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# Working Paper Gender equality in organizational decisions in Spain: Are we making progress?

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# Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS



# Gender Equality in Organizational Decisions in Spain: Are We Making Progress?<sup>1</sup>

José Javier Domínguez<sup>2</sup>, Juan Antonio Lacomba<sup>3</sup>, Francisco Lagos<sup>4</sup> and Natalia Montinari<sup>5</sup>

**Abstract:** The underrepresentation of women in male-dominated labor markets is often linked to biased perceptions of their capabilities. In recent decades, Spain has advanced significantly in including women in political and economic roles. This study examines how these shifts impact perceptions of women's abilities and managerial decisions (i.e. hiring and task assignments). We conducted an online experiment with a representative sample of the Spanish population (N=806), focusing on the effects of age and gender. Results show either gender equality or positive discrimination favouring women. Additionally, age positively influences hiring decisions, likely due to shifting beliefs as workplace exposure to women increases. Evidence from a new Spanish sample (N=1,450) supports this mechanism through the contact hypothesis, indicating that increased exposure to women in the workplace reduces gender bias among older male employers. To test whether results are specific to Spain, we conducted a robustness check with a representative sample from Italy (N=1,450), a country with similar culture but differing gender equality trends. The findings were consistent. These age-related patterns underscore the importance of workplace characteristics in shaping employment decisions and offer insights for strategies to foster inclusion and reduce gender discrimination.

#### JEL classification: D03, C91, J71.

Key words: Hiring, Task Assignment, Gender, Equality, Age, Online Experiment, Spain, Contact hypothesis

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Correspondent Author: jjdominguez@ugr.es. Faculty of Economics and Business. Campus Universitario de La Cartuja 18071 Granada (Spain)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> University of Granada, Spain, jlacomba@ugr.es

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> University of Granada, Spain, fmlagos@ugr.es

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> University of Bologna, Italy, natalia.montinari2@unibo.it

#### **Non-Technical Summary**

This paper investigates how gender equality policies and societal attitudes influence hiring and task assignment decisions, focusing on Spain—a country recognized for its progressive gender equality policies. Using a controlled online experiment with 806 participants representative of the Spanish population, the study explores whether biases in evaluating women's abilities persist in a traditionally male-dominated domain: mathematics-related tasks. Additionally, it examines the influence of employers' age on their decision-making and perceptions of gender.

Participants were placed in the role of employers tasked with hiring workers for arithmetic tasks and assigning two employees to a more complex mathematical task. This experimental setup aimed to measure the presence of gender bias in hiring and promotion decisions. Surprisingly, the results suggest that overt discrimination against women is no longer prevalent in Spain. Instead, the study finds evidence of positive discrimination, particularly among older employers aged 55-65, who were more likely to favor female candidates for hiring and promotion compared to their younger counterparts.

The role of age in shaping perceptions emerges as a critical finding. Older employers appear to be influenced by their greater exposure to women in professional settings, supporting the "contact hypothesis." This theory suggests that increased interactions with women in the workplace reduce reliance on gender stereotypes, leading to more equitable or even favorable treatment. Conversely, younger participants displayed a tendency toward gender-neutral decisions, reflecting generational differences in how equality is enacted. While younger participants may value equal treatment, older individuals may lean toward compensatory favoritism, perhaps reflecting their awareness of historical biases against women.

To validate the findings, the researchers conducted a parallel experiment in Italy, a country with cultural similarities to Spain but different levels of gender equality. The results were consistent, highlighting the importance of workplace exposure and societal context in shaping gender-related attitudes. In both countries, the findings suggest that progress in gender equality policies may not eliminate biases but instead reshape them, with older generations sometimes compensating for perceived inequalities by favoring women.

This research offers significant insights into how policy, age, and societal attitudes interact to influence perceptions of women's abilities and decision-making in professional contexts. By focusing on Spain and drawing comparisons with Italy, the study sheds light on the mechanisms through which progressive gender policies can reshape biases, providing valuable guidance for designing effective interventions to promote inclusion in labor markets.

#### 1. Introduction.

The underrepresentation of women in male-dominated areas and in top positions has been a central topic of policy discussions in recent years. Some scholars argue that gender inequalities in the labor market, particularly in the political and economic domains, persist and have intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic (Alon et al., 2020; Deryugina et al., 2021). Over the past decade, a discernible pattern of differential treatment has been observed between similarly skilled men and women (i.e. statistical discrimination), as evidenced by a multitude of laboratory experiments (Reuben et al., 2014; Bohnet et al., 2015; Williams and Ceci, 2015; Heinz et al., 2016; Peterle and Rau, 2017; Babcock et al., 2017; Paryavi et al., 2021; Barron et al., 2022; Birkenlund et al., 2022).<sup>6</sup> In the field, empirical evidence has also shown that women are discriminated against when applying for male occupations (Riach and Rich, 2002; 2006; Carlsson, 2011; Rich, 2014). However, younger generations, such as Gen Z, are increasingly challenging traditional norms and actively promoting gender equality, reshaping expectations in both professional and social contexts (Twenge, 2023).

Recent developments in economic theory provide critical insights into gender dynamics within labor markets, particularly through frameworks like statistical discrimination and social role theory. Foundational theories on statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972) suggest that employers may rely on stereotypes about group averages, including gender, when making hiring decisions under uncertainty, perpetuating gender gaps if women are viewed as less suited to traditionally male-dominated roles. Claudia Goldin's work (2014) on the trajectory of women's labor market participation highlights that, while educational gains have increased opportunities for women, enduring structural and gender-based biases still limit their economic progress, especially in high-earning and leadership positions. Goldin emphasizes that even with parity in education, systemic constraints continue to shape women's economic outcomes.

Social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012) complements these ideas by explaining how occupational roles reinforce beliefs about gender-specific capabilities, shaping biases in hiring and promotion. Meanwhile, studies show that younger generations often advocate for workplace equality, actively influencing cultural norms around gender inclusivity in professional settings (World Economic Forum, 2023; UNDP, 2021). Although younger cohorts are frequently associated with progressive stances on gender roles (Twenge, 2023), age itself may also mitigate biases. For example, older evaluators, likely due to greater exposure to diverse workplaces, often demonstrate less reliance on gender stereotypes in evaluations (Zinovyeva & Bagues, 2011; Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vazquez, 2022). Additionally, theories in social cognition (Bordalo et al., 2016) suggest that stereotypes can act as cognitive shortcuts, often resulting in "confirmation bias," where evaluators unconsciously uphold pre-existing beliefs about gendered abilities in decision-making contexts. This theoretical framework underscores the persistence of gender biases in organizational decisions, offering a foundation for our study's analysis of age as a moderating factor in these biases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> As far as we know, Charness et al. (2020) is the only study that do not show gender discrimination in a hiring process. However, it can contain confounding evidence since applicants could select the gender to be shown to decision makers.

The generalized belief that women are less capable than men in specific environments often manifests as gender stereotypes, contributing to persistent gender gaps in labor market outcomes and reinforcing discriminatory behaviours. Research on decision-making for others has shown that individuals may apply different standards when making choices on behalf of others compared to decisions made for themselves, highlighting potential disparities in task delegation standards (Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2021). Additionally, studies indicate that characteristics of the evaluator, such as age, can shape the extent of these biases. For instance, Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) demonstrate that older, more experienced evaluators in academic promotion decisions exhibit fewer gender-based biases than younger evaluators. Similarly, Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2022) find that gender bias in applicant scoring varies across evaluator age groups, with a U-shaped pattern observed among female evaluators. These findings suggest that age and experience may influence evaluative behaviours, particularly in how gender stereotypes are applied. Research further shows that younger generations tend to endorse more progressive perspectives on gender roles and equity, which may influence these patterns (Black & Velázquez, 2021). These findings suggest that age and experience may influence evaluative behaviours, particularly in how gender stereotypes are applied. Nonetheless, the increasing integration of women into political, economic, and social spheres, coupled with rising public support for gender equality, suggests potential improvements in societal perceptions of women's capabilities in traditionally male-dominated fields, possibly mitigating these biases. Evidence from recent years even indicates a shift toward more inclusive gender stereotypes (Scarborough et al., 2019; Moya and Moya-Garófano, 2021). In this study, our goal is to reassess perceptions of women's capabilities in settings where gender inclusivity has advanced, potentially challenging previously held notions from past research. We examine age-based variations in these perceptions, aiming to reveal how attitudes and behaviours may differ across distinct age groups. Analyzing age-related trends, often intertwined with other demographic and socio-economic factors, offers valuable insights into the underlying dynamics influencing contemporary gender perceptions. Spain's recent advancements in gender equality make it an especially suitable context for investigating the dynamics of gender perceptions in labor markets. The country has enacted progressive policies to support gender parity, such as mandatory quotas introduced in 2007 for corporate board representation, requiring at least 40% female board members in certain sectors. These quotas, along with legislation for pay equity and comprehensive equality plans, have led to increased representation of women in high-level positions in both political and economic spheres (EIGE, 2022). Furthermore, Spain's Ministry of Equality, established in 2018, has accelerated efforts toward achieving parity, positioning the country as a leader in gender equality progress within Southern Europe. Compared to other Mediterranean countries with similar cultural values but slower progress, such as Italy, Spain's gender policies provide an ideal backdrop to explore how visible female representation influences societal beliefs about women's capabilities in the workplace.

We conduct an online experiment using a representative sample in Spain (N=806), where the involvement of women in decision-making bodies has experienced steady growth in recent years. Over the past decade, Spain has witnessed a growing inclusion of women in political, economic, and social spheres, aligning with trends

observed in other European countries. According to data from the European Institute of Gender Equality (EIGE), Spain holds the sixth position among European countries in the Gender Equality Index, scoring 74.6. This ranking places Spain behind Nordic countries and France. The Gender Equality Index considers six components: work, money, knowledge, time, power, and health. Figure 1 illustrates the temporal evolution of these index components.



**Figure 1.** Evolution of components of the Gender Equality Index. **Note:** The graph is own elaboration from European Institute of Gender Equality's data.

The graph highlights an upward trend in the *Power* component, which measures gender equality in high-level decision-making roles across political, economic, and social domains. Between 2010 and 2020, this component grew steadily, with an acceleration from 2018—parallel to the establishment of Spain's Ministry of Equality. This ministry has enacted several progressive policies recently aimed at reinforcing gender parity. Key policies include legislation for pay equity (Real Decreto 902/2020, October 2020), corporate equality plans (Real Decreto 901/2020, October 2020), and the comprehensive sexual freedom guarantee (Ley Orgánica 10/2022, September 2022). These changes culminated in a *Power* index increase to 80.6 points in 2020.

The *Power* metric aggregates indicators from multiple spheres: political (percentage of women in ministerial roles, parliament, and regional assemblies), economic (proportion of women on corporate boards and central bank boards), and social (representation in research funding bodies, broadcast networks, and sports organizations). For instance, women's representation on corporate boards grew from 10.3% in 2010 to 28.5% by 2020, and the share of women in Spain's central bank rose by 20 percentage points over the same period. Although representation in political domains was relatively stable, it consistently remained close to the 30%-50% range, underscoring steady female participation in political decision-making.

As illustrated in Figure A5 (Appendix A), the *Power* metric for Spain exhibits a robust upward trajectory compared to Mediterranean peers and the EU average, with Spain surpassing most except France, which

displayed a similar increase beginning in 2010. By 2020, Spain achieved parity with France, reaching an index score of 80.6, positioning it as a leader in gender equality progress in Southern Europe.

Our study experiment involved 806 subjects aged 18-65, representative of the Spanish population with respect to age and gender. All participating subjects acted as employers and had to take two sequential decisions: i) hiring six out of 15 candidates for an arithmetic task involving summing numbers, and ii) subsequently assigning two of the hired workers to a challenging task consisting in solving mathematical problems. These two tasks represent different situations of the labour environment. While the hiring decisions for an easy task such as adding numbers signal employability outcomes, the assignment to more complex tasks represent the access to higher positions, what also affects the pay gap. In both tasks employers were rewarded for based on the performance of the selected workers<sup>7</sup>. The arithmetic task has been regarded as a male-stereotyped task in prior studies (see, among others Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Before making choices, employers were provided with information about the candidates, including gender, age, and a signal of performance on the arithmetic task. This builds upon previous work by Dominguez and Montinari (2021) to comprehend how employers make hiring decisions and allocate workers to complex, more lucrative tasks in presence of a quota system, serving as a proxy for initiating career paths leading to leadership positions. We use the proportion of women hired and promoted for these tasks as an approximation for the actual impact of perceptions. We also incentivized questions regarding gender differences in performance for such tasks, serving as an implicit measure for real beliefs. We compare decisions and beliefs across five age groups, considering variables such as gender, level of studies, income, employment status, and political ideology of the decision makers in order to account for the heterogeneity of the population.

Contrary to the previous literature, our findings reveal signs of gender equality and positive discrimination toward women in Spain. Furthermore, we observe that positive discrimination tends to be more pronounced with age. Interestingly, even in the age group exhibiting a lower propensity for selecting women, the youngest one, we do not find discrimination against women. We attribute this pattern to the development of beliefs about relative ability of both genders over time. This age-related effect on beliefs is discernible specifically among male employers. These outcomes substantiate the hypothesis that the recent inclusion of women in traditionally male-dominated spheres in Spain could have positively influenced the perception of women's skills in settings where historical discrimination prevailed.

In order to understand the mechanisms driving our first result we further hypothesize that exposure to women in professional environments can reduce prejudicial attitudes, in line with the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck et al., 2019). To explore this, we conduct an additional analysis with a new representative sample of the Spanish population (N=1450) examining whether older individuals, having had more workplace

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> In the subsequent step, when employers were asked to assign two out of the six candidates selected in the previous stage to a more challenging mathematical task and the productivity of the selected employees was re-evaluated and the earnings of the employers, updated.

contact with women, show more equitable attitudes towards female candidates. Results from this analysis support the notion that increased interaction with women in professional settings positively affects male employers' decision-making toward female candidates, aligning with the contact hypothesis. Finally, to test the generalizability of these findings, we expand our analysis to include a representative sample from Italy (N=1175), a country with cultural similarities to Spain but differing trends in gender equality progress. The Italian data provides a valuable comparison, showing that while age-related trends in gender-inclusive decisions are consistent, regional variations exert minimal influence on the primary outcomes. Based on data from over 3,500 participants across Spain and Italy, our findings suggest that gender biases in hiring are mitigated through workplace exposure and generational shifts, underscoring the cross-country applicability of these effects.

Our study contributes to literature in several ways. Firstly, our findings indicate that shifts in gender perceptions within Spain's labor market are likely driven by workplace exposure and generational differences rather than broader societal changes alone. By incorporating data from Italy, a country with similar cultural characteristics yet differing trends in gender equality, we demonstrate that age-related trends in gender-inclusive decisions are robust across both contexts, highlighting that workplace experience with female colleagues plays a significant role in reducing gender bias. This opens new research avenues, particularly in exploring the mechanisms and contexts that drive shifts in attitudes in similar Southern European countries.

Secondly, our study highlights the influence of decision-makers' age on beliefs and choices in hiring and task assignment decisions. By integrating age into our analysis, we provide a more comprehensive investigation of the factors influencing employers' decisions, acknowledging how age-related perspectives shape labor market outcomes. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental study that places a primary focus on age differences among evaluators in hiring and task assignment decisions. While some prior studies have controlled for evaluator age, such as Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) and Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2022), these studies did not examine age as the central factor in moderating gender biases. By using representative age samples and emphasizing age-related differences, our study provides a unique perspective on how generational shifts influence attitudes toward gender roles and stereotypes in hiring contexts. Identifying these age-related patterns has important policy implications, as it can inform interventions aimed at fostering inclusivity and reducing discrimination across different age cohorts.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details experimental design and sample recruitment; Section 3 provides the results of the experiment; and Section 4 concludes.

#### 2. Method

We implemented an online experiment in which subjects played the role of employers and confronted a pool of 15 candidates. Employers were asked to make two sequential decisions: 1) a hiring decision, and 2) a task

assignment decision. The experimental instructions and screenshots of the decision environment are provided in the Appendix C.

#### 2.1. Hiring decisions.

The task for employers was to select six candidates out of a pool of 15 for a task known as the Simple Task (ST). This task required candidates to add as many combinations of three three-digit numbers as possible within six minutes. Employers were incentivized based on the performance of the selected candidates in the task, receiving 2 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) for each correct answer provided by each selected candidate. During the selection process, employers were provided with information regarding age, gender, and a signal of performance. The signal was determined by the number of correct calculations performed in the first three minutes of ST.

#### 2.2. Task assignment decisions.

The second decision made by employers involved assigning two candidates from the group of six selected in the first decision to the Challenging Task (CT). In the experiment, ST and CT were referred as Task 1 and Task 2, respectively. No clues about complexity or profitability were mentioned, but participants in the role of the employer could see the content of the two tasks and gain an idea of their complexity. Unlike the Simple Task (ST), the CT is more complex and offers higher profitability for employers. Candidates were required to solve as many mathematical problems as possible within 15 minutes, with employers earning 7 ECU for each problem correctly solved by each candidate assigned to the CT. The same information provided in the first decision was provided to the employers, except for the signal. Instead, employers were provided with the absolute productivity of candidates in the previous ST, which was determined by the total number of correct calculations made during the task's entire duration of six minutes.

#### 2.3. Repetitions.

Employers participated in four rounds, with each round featuring a different pool of candidates and requiring employers to make hiring and task assignment decisions. Pools were presented in random order. Subjects were informed that their final earnings would be determined by one of four rounds randomly selected by the computer. No information regarding selected candidates' productivity and earnings was displayed between rounds, and this information was only provided at the conclusion of the experiment.

#### 2.4. Candidates.

At the start of the experiment, employers were informed that the candidates were individuals who had participated in a previous experiment completing both the Simple Task (ST) and Challenging Task (CT), and getting paid on the basis of their performance. Information about the procedures of this experiment is provided in Appendix C. The pools of candidates shown to were composed to ensure that both men and women had the

same average signals. We consider the signal of performance the most important piece of information at the time to predict absolute performances when hiring candidates (Reuben et al., 2014).

Table A1 in Appendix A displays the candidate distribution and performance across pools, with signals ranging from three to eight in all pools. To test for the presence of statistical gender discrimination, we designed candidate pools such that men and women with similar signals within the same pool could be compared. If no bias exists, men and women should have equal aggregate opportunities of being hired across the pools. For example, for "Pool 1" displayed in Table A1 it can be noted how, among the best candidates (according to the signal) two men and two women had a signal of performance equal to eight, while two men and two women had a signal of performance equal to seven. We expect that employers will hire all four candidates with a signal equal to eight and then choose between the four candidates, one man and one woman with a signal equal to eight, one man and one woman with a signal equal to seven, and two men and two women with a signal equal to seven, and two men and two women with a signal equal to seven are expected to be hired, and employers will choose between all candidates with a signal equal to six for the remaining positions. "Pool 3" has the same distribution of signals as "Pool 2", but two women with a signal equal to eight and two men have a signal equal to eight and two men with a signal equal to seven are included. In contrast, in "Pool 4", two men have a signal equal to eight, and two women have a signal equal to seven.

For task assignment decisions, employers must assign two candidates (out of the six already hired) to CT. For this decision, employers observed the absolute productivity of candidates in ST, reported in Table A1. For example, in Pool 1, we expect that the two candidates assigned to CT will be among those whose signal of performance is equal to eight. Among these candidates, one woman has an absolute productivity in ST equal to 18 for which we expect that she will always be selected for CT. Then, one man and one woman have an absolute productivity of 17 and we assume that they will have a similar probability of being selected if no gender bias exists. In Pool 1, women should be more likely to be assigned to CT. In Pool 3, we assume that employers will select the candidate to be assigned to CT from those with signals equal to eight and seven. Of these four candidates, one man has an absolute productivity in ST of 17. A man and a woman have a performance in ST equal to 16, so they should be both hired. In this pool, contrary to Pool 1, men should be more likely to be selected for CT. In Pool 2 and Pool 4, one man and one woman present the highest productivities in ST (16 in Pool 2 and 17-16 in Pool 4) so men and women should be equally likely to be hired if no bias exist. Based on these reasonings (that is, if decisions are based on the total productivity of candidates in the ST), at the aggregate level and considering all pools together, we do not expect to observe a gender gap in task assignment decisions.

#### 2.5. Belief elicitation

At the conclusion of the decision game, we incentivized subjects' beliefs regarding the performance of female candidates compared to that of male candidates in the Challenging Task, which represents the most difficult task. Subjects were asked to report whether women in our sample of candidates were more, less or equally

productive than men in the Challenging Task. Subjects received 10 ECU based on the accuracy of their responses. In our sample, men were more productive (8.6 problems correctly submitted) than women (6.9) in the CT, although the difference is not statistically significant.

#### 2.6. Procedures and Sample.

The experiment was programmed using Qualtrics and conducted by the private company Bilendi (https://www.bilendi.es/) in charge of the recruitment of the subjects in November 2023. For each subject, instructions were included at the beginning of the study and subjects were informed that final payments would be relevant in only one randomly selected round. The average payment was 265 ECU. Each ECU was exchanged by 0.035 Euro at the end of the experiment. Additionally, we administered a post-experimental questionnaire that included socioeconomic inquiries.

The sample for this study comprises 806 subjects, categorized into five age groups that are representative of the age structure of Spain, as outlined by the INE (National Institute of Statistics). The sample is also representative with respect to gender. Table 1 provides a summary of the sample, illustrating the weight of each age group in the total sample and their representative weight in the Spanish population.

Age group	Male	Female	Total		% Sample	% Spain	p-value
18-24	28	52	80		9.93	11.13	0.277
25-34	62	79	141		17.49	17.32	0.896
35-44	113	103	216		26.80	22.80	0.007
45-54	103	95	198		24.57	25.38	0.595
55-65	88	83	171	_	21.22	23.38	0.146
	394	412	806	-	100.00	100.00	

**Table 1.** Sample composition: comparison with the Spanish Population.

**Note**: p-value report the difference between the observed proportion (% sample) and the representative proportion (% Spain). Only the 25-44 age group differ significantly from the representative proportion.

#### 2.7 Hypotheses.

Our study explores age as a moderating factor in gender-based perceptions within hiring and task assignment decisions, particularly considering the impact of increased exposure to women in professional contexts on biases in managerial decisions. Previous research has suggested that age may play a significant role in shaping perceptions of gender abilities, especially in environments historically biased toward male-dominated roles. Specifically, we hypothesize that:

### Hypothesis 1: Age and Gender Bias in Hiring Decisions.

The probability of female candidates being hired or assigned to complex tasks will increase with the employer's age, reflecting reduced gender bias among older employers.

Our first hypothesis is grounded in the understanding that age may influence hiring preferences in complex ways. On one hand, Claudia Goldin's (2014) research illustrates that while educational gains have reduced gender disparities, structural biases continue to restrict women's advancement, particularly in leadership roles. This aligns with the possibility that older employers, having observed shifts in societal norms and workplace dynamics over time, may be more inclined toward equitable practices. Social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012) also supports this view, suggesting that long-term exposure to evolving occupational roles could lead older employers to hold less stereotyped perceptions of gender capabilities. However, it is also plausible that younger generations, often associated with progressive views on gender equality (Twenge, 2023; World Economic Forum, 2023), may approach hiring with a more egalitarian mindset. Younger cohorts' advocacy for inclusivity, influenced by current cultural shifts and discussions on equity, could imply that they are less affected by traditional gender biases compared to their older counterparts. These contrasting perspectives indicate that it is not obvious a priori which direction age-related gender bias will take, as both generational openness to change and accumulated workplace experience could play significant roles.

Our second hypothesis builds on the first by examining the mechanisms that may explain why older generations with greater workplace experience display fewer gender biases in professional decision-making. Specifically, we draw from the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck et al., 2019), which posits that increased interaction with members of a different group—in this case, women in workplace settings—can lead to reduced prejudice and more equitable perceptions of the group's capabilities. Originally applied to ethnic groups, the contact hypothesis has been extended to various forms of intergroup relations, suggesting that frequent exposure to women in professional environments may foster more favorable views of women's capabilities. This hypothesis is further supported by studies such as those by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) and Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2022), which indicate that evaluators with greater experience, often associated with age, tend to rely less on gender-based stereotypes in their evaluations. These findings align with the idea that extended professional contact with women not only mitigates biases but may also increase the likelihood of equitable outcomes for female candidates in hiring and task assignment decisions.

#### Hypothesis 2: Contact Hypothesis and Gender Equality Perceptions

Greater workplace contact with women positively influences employers' evaluations of female candidates, reducing gender bias and enhancing the likelihood of women's success in hiring and task assignment decisions.

Our third hypothesis refers to the influence of individual beliefs on managerial decisions. Specifically, we examine the relationship between employers' beliefs about gender and their hiring and task assignment choices:

*Hypothesis 3*: Employers' beliefs about gender capabilities will significantly influence hiring decisions, particularly in the distribution of complex tasks, with those holding more gender-equitable beliefs exhibiting less discriminatory decision patterns.

We examine how employers' individual beliefs about gender capabilities influence their hiring and task assignment decisions, particularly in roles that are perceived as complex or demanding. This hypothesis is grounded in social cognition theories, which suggest that stereotypes can function as cognitive shortcuts, leading individuals to rely on pre-existing beliefs when making decisions (Bordalo et al., 2016). In the context of hiring, these beliefs may shape evaluations of candidates' suitability for certain tasks, with more gender-equitable beliefs promoting less biased decision patterns. Further, studies such as those by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2021) demonstrate that decision-making for others can involve the application of different standards, reflecting evaluators' own beliefs and biases. In line with this literature, our hypothesis proposes that employers with gender-equitable beliefs will be more likely to allocate complex tasks fairly, thereby reducing gender bias in both hiring and task assignments. By understanding how these individual beliefs shape managerial decisions, we can gain insight into the cognitive processes that underpin gender bias and explore how more equitable beliefs can lead to inclusive outcomes.

#### 3. Results

#### 3.1. Individual beliefs.

In the belief elicitation stage, we asked subjects to assess whether women in our candidate sample performed better than men in the Challenging task. An equal percentage of subjects reported that either female candidates performed better or equally to male candidates (41%), while 18% asserted that male candidates outperformed female candidates. Notably, we did not identify significant differences in beliefs based on gender of the respondents. Figure 2 provides a summary of elicited beliefs categorized by age groups and separately for each gender. We treat beliefs, reported on the y-axis- as a continuous variable, assigning a value of -1 if the subject believed that men outperformed women in CT, 0 if they believed both performed similarly, and 1 if they believed that women outperformed men. Consequently, a tendency toward zero indicates an absence of expected gender differences in performance, while positive or negative values indicate a better perception of women or men, respectively.

We observe divergent trends between men and women. For male employers (on the right panel), there is a positive age-related trend favoring female candidates. Except for the youngest age group, all other age groups exhibit positive values. Subjects aged 18-24 display a tendency toward a more favorable evaluation of male candidates. Significantly, the only discernible differences among men are observed when comparing the youngest group (18-24) to the two oldest groups (18-24 vs 45-54: Mann-Whitney Z=-2.842, p=0.004; and 18-24 vs 55-65: Z=-3.068, p=0.002). Conversely, for female employers, positive values in favor of female candidates are evident across all age groups. However, the trend is negative, signifying that the older the female employer, the less likely they are to believe that women outperformed men in the CT. Nevertheless, these differences among age groups do not achieve statistical significance.



Figure 2. Beliefs of female candidates' capabilities by age group.

Table 2 reports the marginal effects from asset of regression of the probability of believing that women are equally or more productive than men on several independent variables associated with employers' characteristics, utilizing both continuous and categorical measures for age. In Model (1), no variable beyond age significantly impacts subjects' beliefs. Age presents a significant relationship with believing that women are at least as good as men. Model (2), which introduces an interaction between the continuous measure of age and gender, reveals the gender differences observed previously. While age seems to exert a non-significant effect on the beliefs of women, captured by the coefficient *Age*, the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that the older the male employer, the more favorable their perception of female candidates compared to male candidates. This observation is corroborated in models (4) and (5), where we treat age as a categorical variable. In model (4), referring to the female sample, there are no significant differences between any age group and the references group (18-24 years old). We do observe a positive trend with age among our male sample in model (5). Men exhibit a higher probability of believing that women are at least as good as men as age increases monotonically.

All age categories suppose a positive difference with respect the youngest age group. Additionally, such effect is higher as age increases, looking at the size of the coefficients. This result has two important implications: 1) most participants in the sample hold a positive view in favor of women, what opposes previous evidence in male-stereotyped environments, and 2) age presents a positive and increasing effect, with older generations holding a more positive evaluation of women, although this is only true among men. Our findings are summarized in Result 1.

**Result 1– Individual beliefs:** Most of the sample hold a positive view in favor of women. As men age, their perception of female candidates relative to male candidates improves monotonically. Women do not present significant age differences in beliefs.

Dependent variable:		Pr (E	Beliefs: Women	>=Men) =1	
Estimation technique:			Probit regres	sion	
Population:	All	All	All	Women	Men
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age (cont.)	0.002*	-0.001			
	(0.001)	(0.002)			
Male	-0.030	-0.297**	-0.029		
	(0.028)	(0.095)	(0.028)		
Age x Male		0.006**			
		(0.002)			
25-34			0.066	-0.071	0.328**
			(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.113)
35-44			0.066	-0.103	0.361**
			(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.110)
45-54			0.106	-0.064	0.404**
			(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.107)
55-65			0.115*	-0.088	0.449**
			(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.106)
Education (1-6)	0.013	0.011	0.013	-0.001	0.028
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Worker	-0.024	-0.022	-0.030	-0.062	0.008
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.061)
Self-employed	0.084	0.084	0.079	0.033	0.121
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Income (1-6)	0.025	0.021	0.024	0.076**	-0.023
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Extreme-right (1-5)	-0.020	-0.016	-0.020	-0.003	-0.025
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Observations	806	806	806	412	394

#### 3.2. Age trend in hiring and task assignment decisions.

In order to understand whether individual beliefs translate into managerial decisions, we analyze hiring and task assignment stages of our experiment. While female candidates constitute 50% of the overall candidate pool, they make up 53% of the hired candidates (Binomial test p=0.000) and 54% of those assigned to the Challenging Task (Binomial test: p=0.000). Notably, this suggests signs of positive gender discrimination in favor of women within our participants. This observation is consistent across a set of different variables associated with employers.

Table 3 presents the proportion of women hired and assigned to the Challenging Task by age group, gender, level of education, income, employment status, and ideology of the employers. In the cases of subjects aged 18-34, students, low-income and extreme-right ideology, the percentage of women hired and assigned to CT, does not significantly exceed 50%. This indicates equality in the decisions. In these groups, female and male candidates are equally treated. In the remaining subgroups, positive discrimination toward women is observed. Notably, this positive discrimination is evident in the categories of subjects aged 55-65 (Binomial test hiring: p=0.000, assignment to CT: p=0.000), and individuals with higher studies (Binomial test hiring: p=0.000; assignment to CT: p=0.000). An interesting observation pertains to the results based on ideology. While subjects self-identifying as left-wing exhibit positive discrimination among those identifying as right-wing (Binomial test hiring p=0.001; assignment to CT p=671), traditionally considered resistant to gender-related issues in recent years (Graff et al., 2019). Lastly, we find the same age pattern in both men and women. For subjects 18-34 years old, the treatment towards women is similar to that toward men, while older subjects make decisions in which women are more benefitted than men.

	Ν	Hiring for ST	p-value	Assignment to CT	p-value
		A. Age	tendency		
All					
18-24	80	0.495	0.698	0.497	0.905
25-34	142	0.509	0.280	0.521	0.163
35-44	216	0.533	0.001	0.543	0.001
45-54	198	0.532	0.001	0.542	0.001
55-65	171	0.559	0.000	0.581	0.000
Men					
18-24	28	0.465	0.082	0.459	0.255
25-34	62	0.483	0.203	0.493	0.822
35-44	113	0.516	0.094	0.517	0.302
45-54	103	0.526	0.009	0.538	0.028
55-65	88	0.576	0.000	0.586	0.001
Women					
18-24	52	0.511	0.444	0.516	0.523
25-34	79	0.529	0.012	0.544	0.028
35-44	103	0.552	0.000	0.570	0.000
45-54	95	0.537	0.001	0.544	0.015
55-65	83	0.540	0.001	0.575	0.001
		B. Other cl	naracteristics		
Gender					
Female	412	0.537	0.000	0.554	0.000
Male	394	0.524	0.001	0.531	0.001
Studies					
Primary studies	63	0.522	0.094	0.506	0.823
Middle studies	309	0.525	0.001	0.536	0.001
Higher studies	435	0.536	0.000	0.552	0.000

**Table 3.** Proportion of female candidates hired for ST and assigned to CT depending on employers' characteristics.

Monthly income					
<1000	183	0.518	0.020	0.533	0.013
1000-2000	380	0.530	0.000	0.541	0.001
2001-3000	174	0.547	0.000	0.561	0.001
>3000	70	0.524	0.048	0.527	0.220
Employment status					
Unemployed	142	0.523	0.008	0.534	0.022
Student	48	0.499	0.976	0.487	0.646
Employee	556	0.534	0.000	0.550	0.000
Self-employed	61	0.539	0.003	0.537	0.113
Ideology					
Extreme left	69	0.543	0.001	0.571	0.001
Center-left	305	0.542	0.000	0.552	0.000
Center	238	0.519	0.003	0.534	0.003
Center-right	161	0.526	0.001	0.530	0.031
Extreme right	34	0.504	0.861	0.515	0.671

**Note:** P-values correspond to two-sided binomial tests that check whether the proportions are statistically different to 50%.

The positive age trend in female candidates' proportion of hiring and assignment to CT is also observed within other employers' characteristics. Figure 3a and Figure 3b provide a summary of the proportion of women hired for ST and assigned to CT, respectively, by age within ideology, gender and education.<sup>8</sup>



Figure 3a. Proportion of women hired for ST by age group.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Note that some subcategories have been pooled for simplicity. Figures 3a and 3b are replicated using other categories such as income, employment status and beliefs in Figures 2a and 2b in the Appendix A.



Figure 3b. Proportion of women assigned to CT by age group.

For a more rigorous analysis, Table 4a employs regression models to evaluate the influence of various characteristics of both the employer and the candidates on the probability of female candidates being hired in each pool for ST and assigned to CT. The independent variables include age (continuously), gender, level of education, employment status, income level, ideology, and beliefs. The marginal effects of these models are presented in Table 4a. We use bivariate probit regression models that estimates the probability of being hired (Hiring) and assigned to CT (Task) jointly, to address the dependence of both decisions (rho=1.000). For each model, we estimate the equations for hiring and assignment to CT separately (models 1-2, 4-5, 7-8) and jointly (models 3, 6 and 9).

Model (1) shows that three factors significantly affect the probability of women being hired. Age and Education level positively affects it and political ideology, especially the closest to extreme-right, negatively affects it. The set of variables representing candidate's characteristics (signal-based ranking and age) also impact such probability. This observation is replicated for both the equation relative to the assignment to CT (model 2) and the joint equation (model 3). Models (4)-(6) include an interaction between employers' age and gender with the intention to address age effects separately for male and female employers. Again, the results are replicated in all three equations. Estimations present a positive and significant effect of *Age*, suggesting that the older the female employer, the higher the probability of female candidates being both hired (model 4) and assigned to the most complex task (model 5) separately, and jointly (model 6). The interaction *Age x Male* presents a positive and significant effect. This indicates that, in comparison to female employers, the relationship between age and male employers is even more pronounced. The linear combination of both coefficients (Age + Age x Male =0.001\*\*\*) represents the net effect of male employers' age on the dependent variable. As a robustness check, models (7)-(9) control for individual beliefs (the higher the value, the higher the preference for women). Results

in previous models are corroborated. <sup>9</sup> Finally, we also observe how other employers' characteristics affect the decisions referent to female candidates. In all models, the effect educational level is positively associated with a better evaluation of women. Political ideology also affects such decisions. The closest to extreme-right ideology, the lowest the probability of success of female candidates. This effect is not particular of any gender, as suggested by the interaction *Extreme-right x Male* in models 4-9.

Table 4a. The effect of age	on female candidates'	probability of hiring	g and assignment to	o CT: marginal effects
			8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Estimation technique:				Bivaria	te probit reg	ression:			
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age (cont.)	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.006	-0.003	-0.003	-0.038**	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.031*	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age x Male				0.001**	0.000*	0.000*	0.001*	0.000	0.000
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Extreme right x Male				0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
				(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003*	0.001*	0.001*	0.003*	0.001*	0.001*	0.003	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	0.007	0.003*	0.003*	0.008*	0.004*	0.004*	0.008*	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self-employed	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income (1-6)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favour of women	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***
							(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360
Number of employers	806	806	806	806	806	806	806	806	806
Rho			1,000			1,000			1,000

**Note:** Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). For models 4-9, we summarize the effect of the interactions. Age + Age x Male = 0,001\*\*\* for all models. Extreme right + Extreme-right x Male = -0,003 for models 4 and 7; Extreme-right + Extreme-right x Male=-0,002 for models 5, 6, 8 and 9. Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> As a robustness check for the results in Table 4a, we perform three additional analyses in Appendix A. First, Table A2 estimates the probability of women being hired and the probability of women being assigned to CT separately by using simple probit regression models. Second, since this study uses a representative sample of Spain, Table A3 replicates Table 4a using the command *svy* in Stata, instead of individual cluster, to account for the weight each individual has over the representative sample. Table A3c reproduces the weight assigned to each individual. Finally, Table A4 replicates models 1-3 in table 4a splitting the sample by gender.

To account for generational effects, Table 4b treats age as a categorical variable. Again, results replicate in the estimations of the hiring and task assignment decisions as well as the joint estimations. Models (1)-(3) estimate the effects for the overall sample. With respect to the youngest age group (18-24), the probability of women being hired and assigned to CT increase from the group 35-44 years old, with the marginal effects suggesting a monotonic effect from such age group. That is, the chances of female candidates increase by 1.3% if employers belong to the age group 35-44, by 1.4% if age group 45-54 and by 2.7% if age group 55-65, with respect to the youngest age group. However, we find different trends by employers' gender. On one hand, we observe among female employers (models 4-6) that only the age groups 35-44 and 55-65, at the same rate, significantly and positively affect the chances of female candidates. Regarding male employers (models 7-9), only the oldest age group significantly differ (positively) from the youngest age group.<sup>10</sup>

Estimation technique:					Bivariate	probit reg	ression			
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint		Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Population		All				Women			Men	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	_	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
25-34	0.003	0.001	0.001		0.007	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
35-44	0.013**	0.005*	0.005*		0.017**	0.007**	0.007**	0.011	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
45-54	0.014*	0.006*	0.006*		0.012	0.005	0.005	0.015	0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
55-65	0.027***	0.012***	0.012***		0.017**	0.008**	0.008**	0.038***	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360		24,720	24,720	24,720	23,640	23,640	23,640
Number of employers	806	806	806		412	412	412	394	394	394
Rho			1,000				1,000			1,000

Table 4b. The effect of age on managerial decisions: marginal effects.

**Note:** All models control for both candidates' and employers' characteristics similar to Table 4a. Complete estimations can be found in Table A5 in Appendix A. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.5.

Our focus now shifts to an in-depth analysis of the magnitude of the decisions made by each age group. To determine whether employers statistically discriminate (either positively or negatively) between genders, we examine the differences in the probability of being hired between male and female candidates when they exhibit similar signals of productivity. Hiring decisions were not exclusively influenced by employers' age; indeed, a positive correlation existed between the candidate's signal of productivity in the Simple Task and the frequency

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> As a robustness check, we perform the analysis in Table 4b varying the size of the age groups in Table A6 in Appendix A.

of candidate selection (Spearman's rho=0.717, p=0.000). This is also consistent with the findings in Table 4a. Figure 4 illustrates, for each age group, the probability of women being hired compared to that of men for each level of signal of performance (reported on the y-axis).<sup>11</sup>



Figure 4. Statistical discrimination by employers' age and gender.

**Note:** This figure shows, for each level of signal (y-axis) and for each age group, the difference between the probability of women being hired with respect to the probability of men belonging to the same pool and holding a similar level of signal. The y-axis represents different categories according to the signal. Importantly, in the case where there is more than one man sharing ability with women in each pool, their probability is compared to the mean probability of all men in her pool that have the same level of ability. Probability was estimated by dividing the number of times that each candidate was hired (in each age group) by the total number of employers (in each age group).

For the maximum signal of performance (i.e. signal equal to 8), Figure 4 depicts a consistent, an upward trend in the probability of female candidates being hired with age compared to similar male candidates, with male employers presenting a monotonic increase. This indicates an overall positive discrimination toward women, except in the youngest age group of women and the two youngest groups of men where employers statistically discriminate against women. This pattern persists among men when evaluating candidates with signals equal to 6. In the case of women, when evaluating candidates with signal equal to 6, we find no discrimination against women. Unexpectedly, we observe a reversal in the trend among the oldest employers (irrespective of gender) when evaluating candidates with a signal equal to 7, displaying a negative bias toward female candidates. This observation suggests the possibility of distinct strategies used by employers who prioritize gender equality in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Figure A3 in Appendix A represents the general overview of the probability of women being hired with respect men, without distinctions by employers' gender.

decision environments. Specifically, if employers believe that female candidates are more productive than male candidates in this type of task, the probability of women being hired tends to be higher than that of men when candidates have the highest signal. However, in an effort to maintain gender equality, employers might hire more male candidates in the subsequent signal to compensate the higher number of female candidates hired earlier. These findings are corroborated by regression models in table A7 in Appendix A.

The results in this section have three implications. First, age plays a converse role as expected in our initial hypothesis. For both male and female employers, the older the subject, the higher the probabilities of success of female candidates in labor market. However, the effects seem to be non-monotonic, what is attributed just to disparities between the youngest and oldest age groups. Second, beyond the effect of age on female candidates, we also confirm that female candidates, in comparison to male candidates, are only discriminated against in the youngest age group, being positively discriminated against in older age groups. This finding stands in contrast to previous experimental evidence in male-stereotyped tasks (Domínguez and Montinari, 2021). Third, it is important to highlight similarities and disparities between managerial decisions and individual beliefs. We find that among male employers, individual beliefs and managerial decisions follow the same path, from negative discrimination in the 18-24 years old group to positive discrimination in the 55-65 age group. In other words, male employers' individual beliefs translate into managerial decisions. In contrast, this is not observed among female employers. Our findings for this section are summarized in Result 2.

**Result 2** – **Managerial decisions:** *We observe a positive age trend in the probability of female candidates being hired and assigned to CT. This trend is explained by distinctions between the youngest and oldest age groups. While the youngest group exhibits a tendency to discriminate against women, the oldest group shows the highest disposition to select female candidates.* 

#### 3.3. Mechanism: Contact hypothesis.

To understand why an opposite age trend than expected is observed, and why this is driven by differences between the youngest and the oldest age groups, we conducted a second, online experiment with a different sample. From a labor market perspective, our results might be reasonable if we consider that older generations, particularly those aged 55-65, have more work experience and have had more opportunities to collaborate with women. This would allow them to better evaluate women's capabilities in comparison to men. If workplace experience enables individuals to realize that men and women do not differ significantly in terms of performance, it becomes logical that older generations hold more favorable views of women than younger individuals, who may have had less workplace interaction with women. This argument aligns with the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck et al., 2019) evidenced in hypothesis 2, which suggests that greater interaction with members of other groups—commonly applied to ethnic groups—reduces prejudice toward that group.

We divided the new experiment into two parts. First, in line with the approach of DellaVigna and Pope (2018), we asked a new sample representative of Spain to forecast the proportion of female candidates hired and assigned to CT by each age group in our main experiment. We implemented three treatments: (1) No Anchor, where no information was provided (N=492; 248 females, 244 males); (2) Young Anchor, where the proportion of female candidates hired and assigned to CT by the 18-24 age group was provided (N=476, 248 females, 228 males); and (3) Old Anchor, where the proportion of female candidates hired and assigned to CT by the 18-24 age group was provided (N=482, 263 females, 219 males). Second, we conducted a survey in which participants responded to a series of questions related to socioeconomic factors, their opinions on gender equality in their country, and the level of contact they have with women in both their workplace and personal life. Instructions, the complete survey and sample selection can be found in Appendix C. With this new data, we aim to achieve two objectives: (1) to confirm whether older participants had more workplace contact with women compared to younger participants, and (2) to evaluate whether greater contact with women influences labor market decisions, particularly the absence of gender discrimination in managerial decision-making.

In Table 5a, we regress the probability of subjects reporting that, in the workplace, they had at least the same amount of contact with men as with women (models 1-4). In the survey, participants had to choose between three options: (1) more contact with men, (2) equal contact with men and women, and (3) more contact with women. The same question was asked regarding their general life (outside of the workplace), and the results are similarly regressed in models (5-8) in Table 5a. Figure A4 provides the summary statistics for these questions. We control for different characteristics of the subjects, such as position, sector, ideology, education, responsibility and number of workers in their firm and income.

Models (1) and (2) suggest that being male, working in the private sector, or holding positions as executives, entrepreneurs, or white-collar workers negatively affects the probability of having at least the same level of contact with women in the workplace. Additionally, age is not a significant predictor of such contact. However, since we are analyzing workplace contact, it seems more appropriate to focus only on individuals who are employed or self-employed (models 3-4). By doing so, we exclude subjects from the youngest age group who are students and have no labor market experience. In these adjusted models, the negative impact of being an executive, entrepreneur, or white-collar worker remains, but in this case, age becomes a significant and positive factor. Specifically, older individuals are more likely to report having at least the same level of contact with both men and women (model 3). Furthermore, model (4) shows that this positive effect of age applies to both women (Age coefficient) and men (Age × Male), as the interaction term is not significantly different from the effect of age. Additionally, models (3) and (4) reveal that the number of workers in the firm and the level of education are positively associated with the likelihood of workplace contact with women in general life (outside of the workplace). In both the overall sample (models 5-6) and among only employed individuals (models 7-8), age is not a significant predictor of contact with women in real life.

Dependent variable:		Pr (FCV	Vork)=1			Pr (FC	Life)=1	
Estimation technique:		(	,	Probit r	egression	(	,	
Population	А	.11	Empl	oved	A	1	Empl	oved
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Male	-0.151***	-0.240**	-0.157***	-0.138	-0.160***	-0.175*	-0.139***	-0.163
	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.031)	(0.102)	(0.024)	(0.069)	(0.029)	(0.096)
Age	0.001	0.000	0.004**	0.004*	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001
-	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Age x Male		0.002		-0.000		0.000		0.001
2		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Education	0.010	0.010	0.033*	0.033*	0.015	0.015	0.023*	0.023
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Worker	0.062	0.064			-0.012	-0.011		
	(0.034)	(0.034)			(0.030)	(0.030)		
Self-employed	0.044	0.046	0.026	0.026	-0.045	-0.044	-0.011	-0.010
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Public sector	-0.102	-0.103	-0.030	-0.030	0.075	0.075	0.018	0.018
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Private Sector	-0.155*	-0.156*	-0.121	-0.121	0.025	0.025	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Number of workers	0.022	0.021	0.044**	0.044**	-0.001	-0.002	0.008	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Executive	-0.230***	-0.233***	-0.190*	-0.190*	0.044	0.044	0.058	0.058
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Other official	-0.153**	-0.153**	-0.127	-0.127	-0.047	-0.047	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Human Resources Manager	-0.100	-0.102	-0.045	-0.045	-0.065	-0.065	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Entrepreneur	-0.265**	-0.264**	-0.233*	-0.232*	-0.089	-0.089	-0.088	-0.089
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.108)
White-collar	-0.163***	-0.160***	-0.114*	-0.114*	0.010	0.011	0.035	0.035
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Other	-0.140**	-0.137**	-0.099	-0.099	-0.035	-0.035	0.059	0.059
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Extreme-right	-0.011	-0.010	-0.024	-0.024	-0.009	-0.008	-0.013	-0.013
2	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income	-0.030	-0.029	-0.041*	-0.041*	0.001	0.001	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Observations	1,448	1,448	1,004	1,004	1,448	1,448	1,004	1,004
					-		-	

Table 5a. Female contact in work and life: age continuous.

**Note:** This table regresses the probability of subjects reporting having at least the same contact with females than with males (or more) in either the work environment (FCWork) or general life (FCLife). All models control for work sector. See complete estimations in table A8 in Appendix A. For models 2, 4,6 and 8, we summarize the effect of the interactions. Age + Age x Male =  $0,002^{**}$  for 2,  $0.0.3^{*}$  for model 3, 0.02 for model 6 and 0.02 for model 8. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.

In Table 5b, we further explore generational effects. We observe that the positive impact of age on workplace contact with women among employed individuals is primarily driven by differences between the youngest age group (18-24) and the oldest age group (55-65) for both female (model 3) and male participants (model 4). For employed men, we also identify earlier generational differences, as significant deviations from the youngest age group are already significant in the 45-54 age group. Models (5)-(8) confirm that no clear generational effects are present when female contact is measured in general life outside the workplace.

Dependent variable:	Pr (FCW)=1 Pr (FCL)=1							
Estimation technique:				ression				
Population	1	All	Emp	oloyed	А	11	Employed	
	Women Men		Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
25-34	0.005	0.226**	0.053	0.266**	-0.045	0.087	-0.076	0.092
	(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.044)	(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.082)
35-44	0.067	0.125	0.162*	0.175	-0.048	0.043	-0.047	0.085
	(0.049)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.090)	(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.057)	(0.084)
45-54	0.024	0.261***	0.117	0.330***	-0.022	0.031	-0.034	0.073
	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.049)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.082)
55-65	0.007	0.118	0.174*	0.212*	0.035	0.083	0.024	0.117
	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.097)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.088)
Observations	757	691	511	485	757	691	511	491
<b>Note:</b> This table regresses the probability of subjects reporting having more or equal contact with females than with males in either the work environment (ECW) or general life (ECL). All models control for work sector. All models								

control for employers' characteristics similar to Table 5a. See complete estimations in table A9 in Appendix A.

Table 5b. Female contact in work and life: age categorical.

Our findings so far can be summarized in result 3.

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.

**Result 3 - Female contact:** The oldest generation (55-65 years old) report a higher contact with women at the workplace than the youngest generation (18-24 years old). No age difference exists regarding female contact in general life.

Finally, we aim to examine the correlation between female contact and managerial decisions to determine whether the (gender) contact hypothesis could account for the generational differences observed in this context. To do so, we approximate the decisions made in the main experiment using forecasts from the survey. Participants are categorized based on their forecast of the proportion of women hired and assigned to CT by individuals from the same age cohort, distinguishing whether this forecast is above or below 50%.

In Table 6, we regress the probability that survey participants predict individuals from the same-age cohort in the main experiment hired 50% or more female candidates. We include a continuous variable representing female contact in the workplace, ranging from 1 to 3, where higher values indicate greater contact with women. In a similar way we also use female contact in general life. In this table, we find limited significant effects on the dependent variable. However, models (3) and (6), both relative to men, indicate that workplace contact with women positively influences the likelihood of predicting a female hiring rate of at least 50%. In other words, the greater the workplace contact with women, the more likely individuals are to believe that female candidates are hired at equal or higher rates compared to male candidates. Notably, contact with women in general life does not significantly affect this probability, further reinforcing the robustness of our mechanism. Table A11 in Appendix A uses the ask assignment forecasts as the dependent variable, confirming the results from Table 6.

Dependent variable:		Pr	(% women hi	red > =50%) =	1					
Estimation technique:			Probit re	gression						
Population:	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men				
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Male	0.061*			0.056	~ /					
	(0.030)			(0.031)						
Age	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.001	-0.001				
-	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)				
Female contact work	0.001	-0.040	0.066*	0.003	-0.044	0.067*				
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.033)				
% female contact work	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Female contact life	0.007	0.051	-0.045	0.003	0.038	-0.039				
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.030)				
% female contact life	0.002*	0.002	0.002	0.002*	0.002	0.001				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Education	-0.022	-0.013	-0.036	-0.022	-0.014	-0.030				
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)				
Worker	-0.068	-0.124*	-0.044	-0.065	-0.116*	-0.029				
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.055)				
Entrepreneur	-0.009	-0.048	-0.010	-0.011	-0.057	-0.010				
-	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.096)				
Public sector	-0.115	-0.233*	0.197	-0.083	-0.199	0.235				
	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.174)	(0.089)	(0.105)	(0.176)				
Private Sector	-0.168*	-0.241*	0.111	-0.135	-0.202	0.146				
	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.172)	(0.088)	(0.104)	(0.174)				
Number workers	0.000	0.025	-0.020	-0.003	0.025	-0.025				
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)				
	(0.076)	(0.129)	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.131)	(0.101)				
Right-wing	-0.005	-0.006	-0.001	0.004	-0.003	0.017				
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)				
Income	-0.006	-0.012	0.010	-0.005	-0.017	0.004				
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.027)				
Young Anchor	0.054	0.019	0.068	0.055	0.020	0.060				
	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.049)				
Old Anchor	0.166***	0.176***	0.136**	0.167***	0.181***	0.144**				
	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.049)				
				(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.018)				
Gendered-beliefs				Vec	Vec	Vec				
Observations	1 423	742	681	1 423	yes 742	681				
	1,725	1 .	1 4 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	/ 72	4 500/ 6				
female candidates All models of	<b>Note:</b> This table regresses the probability of guessing that same-age cohort subjects hired, on average, more than 50% of									
derived from the administered ou	estionnaire please	refer to Table	$\Delta 12$ in the $\Delta n$	nendix Compl	ete estimatione	are presented				
in Table A10 in the Appendix. S	tandard errors in p	arentheses. ***	p<0.001, **	p<0.01, * p<0.0	05.	are presented				

Table 6. Contact hypothesis: relationship between contact and decisions.

At this point, some key implications emerge. First, both men and women report increased contact with women in the workplace as they age, suggesting that older generations may have better information about women's abilities. Additionally, we evidence that such female contact in the workplace positively affects the probability of women being hired potentially. However, this effect is observed only among men, which aligns with the development of individual beliefs and the hiring and task assignment decisions made by men in the main experiment. Result 4 summarizes our findings: **Result 4 – Contact hypothesis:** *We find evidence on female contact positively influencing decisions that benefit female candidates in hiring processes.* This is true only for male individuals.

#### 3.4. Robustness checks: Regional Analysis

In this section, we investigate whether the observed differences in hiring and task assignment might be influenced by Spain's recent performance in terms of gender equality. To test this, we replicated the experiment with a representative sample of 1,175 Italian subjects. Spain and Italy share cultural and economic similarities as Mediterranean countries, facing parallel challenges in achieving gender equality due to historically traditional views on gender roles. However, Spain has made significant progress in recent years, surpassing Italy in several gender equality indicators. According to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), Spain consistently ranks higher than Italy in areas like women's labor force participation, political representation, and genderbalanced decision-making in both public and private sectors (EIGE, 2022). For example, Spain implemented a 40% gender quota law for corporate boards in 2007, leading to greater female representation in leadership positions. Italy introduced similar quotas later, in 2011, but with comparatively less impact on overall gender equality in the workplace (EIGE, 2022). Academic research supports these findings, noting that Spain's proactive gender policies have fostered a more gender-inclusive labor market. Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) find that gender quotas in Spain positively influenced the performance and diversity of corporate boards. Meanwhile, Del Boca and Locatelli (2006) point out that while Italy has made strides, traditional family structures and lower public investment in childcare contribute to persistent gender gaps in labor market outcomes. Spain's broader social policies, such as expanded parental leave and childcare services, also contribute to higher female labor force participation and serve as additional supports for gender equality (OECD, 2020). These differences provide a valuable comparative context for our study, enabling us to explore how varying levels of gender equality progress influence managerial decisions and gender perceptions in similar, culturally related countries. Detailed information about the sample selection and experimental procedures can be found in Appendix C. Tables 7a and 7b present analyses equivalent to those in Tables 4a and 4b, now applied to the Italian population.

Table 7a reveals that age positively influences the proportion of women hired and assigned to CT positions (model 3). This positive age trend holds for both female and male employers, but the effect is only significant during the hiring stage (models 4 and 7), as demonstrated by the coefficients for *Age* and the interaction term *Age* × *Male*. This indicates that older employers, regardless of gender, tend to hire a higher proportion of women. However, the positive impact of age on task assignment is not significant, as reflected in models 5, 6, 8, and 9, suggesting that while age plays a role in hiring decisions, it may not influence the distribution of tasks in the same way. When we examine generational effects, Table 7b uses age as a categorical variable to explore differences across age groups. Consistent with the results from the Spanish sample, we find that in both the hiring and task assignment stages, the oldest age group (55-65) is more likely to hire and assign women to CT roles compared to the youngest group (18-24). This pattern is observed in the overall population (models 1-3), as well as when analyzing female (models 4-6) and male employers (models 7-9) separately. It is important to

note that differences also exist between the 18-24 and 45-55 age groups in the hiring process (model 1), and these differences are primarily driven by female employers (model 4). However, when it comes to task assignment, the age-related differences among women (model 5) and among men (model 8) are not statistically significant. This lack of significance in the task assignment stage may help explain why the continuous effect of age observed in Table 7a for task assignment is also not significant.

Estimation technique:		Bivaria	te probit reg	ression: Pr (l	Female&Hir	ing) =1 & Pi	r (Female&T	Task) =1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age (cont.)	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.031**	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.023*	-0.010*	-0.010*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age x Male				0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006***	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.006**	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Extreme right x Male				0.007**	0.002	0.002	0.006*	0.002	0.002
				(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self-employed	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001
1 2	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income (1-6)	-0.006***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.005***	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favor of	. ,	· · · ·							
women							0.013***	0.007***	0.007***
							(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	70,500	70.500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500
Number of employers	1.175	1.175	1.175	1.175	1.175	1.175	1.175	1.175	1.175
Rho	-,	-,	-,	-,	-,	1,000	- ,	- ,	1,000

Table 7a. The effect of age on managerial decisions in Italy: marginal effects.

**Note:** Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). For models 4-9, we summarize the effect of the interactions. Age + Age x Male = 0,001\*\*\* for all models. Extreme right + Extreme-right x Male =0,001 for all models. Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.5.

	U	U		2	U				
Estimation technique:		Bivariate	probit regres	sion: Pr (Fema	le&Hiring)	) =1 & Pr (1	Female&Task	x) =1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Population		All			Women			Men	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
25-34	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
35-44	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
45-54	0.010**	0.003	0.003	0.012**	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
55-65	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***	0.015**	0.006*	0.006*	0.013*	0.007*	0.007*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	70,500	70,500	70,500	32,040	32,040	32,040	38,460	38,460	38,460
Number of employers	1,175	1,175	1,175	534	534	534	641	641	641
Rho			1,000			1,000			1,000

Table 7b. The effect of age on managerial decisions in Italy: marginal effects.

**Note:** All models control for both candidates' and employers' characteristics similar to Table 7a. Complete estimations can be found in Table B1in Appendix B. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

These findings suggest that, like for the Spanish sample, age plays a crucial role in shaping gender-related managerial decisions in Italy, particularly in hiring processes. Figure B3 in Appendix B shows the age trend in individual beliefs similar to Figure 2, presenting a consistent evolution with the Spanish population. The generational differences observed in both countries indicate that older employers may have more favorable attitudes toward female candidates, possibly due to greater workplace experience and exposure to gender diversity over time.

Notably, Spain and Italy characterize for being composed by a set of heterogeneous regions that can alter the genera effect observed for the whole country. Figure 5 illustrates the proportion of female candidates hired by region in each country. We do not find significant differences by region. We observe the cases of Región de Murcia in Spain (N=9) and Valle D'Aosta (N=10) in Italy present averages lower than 50%. However, the sample for those regions is pretty small so it is difficult to claim a significant effect. Figures B1 in Appendix B replicates figure 5 by gender, and Figure B2 extend the analysis to the task assignment stage. In addition, controlling for region in the regressions that analyze the main effect does not affect the main outcome significantly. Tables B2 and B3 in Appendix B present the estimations in Tables 4a and 7a, respectively, adding fixed regional effects.



Figure 5. Regional differences within country.

**Result 5** – **Generalizability of the Findings:** *The findings observed in Spain are replicated in the Italian population. The oldest generation (55-65) hired and assigned more women to CT than the youngest generation (18-24).* 

#### 4. Discussion and Conclusions.

This study sheds light on how age influences gender-based hiring and task assignment decisions, using a representative sample from Spain to explore generational shifts in workplace perceptions of gender. By integrating age as a moderating factor, our findings indicate that increased exposure to women in professional settings, particularly among older male evaluators, reduces reliance on gender stereotypes, aligning with the contact hypothesis. This pattern suggests that age positively correlates with more favorable evaluations of female candidates, supporting the idea that experience in gender-diverse work environments may lessen gender biases. To enhance the robustness and generalizability of these findings, we conducted a follow-up survey with an expanded sample of 1,175 participants in Italy, which confirmed similar age-related trends in gender perceptions. These results imply that the observed dynamics may reflect broader cultural shifts in Southern Europe.

We recognize the methodological limitations of our online experiment, particularly regarding the absence of pre-registration, which may raise concerns about potential post hoc analysis. Nevertheless, investigating age as a moderating factor in gender bias was a core objective, motivated by a substantial body of literature on generational attitudes toward gender (e.g., Goldin, 2014; Eagly and Wood, 2012). The sample size of 806 was deliberately chosen to achieve representativeness across age and gender, allowing us to analyze hiring preferences and task assignments across cohorts effectively. Additionally, robustness checks presented in Table A6 validate the stability of our age-group categorizations. Analyses using alternative definitions, such as broader age groupings or continuous age variables, showed consistent findings, affirming that our results are not contingent on specific age categorizations.

Our findings highlight the role of age and workplace experience in shaping gender-related decision-making, with older generations showing a tendency towards more inclusive attitudes toward female candidates. These results carry important implications for organizational policies aimed at reducing gender bias. Encouraging intergenerational exposure in gender-diverse work environments, perhaps through mentorship programs or team structures that foster inclusivity, could be an effective approach to counteract persistent biases, especially among younger decision-makers. Recognizing the influence of individual beliefs on managerial choices also highlights the need for policies that reinforce gender-equitable workplace values, particularly for those who may lack extensive exposure to diverse teams.

In conclusion, this study contributes to the growing literature on workplace discrimination by emphasizing age as a critical factor in gender-based decision-making. Our findings extend the application of social role theory and the contact hypothesis to hiring practices, showing how age can serve as a moderator in gender perceptions within professional contexts. To enhance the external validity of these results, future research might employ a broader range of methodologies, such as field experiments and longitudinal studies across varied cultural contexts. This would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the generalizability of age-related gender perceptions and provide further insights into the mechanisms behind generational differences in attitudes toward gender in the workplace.

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## Gender Equality in Organizational Decisions in Spain: Are We Making Progress?

José Javier Domínguez, Juan Antonio Lacomba, Francisco Lagos and Natalia Montinari

## **APPENDIX A. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS**

#### Table A1. Pools of candidates.

				Correct	Correct					Correct	Correct
Pool	Gender	Signal	Age	ST	СТ	Pool	Gender	Signal	Age	ST	СТ
1	Female	8	1995	18	4	2	Female	8	1992	16	12
1	Female	8	1995	17	2	2	Male	8	1993	16	12
1	Male	8	1996	17	11	2	Female	7	1997	14	6
1	Male	8	1999	16	11	2	Male	7	1992	14	2
1	Female	7	1997	15	9	2	Female	6	1997	13	8
1	Female	7	1996	14	12	2	Female	6	1995	13	4
1	Male	7	1998	14	12	2	Male	6	1997	14	3
1	Male	7	1995	14	11	2	Male	6	1992	13	2
1	Female	6	1996	12	2	2	Female	5	1988	11	4
1	Female	6	1993	12	6	2	Female	5	1996	11	3
1	Male	6	1995	12	8	2	Male	5	1995	11	10
1	Female	5	1997	11	12	2	Male	5	1996	9	11
1	Male	5	1997	12	12	2	Female	4	1992	10	3
1	Female	4	1995	10	6	2	Male	4	1997	9	5
1	Male	4	1997	13	13	2	Female	3	1996	10	8
3	Female	8	1998	16	15	4	Male	8	1997	16	4
3	Female	8	1997	15	8	4	Male	8	1992	15	12
3	Male	7	1980	16	10	4	Female	7	1992	17	7
3	Male	7	1994	17	5	4	Female	7	1998	12	6
3	Female	6	1995	13	12	4	Female	6	1995	11	4
3	Female	6	1997	12	13	4	Female	6	1995	11	4
3	Male	6	1997	13	15	4	Male	6	1996	11	5
3	Male	6	1997	12	7	4	Male	6	1995	11	8
3	Female	5	1991	11	3	4	Female	4	1990	9	7
3	Female	5	1997	11	4	4	Female	4	1995	9	6
3	Male	4	1995	11	9	4	Male	4	1997	9	8
3	Male	4	1999	10	5	4	Male	4	1995	9	6
3	Female	3	1993	10	9	4	Male	4	1996	9	11
3	Male	3	1995	10	11	4	Female	3	1994	8	8
3	Male	3	1991	8	7	4	Male	3	1994	8	5

**Note:** This table reproduces the pools of candidates evaluated by employers in the main experiment. Note that the order to the candidates within each pool was randomly implemented. 'ST refers to the absolute productivity of the candidates in the addition task and 'CT refers to that in the mathematical problems. Note also the 'ST were only displayed for task assignment decisions and 'CT was never displayed.

		1	
Gender	Signal	Correct ST	Correct CT
Female candidates (n=30)	5,767	12,400	6,900
Male candidates (n=34)	5,633	12,300	8,367
Total (n=60)	5,700	12,350	7,633
Mann-Whitney test	Z=0,301	Z=0,127	Z=-1,530
of gender differences	p=0,770	p=0,902	p=0,127

Table A1b. Candidates' gender differences in signal and performance in ST and CT.

**Note:** The 60 candidates were extracted from the 128 subjects analyzed by Domínguez and Montinari (2021). Neither the subsample of 60 candidates nor the overall sample of 5128 subjects present significant gender differences in performances in ST and CT; see also Domínguez and Montinari, 2021).
Dependent variable	Pr( Women&Hiring)=1								
Estimation technique		]	Probit regression						
Population	All	All	All	Women	Men				
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
Age (cont)	0.001***	0.000**							
	(0.000)	(0.000)							
Male		-0.033**							
		(0.013)							
Age x Male		0.001*							
-		(0.000)							
25-34			0.003	0.007	-0.000				
			(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)				
35-44			0.014**	0.018**	0.012				
			(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)				
45-54			0.014**	0.013	0.016				
			(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)				
55-65			0.027***	0.017**	0.039***				
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)				
Education (1-6)	0.003*	0.003	0.003*	-0.000	0.006**				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)				
Worker	0.007	0.008*	0.007	0.006	0.009				
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)				
Self-empoloyed	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.001	0.009				
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)				
Income (1-6)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.004				
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)				
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.005**	-0.003				
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)				
Extreme right x Male		0.002	. ,	. ,					
		(0.003)							
Candidate's age	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.002*	-0.006***				
-	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.013***	-0.006***				
-	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.008***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Beliefs in favor of women	0.015***	0.014***	0.015***	0.012***	0.016***				
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)				
				· · · ·					
Observations	48.420	48,360	48,420	24,720	23,640				
Number of employers	807	807	807	412	394				

Table A2a. The effect of age on hiring decisions: probit regression.

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

Dependent variable	Pr( Women&Task)=1								
Estimation technique		Probit	regression						
Population	All	All	All	Women	Men				
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
Age (cont)	0.000***	0.000							
	(0.000)	(0.000)							
Male		0.003							
		(0.002)							
Age x Male		-0.000							
		(0.000)							
25-34		. ,	0.002	0.003	0.001				
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)				
35-44			0.005*	0.007*	0.003				
			(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)				
45-54			0.006*	0.005	0.006				
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)				
55-65			0.012***	0.010**	0.014**				
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)				
Education (1-6)	0.002*	-0.001**	0.002*	0.001	0.002*				
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Worker	0.004*	-0.001	0.004*	0.003	0.005				
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)				
Self-empoloyed	0.000	-0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.001				
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)				
Income (1-6)	-0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.000	-0.003*				
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.001*	0.000	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.002				
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Extreme right x Male		0.000	. ,		. ,				
5		(0.001)							
		-	-	-					
Candidate's age	-0.005***	0.009***	0.005***	0.005***	-0.005***				
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
Candidate's ranking	0.010***	0.020***	0.010***	0.012***	0.008***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Pool of candidates (1-4)	0.001	0.011***	0.001	0.002*	-0.000				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Beliefs in favor of women	0.008***	0.000	0.008***	0.007***	0.009***				
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)				
Observations	48,420	48,360	48,420	24,720	23,640				
Number of employers	807	807	807	412	394				

## Table A2b. The effect of age on task assignment decisions: probit regression.

Note: The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

Table A3a. The effect of age on managerial decisions: survey options
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Estimation technique:		SVY: Biv	ariate probit	regression:	Pr (Female&	Hiring)=1 &	Pr (Female	&Task)=1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age (cont)	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	-0.037**	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.028*	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age x Male				0.001**	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000	0.000
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.005**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.004*	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Extreme right x Male				0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000
				(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003*	0.002*	0.002*	0.003	0.001*	0.001*	0.003	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	0.008	0.004*	0.004*	0.008	0.004*	0.004*	0.008	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self-empoloyed	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income (1-6)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favor of women							0.015***	0.007***	0.007***
							(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360	48,360
Number of employers	806	806	806	806	806	806	806	806	806
Rho			1,000			1,000			1,000

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

Estimation technique:		SVY: Biv	variate probit	regression:	Pr (Female&	Hiring)=1 &	Pr (Female&	&Task)=1	
Population		All			Women			Men	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
25-34	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
35-44	0.013**	0.005*	0.005*	0.017**	0.007**	0.007**	0.011	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
45-54	0.014*	0.006*	0.006*	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.015	0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
55-65	0.027***	0.012***	0.012***	0.017**	0.008**	0.008**	0.038***	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Male	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003						
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)						
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.005**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003*	0.001*	0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.006**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	0.007	0.004*	0.004*	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Self-empoloyed	0.005	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income (1-6)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.004	-0.003*	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favor of	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***	0.010***	0.00(****	0 00 (****	0.01.(****	0.000***	0.000
women	0.015***	0.00/***	0.00/***	0.013***	0.006***	0.006***	0.016***	0.008***	0.008***
0 11141	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.003***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.00/***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.013***	-0.00/***	-0.00/***	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.004***
$D_{-1} = f_{} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2$	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.00/***	-0.00/***	-0.00/***	-0.005***	-0.00/***	-0.00/***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	48 360	48 360	48 360	24 720	24 720	24 720	23 640	23 640	23 640
Number of employers	806	806	806	412	412	412	394	394	394
Rho	000	000	1 000	112	112	1 000	571	571	1 000
1010			1,000			1,000			1,000

Table A3b. The effect of age on managerial decisions: survey option.

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.5.

Age Group	Gender	Weight
18-24	Male	1,64981770230075
25-34		1,13758419472545
35-44		0,81617283268870
45-54		0,99853324443029
55-65		1,04483105837186
18-24	Female	0,83624248933966
25-34		0,87380606005401
35-44		0,88859674422980
45-54		1,07100738057051
55-65		1,16225111874621
The sample weights have be	en provided by the Bilendi	Company.

 Table A3c. Weights associated to employers for the representative sample.

Estimation technique	Bivariate probit regression: Pr (Female&Hiring)=1 & Pr (Female&Task)=1									
Population		Women			Men					
Dependent variable	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint				
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Age	0.000*	0.000**	0.000**	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001				
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Education (1-6)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005*	0.002*	0.002*				
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Worker	0.008	0.003	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.005				
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)				
Self-empoloyed	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.001				
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)				
Income (1-6)	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.004	-0.003*	-0.003*				
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Beliefs in favor of women	0.013***	0.006***	0.006***	0.016***	0.008***	0.008***				
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Candidate's age	-0.003***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.009***				
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)				
Candidate's ranking	-0.013***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.004***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.006***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)				
Observations	24,720	24,720	24,720	23,640	23,640	23,640				
	412	412	412	394	394	394				
Rho			1,000			1.000				

## Table A4. The effect of age on managerial decisions by employers' gender.

**Note**: The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.5.

Estimation technique:		Biv	ariate probit r	egression: Pr	(Female&Hi	ring)=1 & Pr	(Female&Tasl	c)=1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Population	C	All		C	Women		e	Men	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
age groups									
25-34	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
35-44	0.013**	0.005*	0.005*	0.017**	0.007**	0.007**	0.011	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
45-54	0.014*	0.006*	0.006*	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.015	0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
55-65	0.027***	0.012***	0.012***	0.017**	0.008**	0.008**	0.038***	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Male	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003						
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)						
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.005**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003*	0.001*	0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.006**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	0.007	0.004*	0.004*	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Self-employed	0.005	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income (1-6)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.004	-0.003*	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favour of women	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***	0.013***	0.006***	0.006***	0.016***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.003***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.013***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360	24,720	24,720	24,720	23,640	23,640	23,640
Number of employers	806	806	806	412	412	412	394	394	394
Rho			1,000			1,000			1,000

 Table A5. The effect of age on managerial decisions: complete estimation of Table 4b.

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

Table A6a. The effect of age on managerial decisions: three age groups.

Estimation technique:		Biv	ariate probit r	egression: Pr	(Female&Hi	ring)=1 & Pr	(Female&Tas	k)=1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Population		All			Women			Men	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
34-49	0.010**	0.004**	0.004**	0.012**	0.004*	0.004*	0.010	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)
50-65	0.021***	0.009***	0.009***	0.011*	0.006*	0.006*	0.033***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Male	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003						
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)						
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.005**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003*	0.001*	0.001*	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.005*	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Self-employed	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income (1-6)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favour of women	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***	0.013***	0.006***	0.006***	0.016***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.003***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.013***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360	24,720	24,720	24,720	23,640	23,640	23,640
Number of employers	806	806	806	412	412	412	394	394	394
Rho			1,000			1,000			1,000

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

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Table A6b	The effect of a	age on managerial	decisions: illuidile age
1 abic 1100.		ige on manageman	deelsions. unique uge.

Dependation         Hiring         Task         Joint         Hiring         Task         Joint         Hiring         Task         Joint           Population         All         Women         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)         (0)	Estimation technique:		Biv	ariate probit 1	regression: Pr (	Female&Hi	ring)=1 & Pr	(Female&Task	)=1	
PequationAllWomenMenModel(1)(2)(3)(4)(6)(6)(7)(8) $Age = 19$ (0.0160.0080.0080.0020.013*0.011*0.006<	Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Population		All			Women			Men	
Age = 19-0.0160.0080.0080.0020.013*0.013*0.013*0.009*0.0000.0010Age = 200.0060.0060.00660.00660.00660.00670.00120.00100.00120.00100.00150.00120.0017 <t< td=""><td>Model</td><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td><td>(6)</td><td>(7)</td><td>(8)</td><td>(9)</td></t<>	Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age = 20(0.011)(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)(0.016)(0.012)(0.016)Age = 210.0050.0000.0010(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.005)(0.017)(0.017)(0.014)(0.007)(0.011)0.0080.008(0.003)(0.011)(0.005)(0.016)(0.016)(0.017)(0.014)(0.007)(0.011)(0.005)(0.015)(0.015)(0.012)(0.008)(0.008)Age = 23-0.0010.0020.0110.005(0.015)(0.015)(0.012)(0.006)(0.017)Age = 240.0100.0060.006(0.007)(0.005)(0.015)(0.015)(0.017)(0.007)Age = 25-0.0100.0060.006(0.007)(0.005)(0.015)-0.0110.006(0.007)Age = 260.0090.0070.001(0.004)(0.004)(0.013)-0.011-0.0110.001Age = 27-0.0100.0060.0060.0160.00630.0030.0010.0010.001Age = 280.004-0.0040.0170.003-0.0110.0010.0010.0010.0010.001Age = 29-0.0010.0070.0070.003-0.0030.0010.0010.0010.0010.001Age = 310.0140.0070.0070.0070.0030.0010.0010.0010.0010.001Age = 310.0160.0070.007<	Age = 19	-0.016	0.008	0.008	0.002	0.013*	0.013*	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age = 20-0.008-0.000-0.0000.0220.0090.009(0.015)(0.006)(0.006)Age = 210.0050.004(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)-0.006Age = 220.0040.0040.0017(0.011)(0.006)(0.005)-0.005(0.017)(0.017)Age = 230.0040.0040.0020.011(0.005)(0.005)(0.012)(0.006)-0.004Age = 240.0100.0060.001(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)(0.007)(0.007)Age = 25-0.0100.0060.0070.005(0.005)-0.037(0.006)(0.004)(0.004)-0.013-0.01Age = 260.0090.0070.005(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)-0.013-0.01-0.01Age = 270.0040.0060.0060.0140.004-0.0150.007(0.007)(0.007)0.0070.0110.004-0.0010.0050.0050.007 <td></td> <td>(0.011)</td> <td>(0.006)</td> <td>(0.006)</td> <td>(0.005)</td> <td>(0.006)</td> <td>(0.006)</td> <td>-0.049**</td> <td>-0.012*</td> <td>-0.012*</td>		(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	-0.049**	-0.012*	-0.012*
Age = 21(0.014)(0.004)(0.012)(0.014)(0.004)0.0080.009(0.017)Age = 220.0040.0040.0040.0050.0050.0050.0110.007Age = 220.0040.0040.0040.0050.017***0.017***0.0230.0080.008Age = 230.0010.0020.0010.0050.00150.0050.00120.0010.007Age = 240.0100.0040.0040.0040.0040.0040.0010.0010.001Age = 240.0100.0060.0050.0050.0050.0050.0050.0050.007Age = 250.0100.0060.0070.0080.0040.0040.0040.0040.0040.004Age = 270.0040.0060.0070.0010.0050.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.007Age = 280.004-0.0040.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.007Age = 290.0010.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.007Age = 310.0140.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.007Age = 320.0160.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.007Age = 290.0010.0070.0070.0070.0070.0070.007 <td< td=""><td>Age = 20</td><td>-0.008</td><td>-0.000</td><td>-0.000</td><td>0.022</td><td>0.009</td><td>0.009</td><td>(0.015)</td><td>(0.006)</td><td>(0.006)</td></td<>	Age = 20	-0.008	-0.000	-0.000	0.022	0.009	0.009	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age = 21         0.005         0.004         0.004         0.019         0.008         0.008         (0.009)         (0.017)         (0.017)           Age = 22         0.004         0.004         0.004         0.004         0.005         0.005         0.012         0.003         0.008           Age = 23         0.001         0.002         0.002         0.011         0.005         0.005         (0.012)         0.006         (0.006)           Age = 24         0.001         0.006         0.005         (0.005)         (0.007)         (0.005)         (0.015)         (0.007)           Age = 25         0.010         0.006         0.006         0.016         0.016         0.016         0.014         (0.013)         (0.007)         (0.013)         (0.007)         (0.013)         (0.007)         (0.014         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.011)         (0.014         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.017)<		(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age = 21	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.019	0.008	0.008	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.017)
		(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	-0.034	-0.011	-0.011
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age = 22	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.032**	0.017***	0.017***	(0.023)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age = 23         -0.001         0.002         0.011         0.005         0.005         (0.012)         (0.006)         (0.006)           Age = 24         0.010         0.006         0.005         (0.005)         (0.005)         (0.005)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.007)           Age = 25         -0.010         0.006         0.006         0.007         0.008         0.004         (0.012)         (0.005)         (0.007)         (0.005)         (0.007)         0.006         0.007         0.006         0.006         0.006         0.006         0.006         0.004         (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.001)         -0.001		(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.021	-0.005	-0.005
	Age = 23	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.011	0.005	0.005	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)
		(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	0.012	0.011	0.011
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age = 24	0.010	0.006	0.006	0.015*	0.005	0.005	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.007)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.037**	0.009*	0.009*
	Age = 25	-0.010	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.008	0.008	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	C	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	-0.013	-0.001	-0.001
	Age = 26	0.009	0.007	0.007	0.016	0.014***	0.014***	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	C	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.004)	-0.015	0.004	0.004
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age = 27	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.016	0.008	0.008	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	C	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.017	-0.001	-0.001
Age = 29 $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.010)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.016)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.066^{***}$ $0.002$ $0.002$ Age = 30 $0.019$ $0.011$ $0.011$ $0.044^{***}$ $0.018$ $0.013$ $(0.003)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.018)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $-0.015$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.008$ $0.030^{***}$ $0.014^{**}$ $0.014^{**}$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $Age = 33$ $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.014$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 34$ $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022^{**}$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.024)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $Age = 35$ $0.038^{*}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ <t< td=""><td>Age = 28</td><td>0.004</td><td>-0.004</td><td>-0.004</td><td>0.019*</td><td>-0.003</td><td>-0.003</td><td>(0.011)</td><td>(0.009)</td><td>(0.009)</td></t<>	Age = 28	0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.019*	-0.003	-0.003	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age = 29 $-0.001$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.030^{**}$ $0.014^{**}$ $0.014^{**}$ $(0.023)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.011)$ Age = 30 $0.019$ $0.011$ $0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.066^{***}$ $0.002$ $0.002$ Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.009)$ $-0.015$ $-0.004$ Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.008$ $0.030^{***}$ $0.014^{***}$ $0.014^{***}$ $(0.013)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $-0.026^{**}$ $-0.006$ Age = 32 $-0.000$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.014$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.008)$ Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.022)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 34$ $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.029^{*}$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 34$ $0.007$ $0.005$ $(0.005)$ $(0.021)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 35$ $0.038^{*}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.006$ $(0.017)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ $Age = 36$	C	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	-0.042	-0.009	-0.009
Age = 30 $(0.016)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.010)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $(-0.066^{***}$ $0.002$ $0.002$ Age = 30 $0.019$ $0.011$ $0.011$ $0.044^{***}$ $0.018$ $0.013$ $(0.003)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.018)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.004)$ $-0.004$ Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.008$ $0.030^{***}$ $0.014^{***}$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $-0.026^{**}$ $-0.006$ Age = 32 $-0.000$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.014$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.003)$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.003$ $-0.007$ $(0.007)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.022)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.07)$ $Age = 34$ $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $Age = 35$ $0.038^{**}$ $0.016^{***}$ $0.027^{****}$ $0.027^{****}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $0.007$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $Age = 36$ $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.0$	Age = 29	-0.001	0.005	0.005	0.030**	0.014**	0.014**	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age = 30 $0.019$ $0.011$ $0.011$ $0.044^{***}$ $0.018$ $0.013$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.007$ $(0.017)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.004)$ Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.008$ $0.033^{***}$ $0.014^{***}$ $0.014^{***}$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ Age = 32 $-0.000$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.014$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.009$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022$ $(0.007)$ $0.007$ $0.012$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 35 $0.038^{*}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.006$ $0.006$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.001$ $0.006$ $0.006$ $Age = 37$ $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.006$ $Age = 37$ $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$	C	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.066***	0.002	0.002
$d_{ge} = 31$ $(0.018)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.01)$ $Age = 31$ $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.008$ $0.030^{***}$ $0.014^{**}$ $0.014^{**}$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $-0.026^{*}$ $-0.006$ $-0.006$ $Age = 32$ $-0.000$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.014$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $Age = 33$ $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.009$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 34$ $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 34$ $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.029^{**}$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $Age = 35$ $0.038^{**}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $Age = 36$ $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.014$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ $Age = 37$ $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.017^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.021^{***}$ $0.001$ $0.006$ $Age = 36$ $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.004$ $Age = 37$ $0.018$ $0.005$ <td>Age = 30</td> <td>0.019</td> <td>0.011</td> <td>0.011</td> <td>0.044***</td> <td>0.018</td> <td>0.018</td> <td>(0.013)</td> <td>(0.006)</td> <td>(0.006)</td>	Age = 30	0.019	0.011	0.011	0.044***	0.018	0.018	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age = 31 $0.014$ $0.008$ $0.008$ $0.030^{***}$ $0.014^{**}$ $0.014^{**}$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ Age = 32 $0.000$ $0.006$ $(0.006)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $-0.026^{*}$ $-0.006$ $-0.006$ Age = 33 $0.013$ $(0.004)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.003)$ $-0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.003$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ Age = 34 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $-0.022$ $-0.005$ $-0.005$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022^{*}$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $-0.002$ $-0.005$ $-0.005$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022^{*}$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $Age = 35$ $0.038^{*}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.080^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ $Age = 36$ $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.005$	C	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.015	-0.004	-0.004
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age = 31	0.014	0.008	0.008	0.030***	0.014**	0.014**	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Age = 32 $-0.000$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.014$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.009$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.009$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.029*$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 35 $0.038*$ $0.016**$ $0.016**$ $0.080**$ $0.27***$ $0.027***$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026**$ $0.010*$ $0.010*$ $0.014$ $0.006$ $(0.006)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$	C	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	-0.026*	-0.006	-0.006
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age = 32	-0.000	0.003	0.003	0.014	0.007	0.007	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age = 33 $0.016$ $0.002$ $0.002$ $0.041$ $0.009$ $0.009$ $(0.013)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.022$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $-0.022$ $-0.005$ $-0.005$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.029^*$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 35 $0.038^*$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.080^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.010^*$ $0.014$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.005$ $-0.004$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$	C	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.003)	-0.014	-0.009	-0.009
(0.015) $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.022)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $-0.022$ $-0.005$ $-0.005$ Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.029*$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 35 $0.038*$ $0.016**$ $0.016**$ $0.080**$ $0.027***$ $0.027***$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 36 $0.017$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.024)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.008)$ $-0.020$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026**$ $0.010*$ $0.010*$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.009)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.011$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$	Age = 33	0.016	0.002	0.002	0.041	0.009	0.009	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age = 34 $0.007$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.029^*$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ Age = 35 $0.038^*$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.005)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $-0.009$ $0.001$ $0.001$ Age = 35 $0.038^*$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.080^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.010^*$ $0.010^*$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.015$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$	C	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.007)	-0.022	-0.005	-0.005
(0.013) $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $-0.009$ $0.001$ $0.001$ Age = 35 $0.038*$ $0.016**$ $0.016**$ $0.080**$ $0.027***$ $0.027***$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.024)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.008)$ $-0.020$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.026**$ $0.010*$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $-0.014$ $-0.007$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.006$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.040$ $-0.007$	Age = 34	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.029*	0.007	0.007	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age = 35 $0.038^*$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.016^{**}$ $0.080^{**}$ $0.027^{***}$ $0.027^{***}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.024)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.008)$ $-0.020$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.010^*$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.007$ $-0.007$	C	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	-0.009	0.001	0.001
(0.017) $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.024)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.008)$ $-0.020$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $0.007$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.026**$ $0.010*$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.040$ $-0.007$ $-0.007$	Age = 35	0.038*	0.016**	0.016**	0.080**	0.027***	0.027***	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age = 36 $0.001$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.011$ $0.007$ $(0.01)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.010^{*}$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.040$ $-0.007$ $-0.007$	C	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.008)	-0.020	-0.004	-0.004
$(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.001$ $-0.004$ $-0.004$ Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.010^{*}$ $(0.014)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.040$ $-0.007$ $-0.007$	Age = 36	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.011	0.007	0.007	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age = 37 $0.018$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.026^{**}$ $0.010^{*}$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $0.0014$ $-0.009$ Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.040$ $-0.007$ $-0.007$	0	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.001	-0.004	-0.004
Age = 38 $(0.012)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.005)$ $-0.014$ $-0.009$ $-0.009$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.009)$	Age = 37	0.018	0.005	0.005	0.026**	0.010*	0.010*	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age = 38 $0.007$ $0.001$ $0.001$ $0.019$ $0.005$ $0.005$ $(0.015)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.006)$ $-0.040$ $-0.007$ $-0.007$	0	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.014	-0.009	-0.009
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) -0.040 -0.007 -0.007	Age = 38	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.019	0.005	0.005	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	0	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	-0.040	-0.007	-0.007
$Age = 39 \qquad 0.007  0.002  0.002  0.036^{***}  0.004  0.004  (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.010)$	Age = 39	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.036***	0.004	0.004	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.010)

	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	0.027	0.011	0.011
Age = 40	0.021	0.011*	0.011*	0.006	0.006	0.006	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.008)
	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	-0.014	-0.005	-0.005
Age = 41	0.020	0.011*	0.011*	0.044***	0.022*	0.022*	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.008)
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.012	-0.002	-0.002
Age = 42	0.018	0.011*	0.011*	0.043***	0.022**	0.022**	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	-0.013	-0.016	-0.016
Age = 43	0.024	0.005	0.005	0.048**	0.016*	0.016*	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.007)	-0.020	-0.002	-0.002
Age = 44	0.012	0.008	0.008	0.043*	0.017	0.017	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.015	-0.002	-0.002
Age = 45	0.011	0.006	0.006	0.027*	0.011	0.011	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
-	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	-0.015	-0.005	-0.005
Age = 46	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.019**	0.005	0.005	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.010)
-	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	-0.017	-0.003	-0.003
Age = 47	0.010	0.006	0.006	0.026**	0.012*	0.012*	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
0	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.004	0.002	0.002
Age = 48	0.025	0.012*	0.012*	0.048*	0.017	0.017	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)
-	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.002	0.006	0.006
Age = 49	0.027	0.014*	0.014*	0.052	0.018	0.018	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.007)
0	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001
Age = 50	0.013	0.007	0.007	0.018	0.007	0.007	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.008)
0	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	0.019	0.009	0.009
Age = 51	0.032	0.017*	0.017*	0.034***	0.022***	0.022***	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.010)
	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	-0.001	0.004	0.004
Age = 52	0.029	0.014**	0.014**	0.050*	0.020*	0.020*	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.004	0.003	0.003
Age = 53	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.010	0.005	0.005	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.009)	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002
Age = 54	0.013	0.006	0.006	0.024	0.009	0.009	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.007)
	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.020	-0.020*	-0.020*
Age = 55	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.021	0.027**	0.027**	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.009)	0.052	0.020*	0.020*
Age = 56	0.050**	0.023***	0.023***	0.037***	0.017***	0.017***	(0.027)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	0.008	0.003	0.003
Age = 57	0.027	0.014*	0.014*	0.042*	0.019*	0.019*	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.008)	-0.012	-0.003	-0.003
Age = 58	0.014	0.005	0.005	0.029***	0.008	0.008	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	0.048	0.016	0.016
Age = 59	0.037	0.016*	0.016*	0.012	0.007	0.007	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	0.026	0.017	0.017
Age = 60	0.048*	0.019**	0.019**	0.064**	0.021**	0.021**	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.008)	-0.002	-0.005	-0.005
Age = 61	0.019	0.011	0.011	0.025*	0.042*	0.042*	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)	0.038	0.006	0.006
Age = 62	0.035	0.013	0.013	0.031***	0.014**	0.014**	(0.041)	(0.014)	(0.014)
	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	-0.003	0.007	0.007

Age = 63	0.015	0.014	0.014	0.018*	0.021***	0.021***	(0.027)	(0.010)	(0.010)
	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	0.003	0.015	0.015
Age = 64	0.035*	0.013	0.013	0.051***	0.003	0.003	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	0.010	0.013*	0.013*
Age = 65	0.025	0.015**	0.015**	0.026	0.012	0.012	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.007)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
Male	-0.005	-0.003*	-0.003*						
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)						
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.005*	-0.002	-0.002			
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005*	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	0.006	0.004*	0.004*	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.008	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Self-employed	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income (1-6)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.006*	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favour of women	0.014***	0.007***	0.007***	0.012***	0.006***	0.006***	0.014***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.003***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.013***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360	24,720	24,720	24,720	23,640	23,640	23,640
Number of employers	806	806	806	412	412	412	394	394	394
Rho			1,000			1,000			1,000

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.5.

	<b>T</b> 1	CC /	C		1	1.	• •	· •	•	1 .	•	1 .	•
Table A7	I he e	ettect (	ot age	on	gender	disci	rimin	ation	1n	h11	nno	decis	nns
1 abic 11/.			or uge	on	Senaer	ansei		unon	111	m	ms	acon	nons.

Dependent variable:					Pr (Hiring) =	=1			
Employer sample	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Candidate sample		All			ranking < 6			ranking > 7	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Candidate	-0.025	0.042	-0.149	-0.024	0.099	-0.249*	-0.054	-0.036	-0.073
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.086)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.105)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.113)
25-34	-0.030	-0.038	-0.036	-0.102	-0.094	-0.120	0.062	0.036	0.063
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.079)	(0.106)	(0.123)	(0.108)	(0.155)	(0.143)
35-44	-0.081**	-0.088**	-0.105*	-0.173*	-0.168	-0.215	0.037	0.016	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.075)	(0.102)	(0.116)	(0.103)	(0.147)	(0.140)
45-54	-0.076**	-0.055	-0.127**	-0.221**	-0.215*	-0.269*	0.109	0.158	0.044
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.076)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.148)	(0.141)
55-65	-0.136***	-0.063	-0.235***	-0.265***	-0.192	-0.380**	0.028	0.108	-0.061
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.101)	(0.124)	(0.103)	(0.141)	(0.145)
25-34 x Female candidate	0.058	0.074	0.072	0.051	0.101	0.057	0.071	0.045	0.089
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.119)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.126)
35-44 x Female candidate	0.158**	0.171**	0.210*	0.148*	0.136	0.271*	0.179*	0.232*	0.137
	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.095)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.117)	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.124)
45-54 x Female candidate	0.150**	0.108	0.252**	0.185**	0.126	0.350**	0.110	0.089	0.133
	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.118)	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.126)
55-65 x Female candidate	0.266***	0.122	0.463***	0.265***	0.046	0.581***	0.273***	0.221*	0.325*
	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.111)	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.128)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.140)
Education (1-6)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.051**	0.003	0.085***	-0.065**	-0.004	-0.105***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Extreme right (1-5)	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.020	0.010	-0.000	0.025
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.033)
Worker	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.024	0.051	-0.003	-0.032	-0.066	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.092)	(0.096)
Self-employed	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.106	0.152	0.066	-0.142	-0.210	-0.083
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.080)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.107)	(0.154)	(0.150)
Income (1-6)	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.003	0.017	0.008	-0.004	-0.024	-0.009
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Candidate's age	-0.030***	-0.027***	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.035***	-0.029***	-0.045***	-0.038***	-0.053***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.011***	0.004	0.001	0.007	-0.035***	-0.030**	-0.040***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Constant	60.450***	54.400***	66.399***	63.490***	69.172***	57.519***	89.850***	74.739***	105.027***
	(5.197)	(7.143)	(7.570)	(5.472)	(7.614)	(7.922)	(9.263)	(12.958)	(13.311)
Observations	48,420	24,720	23,640	25,824	13,184	12,608	22,596	11,536	11,032
Number of employers	807	412	394	807	807	807	807	807	807

**Note**: In each model, the number of observations varies. In models 1-3, employers make 60 evaluations (all candidates). In models 4-6, they make 32 evaluations (high-quality candidates). In models 7-9, they make 28 evaluations (low-quality candidates). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.5.

Dependent variable:		Pr (FC	CW)=1	D 1		Pr (F	Pr (FCL)=1		
Estimation technique:				Probit r	egression				
Population	А	.11	Empl	loyed	A	1	Emple	oyed	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Male	-0.151***	-0.240**	-0.157***	-0.138	-0.160***	-0.175*	-0.139***	-0.163	
	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.031)	(0.102)	(0.024)	(0.069)	(0.029)	(0.096)	
Age	0.001	0.000	0.004**	0.004*	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Age x Male		0.002		-0.000		0.000		0.001	
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
Education	0.010	0.010	0.033*	0.033*	0.015	0.015	0.023*	0.023	
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Worker	0.062	0.064			-0.012	-0.011			
	(0.034)	(0.034)			(0.030)	(0.030)			
Entrepreneur	0.044	0.046	0.026	0.026	-0.045	-0.044	-0.011	-0.010	
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)	
Public sector	-0.102	-0.103	-0.030	-0.030	0.075	0.075	0.018	0.018	
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.129)	(0.129)	
Private Sector	-0.155*	-0.156*	-0.121	-0.121	0.025	0.025	-0.052	-0.052	
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.128)	(0.128)	
Number workers	0.022	0.021	0.044**	0.044**	-0.001	-0.002	0.008	0.008	
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Construction	-0.034	-0.035	-0.021	-0.022	0.009	0.009	0.044	0.044	
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.071)	
Commerce	0 240***	0 242***	0 231***	0 230***	0.087	0.087	0.087	0.088	
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.059)	
Transport	0.083	0.079	0.058	0.059	0.043	0.042	-0.046	(0.037)	
Transport	(0.000)	(0.07)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.091)	
Hotel and restaurant	0.328***	0 323***	0.202***	0.202***	0.029	0.028	(0.071)	(0.071)	
Hoter and restaurant	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.02)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	
ICT apprison	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.078)	0.066	(0.098)	(0.098)	
ICT services	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.013)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.071	-0.071	
Finance	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.091)	(0.091)	
Finance	(0.123)	(0.087)	0.133	0.130	-0.030	-0.051	0.008	0.008	
D 10/ /	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.088)	
Real State	0.1/1	0.164	0.263*	0.264*	0.068	0.06/	0.118	0.118	
a .	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.117)	
Science	-0.040	-0.039	-0.046	-0.046	0.014	0.014	-0.017	-0.017	
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.074)	(0.0/4)	(0.082)	(0.082)	
Fiscal consultory	0.28/**	0.285**	0.298**	0.299**	-0.007	-0.007	-0.024	-0.025	
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.111)	
Teaching	0.414***	0.414***	0.401***	0.401***	0.118*	0.118*	0.110*	0.110	
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.061)	
Health	0.329***	0.326***	0.295***	0.296***	0.121*	0.121*	0.115*	0.114	
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.065)	
Entertainment	0.249*	0.249*	0.327***	0.327***	-0.043	-0.043	-0.136	-0.136	
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.126)	
Other	0.217***	0.217***	0.205***	0.205***	0.081	0.081	0.079	0.079	
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.052)	
Executive	-0.230***	-0.233***	-0.190*	-0.190*	0.044	0.044	0.058	0.058	
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.079)	
Other official	-0.153**	-0.153**	-0.127	-0.127	-0.047	-0.047	-0.005	-0.005	
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.076)	
Human Resources Manager	-0.100	-0.102	-0.045	-0.045	-0.065	-0.065	-0.013	-0.013	
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.115)	
Entrepreneur	-0.265**	-0.264**	-0.233*	-0.232*	-0.089	-0.089	-0.088	-0.089	
-	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.108)	
Worker	-0.163***	-0.160***	-0.114*	-0.114*	0.010	0.011	0.035	0.035	

# **Table A8.** Female contact in work and lif: Complete estimations in Table 5a.

	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Other	-0.140**	-0.137**	-0.099	-0.099	-0.035	-0.035	0.059	0.059
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Right-wing	-0.011	-0.010	-0.024	-0.024	-0.009	-0.008	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income	-0.030	-0.029	-0.041*	-0.041*	0.001	0.001	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Observations	1,448	1,448	1,004	1,004	1,448	1,448	1,004	1,004

Note: The table shows the marginal effects. This table regresses the probability of subjects reporting having more or equal contact with females than with males, in either the work environment (FCW) or general life (FCL). For models 2, 4,6 and 8, we summarize the effect of the interactions. Age + Age x Male =  $0,002^{***}$  for 2, 0.0.3\* for model 3, 0.02 for model 6 and 0.02 for model 8. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05.

Dependent variable:	Pr (FCW)=1				Pr (FCL)=1				
Estimation technique:			,	Probit r	egression	,	,		
Population	1	All	Emr	ployed	A	.11	Emp	loved	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
25-34	0.005	0.226**	0.053	0.266**	-0.045	0.087	-0.076	0.092	
	(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.044)	(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.082)	
35-44	0.067	0.125	0.162*	0.175	-0.048	0.043	-0.047	0.085	
	(0.049)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.090)	(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.057)	(0.084)	
45-54	0.024	0.261***	0.117	0.330***	-0.022	0.031	-0.034	0.073	
	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.049)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.082)	
55-65	0.007	0.118	0.174*	0.212*	0.035	0.083	0.024	0.117	
	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.097)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.088)	
Education	0.007	0.013	0.043**	0.030	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.036	
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	
Worker	0.057	-0.028			0.000	-0.007			
	(0.044)	(0.057)			(0.039)	(0.053)			
Entrepreneur	0.103	-0.107			0.029	-0.130			
	(0.057)	(0.097)			(0.055)	(0.092)			
Public sector	-0.014	-0.318***	0.089		0.045	0.062	0.066		
	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.145)		(0.084)	(0.166)	(0.147)		
Private Sector	-0.077	-0.372***	0.006		0.029	-0.023	0.025		
	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.145)		(0.084)	(0.164)	(0.147)		
Number workers	0.003	0.055**	0.002	0.107***	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.026	
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.021)	
Executive	-0.086	-0.386***	0.059	-0.407***	0.149	-0.040	0.074	-0.015	
	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.136)	(0.109)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.117)	
Other official	-0.094	-0.204*	-0.014	-0.204*	-0.085	-0.027	-0.092	0.020	
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.140)	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.090)	(0.118)	(0.105)	
Human Resources Manager	-0.104	-0.166	-0.011	-0.098	0.050	-0.274	-0.048	-0.122	
	(0.118)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.187)	(0.124)	(0.178)	(0.141)	(0.201)	
Entrepreneur	-0.357**	-0.079	-0.162	-0.105	-0.106	0.001	-0.201	0.030	
	(0.131)	(0.116)	(0.169)	(0.143)	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.149)	(0.150)	
Worker	-0.107	-0.212**	0.021	-0.186*	0.049	0.011	-0.026	0.074	
	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.126)	(0.081)	(0.093)	(0.078)	(0.099)	(0.092)	
Other	-0.065	-0.189*	-0.053	-0.054	0.040	-0.093	-0.076	0.165	
	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.149)	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.122)	(0.114)	
Right-wing	0.004	-0.038*	-0.009	-0.063**	-0.003	-0.016	-0.018	-0.018	
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	
Income	-0.026	-0.014	-0.039	-0.015	-0.021	0.045	-0.029	0.014	
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.028)	
Observations	757	601	511	105	757	601	511	401	
Observations	131	091	311	480	131	091	311	491	

Table A9. Female contact in work and life: complete estimations in Table 5b.

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. This table regresses the probability of subjects reporting having more or equal contact with females than with males, in either the work environment (FCW) or general life (FCL). All models control for work sector. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05.

Donondont worighto:	Pr (% women hired > =50%) =1								
Dependent variable:	Pr(%  women hired > =50%) = 1								
Estimation technique:	. 11	33.7	Probit 1	regression	117				
Population:	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
Male	0.061*			0.056					
	(0.030)			(0.031)					
Age	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.001	-0.001			
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Female contact work	0.001	-0.040	0.066*	0.003	-0.044	0.067*			
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.033)			
% female contact work	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Female contact life	0.007	0.051	-0.045	0.003	0.038	-0.039			
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.030)			
% female contact life	0.002*	0.002	0.002	0.002*	0.002	0.001			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Education	-0.022	-0.013	-0.036	-0.022	-0.014	-0.030			
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)			
Worker	-0.068	-0.124*	-0.044	-0.065	-0.116*	-0.029			
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.055)			
Entrepreneur	-0.009	-0.048	-0.010	-0.011	-0.057	-0.010			
Lintepreneur	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.096)			
Public sector	(0.001)	(0.084)	(0.077)	0.083	0.100	(0.090)			
I dolle sector	-0.115	-0.233	(0.177)	(0.083)	(0.105)	(0.235)			
Driveta Sector	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.174)	(0.089)	(0.103)	(0.170)			
Private Sector	-0.168*	-0.241*	(0.172)	-0.135	-0.202	0.146			
NT 1 1	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.1/2)	(0.088)	(0.104)	(0.174)			
Number workers	0.000	0.025	-0.020	-0.003	0.025	-0.025			
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)			
Construction	0.135	0.134	0.127	0.138	0.124	0.127			
	(0.073)	(0.126)	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.128)	(0.092)			
Commerce	0.022	-0.002	-0.038	0.029	-0.005	-0.042			
	(0.061)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.061)	(0.095)	(0.089)			
Transport	0.073	-0.111	0.147	0.061	-0.153	0.137			
	(0.080)	(0.135)	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.136)	(0.104)			
Hotel and restaurant	-0.102	-0.075	-0.202	-0.097	-0.087	-0.213			
	(0.087)	(0.118)	(0.146)	(0.087)	(0.120)	(0.145)			
ICT services	-0.007	-0.018	-0.028	-0.009	-0.053	-0.032			
	(0.090)	(0.145)	(0.118)	(0.092)	(0.149)	(0.121)			
Finance	0.002	-0.047	0.017	0.003	-0.074	0.052			
	(0.090)	(0.137)	(0.124)	(0.091)	(0.139)	(0.125)			
Real State	-0.366***	-0.456***	-0.277	-0.362***	-0.476***	-0.289			
	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.213)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.215)			
Science	0.115	-0.070	0.210*	0.117	-0.067	0.227*			
	(0.082)	(0.145)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.148)	(0.095)			
Fiscal consultory	0.167	0.169	0.157	0.169	0.154	0.163			
i ibeai consultory	(0.103)	(0.156)	(0.138)	(0.105)	(0.163)	(0.140)			
Teaching	0.045	0.007	0.070	0.045	-0.001	0.065			
reaching	(0.063)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.043)	(0.007)	(0.003)			
Health	0.003)	0.093)	0.007	0.003)	0.097)	0.075			
Healul	0.004	(0.100)	0.092	0.001	(0.101)	0.043			
	(0.068)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.108)			
Entertainment	0.196	0.231	0.119	0.192	0.198	0.128			
0.1	(0.106)	(0.137)	(0.184)	(0.108)	(0.144)	(0.189)			
Other	-0.013	-0.047	-0.002	-0.011	-0.053	-0.012			
	(0.052)	(0.085)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.070)			
Executive	-0.054	-0.123	0.006	-0.060	-0.101	-0.000			

**Table A10.** Contact hypothesis: relationship between contact and decisions: complete estimations in Table 6.

	(0.084)	(0.149)	(0.105)	(0.085)	(0.153)	(0.107)
Other official	-0.008	-0.123	0.045	-0.014	-0.137	0.050
	(0.078)	(0.138)	(0.097)	(0.079)	(0.141)	(0.099)
Human Resources Manager	0.019	0.121	-0.344*	0.008	0.096	-0.288
	(0.126)	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.129)	(0.174)	(0.173)
Entrepreneur	0.029	-0.152	0.125	0.009	-0.164	0.110
	(0.101)	(0.162)	(0.138)	(0.102)	(0.163)	(0.141)
Worker	0.009	-0.142	0.106	0.009	-0.133	0.121
	(0.067)	(0.120)	(0.085)	(0.068)	(0.122)	(0.087)
Other	0.028	-0.056	0.029	0.033	-0.042	0.048
	(0.076)	(0.129)	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.131)	(0.101)
Right-wing	-0.005	-0.006	-0.001	0.004	-0.003	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Income	-0.006	-0.012	0.010	-0.005	-0.017	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Young Anchor	0.054	0.019	0.068	0.055	0.020	0.060
	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Old Anchor	0.166***	0.176***	0.136**	0.167***	0.181***	0.144**
	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.049)
govlabor				-0.040*	-0.040	-0.052
				(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.030)
govdis				0.014	0.008	0.034
				(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.030)
care				-0.010	-0.001	-0.029
				(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.022)
revdisc				0.032*	0.040	0.019
				(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.021)
gequality				0.016	-0.012	0.051*
				(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)
quotas				-0.021*	-0.014	-0.026*
				(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)
past				0.001	0.004	0.001
				(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.022)
coequality				0.008	0.015	-0.013
				(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.025)
coequality5				0.002	0.029	-0.014
				(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.031)
menequality				0.012	-0.005	0.035
				(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.026)
2.hequality				-0.015	-0.022	-0.009
				(0.054)	(0.095)	(0.069)
3.hequality				0.009	-0.007	0.015
				(0.045)	(0.079)	(0.057)
womenexec				-0.003	-0.010	0.014
				(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Observations	1,423	742	681	1,423	742	681

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. This table regresses the probability of guessing that same-age cohort subjects hired, on average, more than 50% of female candidates. Please refer to Table A12 for a codebook of the variables referent to gender equality questions. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05.

D 1		~ ~ ~	, .	1	500() 1	
Dependent variable:		Pr (%	• women assig	gned to CT>	=50%) =1	
Estimation technique:	,		Probit	regression		
Population:	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	0.075*			0.066*		
	(0.029)			(0.031)		
Age	-0.001	0.002	-0.006***	-0.000	0.002	-0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female contact work	-0.021	-0.050	0.032	-0.021	-0.057	0.036
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.032)
% female contact work	-0.000	0.002	-0.002*	0.000	0.002	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female contact life	-0.009	-0.015	-0.015	-0.006	-0.016	-0.015
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.027)
% female contact life	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.017	-0.004	-0.037*	-0.016	0.001	-0.034
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Worker	-0.058	-0.024	-0.142**	-0.061	-0.020	-0.141**
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.055)
Entrepreneur	0.055	0.140	-0.113	0.046	0.137	-0.144
	(0.060)	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.099)
Public sector	-0.001	0.054	-0.039	-0.000	0.054	-0.042
	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Private Sector	0.170*	0.344***	-0.252	0.159	0.328***	-0.289
	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.167)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.165)
Number workers	0.010	0.018	0.015	0.012	0.020	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Construction	0.074	0.012	0.107	0.081	0.001	0.105
	(0.074)	(0.129)	(0.092)	(0.075)	(0.133)	(0.094)
Commerce	0.094	0.040	0.083	0.105	0.038	0.085
	(0.060)	(0.094)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.096)	(0.089)
Transport	-0.004	-0.036	-0.011	-0.002	-0.048	-0.009
1	(0.082)	(0.140)	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.144)	(0.108)
Hotel and restaurant	-0.042	-0.062	-0.081	-0.017	-0.055	-0.088
	(0.088)	(0.118)	(0.161)	(0.088)	(0.120)	(0.164)
ICT services	-0.027	-0.046	-0.045	-0.036	-0.131	-0.041
	(0.090)	(0.145)	(0.118)	(0.091)	(0.146)	(0.120)
Finance	-0.012	-0.070	0.016	-0.019	-0.087	0.019
	(0.091)	(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.092)	(0.138)	(0.132)
Real State	-0.153	-0.207	-0.196	-0.134	-0.227	-0.177
	(0.135)	(0.172)	(0.251)	(0.138)	(0.174)	(0.260)
Science	0.165*	-0.069	0.310***	0.166*	-0.071	0.310***
	(0.081)	(0.147)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.146)	(0.089)
Fiscal consultory	-0.034	-0.227	0.134	-0.017	-0.239	0.140
	(0.109)	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.111)	(0.162)	(0.146)
Teaching	0.086	0.012	0.152	0 101	0.011	0 149
Teaching	(0.063)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.063)	(0.097)	(0.093)
Health	0.113	0.002	0.218*	0.122	0.004	0 204*
Troutin	(0.067)	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.068)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Entertainment	0 148	0.207	0.036	0.151	0 204	0.028
Entertainment	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.187)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.191)
Other	0.110)	-0.026	0.107)	0.038	_0.025	0.025
Ould	(0.021)	-0.020	(0,020	(0.050)	-0.025	(0.023)
Executive	(0.032) _0.017	-0.140	0.051	-0.032)	_0 10/	0.0/1)
	-0.017	(0.140)	(0.106)	(0.020)	-0.17 <del>4</del> (0.1/0)	(0.108)
Other official	0.004)	_0.152	0.120	0.004)	_0.100	0.124
Other Official	0.000	-0.132	0.130	0.049	-0.190	0.134

Table A11. Contact hypothesis: relationship between contact and decisi	ons.
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	(0.078)	(0.139)	(0.097)	(0.078)	(0.139)	(0.099)
Human Resources Manager	0.047	-0.035	-0.033	0.025	-0.107	0.000
	(0.126)	(0.181)	(0.202)	(0.127)	(0.185)	(0.209)
Entrepreneur	0.032	-0.222	0.164	0.013	-0.251	0.148
	(0.101)	(0.158)	(0.139)	(0.102)	(0.157)	(0.141)
Worker	0.047	-0.127	0.116	0.037	-0.149	0.111
	(0.067)	(0.121)	(0.085)	(0.068)	(0.120)	(0.087)
Other	0.037	-0.055	0.019	0.024	-0.073	0.008
	(0.075)	(0.130)	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.129)	(0.101)
Right-wing	-0.015	-0.003	-0.047*	-0.030*	-0.015	-0.048*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Income	-0.019	-0.006	-0.014	-0.012	-0.012	-0.015
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Young Anchor	0.068*	0.032	0.077	0.069*	0.033	0.069
	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Old Anchor	0.176***	0.183***	0.144**	0.176***	0.186***	0.140**
	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.049)
govlabor				-0.025	-0.055	-0.011
				(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.030)
govdis				0.012	0.028	0.012
				(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.031)
care				-0.003	0.002	-0.023
				(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.022)
revdisc				0.021	0.016	0.028
				(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.021)
gequality				-0.008	-0.023	0.006
				(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)
quotas				-0.013	-0.005	-0.021
				(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)
past				-0.011	-0.030	0.004
				(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.022)
coequality				0.002	0.002	-0.018
				(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.026)
coequality5				-0.031	0.000	-0.044
				(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.032)
menequality				0.007	-0.010	0.027
				(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.026)
2.hequality				0.098	0.137	0.092
				(0.054)	(0.094)	(0.069)
3.hequality				0.060	0.124	0.036
				(0.045)	(0.076)	(0.058)
womenexec				0.011	0.010	0.020
				(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Observations	1,423	742	681	1,423	742	681

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. This table regresses the probability of guessing that same-age cohort subjects hired, on average, more than 50% of female candidates. Please refer to Table A12 for a codebook of the variables referent to gender equality questions. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.

govlabor	Do you think the government should increase or decrease efforts to keep women in the labor market?
govdis	Do you think the government should increase or decrease political efforts to compensate for the disadvantage women may have in the labor market due to family responsibilities?
care	A husband's responsibility is to earn money, and a woman's responsibility is to take care of the home and family.
revdisc	When women advance in the labor market, some men are displaced or lose their jobs.
gequality	Gender equality is so important that the government should take measures to keep women in the labor market even if it is economically costly.
quotas	Fighting discrimination against women with measures such as gender quotas is a wrong action because it creates discrimination against men.
past	Past generations and certain social norms have interfered with women's self-determination and contributed to building prejudices that prevent women from obtaining relevant job positions.
coequality	How do you think your country is acting in terms of the fight for gender equality?
coequality5	How would you judge the progress in gender equality in your country over the last 5 years?
menequality	How important do you think it is for men to change the labor market dynamics that are unfair to women?
2.hequality	It will happen mainly thanks to government intervention.
3.hequality	Everyone must actively work to pursue it; otherwise, it won't happen.
womenexec	It is a matter of commitment. If women want to reach the highest positions, they must work harder to achieve their goals and attain the same results as men.

 Table A12. Codebook for questions relative to gender equality.

**Note:** Participants rated the level of agreement with these sentences, from 1 totally disagree to 4 totally agree. Note that the values of all questions have been normalized for which the higher the value the higher the gender equality thinking.



**Figure A1.** Proportion of subjects categorized by beliefs about gender differences in performance in CT.



Figure A2a. Proportion of women hired for ST by age group.



Figure A2b. Proportion of women assigned to CT by age group.



Figure A3. Statistical discrimination by age.

**Note:** This figure shows, for each level of signal (y-axis) and for each age group, the difference between the probability of women being hired with respect to the probability of men belonging to the same pool and holding a similar level of signal. The y-axis represents different categories according to the signal. Importantly, in the case where there is more than one man sharing ability with women in each pool, their probability is compared to the mean probability of all men in her pool that have the same level of ability. Probability was estimated by dividing the number of times that each candidate was hired (in each age group) by the total number of employers (in each age group).



Figure A4a. Contact in the workplace.



Figure A4b. Contact in general life.



Figure A5. Evolution of the indicators of '*Power*'.

Note: The graph is own elaboration taking the data from the EIGE.



Figure A6. Evolution of 'Power' among countries.

Note: The graph is own elaboration taking the data from the EIGE.

Estimation technique:		Biv	ariate probit	regression: Pr	Female&Hi	ring)=1 & Pr	(Female&Tas	k)=1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Population	2	All		C	Women		2	Men	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
25-34	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
35-44	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
45-54	0.010**	0.003	0.003	0.012**	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
55-65	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***	0.015**	0.006*	0.006*	0.013*	0.007*	0.007*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Male	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001						
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)						
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006***	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Worker	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self-employed	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income (1-6)	-0.005***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.005*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005**	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favour of									
women	0.013***	0.007***	0.007***	0.006**	0.004**	0.004**	0.019***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.002**	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.002*	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	70.500	70.500	70.500	22.040	22.040	22.040	20.460	20.460	20.460
Observations	/0,500	/0,500	/0,500	52,040	52,040	52,040	38,460	38,460	38,460
Number of employers	1,175	1,175	1,175	534	534	534	641	641	641
Kho			1,000			1,000			1,000

Table B1. The effect of age on managerial decisions in Italy: marginal effects.

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.5.

Table B2. The effect of age on managerial decisions: regional fixed effects.

Estimation technique:		SVY · Riv	variate probit	regression	Pr (Female&	Hiring)=1 &	Pr (Female)	&Task)=1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint	Hiring	Task	Joint
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age (cont)	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.006	-0.003*	-0.003*	-0.037**	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.030*	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age x Male	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.001*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000
				(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004*	-0.001	-0.001
Extreme right (1 0)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0,001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Extreme right x Male	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000
				(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	0.003	0.002*	0.002*	0.003*	0.002*	0.002*	0.003	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.002)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0.002)	(0,001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Worker	0.008	0.004*	0.004*	0.007	0.003*	0.003*	0.007	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0,002)	(0.004)	(0,002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0,002)	(0.002)
Self-empoloved	0.009	0.002	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.000	0.000
zen emporojea	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income (1-6)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0.001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0.002)	(0,001)	(0.001)
Candidate's age	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.010***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***
r oor or canalicates (1-1)	(0.00)	(0.007)	(0,001)	(0.007)	(0,001)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0,001)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favor of women	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.015***	0.007***	0.007***
							(0.002)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Region = $2$ Aragón	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
10051011 _, 11005011	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Region $=$ 3. Asturias	-0.016*	-0.006	-0.006	-0.017*	-0.006	-0.006	-0.021***	-0.007*	-0.007*
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0,003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Region = 4 Cantabria	0.007	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	-0.003	-0.003	0.001	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.023)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Region = 5 Castila-La Mancha	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
Region 3, Custilu Lu Mullena	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Region = 6 Castilla y León	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
Region 0, custina y Leon	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Region = 7. Cataluña	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Region $= 8$ . Extremadura	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = 9. Galicia	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.000	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 10. Islas Baleares	-0.013*	-0.003	-0.003	-0.012	-0.002	-0.002	-0.014*	-0.003	-0.003
6, 16146 E 4164160	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Region = 11. Islas Canarias	-0.010	-0.003	-0.003	-0.010	-0.003	-0.003	-0.008	-0.001	-0.001
6, 10100 Culturius	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 12. La Rioia	-0.020**	-0.006	-0.006	-0.019*	-0.005	-0.005	-0.016	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = $13$ Madrid	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000
region 10, munu	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Region = $15$ Navarra	-0.008	0.002	0.002	-0.007	0.002)	0.002)	-0.008	0.002)	0.002)
Region 15, navalla	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = $16$ País Vasco	-0 004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0 004	-0.002	-0.002
	-0.00 <del>-</del> (0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0 000)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.00 <del>-</del> (0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Region $= 17$ Valencia	_0.009)	_0.004)	_0.004)	_0 001	_0.004)	_0.004)	0.000)	_0.004)	-0.001
	(0.001	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000	(0, 002)	(0.001)
Region = $14$ Muraia	(0.000)	-0.003	-0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)
region 17, multia	-0.032	-0.004	-0.004						

	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.011)						
Observations	48,360	48,360	48,360	47,820	47,820	47,820	47,820	47,820	47,820
Number of employers	806	806	806	797	797	797	797	797	797
Rho			1			1			1

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects. Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). In models 4-9, n=9 observations have been removed for providing missing values. Such observations are all referent to *Región de Murcia*. Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.5.

Table B3. The effect of age on managerial decisions in Italy: regional fixed effects.

Estimation technique		SVV Bi	variate probit	regression	Pr (Female &	Hiring)=1 &	Pr (Female	&Task)=1	
Dependent variable:	Hiring	5 у 1. DIV Таск	Joint	Hiring	Tack	Joint	Hiring	Task	Igint
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age (cont)	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000	0.000
Age (cont)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)
Male	-0.004	(0.000)	(0.000)	-0.030**	-0.01/1**	-0.01/**	(0.000) _0.022*	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wate	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.001 + (0.005))	(0.0014)	(0.022)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age y Male	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
rige A male				(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)
Extreme right (1-5)	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.001
Extende fight (1.5)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Extreme right x Male	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.007**	0.002*	0.002*	0.006*	0.002	0.002
				(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education (1-6)	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0,001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0,001)
Worker	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
Worker	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Self-empoloyed	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000
Sen empoloyed	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income (1-6)	-0.005***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.005***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.005***	-0.000	-0.000
income (1 0)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Beliefs in favour of women	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.013***	0.007***	0.007***
							(0.002)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Candidate's age	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0 006***	-0.002***	-0.006***	-0.006***
Cunardate 5 age	(0.002)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0.002)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0.002)	(0,000)	(0,000)
Candidate's ranking	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.005***
Canalaate 5 Tanking	(0,001)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,001)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0.00)	(0,000)	(0,000)
Pool of candidates (1-4)	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Region = 2. Basilicata	-0.006	-0.009	-0.009	-0.006	-0.009	-0.009	0.000	-0.006	-0.006
10g.011 2, 200.1100.00	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Region = 3. Calabria	0.021*	0.008	0.008	0.022*	0.008	0.008	0.026**	0.010	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = 4. Campania	0.011	0.006	0.006	0.010	0.006	0.006	0.014*	0.007	0.007
<u>8</u>	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 5. Emilia-Romagna	0.008	-0.001	-0.001	0.007	-0.001	-0.001	0.010	0.000	0.000
6 ) 6	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia	0.015	0.004	0.004	0.015	0.004	0.004	0.019*	0.006	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Region = 7. Lazio	0.012*	0.008	0.008	0.012*	0.007*	0.007*	0.015*	0.009*	0.009*
5	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 8, Liguria	0.010	0.004	0.004	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.012	0.006	0.006
5 , 5	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = 9, Lombardia	0.005	-0.000	-0.000	0.005	-0.000	-0.000	0.008	0.001	0.001
8	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region $= 10$ . Marche	0.020	0.006	0.006	0.019	0.005	0.005	0.020	0.005	0.005
5	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = 11. Molise	0.010	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.017	0.017	0.005	0.014	0.014
8,	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Region $= 12$ . Piemonte	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.011	0.004	0.004
8	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 13. Puglia	0.014	0.004	0.004	0.012	0.003	0.003	0.017*	0.005	0.005
6, 0 ·····	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 14. Sardegna	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.015*	0.007	0.007
8, <del>&gt; B</del>	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Region = 15, Sicilia	0.011	0.002	0.002	0.011	0.001	0.001	0.017*	0.004	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)

Region = 16, Toscana	0.008	0.003	0.003	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.010	0.004	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 18, Trentino-Alto Adige	0.006	-0.005	-0.005	0.006	-0.005	-0.005	0.010	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Region = 19, Valle D'Aosta	-0.027***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.027***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.010*
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 20, Umbria	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.017	0.012	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Region $= 21$ , Veneto	0.011	0.001	0.001	0.010	0.001	0.001	0.014	0.003	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region = 22, Estero	0.022***	0.000	0.000	0.021***	-0.001	-0.001	0.015*	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500	70,500
Number of employers	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175
Rho			1			1			1

**Note:** The table shows the marginal effects Observations include 60 decisions made by each employer (15 candidates x 4 pools). Standard errors, clustered at employer level, in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.5.



Figure B1a. Proportion of women hired by region within Spain by gender,



Figure B1b. Proportion of women hired by region within Italy by gender.



Figure B2a. Proportion of women assigned to CT by region within Spain by gender.



Figure B2b. Proportion of women assigned to CT by region within Italy by gender.



Figure B3. Beliefs in favor of women in Italy by gender.

#### MAIN EXPERIMENT -Original instructions in Spanish-

#### **INSTRUCCIONES (1/2)**

Bienvenido/a. En este estudio, te pediremos tomar una serie de decisiones muy simples, con las cuáles podrás ganar una cantidad de dinero. Las normas que determinan tus ganancias se detallan a continuación. La duración de este estudio se estima en unos 15 minutos.

Supón que eres el dueño/a de una empresa. Como dueño/a, tendrás que tomar <u>dos decisiones</u> que consisten en 1) <u>contratar</u> y 2) <u>evaluar</u> a distintos candidatos para tu empresa. Por tanto, te encontrarás con una lista de 15 personas (candidatos/as) que están dispuestas a entrar en tu empresa.

En primer lugar, tendrás que contratar a 6 personas para que trabajen en tu empresa. Esas personas que contrates deberán realizar una tarea, que llamaremos **TAREA 1**, y que consiste en resolver sumas durante 6 minutos. Concretamente, son sumas de tres números con tres dígitos cada uno. Por cada suma que resuelvan correctamente los 6 trabajadores contratados recibirás **2 puntos**. Por ejemplo, supón que has contratado a los trabajadores 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 y 10 y que han resuelto 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 y 12 sumas de forma correcta, respectivamente. Entonces recibirás 84 puntos (42 respuestas correctas x 2 puntos).

En segundo lugar, tendrás que seleccionar a dos de los trabajadores que ya has contratado para realizar una tarea distinta. Esta tarea, que llamaremos **TAREA 2**, va a consistir en resolver problemas matemáticos durante un total de 15 minutos. Por cada problema que resuelvan correctamente los dos trabajadores seleccionados recibirás **7 puntos**. Por ejemplo, de los trabajadores que ya has contratado (1, 3, 4, 6, 7 y 10), supón que seleccionas a los trabajadores 1 y 3 para la TAREA 2. Estos dos trabajadores han resuelto 10 y 12 problemas matemáticos de forma correcta, respectivamente. En este caso, recibirás 154 puntos (22 respuestas correctas x 7 puntos). Estos puntos se añadirán a los que ya has ganado anteriormente. Es decir, ganarás un total de 238 puntos.

A continuación, te mostramos un ejemplo de cada una de las tareas que los candidatos seleccionados realizarán. Cuando estés listo/a, pulsa la **FLECHA** para continuar.

#### **INSTRUCCIONES (2/2)**

En el momento de contratar trabajadores para tu empresa, tendrás la oportunidad de ver el CV de cada una de las personas en la lista. Se te proporcionará un número identificativo, el sexo, la edad y lo que llamamos <u>SEÑAL</u>. Esta señal consiste la productividad (número de sumas correctamente resueltas) en la primera mitad de la TAREA 1. Es decir, si la TAREA 1 tiene 6 minutos de duración, vas a ver el número de sumas resueltas correctamente en los primeros tres minutos de la TAREA 1. No se proporcionará información sobre la productividad en la TAREA 2.

Para la asignación de trabajadores a la **TAREA 2**, observarás la misma información que durante la contratación, pero se sustituirá la señal por la productividad total en la **TAREA 1**. Es decir, en lugar de la productividad en los tres primeros minutos de la tarea, observarás el número total de sumas correctamente resueltas en la totalidad de los 6 minutos que dura la **TAREA 1**. De igual forma, no se proporcionará información sobre la productividad en la **TAREA 2**.

Los candidatos que estás evaluando son personas reales que ya participaron en el estudio anteriormente, donde proporcionaron la información que utilizamos en este estudio.

Tendrás que repetir este proceso 4 veces. Es decir, habrá 4 rondas. En cada una de ellas, verás un grupo de 15 candidatos/as nuevo y tendrás que contratar a 6 personas que trabajarán en la **TAREA 1** y de ellas, deberás seleccionar a 2 personas para la **TAREA 2**. Al final del estudio, elegiremos uno de los cuatro grupos de forma aleatoria para determinar cuáles serán tus ganancias finales. Ten en cuenta que los grupos pueden aparecer desordenados.

A continuación, encontrarás la primera de las listas de candidatos/as. Importante, una vez pulses una flecha para continuar, no podrás volver atrás. Pulsa la **FLECHA** para continuar a la **PRIMERA RONDA**.

## Ejemplo Selección GRUPO 1

### <u>Selecciona 6 trabajadores para tu empresa.</u>

Recuerda que trabajarán en la TAREA 1, que consiste en calcular sumas durante 6 minutos.

<b>ID: #01</b> Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1997 Señal (TAREA 1 - 3 min): 4
<b>ID: #02</b> Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1995 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 6
<b>ID: #03</b> Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1995 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 8
ID: #04 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1997 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 7
<b>ID: #05</b> Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1997 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 5
<b>ID: #06</b> Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1998 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 7
ID: #07 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1995 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 8
ID: #08 Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1996 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 8
ID: #09 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1993 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 6
ID: #10 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1995 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 4
ID: #11 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1997 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 5
ID: #12 Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1999 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 8
ID #13 Sexo: Hombre Fecha de nacimiento: 1995 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 7
ID: #14 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1996 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 6
ID: #15 Sexo: Mujer Fecha de nacimiento: 1996 Señal (TAREA 1 -3 min): 7

Ahora, formularemos una pregunta donde podrás ganar una cantidad de puntos extra. Si la respondes correctamente se añadirán 10 puntos a tus ganancias. Si tu respuesta es incorrecta, no se añadirá nada a tus ganancias.
De la muestra de candidatos que participaron en el estudio anterior donde extrajimos la información, ¿quién crees que tuvo una mayor productividad resolviendo problemas matemáticos (TAREA 2)?

O Los hombres tuvieron más productividad que las mujeres

O Las mujeres tuvieron más productividad que los hombres

O Mujeres y hombres tuvieron la misma productividad

Para finalizar, te pedimos completar el siguiente cuestionario.

# ES MUY IMPORTANTE QUE RESPONDAS A TODAS LAS PREGUNTAS DE FORMA VERÍDICA.

Recuerda que todas tus decisiones en este estudio serán tratadas de forma anónima y únicamente con fines científicos.

# Edad: 16 28 41 53 65 Años

## Género

O Masculino

O Femenino

🔿 Otro

## Comunidad Autónoma:

- O Andalucía
- 🔿 Aragón
- O Asturias
- 🔿 Cantabria
- O Castilla-La Mancha
- 🔿 Castilla y León
- 🔿 Cataluña
- O Extremadura
- O Galicia
- O Islas Baleares
- O Islas Canarias
- 🔿 La Rioja
- Madrid
- O Murcia
- 🔿 Navarra
- 🔿 País Vasco
- 🔿 Valencia
- O Ceuta
- 🔿 Melilla

Nivel de educación:

O Primaria

O Secundaria

O Bachillerato

O Formación Profesional

O Educación Universitaria

O Posgrado

¿Estás empleado actualmente?

O Sí, por cuenta ajena

O Sí, por cuenta propia

O No

¿Por qué estás desempleado?

O Soy estudiante

Otras razones

¿En qué rango se sitúan tus ingresos netos mensuales?

O Menos de 1.000 €

◯ 1.000€-2.000€

○ 2.001€-3.000€

◯ 3.001€-5.000€

◯ 5.001€-10.000€

○ Más de 10.001€

En promedio, ¿en qué rango se sitúan los ingresos netos mensuales de tu entorno familiar? (Con "entorno familiar" nos estamos refiriendo a tus padres)

○ Menos de 1.000 €

◯ 1.000€-2.000€

○ 2.001€-3.000€

◯ 3.001€-5.000€

◯ 5.001€-10.000€

O Más de 10.001€

¿En qué parte del espectro político te situarías?

O Extrema Izquierda

O Centro-Izquierda

O Centro

O Centro-Derecha

O Extrema Derecha

En promedio, ¿qué parte del espectro político dirías que define a tu entorno familiar? (Con "entorno familiar" nos estamos refiriendo a tus padres)

O Extrema Izquierda

O Centro-Izquierda

O Centro

Centro-Derecha

O Extrema Derecha

## MAIN EXPERIMENT -Sample Selection in Italy-

	Female	Male	Total
18-24	112	94	206
25-34	98	100	198
35-44	124	192	316
45-54	108	149	257
55-65	92	106	198
Total	534	641	1,175

## FORECASTS AND SURVEY EXPERIMENT -Original instructions in Spanish-

#### Bienvenido/a!

En este estudio te pediremos hacer una serie de estimaciones sobre diversos escenarios que te iremos describiendo. Tus ganancias dependerán de la precisión de tus estimaciones. A continuación, encontrarás detalles sobre como se calcularán tus ganancias.

#### Lee con atención las siguientes instrucciones

#### **INSTRUCCIONES (1/3)**

Hace un año, condujimos un estudio con la ayuda de la empresa *Bilendi*. Los participantes, inscritos en el panel de *Bilendi*, aceptaron tomar una serie de decisiones que podían hacerles ganar dinero. En este estudio, <u>tu misión será la de prever las decisiones tomadas por los participantes en dicho estudio</u>. Antes de efectuar tus previsiones, te mostraremos las instrucciones completas que recibieron los participantes del primer estudio para ofrecer una clara comprensión del contexto en que tomaron sus decisiones.

Tu recompensa dependerá de la precisión de tus estimaciones. En particular, recibirás hasta 350 puntos menos el (Error Cuadrático Medio/2), donde el Error Cuadrático Medio (ECM) representa la media de las diferencias, al cuadrado, entre tus estimaciones y los valores reales, calculados en base a las elecciones de los participantes en el primer estudio.

# Mas allá de los cálculos, la idea es que mientras más precisas sean tus estimaciones, mayor será tu ganancia.

Ejemplo Aquí verás como se calcularía tu ganancia en base a la precisión de tus estimaciones:

Suponemos que en una de las preguntas: tus estimaciones son: 10 y 19 Y los valores reales del estudio son: 12 y 22.

Para calcular el montante que has ganancia, procedemos a calcular la diferencia entre tus estimaciones y los

valores reales al cuadrado:

Cálculo de las diferencias elevadas al cuadrado:  $(10 - 12)^2 = 4$   $(19 - 22)^2 = 9$ En segundo lugar, calculamos el Error Cuadrático Medio (ECM): Suma de las diferencias cuadradas: 4 + 9 = 13Media de las diferencias cuadradas (ECM): 13 / 2 = 6,5Finalmente, tu pago será calculado de la siguiente forma: Pago = 350 puntos - (ECM/) = 350 - (6,5/2) = 350 - 3,25 = 346,75 puntos

Pulsa la FLECHA para continuar cuando estés listo/a.

# **INSTRUCTIONS (2/3)**

A continuación, te mostramos las instrucciones provistas a los participantes del primer estudio que condujimos, de forma que, antes de efectuar tus estimaciones, puedas tener claro el contexto decisional presentado a los participantes del primer estudio.

#### Instrucciones del estudio implementado hace un año a través de Bilendi

Los participantes tenían el rol del propietario de una empresa y debían tomar dos decisiones clave: Contratar y Seleccionar.

#### Contratación de trabajadores

Los participantes debían contratar 6 candidatos de un grupo de 15. Los candidatos seleccionados debían efectuar un trabajo, denominado **TAREA 1**. Esta tarea consistía en resolver sumas durante 6 minutos, donde cada suma comprendía tres números de tres cifras cada uno. Cada suma resuelta correctamente por cada uno de los candidatos seleccionados suponían 2 puntos de ganancia para los participantes.

**Ejemplo**: Si un propietario contrataba a los candidatos 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 y 10, y estos candidatos resolvían 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 y 12 sumas correctamente, el propietario habría ganado 84 puntos (42 sumas correctas x 2 puntos).

#### Selección de trabajadores

Después, los participantes debían seleccionar a 2 de los trabajadores, entre los que ya habían contratado anteriormente, para trabajar en la **TAREA 2**. Esta nueva tarea consistía en resolver problemas matemáticos durante 15 minutos. Cada problema resuelto correctamente por los dos trabajadores seleccionados hacía ganar 7 puntos a los participantes.

**Ejemplo**: Si un propietario seleccionó a los trabajadores 1 y 3, y estos trabajadores resolvieron respectivamente 10 y 12 problemas correctamente, el propietario ganó 154 puntos (22 problemas correctos x 7 puntos).

Abajo, puedes encontrar un ejemplo de la TAREA 1 y de la TAREA 2.

#### Información Provista

Antes de contratar trabajadores, los participantes tenían la posibilidad de observar el CV de cada candidatos/a, que incluía la siguiente información:

- Número de Identificación - Sexo - Edad - Número de sumas resultas correctamente en los primeros tres minutos de la TAREA 1

Antes de decidir quién de los trabajadores contratados participaba en la **TAREA 2**, los participantes recibieron también información sobre el número de sumas resueltas correctamente en la totalidad de los seis minutos que comprendían la **TAREA 1**.

Los candidatos evaluados fueron individuos reales. Cada participante en el estudio repitió el proceso de Contratación y Selección cuatro veces, cada vez con un grupo nuevo de candidatos. En cada vuelta, los participantes debían contratar 6 trabajadores para la TAREA 1, y entre estos 6, seleccionar a 2 para trabajar en la TAREA 2. Por tanto, en total, cada participante contrató a 16 trabajadores (6 trabajadores x 4 grupos) y asignó a 8 trabajadores a la tarea más complicada (2 trabajadores x 4 grupos). Dentro de cada grupo de candidatos, alrededor de la mitad de los candidatos eran mujeres.

Al final del estudio, se seleccionó de forma aleatoria uno de los cuatro grupos para determinar las ganancias finales de cada participante.

#### Muestra

La muestra de este estudio ascendía a 806 sujetos, de edad comprendida entre los 18 y los 65 años, donde alrededor del 50% eran mujeres.

Pulsa la FLECHA para continuar cuando estés listo/a.

# INSTRUCCIONES (3/3) – Sólo para Young Anchor y Old Anchor

## Resultados para guiar tus estimaciones

A continuación, te pedimos estimar el porcentaje de mujeres contratadas para la **TAREA 1** y después el porcentaje de mujeres asignadas a la **TAREA 2** por los participantes del estudio anterior.

Ahora reportamos los resultados efectivos de 2 de las 16 elecciones efectuadas por los participantes del primer estudio.

A la izquierda, puedes ver el texto de la situación decisional exactamente como fue mostrado a los participantes. A la derecha, podrás ver una escala con un cursor que indica el porcentaje de mujeres contratadas para la TAREA 1 y el de mujeres asignadas a la TAREA 2.

Por ejemplo, en la primera tabla se puede ver que, a nivel medio, el 53% de los candidatos contratados para trabajar en la **TAREA 1** fueron mujeres. Mientras tanto, en la segunda tabla se observa que el 54% de los trabajadores asignados a la **TAREA 2** fueron mujeres.

# **DECISIONES**

Hemos dividido a los participantes del estudio anterior en distintos grupos: por edad y por sexo.

Te pedimos estimar el **porcentaje de mujeres candidatas que cada grupo contrató para la TAREA 1** y **el porcentaje de mujeres que cada grupo seleccionó para la TAREA 2**. Utiliza la barra para indicar tus estimaciones.

#### Edad del grupo de participantes: 18-24 años

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
"% de mujeres contratadas para la TAREA 1"											
"% de mujeres seleccionadas para la TAREA 2"											



# 

"% de mujeres contratadas para la TAREA 1"	
"% de mujeres seleccionadas para la TAREA 2"	

De las 14 estimaciones que has hecho, ¿cuántas crees que están dentro de los 10 puntos porcentuales de diferencia con respecto a los valores reales?

Estamos planificando administrar este estudio a diversos grupos de personas. Querríamos saber como crees que se comportarán las personas en esta misma tarea en base a sus características personales: sexo, edad, actividad laboral, ideología política, nivel de educación y experiencia laboral.

Según tú, ¿los participantes hombres son más/menos/igualmente acertados que las mujeres en sus estimaciones?

O Los hombres son más acertados que las mujeres

O Los hombres son menos acertados que las mujeres

O Mujeres y hombres son igualmente acertados

¿Los participantes más jóvenes son más/menos/igualmente acertados que los participantes menos jóvenes?

🔘 Los más jóvnees son más acertados que los menos jóvenes

O Los más jóvenes son menos acertados que los menos jóvenes

O Jóvenes y menos jóvenes son igualmente acertados

¿Los participantes con orientación política de derechas son más/menos/igualmente acertados que los participantes con orientación política de izquierdas?

O Los participantes de derechas son más acertados que los de izquierdas

O Los participantes de derechas son menos acertados que los de izquierdas

O Los participantes de derechas e izquierdas son igualmente acertados

¿Los participantes más educados son más/menos/igualmente acertados que los participantes menos educados?

O Los participantes más educados son más acertados que los participantes menos educados

O Los participantes más educados son menos acertados que los participantes menos educados

O Educados y menos educados son igualmente acertados

¿Los participantes más ricos son más/menos/igualmente acertados que los participantes más pobres?

O Los participantes más ricos son más acertados que los participantes más pobres

O Los participantes más ricos son menos acertados que los participantes más pobres

O Ricos y pobres son igualmente acertados

¿Los participantes con más experiencia laboral son más/menos/igualmente acertados que los participantes con menos experiencia?

O Los participantes con más experiencia laboral son más acertados que los participantes con menos experiencia

O Los participantes con más experiencia laboral son menos acertados que los participantes con menos experiencia

O Los participantes con más o menos experiencial laboral son igualmente acertados

¿Las personas más expuestas a trabajar con mujeres son más/menos/igualmente acertadas que las personas menos expuestas a trabajar con mujeres?

C Las personas más expuestas a trabajar con mujeres son más acertadas que las personas menos expuestas a trabajar con mujeres

C Las personas más expuestas a trabajar con mujeres son menos acertadas que las personas menos expuestas a trabajar con mujeres

O Las personas más y menos expuestas son igualmente acertadas

Te preguntamos ahora algunas opiniones personales. ES FUNDAMENTAL QUE TODAS TUS **RESPUESTAS SEAN VERÍDICAS.** Recuerda que todas las respuestas de este estudio serán tratadas de forma anónima y exclusivamente con fines científicos.

¿Crees que el gobierno debe aumentar o disminuir los esfuerzos para mantener a las mujeres en el mercado de trabajo?

O Disminuir mucho

O Disminuir un poco

O Mantener el nivel actual

O Aumentar un poco

O Aumentar mucho

¿Crees que el gobierno debería aumentar o disminuir los esfuerzos políticos para compensar la desventaja que las mujeres pueden tener en el mercado de trabajo debido a las responsabilidades familiares?

O Disminuir mucho

- O Disminuir un poco
- O Mantener el nivel actual
- O Aumentar un poco
- O Aumentar mucho

La responsabilidad de un marido es ganar dinero, la responsabilidad de una mujer es estar al cuidado de la casa y de la familia

O Totalmente de acuerdo

- O De acuerdo
- O Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
- O En desacuerdo
- O Totalmente en desacuerdo

Cuando las mujeres avanzan en el mercado de trabajo, algunos hombres son expulsados o pierden su puesto de trabajo.

- O Totalmente de acuerdo
- O De acuerdo
- O Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
- O En desacuerdo
- O Totalmente en desacuerdo

La igualdad de género es tan importante que el gobierno debería adoptar medidas para mantener a las mujeres en el mercado de trabajo aunque sea costoso económicamente.

O Totalmente de acuerdo

O De acuerdo

O Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo

O En desacuerdo

O Totalmente en desacuerdo

Combatir la discriminación contra las mujeres con medidas como las cuotas de género es una acción equivocada porque crea discriminación contra los hombres.

O Totalmente de acuerdo

O De acuerdo

O Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo

O En desacuerdo

O Totalmente en desacuerdo

Las generaciones pasadas y algunas normas sociales han interferido con la autodeterminación de las mujeres y han contribuído a construir prejuicios que impiden a las mujeres obtener posiciones laborales de relevancia.

O Totalmente de acuerdo

O De acuerdo

O Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo

O En desacuerdo

O Totalmente en desacuerdo

¿Cómo crees que tu país está actuando en términos de lucha por la igualdad de género?

O Muy mal

🔿 Mal

○ Ni bien ni mal

O Bien

O Muy bien

¿Cómo juzgarías los avances en la igualdad de género en tu país durante los últimos 5 años?

O Fuerte retroceso

O Ningún cambio

O Algún progreso

O Fuerte progreso

¿Cómo crees que se logrará la igualdad de género?

O Sucederá espontáneamente en el tiempo

O Llegará sobre todo gracias a la intervención del Estado

O Todos deben trabajar activamente para perseguirlo; de lo contrario no sucederá.

¿Qué importancia crees que tiene para los hombres cambiar la dinámica del mercado laboral que es injusta con las mujeres?

O Extremadamente importante

O Muy importante

O Moderadamente importante

O No es importante

Es una cuestión de compromiso. Si las mujeres quieren llegar a los puestos más altos, deben trabajar más para alcanzar sus objetivos y lograr los mismos resultados que los hombres.

O Totalmente de acuerdo

O De acuerdo

 $\bigcirc$  Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo

O En desacuerdo

○ Totalmente en desacuerdo

Te preguntamos ahora información socio-demográfica.

Edad:	16	28	41	53	65
Años	1				

Indica el género en que te reconoces:

O Masculino

○ Femenino

Otro

Indica tu región de residencia:

- O Andalucía
- 🔿 Aragón
- O Baleares
- O Canarias
- O Cantabria
- 🔿 Castilla La Mancha
- 🔿 Castilla y León
- 🔿 Cataluña
- 🔿 Ceuta
- O Comunidad de Madrid
- Extremadura
- O Galicia
- 🔿 La Rioja
- O Melilla
- O Murcia
- 🔿 Navarra
- 🔿 País Vasco
- O Principado de Asturias
- O Comunidad Valenciana

Nivel de educación:

O Primaria

O Secundaria

- O Bachillerato
- O Formación Profesional
- O Estudios Universitarios
- O Master

O Doctorado

# Estado civil:

🔿 Casado/a

O Separado/a, Divorciado/a

O Soltero/a

¿Cuántos hijos tienes?

En tu vida personal (piensa en la familia y los amigos frecuentes), ¿qué porcentaje de personas que frecuentas son mujeres? No incluir el símbolo "%".

Durante toda tu vida, ¿has tenido más contacto con hombres o con mujeres?

O Mujeres

○ Hombres

O Igual

Ingresos mensuales netos:

○ Menos de 1.000 €

○ 1.000€-2.000€

○ 2.001€-3.000€

◯ 3.001€-5.000€

◯ 5.001€-10.000€

O Más de 10.001€

En media, ¿dónde se colocarían los ingresos mensuales netos de tu nucleo familiar? (Con 'nucleo familiar' nos referimos a tu familia más estrecha)

○ Menos de 1.000 €

○ 1.000€-2.000€

○ 2.001€-3.000€

◯ 3.001€-5.000€

○ 5.001€-10.000€

O Más de 10.001€

¿Trabajas actualmente?

O Sí, por cuenta ajena

O Sí, por cuenta propia

O No

¿Por qué no trabajas?

O Estudio

 $\bigcirc$  Otros motivos

¿En qué sector opera tu empresa?

O Público

O Privado

ONG

¿Cuántos trabajadores hay en tu empresa?

O Menos de 10

0 10-49

0 50-249

O Más de 250

 $\bigcirc$ 

¿En qué año comenzaste a trabajar en tu empresa?

## 19501957196519721980198719942002200920172024



¿En qué sector opera tu empresa?

- ◯ Industria
- Construcción
- Comercio
- Trasporte
- O Servicio de alojamiento y restauración
- Servicios ICT
- Finanzas
- 🔿 Inmobiliaria
- O Actividades científicas y técnicas
- Servicios de consultoría fiscal
- O Docencia
- Salud
- Servicios recreativos
- O Otros

¿Cuál es tu responsabilidad laboral?

Manager
Ejecutivo
Otro oficial
Jefe de recursos humanos
Emprendedor
Trabajador
Otro

¿En qué año conseguiste este rol?

19501957196519721980198719942002200920172024



En tu actividad laboral (piensa en tus compañeros y clientes/usuarios), ¿qué porcentaje de personas con las que tienes contacto está representado por mujeres? (no insertar el símbolo %)

Durante tu vida laboral, ¿has tenido más contacto con mujeres que con hombres?

O Mujeres

○ Hombres

🔿 Igual

¿Crees que los ascensos de carrera son igualmente accesibles a todos los sexos en tu lugar de trabajo?

O Totalmente de acuerdo

O De acuerdo

O Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo

O En desacuerdo

O Totalmente en desacuerdo

¿Existen políticas específicas en tu organización que apoyen la igualdad de género (por ejemplo, políticas antidiscriminatorias, capacitación sobre diversidad de género, cuotas de género)?

🔿 Sí

🔿 No

🔿 No lo sé

Si se vota hoy, ¿en qué parte del espectro político te situarías?

O Extrema izquierda

O Centro-izquierda

O Centro

O Centro-derecha

O Extrema derecha

En promedio, ¿en qué parte del espectro político dirías que se ubica tu nucleo familiar? (Con 'nucleo familiar' nos referimos a tus padres)

O Extrema izquierda

O Centro-izquierda

O Centro

O Centroderecha

O Extrema derecha

Age	Male	Female	binar	Total			
		No Anchor					
18-24	37	46	0	83			
25-34	46	72	2	120			
35-44	37	42	0	79			
45-54	56	39	0	95			
55-65	68	49	0	117			
Total	244	248	2	494			
	Young Anchor						
18-24	39	43	0	82			
25-34	51	62	0	113			
35-44	44	52	0	96			
45-54	37	43	0	80			
55-65	57	48	1	106			
Total	228	248	1	477			
	Old Anchor						
18-24	34	63	0	97			
25-34	37	60	3	100			
35-44	43	42	0	85			
45-54	49	44	0	93			
55-65	56	54	0	110			
Total	219	263	3 485				

#### FORECASTS AND SURVEY EXPERIMENT -Sample Selection in Spain-

## CANDIDATES' EXPERIMENT - Experimental Design-

The pools of candidates were generated from the information collected in a previous, separated experiment ("candidates' experiment"). 128 subjects were asked to fill a short CV with baseline information: year of birth, gender and field of study. They were asked to perform the adding task (stage 1) and the mathematical task (stage 2) for which they earned 0.5 Euro per each correct calculation and 1.5 Euro per each problem correctly solved, respectively. A random task was selected for payments at the end of the experiment in order to avoid wealth effects.

To guarantee comparability between the two experiments and create a credible environment for participants in the role of candidate, each session of the candidates' experiment also included participants in the role of evaluator that made hiring decisions (stage 3). These evaluators were excluded in the final dataset.

32 subjects participated in each session. In each session, participants were randomly assigned the role of Employer (N=2) or Worker (N=30). Each Employer was randomly matched with a group of 15 Workers and

was asked to make two decisions. First, employers had to select six workers to conform a team. And second, they had to assign the six selected Workers to two different tasks. Specifically, they had to assign four workers to an Easy Task and two workers to a Hard Task. The Easy Task (i.e. a less complex and profitable task) and the Hard Task (a more complex and profitable task) corresponded to the tasks in Part 1 and Part 2, respectively. We provided Employers with Workers' ID, Gender, Year of Birth, Field of Study and a Signal of performance (i.e. number of correct calculations obtained in the first half of the Easy Task). It comprised two rounds.

In each round, employers made the same decisions over the same group but differed in the role of workers. In the first round, workers played a passive role. They received  $\in 10$  if resulted hired and assigned to the Hard Task,  $\in 6$  if resulted hired and assigned to the Easy Task and  $\in 2$  if not hired. In the second round, workers made one decision. They had to decide whether to participate in the hiring process or not. All workers were endowed with  $\in 4$ . Those who decided to opt-out kept the whole endowment and their profile was removed from the pool of workers. The decision to participate in the selection process cost  $\in 2$  and had three possible outcomes: 1) being not hired, 2) being hired and assigned to the Hard Task, or 3) being hired and assigned to the Easy Task. Workers who participated in the selection and were discarded lost the participation fee and earned the remaining  $\epsilon 2$ . Workers who participated, resulted hired and assigned either to Hard Task or the Easy Task recovered the participation fee and received  $\epsilon 8$  and  $\epsilon 4$  respectively. Then, at the end, Workers assigned to the Hard Task received  $\epsilon 12$  and Workers assigned to the Easy Task received  $\epsilon 8$ . The decisions of employers and workers were not simultaneous, workers made their decision first. Therefore, depending on the decision of the workers, the employers may have been confronted with a different number of candidates in the first stage/decision.

The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at BLESS, the experimental laboratory of the University of Bologna (Italy). Subjects were undergraduate students Sciences, Social Sciences, Engineering and Foreign Languages at the University of Bologna, recruited via ORSEE. From November to December 2018, 128 subjects (57% female) participated divided in 2 sessions of 32 subjects per treatment (4 sessions in total). Sessions were not gender-balanced. All treatments were run in a between-subjects design and none participated in more than one treatment. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments. The duration of each session was about 90 minutes. In each session, once arrived at the lab, instructions were read aloud and subjects were informed that Part 4 and one randomly selected part among Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3 will be relevant for payments, in order to avoid wealth effects. If Part 3 was selected for payments, of the two rounds was relevant for payments in a second random draw. The average payment was about €15.

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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

> Strada Maggiore 45 40125 Bologna - Italy Tel. +39 051 2092604 Fax +39 051 2092664 http://www.dse.unibo.it