

Abel, Martin; Robbett, Andrea; Stone, Daniel F.

**Working Paper**

## Partisan Discrimination in Hiring

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 17540

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

*Suggested Citation:* Abel, Martin; Robbett, Andrea; Stone, Daniel F. (2024) : Partisan Discrimination in Hiring, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 17540, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311979>

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 17540

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DECEMBER 2024

## DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 17540

# Partisan Discrimination in Hiring

**Martin Abel**

*Bowdoin College, JPAL and IZA*

**Andrea Robbett**

*Middlebury College*

**Daniel F. Stone**

*Bowdoin College*

DECEMBER 2024

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ISSN: 2365-9793

**IZA – Institute of Labor Economics**

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9  
53113 Bonn, Germany

Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Email: [publications@iza.org](mailto:publications@iza.org)

[www.iza.org](http://www.iza.org)

## ABSTRACT

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### Partisan Discrimination in Hiring\*

This study experimentally investigates the role of politics in hiring decisions. Participants acted as employers, determining the highest wage to offer candidates based only on their demographic characteristics, education, and partisanship. We find that both Democratic and Republican participants significantly favor co-partisans, with an out-partisan wage penalty of 7.5%. Discrimination is consistent across tasks that focus respectively on competence, shirking, feedback responsiveness, and voluntary effort, and appears largely driven by biased beliefs about partisan productivity, while affective polarization is also predictive of the out-partisan wage penalty. Discrimination does not increase in a treatment where workers benefit financially from being hired.

**JEL Classification:** J70, D90, C91

**Keywords:** discrimination, affective polarization, inaccurate beliefs

**Corresponding author:**

Martin Abel  
Bowdoin College  
255 Maine Street  
Brunswick  
Maine 04011  
USA  
E-mail: [m.abel@bowdoin.edu](mailto:m.abel@bowdoin.edu)

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\* This paper greatly benefited from comments by Jeff Carpenter, Emanuele Colonnelli, Peter Matthews, and participants at various workshops. Tyler Lenk provided outstanding research assistance and we thank Ivo Verzone for his programming work. The experiment was registered under registry number AEARCTR-0013763 and IRB approval was obtained from Middlebury College. All errors and omissions are our own. Declarations of interest: none.

# 1 Introduction

American society is increasingly divided along political lines. Affective polarization, or dislike and distrust of opposing partisans relative to co-partisans, has risen steadily over the past four decades and is higher than other developed countries (Finkel et al., 2020; Boxell et al., 2024). These hostilities transcend politics and influence behavior in everyday interactions outside of the political domain. For example, participants are more generous toward co-partisans in incentivized economic games (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Kranton and Sanders, 2017; Robbett and Matthews, 2023; Dimant, 2024), are more willing to provide hypothetical scholarships, discounted sports tickets, and college admissions to co-partisans (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Munro et al., 2010; Engelhardt and Utych, 2020) and are more inclined to respond to messages from co-partisans on dating platforms (Huber and Malhotra, 2017). In these settings, favoritism toward co-partisans often rivals or exceeds the favoritism based on other demographic characteristics such as gender, race, and education.

An important economic context where this partisan hostility may play a large role – but could also be more likely to be mitigated by economic incentives – is the labor market. To investigate how affective polarization influences hiring, we conduct a pre-registered online experiment, which elicits American political partisans’ willingness to pay workers to complete certain tasks for them using an incentive compatible mechanism. The experiment was designed to estimate the magnitude of hiring discrimination in a controlled setting and to distinguish between mechanisms potentially driving this discrimination. Understanding the causes of hiring discrimination is relevant both to the question of how this discrimination may vary across labor market settings and to the broader literature on causes and consequences of affective polarization.

There are several factors that may influence partisan discrimination in hiring and in-

clude both belief-based and preference-based motives. Existing evidence suggests that both Democrats and Republicans see the other side as less intelligent and are less trusting of their advice on non-political matters (Hartman et al., 2023; Zhang and Rand, 2023), and recent work shows that biased beliefs about (apolitical) group identities can lead to “inaccurate statistical discrimination” against specific groups (Bohren et al., 2023).<sup>1</sup> These stereotypes may translate into beliefs that out-partisans are less productive along various dimensions: they could be less intelligent, more dishonest and willing to cheat the firm, less responsive to feedback, or generally have a worse work ethic. These traits have varying relevance for different jobs and tasks, which could cause discrimination to vary accordingly.

Alternatively, partisan discrimination may be driven by one or more preference-based motives. Partisan employers may wish to help co-partisans or to hurt out-partisans by offering or withholding employment. Across a variety of settings, people regularly treat members of their in-group more favorably than the out-group and economists typically model this behavior by assuming that people have group-contingent social preferences, such that they put greater weight on the outcomes of in-group members (Tajfel et al., 1971; Fehr and Charness, 2023; Chen and Li, 2009). Beyond caring about the outcomes of job candidates, employers may simply prefer to spend time with co-partisans and avoid interacting with out-partisans, or have concerns about out-partisans fitting in with existing employees, in line with evidence that partisans wish to avoid social interactions with out-group members (Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019). People might even have a visceral antipathy to the act of hiring out-partisans, independent of the practical consequences for themselves or their employees.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Likewise, partisans tend to have exaggerated perceptions of the proportion of out-party members who belong to party-stereotypical groups, such as the proportion of Democrats who are Black and the proportion of Republicans who are older than 65 (Ahler and Sood, 2018), and thus might also conflate partisanship with demographic characteristics that they perceive to signal productivity.

<sup>2</sup>A large literature in behavioral economics addresses such non-consequentialist behavior and finds that people often act, not only to influence outcomes, but to signal their self- or social-identity or adhere to group-specific social norms (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011; Bursztyń and Jensen, 2017). When it comes to political identity, there is evidence that how people vote, their responses to factual political questions, and

In our study, we recruit 543 Republican and 545 Democratic participants on Prolific to act as employers in a hiring experiment. In each of 30 hiring rounds, participants are endowed with 100 cents and decide on the highest wage they are willing to pay a potential worker. To assess whether discrimination varies across work contexts, wage decisions are made across four tasks, which, respectively, emphasize general competence, honesty, responsiveness to negative feedback, and voluntary effort. Following [Bohren et al. \(2023\)](#), we inform participants that for one randomly selected hiring round, if a random market wage is less than the participant’s stated willingness to pay, then they effectively hire the worker, which means the participant pays the market wage and receives the worker’s actual productivity in that task as a bonus payment. If the market wage is greater than the participant’s willingness to pay, the worker is not hired and the bonus is unaffected.

We provide participants with a profile of demographic and political information for each worker: gender (Male or Female), race (Black or White), education (College Degree or No College Degree), age (40-69 or 19-39), political party (Republican, Democratic, Independent), and location (United States). Doing so serves three purposes: We can compare any discrimination based on political identity to the wage gaps that arise between more commonly studied demographics, we ensure that partisanship is no more salient than other demographic categories, and by controlling for these characteristics we eliminate by design the mechanism in which partisans discriminate simply because they infer categories such as race, education, or age from political affiliation. Since the worker and the employee never interact directly, we also shut down the social interaction pathway. While partisanship is often not as directly observable as other demographic characteristics, later in the introduction, we discuss evidence that employers typically can infer or observe the political views of prospective employees.

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even their in-group favoritism may be influenced by the desire to affirm their political identity as well as by outcome-based considerations, and it is plausible that this also extends to hiring practices ([Bullock and Lenz, 2019](#); [Pickup et al., 2021](#); [Robbett and Matthews, 2018](#); [Robbett et al., 2024](#)).

Regardless, our results can be interpreted as estimates of partisan discrimination conditional on the candidate’s partisanship being known.

We find that both Democrats and Republicans significantly favor co-partisans over independents and, to a larger degree, over out-partisans. The out-partisan wage penalty of 7.5% is sizeable, equal to almost 80% of the college degree premium. The fact that the wage penalty for out-partisans is three times as high as that for independents (2.5%) suggests that discrimination is primarily driven by penalizing out-partisans rather than favoring copartisans. The out-partisan wage penalty is stable across the four different tasks, indicating that this bias is general and not driven by reluctance to hire opposing partisans for specific types of work. Furthermore, we find that, in aggregate, Democrats penalize Republicans 45% more than Republicans penalize Democrats.

To test the underlying mechanisms driving discrimination, half of all participants are truthfully told that the worker will actually be paid the market wage if “hired.” This should affect wage offers if people have a desire to punish out-partisans or benefit in-partisans. We find that the effects of this treatment on the independent and out-partisan wage penalties are consistently small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that group-contingent social preferences do not play a role in the discrimination we observe. To further investigate the role of sentiments towards out-partisans, we elicit participants’ warmth towards members of each party and use the difference across parties as our measure of affective polarization, as is standard in the literature. The level of affective polarization is highly predictive of the out-partisan wage penalty. This relationship is disproportionately driven by the most polarized partisans.

Finally, we conduct an incentivized belief elicitation of productivity levels for the worker traits included in our profiles. Beliefs about differences in partisan productivity are highly



correlated with the out-partisan wage penalty: it is statistically insignificant for those believing members of the other party are *more* productive, 3.5% for those believing there is no productivity difference, and then steadily increases to more than 20% in the top quintile. Both Democrats and Republicans believe that out-partisans are about 7 pp (0.42 standard deviations) less productive.<sup>3</sup> Our results thus suggest that productivity beliefs of our study participants are biased and thus an example of inaccurate statistical discrimination [Bohren et al. \(2023\)](#), as well as what [Stone \(2023\)](#) refers to as affective polarization bias.

Overall, our results confirm that substantial discrimination exists in a controlled setting, even when workers do not interact with out-partisans. While discrimination in our experiment is not due to a desire to help co-partisans or harm out-partisans, affective polarization and beliefs about partisan productivity differences are key predictors of the out-partisan wage penalty. Given that these two moderators are correlated, we also estimate models in which we jointly account for these factors. We find that both moderators are attenuated but remain economically meaningful and statistically significant, suggesting that both productivity beliefs and non-instrumental psychological factors independently contribute to partisan discrimination.

Our paper relates to previous work finding partisan discrimination in the labor market, while also shedding light on its mechanisms. [Gift and Gift \(2015\)](#) conducted a field experiment in which job applications with partisan signals were submitted for real job openings in heavily liberal and conservative counties, and found that out-partisans were significantly less likely to receive callbacks in both counties. However, their study does not directly distinguish between beliefs, social preferences, or other potential mechanisms. [Colonnelli et al. \(2024\)](#) study a large data set of Brazilian workers and firm owners with partisan affiliations, and find

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<sup>3</sup>While we do not have access to representative data, Republicans were slightly more productive than Democrats in our pool of 365 workers. However, the difference of 4 pp is not significant at the 5% level and lower than the perceived differences.

significant assortative matching by partisanship and that co-partisans were more likely to be promoted and paid more despite being less qualified. They also conduct a field experiment with Brazilian business owners and find that they rate resumes of co-partisans more highly. They conclude this is due to political discrimination and not a *quid-pro-quo* between firm owners and politicians, but note, “Disentangling taste-based discrimination from inaccurate belief-based discrimination remains extremely challenging and beyond the scope of our paper.” Additionally, online experiments find that partisans have lower reservation wages when working for a member of their political party (McConnell et al., 2018) and that partisans who were asked to choose members for a team problem-solving task often avoided opposing partisans, even when those individuals were more skilled (Lelkes and Westwood, 2017).

Our design reflects scenarios in which an employer has limited information about a candidate’s productivity, but observes or infers their political leaning.<sup>4</sup> Partisanship of prospective employees can often be observed or inferred via social media, offline social networks, interviews, aspects of the candidate’s resume, or even official listings of party members or political donations. Colonnelli et al. (2024) report that, in their survey of Brazilian business owners, 86% say that they learn of a candidate’s politics at some point in the hiring process (see Panel C of Figure 1 of their paper). In the US, partisanship is perhaps even more observable as it has become part of a “mega-identity” including both voting patterns and many more observable traits such as the cars we drive, the way we dress, hobbies, food preferences, and music taste.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, among our participants with real-world hiring experience, most state that they are at least somewhat confident that they

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<sup>4</sup>Our study also relates to situations in which more detailed information is available but employers selectively focus on certain traits and ignore other information. This type of attention discrimination was documented in hiring e.g. by Bartoš et al. (2016). Recent studies document how limited attention can increase reliance on stereotypes and reduce the use of more relevant criteria in hiring (Abel and Burger, 2023; Esponda et al., 2024). In our study, the political affiliation of workers does not affect decision times.

<sup>5</sup>Experiments indicate that people can judge partisan affiliation with above-chance accuracy just by looking at still photographs (Olivola et al., 2012; Rule and Ambady, 2010).

know the political affiliation of their coworkers (76.4%) and job applicants (52%). Our post-experiment survey finds that 38% of participants admitted to using workers' political leaning as an important criteria in the wage offer decision. The partisan wage penalty is 17% among employers who say that they focus on applicants' politics, compared to less than 3% for those who do not, suggesting that participants do not feel a need to hide partisanship in their decision making. These results also provide evidence against a set of models in which discrimination occurs subconsciously.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, we acknowledge potential limitations of our experimental design, as discussed in detail in Section 4. One is that the wage amounts are relatively small. Although recent evidence suggests that behavior in the lab is not sensitive to the size of the incentive ([Camerer and Hogarth, 1999](#); [Enke et al., 2023](#)), we acknowledge this limits the power of our worker bonus variation. One common concern in research about discrimination is that people do not respond truthfully or give responses to support the research hypothesis. Reassuringly, we find that discrimination levels are very similar for participants who report in the post-study survey that they suspect that the research is related to politics. Last, we do not have a representative sample and most of our participants are not actual hiring managers. However, almost everyone has experience hiring other people for various tasks such as dentists and electricians, and we also address this concern by asking respondents in the post-survey if they have more formally been involved in hiring people. Among the 56% with real-world hiring experience, we observe a partisan wage gap of similar magnitude (6.5%).

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<sup>6</sup>There is an extensive literature on the role of implicit biases are important drivers of behavior ([Banaji, 2013](#)). The evidence is mixed with some studies showing that implicit bias levels are highly predictive of discriminatory behavior (e.g. [Glover et al. \(2017\)](#); [Reuben et al. \(2014\)](#)) while other studies conclude that implicit bias measures have limited predictive power ([Oswald et al., 2013](#)).

## 2 Experimental Design

Our design builds on previous experiments in which participants make hiring decisions and receive a payment that depends on the actual productivity of the worker they hire (Reuben et al., 2014; Bohnet et al., 2016; Bohren et al., 2023). This section first describes the tasks the workers completed. We then discuss the hiring task in which participants decide how much to offer to hire workers with certain traits to complete different tasks. Last, we describe the empirical strategy. The design and analysis plan were pre-registered.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.1 Worker Tasks

The pool of “workers” that our participants could hire was drawn from an earlier experiment (Abel, 2024) in which subjects recruited from Cloud Research were asked to transcribe grocery store receipts, such as those shown in Figure A1. In that experiment, the task was framed to participants as completing work for a firm. Workers had unlimited time to transcribe seven receipts and received a flat payment regardless of how many they completed or their accuracy. The receipts varied in legibility, as can be seen in the figure, and workers could skip the transcription for as many receipts as they wished without penalty by reporting them “illegible”. Notably, no receipts were truly illegible, as evinced by the fact that all were accurately transcribed by at least some workers. Workers were also told that they could voluntarily add up the total price of the individual items. It was emphasized that this was not a required task and did not affect their payment. Finally, some workers received criticism midway through the experiment if their performance was below average.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The pre-analysis plan can be found at: <https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13763>.

<sup>8</sup>The wording of the criticism was “*I just went over some of the receipts. Your performance has been below average. I was disappointed by your effort and attention to detail. Going forward, remember that your lack of commitment will harm the quality of our services.*” Workers who performed above average and received praise for their work are excluded from our sample.


These data provide us with four distinct measures of productivity that we use in the main experiment: the percentage of receipts accurately transcribed (*accuracy task*); the percentage of receipts attempted rather than skipped (*shirking task*); the percentage of receipts totaled up (*volunteering task*); and the change in transcription accuracy after receiving criticism (*feedback task*). These tasks therefore map to various workplace facets of interest, including general competence, laziness or willingness to shirk, volunteerism, and reaction to critical feedback.

## 2.2 Hiring Task

We recruited 1088 participants located in the United States for the experiment, which was conducted on Prolific in the summer of 2024. The median time to complete the study was 19 minutes and participants received a flat payment of 3 USD plus a bonus payment based on their hiring decision (described below). [Table A2](#) shows summary statistics of our sample (Col. 1). Participants are almost equally divided by gender. The average age is 40.7, which is close to the national average of 39 years. 58% of participants identify as white, 27.2% as Black, 6.2% as Hispanic and 6.9% as Asian. 69.6% of our sample has a bachelor degree (or higher) compared to the national average of around 40%. We limited our sample to political partisans and recruited an equal share of Democrats and Republicans. The level of affective polarization is 52 points, which is very close to the national average of 52-54 points at that time ([Iyengar et al., 2024](#)).

The hiring experiment consisted of three parts, followed by survey questions, as shown in [Figure 1](#). In each part, participants saw a series of ten worker profiles, such as that shown in [Figure 2](#), which were presented on separate screens and in random order. Each profile listed the worker’s political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, or Independent), age (19-39 or

**Figure 1:** Experimental Design



*Notes:* Participants were randomly assigned to the “no worker bonus” or “worker bonus” treatment. They completed 10 hiring decisions in the accuracy task, followed by 10 hiring decisions in two of the three other types of tasks (shirking, volunteering, or feedback). Finally, they completed an incentivized belief elicitation and survey.

40-69), gender (Male or Female), race (White or Black), education (No College Degree or College Degree), and location (United States for all workers). Each worker profile matched the characteristics of an actual worker who completed the previous experiment and for whom we had all four productivity measures. The profiles were drawn from a menu of 33 total profiles, as described later.

Worker Profile	
Age:	<b>19-39</b>
Gender:	<b>Male</b>
Race:	<b>White</b>
Political Party:	<b>Republican</b>
Education:	<b>No College Degree</b>
Location:	<b>United States</b>

**Figure 2:** Example of worker profile.

In the first part of the experiment, we used the incentive-compatible Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit the participant’s willingness to pay to hire a worker to accurately transcribe receipts (the *accuracy task*). The procedure matches that used by [Bohren et al. \(2023\)](#) to elicit the willingness to pay to hire workers with various characteristics

in an online experiment. Specifically, for each of the ten profiles, the participant reported the maximum wage,  $\bar{w}$ , ranging from 0 to 100, that they were willing to pay to hire the worker. They knew that a random “market wage,”  $m$ , would be generated and they would hire the worker at the wage  $m$  only if their stated willingness to pay exceeded (or equaled) this market wage. If they hired the worker, they received a bonus payoff for the task equal to the worker’s actual productivity (i.e., the percentage of items correctly transcribed) minus the randomly drawn wage. To ensure a non-negative bonus for the task, the participants additionally received an endowment of 100 cents. Thus, the bonus for the task was:

$$\text{payoff} = \begin{cases} 100 & \text{if } \bar{w} < m \\ 100 + \text{productivity} - m & \text{if } \bar{w} \geq m \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

This mechanism incentivizes participants to truthfully report their own willingness to pay to hire a specific worker for the task. Furthermore, she maximizes her expected *monetary* payment by setting the wage equal to the percentage of items she believes the worker accurately transcribed. However, as noted above, workers may have non-monetary motives that influence their willingness to pay to hire a worker, such as outcome-based social preferences and identity concerns. Before submitting their wage offers, participants were informed that the average worker transcribed 75% of items accurately. The worker interface is shown in [Figure A2](#).

To determine whether participants’ willingness to pay workers was influenced by social preferences, we conducted two separate treatments. In the *Worker Payment* treatment, participants knew that the wage from the randomly selected round would be paid to the worker, while in the *No Worker Payment* treatment, they were told that the worker would not actually receive the wage.

Next, participants completed ten hiring decisions for two more hiring tasks (randomly drawn

from the other three tasks).<sup>9</sup> They again reported their willingness to pay ten workers and their own payoff was determined by either the percentage of profiles not skipped, percentage of receipts voluntarily added, or percentage point change in performance after criticism, respectively.<sup>10</sup> As in the first part, participants were told the average worker productivities for the different tasks, which were 71% of receipts claimed to be legible, 55% of receipts voluntarily added, and a 5pp decline in performance after criticism. In addition to the flat participation payment of \$3.00, participants received the payoff from one randomly selected hiring round.<sup>11</sup>

The participant saw the same ten profiles in all three parts of the experiment, which were drawn from the full menu of 33 possible profiles. These were constructed using the 11 “base” profiles, shown in Appendix [Table A1a](#), which differed on non-political demographics. Each of the base profiles had three versions, one for each of the three possible worker political affiliations (Democrat, Republican, and Independent). We used only those base profiles for which we had worker observations for all three political affiliations. To determine which ten profiles a participant saw, we randomly drew 5 of the 11 base profiles and then, for each of these, we randomly drew 2 of the 3 political affiliations. In other words, the ten profiles that a participant saw consisted of five pairs that were identical except for political affiliation. The profiles were presented in random order.

Following the three experimental tasks, participants answered two additional incentivized

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<sup>9</sup>We did not ask workers to make the 10 hiring decisions for all four tasks to limit the time required to complete the experiment and avoid participant fatigue.

<sup>10</sup>In the latter case, the worker reported a wage between  $-50$  and  $50$ , to capture the fact that the worker’s productivity could be positive or negative. For this part, participants in the Bonus treatment were informed that the worker would also receive a base pay of 50 cents so that their wage could not be negative. Using the range of  $-50$  to  $50$  ensures that our interpretation of the wage in this task is the same as in the others since the participant again maximizes her monetary payoff by setting wage equal to her expectation of the worker’s (change in) performance.

<sup>11</sup>We pre-registered a flat payment of 2.50 and this is what was reported in the instructions and awarded at the time of participation. However, we discovered that some participants took longer than expected and so added an additional 0.50 to the bonus payment. The median pay in our sample was equivalent to an hourly pay of around 15 USD.



questions and completed survey questions on demographic characteristics (gender, age, race, education, and political affiliation), warmth toward each political party using the feelings thermometer and experience with hiring. The first incentivized question asked the participant to recall the profile characteristics of the final profile they saw and paid a bonus of \$1 if they recalled all characteristics correctly. The second asked them to report their belief about the share of items entered correctly (i.e., accuracy task performance) by workers of each of the various demographic characteristics. For each of these 11 questions, they received a 10 cent bonus if their answer was within two percentage points of the actual performance of the relevant group.

## 2.3 Empirical Strategy

Our preregistered analysis plan is to estimate variations of the regression equation:

$$y_{itr} = \alpha + \beta_1 Independent_{tr} + \beta_2 OutPartisan_{tr} + \beta_3 Black_{tr} + \beta_4 College_{tr} + \beta_5 Age40 - 69 + \beta_6 Female + \omega_t. \quad (2)$$

The subscripts  $i$ ,  $t$ , and  $r$  denote participant, task, and round respectively,  $\omega_t$  is a task fixed effect, and the other regressors are all dummy variables for worker characteristics. The omitted party category is co-partisan, so the party effects are both relative to this group. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level. We estimate models with and without participant fixed effects. We estimate (2) first pooled across all tasks and participants, and then separately by participant party and task.

To analyze mechanisms possibly driving differences in willingness to pay workers with different partisan affiliations, we interact the following variables with the party dummy

variables:

- $\text{Worker Payment}_i$  = a dummy variable for participant  $i$  being in the treatment in which workers will receive the market wage if hired;
- $\text{Polarization}_i$ , defined as participant  $i$ 's in-party thermometer score minus out-party thermometer score (this is the standard measure of affective polarization);
- $\text{Productivity Beliefs}_i$  = Participant  $i$ 's beliefs about the in-party's average productivity in the accuracy task minus the out-party's average productivity in this task.

## 3 Results

This section first analyzes how maximum wage offers are influenced by workers' partisan affiliation and how they vary across worker tasks and participants' political leaning. We then discuss underlying mechanisms that may explain partisan discrimination.

### 3.1 Hiring Decisions

[Table 1](#) reports how wage offers vary with worker characteristics, pooled across tasks. The coefficients on Independent and Outpartisan indicate that participants offer significantly higher wages to co-partisans compared to independents and, even more, so to out-partisans. The out-partisan penalty of around 4.6 (0.25 sd) indicates that the wages participants were willing to pay out-partisans are around 7.5% lower than co-partisans and around 5% lower than independents (Col. 1). We thus observe both in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination, with the latter significantly stronger ( $p < 0.001$ ). In contrast, [Gift and Gift](#)

(2015)’s resume audit study uncovered only a disadvantage for applicants from the local minority party and no advantage for those in the majority. Participants offer 9.6% more to workers with a college degree (Col. 3) and 2.1% more to female workers (Col. 5). Wage levels do not vary across workers’ race (Col. 2) and age (Col. 4). Partisan coefficients remain stable when we control for worker traits simultaneously (Col. 6) and include participant fixed effects (Col. 7). Overall, the out-partisan penalty is economically meaningful at over three-fourths of the penalty for not having a college degree, translating into a 4.6pp lower chance that out-partisans are ultimately hired for the job.

We next consider whether partisan discrimination varies by participant (“employer”) party. Table 2 presents results of specification 1, where the odd (even) columns include only Democratic (Republican) participants. Co-partisans are favored over independents by Republican participants somewhat more than by Democratic participants, but this difference is small and not significant. However, the out-party penalty is significantly larger for Democratic participants than for Republicans: for Democrats it is around 5.4 (8.9%), and for Republicans it is around 3.8 (6%). These estimates are robust to controlling for other worker characteristics (Col. 3-4) and to including participant fixed effects (Col. 3-4).<sup>12</sup> Due to their increased precision, we restrict subsequent tables to models with participant fixed effects (corresponding results without fixed effects are available upon request). In these models, out-partisan effects are over three times as large as the next largest effect among profile characteristics other than education for members of both parties.

Table 3 splits out the analysis by worker task. We see that the out-partisan wage penalty is statistically significant and similar in magnitude for all four tasks. This result is not driven by inattention to the variation in tasks. For example, the positive wage effects of having a

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<sup>12</sup>While not the focus of this paper, partisan differences for other worker characteristics are also noteworthy. Republicans offer lower wages to Black, female, and college-educated workers than Democrats. However, these differences are small in magnitude at around 1 to 1.5 cents (Col. 5-6).

**Table 1:** Effects of Worker Characteristics on Wage Offer (All Tasks Pooled)

	Maximum Wage Offer (0-100)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Independent	-1.612*** (0.280)					-1.572*** (0.276)	-1.732*** (0.186)
Outpartisan	-4.644*** (0.377)					-4.616*** (0.372)	-4.587*** (0.305)
Black		0.320 (0.339)				-0.550 (0.361)	-0.229 (0.223)
4-Year Degree			5.123*** (0.380)			5.100*** (0.376)	5.935*** (0.267)
Age 40-69				-0.340 (0.336)		-0.179 (0.363)	0.188 (0.216)
Female					1.175*** (0.322)	0.545* (0.314)	0.707*** (0.181)
Observations	29999	29999	29999	29999	29999	29999	29999
Left-Out Group Mean	58.05	55.87	53.14	56.08	55.41	63.76	63.76
SD	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6
Adj R-Square	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.54
Participant FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00					0.00	0.00

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. Outpartisan indicates the worker party affiliation is opposite the participant's. Left-Out Group refers to in Col (1) Inparty workers, (2) White workers, etc. All estimations include task fixed effects. Participant FE indicates participant fixed effects were included. P-Val: Ind = Outp is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Independent and Outpartisan coefficients are equal. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table 2:** Effects of Worker Characteristics on Wage Offer By Party (All Tasks Pooled)

	Maximum Wage Offer (0-100)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Independent	-1.396*** (0.364)	-1.834*** (0.430)	-1.266*** (0.356)	-1.918*** (0.425)	-1.317*** (0.241)	-2.181*** (0.283)
Outpartisan	-5.405*** (0.563)	-3.863*** (0.492)	-5.310*** (0.555)	-3.888*** (0.484)	-5.394*** (0.454)	-3.731*** (0.400)
Black			0.781 (0.480)	-1.982*** (0.534)	0.525* (0.297)	-1.099*** (0.329)
4-Year Degree			5.370*** (0.542)	4.796*** (0.515)	6.386*** (0.370)	5.460*** (0.381)
Age 40-69			-0.020 (0.534)	-0.409 (0.487)	-0.101 (0.312)	0.457 (0.296)
Female			0.962** (0.418)	0.095 (0.464)	1.149*** (0.263)	0.250 (0.245)
Observations	15369	14630	15369	14630	15369	14630
Inparty Mean	63.09	64.46	63.09	64.46	63.09	64.46
SD	17.4	17.8	17.4	17.8	17.4	17.8
Adj R-Square	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.56	0.53
Participant FE	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Sample	D	R	D	R	D	R
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P-Val: Ind (D=R)		0.44		0.24		0.02
P-Val: Outp (D=R)		0.04		0.05		0.01

*Notes:* The sample row specifies hiring manager party subgroups (D=Democrats, R=Republicans). The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. Outpartisan indicates the worker party affiliation is opposite the participant's. All estimations include task fixed effects. Participant FE indicates participant fixed effects were included. P-Val: Ind = Outp is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Independent and Outpartisan coefficients are equal. P-Val: (D=R) compares the given coefficient across regressions by participant party for a particular task. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

college degree is larger for the accuracy task than other tasks. Likewise, women receive a wage premium for all tasks except responsiveness to feedback. These results also imply that participants consider the skills or traits necessary to do well to vary across the tasks.

Table 4 presents results split by participants' party and worker task. We find that the out-partisan wage penalty is significant for each task for both Democrats and Republicans. However, the *difference* in wage penalty between Democratic and Republican participants is only significant for the accuracy and volunteering task. The larger differences in wage penalties imply that members of both parties are in relatively greater agreement that members of one party are more productive in that task. In this case, all participants agree that Democrats perform relatively better in the accuracy and volunteering task than Republicans compared to the shirking and feedback task.

## 3.2 Mechanisms

Next, we consider the mechanisms that drive out-party favoritism. As specified in our pre-analysis plan, we explore the role of i) group-contingent social preferences, ii) affective polarization, iii) productivity beliefs, and iv) attention.

**Group-contingent social preferences:** Table 5 presents analyses of the Worker Payment treatment, which should only increase the out-partisan wage penalty if employers differentially care about the payout to workers. Interactions with independent and out-partisan are consistently insignificant, both for the full sample and for subsamples of participants from each party (columns 4 and 5), indicating that participants do not favor co-partisans more or penalize out-partisans further because workers will receive the payment. Our estimates are precise, allowing us to rule out with 95 percent confidence that the worker payment increases the wage penalty by less than 2 percent in the pooled sample. These results suggest that

**Table 3:** Effects of Worker Characteristics on Wage Offer By Task

	Maximum Wage Offer (0-100)			
	Accuracy	Shirking	Feedback	Volunteering
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-1.84*** (0.24)	-1.79*** (0.31)	-1.31*** (0.31)	-1.90*** (0.33)
Outpartisan	-4.32*** (0.33)	-5.03*** (0.46)	-4.39*** (0.51)	-4.79*** (0.51)
Black	-0.47* (0.28)	0.17 (0.40)	-0.56 (0.40)	0.09 (0.40)
4-Year Degree	7.60*** (0.33)	5.60*** (0.41)	4.67*** (0.42)	4.66*** (0.41)
Age 40-69	-0.36 (0.30)	0.82** (0.37)	0.17 (0.37)	0.45 (0.38)
Female	0.53** (0.23)	0.99*** (0.28)	-0.10 (0.31)	1.49*** (0.32)
Observations	10879	6470	6170	6480
Inparty Mean	67.10	67.37	9.77	58.32
SD	16.5	16.9	17.5	18.1
Adj R-Square	0.66	0.69	0.68	0.72
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P-Val: Ind (=Acc)		0.90	0.17	0.89
P-Val: Outp (=Acc)		0.21	0.91	0.44

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. Outpartisan indicates the worker party affiliation is opposite the participant's. Column titles designate the task. All estimations include participant fixed effects. P-Val: Ind = Outp is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Independent and Outpartisan coefficients are equal. P-Val: (=Acc) compares the given coefficient across regressions to the accuracy task. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table 4:** Effects By Party and Task

	Maximum Wage Offer (0-100)							
	Accuracy		Shirking		Feedback		Volunteering	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Independent	-1.68*** (0.30)	-2.01*** (0.37)	-1.24*** (0.37)	-2.38*** (0.52)	-0.66* (0.34)	-2.07*** (0.53)	-1.45*** (0.49)	-2.40*** (0.45)
Outpartisan	-5.36*** (0.49)	-3.26*** (0.45)	-5.48*** (0.63)	-4.54*** (0.67)	-4.60*** (0.68)	-4.15*** (0.77)	-6.14*** (0.81)	-3.38*** (0.60)
Black	0.16 (0.36)	-1.17*** (0.43)	1.03* (0.55)	-0.84 (0.57)	0.17 (0.52)	-1.43** (0.61)	0.97* (0.56)	-0.93 (0.57)
4-Year Degree	8.40*** (0.48)	6.82*** (0.47)	5.94*** (0.58)	5.21*** (0.56)	4.87*** (0.55)	4.45*** (0.64)	5.01*** (0.55)	4.29*** (0.62)
Age 40-69	-0.75* (0.42)	0.01 (0.43)	0.56 (0.48)	1.06* (0.56)	0.14 (0.54)	0.17 (0.52)	0.06 (0.53)	0.80 (0.53)
Female	1.09*** (0.32)	-0.02 (0.32)	1.05** (0.41)	0.94** (0.39)	0.64 (0.41)	-0.96** (0.46)	1.86*** (0.47)	1.09** (0.44)
Observations	5449	5430	3320	3150	3300	2870	3300	3180
Inparty Mean	66.72	67.49	66.97	67.80	8.50	11.24	57.79	58.88
SD	16.54	16.44	16.72	17.01	16.48	18.48	17.97	18.23
Adj R-Square	0.69	0.62	0.71	0.68	0.69	0.67	0.69	0.75
Sample	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
P-Val: Ind (D=R)		0.48		0.07		0.03		0.15
P-Val: Outp (D=R)		0.00		0.31		0.66		0.01
P-Val: Ind (=Acc)			0.36	0.56	0.03	0.92	0.69	0.49
P-Val: Outp (=Acc)			0.88	0.11	0.37	0.32	0.41	0.87

*Notes:* The sample row specifies hiring manager party subgroups (D=Democrats, R=Republicans). The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. Outpartisan indicates the worker party affiliation is opposite the participant's. Column titles designate the task. All estimations include participant fixed effects (Participant FE). P-Val: Ind = Outp is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Independent and Outpartisan coefficients are equal. P-Val: (=Acc) compares the given coefficient across regressions to the accuracy task. Similarly, P-Val: (D=R) compares across participant party for a single task. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



out-party penalties are not driven by a desire to make out-partisans worse off and are instead due to beliefs about out-partisans being less productive or other factors. Likewise, there are no significant interactions between the worker payment and any of the other demographic traits at the 0.05 level.

**Affective polarization:** To further explore the role of partisan sentiments, [Table 6](#) reports interactions of the demeaned affective polarization score (i.e, in-party thermometer score - out-party thermometer score) with Independent and Out-partisan. The interaction coefficients are highly significant and negative, implying that the wage penalty is higher for more polarized participants. The coefficient magnitude of around 0.8 in the pooled sample means that a one standard deviation increase in affective polarization is associated with a 2.5 (54%) higher wage penalty (Col. 1-2). Interestingly, the left panel of [Figure 3](#) shows a large discontinuity in this relationship: for the first three quintiles of affective polarization, the wage penalty is relatively stable between two and three cents.<sup>13</sup> For quintiles four and five, the wage penalty increases sharply to around eight cents, implying that partisan discrimination is disproportionately driven by the most polarized people.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>While we included this and the following specifications with interaction terms in our pre-analysis plan, we did not specify that we would look at quintiles in addition to linear interactions.

<sup>14</sup>While not part of the analysis plan, we want to briefly discuss interactions between mechanisms. One possibility is that the Worker Payment has a larger effect for more polarized participants. [Figure A3](#) indeed suggests that for the most polarized participants, the bonus has a more negative effect on the out-partisan wage penalty. However, these estimates are relatively imprecise and not statistically significant.

**Table 5:** Effect of Worker Payment (WP) on Wage Offer

	Wage Offer (0-100)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-1.790*** (0.286)	-1.751*** (0.279)	-1.403*** (0.356)	-2.049*** (0.426)
Outpartisan	-4.631*** (0.443)	-4.657*** (0.431)	-5.181*** (0.625)	-4.081*** (0.588)
Independent x WP	0.072 (0.384)	0.042 (0.374)	0.179 (0.485)	-0.261 (0.566)
Outpartisan x WP	0.063 (0.623)	0.134 (0.608)	-0.413 (0.905)	0.671 (0.799)
Black		-0.145 (0.326)	0.628 (0.417)	-1.043** (0.501)
4-Year Degree		6.113*** (0.375)	6.975*** (0.548)	5.240*** (0.503)
Age 40-69		0.440 (0.299)	0.377 (0.435)	0.490 (0.410)
Female		1.073*** (0.269)	1.457*** (0.409)	0.651* (0.345)
Black x WP		-0.169 (0.447)	-0.185 (0.594)	-0.138 (0.659)
4-Year Degree x WP		-0.336 (0.532)	-1.140 (0.740)	0.459 (0.759)
Female x WP		-0.704* (0.363)	-0.609 (0.531)	-0.794 (0.491)
Age 40-69 x WP		-0.480 (0.430)	-0.880 (0.621)	-0.073 (0.593)
Observations	29999	29999	15369	14630
Inparty Mean	63.8	63.8	63.1	64.5
SD	17.6	17.6	17.4	17.8
Adj R-Square	0.52	0.54	0.56	0.53
Sample	All	All	D	R
P-Val: Ind x WP (D=R)				0.56
P-Val: Outp x WP (D=R)				0.37


*Notes:* The sample row specifies hiring manager party subgroups (D=Democrats, R=Republicans). The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). Worker Payment (WP) is an indicator for whether the participant was randomized into the worker payment treatment arm. All estimations include task and participant fixed effects. The standalone WP term is not identified due to collinearity with the participant FEs. P-Val: Ind x WP (D=R) and P-Val: Outp x WP (D=R) are tests of equality of the given coefficient across the D and R regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table 6:** Effects of Affective Polarization

	Wage Offer (0-100)			
	All		Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-1.787*** (0.190)	-1.764*** (0.184)	-1.232*** (0.230)	-2.393*** (0.303)
Outpartisan	-4.649*** (0.304)	-4.639*** (0.297)	-5.036*** (0.417)	-4.120*** (0.438)
Independent x AP	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.029*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.010)
Outpartisan x AP	-0.082*** (0.010)	-0.081*** (0.010)	-0.088*** (0.014)	-0.069*** (0.015)
Observations	29849	29849	15349	14500
Inparty Mean	63.76	63.76	63.09	64.46
SD	17.6	17.6	17.4	17.4
Adj R-Square	0.52	0.55	0.56	0.54
Worker Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P-Val: Ind x PB = Outp x AP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P-Val: Ind x AP (D=R)				0.31
P-Val: Outp x AP (D=R)				0.34

*Notes:* The column name specifies the sample included in a given regression. The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). Affective Polarization (AP) is a difference of 0-100 thermometer scores (inparty-outparty). We subtract the mean value from AP so the Ind / Outp coefficients measure the wage penalty at the average AP level. All estimations include task and participant FEs. As a result, the standalone AP term is not identified due to collinearity. Worker Controls indicates whether worker race, education, gender, and age are controlled for. P-Val: Ind = Outp and P-Val: Ind x AP = Outp x AP are intra-regression tests of coefficient equality. P-Val: Ind x AP (D=R) and P-Val: Outp x AP (D=R) are tests of equality of the given coefficient across the D and R regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 3:** Outpartisan Effect by Polarization Quintile (left) and Productivity Belief Difference (Right)



Note: The x-axis measures the quintile for differences in productivity beliefs between the own and other party. Mean productivity differences are: -9.2pp (Q1), 0 (Q2), 3.8pp (Q3), 10pp (Q4), 27.4pp (Q5)

The interaction of affective polarization and out-partisan is significant for both parties and is (insignificantly) larger for Democratic participants (Col. 3-4). This helps to explain why, as discussed above, the out-partisan wage penalty is on average larger for Democratic participants. We also find that Democrats are about 9 points more affectively polarized than Republicans on average, which also contributes to there being a larger out-partisan effect for Democratic participants.<sup>15</sup>

**Worker productivity beliefs:** When it comes to beliefs about worker productivity, both Democrats and Republicans believe that co-partisans are more productive than out-partisans, as shown in Figure A12. Members of both parties consider partisanship to be the trait that matters most for worker productivity after education.<sup>16</sup> Table 7 reports interactions of worker

<sup>15</sup>While very recent data is not available, the partisan difference in affective polarization is likely not representative as studies show that Democrats and Republicans are similarly affectively polarized (Voelkel et al, 2022).

<sup>16</sup>The actual productivity of the workers in our sample is analyzed in Table A7. Within this sample, older workers are marginally less productive on the accuracy task than younger ones and Democrats are marginally less productive than Republicans ( $p = 0.095$ ).

politics with the difference in employer beliefs about transcription accuracy of in-partisan and out-partisans. Again, the interactions are consistently highly significant and negative. In the pooled sample, the out-partisan wage penalty doubles for a one standard deviation increase in productivity belief differences. To further explore this relationship, the right panel of [Figure 3](#) plots the out-partisan wage penalty for each quintile of productivity belief differences. Among the 11% of participants who believe that out-partisans are more productive than co-partisans (Q1), the out-partisan wage coefficient is positive, but small in magnitude (1 cent) and insignificant. For the 31% who believe there is no partisan productivity difference, the out-party wage penalty is 2 cents (Q2). This suggests that while productivity beliefs play an important role, there are other factors driving partisan discrimination. The wage penalty then steadily increases with each quintile and peaks at almost 13 cents for participants with the most partisan beliefs (Q5). The interaction coefficient for Democrats is about twice as large as for Republicans (Col. 3-4). While members of both parties believe that out-partisans are around 7pp less productive ([Figure A12](#)), this implies that these partisan beliefs have a larger effect on wage decisions of Democrats.

**Attention:** Our analysis plan specifies two measures of attention: the amount of time employers spend on the wage decision and what attributes of a worker profile they remember. [Figure A6](#) shows that participants were most likely to remember the race of the last profile, and second most likely to remember partisanship, compared to a random guess for each profile characteristic. However, the accuracy rates are similar across worker characteristics. This suggests that the out-partisan penalty was not driven by people simply not paying attention to or noticing other worker characteristics than partisanship. Along similar lines, [Table A8](#) shows that workers' party (or any other traits) does not affect the time that employers spend making wage decision. Results (not reported) further show that these results do not vary across parties.

**Table 7:** Effects of Productivity Beliefs (Performance Task)

	Wage Offer (0-100)			
	All		Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-1.843*** (0.242)	-1.819*** (0.236)	-1.672*** (0.295)	-1.968*** (0.366)
Outpartisan	-4.483*** (0.330)	-4.446*** (0.321)	-5.567*** (0.462)	-3.324*** (0.439)
Independent x Prod Belief	-0.102*** (0.027)	-0.098*** (0.027)	-0.075* (0.042)	-0.107*** (0.035)
Outparty x Prod Belief	-0.281*** (0.042)	-0.273*** (0.041)	-0.383*** (0.071)	-0.207*** (0.048)
Observations	10509	10509	5309	5200
Inparty Mean	67.10	67.10	66.72	67.49
SD	16.5	16.5	16.5	16.4
Adj R-Square	0.61	0.67	0.71	0.63
Worker Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P-Val: Ind x PB = Outp x PB	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
P-Val: Ind x PB (D=R)				0.55
P-Val: Outp x PB (D=R)				0.04

*Notes:* Sample is limited to offers from the accuracy task. The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). Prod Belief (PB) is the difference between participants' average performance task productivity beliefs by party (inparty-outparty). We subtract the mean value from PB so the Ind / Outp coefficients measure the wage penalty at the average PB difference. All estimations include task and participant FEs. As a result, the standalone PB term is not identified due to collinearity. P-Val: Ind = Outp and P-Val: Ind x PB = Outp x PB are intra-regression tests of coefficient equality. P-Val: Ind x PB (D=R) and P-Val: Outp x PB (D=R) are tests of equality of the given coefficient across the D and R regressions. Worker Controls indicates whether worker race, education, gender, and age are controlled for. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Isolating mechanisms:** The effect of the Worker Payment treatment and effects on attention are well identified due to random assignment. By contrast, interaction terms with affective polarization and productivity beliefs are likely endogenous. Indeed, affective polarization and productivity beliefs are correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.2335): more polarized participants also believe that out-partisans are less productive (Figure A5). Table 8 therefore reports results in which we jointly control for these factors. The sample is limited to hiring decisions for the accuracy task for which we elicit productivity beliefs. We first estimate models with separate interaction terms. Variables are now not demeaned, so the coefficient measures the wage penalty at affective polarization and belief levels equal to zero.

The table shows that both out-partisan interactions continue to be highly significant when they are included together, but the affective polarization interaction coefficient declines by about one third, while the productivity interaction declines by less than 10% (Col. 5-6). Moreover, a one standard deviation change in beliefs continues to have more than twice the effect on the wage penalty than a one standard deviation increase in affective polarization. These results suggest that productivity beliefs play a more important role in explaining discrimination. However, a well-known caveat with this interpretation is that simultaneously controlling for moderators insufficiently addresses endogeneity concerns. Future research that exogenously shifts beliefs or affective polarization is required to isolate mechanisms more conclusively.

## 4 Discussion

We find that both Democrats and Republicans discriminate against out-partisans when making incentivized hiring decisions to a substantial degree. For members of both parties,

**Table 8:** Mediation: Polarization and Productivity Beliefs

	Wage Offer (0-100)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Independent	-0.580 (0.430)	-0.539 (0.413)	-1.120*** (0.275)	-1.122*** (0.267)	-0.385 (0.451)	-0.377 (0.432)
Outpartisan	-0.731 (0.567)	-0.814 (0.555)	-2.487*** (0.334)	-2.507*** (0.327)	-0.408 (0.580)	-0.468 (0.566)
Independent x AP	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)			-0.017** (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)
Outpartisan x AP	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.069*** (0.011)			-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.043*** (0.010)
Independent x Prod Belief			-0.102*** (0.027)	-0.098*** (0.027)	-0.092*** (0.028)	-0.088*** (0.027)
Outparty x Prod Belief			-0.281*** (0.042)	-0.273*** (0.041)	-0.258*** (0.041)	-0.250*** (0.040)
Observations	10819	10819	10509	10509	10449	10449
Inparty Mean	67.10	67.10	67.10	67.10	67.10	67.10
SD	16.5	16.5	16.5	16.5	16.5	16.5
Adj R-Square	0.61	0.66	0.61	0.67	0.61	0.67
Sample	All	All	All	All	All	All
Worker Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). Affective Polarization (AP) is a difference of 0-100 thermometer scores (inparty-outparty). Prod Belief (PB) is the difference between participants' average performance task productivity beliefs by party (inparty-outparty). All estimations include task and participant FEs. As a result, the standalone AP and PB terms are not identified due to collinearity. Worker Controls indicates worker race, education, gender, and age are controlled for. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



the disparity between co-partisan and out-partisan wages is more than three times as large as the disparities based on race and gender, but is not as large as the college education premium. Wage discrimination by members of both parties is similar across a variety of work tasks, but relative discrimination against Republicans is relatively high for general competence and voluntary effort tasks. Discrimination is driven by inaccurate statistical discrimination and affective polarization, and not by social preferences. Our results confirm the sincerity of misguided polarization and the existence of consequences of this polarization beyond the political sphere. An optimistic interpretation of the behavior we observe is that partisan discrimination is, while substantial, somewhat limited and restrained on average, and is not driven by a desire to harm out-partisans.

One key concern in lab experiments is that participants do not respond or act truthfully, either in line with the suspected research purpose or with what is deemed socially acceptable. To address these concerns, we ask participants immediately after the experiment what they thought the research was about. [Table A5](#) shows that the out-partisan wage penalty is very similar for the 15% of participants who suspect that the research is related to politics (Col. 1-4).<sup>17</sup> While this does not conclusively address internal validity concerns, it provides some reassurance that results are not driven by social desirability and reporting bias concerns.

While the tight experimental control of lab settings supports internal validity, it often comes at the cost of more questionable external validity. Indeed, one key limitation of our design and similar studies (e.g. [Barron et al. \(2024\)](#); [Bohren et al. \(2023\)](#)) is that we employ a stylized hiring decision that does not capture many elements of a typical selection process. For example, while recent evidence suggests experimental results are not sensitive to the size of the incentive ([Camerer and Hogarth, 1999](#); [Enke et al., 2023](#)), effects may vary if

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<sup>17</sup>Immediately after the productivity belief elicitation, we ask participants “What do you think is the main question that this research is trying to answer?” We group responses with key words such as politics, Republican, Democrat, or partisan.

hiring decisions are made over larger amounts. Another limitation is that the sample is not representative of actual professional hiring managers. While we note that the survey frames the decisions as “highest wages that you are willing to pay to hire people” – decisions that most people implicitly make regularly over the course of life when hiring people such as plumbers and accountants – we attempt to address this concern directly by identifying participants who have previously been involved in hiring in a workplace environment. We find that the wage penalty is similar in magnitude and highly significant among those with real-world hiring experience. Moreover, it is reassuring that our results are broadly in line with findings from studies that use field data such as [Colonnelli et al. \(2024\)](#).

Beyond the implications of our results for labor market settings, our paper also contributes to the broader literature on causes of affective polarization. Our finding that Democrats generally impose larger out-partisan wage penalties than Republicans counters survey and anecdotal evidence that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to describe out-partisans as “lazy,” “dishonest,” and “snowflakes.” Results in surveys and other settings might differ from ours due to lack of incentives to express sincere beliefs ([Bullock and Lenz, 2019](#)) or conflation of partisan identity with other demographic characteristics.<sup>18</sup> Our results also support the prior work noted above using incentivized experiments to find that partisans sincerely believe that out-partisans are generally less competent ([Hartman et al., 2023](#); [Zhang and Rand, 2023](#)).

A question that our work raises is whether people think that it is ethically or socially acceptable to consider partisan identity in hiring decisions. To further address this issue, we

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<sup>18</sup>See [Pew Research Center \(2022\)](#) for survey evidence and [McIntosh \(2020\)](#) for discussion of the claim that Democrats are more likely to be “snowflakes,” which is contradicted by our finding that Republicans did not penalize out-party members in the negative feedback task more than Democrats did. The fact that Democrats discriminate more than Republicans in our sample is somewhat surprising given past evidence of approximate symmetry of bias ([Stone, 2023](#)). This is in part due to the fact that Democrats are relatively highly affectively polarized in our sample. However, we also find that the marginal effect of affective polarization on wage discrimination is directionally, though not significantly, higher for Democrats, which is consistent with evidence that Democrats respect Republicans less than vice versa ([Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2024](#)).

explore to what extent people admit to using workers’ politics in their wage decisions. [Figure A7](#) shows that only about half as many participants claim to focus on politics compared to education (38% vs. 76%).<sup>19</sup> Given that the out-partisan and education coefficients are similar in magnitude ([Table A5](#), Col. 5-8), this implies that some participants either did not admit to their focus on politics, or those who did focus on this actually put more weight on this factor than was typically put on education.

The latter possibility is supported by our results showing that more polarized partisans impose a larger outpartisan wage penalty. However, to investigate these two competing explanations further, we compare hiring decisions between those who do and those who do not claim to focus on specific worker traits. [Figure A8](#) confirms that the effect of politics is almost 50% larger than that of education among those who say they focus on these traits. The out-partisan effect is also fairly small for those who say they do not focus on politics, implying that there were not many participants who did focus on this but just did not want to admit it.<sup>20</sup> We also find that both affective polarization and productivity beliefs are only predictive of the wage penalty among employers who say they focus on politics ([Table 8](#)). We interpret this as additional suggestive evidence that the interaction effects for affective polarization and productivity beliefs are not driven by other unobserved factors.

Overall, our results suggest that a substantial share of people regard political affiliation as a key selection criterion across a range of worker tasks. To what extent this translates into decisions about whom to hire or promote outside of our experimental setting depends

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<sup>19</sup>Participants were asked “In general, which were the worker characteristics that you focused on most in deciding what wage to offer? (check all that apply.)” They could select as many of the six characteristics as they wanted. The median participant selected two.

<sup>20</sup>It is notable that politics differs from other demographic traits including protected characteristics such as gender and race. Among those who focus on gender (33%), we observe a small wage premium paid to women. And among the 19% who focus on race, we do not find lower wages offered to Black workers. The same applies to age. This may be because the variable is used in off-setting ways by those who focus on it. For example, results (not reported) show that among those who focus on race, Democrats pay slightly higher wages to Black workers, while Republicans pay slightly less.

in part on employers’ *perceived* ability to identify the political leaning of applicants and co-workers. When asked in the post-experiment survey, a majority of respondents with real world hiring experience say they are at least somewhat confident in knowing the political leaning of applicants (52%) and coworkers (76.4%), which is in line with previously discussed evidence that people feel confident to identify political affiliation based on photos or hobbies. As political identities increasingly permeate non-political domains, understanding how partisanship influences economic behavior becomes critical for addressing the wider social and economic implications of polarization.

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## A Online Appendix

**Table A1:** Worker Profiles

Block	Education	Gender	Race	Age
1	No College	Male	White	Young
2	No College	Male	Black	Young
3	College	Male	White	Young
4	College	Male	Black	Young
5	No College	Female	White	Young
6	College	Female	White	Young
7	College	Female	Black	Young
8	No College	Male	White	Old
9	College	Male	White	Old
10	No College	Female	White	Old
11	College	Female	White	Old

- (a) Notes: The worker profiles were drawn from one of these eleven blocks that varied by non-political characteristics. There were three different profiles for each block, one for each political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, Independent), yielding our menu of 33 profiles, each of which actually corresponded to an actual worker.



**Table A2:** Worker Payment Randomization Balance

		(1)		(2)		(3)		(3)-(2)
Variable	N	Total Mean/(SE)	No Worker N	Payment Mean/(SE)	Worker N	Payment Mean/(SE)	Pairwise t-test N	P-value
Male	1088	0.508 (0.015)	529	0.526 (0.022)	559	0.492 (0.021)	1088	0.269
Female	1088	0.481 (0.015)	529	0.461 (0.022)	559	0.499 (0.021)	1088	0.212
White	1086	0.628 (0.015)	529	0.633 (0.021)	557	0.623 (0.021)	1086	0.726
Black	1086	0.279 (0.014)	529	0.289 (0.020)	557	0.269 (0.019)	1086	0.465
Hispanic	1086	0.064 (0.007)	529	0.047 (0.009)	557	0.079 (0.011)	1086	0.031**
Asian	1086	0.071 (0.008)	529	0.070 (0.011)	557	0.072 (0.011)	1086	0.905
College Degree (4 yr)	1088	0.696 (0.014)	529	0.692 (0.020)	559	0.699 (0.019)	1088	0.786
Age	1082	40.086 (0.620)	524	40.802 (1.152)	558	39.415 (0.524)	1082	0.273
Democrat	1088	0.501 (0.015)	529	0.490 (0.022)	559	0.512 (0.021)	1088	0.468
Thermometer Dems	1084	54.483 (0.955)	526	54.399 (1.365)	558	54.563 (1.336)	1084	0.932
Thermometer Rep	1085	50.174 (1.095)	527	51.184 (1.591)	558	49.220 (1.509)	1085	0.371
Hiring Experience	1077	0.593 (0.015)	523	0.616 (0.021)	554	0.572 (0.021)	1077	0.147
Joint F-test, P-value								0.230
Joint F-test, N								1063

*Notes:* This table presents summary statistics of the full sample (1) and of subsamples of those assigned to groups where the workers being hired do (3) and do not (2) randomly receive payment. For example, 50.8% of the full sample identified as male. Standard errors are robust. The sample includes only Democrats and Republicans, so all non-Democrats are Republican. The last column reports p-values from a test of equal means of characteristics across the worker bonus treatment. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A3:** Focus on Politics

	Wage Offer (0-100)			
	All		Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.617*** (0.188)	-0.611*** (0.178)	-0.328 (0.224)	-0.887*** (0.271)
Outpartisan	-1.443*** (0.222)	-1.497*** (0.212)	-1.368*** (0.264)	-1.619*** (0.328)
Independent x FP	-3.152*** (0.429)	-3.128*** (0.420)	-2.574*** (0.521)	-3.957*** (0.666)
Outparty x FP	-8.509*** (0.696)	-8.347*** (0.681)	-9.900*** (0.927)	-6.362*** (0.972)
Observations	29879	29879	15249	14630
Inparty Mean	63.76	63.76	63.09	64.46
SD	17.6	17.6	17.4	17.8
Adj R-Square	0.53	0.55	0.57	0.54
Worker Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
P-Val: Ind x FP = Outp x FP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P-Val: Ind x FP (D=R)				0.10
P-Val: Outp x FP (D=R)				0.01

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). Focus Politics (FP) indicates the participant claimed to focus on worker politics in wage decisions. All estimations include task and participant FEs. As a result, the standalone FP term is not identified due to collinearity.. P-Val: Ind = Outp and P-Val: Ind x FP = Outp x FP are intra-regression tests of coefficient equality. P-Val: Ind x FP (D=R) and P-Val: Outp x FP (D=R) are tests of equality of the given coefficient across the D and R regressions. Worker Controls indicates whether worker race, education, gender, and age are controlled for. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A4:** Mediation: Split By Focus on Politics

	Wage Offer (0-100)					
	No Focus on Politics			Focus on Politics		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Independent	-0.603 (0.478)	-0.811 (0.586)	-0.477 (0.683)	-0.649 (0.907)	-1.586 (1.315)	0.370 (1.201)
Outpartisan	-1.144* (0.604)	-1.034 (0.746)	-1.243 (0.874)	-1.131 (1.198)	-2.920* (1.690)	1.282 (1.601)
Independent x AP	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.058*** (0.022)
Outpartisan x AP	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.000 (0.019)	-0.069*** (0.021)	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.097*** (0.029)
Independent x Prod Belief	-0.028 (0.032)	0.003 (0.046)	-0.042 (0.042)	-0.110*** (0.041)	-0.090 (0.062)	-0.104* (0.055)
Outparty x Prod Belief	-0.048 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.047)	-0.069 (0.050)	-0.327*** (0.055)	-0.467*** (0.093)	-0.234*** (0.060)
Observations	6459	3059	3400	3950	2200	1750
Inparty Mean	66.57	65.75	67.29	67.96	68.00	67.90
SD	15.8	15.6	15.9	17.6	17.8	17.4
Adj R-Square	0.67	0.74	0.62	0.67	0.70	0.65
Sample	All	D	R	All	D	R

*Notes:* The sample row specifies hiring manager party subgroups (D=Democrats, R=Republicans). The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). Affective Polarization (AP) is a difference of 0-100 thermometer scores (inparty-outparty). Prod Belief (PB) is the difference between participants' average performance task productivity beliefs by party (inparty-outparty). All estimations include task and participant FEs. As a result, the standalone AP and PB terms are not identified due to collinearity. Worker race, education, gender, and age are controlled for. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A5:** Robustness: Goals of Study and Hiring Experience

	Maximum Wage Offer (0-100)							
	Goal: Politics				Hiring Experience			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Independent	-1.190*	-1.205*	-1.856***	-1.794***	-1.809***	-1.736***	-1.260***	-1.242***
	(0.710)	(0.700)	(0.313)	(0.308)	(0.374)	(0.367)	(0.429)	(0.427)
Outpartisan	-5.084***	-5.051***	-4.774***	-4.735***	-4.013***	-3.988***	-5.604***	-5.524***
	(1.068)	(1.043)	(0.413)	(0.407)	(0.489)	(0.483)	(0.600)	(0.586)
Black		-1.247		-0.346		-0.563		-0.532
		(0.957)		(0.397)		(0.502)		(0.520)
4-Year Degree		5.178***		5.171***		4.903***		5.215***
		(0.919)		(0.424)		(0.498)		(0.578)
Age 40-69		-1.567		0.089		0.501		-1.023**
		(1.050)		(0.390)		(0.504)		(0.512)
Female		0.835		0.609*		0.388		0.651
		(0.971)		(0.334)		(0.414)		(0.488)
Subgroup	Polit.	Polit.	Not Pol.	Not Pol.	Exper.	Exper.	No Exp.	No Exp.
Observations	4400	4400	24629	24629	17280	17280	12399	12399
Mean	63.74	63.74	61.11	61.11	62.06	62.06	61.17	61.17
SD	17.79	17.79	17.64	17.64	17.74	17.74	17.47	17.47
Adj R-Square	.083	.106	.0675	.0891	.0453	.0641	.107	.131
Participant FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Ind = Outp	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

*Notes:* Column titles specify hiring manager party subgroups. Cols 1-2 and 3-4 include those who did and did not think the experiment was about worker politics. Cols 5-6 and 7-8 include who do and not have hiring experience. The dependent variable is the maximum wage offer specified by the participant for a given worker (0-100). The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. All estimations include task fixed effects. P-Val: Ind = Outp is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Independent and Outpartisan coefficients are equal. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A6:** Correlates with Claiming to Focus on Politics

	Focus on Politics (1=yes)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat	0.077*** (0.029)	0.053* (0.029)	0.084*** (0.029)	0.072** (0.029)	0.076** (0.030)	0.072** (0.030)
Affective Polarization		0.003*** (0.000)				
Prod Belief			0.010*** (0.001)			
Remember Politics				0.084*** (0.030)		
Hiring Experience					-0.037 (0.031)	
Male						-0.037 (0.030)
Age						-0.001** (0.001)
White						0.075 (0.048)
Black						0.035 (0.051)
College Degree (4 yr)						0.006 (0.033)
Observations	1084	1078	1047	1084	1073	1076
Mean	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
SD	.484	.484	.484	.484	.484	.484
Adj R-Square	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.01

*Notes:* The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the participant claimed to focus on a worker's political affiliation in making wage decisions. Affective Polarization is a difference of the participant's 0-100 thermometer scores for each party (inparty-outparty). Prod Belief is the difference between participants' average performance task productivity beliefs for each party (inparty-outparty). Remember politics indicates correct recall of the last worker profile's political affiliation. Age is the participant's age in years. The other independent variables are indicators for participant characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A7: Actual Worker Productivity**

	Worker Productivity								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Republican	0.026 (0.025)					0.026 (0.026)	0.033 (0.027)	0.030 (0.059)	0.051 (0.057)
Democrat	-0.016 (0.023)					-0.011 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.038 (0.050)	-0.038 (0.051)
4-Year Degree		0.016 (0.020)				0.018 (0.020)	0.020 (0.021)	0.020 (0.043)	0.002 (0.040)
Black			-0.027 (0.021)			-0.023 (0.023)	0.002 (0.024)	0.088* (0.046)	0.000 (0.043)
Female				-0.014 (0.019)		-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.020)	-0.041 (0.043)	0.036 (0.041)
Age 40-69					-0.031 (0.019)	-0.037* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.025 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.042)
Observations	365	360	365	365	365	360	360	360	160
Task	Accur	Accur	Accur	Accur	Accur	Accur	Shirk	Volun	Feedb
P-Val: Rep = Dem	.057					.095	.13	.2	.056

*Notes:* Task row specifies the task included for that regression. The dependent variable is the actual worker productivity at the given task [0,1]. The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. P-Val: Dem = Rep is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Democrat and Republican coefficients are equal. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A8:** Time

	Time (Seconds) Taken to Give Offer						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Independent	-0.028 (0.341)					-0.027 (0.341)	-0.082 (0.342)
Outpartisan	0.148 (0.380)					0.147 (0.380)	0.123 (0.380)
Black		-0.125 (0.335)				0.024 (0.411)	-0.111 (0.428)
4-Year Degree			0.269 (0.337)			0.314 (0.348)	0.209 (0.320)
Age 40-69				0.392 (0.340)		0.437 (0.397)	0.216 (0.414)
Female					-0.061 (0.311)	-0.129 (0.331)	-0.297 (0.328)
Observations	29999	29999	29999	29999	29999	29999	29999
Left-Out Group Mean	9.26	9.34	9.15	9.16	9.33	12.26	12.26
SD	26	26	26	26	26	26.1	26.1
Adj R-Square	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09
Participant FE	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
P-Val: Ind = Outp	0.64					0.64	0.59

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the time taken (in seconds) by the participant to submit a wage offer. The independent variables are indicators for worker characteristics. Outpartisan indicates the worker party affiliation is opposite the participant's. All estimations include task fixed effects. Participant FE indicates participant fixed effects were included. P-Val: Ind = Outp is the p-value for an intra-regression test that the Independent and Outpartisan coefficients are equal. Robust standard errors clustered at the participant level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure A1:** Examples of the receipts the workers transcribed (varied in legibility)



**Figure A2:** Hiring decision interface

You have completed 1 of 10 required profiles.

Worker Profile

Age: 19-39

Gender: Female

Race: White

Political Party: Independent

Education: College Degree

Location: United States

Enter the highest wage at which you'd be willing to hire this individual to accurately transcribe receipts and remember:

- Workers correctly transcribed 75% on average
- You maximize your bonus, on average, by **setting your highest wage equal to the percentage of receipts you believe this worker** transcribed accurately

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100


Highest wage you are willing to pay

28

→




**Figure A3:** Effect of Bonus by Polarization Quintile




Note: The Figure shows how the coefficient of the interaction of the worker payment treatment indicator and the outpartisan worker indicator varies across the affective polarization quintile. 95% confidence intervals are reported.

**Figure A4:** Effect of Productivity Beliefs by Party

**(a)** Democrats




**(b)** Republicans




*Notes:* The Figure shows how the outpartisan worker coefficient varies across the productivity belief difference quintile. 95% confidence intervals are reported..

**Figure A5:** Correlation Polarization and Productivity Beliefs




(a) Note: This binscatter plot shows the correlation of affective polarization and difference in productivity beliefs between the own party respondents affiliate with and the other party.

**Figure A6:** Remember Worker Traits Correctly




- (a) Note: The Figure shows the share of correct answers about what the previous worker profile displayed divided by the number of answer options presented. This measure thus captures the chance of correct answers relative to a random guess

**Figure A7:** Claim: What Worker Traits Affect Decisions




(a) Note: This figure measures what worker characteristics respondents claimed they focused on in their decision. Respondents could choose multiple traits.

**Figure A8:** Discrimination by whether people claim they focus on trait




(a) Note: This figure reports results from regressions in which we split the sample depending on whether respondents claim to focus on a given worker trait. The coefficients measure the effect of that trait on their wage decision.

**Figure A9:** Distribution Worker Traits Remembered: Correct vs. Guesses



(a) Note: This figure shows a simulated distribution of correct answers about worker traits (from previous profile) if guesses are purely random (red) and compare them to the distribution of actual correct answers (blue).

**Figure A10:** Effect: Remember vs. Not Remember Traits




- (a) Note: This figure reports results from regressions in which we split the sample depending on whether respondents remember traits correctly. The coefficients measure the effect of that trait on their wage decision.




**Figure A11:** Effect by Remembering Traits by Party

(a) Democrats




(b) Republicans



*Notes:* This figure reports results from regressions in which we split the sample depending on whether respondents remember traits correctly and by respondents party. The coefficients measure the effect of that trait on their wage decision. .

**Figure A12:** Difference in Productivity Beliefs by Party



(a) Note: This figure reports perceived productivity belief differences (in percentage points) between different worker characteristics. Above each group, we report the difference in beliefs and a p-value from a test of whether the coefficient is equal across members of respondents' political affiliation.