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# Prosociality Beyond In-Group Boundaries: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Selection and Intergroup Interactions in a Multiethnic European Metropolis

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**Abstract:** How does prosocial behavior extend beyond in-group boundaries in multiethnic societies? The differentiation of Western societies presents an opportunity to understand the tension between societal pressures that push people outside the comfort zones of their familiar networks to constructively interact with unknown diverse others and the tendency toward homophily and in-group favoritism. We introduce a three-step model of out-group exposure that includes macrostructural conditions for intergroup encounters and microlevel dynamics of intergroup selection and interaction. Using lab-in-the-field experiments with a large representative sample of Italian natives and immigrants from the multiethnic city of Milan, we find that, when pushed to interact with non-coethnics, Italians generally treat them similarly to how they treat coethnics and value signs of social and market integration. However, when given the opportunity to select their interaction partners, Italians favor coethnics over immigrants. Taken together, these results help reconcile classical findings concerning the positive effects of intergroup contact with evidence documenting the persistence of out-group discrimination in selection processes.

**Keywords:** prosociality; trust; contact; ethnic diversity; immigration; Italy; lab-in-the-field experiment

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
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HOW does prosocial behavior extend beyond in-group boundaries in multiethnic societies? Recent waves of immigration and the increased ethnic diversity of North America and Western Europe have drawn renewed scholarly attention to the effects of out-group exposure on prosocial behavior. Although proponents of contact theory (Allport 1954; Paluck, Green, and Green 2019; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) and recent field experimental research (Boisjoly et al. 2006; Carrell, Hoekstra and West 2015; Finseraas et al. 2019; Mousa 2020; Scacco and Warren 2018) point to the positive effects of interpersonal contact across ethnic boundaries, scholarship on the effects of ethnic heterogeneity—for example, residing in an ethnically homogeneous versus heterogeneous neighborhood—hints to a negative effect of ethnic diversity on a host of social outcomes, including trust and public goods provision (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000a, 2000b; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Costa and Kahn 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005; Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008; Putnam 2007).

To reconcile these two apparently contradictory results, scholars have pointed to the distinction between the effects of contextual exposure and actual intergroup contact (Hewstone 2015; Laurence 2014; Schmid, Al Ramiah, and Hewstone 2014;

Stein, Post and Rinden 2000). Whereas an increase in the number of out-group members might trigger the perception of threat and intergroup conflict (Blalock 1967; Enos 2017; Olzak 1992), actual contact in the form of ethnically heterogeneous networks of friends and acquaintances might reduce prejudice and hostility (Hewstone 2015; Uslaner 2012). In other words, the increase in out-group exposure brought about by recent migratory patterns might either increase hostility or lower prejudice among natives, depending on whether immigrants' presence triggers systematic avoidance or fruitful interactions. In this article, we document how majority group members approach social interactions with immigrants and use an experimental magnifying lens to zoom in on microlevel dynamics of intergroup selection and intergroup contact, to better understand how people living in ethnically diverse contexts, and the majority, in particular, navigate different types of interactions with both coethnics and non-coethnics.

Building on different strands of research on prosocial behavior, intergroup contact, and ethnoracial diversity, we introduce a comprehensive analytical framework conceptualizing out-group exposure as a process that encompasses three constitutive steps: first, the macrostructural factors that create the *opportunity (and necessity)* for intergroup contact; second, individual-level decisions concerning the *selection* of interaction partners; and third, the actual experience of intergroup *contact*. In principle, to assess the overall effects of out-group exposure and fully understand how prosociality emerges in complex societies, we need to consider these three steps in combination. Empirically, leveraging variation at the macrolevel while also capturing microlevel dynamics proved prohibitive at this stage of the research. In our study, we hence hold the macrostructural conditions constant by focusing on people living in a multiethnic metropolis and investigate the latter two steps of the process, using lab-in-the-field experiments to disentangle the dynamics of intergroup selection and intergroup contact. Doing so allows us to capture the tension between basic tendencies toward homophily and in-group favoritism and societal pressures to move beyond in-group boundaries in purposive social interactions.

What is the nature of prosociality in complex diverse societies? Mainstream conceptions of social capital and, more generally, prosocial behavior are (implicitly) based on homogeneous communities, where close-knit networks facilitate the emergence of shared norms of reciprocity, cooperation, and sanctioning (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2007).<sup>1</sup> However, sociologists have long acknowledged that solidarity and cooperation in complex societies may not derive from the type of mechanical solidarity that makes homogeneous communities thrive. As Durkheim powerfully theorized more than a century ago, solidarity in complex societies derives from interdependence and the division of labor, rather than from cultural similarity and mutual acquaintanceship (Durkheim 1984; Portes and Vickstrom 2011; Simmel 1955). In this article, we build on this core intuition to provide a deeper understanding of the processes through which prosociality extends beyond close-knit networks and crosses group boundaries (Baldassarri and Abascal 2020; Ermisch and Gambetta 2010; Henrich et al. 2001; Yamagishi 2011). To do so, we depart from scholarship adjudicating whether ethnic diversity undermines solidarity and refrain from comparing heterogeneous to homogeneous communities, exclusively focusing on people living in ethnoracially diverse social settings.

First, we consider the *macrostructural factors* that create opportunities for encounters across ethnic boundaries. People in modern societies are often pushed outside the comfort zones of their familiar networks to constructively interact with unknown others (Ermisch and Gambetta 2010; Yamagishi 2011). In particular, economic interdependence, by fostering purposive interactions in economic settings, likely constitutes a primary source of exposure to out-group members (Baldassarri 2020; Henrich et al. 2001). In turn, the social and market integration of minorities and immigrants often contributes to reduce bias toward them (Alba and Nee 2005; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Portes, Parker, and Cobas 1980; Zhang et al. 2019).

This framework does not assume that individuals would seamlessly cross inter-group boundaries or that they would be inclined to treat non-coethnics in the same way as coethnics. As we know from decades of social network studies, homophily in social relations is particularly marked along racial and ethnic lines due to both social structure and individual choice (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Moody 2001). And, according to social identity theory (Balliet, Wu and De Dreu 2014; Tajfel and Turner 1979), individuals have a tendency to play it safe and favor members of their in-group. However, the interdependence and division of labor of life in contemporary urban settings have made constructive interactions with out-group members, and non-coethnics, in particular, an everyday necessity, because individuals' material needs cannot be satisfied within their immediate social networks. To understand prosociality in complex societies, we therefore need to balance the tension between homophily and in-group favoritism, on the one hand, and societal pressures to move beyond in-group boundaries, on the other. Accordingly, in addition to the macrostructural factors that push people to interact with out-group members, our three-step model of out-group exposure identifies two microlevel components that affect intergroup contact. Namely, step 2 considers the network dynamics of *selection* into homogeneous versus diverse interaction settings, capturing the active role people play in selecting their interaction partners, as well as the consequent formation of social networks, and the role of previous exposure and diverse social networks in affecting future opportunities of contact. Finally, our third and last step concerns the actual experience of *contact* with out-group members, which in turn affects attitudes toward non-coethnics, and the likelihood of future interactions with them.

Overall, in our model, generalized prosociality develops from a multiplicity of microinteractions in everyday settings. We posit that the enhanced frequency of interactions with out-group members typical of complex societies is likely to contribute to the "normalization" of experiences, and, overall, be conducive to greater generalized prosociality. However, the overall societal effect of social differentiation cannot be understood separate from the dynamics of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination that operate by systematically limiting opportunities for out-group contact and social integration.

We apply this model to the study of interaction dynamics between natives and immigrants in a multicultural European metropolis, Milan (Italy). We go beyond generic assessments of trust to measure actual behavior toward coethnics and non-coethnics in a series of behavioral games and other experimental activities

with a representative sample of Milan residents, including both Italian natives and immigrants of different national origins in our sample. We consider both nonstrategic interactions that capture general levels of altruism toward coethnics and non-coethnics, and strategic interactions, in which the participants' behavior is affected by expectations about alters' behavior, based on their perceived trustworthiness and competence. Moreover, available information about interaction partners is not limited to their ethnicity: it also encompasses their embeddedness in the social and economic life of the metropolis, thus favoring a conceptualization of individuals that does not exclusively rely on stereotypical views of natives and immigrants.

Our operationalization of out-group exposure includes both the process of selection of interaction partners as well as what people actually do when paired with coethnics and non-coethnics in specific interaction settings. Finally, combining behavior in our experimental setting with detailed information about our participants' social network composition provides suggestive evidence of the role past experiences may play in informing people's behavior toward non-coethnics. Thanks to our comprehensive conceptualization of out-group exposure, we help reconcile classical findings concerning the positive effects of intergroup contact with evidence documenting the persistence of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.

We find that Italians display similar levels of altruism toward coethnics and non-coethnics, and they do not discriminate in strategic interactions involving trust and competence. They also value signs of active participation in the economic and civil life of the city. However, when given the opportunity to select their interaction partners, Italians prefer to interact with coethnics rather than immigrants. Taken together, these results are in line with the tenets of our theory of prosocial behavior: although in-group preference persists and drives the selection of interaction partners, when pushed out of their comfort zone and forced to interact with non-coethnics, Italians generally treat them similarly to how they treat coethnics in both strategic and nonstrategic interaction dynamics. In addition, both the choice of non-coethnics as well as their treatment are strongly related to the extent to which individuals have immigrants in their friendship networks, thus supporting the idea that previous experience with non-coethnics is likely to lead to further exposure and positive interactions, reducing in-group bias and fostering generalized altruism.

Taken together, these results contribute to make sense of the persistence of discriminatory behavior toward minorities and immigrants in selection processes as well as confirm contact theory's finding that interaction with out-group members, especially when it occurs among individuals sharing common goals, is likely to foster prosociality. We speculate that several market transactions are likely to satisfy these conditions, for their very nature of being settings in which people from different walks of life exchange complementary goods, skills, or capabilities.

## Economic Interdependence and Prosocial Behavior: Theory and Measurement

How does prosocial behavior extend beyond close-knit homogeneous social groups? Insights from various strains of research suggest that the economic and social interdependence of complex societies might favor the development of generalized prosocial behavior (Baldassarri and Abascal 2020; Henrich and Ensminger 2014; Hirschman 1982; Zaki, Neumann, and Baltiansky 2021). Studies of cross-cultural variation in prosocial behavior have shown that societies in which people extensively rely on market exchange in their daily lives display greater fairness and cooperative behavior (Ensminger 2004; Henrich et al. 2001, 2010). Market integration—and, in particular, the experience of mutually satisfying transactions among strangers—is theorized to be beneficial for the development of “abstract sharing principles concerning behaviors toward strangers” (Henrich et al. 2001:76). Further research has also shown that greater market integration is not only related to altruism toward generic strangers but it also specifically extends to immigrants, thus crossing ethnic boundaries (Baldassarri 2020).

Similar efforts to understand generalized prosociality support the idea that trust in strangers is enhanced by structural conditions that push individuals beyond the comfort zone of their most proximate social circles (e.g., family, religion, and ethnicity) to interact with unknown dissimilar others. For instance, Yamagishi’s emancipation theory of trust is built on the observation that individualistic societies, such as the United States, display higher levels of generalized trust than collectivist societies, such as Japan. The intense group ties typical of the Japanese society are a guarantee of security but prevent trust from developing beyond group boundaries. In contrast, the greater mobility and uncertainty that U.S. individuals generally face force them to trust unknown others more often and become “competent” at doing so (Gheorgiou, Vignoles and Smith 2009; Yamagishi 2011; Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe 1998). Experimentally testing the basic tenets of this theory at the individual level, Gambetta and coauthors show that strong group and family ties inhibit generalized trust. In contrast, loose family connections and, moreover, having experienced uprooting events, such as a divorce, or the pandemic, is associated with a greater likelihood to trust strangers (Ermisch and Gambetta 2010; Gambetta and Morisi 2022).

Taken together, these contributions point to the importance of exogenous forces, such as market interdependence, in understanding how prosocial behavior may extend beyond the boundaries of the in-group in multiethnic urban environments. Indeed, when individual needs cannot be satisfied within small social circles, constructive interactions with out-group members become an everyday necessity. And economic transactions may constitute a primary setting for mutually satisfactory interactions with dissimilar others for their very nature of being an exchange between individuals who have different goods or skills to trade (Baldassarri 2020). Commonality of interests has been shown to reduce the relevance of ethnoracial markers in the categorization of others (Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001). It follows that the type of prosociality that holds complex societies together likely derives from positive experiences in strategic interaction settings (Hirschman 1982;



Simmel 1955) and differs from mechanic solidarity based on collective identification that glues homogeneous societies together (Portes and Vickstrom 2011). Relevant, thus, becomes the distinction between commonality-based solidarity that derives from shared identities (Cummins and Barnett 2021) and prosocial behavior that derives from generalized exchange (Bearman 1997; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007).

These theoretical considerations concerning the nature of prosociality in complex social settings have important consequences for our research design and measurement in particular. Namely, we need to deploy data-collection strategies that, first, capture the interdependence of human behavior, and thus the relational nature of prosocial behavior, and, second, encompass the variety of interaction dynamics that populate everyday experiences, including strategic interactions. If economic interdependence and market exchanges play a major role in determining the material outcomes of immigrants and their inclusion in the broader polity, the study of native-immigrant interactions should go beyond the study of empathetic manifestations of solidarity—think of clothes donations or other forms of charity, for instance—and also consider more instrumental patterns of relationships, such as the decision to hire or rent to a non-coethnic.

Generic measures of trust or prejudice, such as the classic question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” have been widely criticized for being ambiguous—not specifying “who” can be trusted and for what—and for their limited behavioral validity (Ermisch et al. 2009; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Glaeser et al. 2000; Karlan 2005). In particular, these measures are clearly suboptimal in research like ours, which is sensitive to the relational nature of prosociality and thus interested in documenting trust and solidarity toward different groups. Our interest in discerning behavior in strategic as well as nonstrategic social settings further calls for moving beyond self-reported attitudinal measures of prosociality. Accordingly, we embraced the use of lab-in-the-field behavioral games and other behavioral activities in this research (Baldassarri and Abascal 2017; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Camerer 2011; Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; Gerber and Green 2012).

Seminal, in this regard, was Habyarimana et al.’s (2009) study of ethnic diversity and its effects on public goods provision, in which lab-in-the-field behavioral games were used to dissect interactions between coethnics and non-coethnics in highly diverse neighborhoods of Kampala, Uganda. Interestingly, they do not find evidence of in-group favoritism (also referred to as out-group animus- or taste-based discrimination): in an anonymous Dictator Game, participants are equally generous toward coethnics and non-coethnics. Instead, their findings suggest that stronger norms dictate cooperation with coethnics than non-coethnics in interactions that entail risk. Moreover, difficulties in communication across ethnic lines, due to linguistic differences or fewer social network connections with out-group members, may constitute an additional obstacle to intergroup cooperation. Findings from this research inspired other studies to go beyond arguments based on other-regarding preferences to investigate various mechanisms that might affect collective outcomes in diverse settings. Focusing on natives and immigrants interactions, field

experiments in urban European settings have documented differential sanctioning of norm violation (Winter and Zhang 2018) and the importance of shared norms (Choi, Poertner, and Sambanis 2019). Instead, paying attention to cultural and religious differences, Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2016) rely on a combination of behavioral games to investigate Muslim integration in France, disentangling the religious and ethnic component, whereas Enos and Gidron (2016) use multisite lab-in-the-field experiments to study the role of residential segregation in increasing intergroup tensions among ultra-orthodox and secular Jews in Israel.

In a recent review and assessment of the political science scholarship on intergroup contact, Nathan and Sands (2023) acknowledge the extent to which recent contributions have moved beyond the classic psychology literature on contact theory, to incorporate the contextual features of the local environment and a broader set of mechanisms. Rather than aiming for a holistic assessment of contact theory, their proposed approach invites scholars to engage with more specific contextual theories and mechanisms. Our contribution follows in these footsteps, relying on lab-in-the-field behavioral games to understand native-immigrant relationships in both nonstrategic and strategic interaction settings in a multiethnic European metropolis. In particular, as outlined in the next section, we dissect the process of out-group exposure into its core components, and by analytically distinguishing between the dynamics of intergroup selection from actual contact, we provide a better understanding of the combined effects of in-group favoritism and out-group contact in everyday social settings. This style of research complements results from cross-cultural comparisons on in-group and out-group trust (Henrich et al. 2001; Romano et al. 2017) with contextually specific findings.

## Intergroup Exposure, Selection, and Contact

The idea that economic and social interdependence might foster generalized prosociality by pushing people to interact with unknown different others is based on the assumption that contact with the out-group would generally lead to positive outcomes. This is, indeed, the main tenet of contact theory, according to which sustained, positive interactions with out-group members can reduce prejudice, especially under optimal circumstances, such as common goals, equal status among groups, and a supportive institutional environment (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).

However, despite a large volume of research showing that intergroup contact reduces prejudice and hostility (Paluck et al. 2019); this is not yet considered as a settled dispute in the literature. This position is often challenged by other research suggesting that out-group exposure, especially in the context of competition over scarce resources, might exacerbate group threat and conflict (Olzak 1992; Blalock 1967). Recent research on the negative effects of ethnoracial diversity on prosocial behavior often relies on this latter argument (Putnam 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000b; Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020). Similarly, some research that exploited the sudden relocation of refugees in European countries in 2015/2016 find a negative effect of refugees arrival on attitudes toward asylum seekers, immigration policy preferences, and political engagement (Hangartner et al. 2019); although




others found no effect or mixed results (Deiss-Helbig and Remer 2022; Schaub, Gereke and Baldassarri 2021; Schmidt, Jacobsen and Iglauer 2023; Steinmayr 2021), suggesting that the effects of out-group exposure may differ across contexts.

A closer look at microlevel dynamics helps reconcile these views. “(D)iverse communities are dynamic and contested spaces, in which both attitudes of receptiveness and threat may be present among residents” (Laurence 2014:p. 1332). In particular, scholars have drawn attention to the analytical distinction between contextual exposure and actual intergroup contact (Hewstone 2015; Laurence 2014; Stein et al. 2000; Dinesen et al. 2020; Steinmayr 2021). Whereas casual contextual exposure, generally measured as the proportion of out-group members in a neighborhood, might trigger the perception of threat and intergroup conflict (Enos 2017; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015; Lancee and Schaeffer 2015), actual and extended intergroup contact might moderate, or counter this effect, reducing prejudice, correcting stereotypes, and fostering trust (Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008; Schmid et al. 2014; Koopmans and Veit 2014; Gundelach and Freitag 2014; Mo and Conn 2018). For instance, among White British majority residents, the negative direct effect of neighborhood diversity is almost fully countervailed by the increase in trust that derives from positive contact and lower threat (Schmid et al. 2014). Similarly, U.S. whites who live in diverse communities and have a diverse network of friends and acquaintances do not display low levels of trust. It is white natives who, despite living in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, have maintained homogeneous social networks that seem to suffer from the presence of non-coethnics (Uslaner 2012).<sup>2</sup>

Central to this analytical distinction between contextual exposure and actual intergroup contact is the fact that the heterogeneity of people’s networks does not simply resemble the level of diversity of the places they inhabit: in fact, social networks are generally less heterogeneous than population as a whole (Marsden 1990). When studying people’s tendency to associate with similar others, scholars distinguish between structural and choice homophily (McPherson et al. 2001; Moody 2001; Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954). In the context of interethnic relationships, living or working in an ethnically diverse context creates structural conditions for intergroup contact. However, individuals have some agency over whether to form relationships with non-coethnics. In diversifying contexts, self-selection into coethnic relationships, or simply certain inertia in forming new relationships, might help explain how it is possible for people to live in ethnically heterogeneous contexts and isolate in relatively homogeneous social networks.<sup>3</sup> In this article, we cast some light on this aspect, focusing on the process of selection of interaction partners as a precursor of intergroup contact.

To summarize our analytical framework, we dissect the process of out-group exposure and contact into its constituent components. Figure 1 summarizes this process in a three-step model. First, as discussed in the previous section, there are macrostructural factors that favor out-group exposure. Second, we should consider individuals’ willingness to interact with non-coethnics and the network dynamics that lead to selection into relationships with coethnics or non-coethnics. Third, there is the actual experience of contact in purposeful interaction settings and its consequences on further interactions. In the following paragraphs, we review empirical research that speaks on these latter two stages and systematize



**Figure 1:** Three-step iterative model of out-group exposure. *Note:* The large arrows between the boxes underscore the connection between three key factors of the model of out-group exposure: the contextual opportunities for contact, the individual willingness to interact with non-coethnics, and the actual contact experience. The narrow arrows indicate only major feedback loops, such as how the experience of contact shapes attitudes toward non-coethnics and subsequently influences the willingness to interact.

these various contributions in a framework that reconciles instances of out-group discrimination/in-group favoritism with the basic tenets of contact theory.

### *Intergroup Contact*

Experimental tests of the contact hypothesis mainly focused on the latter of the three stages—they studied the effects of actual contact between individuals. In particular, a recent wave of natural and field experiments have studied the effects of interaction across ethnic boundaries in a variety of social and occupational settings. Soldiers who were randomly assigned to share rooms with ethnic minorities later show greater trust toward a generic immigrant (Finseraas et al. 2019). U.S. air force students who were randomly assigned to peer groups with more students of color were later more accepting of blacks in general and more likely to match with black roommates in the future (Carrell et al. 2015). Similarly, university students who were assigned to African American roommates showed greater appreciation of diversity and were more comfortable around minorities (Boisjoly et al. 2006). Even in settings with a recent history of violence between ethnic/religious groups, interpersonal contact can alter behavior in positive ways (Mousa 2020; Scacco and Warren 2018; see also Rydgren, Sofi and Hällsten 2013). Overall, these studies that took place in real-life social settings add solid empirical evidence in support of contact theory: the effects of intergroup contact are often positive, leading to more favorable attitudes and greater likelihood of future interactions with non-coethnics, and even when there are no positive effects, out-group contact does not generally enhance hostility toward non-coethnics.

The random assignment of individuals to mixed versus homogeneous settings is used to assess the effects of contact net of self-selection and other factors that might affect behavior. Therefore, these studies tell us what people do when they are forced (randomly assigned) into specific interactions in organized social settings, but, by

design, they are silent concerning the process that leads to intergroup contact, and in particular they do not consider intergroup selection: what people do when they have the opportunity to choose with whom to interact. Although prejudice and discrimination have been investigated in the psychological literature as clear-cut attitudes that either inform human behavior or not (Nathan and Sands 2023; Paluck et al. 2019), empirical evidence coming from a broader set of studies alerts us to the possibility that multiple forces might be affecting human behavior in real world interaction dynamics, and considerations based on coethnicity could persist guiding our choices in the formation of social relations (intergroup selection) even when other considerations might trump ethnicity in informing actual behavior in interactions (intergroup contact).

### *Intergroup Selection*

Solid field experimental research documents the persistence of discrimination in hiring, housing, and other markets in most Western societies, even toward second- or third-generation immigrants. Dozens of audit and correspondence studies have been carried out, overall showing that when it comes to selecting employees, tenants, or romantic partners, native majorities tend to favor coethnics over equally, or even better qualified immigrants and minorities (Auspurg, Schneck, and Hinz 2019; Bertrand and Duflo 2017; Di Stasio et al. 2021; Quillian et al. 2019; Zschirnt 2020). For example, a meta-analysis of more than 700 correspondence tests on hiring discrimination conducted between 1990 and 2015 in OECD countries found that ethnic and racial minority candidates (including immigrants) have to write about 1.6 times as many applications as majority population candidates to be invited for a job interview (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016). Similar effect sizes of labor market discrimination of individuals from minority ethnic groups were also found recently in a large-scale study in Switzerland, where the online search behavior of more than 40,000 recruiters on the recruitment platform of the public employment service was analyzed and revealed an ethnic penalty of 4 percent to 19 percent depending on the country of origin (Hangartner, Kopp, and Siegenthaler 2021). Moreover, research also shows that in Europe, even children of immigrants who are born and raised in the respective host country, thus fluent in the national language and educated and trained locally as majority “natives,” receive significantly lower call-back rates to their job applications than majority members (Veit and Thijsen 2021).

Further evidence of the distinctive role played by in-group selection dynamics in everyday settings comes from studies of real or perceived demographic change and its impact on attitudes toward ethnoracial minorities and immigrants. These studies largely point to greater exclusionary attitudes among the majority population, less prosocial behavior toward minorities, boundary contraction among members of the dominant status group, and a greater willingness to move away from diversifying neighborhoods (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005; Abascal 2015, 2020; Myers and Levy 2018; Zou and Cheryan 2022). Together, this literature suggests that even when exposure to large or growing minority groups is only imagined (i.e., as in future demographic predictions), majority group members would rather not be in contact, given a choice.

This process of intergroup selection has ramifications that go beyond single encounters: patterns of interactions often crystallize in social networks, and the composition of social networks then affects opportunities for future interactions (Tropp et al. 2018), thus bringing us full circle with the aforementioned literature documenting the mediating role of heterogeneous social networks' composition on the effects of ethnic diversity on trust and social capital (Gundelach and Freitag 2014; Koopmans and Veit 2014; Laurence 2017; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008; Uslaner 2012).

Taken together, these findings depict a scenario in which the intergroup contact does have a positive effect on attitudes and behavior toward the out-group, but the overall societal effect of social differentiation cannot be understood separate from network dynamics of in-group selection that operate by systematically limiting opportunities for interethnic encounters. Thus, to properly understand the extent to which prosocial behavior extends beyond in-group boundaries in diverse societies it is vital to capture different steps through which out-group exposure takes place. In our three-step model of out-group exposure, we first consider external, partially exogenous factors, for instance, neighborhood diversity as well as market integration increase the chances of out-group exposure. Living or working in a diverse setting, however, does not necessarily mean actual contact with out-group members. Second, and often overlooked by studies of contact effects, we should consider the active role people have in selecting their interaction partners, the consequent formation of heterogeneous social networks, and the role of previous exposure and network diversity in affecting future opportunities for exposure. Finally, we should focus on actual behavior in interactions, and the effects that the contact experience has on attitudes toward out-group members and future opportunities for interaction. This is an iterative model, and Figure 1 highlights only the most relevant feedback loops. Out-group exposure is a three-stage process that leads all the way from contextual opportunities to personal contact.

Fully addressing all three aspects in a single design is beyond our reach at this stage of research: in this article, we hence focus on steps 2 and 3, using a field-experimental lens to isolate the microlevel dynamics of intergroup selection and contact. In line with our interest in studying prosociality in diverse societies, we do not leverage variation in macrostructural conditions (step 1) and deliberately sample participants who live in multiethnic neighborhoods, thus moving away from studies that compare homogeneous to heterogeneous contexts. Although we maintain macrostructural conditions constant, our design incorporates an important insight from our discussion of macrostructural factors: the role of market interdependence in fostering prosociality. Accordingly, our study of interpersonal dynamics will focus on both altruistic as well as strategic interactions and capture the role of embeddedness in the economic and civic life of the community. Overall, considering this analytical framework in its entirety has helped us set the stage for a research design that is receptive of the entire process of out-group exposure, even though it does not address all three steps. Moreover, it allows to better inform the conclusions that one can draw from single studies, as well as their scope conditions.

## Research Design


Our theoretical framework informs our research design in a few major ways. First, to understand how prosocial behavior extends beyond group boundaries, we recruited our study participants from social settings in which they are exposed to diversity (cfr., for a similar strategy, Habyarimana et al. 2009; Rydgren et al. 2013). Second, as discussed in the previous section, our focus on interdependence and economic integration as drivers of contemporary forms of solidarity requires the adoption of measures of prosocial behavior that are interactive—that is, that capture behavior in relationship with others—and the consideration of both nonstrategic and strategic interaction dynamics, encompassing motives that go beyond generic solidarity, to comprise situations that entail risk and uncertainty. To this goal, we conducted behavioral games in a lab-controlled setting in which we study how natives and immigrants behave toward coethnics and non-coethnics in different situations. Third, as we will describe in further detail below, our experimental design neatly decouples the process of partner selection from the actual behavior in interaction settings, thus allowing for an independent assessment of discriminatory behavior in both selection and interaction. Finally, further relying on randomization, we also directly test the extent to which economic and civic engagement are perceived as valuable aspects in strategic interaction settings.<sup>4</sup>

### *Sampling and Recruitment*

Given our general interest in understanding cooperation in diverse societies, we recruited Italians and immigrants (men and women) from diverse neighborhoods in Milan, a large European metropolis and Italy's economic capital. On average, 14 percent of the Milanese (legal) population is of foreign origin. To minimize economic and ecological differences across neighborhoods, our sampling strategy aimed to recruit a representative sample of Milan residents who live in "typical" diverse neighborhoods, that is, neighborhoods that are ethnically mixed and where there is everyday exposure to foreigners, but that are not "extreme" in any regard.

Therefore, we avoided recruiting our study participants in neighborhoods with very low shares of foreign residents—because here individuals may have no exposure to immigrants in their day-to-day life—and in neighborhoods where the exposure to high shares of foreigners is coupled with the experience of deep economic deprivation since economic differences may be an independent cause of out-group discrimination (Schaub, Gereke, and Baldassarri 2020). In practice, this means that we excluded only the poorest and the wealthiest (as measured by the average apartment size and unemployment rate) neighborhoods in the city's center and periphery and included a wide range of localities, as shown in Figure 2. In total, our neighborhood sample is made up of 55 out of 88 neighborhoods of Milan (NIL) with 7 percent to 27 percent of foreigners, no extreme poverty, unemployment or wealth, and urban rather than suburban structure in terms of population density (for additional information, see Appendix 1.1 and 1.2 in the online supplement). Not surprisingly, because we sampled our participants from multiethnic neighborhoods, fewer than 5 percent of Italian natives report never or rarely seeing immigrants on the streets and almost 80 percent of them see immigrants often or almost always.





**Figure 2:** Map of Milano neighborhoods by percent foreigners. Shaded neighborhoods were included in the sample.

Our exclusive focus on residents of diverse neighborhoods may raise some concern about the fact that the people electing to live in urban settings and diverse neighborhoods might systematically differ (in terms of tolerance, openness, etc.) from individuals who avoid multiethnic settings. We acknowledge this aspect and consider it as an additional proof of the importance of considering intergroup selection (Maxwell 2019). Limiting our sample to people living in diverse communities, however, would not bias our findings because our research question is about prosociality in diverse communities and our universe of interest are people living in multiethnic settings. However, we should keep in mind that this process of self-selection is a primary reason for not automatically extending our findings to people living in nonurban, nondiverse settings, as we elaborate in the conclusions. Finally, we point out that residential mobility is much lower in European settings, and, in particular, in Milan, than what is experienced in the United States (Causa and Pichelmann 2020). It is also the case that Milan, similar to most European metropolises, is not characterized by the level of hypersegregation that is typical of U.S. settings (Andersson, Lyngstad, and Sleutjes 2018; Consolazio, Benassi, and Russo 2023). Taken together, these considerations suggest that a sizeable trend of



residential movement driven by diversification is extremely unlikely (and has not been registered by the research community).

In our study, we move beyond generic assessments of prejudice or trust to study native Italians and immigrants actual behavior in interactions. Namely, we study how native Italians (henceforth Italians)<sup>5</sup> treat both other Italians and immigrants from five major national origins—Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Morocco, and China—reflecting the diversity of interactions that take place in everyday Milan. Although our goal is to understand behavior toward immigrants in general and while we do not have specific expectations for each of these national origins, by including a range of national origins, we address the possibility that Italians may hold specific beliefs and stereotypes about different ethnic groups (Morning and Maneri 2022) and thus act differently toward them.

In addition, we document how different immigrant groups behave toward Italians as compared to coethnics. Because we could not recruit a sufficiently large sample of immigrants from all major nationalities present in Milan, and because relying on a random sample of immigrants would have introduced too much heterogeneity in the experimental design, we recruited our immigrant respondents from two of the largest immigrant groups in Milan (and Italy): ethnic Filipinos and Moroccans. Both groups are phenotypically distinguishable from Italians and could be considered similarly likeable, although they are associated with slightly different stereotypes. Namely, Filipinos are often perceived as trustworthy and polite, whereas Moroccans are seen as not only joyful and friendly but also potentially aggressive, loud, and unreliable (Morning and Maneri 2022).

Finally, migration to Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon, thus we restricted our participant pool to only first-generation immigrants with basic Italian language proficiency but who had lived in Italy for varying amounts of time.

We relied on a marketing company for the recruitment of both Italians ( $N = 558$ ) and immigrants ( $N = 140$  for Filipinos and  $N = 192$  for Moroccans).<sup>6</sup> Our sample of Italians is representative of the Milanese population in terms of gender, age, education, and employment (Istat 2011)<sup>7</sup> (for further details, see Appendix sections 1.1 and 1.2 in the online supplement). We held 149 sessions, with about six people per session, in the same location in Milan. The location was easily reachable via public transportation. All participants were paid a show-up fee of 10 € and a variable amount (between 15 and 25 €) depending on their individual and group performance on various behavioral tasks at the end of the session. On average, participants earned 20 € for their task performance.

To maximally guarantee the privacy and anonymity of our participants and limit social desirability bias in responses, our participants performed all the activities and filled out a questionnaire using a tablet. Following a few sociodemographic questions, our participants took part in a series of behavioral activities, some of which are described in detail below. Only after the activities, they were asked questions about their political attitudes and the ethnic composition of their social networks.

## *Behavioral Games*

We capture the interdependence of social action through behavioral games, and we distinguish different interaction dynamics. Conceptually, we are interested in both nonstrategic altruistic behavior (such as donating money or clothes, volunteering, etc.) and strategic cooperative behavior (such as hiring or subletting to somebody, working together, or sending kids to the same school). Previous literature has shown the importance of distinguishing between altruistic behavior, as captured in a Dictator Game, and more strategic types of interactions, using trust, public goods, ultimatum games, and other activities (Adida et al. 2016; Baldassarri 2015; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Hager, Krakowski and Schaub 2019). This distinction acquires even greater importance in our framework, given the centrality of strategic interactions and generalized exchange in fostering prosociality in complex societies. We use Dictator Games to capture nonstrategic prosocial behavior and Trust and Competence Games to study strategic interactions.

By experimentally manipulating the nationality of alter in a series of behavioral tasks, we study the effect of alter's ethnicity in different interaction settings. This strategy has been previously used in other contexts, leading to a variety of results. For instance, being partnered with an alter coming from a different country had no significant effect in a Trust Game with undergraduate students in the United States (Glaeser et al. 2000) or American and Canadian users (hosts) of the Airbnb online marketplace (Kas et al. 2022), as well as in a large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment in German schools, where majority children did not systematically trusted immigrants any less (Felfe et al. 2021). In contrast, studies using pictures or names to signal race/ethnicity found partial evidence of lower trust in immigrant men in Germany (Gereke, Schaub and Baldassarri 2020) and lower trustworthiness toward immigrants in the Netherlands (Cettolin and Suetens 2019). Finally, large cross-national comparisons found a tendency to trust co-nationals more, at least in a subset of countries (Romano et al. 2017), but considerations about country poverty, rather than nationality per se, seem to be driving these results (Bader and Keuschnigg 2020).

Given the contextual nature of the intergroup dynamics that we are studying (Nathan and Sands 2023), a certain variation in results is expected. Moreover, previous studies differ with respect to how much information about alter is conveyed. When only alters' ethnicity or nationality is provided, participants would tend to rely on stereotypes associated with such characteristics to infer other characteristics of alter (De Dreu 2018), often inflating effects estimates. To partly address this issue, in our approach we provide greater information concerning the person, including their gender, age, current residence, and, in some instances, also their job, volunteering, or hobby.

To capture nonstrategic altruistic behavior toward both coethnics and non-coethnics, our participants took part twice in the role of deciders in a Dictator Game. In the Dictator Game, deciders have to split an amount of money; in our case 10 €, between themselves and another person. Whatever amount they decide to keep is theirs, while the other person will take home whatever is given to them (if anything). Because the identity of the participants will remain anonymous, the contribution in this game is usually considered a measure of altruism or other-regarding

preferences. Italians were paired with another Italian and an immigrant, described as someone who lives in Milan and was born in Morocco, the Philippines, Romania, China, or Peru. For instance, some of our participants read: “For this first activity, you have been paired with [Chiara], who lives in Milan, was born in [Lombardia], and is [25] years old.”<sup>8</sup> Immigrants were similarly paired with someone from their country of origin or an Italian. We randomized the order in which coethnics and non-coethnics appear.

Next, we test Italians’ and immigrants’ behavior in two types of strategic interactions. The first, a Trust Game, involves considerations concerning alter’s trustworthiness. The second, instead, is exclusively based on the evaluations of alter’s competence. In both cases, we are interested in assessing the extent to which alter’s nationality affects decisions. In this second set of activities, alter’s profile was enriched with additional information concerning his/her professional, voluntary, or recreational activity. In strategic interactions, behavior is informed by expectations of what alter will do, and these expectations are likely formed based on alter’s profile. If presented exclusively with a name and nationality, people would tend to infer other characteristics of the person, such as their economic status and level of education, from their immigrant status and country of origin (De Dreu 2018; Schaub et al. 2021). Given the importance of these characteristics in guiding strategic interactions, we consider it fundamental to these tasks that we provide a more complex image of the person and we expect that the active involvement in the economic and civic life of a community would help convey trustworthiness.

In the Trust Game, two people are allocated 10 € each. The first player is given the possibility to give some of his/her resources to the other player. The amount is tripled and given to the second player, who then decides how much, if anything, to give back to the first player. We focus on the behavior of the first player, which is commonly interpreted as a measure of trust. Namely, the first player has to assess whether alter could be trusted to share the gains in a fair manner. For half of the participants, the interaction partner was assigned. The other half of the sample was instead asked to choose between two possible partners, whose identities were randomized, before making their decision in the game. This treatment allows us to decouple the effect of selection from that of actual contact by studying not only whether coethnics elicit better treatment in strategic interactions but also whether they are preferred over non-coethnics as interaction partners.


In practice, after having received a thorough explanation of the activity, participants were either introduced to their interaction partner or asked to choose between two alternatives. For instance, participants who were assigned a partner read: “You have been paired with [Farida], who lives in Milan, was born in [Morocco], is [52] years old and [works in elderly care].” In addition to gender, age, country of origin, we provide information about the alter’s professional, civic, or recreational activity, selecting from a range of activities that are common for both Italians and immigrants: namely, alter can hold a factory job or work in elderly care, be a parent representative at her/his son’s school or volunteer at the local Church (or Mosque in case of Moroccans), and like to watch TV or go on walks. Although we are not interested in estimating individual effects for each of these characterizations—indeed, we do not have any specific hypothesis concerning, for

## Attività 5

In questa attività sia tu che un'altra persona dovete fare l'esercizio di logica che vedi qui sotto.

Se entrambi date la risposta giusta, guadagnate 6€ ciascuno. Se invece uno di voi sbaglia la risposta, nessuno di voi guadagna nulla.

Nella prossima pagina potrai scegliere con quale persona partecipare a questa attività tra due che hanno precedentemente partecipato alla nostra ricerca. Ora fai l'esercizio:



**Figure 3:** Screenshot of the Competence Task. *Note:* Participants were asked to choose a partner who could solve this logic puzzle. The text reads: “In this activity both you and another person have to solve the logic test shown below. If both of you respond correctly, you’ll make 6 € each. If, instead, either of you selects the wrong answer, neither of you will earn any money. On the next page, you will choose the person with whom you want to take part in this activity. You can choose between two participants that have already taken our survey. Now solve the logic task: [graphic] Which figure completes the series?”

instance, whether working in elderly care signals greater trust than serving as a class representative—we do have the general expectation that the active involvement in the economic and civic life of a community helps convey trustworthiness.

In the Competence Task, participants are paired with another person and both individuals are asked to solve the same logic puzzle, as shown in Figure 3. If they both provided the correct answer, they received 6 € each; otherwise, both received nothing. Both immigrants and Italians participated in this task and they were all given the possibility to choose between two different alters. Namely, the baseline alternative was an Italian who works in a supermarket, while the alternative was an Italian or immigrant who is either an elementary school teacher or someone who likes to watch TV. The only relevant aspect of this task is competence, and we therefore expect our participants to privilege teachers as partners. In theory, nationality should not factor into their consideration, and thus, if it does, we would interpret it as a sign of in-group favoritism/out-group prejudice (Brewer 1999).

Taken together, these activities cover an ample spectrum of interaction dynamics, from solidarity gestures to strategic interactions involving evaluations of alters' trustworthiness and competence, which are likely to affect individual and group outcomes in real life. We notice that the structure of these games, despite their abstraction, retains the basic features of a positive intergroup contact experience: equal group status within the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and institutional support.

From a theoretical point of view, our primary focus is on the behavior of native Italians, the numerical majority and dominant group, when paired with coethnics and non-coethnics. However, we also report results for immigrants in the Dictator and Competence Game, while we collected decisions in the Trust Game only from Italian participants.<sup>9</sup>


### *Diversity of Social Networks*

We posit that generalized prosociality develops from a multiplicity of microinteractions and individuals' orientation toward non-coethnics likely depends on past experiences and the ethnic heterogeneity of their social networks. Therefore, we explore variation in prosocial behavior in relationship to social network composition. We collected five different social network indicators: friendship, acquaintance, and workplace networks; employment of an immigrant; and negative experiences with immigrants. One-third of Italian respondents have friendship networks with none or only one immigrant, whereas the remaining 70 percent report two or more immigrant friends. As expected, acquaintance networks are more heterogeneous, with 80 percent of participants knowing two or more immigrants. Work environments remain rather homogeneous, with half of our respondents reporting not working with any immigrant and 12 percent just one immigrant, while the remaining 40 percent report two or more immigrants. Finally, 46 percent of our Italian participants employ an immigrant, often for home care jobs, such as babysitting, elderly care, and cleaning. Experiences with immigrants are generally positive: 38 percent of Italian respondents report never having had any negative experience and another 32 percent report negative experiences "rarely." Another 24 percent report them sometimes and only 6 percent say "often" or "almost always."

## Results

### *Altruism Toward Coethnics and Non-coethnics*

How does altruistic behavior vary toward coethnics and non-coethnics? Figure 4 shows average contributions in the Dictator Games for Italians, Filipinos, and Moroccans, distinguishing between their allocation to coethnics and non-coethnics. We find that all three groups have similar levels of altruism—they share, on average, 3.7 € out of 10 € with the other person—and there are no substantial differences in the amount they decide to share with a coethnic or a non-coethnic. Zooming in on the behavior of Italians toward immigrants from specific nationalities, we obtain a similar picture (Fig. 5): while Chinese, on average, receive a little more than other




**Figure 4:** Average contribution (in €) to coethnics and non-coethnics in the Dictator Game among Italians ( $N = 558$ ), Filipinos ( $N = 140$ ), and Moroccans ( $N = 192$ ).

Italians, Peruvians a little less, and Filipinos, Romanians, and Moroccans about the same, these differences are not statistically significant, leading us to conclude that altruism toward immigrants does not seem to be driven by their specific country of origin. Moreover, in line with previous findings (Camerer 2011; Henrich et al. 2001), individual-level characteristics, such as age, socioeconomic status, education, and gender do not predict contributions in Dictator Games (see Appendix A2 in the online supplement).

Around 60 percent of all participants (and 57 percent of Italians) contribute the same amount to coethnics and non-coethnics. Among Italians, the remaining 2/5 are distributed almost evenly between 20 percent of participants who favor other Italians and another 20 percent who, instead, give more to immigrants. As expected, these differences map onto political preferences, with native Italians harboring anti-immigrant sentiments giving more to other Italians, while progressive views on immigration often lead to greater generosity toward immigrants. Moreover, friendship with immigrants is substantially and significantly correlated with greater contribution for non-coethnics than coethnics. On average, Italians who report having two or more immigrant friends tend to give 0.5 € more to an immigrant than a coethnic.

Overall, we find that Italians, on average, show similar levels of altruism toward immigrants and coethnics, hinting to a limited role of in-group favoritism (or






**Figure 5:** Italians' average contribution (in €) in the Dictator Game by nationality of the recipient ( $N = 558$ ).

taste-based discrimination) in non-strategic interactions. Nonetheless, Italians might factor in alter's nationality when engaging in strategic interactions, where expectations about alter's trustworthiness and competence inform decisions. We turn to this aspect next.

### *Behavior in strategic interactions and intergroup selection*

First, we consider strategic decisions in the context of a Trust Game. Namely, we focus on the behavior of Italians in the role of first movers and we explore whether considerations about both the interaction partners' nationality and their integration in the civic and economic life of the city affect their perceived trustworthiness. In this activity, the profile of the interaction partner is described in terms of nationality, economic, or civic engagement, as well as gender and age. In Figure 6, we plot results from a linear regression that models the amount shared with the interaction partner as a function of his/her immigrant status (Italian is the baseline) and economic or civic activity (leisure activity is the baseline).<sup>10</sup> The model also controls for gender and age of the interaction partner and choice treatment (for details, cfr. Appendix Table A3 in the online supplement). We find that there is no significant difference in the amount Italians decide to contribute when paired with other Italians rather than immigrants. This said, engagement in the economic and civic life of the city effectively signals trustworthiness (for immigrants and natives




**Figure 6:** Estimated effects on contributions in the Trust Game by nationality and economic and civic activity of the recipient. Results from linear regressions predicting contributions in the Trust Game as a function of alter's nationality, civic and economic engagement, gender, age, and choice treatment. Only Italian participants, two rounds ( $N = 1,114$ ) (cfr Appendix Table A2 in the online supplement).

alike): both civic involvement and holding a job command substantially greater contributions, in the order of 0.5 € more.

Although trusting behavior in the interaction setting does not seem to be particularly affected by alter's immigrant status, it is nonetheless possible that Italians would favor a coethnic if given the opportunity to choose whom to interact with. We find evidence of this from the subgroup of participants who were asked, after learning about the activity, to pick the person they would like to interact with. In particular, all of them had to choose between a default option, an Italian who loves to watch TV or go on walks, and an Italian or immigrant who is involved in one of four forms of civic and economic engagement. Figure 7 reports the likelihood of choosing an immigrant over an Italian and someone with some form of economic or civic engagement over recreational activities. Immigrants are 8 percent less likely to be chosen,<sup>11</sup> while on average, holding a job or volunteering increases by 20 percent the chances of being selected. Thus, when given the opportunity to choose whom to trust, Italians display a slight preference for coethnics, and they greatly value signs of economic and civic integration.


Finally, we explore differences in game behavior between participants who were given the opportunity to choose their partners and those who were, instead, randomly assigned one. In fact, the opportunity of choosing one's partner could induce more trusting behavior. We do find that contributions in the Trust Game are slightly higher (they increase by 0.3 €) on average when people are given a chance to choose their interaction partner (Appendix Table A3 in the online supplement).



**Figure 7:** Model estimates of the probability to choose an immigrant and someone who is economically or socially engaged as a partner in the Trust Game. Results from linear regressions predicting partner's choice in the Trust Game as a function of alter's nationality, and civic and economic engagement. Only Italian participants, two rounds ( $N = 1,114$ ).

This difference is accounted for by the fact that participants tend to give more when they choose to interact with an Italian. Namely, contributions toward immigrants are the same as in the non-choice treatment (where contributions are the same toward Italians and immigrants), while contributions to Italians are higher. The size of the estimate is robust across different model specifications, while its statistical significance varies around a  $p$  value of 0.05 (Appendix Table A4 in the online supplement). We consider this finding generative of an interesting hypothesis: namely, that the opportunity to select an interaction partner has some consequences on the successive behavior only among Italians who select a coethnic. In this case, opting for a coethnic brings with it greater willingness to trust. This finding is consistent with the idea that people, if given the opportunity, would play it safe and stick to the option that provides more certainty.

In our last activity, we test whether the tendency to choose coethnics is also present when participating in a task that is purely based on competence. Both Italians and immigrants participated in this game, and they were asked to select a partner to solve a logic puzzle. They could choose between a default option, an Italian who works in a supermarket, and a second option with an [Italian or immigrant] who [likes to watch TV] or [is an elementary-school teacher]. Figure 8 shows, as expected, that teachers are much more likely to be chosen, almost 30 percent more, but also that immigrants are less likely to be chosen over Italians.<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, when we consider these aspects in combination (right panel), we find that immigrant teachers are chosen over anyone (Italian or immigrant) who likes to watch TV. However, Italian teachers seem to enjoy a greater professional advantage



**Figure 8:** Model estimates of the probability to choose an immigrant or a teacher as a partner in the Competence Task (left panel) and the probability to choose an immigrant who likes to watch TV and an immigrant teacher and an Italian teacher over an Italian who likes to watch TV (right panel). Estimates from linear regression models predicting partner's choice in the Competence Task as a function of alter's nationality and job (left panel) and their interaction terms (right panel). All participants ( $N = 890$ ).

than immigrant teachers: namely, they are 12 percent more likely to be chosen than immigrant teachers (this difference is statistically significant,  $p = 0.01$ ).<sup>13</sup> Overall, professional competence is highly valued and trumps considerations based on nationality—an immigrant teacher is favored over an Italian who likes to watch TV. Nonetheless, Italian teachers have an advantage over immigrant teachers, confirming the persistence of discriminatory behavior in the selection process.


Very similar results are obtained when looking at the behavior of Italians and immigrants separately (Appendix Fig. A1 in the online supplement). Namely, both Italians and immigrants value teachers and both of them value Italian teachers more than immigrant ones. The fact that immigrants show a preference for Italians rather than coethnics in this task could be explained in two ways. First, we should consider that for immigrants, being a numeric minority, interactions with Italians are the norm, especially in professional settings, and they might reproduce this regularity in their choice of interaction partners. Alternatively, the finding is also consistent with expectations from status construction theories, according to which everybody has a vested interest in associating with high status (i.e., natives) individuals. Either way, this calls for a more nuanced understanding of how social identity theory applies to lower status groups and members of numeric minorities. Our design, which included both natives and immigrants, made it possible to elicit this aspect, although additional research is needed to understand its full implications.

## *Social Networks and Feedback Loops*

Our experimental design revealed discriminatory patterns at the point of entry in social relationships: the choice of interaction partners. As we know, repeated interactions tend to crystallize into social networks and, in turn, affect future patterns of interaction. Observational analysis has documented that individuals who are embedded in ethnically diverse social networks tend to report positive attitudes and behaviors toward non-coethnics and greater generalized altruism (Gundelach and Freitag 2014; Hewstone 2015; Koopmans and Veit 2014; Laurence 2014; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008; Schmid et al. 2014). Models of social network and attitudes formation and coevolution generally point to the interplay between selection and peer effects dynamics in determining the coevolution of social networks and attitudes (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Bracegirdle et al. 2022; Feld 1982; Lazer et al. 2010). In our context, both interaction experiences as well as pre-existing positive predisposition toward non-coethnics are likely to affect the formation of new ties and positive views, fostering a feedback loop in which individual attitudes and social network composition affect the likelihood of intergroup contact. The experience of intergroup contact would then affect both attitude change and social network composition, which in turn, again, affect the likelihood of intergroup contact (cfr. Fig. 1). In this latter analysis, we test a crucial aspect of this dynamic, namely that people who are embedded in heterogeneous social contexts are also more likely to choose to interact with non-coethnics and to treat them better in interactions.

Although we cannot meaningfully randomize the network of social relationships in which people are embedded, we can, however, test whether, at the specific point in time in which they participated in our study, Italians who display more diverse networks are also more likely to favor non-coethnics in interaction settings. Figure 9 reports results from different regression models, estimating the change in contributions in the Dictator Game and Trust Game (first two panels) and the likelihood of choosing an immigrant in the Trust Game and Competence Task (last two panels) as a function of having heterogeneous friendship, acquaintance, and workplace networks; employing an immigrant; and having had negative experiences with immigrants at least sometimes.

We find that Italians who report two or more non-coethnic friends are around 10 percent and 20 percent more likely to select an immigrant as a partner in the Competence Task and Trust Game, respectively. They are also more generous and trusting in the Dictator Game and Trust Game. Heterogeneous work networks and employing an immigrant also positively affect the likelihood of partnering with an immigrant in the Competence Task. In addition, employment of an immigrant is positively correlated with greater trusting behavior. In turn, having had negative experiences with immigrants negatively reflects on both generosity, trust, and willingness to interact with them. Overall, this analysis provides descriptive support to the idea that a feedback loop exists between network heterogeneity, the likelihood to enter relationships with non-coethnics, and their favorable treatment in interaction settings. Although this evidence is not sufficient to draw causal conclusions, we note that we obtain very similar results even when controlling for attitudes toward immigrants. As shown in Appendix Figure A2 in the online supplement, the relationship between network heterogeneity and both contributions and selection



**Figure 9:** Model estimates of the effect of having two or more immigrant friends, acquaintances, coworkers, employing an immigrant, and had negative experiences with immigrants on contributions in the Dictator Game and Trust Game (first two panels) and the likelihood of choosing an immigrant in the Trust Game and Competence Task (last two panels). Regression models predicting contribution and probability of choosing an immigrant. Only Italian participants ( $N = 384-558$ ).

patterns remain substantial and significant even when controlling for attitudes, with the partial exception of selection in the Competence Game (possibly due to a small  $N$  problem).<sup>14</sup>

## Discussion and Conclusions

In our research, we treat the ongoing process of differentiation of Western societies as an opportunity to better understand how prosociality extends beyond in-group boundaries, and we move past existing scholarship that largely focuses on either the generally positive consequences of intergroup contact or documents discrimination and the consequences of out-group exposure. Our three-step model of out-group exposure helps trace the process that leads individuals to experience contact with out-group members. Starting from Durkheim's intuition that the type of solidarity that makes heterogeneous societies function is different from the in-group solidarity that glues homogeneous communities together, we identified economic interdependence as a primary macrostructural factor that is likely to create opportunities for out-group encounters. Therefore, we focused our empirical study on a sample of natives and immigrants living in multiethnic neighborhoods of Milan, a prosperous European metropolis, to study how individuals who are generally exposed to this type of macrostructural pressure behave toward coethnics and non-coethnics in various interaction settings, including strategic interactions that resemble common market exchange dynamics.

We further dissect the process that leads to out-group contact into two components: the selection into interactions with coethnics versus non-coethnics and the actual experience of out-group contact. Distinguishing between selection and contact allows us to make sense of the persistence of immigrant discrimination even in contexts where constructive interactions with out-group members are well



established. In fact, we find that Italian natives show similar levels of altruism toward coethnics and non-coethnic members, do not discriminate in strategic interactions involving trust, and value the market and civic integration and professional competence of immigrants. However, when given the opportunity to choose their interaction partners, Italians tend to prefer coethnics over non-coethnics. Although most research on interethnic relationships has treated prejudice as a clear-cut attitude that either informs human behavior or not, our research points to a certain plasticity with which individuals approach intergroup relationships. Namely, co-ethnicity may persist in guiding natives' choice of interaction partners even though, when they find themselves in interaction with out-group members, they treat them similarly to how they would treat coethnics. Likely, in organized interaction settings, people may follow behavioral scripts that are appropriate to the situation, partially ignoring information about alters' ethnicity when deemed irrelevant.

*Contact theory reconsidered.* Overall, the observed behavior in interaction settings shows that contact with non-coethnics, once it happens, unfolds as positively as with coethnics. We also find that people who are embedded in heterogeneous social networks are more likely to choose to interact with non-coethnics and treat them more favorably. This is in line with results from contact theory showing that engagement in purposeful interactions with non-coethnics—from military training, to college dorms and soccer leagues—does not lead to lower performance and greater animosity. Indeed, out-group contact in organized social settings is likely to foster positive future interactions.

However, we also show that the same group of Italian natives that treat coethnics and non-coethnics equally, favors interacting with other Italians if given the opportunity to choose. The persistence of discriminatory behavior in selection dynamics is an aspect that is, by design, ignored in most tests of the contact hypothesis: the randomization into homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups, while allowing for a clean causal assessment of the effects of contact, actually neglects the active role people play in affecting their chances of interacting with out-group members in the first place. To fully understand the consequences of social differentiation, we should therefore pay attention to the combined effect of intergroup contact, which in many settings is likely to be positive, and network dynamics of in-group selection, which might operate to systematically limit opportunities of interaction with non-coethnics. In taking the issue of selection more seriously, future research should also investigate the extent to which the optimal conditions for positive contact, —namely equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and institutional support, also apply to the likelihood of choosing to interact with an out-group member.

*Virtues and perils of economic interdependence.* In our framework, economic interdependence plays a pivotal role in fostering prosociality across group boundaries. However, we do not regard the economic domain to be unique, nor do we believe that markets, capitalism, or the global economy have some intrinsic, special attribute missing from other social domains. We simply observe that, given the multivocality of human social action, economic transactions are the place in which group boundaries are more likely to be crossed, out of mutual interest, and necessity (Baldassarri and Abascal 2020). In fact, interpersonal relationships in other domains,

such as leisure activities, or civic engagement might be even more conducive to prosociality. Nonetheless, they are less likely to occur because natives will tend to sort into homogeneous social relationships unless they are forced outside their comfort zones by external factors. The economic realm provides this opportunity for interactions. This may explain why we are seeing fairly integrated (or at least fairly nonconflictual) interethnic relations in many European cities such as Milan.

Economic transactions have the potential to foster mutual trust, reciprocity, and reduce the perceived social distance with non-coethnics. Our theoretical model therefore provides an additional reason why policies excluding refugees and asylum seekers from the labor market can be harmful. Previous scholarship has highlighted the monetary and psychological costs of such policies (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Lawrence 2016; Marbach, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2018). Our research implies that such policies may also have, yet largely unforeseen, ramifications on levels of prosociality.

However, we do not want to canonize market integration. We are well aware that economic transactions can easily turn exploitative in the case of unbalanced power relationships. This happens, for instance, in the case when immigrants have perilous legal status and/or are not sufficiently protected by labor contracts. The larger institutional structure, including labor market regulations and welfare provisions as well as the context of reception (Okamoto et al. 2020), therefore plays an important role in determining whether market transactions become a place of inclusion, or exploitation. In this sense, this is just the beginning of a research agenda that explores the way market interactions facilitate out-group contact, and the conditions under which market interactions do foster prosociality.

From a policy perspective, the most consequential conclusion is that forcing contact between groups in organized social settings may indeed foster prosociality, in particular by overcoming the problem of self-selection into homogeneous social relationships. This is indeed the rationale that informs many of these initiatives, for instance, in military and educational settings, and they are generally quite successful. However, we caution that so far we still lack insights into what people with strong negative attitudes toward non-coethnics will do in such settings. Although solid empirical evidence suggests that, on average, people become more tolerant and inclusive in their behavior (Schaub et al. 2021), we cannot rule out that forced intergroup contact might not work for everyone and could even exacerbate intergroup hatred in some contexts (Dustmann, Vasiljeva and PiilDamm 2019; Hangartner et al. 2019). Moreover, such policies may fail, because (resource-endowed) individuals have the option to leave (e.g., change job, relocate to other neighborhoods, and send their kids to different schools), and occasionally may opt to do so, as the history of “white flight” in the United States reminds us.

*In-group/out-group dynamics from the perspective of low-status groups and numeric minorities.* Most of our analysis has concentrated on the behavior of Italians, who are the numeric majority and dominant group in the social context we are investigating. This is indeed in line with most studies of interethnic relationships, both experimental and observational, which primarily focus on the beliefs and behavior of the numeric majority and dominant group (generally, native whites). However, our experimental design does include not only Italian natives but also immigrants,

and this gives us the opportunity to reflect on the difficulties of applying a simple in- versus out-group framework to members of a numerical minority and/or low-status group. First, members of a numeric minority tend to extensively experience exposure to members of the majority group, simply by virtue of being part of a small group. This factor alone may shape a different perception of the in- versus out-group divide.

More importantly, ethnic minorities and immigrants are often at the bottom of the social hierarchy and are perceived to belong to lower status groups (Zhang, Gereke and Baldassarri 2022). A comprehensive reading of in- versus out-group dynamics should therefore include, alongside with ethnic identities, status hierarchies as an organizing principle. Namely, in the perspective of status construction theory (Ridgeway 2014), people strive to associate with high-status individuals and attribute great virtues to them. Discrimination against minorities and immigrants may also derive from a generic disregard of lower status groups, rather than exclusively from the fact that they are non-coethnics. Distinctive of this second explanation is that all members of society would favor members of the dominant group over non-members, independent of their own identity.<sup>15</sup>

Because most existing studies do primarily focus on the beliefs and behavior of the dominant group and do not document the behavior of minorities and immigrants toward their own in-group, this latter possibility has rarely surfaced and the implication that even minorities would favor members of the dominant group has rarely been tested. In contrast, our analysis of the behavior of immigrants in the Competence Task shows that immigrants prefer to interact with Italians when given the opportunity to choose. Thus, it is possible that both Italians and immigrants engage in a process of reproduction of status hierarchies: they both prefer to interact with the dominant group. From the point of view of individual experiences and societal effects, whether Italians operate based on ethnic discrimination or whether they reproduce status hierarchies, and, de-facto, privilege other Italians, does not make much difference: in both cases immigrants are penalized at the point of selection into social relations. However, a better understanding of what the underlying mechanisms are is commendable not only for theoretical but also for practical and political reasons. In fact, if ethnic discrimination is at work, the most likely way to address it has to do with the beliefs and stereotypes of Italian citizens. If, instead, immigrants are penalized for their lower status, it means addressing differences that are ingrained in the social structure, and might be reproduced not only by natives but also by other immigrants. Status-based discrimination may be particularly hard to address, especially in societies with little social mobility, in which not only first generation immigrants but also second generation, thus Italian born and raised ethnic minorities, face unfavorable employment opportunities. Thus, status-based discrimination is no less problematic in terms of the difficulties immigrants (and minorities) face and it might have even a bigger effect on the reproduction of inequalities than ethnic-based discrimination.

*Scope conditions and generalization.* Our research agenda is complementary to the studies of cross-cultural variation (Henrich et al. 2001; Romano et al. 2017). We work in the tradition of Adida et al. (2016), Enos and Gidron (2018), and Habyarimana et al. (2009), focusing on within-cultural variation and microlevel mechanisms. We

believe both agendas are valuable, but complementary: cross-cultural comparisons are better adept at capturing macrostructural factors, such as market integration, differences in institutional frameworks, familism, and so on. But they rarely offer insights into microdynamics and contextual factors. The latter are better pursued with within-cultural approaches capable of capturing microlevel behavior, network interdependencies, and so on. Further iterations of our research would likely include attempts at bridging this gap, with sample designs that would ideally allow for both cross- and within-cultural comparisons. However, this approach would be possible only after sufficient context-rich research like ours has been carried out.

To what extent can findings from a multiethnic European metropolis be applied to other social contexts? Obviously, we cannot generalize our findings to non-urban settings, in which the macrostructural factors creating opportunities for contact are very different (see Fig. 1). Although vibrant urban settings tend to attract and employ a disproportionate share of immigrants and ethnic minorities, several non-urban regions in Western Europe and North America, especially those experiencing economic hardship, remain largely homogeneous. In the latter case, given the limited opportunities for exposure, attitudes and behavior toward immigrants and ethnic minorities are more likely to be affected by the media and (often hostile) political environments rather than direct experience. Perhaps not surprisingly then, there is greater hostility toward immigrants in regions where immigration is low, while urban multiethnic settings are generally more inclusive (Alba and Foner 2017; Jennings and Stoker 2016).

In addition, as discussed previously, there are institutional and political factors, from immigrants' legal status and their inclusion in the broader polity to overall market opportunities, which might vary across time and place and are likely to affect opportunities for out-group exposure or turn contact into conflict or exploitation. For instance, prosocial behavior across ethnic group boundaries may vary depending on the refugee or asylum status of immigrants or may change with the presence of new and large refugee populations, such as the recent influx of Ukrainians, as attitudinal data from Italy suggest (Moise, Dennison, and Kriesi 2024).

Finally, as anticipated in the discussion of our sampling, people electing to live in urban settings and diverse neighborhoods might systematically differ (in terms of tolerance, openness, etc.) from individuals who purposefully avoid multiethnic settings (Maxwell 2020, 2019). Although we speculate that patterns of residential mobility are rarely affected by diversification in many European cities, it is nonetheless important to factor in this aspect when considering the potential effects of diversification in homogeneous communities.

However, we should not dismiss the possibility that the dynamics of out-group exposure detailed in this article might offer a glimpse into what might happen in the near future in other social settings. For many centuries, cities have anticipated what Western societies were about to become. New modes of production, lifestyles, norms, and fads (and pandemics) all generated from the density of life in urban environments and then spread to most corners of society.

## Notes

- 1 In this framework, it makes sense to expect that heterogeneity has negative effects on collectivity by undermining the dense network of reciprocity and social control on which traditional societies rely.
- 2 Going beyond cross-sectional evidence, Laurence and coauthors rely on a two-wave panel data of white British individuals in England to determine the conditions under which increasing minority share in a community generates processes of contact and/or perceived threat, and they conclude that this will depend on how segregated groups are from one another. Namely, “residents living among high proportions of out-group where the groups are integrated report an improvement in out-group attitudes. It is only residents living among large out-group populations where groups are more segregated from one another—at the nexus of high minority share and high segregation—who report colder out-group attitudes.” (Laurence et al. 2019:1029).
- 3 Research has shown that individual attitudes also influence the decision of moving to diverse communities in the first place (Maxwell 2020, 2019).
- 4 Results presented here are a part of a larger data collection that was preregistered at EGAP (<https://osf.io/rk84m>), received IRB approval from Bocconi University, and funded by the European Research Council Starting Grant 639284. Data and Code for replication are available at OSF (<https://osf.io/3rzgj>).
- 5 While a small percentage of our immigrant participants had acquired Italian citizenship (20 percent), almost all of them (90 percent) were born abroad. For simplicity, in the rest of the article, we use the term Italian to refer to majority population Italian natives exclusively.
- 6 Our sample size calculations for the entire data collection were informed by previous lab-in-the-field experiments on intergroup behavior, such as Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2016), Baldassarri (2015), Enos and Gidron (2018), and Hager, Krakowski, and Schaub (2019).
- 7 Official statistics for immigrant groups are notoriously unreliable.
- 8 In brackets, we highlight the aspects that varied (brackets were obviously not used in the script seen by the participants).
- 9 For the activities presented here, we paired individuals with fictitious profiles that we experimentally could vary and which were introduced as previous participants who had agreed to be included in future waves of the research. The feedback about the payoff of the games was only revealed at the end of the session, just before the payment. The order of the games was always the same: first two Dictator Games, followed by the Trust and the Competence Game. Payoffs for the Trust and Competence Game were determined by matching prerecorded decisions of Player 2 recorded in the pilot session. Participants only assumed the role of the decider in the Dictator Game and Trust Game. However, the information provided about their interaction partners and the payment process ensured they understood that their actions had real consequences for their partners.
- 10 Due to an error where an Italian participant incorrectly registered as an immigrant starting the software and thus was excluded from the Trust Game, we had 557 Italians participating in the trust games instead of the intended 558 as in the Dictator Game.
- 11 This result ( $p = 0.067$ ) is not significant at the 95 percent conventional level but passes less-stringent statistical significance tests.
- 12 Logistic regressions produce the same results, as do models controlling for gender of the partner, and respondent’s education and performance in the competence task.

- <sup>13</sup> Note that the confidence intervals in the right panel of Figure 8 do not refer to the comparison between these two categories but to the comparison with the baseline category of an Italian who works in a supermarket.
- <sup>14</sup> As expected, and confirming in an experimental setting major findings from observational analysis, negative attitudes toward immigrants are related to both lower prosociality toward them, and a clear unwillingness to interact with them. Estimates for attitudes, however, become nonsignificant when controlling for network composition.
- <sup>15</sup> For instance, in many consequential settings (i.e., the labor market), both men and women tend to discriminate against women (Auspurg, Hinz and Sauer 2017).

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