning, there is no reason to hypothesize that intervention behavior is different between groups and individuals, neither in the *Internality* nor the *Externality* situation (for example, with all agents being rational, groups cannot have more cognitive capacities than individuals).⁷

Alternative Considerations. As shown in Ambuehl et al. (2021), CAs frequently intervene in situations similar to our *Internality* situation by removing impatient choice options, based on the belief that such altruistically motivated interventions benefit DMs. However, the literature on group decision-making suggests that groups tend to act more selfishly than individuals (Charness and Sutter, 2012), indicating that groups may be less inclined to intervene due to lower levels of concern for DMs.⁸ Conversely, groups have also been found to be smarter than individuals,⁹ potentially making them better able to recognize that DMs may suffer from present

⁷ Although all participants are drawn from the same population, one might also consider a situation where CAs are more rational than DMs. Predictions about the intervention decisions in *Externality* and *Internality* are less straightforward in this case, because interventions depend on the type of biases that DMs exhibit. Importantly, however, even in such asymmetric rationality cases, there is no reason to predict that group CAs and individual CAs will behave differently.

⁸ The literature demonstrating that groups are less altruistic than individuals typically examines scenarios where agents divide money between themselves and others, which is different than in our *Internality* decision. Nevertheless, given the robust finding in this literature that groups display lower levels of altruism in certain decision situations, and considering that interventions are often motivated by altruistic motives, it seems justified to consider how varying levels of altruism may theoretically influence intervention patterns in our new decision context.

⁹ Groups may be smarter, because they can combine more cognitive capacities and learn about or reflect upon additional arguments in the course of the group discussion (Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Feri et al., 2010; Charness and Sutter, 2012; Kugler et al., 2012; Kocher et al., 2020).

bias. This might suggest that groups intervene more frequently than individuals. Ambuehl et al. (2021) show that CAs, while attempting to be altruistic, behave as if they assume their own preferences are relevant for others (ideals-projective paternalism). Given that they are smarter, groups might be more adept at avoiding this projection bias, potentially leading to a more nuanced understanding of the detrimental impacts of interventions and resulting in less frequent interventions.

In the *Externality* situation, if donations to the charity are perceived as benefiting society and CAs, CAs have a selfish incentive to intervene. Having shown to be smarter and more selfish than individuals (see above), groups are expected to be better in recognizing the public good nature and have less concern for the DM. As a result, they might intervene more frequently than individuals. Conversely, as noted before, group interactions may diminish the projection bias, which could mitigate the tendency to intervene.

In summary, both the degree of altruism and cognitive sophistication differ between groups and individuals, suggesting that groups may respond differently than individuals in both *Internality* and *Externality*; however, the direction of this difference— if any—is ambiguous.¹⁰

3. Results

Individual Interventions in Stage 1. We start our analysis by describing the results of the first stage of our experiment, in which all CAs make individual intervention decisions. Intervening in the choice options of DMs is the modal behavioral pattern of CAs: 68% of our participants remove at least one option from at least one of the two decision situations. Interventions are particularly pronounced for the *Externality* decision, where CAs may perceive to have a self-interested reason to enforce climate action by the DMs. Here, more than half of all CAs intervene (54%). But even for the *Internality* decision, where there is no selfish reason to intervene, about a third (32%) of the CAs decide to restrict the DM’s choice set. As shown by Table 3, intervention decisions by CAs are primarily directed towards impatient (*Internality*) and selfish (*Externality*) choice options. For the *Externality* decision, we find that the least removed option is the one that provides the same payoff to both the DM and *Atmosfair*, suggesting that CAs compromise on the outcome of both beneficiaries, perhaps out of concern

¹⁰ Another potentially relevant non-rational choice motive in the literature concerns the value of granting autonomy to others (Bartling et al., 2014; Ackfeld and Ockenfels, 2021; Bartling et al., 2023). This motive implies that CAs are less willing to intervene, both in *Internality* and *Externality*. However, the literature does not provide any reasons to believe that the value of granting autonomy is differently strong across groups and individuals (Buffat et al., 2023).

for some notion of fairness (Kölle et al., 2024, Andre et al., 2024b). In both decision situations, we find that the modal CA among CAs who intervene removes one choice option (see Figure A1 in Appendix A for the full distribution).¹¹

In the following, we refer to individuals who, in this Stage 1, decide to leave all choice options available to the DM in a given decision situation as ‘libertarian’ types, and those who decide to remove at least one choice option as ‘interventionist’ types.¹² We provide a discussion of this classification in Section 4.4.

¹¹ The results presented in Table 3 suggest heterogeneity in how CAs intervene in others’ choices, perhaps indicating different underlying reasons for interventions. For example, in *Internality*, making one of the last three options not available may show that CAs want to generate the highest overall payment, whereas making the first option unavailable, although it generates the highest payoff, may show that they want the DMs to be able to consume some of the money today, for example because they attribute their own preference onto the DM (called projective paternalism in Ambuehl et al., 2021; indeed, the percentage of paternalists who restricted the most patient option in our study – 6.6% – is comparable to that in Menu 1 of Ambuehl et al.’s main study – 6.0% –, which we used to parameterize our options). Another reason may be that CAs perceive the payments in 6 months as more uncertain. Similarly, in *Externality*, we see several potential reasons that CAs make the first option unavailable, although it is both the most prosocial option and the one that maximizes the distributed monetary amount. For example, individuals who are overly altruistic can sometimes be perceived negatively by their peers, potentially due to not adhering to social norms (see Raihani and Power, 2021; Khalmetski and Ockenfels, 2024), and the CA might aim to prevent DMs from being perceived negatively. It may also be that CAs have a motivation to help the DM retain more money for themselves, or that CAs either view the charity unfavorably and/or do not believe in the charity’s objectives or effectiveness. In the following, we are mainly concerned with whether CAs intervene at all, rather than focussing on the (un)availability of specific options.

¹² Based on rational choice theory, we should not expect a relation between interventions across contexts. It is therefore an interesting empirical question of whether at the individual-level interventions are correlated across decision contexts. We do not find evidence for such a correlation. Specifically, we find that in Stage 1, 17% of CAs intervene in both decision situations, 36% intervene only in the *Externality* decision, 15% intervene only in the *Internality* decision, and 32% do not intervene at all. The correlation between being a libertarian or interventionist type across *Internality* and *Externality* is close to zero and not significant (Spearman rank correlation: $\rho = 0.009$, $p = 0.868$). This suggests that there is not general “intervention type”, but that intervention decisions are rather context-dependent.


TABLE 3: INDIVIDUAL INTERVENTIONS IN STAGE 1

<i>Internality</i>		<i>Externality</i>	
Option	% unavailable	Option	% unavailable
0€ today, 15€ in 6 months	6.6	0€ self, 15€ Atmosfair	11.2
3€ today, 10€ in 6 months	5.9	3€ self, 10€ Atmosfair	8.3
4€ today, 6€ in 6 months	9.2	6€ self, 6€ Atmosfair	4.6
5€ today, 1€ in 6 months	21.1	9€ self, 0€ Atmosfair	41.6
At least one option unavailable	31.7	At least one option unavailable	53.5
Mean (Median) # of options made unavailable conditional on removing at least one option	1.35 (1)	Mean (Median) # of options made unavailable conditional on removing at least one option	1.22 (1)

Individual and Group Interventions in Stage 2. Next, we turn to the results of the second stage of our experiment. We find that groups are considerably less likely to intervene in the choices of others than individuals. Specifically, while the modal behavior in our *IND* treatment is to intervene – 72% of the CAs remove at least one option from at least one of the two decision situations –, in our *GROUP* treatment the modal behavior is not to intervene: 53% of all groups decide to leave all choice options available to the DM. This difference in interventions is economically large and statistically significant (χ^2 -test, $p < 0.001$).

The pattern of fewer interventions in groups is robust and large in magnitude in both the *Internality* and *Externality* situation. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots treatment differences separately for both decision contexts. For the *Internality* decision (left panel), we find that only 11% of the groups decide to intervene compared to 40% of the individuals, a difference that is highly significant (χ^2 -test, $p < 0.001$). Similar differences are observed for the *Externality* decision (right panel), where 41% of the groups decide to intervene compared to 62% of the individuals (χ^2 -test, $p = 0.002$).

FIGURE 2: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP INTERVENTIONS IN STAGE 2



Notes: The figure shows the fraction of groups and individuals deciding to intervene into the DM's decision by removing at least one choice option in Stage 2 of the experiment. The left panel shows the results for the *Internality* decision and the right panel shows the results for the *Externality* decision. P-values are obtained from χ^2 -tests comparing treatments. Vertical lines indicate standard errors of the mean.

We confirm our main finding in regression analyses using a dummy variable indicating whether a choice option was made unavailable as the dependent variable, and a group treatment dummy as the independent variable. The results are shown in Table 4. Model (1) shows that pooling over *Internality* and *Externality*, in our *IND* treatment an option is removed in 15.9% of the cases. In the *GROUP* treatment, this number is significantly reduced by 8.2% to 7.7%. As indicated by the negative and significant group dummy in Models (2) and (3), this result holds when we consider the *Internality* and *Externality* decisions separately. To test whether the observed effects are driven by differences at the intensive or extensive margin, in Models (4) and (5) we restrict our sample to those individuals and groups that decided to intervene at all. As indicated by the insignificant group dummy, we find no evidence that groups and individuals differ in the intensity of their interventions. That is, conditional on intervening at least once, there are no differences in the number of removed options between individuals and groups. This

shows that the differences in interventions across treatment is mainly due to differences at the extensive rather than the intensive margin.¹³

We summarize our results so far as follows:

Result 1: *Groups are significantly less likely than individuals to intervene in others' choices.*

TABLE 4: DIFFERENCES IN INTERVENTIONS ACROSS TREATMENTS


	Pooled	Internality	Externality	If intervention > 0	
				Internality	Externality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Group	-0.082*** (0.017)	-0.094*** (0.021)	-0.070*** (0.023)	0.006 (0.042)	-0.015 (0.021)
Constant	0.159*** (0.014)	0.133*** (0.018)	0.185*** (0.016)	0.335*** (0.021)	0.297*** (0.014)
<i>Observations</i>	1656	828	828	220	432
<i># Clusters</i>	207	207	207	55	108

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if an option was removed and 0 otherwise. In models (1), (2), and (3) we use data from all individuals and groups. In models (4) and (5) we use only data from those individuals and groups who decided to intervene by removing at least one option. To control for the dependency of observations, we cluster standard errors (reported in parentheses) at the group level. We have a total of 207 clusters (111 individuals + 96 groups). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To put the low frequency of group interventions into perspective, we can compare our results to a benchmark that assumes that individual preferences, as elicited in the first stage of the experiment, are straightforwardly aggregated and ties are broken randomly. Specifically, assuming that groups consisting of two liberals never intervene, groups consisting of two interventionists always intervene, and groups consisting of one libertarian and one interventionist intervene in half of the time, we would have expected 31% of group interventions in the *Internality* decision and 51% of group interventions in the *Externality* decision. In both cases, the actual fractions are (marginally) significantly lower than this benchmark (Binomial-tests, $p < 0.001$ and $p = 0.066$, respectively).

¹³ As we show in Figure A2 in Appendix A, the observed treatment differences are also not driven by different intervention patterns; both groups and individuals make the impatient (*Internality*) and selfish (*Externality*) options unavailable most frequently. Instead, for each of the choice options we observe a pronounced level shift with groups being less likely to intervene than individuals.

FIGURE 3: INTERVENTION DECISION BY GROUP TYPE



Notes: The figure shows the fraction of groups that decide to intervene into the DM's decision by removing at least one choice option. The left panel shows the results for the *Internality* decision and the right panel shows the results for the *Externality* decision. "L-L" corresponds to groups consisting of two individuals classified as libertarian, "L-I" indicates groups consisting of one libertarian and one interventionist type, and "I-I" refers to groups consisting of two interventionist types. Dashed lines show the expected level of interventions if individual preferences were straightforwardly aggregated and ties were broken randomly. Vertical lines indicate standard errors of the mean.

Looking at the decisions at the group level helps explain this finding. Consistent with their Stage 1 decisions, groups consisting of two libertarian types decide not to intervene in 96% of the cases. In sharp contrast, groups consisting of two interventionist types agree to intervene in only 68% of the cases.¹⁴ The difference in the alignment of the individual preferences and the eventual group decision between liberal and interventionist groups is highly significant ($p < 0.001$).¹⁵ This asymmetry between libertarian and interventionist types in the implementation

¹⁴ This number does not change much if we consider only the subset of groups consisting of two interventionists who not only agree to intervene at all, but also agree on which choice option to remove. In this case, 75% of the groups decide to intervene.

¹⁵ Statistical inference is obtained using the following approach. We first restrict the sample to groups that contain only members of the same type (either two liberals or two interventionists). Using a linear probability model (LPM), we then regress a dummy indicating if the group made a group choice that aligns with individual preferences of its members on a dummy indicating whether the group consists of liberals or interventionists. We

of their individual preferences when interacting in groups is further demonstrated when looking at the decisions of heterogeneous groups composed of one of each type. They decide to intervene in only 26% of the cases, which is significantly lower than the benchmark of 50% that would be expected if liberals and interventionists were equally likely to implement their views ($p < 0.001$).¹⁶ As can be seen in Figure 3, these results are present in both decision situations, but are particularly pronounced for the *Internality* decision, possibly because the presence of the externality in the *Externality* situation provides a better argument for interventionist types to intervene (recall in this context that we generally see higher intervention rates in *Externality* than *Internality*).¹⁷

4. Why are Groups more Libertarian?

Our results so far reveal that groups are more libertarian than individuals. In this section, we conduct additional analyses based on our choice data (4.1) as well as the data from our chat logs (4.2), and provide evidence from two additional experiments to further explore this core finding and to shed light on possible explanations (4.3).

4.1 Choice Data from Main Experiment

Complexity of Decision Situation. One possible explanation for our findings above is that libertarian decisions are simply “less complex” and therefore more stable over time. To test for this, we check the rate at which participants in our *IND* treatment make consistent decisions between Stage 1 and Stage 2. If the libertarian view was indeed more stable over time, we should expect participants who did not intervene in Stage 1 to be more likely to make consistent choices in Stage 2 than individuals who revealed to be an interventionist. However, this is not

account for the dependency of decisions that are made by the same group by clustering standard errors at the group level ($N = 116$ observations, 85 clusters).

¹⁶ To obtain statistical inference we again rely on a LPM regression approach. In our analysis, we restrict the sample to heterogeneous groups (i.e., containing a liberal and an interventionist type) and regress a dummy indicating the group’s intervention decisions on a constant. We then test whether this coefficient is different from 0.5 and account for the dependency of observations that are made by the same group by clustering standard errors at the group level ($N = 76$ observations, 65 clusters).

¹⁷ In the *Internality* decision, 98% of liberal groups decide not to intervene, while only 36% of interventionists groups decide to intervene. The difference in the alignment of individual preferences and group decisions is highly significant (χ^2 -test, $p < 0.001$). Furthermore, heterogeneous groups decide to intervene only 16% of the time, which is significantly lower than what would be expected if liberals and interventionists were equally likely to implement their preference (t-test, $p < 0.001$). In the *Externality* decision, the difference in the consistency rate between the liberal and interventionist groups is still noticeable but somewhat less pronounced (93% vs. 79%, χ^2 -test, $p = 0.141$). Furthermore, we observe a liberal shift in heterogeneous groups in this decision situation as well: they intervene in only 36% of the cases, which is weakly significantly lower than the 50% that would be expected if the liberal and interventionist views had equal weight (t-test, $p = 0.080$).

what we find. Aggregated over both decision situations, we find that in 79% of the cases in which a participant decided to intervene in Stage 1 they also chose to intervene in Stage 2, compared to a consistency rate of 73% for liberals. So, if anything, the libertarian view is even less stable over time, although the difference is small and not statistically significant ($p = 0.324$).¹⁸


Effort Costs. Another possible explanation for the observed treatment differences is that groups are simply reluctant to make the effort to reach a consensus. Two facts speak against this hypothesis. First, group members were required by design to actively agree on a decision, even if they do not intervene at all; there is no default for groups that fail to reach an agreement. Second, and more importantly, if groups were simply aiming to minimize effort, the arguably simplest decision would be to leave all options available and to not recommend against any option. This is not what we find. Instead, we find that groups *do* make an effort to coordinate, but that they agree on recommending against choosing certain options rather than making them unavailable. Specifically, we find that 62.5% of the groups in *Internality* and 39.6% of the groups in *Externality* use the recommendation but not the intervention option. These numbers are significantly higher than the respective ones in the IND treatment (*Internality*: 39.6%, χ^2 – test, $p = 0.001$; *Externality*: 24.3%, χ^2 – test, $p = 0.018$). As a result, when only comparing the instances in which CAs neither used the advice nor the removal option, we find no differences across treatments, neither for *Internality* (IND: 20.7%, GROUP: 26.0%, χ^2 – test, $p = 0.336$) nor for *Externality* (IND: 13.5%, GROUP: 9.8%, χ^2 – test, $p = 0.224$). Overall, these results indicate that the lower frequency of interventions in our *GROUP* treatment compared to our *IND* treatment is not due to groups simply wanting to avoid the effort of coordinating on a decision. Instead, they show that groups coordinate on the alternative and softer approach of influencing the *DMs*' decisions via recommendations (see Appendix B for an empirical overview of the recommendations given).

4.2 Chat Log Analyses

¹⁸ The p -value comes from a linear probability model in which we regress a dummy indicating whether an individual made a Stage 2 decision consistent with their individual preferences as revealed in Stage 1 on a dummy indicating whether they are classified as libertarian or interventionist. We account for the dependency of decisions that are made by the same participant by clustering standard errors at the individual level ($n = 222$ observations, 111 clusters).

Role of First Proposal. The group outcome is strongly predicted by the initial proposals made in the group chat.¹⁹ Indeed, in our data, the proportion of interventions that are initially proposed in the group discussion is strikingly similar to the proportion of interventions that are ultimately agreed upon by the group members, as shown in Figure 4.²⁰ For the *Internality* decision, we find that 14% of initial proposals involve the removal of at least one option from the DM’s choice menu, which is very similar to and not significantly different from the 11% we observe for the final group decision ($p = 0.482$).²¹ Similarly, the share of initial proposals for the *Externality* decision that involve the removal of at least one option is 42%, which is very close to the 41% of final group interventions ($p = 0.810$). These results indicate that the observed differences in interventions between groups and individuals are not driven by arguments exchanged or information revealed during the group discussion; the share of interventions is already lower among the first proposals being made (Section 4.3 will provide further evidence).

FIGURE 4: FIRST PROPOSALS AND FINAL DECISIONS



Notes: The figure shows the fraction of initial proposals and final decisions entailing an intervention into the DM’s decision. The left panel shows the results for the *Internality* decision and the right

¹⁹ This effect is reminiscent of the so-called anchoring effect which have been shown to matter in various contexts including individual valuations (Ariely et al., 2003) and bargaining (Phillips and Menkhaus, 2010). However, more recent studies suggest that anchoring effects may be less important than initially thought (Fudenberg et al., 2012; Maniadiis et al., 2014).

²⁰ The chat logs were transcribed by a research assistant. A proposal is defined as bringing up and mentioning a specific option for action in the group discussion.

²¹ The p -values come from regressions which compare the share of interventions across the three bars in the figure.

panel shows the results for the *Externality* decision. P-values are obtained from OLS regressions (with clustered standard errors). Vertical lines indicate standard errors of the mean.

Role of Selection Effects. Given the important role of the first proposal, a natural next question is whether the low frequency of initial interventionist proposals is due to a selection effect such that interventionists are less likely to take the initiative in the group discussion. To test this, we conduct regression analyses in which we regress a dummy indicating whether an individual made the first proposal on a dummy indicating their type (interventionist vs. libertarian, as defined based on their Stage 1 decisions – see above). The results are reported in Table 5. The first model contains the pooled data for both decision situations, while models (2) and (3) show the results separately for the *Internality* and the *Externality* decision, respectively. As indicated by the small and insignificant coefficients for the interventionist dummy, we find no evidence for selection effects: in neither model we find an individual’s type to have a significant association with the likelihood of making the first proposal in the group discussion.

TABLE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL’S TYPE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAKING THE FIRST PROPOSAL IN GROUPS

	Pooled (1)	Internality (2)	Externality (3)
Interventionist (=1 if a participant is classified as interventionist, 0 otherwise)	-0.011 (0.054)	-0.061 (0.078)	0.031 (0.073)
Constant	0.504*** (0.032)	0.519*** (0.044)	0.484*** (0.052)
<i>Observations</i>	384	192	192

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if an individual was the first within their group to make a proposal and 0 otherwise. As independent variables, we use a dummy variable indicating whether based on their stage 1 decisions, an individual is classified as an interventionist or libertarian. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. The results reported here are robust to using logistic regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Congruency of First Proposals and Individual Preferences. Taking together, the evidence so far could suggest that interventionists shy away from expressing their individual preferences when they are part of a group. To shed light in this potential explanation, we test in a next step whether, conditional on making the first proposal, CAs make proposals that are congruent with their own type. We find that liberals are much more likely to make congruent proposals than interventionists. Specifically, aggregating across both decision situations, we find that 94.8% of first proposals made by liberals contain no intervention. In stark contrast to that, only 61.0% of interventionists propose to intervene when making the first proposal. This suggests that

interventionists are more likely to shy away from revealing their own type in the context of a group discussion than liberals.

Regression analyses, reported in Table 6, show that this difference is highly significant. As shown by models (2) and (3), this effect is observed in both decision situations, but is particularly pronounced for the *Internality* decision.

Table 6: *RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL'S TYPE AND THE FIRST PROPOSAL*

	Pooled (1)	Internality (2)	Externality (3)
Interventionist (=1 if a participant is classified as interventionist, 0 otherwise)	-0.337*** (0.061)	-0.586*** (0.097)	-0.195*** (0.073)
Constant	0.948*** (0.021)	0.957*** (0.025)	0.935*** (0.037)
<i>Observations</i>	192	96	96

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the first proposal made within a group is congruent with an individual's type as revealed in Stage 1, and 0 otherwise. As an independent variable we use a dummy variable indicating whether based on their stage 1 decisions, an individual is classified as an interventionist or libertarian. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. The results reported here are robust to using logistic regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

4.3 Two Further Experiments

Our analysis so far suggests that it is not the structure or content of the group discussion that is responsible for the lower frequency of intervention in groups with unwilling preferences. Instead, it appears that it is the social context of group decision making *per se* that makes interventionists more reluctant to reveal and express their preferences than liberals. Building on these observations, we expect that, in social contexts, individuals are less likely to reveal their preferences for interventions.

To test for direct, causal evidence for this hypothesis, we conduct two additional experiments, one involving a decision in which participants can self-select into a situation in which they can make an intervention decision, and one in which we manipulate whether intervention decisions are made in private or in public. We explain both experiments in turn.

Experiment 1: Selection into Intervention Decisions

In our first additional experiment, we test whether liberals and interventionists differ in their likelihood to select into a situation in which they can decide on the choice set of a third party.

To this end, we design an experiment similar to our main experiment, but with one important difference. As before, in Stage 1 all participants in the role of a CA have to make individual intervention decisions for the two decision situations described above, *Internality* and *Externality*. As in our main experiment, Stage 2 differs in whether intervention decisions have to be made individually (*IND* treatment) or as part of a group (*GROUP* treatment). However, in contrast to our main experiment, participation in Stage 2 is now voluntary. That is, at the beginning of Stage 2, CAs are asked whether they want to participate in Stage 2 and make additional intervention decisions for both decision situations, or whether they want to opt out and not make any further intervention decisions.²² CAs know the decision situation in Stage 2 (i.e., group or individual decision) when they decide whether they want to move on to Stage 2.

The procedures of this experiment including the payment, participant recruitment, and timing of events, are identical to those of our main experiment (as described in Section 2). In total, we collected data from $n = 184$ CAs, $n = 89$ in the *IND* treatment and $n = 95$ in the *GROUP* treatment.²³ As before, the decisions of the DMs were elicited as part of an upcoming experiment.

We find a strong interaction effect between an individual's intervention type (based on their Stage 1 decision) and their willingness to select into the role of a CA across the two contexts. Specifically, at the aggregate level, we find that liberals are equally likely to serve as CAs regardless of whether decisions must to be made individually (61.0%) or as part of a group (64.5%). In contrast, interventionists are significantly less likely to serve as an CA when decisions have to be made in the social context of a group: the proportion of interventionists who select into the role drops from 80.8% in the *IND* treatment to 60.3% in the *GROUP* treatment.

²² To prevent that CAs opt-in merely because they have a preference for talking to another person, even if they decided to opt-out, they were given the possibility to chat with another (idle) CA. To prevent that CAs opt-out merely because they want to finish the experiment sooner, we ensured that opting out did not shorten the experiment.

²³ The original German instructions as well as an English translation can be found in Appendix C2. The experiment was pre-registered along with the main experiment. Ethical approval was also granted along with the main experiment.

TABLE 7: OLS REGRESSIONS OF THE CHOICE TO MAKE A DECISION AS A CA

	Pooled (1)	Internality (2)	Externality (3)
Interventionist (=1 if a participant is classified as interventionist, 0 otherwise)	0.198*** (0.075)	0.172*** (0.102)	0.197*** (0.088)
Group (=1 if treatment is GROUP, 0 otherwise)	0.035 (0.077)	0.055 (0.092)	0.015 (0.100)
Interventionist $\times$ Group	-0.240** (0.104)	-0.134 (0.146)	-0.310** (0.133)
Constant	0.610*** (0.058)	0.564*** (0.068)	0.667*** (0.071)
Observations	368	184	184

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a participant decided to make another decision as a CA, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. The results reported are robust to using logistic regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To test the statistical significance of these results, we rely on regressions in which we relate the decision whether to opt-in to make another intervention decision in Stage 2 to three right-hand-side variables: a *GROUP* treatment dummy, an interventionist dummy, and an interaction term between the two. We run this regression for the pooled data (Model 1) as well as separately for the two decision situations, *Internality* (Model 2) and *Externality* (Model 3). The results of these regressions are shown in Table 7. As can be seen in Model 1, the interaction term between the treatment and type dummies is negative and significant, indicating that participants with an individual preference for interventions select out of making another intervention decision when that other decision is a group decision. The results of Models (2) and (3) further show that this effect occurs in both decision situations, but that it is particularly pronounced for the *Externality* decision. Overall, these observations are consistent with our social context hypothesis, as they show that interventionists are less likely to opt into situations in which they need to discuss potential intervention decisions with others.

Experiment 2: Public Disclosure of Intervention Decision

Our second additional experiment aims to test the causal impact of social context more directly. Building on previous studies investigating the role of social image concerns in other contexts (see, e.g., Ariely et al., 2009; Ewers and Zimmermann, 2015), we design an experiment in

which we exogenously manipulate whether decisions are made either in private or in public. Specifically, in our *PRIVATE* treatment, individuals in the role of CAs make their intervention decisions individually and in private (as in Stage 1 of our previous experiments). In our *PUBLIC* treatment, CAs also make their intervention decisions individually, but are told before the intervention decision that they must publicly reveal their decisions to the other CAs in the session at the end of the experiment. As in our previous experiments, CAs were asked to make decisions for both the *Internality* and *Externality* decision situation. Unlike our previous designs, this experiment consists of only one stage.

The experiment was conducted in person in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER).²⁴ In total, we collected data from $n = 203$ CAs, $n = 101$ in the *PRIVATE* treatment and $n = 102$ in the *PUBLIC* treatment. As before, the decisions of the DMs were elicited as part of an upcoming experiment. All participants received a show-up fee of EUR 4 plus EUR 6 as a fixed payment for completing the experiment. A typical experimental session lasted about 20 minutes.

We find that individuals are less likely to intervene in the decision-making of others when they have to publicly disclose their decision. In our *PUBLIC* treatment, we find that 56% of our participants remove at least one option from at least one of the two decision situations, which is lower than the 69% that we observe in our *PRIVATE* treatment. The results from regression analyses, reported in Table 8, reveal that the difference in interventions between treatments is significant. As can be seen from the results of Models (2) and (3), the coefficient of the *PUBLIC* dummy is negative in both decision situations, but particularly pronounced for the *Externality* decision.²⁵

²⁴ See Appendix C3 for the original German instructions as well as an English translation. We pre-registered this experiment separately after we obtained the results from our main experiment: AEARCTR-0009523 (<https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9523>). We also received a separate ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of the Economics Department of the University of Cologne (Reference: 210034CF).

²⁵ Overall, we see the following rates of no recommendation, any recommendation and intervention in the four conditions: i) Internality/private: 19% no recommendation, 47% recommendation, 35% intervention; ii) Internality/public: 21% no recommendation, 49% recommendation, 30% intervention; iii) Externality/private: 21% no recommendation, 23% recommendation, 56% intervention; iv) Externality/public: 27% no recommendation, 31% recommendation, 41% intervention.

TABLE 8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF INTERVENING AND THE ANONYMITY OF THE DECISION

	All (1)	Internality (2)	Externality (3)
Public (=1 if treatment is PUBLIC, 0 otherwise)	-0.134** (0.068)	-0.043 (0.066)	-0.153** (0.070)
Constant	0.693*** (0.048)	0.347*** (0.048)	0.564*** (0.050)
Observations	203	203	203
R ²	0.019	0.002	0.023

Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a participant decided to intervene by removing at least one of the DM's choice options, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. The results reported are robust to using logistic regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Result 2 summarizes our findings and confirms our hypothesis:

Result 2: *In social contexts, participants shy away from interventions.*

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Our study delves into the questions of why, when, and how groups choose to intervene in decisions of others, and how group intervention behavior differs from that of individuals. We find a substantial disparity in the intervention tendencies of groups and individuals, with groups being significantly more liberal than individuals. In the following, we discuss the internal (5.1) and external (5.2) validity of our empirical approach and findings, and consider the implications for decision-makers and welfare (5.3).

5.1 Internal Validity: Discussion of Mechanisms

In Section 3, we established that groups are less likely to intervene than individuals. Section 4 empirically explores various mechanisms to explain this difference. Our empirical analyses of chat logs (Section 4.2) and two additional experiments (Section 4.3) are consistent with the notion that the social context of the group discourages interventionist individuals from expressing their preferred choices. To assess the relative importance of the social context mechanism in explaining the overall difference observed in the main experiment, we can

compare the results of the main experiment with those of the second additional experiment, where participants' choices are either disclosed or kept private.

In the main experiment, 72% of participants in the IND treatment removed at least one option in at least one decision situation, compared to 47% in the GROUP treatment, yielding a difference of 35% between the treatments. In the second additional experiment, 69% of participants in the PRIVATE treatment removed at least one option, compared to 56% in the PUBLIC treatment, resulting in a relative difference of 19%. Although these two experiments differ in their design and are not directly comparable, the relative differences in the two experiments might suggest that the social context mechanism can account for more than half of the total treatment effect observed in the main experiment.

The observation that the social context mechanism alone is unlikely to fully explain the differences in intervention rates between groups and individuals prompts further investigation into additional mechanisms. Our data analysis sheds light on several of such potential explanations. We find no evidence to support the idea that group discussions, by fostering an exchange of arguments, lead to "smarter" decisions, nor that liberals are more likely to take the initiative in group discussions (as discussed in Section 4.2). We also examined whether differences in effort costs or complexity levels across treatments could explain the observed effects, but found no support for these explanations (Section 4.2). Notably, our data show that groups do not merely avoid coordination costs. Instead, they tend to coordinate on recommending against certain choice options, rather than possibly minimizing coordination costs by selecting the option that avoids making options unavailable or recommending against them.

Further potential explanations for our main finding include the idea that persuading someone to intervene is perceived to require more effort than proposing (and agreeing) not to intervene or recommending against an option. Additionally, it is possible that liberals generally hold stronger convictions, leading to group disagreements being resolved in favor of the more libertarian member, with recommending against an option serving as a compromise. Such mechanisms would not undermine the relevance of the social context explanation, though. First, in our second additional experiment, where participants did not need to persuade anyone to agree with their choice, we still observe fewer interventions when decisions were made in a social context. This suggests that the social context itself discourages interventions, regardless of the effort required to persuade others. Second, as shown in Section 3, even when groups

consist entirely of interventionists, they agree to intervene in only 68% of cases, despite the absence of strongly convicted liberals who might need to be persuaded.

One might also think that people generally accept the attitudes they have toward others also from others toward themselves. As a result, it would perhaps not be surprising that liberals do not want others to intervene in their decisions, while this is more acceptable for interventionists in the group decisions. However, our findings indicate that the initial proposal made during group discussions tends to be more liberal and is typically the one the group ultimately agrees upon (see Section 4.2), and that even groups composed of two interventionists often reach a liberal decision (see the end of Section 3).

Overall, our data support the idea that the social context of group decision-making explains a significant portion of the differences observed between groups and individuals in the main experiment, though not the entire difference. This raises the question of *why* the social context discourages individuals from proposing interventions. One potential mechanism that may contribute to the social context effect is that decisions made in groups (as in Stage 2 of the GROUP treatment) or under public disclosure (as in the PUBLIC treatment of the second additional experiment) are made more carefully and reasonably than decisions made individually (as in Stage 1 of both treatments, Stage 2 of IND, and PRIVATE in the second additional experiment). This could be because the stakes are perceived as low in individual decisions, while in group or public settings, participants may be more concerned about their reputation and thus think through their choices more thoroughly. If this is the case, classifying individuals as interventionist or libertarian based on their Stage 1 behavior could be misleading, as those decisions might reflect a lack of careful consideration rather than true preferences. Consequently, the observed differences between group and individual decisions could be driven by the more deliberate decision-making *process* in group contexts, possibly due to reputational or social image concerns, rather than inherent differences between individual and group *preferences*, although we emphasize that this appears unlikely the full driver of the social context effect.²⁶

²⁶ Our analysis provides some indications that Stage 1 behavior is informative about individual preferences. First, we observe a high degree of consistency between Stage 1 and Stage 2 behavior in the IND treatment, where decisions are made individually in both stages. Consistency rates are 79% for interventionists and 73% for liberals (see Section 4.1). Second, in the GROUP treatment, we find that groups composed of Stage 1 liberals almost invariably choose not to intervene (Section 3). Third, Stage 1 behavior is reasonable in that the most frequently removed options are those associated with selfishness (in the *Externality* decision) and impatience (in the *Internality* decision) (see Table 3). Fourth, we analyze decision times in Stage 1 and find that participants take an average of 52 seconds to decide in the *Internality* situation and 55 seconds in the *Externality* situation. While we

Another, potentially complementary explanation is that interventionists may perceive that granting autonomy is generally viewed as more desirable by others. Philosophical debates have long attributed both instrumental and intrinsic value to autonomous decision-making (Feinberg, 1978; Rawls, 1971, 1980; Young, 1982), and recent empirical evidence shows that people value autonomy for its own sake (Benz and Frey, 2008; Bartling et al., 2014).²⁷ This perception may lead group members to shy away from proposing interventions into others' freedom of choice, fearing that such proposals might be viewed unfavorably by their peers. Consequently, even when a majority supports intervention (as in our externality decision), group dynamics may lead to outcomes that favor libertarianism.²⁸

5.2 External Validity: Relevance of our Findings for Business Contexts

We designed our experiments to isolate individuals' and groups' fundamental willingness to intervene in others' autonomy within a simple and "minimal" environment—one that is just complex enough to allow for clear tests of intervention preferences in both individuals and groups. To achieve this, we employed a spectator design that minimizes potential confounding effects, such as financial incentives or other external motivations. This approach, which follows the emerging literature on paternalism that started with Ambuehl et al. (2021), enables us to show that groups are generally less inclined to intervene in others' decision-making when other (potentially competing) considerations are absent. Employing a stylized social context comes at the cost of abstracting away from real-world complexities, potentially limiting the generalizability of our findings to real-world settings. Generally, questions surrounding

lack a direct benchmark to assess these times, random or careless clicking would likely take less time. Even those who choose not to intervene take 50 seconds on average, compared to 58 seconds for interventionists. Taken together, these observations indicate that individual choices are informative about individual preferences. We also note that it is indeed common in the paternalism literature to use individual behavior of choice architects without incentivizing intervention decisions to infer paternalistic preferences (e.g., Ambuehl et al., 2021; Bartling et al., 2023). However, it remains possible that group decisions are made with even greater care than individual decisions, for example due to reputational or social image concerns. Because the presence of others is a fundamental characteristic of group decisions and a key difference from individual decisions, this would be consistent with the social context interpretation of our results.

²⁷ The extent to which one should, or should not, intervene in the choices of others is often the subject of debate. Consider, for example, contexts where interventions address self-control problems; e.g., sugar taxes, smoking bans, savings for the future, or gun control (e.g., Chetty et al., 2014; Alcott et al., 2019; DeCicca et al., 2022). Also see Al Roth's market design blog, with its many hundreds of posts tagged with the label "repugnance", for an overview of the rich and quickly growing debates and papers on repugnance (<http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/>).

²⁸ The outcome of our study – less interventions in groups – is reminiscent of, and complementary to, the so-called "bystander effect" (Darley and Latane, 1968; Fischer et al., 2011), where an intervention can be socially desirable but is less likely in the presence of (more) other people. However, the underlying mechanism for which we find support is different than in the coordination challenge in the context of the bystander effect, which can typically be overcome by facilitating communication among individuals, while in our case communication in groups does not increase the tendency to intervene.

autonomy and group decision making are relevant for management contexts and the organization of firms (Spector, 1986; Seibert et al., 2011). An important question, therefore, is what insights our results can offer regarding the behavior of actual professionals in real-world management contexts.

First, we note that existing research suggests that findings from student samples often align with findings from samples of professionals (see, for example, Bolton et al., 2012, and Fréchette, 2016). Thus, it seems likely that the tendency for fewer group interventions observed in our study is observed similarly when professionals make decisions in a laboratory setting. Second, while managerial team decision-making involves factors that we do not account for in our experiment—such as direct personal financial stakes, organizational hierarchies, and more indirect factors such as reputational concerns—, these factors can vary widely across different contexts. This variability makes it difficult to design a laboratory experiment that accurately replicates all relevant aspects of managerial decision-making. As a result, we opted for an abstract design to study general behavioral propensities, which are likely present in managerial contexts – even when often balanced against competing motivations outside the laboratory. Moreover, even in many real-world managerial group decisions, direct personal stakes may be low, such as in advisory board decisions, public sector contracting, or CSR and regulatory compliance teams.

Our finding suggests that shifting decision-making authority from individuals to groups may lead to a "liberal shift" because groups are less likely to impose strict oversight or constraints. While granting more decision autonomy has been shown to have positive effects on work motivation and job satisfaction (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Bass, 2009), it may also come at the cost of less control for supervisors. Regardless of whether the positive or negative effects predominate, companies should be aware that giving more decision-making power to groups may promote more employee autonomy beyond what individual preferences would suggest.

In summary, while we believe our minimalistic approach is well-suited to studying the differences in intervention behavior between groups and individuals and that the resulting fundamental results carry implications for business contexts, we also recognize the value of increasing the complexity of experimental scenarios incrementally. We view our study as providing a framework which allows to subsequently add potentially relevant and complicating economic and social real-effects such as financial incentives, external motivations or repeated interactions. Doing so would further enhance our empirical understanding of intervention

behavior in managerial settings. In particular, future research could investigate how professionals approach abstract intervention decisions in groups and how their behavior shifts when competing motivations are introduced.

5.3 Implications for Decision Makers and Welfare

A natural follow-up question arising from our empirical findings is how the documented differences in intervention behavior between groups and individuals impact DMs (i.e., those whose choice set is decided upon) and overall welfare. The welfare criteria for such an investigation are inherently hard to measure (Ambuehl et al., 2021) and we can only speculate about an answer to this question. In the case of our *Internality* situation, a first attempt could focus on the size of the pie (abstracting from time discounting) and the frequency with which CAs remove options that are preferred by DMs. Looking at our data in Appendix Figure A2, we see that individuals remove the pie-maximizing option in 10% of the cases, whereas groups never remove this option. At the same time, we elicit that 70% of participants rank the pie-maximizing option (which is also the most patient option) the highest. That is, we see that individuals remove the option that is both pie-maximizing and most preferred by DMs more frequently than groups. Regarding the *Externality* situation, we find that individuals remove the most cooperative option more often than groups (see Figure A2). We also see that individuals have a slightly higher inclination than groups to remove the selfish option (which is not the pie-maximizing one), even though, as we elicit, this is the option that is ranked highest by 51% of the participants. These observations seem to suggest that DMs' utility is higher in the presence of group decisions. We leave an in-depth analysis of this question to future research.

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(Online) Appendix
Groups are more Libertarian than Individuals

December 11, 2024

A. Additional Tables and Figures

FIGURE A1: *DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF REMOVED OPTIONS IN STAGE 1 OF THE EXPERIMENT*




FIGURE A2: *INTERVENTION PATTERNS IN STAGE 2 BY DECISION SITUATION AND TREATMENT*






FIGURE A3: *CAS BELIEFS ABOUT THE DMs MOST PREFERRED OPTION BY DECISION SITUATION AND TREATMENT*



B. Analysis of Recommendations

Recall that in our experiment, in order to avoid participants in the role of CA simply intervene because they have no other way to give advice or communicate their opinion, CAs could send a message to the DM stating that they ‘do not recommend’ choosing the respective option. Figure B1 below shows the pattern of CAs’ recommendations separately for both decision situations and treatments.

FIGURE B1: *RECOMMENDATION PATTERNS IN STAGE 2 BY DECISION SITUATION AND TREATMENT*



C. Experimental Instructions

C1. Main Experiment

C1a. Main Experiment -- English Translation

Instructions are shown for choice architects in the GROUP treatment. The instructions for the Individual treatment are very similar and available upon request.

SCREEN 1

Welcome to this experiment.

To start the experiment, please click on 'Next'.

SCREEN 2

Participant information

Experiment title: XXX

Person responsible for the experiment: XXX

Experiment description: You will take part in a scientific decision-making experiment. During the experiment, you will read instructions, answer questions and make various decisions that can affect your payoff and the payoff of other participants. Many participants will take part in this experiment at the same time. To ensure a smooth and speedy process for all participants, you must respond within a reasonable time frame. If you exceed the time limit, you will not be able to continue the experiment. In this case, you will receive your participation reward, but not the additional amount you could have earned during the experiment.

Participant rights: Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. In order for us to use your data for research purposes, it is necessary that you complete all parts of the experiment. You can withdraw from participation in the experiment at any time without giving any reason. If you decide to withdraw from the experiment, you will receive 2.50 € for participating, but not the additional amount you would have earned during the experiment.

Data protection: All information in this experiment is anonymous and does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about individual participants. There is no connection between your anonymous information in the experiment and the personal data stored about you in the participant portal of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) for the purpose of inviting you to the experiment. The data collected in the course of this experiment will be used exclusively for research purposes and stored only for scientific evaluation. To ensure transparency in science and within the framework of scientific cooperation projects, the collected data may be made available for subsequent use by third parties.

I am aware that I may contact the person responsible for this experiment if I wish to receive further information about the experiment, and that I may contact her/him or the relevant ethics committee if I wish to make a complaint about my participation.

I agree with these conditions. YES/NO

SCREEN 3

General information

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. For showing up on time for the experiment, you will receive a participation bonus of 2.50 €. In addition, you will receive 7.50 € as a fixed payment if you complete the experiment.

The payment from this experiment will be made via PayPal. To receive your payment, at the end of the experiment you will be asked to enter your email address, which you have deposited with PayPal. Your PayPal email address will be deleted by us after the payment has been completed.

By clicking 'Continue' you agree to the terms and conditions.

SCREEN 4

Today's experiment

Today's experiment is divided into two parts, Part A and Part B. Afterwards, we will ask you a few questions about yourself. At the end of the experiment, one of the two parts will be randomly selected and implemented. In the following, we will first explain to you your task in Part A. After you have completed this part, you will receive the instructions for Part B. Please make well-considered decisions in all situations as each decision could be the one that counts.

Your task in Part A

Your task in Part A is to determine under which conditions a participant in a future experiment can make decisions. In doing so, your decisions can influence the future participant's decision-making options and payoff. You are the only person who determines the decision-making possibilities of this future participant.

The other experiment will be conducted in the next four weeks. The participants in this experiment, just like you, are registered for experiments at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). This excludes the possibility that participants are selected for both experiments. In the event that there are fewer participants in the other experiment than in today's experiment, we will randomly select from all today's participants with equal probability whose decisions will be implemented.

IMPORTANT: We will conduct the partner studies with the future participants within the next 4 weeks and your decisions will influence future participants exactly with the rules described here.

Before we explain your task in detail, we will first describe the decision-making situation of the participants in the future experiment.

SCREEN 5

Task of the participants in the future experiment

The participants in the future experiment have to make a total of two decisions. One of these decisions is randomly selected at the end of the experiment. The decision made in this decision situation then determines the participant's payment. In each of the two decision situations, the future participant can choose between four options. This looks as follows:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

In the decision situations, options A, B, C and D are replaced by concrete payoffs. The options can influence both the participant's own payment as well as the payoff of someone else.

SCREEN 6

Your task

You can influence the decision-making situation of the participant in the future experiment as follows.

1. you can decide whether all options should be available to the future participant or whether one or more of them should not be available. You must make at least one option available in each situation.
2. you can advise the future participant not to choose certain options. If you do this, the future participant will see the following when making decisions about their options:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C*
☐	Option D*

*** A previous participant who has thought about these options recommends against choosing that option**

The screen where you can decide to make certain options available or not, or to advise against certain options or not, looks like this:

Option	<u>Available</u>	<u>Not available</u>	<u>Recommend against</u>
Option A	0	0	☐
Option B	0	0	☐
Option C	0	0	☐
Option D	0	0	☐

Hint:

There are no right or wrong answers. We ask you to make exactly those choices that reflect your genuine views.

SCREEN 7

How the future participant chooses

Here you can see how the future participant will make his/her choices. We will ask the future participant to rank all four options, starting with the option he/she prefers the most and ending with the option he/she prefers the least. To do this, the future participant will assign a rank between 1 and 4 to each option.

At the end of the experiment, the future participant will then be given the option that he/she ranked highest within those options that are available. In his/her decision on the ranking of the options, the future participant will not yet know which of the options are available and which are not.

Rank	Option
☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

Example:

Assume that the future participant assigns rank 1 to option A, rank 3 to option B, rank 4 to option C, and rank 2 to option D. Assume further that you do not make option A available to the future participant. In this case, the future participant will receive option D. The reason is that A is not available, and the participant ranks D higher than B and C.

SCREEN 8

Comprehension questions

Before you make your decision, we ask you to answer some comprehension questions about the instructions and the experiment. This is to ensure that all participants understand how their decisions affect the future participant. Please note that you will have a maximum of 5 minutes to answer the questions.

Assume that the future experiment participant ranks option B highest, followed by C and D, and that he/she ranks option A lowest.

Question 1: If all options are available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 2: If option A is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 3: If option B is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 4: If option C is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 5: If options B, C, and D are not available, which option will the future participant receive?

SCREEN 9

Comprehension Questions - Part 2

Please select all true statements (and only these).

Statement 1: I can make some options available and others unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 2: I can make all options available if I think that is right.

Statement 3: I can make all but one option unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 4: There are no right or wrong choices, I can make options available or unavailable and I can advise against options or not, depending on what I think is right (as long as at least one option remains available to the future experiment participant).

Statement 5: There are right or wrong choices, I cannot simply make options available or unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 6: The future participant will only see those options that I make available and will not even see the options that I make unavailable.

Statement 7: The future participant will rank all options. He will not know which options are available and which are not. His payment will be based on the highest-ranked option among the available options.

Statement 8: The computer will carry out all the decisions I make in this experiment.

Statement 9: The computer randomly selects one of the two parts (part A or B). The decision made in this part is then implemented. Each part is equally probable.

SCREEN 10 – 11: *Decision Screens Part A*

SCREEN 12

Instructions Part B

The general decision situation and your task in Part B is similar to the one in Part A. You again have the opportunity to specify the conditions under which a participant in a future experiment can make decisions. As before, you can decide whether all options should be available to the future participant or whether you want to advise him against choosing certain options. However, the person will be a different one than in Part A.

In contrast to Part A, however, you now make these decisions not alone, but in a group. For this purpose, you will be randomly assigned another participant from this experiment. Together with this participant, you will (with the aim of making a joint decision) first have the opportunity to exchange and consult via chat. Afterwards, you and your group member have to enter the decision you agreed on. Only if both group members enter the exact same decision, the experiment will continue. If you and your group member enter a different decision, the chat discussion will continue until there is an agreement.

Important: Please discuss only your decision in the chat. Sharing other information, especially private information, by which you can be identified, is not allowed. Failure to comply with this rule may result in exclusion from all payments.

As before, when the future participant makes his/her decision, he/she does not yet know whether all options are available to him/her or not. Instead, as before, he/she is asked to rank all the options, starting with the option he/she most prefers and ending with the option he/she least prefers. If you advise the prospective participant against an option, this will be indicated to him/her as follows, as in Part A.

* A participant of a previous experiment, who has thought about these options, suggests not to choose this option

At the end of the experiment, the future participant receives the option that he/she has ranked highest, within those options that are available.

As a reminder, at the end of the experiment, one of the two parts, Part A or Part B, will be randomly selected and actually implemented. This means that the decisions you make in this part may have actual consequences for a participant in the future experiment. Therefore, please make each decision as if it were the one that counts, because it could be!

SCREEN 13 – 14: *Decision Screens Part B*

C1b. Main Experiment – German Original

Instructions are shown for choice architects in the GROUP treatment. The instructions for the Individual treatment are very similar and available upon request.

SCREEN 1

Herzlich willkommen zu diesem Experiment.

Um mit dem Experiment zu beginnen, klicken Sie bitte auf ‚Weiter‘.

SCREEN 2

Informationen zur Teilnahme

Experimenttitel: XXX

Experimentleiter/innen: XXX

Experimentbeschreibung: Sie nehmen an einem wissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. Sie werden während des Experiments Instruktionen lesen, Fragen beantworten und verschiedene Entscheidungen treffen, die Ihre Auszahlung und die Auszahlung anderer Teilnehmer/innen beeinflussen können. An diesem Experiment nehmen viele Teilnehmer gleichzeitig teil. Um allen Teilnehmern einen reibungslosen und zügigen Ablauf zu garantieren, müssen Sie innerhalb eines angemessenen Zeitrahmens reagieren. Bei Überschreitung des Zeitlimits ist keine Fortsetzung des Experiments möglich. In diesem Fall erhalten Sie Ihre Teilnahmeprämie, nicht aber den zusätzlichen Betrag, den Sie während des Experiments hätten verdienen können.

Teilnehmerrechte: Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment ist freiwillig. Damit wir Ihre Daten zu Forschungszwecken verwenden können, ist es nötig, dass Sie alle Teile des Experiments bearbeiten. Sie können jederzeit ohne Angabe von Gründen von der Teilnahme am Experiment zurücktreten. Wenn Sie sich entschließen, das Experiment abubrechen, erhalten Sie 2,50 Euro für die Teilnahme, jedoch nicht den zusätzlichen Betrag, den Sie während des Experiments verdient hätten.

Datenschutz: Alle Angaben in diesem Experiment sind anonym und ermöglichen keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Teilnehmer/innen. Es besteht keine Verbindung zwischen Ihren anonymen Angaben im Experiment und den personenbezogenen Daten, die über Sie im Teilnehmerportal des Kölner Laboratoriums für Wirtschaftsforschung (CLER) zum Zwecke der Experimenteinvladung hinterlegt sind. Die im Rahmen dieses Experiments erhobenen Daten werden ausschließlich für Forschungszwecke genutzt und nur für die wissenschaftliche Auswertung gespeichert. Zur Gewährleistung der Transparenz in der Wissenschaft und im Rahmen von wissenschaftlichen Kooperationsprojekten werden die erhobenen Daten ggf. für eine Nachnutzung durch Dritte zur Verfügung gestellt.

Ich bin mir bewusst, dass ich den/die Experimentleiter/in kontaktieren kann, wenn ich weitere Informationen zum Experiment erhalten möchte, und dass ich den/die Experimentleiter/in oder die zuständige Ethikkommission kontaktieren kann, wenn ich Beschwerde bzgl. meiner Teilnahme einlegen möchte.

Ich bin mit diesen Bedingungen einverstanden. JA/NEIN

SCREEN 4

Das heutige Experiment

Das heutige Experiment ist in zwei Teile unterteilt, Teil A und Teil B. Anschließend folgen noch ein paar Fragen zu Ihrer Person. Am Ende des Experiments wird zufällig einer der beiden Teile ausgewählt und tatsächlich umgesetzt. Im Folgenden erklären wir Ihnen zunächst Ihre Aufgabe in Teil A. Nachdem Sie diesen Teil abgeschlossen haben, erhalten Sie die Instruktionen für den darauffolgenden Teil. Bitte treffen Sie in allen Situationen eine wohlüberlegte Entscheidung, da jede Entscheidung die sein könnte, die am Ende zählt.

Ihre Aufgabe in Teil A

Ihre Aufgabe in Teil A besteht darin, zu bestimmen, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Teilnehmer an einem zukünftigen Experiment Entscheidungen treffen kann. Ihre Entscheidungen können dabei die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten und die Auszahlung des zukünftigen Teilnehmers beeinflussen. Sie sind die einzige Person, die die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten dieses zukünftigen Experimentteilnehmers bestimmt.

Das andere Experiment wird in den nächsten vier Wochen durchgeführt. Die Teilnehmer an diesem Experiment sind, genau wie Sie, für Experimente im Kölner Laboratorium für Wirtschaftsforschung (CLER) registriert. Dabei ist ausgeschlossen, dass Teilnehmer für beide Experimente ausgewählt werden. Für den Fall, dass es weniger Teilnehmer beim anderen als beim heutigen Experiment gibt, wählen wir unter allen heutigen Teilnehmern zufällig und mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit aus, wessen Entscheidungen umgesetzt werden.

Im Anschluss an Ihre heutige Entscheidung über die Bedingungen, unter denen der Teilnehmer des zukünftigen Experiments seine Entscheidungen treffen kann, bitten wir Sie einen Zoom-Raum zu betreten. In diesem Zoom-Raum werden Sie und eine weitere Person sein. Es ist Ihre Aufgabe, der anderen Person im Zoom-Raum mitzuteilen, welche Entscheidung Sie im Experiment getroffen haben. Sie teilen der anderen Person also mit, welche Bedingungen Sie für den Teilnehmer des zukünftigen Experiments festgelegt haben.

WICHTIG: Wir werden die Partnerstudien mit den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmern innerhalb der nächsten 4 Wochen durchführen und Ihre Entscheidungen werden zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer genau mit den hier beschriebenen Regeln beeinflussen.

Bevor wir Ihnen Ihre Aufgabe im Detail erklären, beschreiben wir Ihnen im Folgenden zunächst die Entscheidungssituation der Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment.

SCREEN 5

Aufgabe der Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment

Die Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment müssen insgesamt zwei Entscheidungen treffen. Eine dieser Entscheidungen wird am Ende des Experiments zufällig ausgewählt. Die in dieser Entscheidungssituation getroffene Entscheidung bestimmt dann die Auszahlung des Teilnehmers. In jeder der beiden Entscheidungssituationen kann der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer aus vier Optionen wählen. Dies sieht wie folgt aus:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

In den Entscheidungssituationen werden die Optionen A, B, C und D durch konkrete Auszahlungen ersetzt. Die Optionen können dabei sowohl die eigene Auszahlung des Experimentsteilnehmers als auch die Auszahlung von jemand anderem beeinflussen.

SCREEN 6

Ihre Aufgabe

Sie können die Entscheidungssituation des Teilnehmers am zukünftigen Experiment wie folgt beeinflussen.

1. Sie können entscheiden, ob dem zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer alle Optionen zur Verfügung stehen sollen, oder ob eine oder mehrere davon nicht verfügbar sein sollen. Sie müssen dabei in jeder Situation mindestens eine Option zur Verfügung stellen.
2. Sie können dem zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer davon abraten, bestimmte Optionen zu wählen. Falls Sie dies tun, wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer Folgendes sehen, wenn er Entscheidungen über seine Optionen trifft:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C*
☐	Option D*

*** Ein früherer Experimentsteilnehmer, der über diese Optionen nachgedacht hat, rät von dieser Option ab.**

Der Bildschirm, auf dem Sie entscheiden können, bestimmte Optionen verfügbar zu machen oder nicht bzw. von bestimmten Optionen abzuraten oder nicht, sieht wie folgt aus:

Option	Verfügbar	Nicht verfügbar	Abraten
Option A	☐	☐	☐
Option B	☐	☐	☐
Option C	☐	☐	☐
Option D	☐	☐	☐

Hinweis:

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wir bitten Sie, genau jene Entscheidungen zu treffen, die Ihre echten Ansichten reflektieren.

SCREEN 7

Wie der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer wählt

Hier sehen Sie, wie der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer seine Entscheidungen treffen wird. Wir werden den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer bitten, alle vier Optionen in eine Reihenfolge zu bringen, beginnend mit der von ihm/ihr am meisten bevorzugten Option und endend mit der von ihm/ihr am wenigsten bevorzugten Option. Dazu wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer jeder Option einen Rang zwischen 1 und 4 zuweisen.

Am Ende des Experiments erhält der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer dann jene Option, die er/sie am höchsten eingestuft hat, innerhalb jener Optionen, die verfügbar sind. Bei seiner/ihrer Entscheidung über die Rangfolge der Optionen wird der zukünftige Teilnehmer noch nicht wissen, welche der Optionen verfügbar sind und welche nicht.

Rang	Option
☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

Beispiel:

Nehmen Sie an, der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer weist Option A den Rang 1, Option B den Rang 3, Option C den Rang 4 und Option D den Rang 2 zu. Nehmen Sie weiterhin an, dass Sie Option A für den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer nicht verfügbar machen. In diesem Fall wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer Option D erhalten. Der Grund ist, dass A nicht verfügbar ist und dass der Teilnehmer D höher einstuft als B und C.

SCREEN 8

Verständnisfragen

Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidung treffen, bitten wir Sie noch, einige Verständnisfragen zu den Instruktionen und dem Experiment zu beantworten. Dies soll sicherstellen, dass alle Teilnehmer verstehen, wie sich ihre Entscheidungen auf den anderen Experimentteilnehmer auswirken. Bitte beachten Sie, dass Ihnen zur Beantwortung der Fragen maximal 5 Minuten zur Verfügung stehen.

Nehmen Sie an, dass der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer Option B zuoberst einstuft, gefolgt von C und D, und dass er Option A am niedrigsten einstuft.

Frage 1: Wenn alle Optionen verfügbar sind, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 2: Wenn Option A nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 3: Wenn Option B nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 4: Wenn Option C nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 5: Wenn Optionen B, C und D nicht verfügbar sind, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

SCREEN 9

Verständnisfragen - Teil 2

Bitte wählen Sie alle wahren Aussagen aus (und nur diese).

Aussage 1: Ich kann einige Optionen zur Verfügung stellen und andere nicht, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 2: Ich kann alle Optionen zur Verfügung stellen, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 3: Ich kann alle bis auf eine Option nicht verfügbar machen, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 4: Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Entscheidungen, ich kann Optionen verfügbar oder un verfügbar machen und ich kann von Optionen abraten oder nicht, je nachdem was ich für richtig halte (solange mindestens eine Option für den zukünftigen Experimentteilnehmer verfügbar bleibt).

Aussage 5: Es gibt richtige oder falsche Entscheidungen, ich kann nicht einfach verfügbar oder un verfügbar machen, was ich für richtig halte.

Aussage 6: Der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer wird nur jene Optionen sehen, die ich zur Verfügung stelle, und wird die Optionen, die ich nicht zur Verfügung stelle, nicht einmal sehen.

Aussage 7: Der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer wird alle Optionen einstufen. Er wird nicht wissen, welche verfügbar oder nicht verfügbar sind. Seine Auszahlung richtet sich nach der am höchsten eingestuften Option unter den verfügbaren Optionen.

Aussage 8: Der Computer wird alle Entscheidungen, die ich in diesem Experiment treffe, ausführen.

Aussage 9: Der Computer wählt zufällig einen der beiden Teile (Teil A oder B) aus. Die in diesem Teil getroffenen Entscheidung wird dann umgesetzt. Jeder Teil ist dabei gleich wahrscheinlich.

SCREEN 10 – 11: *Decision Screens Part A*

SCREEN 12

Instruktionen Teil B

Die Ausgangssituation und Ihre Aufgabe in Teil B ist ähnlich wie in Teil A. Sie haben wiederum die Möglichkeit, die Bedingungen, unter denen ein Teilnehmer eines zukünftigen Experiments Entscheidungen treffen kann, festzulegen. Wie zuvor können Sie entscheiden, ob dem zukünftigen Teilnehmer bestimmte Auswahloptionen nicht zur Verfügung stehen sollen oder ob Sie ihm von bestimmten Optionen abraten möchten. Die Person ist dabei jedoch eine andere als in Teil A.

Im Unterschied zu Teil A treffen Sie diese Entscheidung jedoch nun nicht allein, sondern in einer Gruppe. Dazu wird Ihnen ein anderer Teilnehmer aus diesem Experiment zufällig zugeordnet. Gemeinsam mit diesem Teilnehmer haben Sie dann zunächst die Möglichkeit, sich per Chat auszutauschen und zu beraten, mit dem Ziel, eine gemeinsame Entscheidung zu treffen. Anschließend müssen Sie und ihr Gruppenmitglied die Entscheidung eingeben, auf die sie sich geeinigt haben. Nur wenn beide Gruppenmitglieder exakt die gleiche Entscheidung eingeben wird das Experiment fortgesetzt. Sollten Sie und ihr Gruppenmitglied eine unterschiedliche Entscheidung eingeben, wird die Diskussion über den Chat solange fortgesetzt, bis es eine Einigung gibt.

WICHTIG: Bitte diskutieren Sie im Chat nur über Ihre Entscheidung. Das Austauschen anderer, insbesondere privater Informationen, durch die Sie identifiziert werden können, ist nicht gestattet. Eine Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel kann zum Ausschluss aller Zahlungen führen.

Wie zuvor gilt, dass der zukünftige Teilnehmer bei seiner Entscheidung noch nicht weiß, ob ihm alle Optionen zur Verfügung stehen oder nicht. Stattdessen wird er wie zuvor gebeten, alle Optionen in eine Reihenfolge zu bringen, beginnend mit der von ihm/ihr am meisten bevorzugten Option und endend mit der von ihm/ihr am wenigsten bevorzugten Option. Falls Sie dem zukünftigen Teilnehmer von einer Option abraten, wird ihm dies wie in Teil A wie folgt angezeigt:

* Ein früherer Experimentsteilnehmer, der über diese Optionen nachgedacht hat, rät von dieser Option ab.

Am Ende des Experiments erhält der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer dann jene Option die er/sie am höchsten eingestuft hat, innerhalb jener Optionen, die verfügbar sind.

Zur Erinnerung: Am Ende des Experiments wird zufällig einer der beiden Teile, Teil A oder Teil B, ausgewählt und tatsächlich umgesetzt. Das bedeutet, dass die von Ihnen in diesem Teil getroffenen Entscheidungen tatsächliche Konsequenzen für einen Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment haben können. Bitte treffen Sie daher jede Entscheidung so, als ob sie diejenige wäre, die zählt, denn sie könnte es sein!

SCREEN 13 – 14: *Decision Screens Part B*

C2. Selection Experiment

C2a. Selection Experiment -- English Translation

Instructions are shown for choice architects in the GROUP treatment. The instructions for the Individual treatment are very similar and available upon request.

SCREEN 1

Welcome to this experiment.

To start the experiment, please click on 'Next'.

SCREEN 2

Participant information

Experiment title: XXX

Person responsible for the experiment: XXX

Experiment description: You will take part in a scientific decision-making experiment. During the experiment, you will read instructions, answer questions and make various decisions that can affect your payoff and the payoff of other participants. Many participants will take part in this experiment at the same time. To ensure a smooth and speedy process for all participants, you must respond within a reasonable time frame. If you exceed the time limit, you will not be able to continue the experiment. In this case, you will receive your participation reward, but not the additional amount you could have earned during the experiment.

Participant rights: Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. In order for us to use your data for research purposes, it is necessary that you complete all parts of the experiment. You can withdraw from participation in the experiment at any time without giving any reason. If you decide to withdraw from the experiment, you will receive 2.50 € for participating, but not the additional amount you would have earned during the experiment.

Data protection: All information in this experiment is anonymous and does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about individual participants. There is no connection between your anonymous information in the experiment and the personal data stored about you in the participant portal of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) for the purpose of inviting you to the experiment. The data collected in the course of this experiment will be used exclusively for research purposes and stored only for scientific evaluation. To ensure transparency in science and within the framework of scientific cooperation projects, the collected data may be made available for subsequent use by third parties.

I am aware that I may contact the person responsible for this experiment if I wish to receive further information about the experiment, and that I may contact her/him or the relevant ethics committee if I wish to make a complaint about my participation.

I agree with these conditions. YES/NO

SCREEN 3

General information

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. For showing up on time for the experiment, you will receive a participation bonus of 2.50 €. In addition, you will receive 7.50 € as a fixed payment if you complete the experiment.

The payment from this experiment will be made via PayPal. To receive your payment, at the end of the experiment you will be asked to enter your email address, which you have deposited with PayPal. Your PayPal email address will be deleted by us after the payment has been completed.

By clicking 'Continue' you agree to the terms and conditions.

SCREEN 4

Today's experiment

Today's experiment is divided into two parts, Part A and Part B. Afterwards, we will ask you a few questions about yourself. At the end of the experiment, one of the two parts will be randomly selected and implemented. In the following, we will first explain to you your task in Part A. After you have completed this part, you will receive the instructions for Part B. Please make well-considered decisions in all situations as each decision could be the one that counts.

Your task in Part A

Your task in Part A is to determine under which conditions a participant in a future experiment can make decisions. In doing so, your decisions can influence the future participant's decision-making options and payoff. You are the only person who determines the decision-making possibilities of this future participant.

The other experiment will be conducted in the next four weeks. The participants in this experiment, just like you, are registered for experiments at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). This excludes the possibility that participants are selected for both experiments. In the event that there are fewer participants in the other experiment than in today's experiment, we will randomly select from all today's participants with equal probability whose decisions will be implemented.

IMPORTANT: We will conduct the partner studies with the future participants within the next 4 weeks and your decisions will influence future participants exactly with the rules described here.

Before we explain your task in detail, we will first describe the decision-making situation of the participants in the future experiment.

SCREEN 5

Task of the participants in the future experiment

The participants in the future experiment have to make a total of two decisions. One of these decisions is randomly selected at the end of the experiment. The decision made in this decision situation then

determines the participant's payment. In each of the two decision situations, the future participant can choose between four options. This looks as follows:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

In the decision situations, options A, B, C and D are replaced by concrete payoffs. The options can influence both the participant's own payment as well as the payoff of someone else.

SCREEN 6

Your task

You can influence the decision-making situation of the participant in the future experiment as follows.

1. you can decide whether all options should be available to the future participant or whether one or more of them should not be available. You must make at least one option available in each situation.
2. you can advise the future participant not to choose certain options. If you do this, the future participant will see the following when making decisions about their options:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C*
☐	Option D*

*** A previous participant who has thought about these options recommends against choosing that option**

The screen where you can decide to make certain options available or not, or to advise against certain options or not, looks like this:

Option	<u>Available</u>	<u>Not available</u>	<u>Recommend against</u>
Option A	o	o	☐
Option B	o	o	☐
Option C	o	o	☐
Option D	o	o	☐

Hint:

There are no right or wrong answers. We ask you to make exactly those choices that reflect your genuine views.

SCREEN 7**How the future participant chooses**

Here you can see how the future participant will make his/her choices. We will ask the future participant to rank all four options, starting with the option he/she prefers the most and ending with the option he/she prefers the least. To do this, the future participant will assign a rank between 1 and 4 to each option.

At the end of the experiment, the future participant will then be given the option that he/she ranked highest within those options that are available. In his/her decision on the ranking of the options, the future participant will not yet know which of the options are available and which are not.

Rank	Option
☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

Example:

Assume that the future participant assigns rank 1 to option A, rank 3 to option B, rank 4 to option C, and rank 2 to option D. Assume further that you do not make option A available to the future participant. In this case, the future participant will receive option D. The reason is that A is not available, and the participant ranks D higher than B and C.

SCREEN 8**Comprehension questions**

Before you make your decision, we ask you to answer some comprehension questions about the instructions and the experiment. This is to ensure that all participants understand how their decisions affect the future participant. Please note that you will have a maximum of 5 minutes to answer the questions.

Assume that the future experiment participant ranks option B highest, followed by C and D, and that he/ she ranks option A lowest.

Question 1: If all options are available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 2: If option A is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 3: If option B is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 4: If option C is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 5: If options B, C, and D are not available, which option will the future participant receive?

SCREEN 9

Comprehension Questions - Part 2

Please select all true statements (and only these).

Statement 1: I can make some options available and others unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 2: I can make all options available if I think that is right.

Statement 3: I can make all but one option unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 4: There are no right or wrong choices, I can make options available or unavailable and I can advise against options or not, depending on what I think is right (as long as at least one option remains available to the future experiment participant).

Statement 5: There are right or wrong choices, I cannot simply make options available or unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 6: The future participant will only see those options that I make available and will not even see the options that I make unavailable.

Statement 7: The future participant will rank all options. He will not know which options are available and which are not. His payment will be based on the highest-ranked option among the available options.

Statement 8: The computer will carry out all the decisions I make in this experiment.

Statement 9: The computer randomly selects one of the two parts (part A or B). The decision made in this part is then implemented. Each part is equally probable.

SCREEN 10 – 11: *Decision Screens Part A*

SCREEN 12

Instructions Part B

The general decision situation and your task in Part B is similar to the one in Part A. You again have the opportunity to specify the conditions under which a participant in a future experiment can make decisions. As before, you can decide whether all options should be available to the future participant or whether you want to advise him against choosing certain options. However, the person will be a different one than in Part A.

In contrast to Part A, however, this decision is now made in a group rather than alone. For this purpose, two participants from this experiment are randomly assigned to each other. The group members then first have the opportunity to exchange ideas and consult via chat. The goal is to reach a joint group

decision. Following the exchange via chat, both group members must enter the decision they previously agreed upon. Only if both group members enter exactly the same decision will the experiment continue. If the two group members enter a different decision, the chat discussion will continue until an agreement is reached.

In Part B, there are fewer future participants whose decision options can be influenced than in Part A. You can decide in Part B whether you want to be part of a group that determines the choice options for a future participant.

If more participants want to make this decision as part of a group than there are future participants, we will make a selection of participants to be part of a group. The selection will be made regardless of your decision. If fewer participants want to make this decision than there are future experiment participants, the remaining future participants will each get the choice options that were made available to the majority.

If you are part of a group that sets the conditions for a future participant, you can communicate with the other person as described above to make a joint decision. If you do not belong to a group that sets the conditions for a future participant, you can also exchange with another person in the chat, but you do not make a decision.

SCREEN 13 – 16: *Decision Screens Part B*

C2b. Selection Experiment – German Original

Instructions are shown for choice architects in the GROUP treatment. The instructions for the Individual treatment are very similar and available upon request.

SCREEN 1

Herzlich willkommen zu diesem Experiment.

Um mit dem Experiment zu beginnen, klicken Sie bitte auf ‚Weiter‘.

SCREEN 2

Informationen zur Teilnahme

Experimenttitel: XXX

Experimentleiter/innen: XXX

Experimentbeschreibung: Sie nehmen an einem wissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. Sie werden während des Experiments Instruktionen lesen, Fragen beantworten und verschiedene Entscheidungen treffen, die Ihre Auszahlung und die Auszahlung anderer Teilnehmer/innen beeinflussen können. An diesem Experiment nehmen viele Teilnehmer gleichzeitig teil. Um allen Teilnehmern einen reibungslosen und zügigen Ablauf zu garantieren, müssen Sie innerhalb eines angemessenen Zeitrahmens reagieren. Bei Überschreitung des Zeitlimits ist keine Fortsetzung des Experiments möglich. In diesem Fall erhalten Sie Ihre Teilnahmeprämie, nicht aber den zusätzlichen Betrag, den Sie während des Experiments hätten verdienen können.

Teilnehmerrechte: Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment ist freiwillig. Damit wir Ihre Daten zu Forschungszwecken verwenden können, ist es nötig, dass Sie alle Teile des Experiments bearbeiten. Sie können jederzeit ohne Angabe von Gründen von der Teilnahme am Experiment zurücktreten. Wenn Sie sich entschließen, das Experiment abubrechen, erhalten Sie 2,50 Euro für die Teilnahme, jedoch nicht den zusätzlichen Betrag, den Sie während des Experiments verdient hätten.

Datenschutz: Alle Angaben in diesem Experiment sind anonym und ermöglichen keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Teilnehmer/innen. Es besteht keine Verbindung zwischen Ihren anonymen Angaben im Experiment und den personenbezogenen Daten, die über Sie im Teilnehmerportal des Kölner Laboratoriums für Wirtschaftsforschung (CLER) zum Zwecke der Experimenteinladung hinterlegt sind. Die im Rahmen dieses Experiments erhobenen Daten werden ausschließlich für Forschungszwecke genutzt und nur für die wissenschaftliche Auswertung gespeichert. Zur Gewährleistung der Transparenz in der Wissenschaft und im Rahmen von wissenschaftlichen Kooperationsprojekten werden die erhobenen Daten ggf. für eine Nachnutzung durch Dritte zur Verfügung gestellt.

Ich bin mir bewusst, dass ich den/die Experimentleiter/in kontaktieren kann, wenn ich weitere Informationen zum Experiment erhalten möchte, und dass ich den/die Experimentleiter/in oder die zuständige Ethikkommission kontaktieren kann, wenn ich Beschwerde bzgl. meiner Teilnahme einlegen möchte.

Ich bin mit diesen Bedingungen einverstanden. JA/NEIN

SCREEN 4

Das heutige Experiment

Das heutige Experiment ist in zwei Teile unterteilt, Teil A und Teil B. Anschließend folgen noch ein paar Fragen zu Ihrer Person. Am Ende des Experiments wird zufällig einer der beiden Teile ausgewählt und tatsächlich umgesetzt. Im Folgenden erklären wir Ihnen zunächst Ihre Aufgabe in Teil A. Nachdem Sie diesen Teil abgeschlossen haben, erhalten Sie die Instruktionen für den darauffolgenden Teil. Bitte treffen Sie in allen Situationen eine wohlüberlegte Entscheidung, da jede Entscheidung die sein könnte, die am Ende zählt.

Ihre Aufgabe in Teil A

Ihre Aufgabe in Teil A besteht darin, zu bestimmen, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Teilnehmer an einem zukünftigen Experiment Entscheidungen treffen kann. Ihre Entscheidungen können dabei die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten und die Auszahlung des zukünftigen Teilnehmers beeinflussen. Sie sind die einzige Person, die die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten dieses zukünftigen Experimentteilnehmers bestimmt.

Das andere Experiment wird in den nächsten vier Wochen durchgeführt. Die Teilnehmer an diesem Experiment sind, genau wie Sie, für Experimente im Kölner Laboratorium für Wirtschaftsforschung (CLER) registriert. Dabei ist ausgeschlossen, dass Teilnehmer für beide Experimente ausgewählt werden. Für den Fall, dass es weniger Teilnehmer beim anderen als beim heutigen Experiment gibt, wählen wir unter allen heutigen Teilnehmern zufällig und mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit aus, wessen Entscheidungen umgesetzt werden.

Im Anschluss an Ihre heutige Entscheidung über die Bedingungen, unter denen der Teilnehmer des zukünftigen Experiments seine Entscheidungen treffen kann, bitten wir Sie einen Zoom-Raum zu betreten. In diesem Zoom-Raum werden Sie und eine weitere Person sein. Es ist Ihre Aufgabe, der anderen Person im Zoom-Raum mitzuteilen, welche Entscheidung Sie im Experiment getroffen haben. Sie teilen der anderen Person also mit, welche Bedingungen Sie für den Teilnehmer des zukünftigen Experiments festgelegt haben.

WICHTIG: Wir werden die Partnerstudien mit den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmern innerhalb der nächsten 4 Wochen durchführen und Ihre Entscheidungen werden zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer genau mit den hier beschriebenen Regeln beeinflussen.

Bevor wir Ihnen Ihre Aufgabe im Detail erklären, beschreiben wir Ihnen im Folgenden zunächst die Entscheidungssituation der Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment.

SCREEN 5

Aufgabe der Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment

Die Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment müssen insgesamt zwei Entscheidungen treffen. Eine dieser Entscheidungen wird am Ende des Experiments zufällig ausgewählt. Die in dieser Entscheidungssituation getroffene Entscheidung bestimmt dann die Auszahlung des Teilnehmers. In jeder der beiden Entscheidungssituationen kann der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer aus vier Optionen wählen. Dies sieht wie folgt aus:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

In den Entscheidungssituationen werden die Optionen A, B, C und D durch konkrete Auszahlungen ersetzt. Die Optionen können dabei sowohl die eigene Auszahlung des Experimentsteilnehmers als auch die Auszahlung von jemand anderem beeinflussen.

SCREEN 6

Ihre Aufgabe

Sie können die Entscheidungssituation des Teilnehmers am zukünftigen Experiment wie folgt beeinflussen.

1. Sie können entscheiden, ob dem zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer alle Optionen zur Verfügung stehen sollen, oder ob eine oder mehrere davon nicht verfügbar sein sollen. Sie müssen dabei in jeder Situation mindestens eine Option zur Verfügung stellen.
2. Sie können dem zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer davon abraten, bestimmte Optionen zu wählen. Falls Sie dies tun, wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer Folgendes sehen, wenn er Entscheidungen über seine Optionen trifft:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C*
☐	Option D*

*** Ein früherer Experimentsteilnehmer, der über diese Optionen nachgedacht hat, rät von dieser Option ab.**

Der Bildschirm, auf dem Sie entscheiden können, bestimmte Optionen verfügbar zu machen oder nicht bzw. von bestimmten Optionen abzuraten oder nicht, sieht wie folgt aus:

Option	Verfügbar	Nicht verfügbar	Abraten
Option A	☐	☐	☐
Option B	☐	☐	☐
Option C	☐	☐	☐
Option D	☐	☐	☐

Hinweis:

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wir bitten Sie, genau jene Entscheidungen zu treffen, die Ihre echten Ansichten reflektieren.

SCREEN 7

Wie der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer wählt

Hier sehen Sie, wie der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer seine Entscheidungen treffen wird. Wir werden den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer bitten, alle vier Optionen in eine Reihenfolge zu bringen, beginnend mit der von ihm/ihr am meisten bevorzugten Option und endend mit der von ihm/ihr am wenigsten bevorzugten Option. Dazu wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer jeder Option einen Rang zwischen 1 und 4 zuweisen.

Am Ende des Experiments erhält der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer dann jene Option, die er/sie am höchsten eingestuft hat, innerhalb jener Optionen, die verfügbar sind. Bei seiner/ihrer Entscheidung über die Rangfolge der Optionen wird der zukünftige Teilnehmer noch nicht wissen, welche der Optionen verfügbar sind und welche nicht.

Rang	Option
☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

Beispiel:

Nehmen Sie an, der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer weist Option A den Rang 1, Option B den Rang 3, Option C den Rang 4 und Option D den Rang 2 zu. Nehmen Sie weiterhin an, dass Sie Option A für den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer nicht verfügbar machen. In diesem Fall wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer Option D erhalten. Der Grund ist, dass A nicht verfügbar ist und dass der Teilnehmer D höher einstuft als B und C.

SCREEN 8

Verständnisfragen

Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidung treffen, bitten wir Sie noch, einige Verständnisfragen zu den Instruktionen und dem Experiment zu beantworten. Dies soll sicherstellen, dass alle Teilnehmer verstehen, wie sich ihre Entscheidungen auf den anderen Experimentteilnehmer auswirken. Bitte beachten Sie, dass Ihnen zur Beantwortung der Fragen maximal 5 Minuten zur Verfügung stehen.

Nehmen Sie an, dass der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer Option B zuoberst einstuft, gefolgt von C und D, und dass er Option A am niedrigsten einstuft.

Frage 1: Wenn alle Optionen verfügbar sind, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 2: Wenn Option A nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 3: Wenn Option B nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 4: Wenn Option C nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 5: Wenn Optionen B, C und D nicht verfügbar sind, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

SCREEN 9

Verständnisfragen - Teil 2

Bitte wählen Sie alle wahren Aussagen aus (und nur diese).

Aussage 1: Ich kann einige Optionen zur Verfügung stellen und andere nicht, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 2: Ich kann alle Optionen zur Verfügung stellen, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 3: Ich kann alle bis auf eine Option nicht verfügbar machen, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 4: Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Entscheidungen, ich kann Optionen verfügbar oder un verfügbar machen und ich kann von Optionen abraten oder nicht, je nachdem was ich für richtig halte (solange mindestens eine Option für den zukünftigen Experimentteilnehmer verfügbar bleibt).

Aussage 5: Es gibt richtige oder falsche Entscheidungen, ich kann nicht einfach verfügbar oder un verfügbar machen, was ich für richtig halte.

Aussage 6: Der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer wird nur jene Optionen sehen, die ich zur Verfügung stelle, und wird die Optionen, die ich nicht zur Verfügung stelle, nicht einmal sehen.

Aussage 7: Der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer wird alle Optionen einstufen. Er wird nicht wissen, welche verfügbar oder nicht verfügbar sind. Seine Auszahlung richtet sich nach der am höchsten eingestuften Option unter den verfügbaren Optionen.

Aussage 8: Der Computer wird alle Entscheidungen, die ich in diesem Experiment treffe, ausführen.

Aussage 9: Der Computer wählt zufällig einen der beiden Teile (Teil A oder B) aus. Die in diesem Teil getroffenen Entscheidung wird dann umgesetzt. Jeder Teil ist dabei gleich wahrscheinlich.

SCREEN 10 – 11: *Decision Screens Part A*

SCREEN 12

Instruktionen Teil B

Die Ausgangssituation und Ihre Aufgabe in Teil B ist ähnlich wie in Teil A. Sie haben wiederum die Möglichkeit, die Bedingungen, unter denen ein Teilnehmer eines zukünftigen Experiments Entscheidungen treffen kann, festzulegen. Wie zuvor können Sie entscheiden, ob dem zukünftigen Teilnehmer bestimmte Auswahloptionen nicht zur Verfügung stehen sollen oder ob Sie ihm von bestimmten Optionen abraten möchten. Die Person ist dabei jedoch eine andere als in Teil A.

Im Unterschied zu Teil A treffen Sie diese Entscheidung jedoch nun nicht allein, sondern in einer Gruppe. Dazu werden zwei Teilnehmer aus diesem Experiment einander zufällig zugeordnet. Gemeinsam mit diesem Teilnehmer haben Sie dann zunächst die Möglichkeit, sich per Chat auszutauschen und zu beraten, mit dem Ziel, eine gemeinsame Entscheidung zu treffen. Im Anschluss an den Austausch per Chat müssen beide Gruppenmitglieder die Entscheidung eingeben, auf die sie sich zuvor geeinigt haben. Nur wenn beide Gruppenmitglieder exakt die gleiche Entscheidung eingeben wird das Experiment fortgesetzt. Sollten Sie und ihr Gruppenmitglied eine unterschiedliche Entscheidung eingeben, wird die Diskussion über den Chat solange fortgesetzt, bis es eine Einigung gibt.

In Teil B gibt es weniger zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer, deren Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten beeinflusst werden können, als in Teil A. Sie können in Teil B entscheiden, ob Sie Teil einer Gruppe sein möchten, die die Auswahloptionen für einen zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer festlegt oder nicht.

Falls mehr Teilnehmer diese Entscheidung als Teil einer Gruppe treffen möchten als es zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer gibt, werden wir eine Auswahl von Teilnehmern vornehmen, die Teil einer Gruppe sind. Die Auswahl erfolgt unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung. Falls weniger Teilnehmer diese Entscheidung treffen möchten als es zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer gibt, werden die übrigen zukünftigen Entscheidungsteilnehmer jeweils die Auswahloptionen bekommen, die mehrheitlich verfügbar gemacht wurden.

Wenn Sie zu einer Gruppe gehören, die die Bedingungen für einen zukünftigen Teilnehmer festlegt, können Sie sich wie oben beschrieben mit der anderen Person austauschen, um eine gemeinsame Entscheidung zu treffen. Wenn Sie nicht zu einer Gruppe gehören, die die Bedingungen für einen zukünftigen Teilnehmer festlegt, können Sie sich ebenfalls mit einer anderen Person im Chat austauschen, treffen aber keine Entscheidung.

WICHTIG: Bitte diskutieren Sie im Chat nur über Ihre Entscheidung. Das Austauschen anderer, insbesondere privater Informationen, durch die Sie identifiziert werden können, ist nicht gestattet. Eine Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel kann zum Ausschluss aller Zahlungen führen.

SCREEN 13 – 16: *Decision Screens Part B*

C3. Social Image Experiment

C3a. Social Image Experiment -- English Translation

Instructions are shown for choice architects in the PUBLIC treatment. The instructions for the PRIVATE treatment are very similar and available upon request.

SCREEN 1

Welcome to this experiment.

To start the experiment, please click on 'Next'.

SCREEN2

Participant information

Experiment title: XXX

Person responsible for the experiment: XXX

Experiment description: You will take part in a scientific decision-making experiment. During the experiment, you will read instructions, answer questions and make various decisions that can affect your payoff and the payoff of other participants. Many participants will take part in this experiment at the same time.

Participant rights: Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. In order for us to use your data for research purposes, it is necessary that you complete all parts of the experiment. You can withdraw from participation in the experiment at any time without giving any reason. If you decide to withdraw from the experiment, you will receive 5.00 € for participating, but not the additional amount you would have earned during the experiment.

Data protection: All information in this experiment is anonymous and does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about individual participants. There is no connection between your anonymous information in the experiment and the personal data stored about you in the participant portal of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) for the purpose of inviting you to the experiment. The data collected in the course of this experiment will be used exclusively for research purposes and stored only for scientific evaluation. To ensure transparency in science and within the framework of scientific cooperation projects, the collected data may be made available for subsequent use by third parties.

I am aware that I may contact the person responsible for this experiment if I wish to receive further information about the experiment, and that I may contact her/him or the relevant ethics committee if I wish to make a complaint about my participation.

I agree with these conditions. YES/NO

SCREEN 3

General information

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. For showing up on time for the experiment, you will receive a participation bonus of 4.00 €. In addition, you will receive 6.00 € as a fixed payment if you complete the experiment.

By clicking 'Continue' you agree to the terms and conditions.

SCREEN 4

Today's experiment

Your task in today's experiment is to determine under which conditions a participant in a future experiment can make decisions. In doing so, your decisions can influence the future participant's decision-making options and payoff. You are the only person who determines the decision-making possibilities of this future participant.

The other experiment will be conducted in the next four weeks. The participants in this experiment, just like you, are registered for experiments at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). This excludes the possibility that participants are selected for both experiments. In the event that there are fewer participants in the other experiment than in today's experiment, we will randomly select from all today's participants with equal probability whose decisions will be implemented.

IMPORTANT: We will conduct the partner studies with the future participants within the next 4 weeks and your decisions will influence future participants exactly with the rules described here.

Before we explain your task in detail, we will first describe the decision-making situation of the participants in the future experiment.

SCREEN 5

Task of the participants in the future experiment

The participants in the future experiment have to make a total of two decisions. One of these decisions is randomly selected at the end of the experiment. The decision made in this decision situation then determines the participant's payment. In each of the two decision situations, the future participant can choose between four options. This looks as follows:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

In the decision situations, options A, B, C and D are replaced by concrete payoffs. The options can influence both the participant's own payment as well as the payoff of someone else.

SCREEN 6

Your task

You can influence the decision-making situation of the participant in the future experiment as follows.

1. you can decide whether all options should be available to the future participant or whether one or more of them should not be available. You must make at least one option available in each situation.
2. you can advise the future participant not to choose certain options. If you do this, the future participant will see the following when making decisions about their options:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C*
☐	Option D*

*** A previous participant who has thought about these options recommends against choosing that option**

The screen where you can decide to make certain options available or not, or to advise against certain options or not, looks like this:

Option	<u>Available</u>	<u>Not available</u>	<u>Recommend against</u>
Option A	0	0	☐
Option B	0	0	☐
Option C	0	0	☐
Option D	0	0	☐

Hint:

There are no right or wrong answers. We ask you to make exactly those choices that reflect your genuine views.

SCREEN7 (only in PUBLIC treatment)

Announcement of your decision

Following your decisions on the conditions under which a future participant can make decisions, each participant in today's experiment will personally communicate their decision to all other participants. For this purpose, we will call you and the other participants one after the other. Your decision will be displayed on your screen again at that time and the correctness of your statement will be checked by the experimenter.

Procedure of the announcement

To announce your decision, please stand up, state your first name, and tell the other participants what conditions you have set for the future participant. To do this, for each of the options A, B, C, and D,

please say which of the following choices you have made for that option (here using option A as an example):

- "I have made option A available to the future participant." OR
- "I have made option A available to the future participant. However, I have advised against choosing the option." OR
- "I have made option A not available for the future participant."

Do the same for options B, C, and D. Once all participants in today's experiment have announced their decisions, the experiment is over.

SCREEN8

How the future participant chooses

Here you can see how the future participant will make his/her choices. We will ask the future participant to rank all four options, starting with the option he/she prefers the most and ending with the option he/she prefers the least. To do this, the future participant will assign a rank between 1 and 4 to each option.

At the end of the experiment, the future participant will then be given the option that he/she ranked highest within those options that are available. In his/her decision on the ranking of the options, the future participant will not yet know which of the options are available and which are not.

Rank	Option
☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

Example:

Assume that the future participant assigns rank 1 to option A, rank 3 to option B, rank 4 to option C, and rank 2 to option D. Assume further that you do not make option A available to the future participant. In this case, the future participant will receive option D. The reason is that A is not available, and the participant ranks D higher than B and C.

SCREEN9

Comprehension questions

Before you make your decision, we ask you to answer some comprehension questions about the instructions and the experiment. This is to ensure that all participants understand how their decisions affect the future participant. Please note that you will have a maximum of 5 minutes to answer the questions.

Assume that the future experiment participant ranks option B highest, followed by C and D, and that he/she ranks option A lowest.

Question 1: If all options are available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 2: If option A is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 3: If option B is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 4: If option C is not available, which option will the future participant receive?

Question 5: If options B, C, and D are not available, which option will the future participant receive?

SCREEN 10

Comprehension Questions - Part 2

Please select all true statements (and only these).

Statement 1: I can make some options available and others unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 2: I can make all options available if I think that is right.

Statement 3: I can make all but one option unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 4: There are no right or wrong choices, I can make options available or unavailable and I can advise against options or not, depending on what I think is right (as long as at least one option remains available to the future experiment participant).

Statement 5: There are right or wrong choices, I cannot simply make options available or unavailable if I think that is right.

Statement 6: The future participant will only see those options that I make available and will not even see the options that I make unavailable.

Statement 7: The future participant will rank all options. He will not know which options are available and which are not. His payment will be based on the highest-ranked option among the available options.

Statement 8: The computer will carry out all the decisions I make in this experiment.

Statement 9: After making my decisions, I must announce them to all other participants.

C3b. Social Image Experiment – German Original

Instructions are shown for choice architects in the PUBLIC treatment. The instructions for the PRIVATE treatment are very similar and available upon request.

SCREEN 1

Herzlich willkommen zu diesem Experiment.

Um mit dem Experiment zu beginnen, klicken Sie bitte auf ‚Weiter‘.

SCREEN 2

Informationen zur Teilnahme

Experimenttitel: XXX

Experimentleiter/innen: XXX

Experimentbeschreibung: Sie nehmen an einem wissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. Sie werden während des Experiments Instruktionen lesen, Fragen beantworten und verschiedene Entscheidungen treffen, die Ihre Auszahlung und die Auszahlung anderer Teilnehmer/innen beeinflussen können. An diesem Experiment nehmen viele Teilnehmer gleichzeitig teil. Um allen Teilnehmern einen reibungslosen und zügigen Ablauf zu garantieren, müssen Sie innerhalb eines angemessenen Zeitrahmens reagieren. Bei Überschreitung des Zeitlimits ist keine Fortsetzung des Experiments möglich. In diesem Fall erhalten Sie Ihre Teilnahmeprämie, nicht aber den zusätzlichen Betrag, den Sie während des Experiments hätten verdienen können.

Teilnehmerrechte: Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment ist freiwillig. Damit wir Ihre Daten zu Forschungszwecken verwenden können, ist es nötig, dass Sie alle Teile des Experiments bearbeiten. Sie können jederzeit ohne Angabe von Gründen von der Teilnahme am Experiment zurücktreten. Wenn Sie sich entschließen, das Experiment abubrechen, erhalten Sie 2,50 Euro für die Teilnahme, jedoch nicht den zusätzlichen Betrag, den Sie während des Experiments verdient hätten.

Datenschutz: Alle Angaben in diesem Experiment sind anonym und ermöglichen keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Teilnehmer/innen. Es besteht keine Verbindung zwischen Ihren anonymen Angaben im Experiment und den personenbezogenen Daten, die über Sie im Teilnehmerportal des Kölner Laboratoriums für Wirtschaftsforschung (CLER) zum Zwecke der Experimenteinladung hinterlegt sind. Die im Rahmen dieses Experiments erhobenen Daten werden ausschließlich für Forschungszwecke genutzt und nur für die wissenschaftliche Auswertung gespeichert. Zur Gewährleistung der Transparenz in der Wissenschaft und im Rahmen von wissenschaftlichen Kooperationsprojekten werden die erhobenen Daten ggf. für eine Nachnutzung durch Dritte zur Verfügung gestellt.

Ich bin mir bewusst, dass ich den/die Experimentleiter/in kontaktieren kann, wenn ich weitere Informationen zum Experiment erhalten möchte, und dass ich den/die Experimentleiter/in oder die zuständige Ethikkommission kontaktieren kann, wenn ich Beschwerde bzgl. meiner Teilnahme einlegen möchte.

Ich bin mit diesen Bedingungen einverstanden. JA/NEIN

SCREEN 3

Generelle Informationen

Herzlich willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Für Ihr pünktliches Erscheinen zum Experiment erhalten Sie eine Teilnahmeprämie in Höhe von 2.50 €. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie 10.00 € als feste Auszahlung, wenn Sie das Experiment abschließen.

Die Auszahlung aus diesem Experiment erfolgt über PayPal. Um Ihre Auszahlung zu erhalten, werden Sie am Ende des Experiments gebeten Ihre Email-Adresse, welche Sie bei PayPal hinterlegt haben, einzugeben. Ihre PayPal-Email-Adresse wird unsererseits nach Abschluss der Zahlung gelöscht.

Indem Sie auf 'Weiter' klicken, erklären Sie sich mit den Auszahlungsbedingungen einverstanden.

SCREEN 4

Das heutige Experiment

Im Folgenden erklären wir Ihnen Ihre Aufgabe in diesem Experiment. Bitte treffen Sie in allen Situationen eine wohlüberlegte Entscheidung, da jede Entscheidung die sein könnte, die am Ende zählt. Im Anschluss an das Experiment folgen noch ein paar Fragen zu Ihrer Person.

Ihre Aufgabe

Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin, zu bestimmen, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Teilnehmer an einem zukünftigen Experiment Entscheidungen treffen kann. Ihre Entscheidungen können dabei die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten und die Auszahlung des zukünftigen Teilnehmers beeinflussen. Sie sind die einzige Person, die die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten dieses zukünftigen Experimentteilnehmers bestimmt.

Das andere Experiment wird in den nächsten vier Wochen durchgeführt. Die Teilnehmer an diesem Experiment sind, genau wie Sie, für Experimente im Kölner Laboratorium für Wirtschaftsforschung (CLER) registriert. Dabei ist ausgeschlossen, dass Teilnehmer für beide Experimente ausgewählt werden. Für den Fall, dass es weniger Teilnehmer beim anderen als beim heutigen Experiment gibt, wählen wir unter allen heutigen Teilnehmern zufällig und mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit aus, wessen Entscheidungen umgesetzt werden.

Im Anschluss an Ihre heutige Entscheidung über die Bedingungen, unter denen der Teilnehmer des zukünftigen Experiments seine Entscheidungen treffen kann, bitten wir Sie einen Zoom-Raum zu betreten. In diesem Zoom-Raum werden Sie und eine weitere Person sein. Es ist Ihre Aufgabe, der anderen Person im Zoom-Raum mitzuteilen, welche Entscheidung Sie im Experiment getroffen haben. Sie teilen der anderen Person also mit, welche Bedingungen Sie für den Teilnehmer des zukünftigen Experiments festgelegt haben.

WICHTIG: Wir werden die Partnerstudien mit den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmern innerhalb der nächsten 4 Wochen durchführen und Ihre Entscheidungen werden zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer genau mit den hier beschriebenen Regeln beeinflussen.

Bevor wir Ihnen Ihre Aufgabe im Detail erklären, beschreiben wir Ihnen im Folgenden zunächst die Entscheidungssituation der Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment.

SCREEN 5

Aufgabe der Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment

Die Teilnehmer am zukünftigen Experiment müssen insgesamt zwei Entscheidungen treffen. Eine dieser Entscheidungen wird am Ende des Experiments zufällig ausgewählt. Die in dieser Entscheidungssituation getroffene Entscheidung bestimmt dann die Auszahlung des Teilnehmers. In jeder der beiden Entscheidungssituationen kann der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer aus vier Optionen wählen. Dies sieht wie folgt aus:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

In den Entscheidungssituationen werden die Optionen A, B, C und D durch konkrete Auszahlungen ersetzt. Die Optionen können dabei sowohl die eigene Auszahlung des Experimentsteilnehmers als auch die Auszahlung von jemand anderem beeinflussen.

SCREEN 6

Ihre Aufgabe

Sie können die Entscheidungssituation des Teilnehmers am zukünftigen Experiment wie folgt beeinflussen.

1. Sie können entscheiden, ob dem zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer alle Optionen zur Verfügung stehen sollen, oder ob eine oder mehrere davon nicht verfügbar sein sollen. Sie müssen dabei in jeder Situation mindestens eine Option zur Verfügung stellen.
2. Sie können dem zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer davon abraten, bestimmte Optionen zu wählen. Falls Sie dies tun, wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer Folgendes sehen, wenn er Entscheidungen über seine Optionen trifft:

☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C*
☐	Option D*

*** Ein früherer Experimentsteilnehmer, der über diese Optionen nachgedacht hat, rät von dieser Option ab.**

Der Bildschirm, auf dem Sie entscheiden können, bestimmte Optionen verfügbar zu machen oder nicht bzw. von bestimmten Optionen abzuraten oder nicht, sieht wie folgt aus:

Option	Verfügbar	Nicht verfügbar	Abraten
Option A	☐	☐	☐
Option B	☐	☐	☐
Option C	☐	☐	☐
Option D	☐	☐	☐

Hinweis:

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wir bitten Sie, genau jene Entscheidungen zu treffen, die Ihre echten Ansichten reflektieren.

SCREEN 7

Mitteilung Ihrer Entscheidung im Zoom-Raum

Im Anschluss an Ihre Entscheidungen über die Entscheidungsbedingungen des zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmers kommen Sie auf einen Bildschirm, auf dem eine zufällig ausgewählte Ihrer Entscheidungen abgebildet ist.

Dort erhalten Sie auch einen Link zu einem Zoom-Raum, den Sie betreten.

In dem Raum befindet sich eine weitere Person. Wir bitten Sie Ihren Bildschirm, auf dem Ihre Entscheidung dargestellt ist, mit der Person zu teilen. Bitte nennen Sie der Person außerdem Ihren Namen und teilen ihr mit, welche Bedingungen Sie für den zukünftigen Teilnehmer festgelegt haben.

Dazu teilen Sie der Person für jede der Optionen A, B, C und D jeweils Ihre Entscheidung mit, indem Sie **eine** der folgenden Entscheidungen für die jeweilige Option benennen (hier am Beispiel von Option A):

„Option A habe ich für den zukünftigen Teilnehmer ‚Verfügbar‘ gemacht.“ **ODER**

„Option A habe ich für den zukünftigen Teilnehmer ‚Verfügbar‘ gemacht. Ich habe aber von der Option abgeraten.“ **ODER**

„Option A habe ich für den zukünftigen Teilnehmer ‚Nicht verfügbar‘ gemacht.“

Das gleiche machen Sie für die Optionen B, C und D. Im Anschluss erhalten Sie von der Person im Raum per Chat ein Passwort, das sie unten eingeben, um auf den nächsten Bildschirm gelangen.

Option	Verfügbar	Nicht verfügbar	Abraten
Option A	☐	☐	☐
Option B	☐	☐	☐
Option C	☐	☐	☐
Option D	☐	☐	☐

SCREEN 8

Wie der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer wählt

Hier sehen Sie, wie der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer seine Entscheidungen treffen wird. Wir werden den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer bitten, alle vier Optionen in eine Reihenfolge zu bringen, beginnend mit der von ihm/ihr am meisten bevorzugten Option und endend mit der von ihm/ihr am wenigsten bevorzugten Option. Dazu wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer jeder Option einen Rang zwischen 1 und 4 zuweisen.

Am Ende des Experiments erhält der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer dann jene Option, die er/sie am höchsten eingestuft hat, innerhalb jener Optionen, die verfügbar sind. Bei seiner/ihrer Entscheidung über die Rangfolge der Optionen wird der zukünftige Teilnehmer noch nicht wissen, welche der Optionen verfügbar sind und welche nicht.

Rang	Option
☐	Option A
☐	Option B
☐	Option C
☐	Option D

Beispiel:

Nehmen Sie an, der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer weist Option A den Rang 1, Option B den Rang 3, Option C den Rang 4 und Option D den Rang 2 zu. Nehmen Sie weiterhin an, dass Sie Option A für den zukünftigen Experimentsteilnehmer nicht verfügbar machen. In diesem Fall wird der zukünftige Experimentsteilnehmer Option D erhalten. Der Grund ist, dass A nicht verfügbar ist und dass der Teilnehmer D höher einstuft als B und C.

SCREEN 9

Verständnisfragen

Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidung treffen, bitten wir Sie noch, einige Verständnisfragen zu den Instruktionen und dem Experiment zu beantworten. Dies soll sicherstellen, dass alle Teilnehmer verstehen, wie sich ihre Entscheidungen auf den anderen Experimentteilnehmer auswirken. Bitte beachten Sie, dass Ihnen zur Beantwortung der Fragen maximal 5 Minuten zur Verfügung stehen.

Nehmen Sie an, dass der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer Option B zuoberst einstuft, gefolgt von C und D, und dass er Option A am niedrigsten einstuft.

Frage 1: Wenn alle Optionen verfügbar sind, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 2: Wenn Option A nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 3: Wenn Option B nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 4: Wenn Option C nicht verfügbar ist, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

Frage 5: Wenn Optionen B, C und D nicht verfügbar sind, welche wird der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer erhalten?

SCREEN 10

Verständnisfragen - Teil 2

Bitte wählen Sie alle wahren Aussagen aus (und nur diese).

Aussage 1: Ich kann einige Optionen zur Verfügung stellen und andere nicht, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 2: Ich kann alle Optionen zur Verfügung stellen, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 3: Ich kann alle bis auf eine Option nicht verfügbar machen, wenn ich das für richtig halte.

Aussage 4: Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Entscheidungen, ich kann Optionen verfügbar oder un verfügbar machen und ich kann von Optionen abraten oder nicht, je nachdem was ich für richtig halte (solange mindestens eine Option für den zukünftigen Experimentteilnehmer verfügbar bleibt).

Aussage 5: Es gibt richtige oder falsche Entscheidungen, ich kann nicht einfach verfügbar oder un verfügbar machen, was ich für richtig halte.

Aussage 6: Der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer wird nur jene Optionen sehen, die ich zur Verfügung stelle, und wird die Optionen, die ich nicht zur Verfügung stelle, nicht einmal sehen.

Aussage 7: Der zukünftige Experimentteilnehmer wird alle Optionen einstufen. Er wird nicht wissen, welche verfügbar oder nicht verfügbar sind. Seine Auszahlung richtet sich nach der am höchsten eingestuften Option unter den verfügbaren Optionen.

Aussage 8: Der Computer wird alle Entscheidungen, die ich in diesem Experiment treffe, ausführen.

Aussage 9: Der Computer wählt zufällig einen der beiden Teile (Teil A oder B) aus. Die in diesem Teil getroffene Entscheidung wird dann umgesetzt. Jeder Teil ist dabei gleich wahrscheinlich.

D. Questionnaire

D1. Questionnaire -- English translation

SCREEN 1

Questionnaire

Thank you for your participation. Before you get to the overview of your payout, we ask you to complete a short questionnaire.

Please note that all your answers are purely for scientific purposes and will of course only be evaluated anonymously. We would therefore ask you to answer all questions honestly and conscientiously. Your answers have no influence on your payment or the payment of other persons from this study.

Please click on Continue to access the questionnaire.

SCREEN 2

In the following, we ask you to describe the reasons for your decision in Part A and Part B.

SCREEN 3

Next, we would like to ask your opinion on four policy proposals. The first three proposals concern Switzerland. That country is very similar to Germany in many aspects. Since Switzerland has only one tenth of Germany's population and is not a member of the European Union, policy changes in Switzerland have no direct effect on Germany.

Proposal 1: Taxes on high-sugar beverages

Several countries around the world levy taxes on beverages with a high sugar content (which is associated with obesity). These countries include Hungary, Ireland, Norway, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, Great Britain and others. There are many overweight people in Switzerland, as in the vast majority of developed countries.

What is your attitude towards a tax that would increase the price of sugary beverages in Switzerland by 20% (income tax would be reduced so that the government would earn the same tax revenue as before)?

Switzerland should . . . [definitely not introduce such a tax, probably not introduce such a tax, probably introduce such a tax, definitely introduce such a tax.]

What do you think the effect of such a tax would be? If such a tax were introduced, people in Switzerland would be on average . . . [significantly worse off, a little worse off, neither better nor worse off, a little better off, significantly better off.]

SCREEN 4

Proposal 2: Taxes on alcoholic beverages

Binge drinking is the excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages with the aim of getting heavily drunk. Binge drinking is sometimes considered problematic. One reason is that binge drinking might be harmful to health. It is therefore being discussed whether alcohol taxes should be increased in order to make binge drinking more expensive and correspondingly less frequent. Specifically, the price of cheap alcohol (spirits and cheap wines) could be increased disproportionately in percentage terms by charging the tax per liter of pure alcohol in the beverage.

What is your attitude towards a tax that would increase the price of spirits and cheap wines in Switzerland by 50%, on average (income tax would be reduced so that the government would earn the same tax revenue as before)?

Switzerland should ... [definitely not introduce such a tax, probably not introduce such a tax, probably introduce such a tax, definitely introduce such a tax.]

What do you think the effect of such a tax would be?

If such a tax were introduced, adolescents or young adults in Switzerland would be on average... [significantly worse off, a little worse off, neither better nor worse off, a little better off, significantly better off.]

SCREEN 5

Proposal 3: Taxes on tobacco

The harmful effects on health and the addictive potential of smoking cigarettes have been proven scientifically. There is therefore a discussion as to whether taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products in Switzerland should be further increased in order to reduce consumption and to deter young people more from smoking.

What is your attitude towards a tax that would increase the price of cigarettes of other tobacco products in Switzerland by an average of half the current price (income tax would be reduced so that the government would earn the same tax revenue as before)?

Switzerland should ... [definitely not introduce such a tax, probably not introduce such a tax, probably introduce such a tax, definitely introduce such a tax.]

What do you think the effect of such a tax would be?

If such a tax were introduced, people in Switzerland would be on average... [significantly worse off, a little worse off, neither better nor worse off, a little better off, significantly better off.]

SCREEN 6

Proposal 4: Restrictions on short-term loans

Short-term loans have been available in Germany since 2010. Such loans typically finance consumption, ranging from 50€ to 3000€, and must be repaid after 30 or 60 days.

The interest that can be charged on such loans is high, but limited by law. Therefore, people with very bad credit cannot obtain such loans, even if banks would be willing to grant such loans at very high interest rates and borrowers with very low credit ratings would be willing to pay very high interest rates for them.

It is being discussed whether the restrictions should be loosened. Advocates argue that many people who really need the money will otherwise not get credit. Opponents argue that such loans are very expensive and people can end up debt cycles.

How do you feel about that? The market for short-term loans in Germany should... [be severely restricted (in this case, far fewer people can receive a short-term loan), be somewhat restricted (in this case, fewer people can get a short-term loan), remain unchanged, be somewhat liberalized (in this case, more people can get a short-term loan), be severely liberalized (in this case, far more people can get a short-term loan)]

What do you think the effect of such liberalization would be?

If this market were strongly liberalized, the average German would be ... [significantly worse off, a little worse off, neither better nor worse off, a little better off, significantly better off.]

SCREEN 7

How committed are you to climate protection?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means: "not at all" and 10 means "very strongly". You can use the values in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.

Are you currently active in a political party? [Yes; No]

Are you or were you active in the student council, the Asta or another student association? [Yes; No]

SCREEN 8

How do you see yourself? Are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means "not at all willing to take risks", and a 10 means "very willing to take risks". You can also use the values in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.

How do you rate yourself personally: are you generally an impatient person or do you always have a lot of patience?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means "very impatient", and a 10 means "very patient". You can also use the values in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.

How would you rate your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means "not at all willing to share without expecting something in return", and a 10 means "very willing to share without expecting anything in return". You can also use the values in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.

SCREEN 9

Many people use the terms left and right when it comes to characterizing different political attitudes. When you think of your own political views, where would you place them on a scale between 0 and 10?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means "Left", and a 10 means "Right". You can also use the values in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.

SCREEN 10

General questions about yourself

Age

Gender [male; female; diverse; not specified]

Which faculty are you studying at? [WiSo Faculty; Faculty of Medicine; Faculty of Philosophy; Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences; Faculty of Human Sciences; I am not a student]

D2. Questionnaire -- German Original

#SCREEN 1

Fragebogen

Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme. Bevor Sie zu der Übersicht Ihrer Auszahlung gelangen, bitten wir Sie noch, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass alle Ihre Antworten rein wissenschaftlichen Zwecken dienen und selbstverständlich nur in anonymisierter Form ausgewertet werden. Wir möchten Sie daher bitten, alle Fragen ehrlich und gewissenhaft zu beantworten. Ihre Antworten haben keinen Einfluss auf Ihre Zahlung oder die Zahlung anderer Personen aus dieser Studie.

Bitte klicken Sie auf Weiter um zu dem Fragebogen zu gelangen.

SCREEN 2

Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie zu beschreiben, nach welchen Beweggründen Sie Ihre Entscheidung in Teil A und Teil B getroffen haben.

SCREEN 3

Meinung zu Politikvorschlägen

Als nächstes möchten wir Sie nach Ihrer Meinung zu vier Politikvorschlägen fragen. Die ersten drei Vorschläge betreffen die Schweiz. Dieses Land ist Deutschland in vielen Aspekten sehr ähnlich. Da die Schweiz lediglich ein Zehntel der Bevölkerung Deutschlands hat, und nicht Mitglied der Europäischen Union ist, haben Änderungen der Politik in der Schweiz keinerlei Auswirkungen auf Deutschland.

Vorschlag 1: Steuern auf zuckerhaltige Getränke

Mehrere Länder auf der ganzen Welt erheben Steuern auf zuckerhaltige Getränke (die mit Fettleibigkeit in Verbindung gebracht werden). Zu diesen Ländern gehören Ungarn, Irland, Norwegen, die Philippinen, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, Großbritannien und andere. Wie in der großen Mehrheit entwickelter Länder gibt es auch in der Schweiz viele übergewichtige Menschen.

Was ist Ihre Einstellung zu einer Steuer, die den Preis für zuckerhaltige Getränke in der Schweiz um 20% erhöhen würde (die Einkommensteuer würde gesenkt, so dass die Regierung die gleichen Steuereinnahmen wie zuvor erzielen würde)?

Die Schweiz sollte eine solche Steuer ... [keinesfalls einführen; eher nicht einführen; eher einführen; definitiv einführen]

Was denken Sie, wäre der Effekt einer solchen Steuer?

Wenn eine solche Steuer eingeführt würde, wären die Menschen in der Schweiz im

Durchschnitt... [deutlich schlechter gestellt; ein wenig schlechter gestellt; weder besser noch schlechter gestellt; ein wenig besser gestellt; deutlich besser gestellt]

SCREEN 4

Vorschlag 2: Alkoholsteuern

Mit "Rauschtrinken" (auch „Komasaufen“ genannt) bezeichnet man den exzessiven Konsum alkoholischer Getränke mit dem Ziel, sich stark zu betrinken. Rauschtrinken wird manchmal als problematisch angesehen. Ein Grund ist die Vermutung, dass Rauschtrinken gesundheitsschädigend ist. Daher wird diskutiert, ob die Steuern auf Alkohol erhöht werden sollen, um Rauschtrinken teurer, und entsprechend seltener zu machen. Insbesondere könnte der Preis von billigem Alkohol (Spirituosen und billige Weine) prozentual überproportional erhöht werden, in dem die Steuer per Liter reinen Alkohols im Getränk erhoben würde.

Was ist Ihre Einstellung zu einer Steuer, die den Preis von Spirituosen und billigen Weinen in der Schweiz im Durchschnitt um 50% erhöhen würde (die Einkommensteuer würde gesenkt, so dass die Regierung die gleichen Steuereinnahmen wie zuvor erzielen würde)?

Die Schweiz sollte eine solche Steuer ... [keinesfalls einführen; eher nicht einführen; eher einführen; definitiv einführen]

Was denken Sie, wäre der Effekt einer solchen Steuer?

Wenn eine solche Steuer eingeführt würde, wären Jugendliche oder junge Erwachsene in der Schweiz im Durchschnitt... [deutlich schlechter gestellt; ein wenig schlechter gestellt; weder besser noch schlechter gestellt; ein wenig besser gestellt; deutlich besser gestellt]

SCREEN 5

Vorschlag 3: Tabaksteuern

Die gesundheitsschädigenden Folgen und das Suchtpotenzial des Rauchens von Zigaretten sind wissenschaftlich klar belegt. Es besteht deshalb eine Diskussion, ob die Steuern auf Zigaretten und anderen Tabakwaren in der Schweiz weiter erhöht werden sollen, um den Konsum zu verringern, und um Jugendliche stärker davon abzuschrecken mit dem Rauchen zu beginnen. Was ist Ihre Einstellung zu einer Steuer, die den Preis von Zigaretten anderen Tabakwaren in der Schweiz im Durchschnitt um die Hälfte des bisherigen Preises erhöhen würde (die Einkommensteuer würde gesenkt, so dass die Regierung die gleichen Steuereinnahmen wie zuvor erzielen würde)?

[keinesfalls einführen; eher nicht einführen; eher einführen; definitiv einführen]

Was denken Sie, wäre der Effekt einer solchen Steuer?

Wenn eine solche Steuer eingeführt würde, wären die Menschen in der Schweiz im Durchschnitt... [deutlich schlechter gestellt; ein wenig schlechter gestellt; weder besser noch schlechter gestellt; ein wenig besser gestellt; deutlich besser gestellt]

SCREEN 6

Vorschlag 4: Begrenzung von Kurzzeitkrediten

Seit 2010 kann man in Deutschland Kurzzeitkredite erhalten. Solche Kredite finanzieren typischerweise Konsum, betragen zwischen 50 EUR und 3000 EUR, und müssen nach 30 oder 60 Tagen zurückbezahlt werden.

Die Zinsen, die für solche Kredite verlangt werden können, sind zwar hoch, aber gesetzlich beschränkt. Daher können Menschen mit sehr schlechter Kreditwürdigkeit keine solchen Kredite erhalten, auch wenn Banken bereit wären, solche Kredite bei sehr hohen Zinsen zu vergeben, und Kreditnehmer mit sehr geringer Bonität bereit wären, sehr hohe Zinsen dafür zu bezahlen.

Es wird diskutiert, ob die Zinsen freigegeben werden sollen. Befürworter argumentieren, dass viele Menschen, die das Geld wirklich brauchen, andernfalls kein Kredit bekommen. Gegner argumentieren, dass solche Kredite sehr teuer sind und Menschen in der Schuldenfalle landen können.

Wie stehen Sie dazu? Der Markt für Kurzzeitkredite in Deutschland sollte... [stark eingeschränkt werden (in diesem Fall können weitaus weniger Menschen ein kurzfristiges Darlehen erhalten); etwas eingeschränkt werden (in diesem Fall können etwas weniger Menschen einen kurzfristigen Kredit bekommen); unverändert bleiben; etwas liberalisiert werden (in diesem Fall können etwas mehr Menschen ein kurzfristiges Darlehen erhalten); stark liberalisiert werden (in diesem Fall können weit mehr Menschen ein kurzfristiges Darlehen erhalten)]

Was denken Sie, wäre der Effekt einer solchen Liberalisierung? Wenn dieser Markt stark liberalisiert würde, wäre der durchschnittliche Deutsche... [deutlich schlechter gestellt; ein wenig schlechter gestellt; weder besser noch schlechter gestellt; ein wenig besser gestellt; deutlich besser gestellt]

SCREEN 7

Wie stark engagieren Sie sich im Bereich Klimaschutz?

Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: "überhaupt nicht" und der Wert 10: "sehr stark". Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstimmen.

Sind Sie zurzeit in einer politischen Partei aktiv? [Ja; Nein]

Sind oder waren Sie in der Fachschaft, dem Asta, oder einer sonstigen studentischen Vereinigung aktiv? [Ja; Nein]

SCREEN 8

Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind Sie im Allgemeinen ein risikobereiter Mensch oder versuchen Sie, Risiken zu vermeiden?

Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: "gar nicht

risikobereit" und der Wert 10: "sehr risikobereit". Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen.

Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind Sie im Allgemeinen ein Mensch der ungeduldig ist, oder der immer sehr viel Geduld aufbringt?

Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: "sehr ungeduldig" und der Wert 10: "sehr geduldig". Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen.

Wie schätzen Sie Ihre Bereitschaft mit anderen zu teilen, ohne dafür eine Gegenleistung zu erwarten?

Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: "gar nicht bereit zu teilen ohne eine Gegenleistung zu erwarten" und der Wert 10: "sehr bereit zu teilen ohne eine Gegenleistung zu erwarten". Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen.

SCREEN 9

Viele Leute verwenden die Begriffe Links und Rechts, wenn es darum geht, unterschiedliche politische Einstellungen zu kennzeichnen. Wenn Sie an ihre eigenen politischen Ansichten denken, wo würden Sie diese auf einer Skala zwischen 0 und 10 einstufen?

Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: "Links" und der Wert 10: "Rechts". Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen.

SCREEN 10

Allgemeine Fragen zu Ihrer Person

Alter

Geschlecht [Männlich; Weiblich; Divers; Keine Angabe]

An welcher Fakultät studieren Sie? [WiSo Fakultät; Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät; Medizinische Fakultät; Philosophische Fakultät; Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät; Humanwissenschaftliche Fakultät; Ich bin kein Student]