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Article — Published Version

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Democratization

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Suggested Citation: Tuki, Daniel (2024) : What does the population in Niger think about a military government?, Democratization, ISSN 1743-890X, Taylor & Francis, London, Vol. 31, Iss. 8, pp. 1740-1765,
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2341314>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308006>

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RESEARCH ARTICLE



What does the population in Niger think about a military government?

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ABSTRACT

Using the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey data for Niger, this study examined the determinants of support for military intervention with particular focus on political instability, perceived corruption in the democratic government, and socioeconomic deprivation. The descriptive results showed that Nigeriens generally do not have a strong aversion towards military rule. In fact, about 70 percent of them agreed that the military should intervene when the democratic government is corrupt. The regression results showed that political instability, which was measured using the total number of violent conflict incidents in the region where respondents resided, was positively correlated with support for military intervention. This might be because people who are exposed to violence feel that a military government would do a better job at providing security. Perceived corruption in government was also positively correlated with support for military intervention. This might be because corruption engenders discontent with democratic institutions, prompting people to see military intervention as a way of curtailing the democratic government's excesses. Socioeconomic deprivation was negatively correlated with support for military intervention, which suggests that the poor prefer democracy to a military government.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 12 August 2023; Accepted 4 April 2024


KEYWORDS military intervention; coup; poverty; political instability; conflict; corruption; Niger

JEL CODES D74; I30

1. Introduction

On 26 July 2023, the democratically elected President of the Republic of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was ousted by the presidential guards, putting the landlocked country in the international spotlight.¹ The military junta, headed by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, justified the coup on the grounds of rising insecurity caused by Islamist insurgency, corruption, and the poor state of the Nigerien economy.² The Junta

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 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2341314>.

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has decided to limit Niger's ties with France, its former colonial ruler. There have also been protests by Nigeriens supporting the military junta and opposing France's continued influence in the country.³

However, Engels contends that the coup was not driven by France's neocolonial influence, but rather by the "frustrations, cleavages and power struggles within ... [the] state's security forces." She also observes that President Bazoum's intention to restructure the presidential guard might have precipitated the coup.⁴ McCullough and Sandor share Engels' view and also point out that the junta's opposition to the presence of French troops in the country, its emphasis on the reestablishment of Niger's sovereignty, and its criticism of the government's counterinsurgency policy were strategies geared towards garnering support within the military and the larger Nigerien population.⁵ Ajala notes that ethnicity also needs to be considered when analyzing the recent coup. The military, which consists primarily of members of the majority ethnic groups, were uncomfortable with Bazoum being president because he belonged to the minority Arab ethnic group.⁶ Suffice it to add that Bazoum was accused of having foreign origins while he was running for office in 2021.⁷

Besides the recent coup, Niger has experienced four successful coups in the past. The first was in 1974, the second in 1996, the third in 1999, and the fourth in 2010.⁸ Niger's latest is the fourth in a succession of successful coups in West Africa that have toppled democratic governments over the past three years. The first was in Mali in May 2021,⁹ the second in Guinea in September 2021,¹⁰ and the third in Burkina Faso, which experienced two successful coups within a span of nine months.¹¹ Other non-West African countries like Chad and Gabon experienced military coups in 2021 and 2023 respectively.¹²

There has been wide condemnation of the coup by governments around the world such as the French and the United States governments, and by regional blocs like the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Many ECOWAS member states have closed their land and air borders with Niger and suspended financial transactions with the country.¹³ However, there has also been some support for the Nigerien military junta. The military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso have demonstrated solidarity with the Nigerien military junta and have promised to support it militarily should it be attacked by external forces.¹⁴

Houle and Bodea assert that coups are detrimental to democracy because they hinder democratic consolidation, impede economic development, and catalyze political instability.¹⁵ Collier observes that coups could be problematic because "when political power is won through violence, the results are usually awful. The political strongman in a divided society is seldom a visionary leader; he is more likely to be self-serving, or in thrall to the interests of a narrow support group."¹⁶ He points out that military leaders, after assuming power through a coup, usually increase the military budget to reward soldiers who had been loyal to them and to discourage future coup attempts. He also argues that coups are sometimes driven by opportunism and the desire for self-enrichment, in which case the military junta uses the explanations of bad governance and economic stagnation as façades to conceal their ulterior motives. Clark points out that oftentimes, military juntas end up being more corrupt and repressive than the toppled government they criticize.¹⁷ This explains why Mbaku asserts that "coups are a rent-seeking behavior, used by military elites to capture the apparatus of government in order to preside over the state's allocation of resources."¹⁸

Conversely, Thyne and Powell contend that coups, when carried out against governments that are authoritarian and repressive, can pave the way for democratization. They argue that “when coups challenge authoritarian regimes, policymakers should view the actions as windows of opportunities to foster democratization.”¹⁹ They point out that coup leaders, after seizing power, often seek to establish the legitimacy of their government. Leaders also make effort to improve the country’s economy and the country’s relations with the outside world so that sanctions that have been imposed on the country can be lifted. The coup leader achieves these goals by opening up the political process to the country’s population. Moreover, they note that “the bulk of coups do not happen within democracies, giving most coup leaders little democracy to undermine.”²⁰ In a cross-country study covering Africa, Powell concludes that “coups have indeed acted as meaningful agents for democratic gains in Africa ... the statistical reality is that African states, particularly dictatorships, are significantly more likely to democratise in the three years following coups.”²¹

For the purpose of this paper, it is imperative to provide some recent stylized facts about Niger. It had a Human Development Index (HDI) score of 0.4 in 2021, meaning it had one of the lowest levels of human development in the world.²² Only Chad and South Sudan performed worse.²³ Data from the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey, which was conducted in 2022 and is representative of Niger’s population, shows that 77 percent of Nigeriens had gone without food at least “several times” during the past 12 months. 45 percent of them considered the economic situation in the country to be either “very bad” or “bad.” When asked about their own living conditions, 38 percent of them said they were either “very bad” or “bad.” 47 percent of Nigeriens thought the country’s economic situation had deteriorated compared to the previous year, 49 percent of them had no formal education, and 45 percent of them thought the level of corruption in the country had increased during the past five years.²⁴ Data from Transparency International shows that Niger had a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of 32 in 2022, which indicates that corruption is a problem in the country.²⁵

The paradox of Niger’s dismal socioeconomic performance is accentuated by the fact that it is very rich in natural resources, especially uranium. According to Elischer and Mueller, “The details of Franco-Nigerien uranium trade remain shrouded in secrecy, but the trade is said to benefit the French at the expense of the Nigerien population.”²⁶ Graham observes that “During decolonisation, France influenced the election of a pro-French leader named Hamani Diori and secured for their Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) 83% control and shares of the uranium mine, leaving 17% to the Nigerien government.”²⁷ Highlighting the magnitude of French influence in Niger during Diori’s regime, Higgott and Fuglestad observed: “With over 90 French citizens spread throughout its senior administrative structure Niger had, proportionately speaking, one of the least Africanised governments of francophone Africa.”²⁸ Political instability is also a nagging problem in the country, with data obtained from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED)²⁹ showing that between 1997–2022, Niger recorded a total of 2,053 violent conflict incidents and 7,118 associated fatalities.³⁰ 565 incidents were recorded in 2022 alone – i.e. the year preceding the recent coup – making it Niger’s most violent year in terms of the incidence of violent conflict since 1997.

Although the position of governments and regional organizations pertaining to Niger’s July 2023 coup is obvious, as evidenced by numerous statements in the news

media, the perceptions of ordinary Nigeriens towards military intervention have not been systematically examined. Moreover, there is generally a dearth of research on attitudes towards authoritarianism and military rule in Africa, as most studies on regime legitimacy tend to focus on support for democracy. García-Rivero observes that this is due to the tendency to assume that support for authoritarianism and military rule is *antagonistic*.³¹ Using the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey data, which is representative of Niger's population and was collected in 2022, this present study seeks to examine how perceived corruption in the democratic government, socioeconomic deprivation and political instability influence support for military intervention. These three factors overlap with the explanations advanced by the military junta to justify the coup.

This study finds that Nigeriens generally do not have a strong aversion towards military rule. In fact, the descriptive results show that about 70 percent of them approve of military intervention when the democratically elected government is corrupt. The regression results show that political instability (i.e. a high incidence of violent conflict) positively correlates with support for military intervention. This might be because people who are exposed to violence think that a military government would do a better job at tackling the country's security challenges. Perceived corruption in the democratic government was also found to positively correlate with support for military intervention. This might be because corruption erodes people's confidence in the democratic government, making them view the military as a viable alternative. Socioeconomic deprivation was negatively correlated with support for military intervention, which indicates that the poor prefer democracy to a military government. This might be because a military intervention disrupts patron-client networks existing between the poor and political elites, and which are "beneficial" to the poor. It could also be that the poor are disillusioned with both the military and democratic governments; however, the semblance of freedom that democracy provides makes it preferable.

This study proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses Niger's political trajectory from its independence in 1960 up to the 2023 coup. Section 3 discusses the literature on the determinants of coups and how socioeconomic condition, political instability, and perceived corruption play into the mix. I present the data and operationalize the variables that will be used to estimate the regression models in Section 4. Section 5 presents the regression results and discusses them, while Section 6 summarizes the study and concludes.

2. Niger's political trajectory since independence

Niger gained independence from French colonial rule on 3 August 1960. Its first military coup in 1974 toppled Hamani Diori who had been president from independence until then. Higgott and Fuglestad observe that Diori's regime was "an oligarchy ... No opposition was tolerated, no attempt to enlarge the power base of the party was made, and no elections worthy of that name, either within the party [i.e. Nigerien Progressive Party (PPN)] or nation-wide were ever held."³² The government's patron-client relationship with France, corruption, its poor treatment of the military, massive protests among the population due to their worsening socioeconomic circumstance, coupled with the government's inability to address the problem of drought-induced poverty among the population created the "right" conditions for Lieutenant colonel Seyni Kountché to launch a coup that toppled the civilian government.³³ Higgott

and Fuglestad observed that the coup, which was largely perceived as being corrective, “was greeted with feelings of relief or simply indifference at the national level, and by a singular lack of protest outside Niger.”³⁴

Like the earlier regime, Kountché’s was authoritarian and did not tolerate dissent. He died in office in 1987 after which Major Ali Saibou was appointed by the Supreme Military Council to lead the country.³⁵ However, socioeconomic hardship due to the government’s adoption of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), coupled with the repression of civil liberties fostered grievances among Nigeriens.³⁶ This prompted massive protests that led to a national conference, paving the way for a democratic government.³⁷ Multiparty elections were held in 1993 and Mahamane Ousmane emerged as the country’s president. However, the new government continued with the structural adjustment programme that it had vehemently criticized before coming into office. It implemented more liberalization policies and devalued the country’s currency, causing further socioeconomic hardship for the population. Bonnecase observes that the government, by continuing with this programme, had “dismissed the exercise of power by people whose roles had been decisive in the democratization process, and who expected something quite different from it.”³⁸ He goes on to note that, “it [i.e. the continuation of SAP] had a lasting effect on the devaluation of the democratic ideal.”³⁹ This culminated in widespread anti-government protests among the population. In an effort to curtail the protests, which were sometimes violent, a student was killed. This was reminiscent of the heavy-handed approach employed by the military government to quell dissent. Moreover, the rivalry between President Mahamane Ousmane and the prime minister, Hama Amadou, coupled with the deadlock between the president and the opposition members in the parliament further undermined the democratic process.⁴⁰ When Colonel Ibrahim Baré, under the auspices of the Council of National Salvation (CNS), carried out Niger’s second coup in January 1996 that toppled the democratic government, “in Niamey, no one took to the streets to defend the government under attack.”⁴¹

Colonel Ibrahim Baré organized elections that same year and installed himself as president. His regime was repressive and intolerant towards opposition. Niger’s third coup in 1999 resulted in Baré’s death. Davis and Kossomi observe that “In spite of the violence of the assassination and the suddenness of the coup by Major Daouda Malam Wanké and his men, local activities were generally unaffected and people went about their day-to-day business.”⁴² Wanké, drafted a new constitution and organized elections that same year, ushering in Mamadou Tandja as president. Although Tandja successfully completed two five-year terms in office, his regime was not devoid of “recurring social protest, with major student demonstrations in 2001 and 2004, demonstrations against the cost of living in 2005 and continued unrest in the army.”⁴³ A crisis arose when Tandja sought to amend the constitution so he could remain in office for three more years beyond the two-term limit permitted by the constitution. Facing mounting opposition and criticism, both at home and abroad, he dissolved the national assembly and decided to rule by decree.⁴⁴ In February 2010, a group of soldiers, called the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CRSD), orchestrated a coup that removed Tandja from office. Though the African Union condemned the coup and imposed sanctions on Niger, the coup was celebrated on the streets by ordinary Nigeriens, who were already disenchanted with the democratic government.⁴⁵ Commenting on the military junta, an opposition leader,

Mahamadu Karijo, observed: “They behave like they say – they are not interested in political leadership, they will fight to save the Nigerien people from any kind of tyranny.”⁴⁶ Baudais and Chauzal referred to Niger’s 2010 coup “as a ‘corrective coup’ ... aiming to rectify the democratic trajectory by overthrowing an illegitimate government.”⁴⁷ A report by the World Bank highlighted how the coup revived Niger’s relationship with the outside world: “In 2010, for instance, the military coup even enabled Niger to be back on the international scene after the suspension of the European Union cooperation due to Tandja’s governance.”⁴⁸

Within a year, the military government organized elections that ushered in Mahamadou Issoufou as the country’s president.⁴⁹ After completing two terms in office, elections were held in 2021 in which Mohammed Bazoum emerged as president. This marked the first transfer of power between two democratically elected governments in Niger since its independence in 1960. Although there was a coup attempt on the eve of Bazoum’s inauguration on March 31, 2021, it was quashed and he was sworn into office.⁵⁰ He became president at a turbulent time when Niger was battling with high levels of poverty, ethnic disputes and jihadi insurgencies perpetrated by *Boko Haram* and the Islamic State. These crises hampered the government’s effort to improve the socioeconomic wellbeing of the population.⁵¹ Bazoum did not complete his first term because the July 2023 coup ousted him from office.

3. Theoretical considerations

3.1. Coups and their aftermath

McGowan and Johnson define coups as “events in which existing regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of relatively small groups, in which members of the military, police, or security forces of the state play a key role, either on their own or in conjunction with a number of civil servants or politicians.”⁵² According to Powell and Thyne, coups are “overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.”⁵³ Collier refers to coups as a form of political violence observing: “Indeed, the most common and effective form of political violence often succeeds without any deaths at all: it is the surgical strike in the form of a coup d’état. The military, whose purpose is to defend citizens from organized violence, is sometimes in a splendid position to perpetrate it.”⁵⁴ He also highlights the potential for coups to hinder development when he notes: “Wars and coups are not tea parties: they are development in reverse.”⁵⁵

Some studies have shown that countries that are poor, that have slow economic growth, that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities for government revenues, and that have ethnically polarized populations, are particularly vulnerable to coups.⁵⁶ The experience of a coup has also been found to increase the likelihood of another one occurring.⁵⁷ Collier points out that the baseline risk of a coup occurring in an African country is four percent. However, for countries that have previously experienced coups, the risk is 10 percent.⁵⁸ Powell contends that the occurrence of coups depends more on the characteristics of the military than on economic factors.⁵⁹ Using global data, he finds that increased financial investments in the military lower the likelihood of coup attempts and also lower the likelihood of a coup succeeding if attempted. Mehrl and Escribà-Folch have found that the recruitment of foreigners into the military reduces the risk of coups.⁶⁰ This is because foreign

legionnaires are usually loyal to the leader who employs them and not to the nation. Moreover, their presence makes coordination within the military difficult, thereby reducing the likelihood of a coup occurring.

Although Collier agrees that coups are generally bad for economic development, he acknowledges that the threat of coups might foster democracy by preventing elected governments from abusing power: “Not only might the threat of a coup discipline a government, but in extremis, a coup might be the only way of replacing a dysfunctional leader.”⁶¹ Thyne and Powell argue that while coups that topple democratic governments hurt the democratic process, coups could be instrumental in ushering in a transition to democracy when carried out against authoritarian and repressive governments.⁶² This is because “some shock is almost always necessary to budge staunchly authoritarian regimes off their continued path of repression.”⁶³ They recommend that “Instead of automatically condemning coups, policymakers should view coups in authoritarian states as critical windows of opportunity to foster democracy.”⁶⁴ Albrecht et al. contend that the capacity for a military coup to foster democratization depends on the rank of the coup perpetrators.⁶⁵ Coups perpetrated by senior military personnel (i.e. coups from the top) are more likely to succeed, and often ensure the persistence of authoritarianism. Conversely, coups involving personnel at the lower rungs of the military hierarchy (i.e. coups from below), though less likely to succeed, “can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.”⁶⁶ Chacha and Powell observe that when a country’s economy is deeply embedded in the international economic system, the democratic transition process after a coup occurs faster because the military government would be eager to establish its legitimacy and to preserve the confidence of foreign investors.⁶⁷

Miller has challenged the notion of a “good coup” by arguing that even when coups lead to democratic transitions, these transitions are usually short-lived.⁶⁸ This is because military juntas often fail to build durable democratic institutions that will stand the test of time, which in turn paves the way for future coups. Derpanopoulos et al. assert that most coups that topple autocratic governments end up replacing the regimes with more repressive ones, which leads them to the conclusion that “coups destabilize dictatorships not by improving prospects for democratization, but by boosting the odds that a new dictatorship replaces the old one.”⁶⁹ Powell et al. have pointed out that failed coups do not lead to changes in a leaders’ behaviour, but rather strengthens their resolve to persist along the political trajectory they had been following.⁷⁰ This is because the failed coup provides incumbent leaders with information on the political opposition that can then be used to purge it, hence allowing leaders more leeway to pursue their policy objectives.

3.2. Socioeconomic condition and attitudes towards military intervention

When the democratic government fails to provide basic public services like potable drinking water and healthcare facilities, which the population requires to live decent lives, this might erode people’s confidence in the government and make them more open to military intervention. Put differently, the poor might have unfavourable attitudes towards a democratic government because of its inability to bring about significant improvements in their socioeconomic circumstance. As discussed in Section 2, poverty has remained a nagging problem in Niger since its independence from French colonial rule. Moreover, Niger’s first coup of 1974 that toppled the democratic

government was met with a feeling of relief among the population because of the democratic government's failure to address the problem of poverty.⁷¹ The Nigerian population's reaction might have been driven by frustration with the democratic government and the desire to have anything but the status quo. It is also possible that their reaction was anchored on the expectation that the military would do a better job at tackling poverty, as this was one of the justifications that the junta had advanced for the coup. Some studies have shown that citizens tend to trust governments that provide public amenities and social safety nets, which they need to live decent lives.⁷²

The affluent segment of the population might not be supportive of military intervention. When people are able to meet their basic material needs, they begin to attach more importance to non-material needs like individual autonomy, freedom, and liberty – a phenomenon that Inglehart refers to as the “post-modern phase of development.”⁷³ Some empirical studies have shown support for this. Analyzing survey data from Chile, Navia and Osorio find that people with high socioeconomic status are more supportive of democracy than those with low socioeconomic status.⁷⁴ Carlin finds a similar result in a study covering eight Latin American countries.⁷⁵ In a study conducted in Turkey, Sarigil finds that people who are satisfied with their economic situation are less likely to support a military coup against the democratic government.⁷⁶ Put differently, people who are dissatisfied with their socioeconomic status are more likely to support a military intervention. This leads to the first hypothesis that this study seeks to test:

H1a: Socioeconomic deprivation positively correlates with support for military intervention

It is also possible that the poor might prefer democracy to a military government. Cheeseman argues that when a society is characterized by high levels of inequality and poverty, it becomes easier for the political elite to purchase poor people's support to advance their political aims.⁷⁷ This is especially the case in societies where politics is characterized by “patron-client” relationships. In such cases, a military intervention might imply the disruption of patron-client networks that are “beneficial” to the poor; hence their preference for democracy over a military government. The poor might also be indifferent between military and democratic governments. Hern has conducted a study in Zambia, finding that the main reason people choose not to vote is because they perceive all political parties as corrupt and see no difference between them.⁷⁸ One of her interviewees observed: “it doesn't matter who is in power, we all get left alone out here.”⁷⁹ Cassell et al. have conducted a study covering 21 Latin American countries in which they find that household wealth has no effect on support for coups.⁸⁰ In a country like Niger where the population has experienced both democratic and military governments at different points in its checkered history, and yet remains one of the poorest countries in the world, the population might be apathetic towards military and democratic governments because they consider both to be incapable of improving their socioeconomic circumstance. However, even if the poor were disillusioned with both the civilian and military governments, they might still prefer democracy over a military government because of the *semblance* of civil liberties that democracy affords.⁸¹ The discussion so far leads to two more variants of Hypothesis 1:

H1b: Socioeconomic deprivation negatively correlates with support for military intervention

H1c: Socioeconomic deprivation has no effect on support for military intervention

3.3. Political instability and attitudes towards military intervention

When violence is rife, the democratic government might be seen as weak and having failed in its fundamental responsibility of keeping the citizenry safe. Bester observes that the growing threat of insecurity leads to increased reliance upon the military by democratic governments, which in turn engenders “a growing perception of the military not just as a defence force but as a potential agent of stability, order, and governance.”⁸² Relying on the frustration-aggression theory, Bester further observes that the population, frustrated with the democratic government’s inability to provide security, might resort to supporting a military government.⁸³ Hinton and Montalvo observe that the state’s ability to provide security is crucial to democracy’s survival because “When individuals feel threatened or insecure, they are more likely to tolerate and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.”⁸⁴ Empirical studies conducted in Nepal,⁸⁵ South Korea,⁸⁶ and among Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Turkey⁸⁷ have shown that exposure to violent conflict erodes people’s confidence in the government.

This could be applied to the case of Niger where insecurity remains a nagging problem. As shown in [Figure 1](#), Niger recorded 2,053 violent conflict incidents between 1997–2022, 87 percent of which occurred between 2016–2022. Niger was under democratic rule during this period. 59 percent of the total incidents were categorized as “Violence against civilians,” 32 percent were categorized as “Battles,” while the remaining 9 percent were categorized as “Explosions/Remote violence.” Niger recorded a total of 7,118 conflict-related fatalities between 1997–2022, 76 percent of which occurred between 2016–2022. Given that most of the violent conflict incidents and fatalities occurred during the period when Niger was under democratic rule, it is possible that these might have eroded the population’s confidence in the government’s ability to keep them safe. Put differently, Nigeriens might be more supportive of military intervention because they think a military government would do a better job at providing security. But one might ask, *what if the violence against civilians was perpetrated by the Nigerien military? Why then should the population support military intervention?* For instance, Keenan observes that “Since the beginning of the Tuareg rebellion in Niger on 8 February 2007, Niger’s armed forces (Forces Armées Nigériennes – FAN) have been unable to match the rebels in open combat. They have therefore wreaked their frustration and vengeance on the civilian population.”⁸⁸ However, such violence is mostly directed towards Tuaregs, who constitute an ethnic minority in Niger. It is possible that even if perceptions of military intervention are influenced by ethnicity, the relatively smaller size of Tuaregs (i.e. 8.5 percent of the population) might not significantly impact the general attitudes of the Nigerien population towards military intervention.⁸⁹ Moreover, it is also imperative to stress that much of the violence against civilians occurred under the watch of a democratic government. This leads to the second hypothesis that this study seeks to test:

H2a: Political instability positively correlates with support for military intervention

Another strand of literature has shown that threats or national security crises, especially those perpetrated by foreign actors, could lead to increased support for the government, a phenomenon that Mueller refers to as the “rally around the flag effect.”⁹⁰ Some empirical studies have found support for this. Analyzing data collected from undergraduate students in the United States, Sinclair and LoCicero find a positive




Figure 1. Violent conflicts and associated fatalities in Niger (1997–2022) (ACLED).

Note: The figure juxtaposes the incidence of violent conflict in Niger alongside the accompanying fatalities from 1997 to 2022. The y-axis on the left shows the number of fatalities, while the one on the right shows the number of incidents. The x-axis shows the years. Based on data obtained from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED), I define violent conflicts as incidents that fall under any of the following three categories: Battles, Violence against civilians, and Explosions/Remote violence.

correlation between the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks and trust in the American government.⁹¹ As an explanation for their findings, they suggest that people tend to rely more heavily on those tasked with the responsibility of providing security in times of crises. Chanley, who also examined the effect of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the American public, found a similar result.⁹² She goes on to note that people become less cynical about the government when their attention is focused on issues of national security and terrorist attacks. The positive correlation between terrorist attacks and trust in government has been observed in the Norwegian population after the Oslo and Utøya terrorist attacks in 2011,⁹³ and in the Spanish population after the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid (i.e. 3/11).⁹⁴ If the threat of violence indeed fosters support for whichever government is in power, then Nigeriens who are exposed to violence would not support military intervention since much of the violent conflict incidents occurred under the democratic government.

Other studies have shown that the threat of violence has no effect on people's confidence in the government. Nusio conducted a study in Germany where he examined the effect of the 2016 terrorist attack at the Berlin Christmas market on trust in the government.⁹⁵ He found that although the attack made Germans sad, it had no effect on trust in the government. He points out that this might be due to desensitization, which could be cognitive (i.e. when people already expect an attack) or emotional (i.e. when people are no longer sensitive to attacks). Returning to the case of Niger: If Nigeriens are indeed apathetic to violent conflict due to its frequent occurrence, then exposure to violent conflict would have no effect on support for military intervention. To account for the mixed findings in the literature, I will test the following variants of Hypothesis 2:

H2b: Political instability negatively correlates with support for military intervention

H2c: Political instability has no effect on support for military intervention

3.4. Corruption and attitudes towards military intervention

Aidt defines corruption as “an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game.”⁹⁶ When the democratic government is perceived as corrupt, this might erode the population's confidence in the government, which in turn might make them more open to military intervention. This support might stem from the belief that military intervention is necessary to curtail the excesses of the democratic government. This is especially relevant in the case of Niger where the military has constantly been in the political scene and has sometimes played a “corrective” role when democratic governments exhibited authoritarian tendencies. In fact, a report by the World Bank summarizes the Nigerien military's role in politics thus: “Though Niger has experienced a number of coups, it would be inappropriate to consider the army as disruptive to the development process. Coups in Niger are characterized by a high degree of ‘legitimacy’ in which the army acted as arbiter in political games.”⁹⁷

Some studies have shown that people generally do not trust governments that they perceive to be corrupt. For instance, Caillier conducted a study in the United States in which he finds that perceived corruption in government is negatively correlated with people's confidence in its ability to solve problems.⁹⁸ Analyzing survey data covering 18 Sub-Saharan African countries, Lavallée et al. found that perceived

corruption erodes trust in political institutions.⁹⁹ Furthermore, their regression model showed that compared to the actual experience of corruption (e.g. having to pay a bribe to access government services), perceived corruption has a larger negative effect on political trust. Some studies have specifically examined the effect of corruption on support for military intervention. Analyzing survey data covering the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, García-Rivero found that those who considered the democratic government to be corrupt were more supportive of military rule.¹⁰⁰ This was because “Support for authoritarian rule is possibly perceived as the only response to corruption, unaccountable institutions and the inefficacy of party politics.”¹⁰¹ The discussion so far leads to the third hypothesis that this study seeks to test:

H3: Perceived corruption in the democratic government positively correlates with support for military intervention.

4. Data and methodology

This study relies on the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey data collected in Niger in 2022, and which is representative of the country’s population.¹⁰² A total of 1,200 respondents, drawn from Niger’s eight regions, were interviewed. Respondents were at least 18 years old. Males and females were equally represented in the sample at a 50:50 ratio. The variables that will be used to estimate the regression models are discussed below. Table A1 in the appendix presents the summary statistics of these variables.

4.1. Operationalization of the variables

4.1.1. Dependent variable

Military intervention. This measures the degree to which respondents support military intervention conditional upon the democratically elected government being corrupt. It was derived from the following two statements: “STATEMENT 1: Niger’s armed forces should never intervene in the country’s political process. STATEMENT 2: It is legitimate for the armed forces to take control of government when elected leaders abuse power for their own ends.” The responses were measured on an ordinal scale with the following four categories, “1 = strongly agree with statement 1; 2 = agree with statement 1; 3 = agree with statement 2; 4 = strongly agree with statement 2.” I treated respondents who agreed with neither of the statements ($n = 17$) as missing observations. This led to a marginal decrease in the number of observations. I also treated “don’t know” and “refused to answer” responses as missing observations. I applied this rule to all variables derived from the Afrobarometer survey.

As shown in Figure 2, most Nigeriens are supportive of military intervention when the democratically elected government is corrupt. More specifically, 69 percent of them either “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement supporting military intervention (i.e. Statement 2), which translates to two in three Nigeriens. I developed a binary version of the dependent variable in which I coded the two responses associated with *Statement 2* as 1, and the responses associated with *Statement 1* as 0. I used this to conduct a robustness check.




Figure 2. Conditional support for military intervention in Niger (2022).

Note: The figure shows the distribution of responses to a question probing the degree to which Nigeriens support military intervention. The y-axis shows the response categories to two statements: *Statement 1* (S1) opposes military intervention, while *Statement 2* (S2) supports military intervention. The x-axis shows the number of respondents associated with the various response categories.

4.1.2. Explanatory variables

Corruption index. This is an additive indicator that measures the degree to which respondents think corruption is prevalent in the three branches of government. It was derived by combining the responses to the following questions: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? (a) The president and officials in his office (b) Members of the national assembly (c) Judges and magistrates.” The responses were measured on a scale with four ordinal categories ranging from “0 = none” to “3 = all of them.” The three items had a Cronbach Alpha statistic of 0.76, which shows internal reliability. The additive index ranges from 0 to 9, with a value of 0 denoting the lowest level of perceived corruption and 9 the highest.

Figure 3 shows that the level of perceived corruption in government does not differ significantly between its three branches. The mean level of perceived corruption in the executive (i.e. president), legislative (i.e. national assembly) and judicial (i.e. judges and magistrates) arms of the government were 1.21, 1.24, and 1.23 respectively.

Deprivation index. This is an additive indicator that measures the respondents’ wellbeing along five dimensions. It was derived by summing the responses to the following questions: “Over the past 12 months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: (a) Gone without enough food to eat? (b) Gone without enough clean water for home use? (c) Gone without medicines or medical treatment? (d) Gone




Figure 3. Nigeriens’ perception of corruption in government (2022).

Note: The y-axis shows the number of respondents who answered the relevant questions regarding the prevalence of corruption in the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government. The x-axis shows the percentage of respondents associated with the various response categories.




Figure 4. Socioeconomic deprivation among Nigeriens (2022).

Note: The figure shows the distribution of socioeconomic deprivation among Nigeriens. The x-axis shows the deprivation index scores which range from 0 to 20 (higher values denote a higher level of deprivation), while the y-axis shows the number of respondents associated with the various index scores.

without fuel to cook your food? (e) Gone without a cash income?” The responses to each question were measured on a scale with five ordinal categories ranging from “0 = never” to “4 = always.” The five items had a Cronbach Alpha statistic of 0.64. The deprivation index ranges from 0 to 20, with 0 denoting the best socioeconomic condition and 20 denoting the worst. Figure 4 plots the deprivation index on a bar chart.

Only 1.4 percent of the respondents ($n = 17$) had “never” gone without any of the five listed items during the past year. 55 percent of the respondents had deprivation index scores of 10 and above, which suggests a high level of poverty among Nigeriens.

Political instability. This measures the total number of violent conflict incidents that occurred between 1997–2021 in the region where the respondents reside. Relying on data obtained from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED),¹⁰³ I define violent conflicts as incidents that fall under any of the following three categories: Battles, Violence against civilians, and Explosions/Remote violence.¹⁰⁴ I considered all conflict incidents from 1997 to 2021 because I am particularly interested in the cumulative effect of violent conflict. Moreover, some studies have shown that memories of past conflicts tend to persist and affect behaviour in the present.¹⁰⁵ I used the start year of 1997 because the ACLED dataset is available beginning from that year. Although the ACLED dataset is updated in real time, I excluded incidents that occurred after 2021 because the dependent variable is measured in 2022. This lags the measure for political instability, thus mitigating the potential problem of reverse causation.

Figure 5 visualizes the spatial distribution of violent conflicts across Niger’s administrative regions from 1997 to 2021. A total of 1,488 incidents occurred during this




Figure 5. Spatial distribution of violent conflicts across Niger (1997–2021).

Note: The figure shows the geolocations of violent conflict incidents that occurred across Niger's eight administrative regions (i.e. admin1 boundaries) between 1997–2021 and the countries that are contiguous to Niger. The shapefiles containing Niger's administrative divisions were obtained from the Geodata Library at the University of Texas, Austin.

period, with 53 percent of them causing at least one fatality. The incidence of violent conflict is unevenly spread across the regions. The region of Diffa, which has the highest incidence of violent conflicts, accounted for 44 percent of the total incidents. This is likely because of its contiguity with the state of Borno in Northeastern Nigeria, where the activities of the radical Islamist group, *Boko Haram*, are concentrated.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, as shown in Figure 5, the incidents in Diffa are clustered in the areas near Nigeria. Tillaberry, which is contiguous to Mali and Burkina Faso, has the second highest incidence of violent conflict. It accounted for 33 percent of the total incidents. The Southernmost part of the region of Maradi, which is contiguous to the state of Zamfara in Northern Nigeria, also has a high incidence of violent conflicts. In recent years, Zamfara has been contending with sporadic violence perpetrated by armed bandit groups that often engage in ransom-driven abductions.¹⁰⁷

4.1.3. Control variables

Trust in military. This measures the degree to which respondents trust the Nigerian military. It was derived from the question, “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Niger’s defense forces?” The responses were measured on a scale with four ordinal categories ranging from “0 = not at all” to “3 = a lot.” Some studies have shown that trust in the military, especially when insecurity is rife, could morph into support for military rule.¹⁰⁸

Educational level. This measures the highest level of education attained by the respondents on a scale with 10 ordinal categories ranging from “0 = no formal

schooling” to “9 = postgraduate.” 50 percent of the population had no formal education. Some studies have shown that education negatively correlates with support for military rule.¹⁰⁹

Nighttime light. This variable, which proxies economic development at the communal level, measures the mean annual nighttime light in the region where the respondents reside for the year 2020.¹¹⁰ Some studies have shown that nighttime light is a good proxy for economic development.¹¹¹ The nighttime light index ranges from 0 to 63, with higher values denoting a higher level of economic development and vice versa. Since the raw dataset is gridded, I computed the relevant statistics for the respective regions using QGIS software.

Demographic covariates. This includes the gender and age of the respondents. Gender is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if female. Age measures how old the respondents are in years.

4.2. Analytical technique

The general form of the regression model to be estimated could be expressed thus:

$$\gamma_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Corruption index}_t + \beta_2 \text{Deprivation index}_t + \beta_3 \text{Political instability}_{1997-2021} + \beta_4 \phi'_t + \delta_t \quad (1)$$

Where γ_t is the dependent variable which measures support for military intervention at time t when the survey was conducted (i.e. 2022), ϕ'_t is a vector of control variables measuring the level of economic development in the region where the respondents reside, their educational level, demographic attributes, and the degree to which they trust the military, β_0 is the intercept, β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, β_4 denotes the coefficients of the control variables, δ_t is the error term. I estimated the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for easy interpretation of the coefficients. I conducted a robustness check where I operationalized the dependent variable binarily and estimated the regressions using linear probability model (LPM). In some of the models, I included fixed effects for the region where the respondents reside and for the ethnic group to which they belong. The regional fixed effects account for time invariant factors that are unique to the respective regions (e.g. the physical geographical terrain, contiguity of the region to other countries, distance to the state capital etc.) and which could confound the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. The fixed effects for ethnicity account for the effect of ethnic affiliation on support for military intervention. Ethnicity appears to play a crucial role in Nigerien politics.¹¹² I clustered the standard errors at the regional level to allow for the possibility of correlation between observations within the same region. Moreover, I added the variables into the regression model in a stepwise manner to attenuate the problem of multicollinearity.

5. Results and discussion

Table 1 presents the results of regression models examining the effect of corruption, socioeconomic deprivation, and political instability on support for military intervention. In model 1 – i.e. a baseline model where I considered only the corruption index – it carried a positive sign and was significant at the 10 percent level. This

Table 1. Correlates of support for military intervention.

Military intervention ^Φ	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Corruption index	0.037* (0.018)			0.039** (0.016)	0.04** (0.014)	0.028** (0.011)	0.01** (0.004)
Deprivation index		−0.036*** (0.007)		−0.037*** (0.008)	−0.033** (0.011)	−0.027** (0.01)	−0.012** (0.004)
Political instability			0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.00)
Trust in military					0.108 (0.062)	0.064 (0.059)	0.027 (0.023)
Age					−0.002 (0.002)	−0.004 (0.003)	−0.002 (0.001)
Gender					−0.134** (0.052)	−0.112* (0.052)	−0.038 (0.021)
Educational level					−0.021 (0.029)	−0.017 (0.025)	−0.007 (0.009)
Nighttime light					0.016*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)
Constant	2.808*** (0.125)	3.266*** (0.09)	2.831*** (0.14)	3.058*** (0.109)	2.874*** (0.187)	2.668*** (0.193)	0.584*** (0.089)
<i>Estimation method</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	LPM
<i>Region FE</i>	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Ethnic group FE</i>	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	1000	1167	1171	996	991	991	991
<i>R-squared</i>	0.003	0.016	0.012	0.029	0.048	0.076	0.072
<i>AIC statistic</i>	3099.558	3629.754	3645.953	3066.071	3041.005	3011.358	1219.92

Note: Φ is the dependent variable, clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression except for model 7 which is estimated using linear probability model (LPM). The dependent variable is measured on a scale with four ordinal categories, except in model 7 where it is measured binarily. FE demotes fixed effects.

supports Hypothesis 3, which states that perceived corruption in the democratic government positively correlates with support for military intervention. This might be because perceived corruption erodes people's confidence in the democratic government, which prompts them to think that a military intervention is necessary to curtail the democratic government's excesses.

In model 2 where I considered only the deprivation index, it carried a negative sign and was significant at the one percent level. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1b which states that socioeconomic deprivation negatively correlates with support for military intervention. Put differently, poor Nigeriens think the military should never interfere with the country's political process. A reason for this might be because a coup cuts off the patron-client networks that exist between the poor and the political elites, and which are "beneficial" to the poor. It might also be that the poor are disillusioned with both the democratic and military governments, yet the semblance of civil liberties that democracy affords makes them prefer it. Disaggregating the data based on area of residence (i.e. urban vs. rural) showed that the negative correlation between deprivation and support for military intervention was present only among the rural population. Among the urban population, deprivation was statistically insignificant (see Table A2 in the appendix).¹¹³ This is consistent with the finding of Kuenzi and Lambricht that the rural population in Africa, which is often poor, is more likely to vote than that in urban centres.¹¹⁴ In model 3 where I considered only political instability, it carried a positive sign that supports Hypothesis 2a; however, it had a *p*-value of 0.11 that was at the margin of statistical significance. In model 4 where I included the three explanatory variables in the same model, the results were consistent with those in preceding baseline models.

In model 5 where I added the control variables, the results remained largely consistent with those reported earlier. Moreover, the AIC statistic declined from 3,066–3,041, which suggests that model 5 has a better fit than its predecessor. Among the control variables, only gender and nighttime light were significant. Gender was significant at the five percent level and carried a negative sign, which suggests that men are less supportive of military intervention than women. This is consistent with the findings of Cassell et al. in Latin America.¹¹⁵ Nighttime light carried a positive sign and was significant at the one percent level. If this result were to be taken at face value, then it means that economic development makes people more supportive of military intervention. However, a closer inspection of the nighttime light variable reveals that it is highly skewed. While the mean nighttime light value for the state capital (i.e. Niamey) was 29, the values for the remaining seven regions were below one. When I excluded the subsample of respondents from Niamey (*n* = 72) and re-estimated the regression model, nighttime light became statistically insignificant. Age, educational level, and trust in the military were all insignificant. The statistical insignificance of education is quite surprising because it has been found to reduce support for military rule.¹¹⁶ In fact, García-Rivero observed that "education is an effective antidote against military rule [in Africa]."¹¹⁷

In model 6 where I added fixed effects for ethnicity and the regions where the respondents resided, the AIC statistic further declined from 3,041–3,011, which suggests that model 6 has a better fit than model 5. The R-squared also increased from 0.05–0.08, indicating that the latter model has a better explanatory power. Political instability became statistically significant for the first time. It carried a positive sign and was significant at the one percent level. This supports Hypothesis 2a which states that exposure to violent

conflict positively correlates with support for military intervention. This might be because people who are exposed to violence think a military government would do a better job at addressing the problem of insecurity than a civilian government. As shown in model 7, the results reported in model 6 are robust to a binary operationalization of the dependent variable and to the use of linear probability model (LPM) as an alternative estimation method. Although this study is based on the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey data collected in 2022 – because I am particularly interested in the conditions in Niger immediately preceding the coup – I have conducted some additional analyses where I pooled together five rounds of survey data (i.e. Rounds 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) collected between 2013–2022. [Section B](#) in the appendix reports these results.

6. Conclusion

Relying on the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey data, which is representative for Niger's population, this study examined the determinants of support for military intervention with a particular focus on perceived corruption in the democratic government, political instability, and socioeconomic condition. The descriptive results showed that Nigeriens generally do not have a strong aversion towards military rule: About 70 percent of them agree that the military should intervene when the democratically elected government is corrupt. The regression results showed that perceived corruption and political instability were positively correlated with support for military intervention. This might be because Nigeriens think the military would do a better job at governance and tackling insecurity. Socioeconomic deprivation was negatively correlated with support for military intervention. The support for democracy among the poor might be because coups disrupt existing patron-client networks that are “beneficial” to them. It might also be that the poor are indifferent regarding the ability of the military or civilian government to improve their socioeconomic circumstance; yet, the semblance of freedom that democracy provides makes it preferable. An ideal setting for this study would have been to examine the relevant relationships both before and after the July 2023 coup. However, I am unable to do that because I am not privy to any recent data that has been collected after the coup. Future studies could focus on this as well as the causal mechanisms through which perceived corruption, socioeconomic condition, and political instability influence support for military intervention.

Notes

1. International Crisis Group, “Mali, a Coup within a Coup.”
2. France 24, “Burkina Faso, Mali say Military Intervention in Niger would be ‘Declaration of War.’”
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5. McCullough and Sandor, “Briefing: How a Mutiny became a(nother) Coup.”
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9. See note 1 above.
10. Human Rights Watch, “Guinea: Events of 2021.”

11. Chason and Tall, "In Burkina Faso, a Coup within a Coup."
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14. See note 2 above.
15. Houle and Bodea, "Ethnic Inequality and Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa."
16. Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, 9.
17. Clark, "The Decline of the African Military Coup."
18. Mbaku, "Military Coups as Rent-seeking Behavior."
19. Thyne and Powell, "Coups d'État or Coup d'Autocracy?," 209.
20. Ibid., 193.
21. Powell, "An Assessment of the 'Democratic' Coup Theory."
22. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a weighted measure that consists of three main components: education, life expectancy, and income. It ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 denoting the highest level of human development and 0 the lowest.
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27. Graham, "What the Nigerien Coup d'État means to the World," 528.
28. Higgott and Fuglestad, "The 1974 Coup d'État in Niger," 388.
29. Raleigh et al., "Introducing ACLED – Armed Conflict Location and Event Data."
30. I define violent conflicts as incident that fall under any of the following three categories: Battles, Violence against civilians, and Explosions/Remote violence.
31. García-Rivero, "Authoritarian Personality vs Institutional Performance – Understanding Military Rule in Africa."
32. Note 28., 386.
33. Smirnova, "Student Activism in Niger," S174; Note 28.
34. Ibid., 397.
35. International Crisis Group, "The Scramble for Power"
36. The structural adjustment programme (SAP) aimed to foster a market economy by limiting the government's involvement in the economy through the privatization of public enterprises, freeing prices, and reforming investment laws. The IMF believed that these policies were necessary for Niger to adequately manage its debt and achieve sustainable economic growth. See Gervais (1995) and Bonnacase (2021) for a detailed discussion of SAP in Niger.
37. Bonnacase, "Democracy and Adjustment in Niger."
38. Ibid., 202–3.
39. Ibid., 208.
40. Amnesty International, "Niger."
41. Note 37., 211.
42. Davis and Kossomi, "Niger gets Back on Track," 82.
43. Note 35., 11.
44. Massalatchi, "Niger President Rules by Decree after Court Snub."
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48. World Bank, *Republic of Niger*, 54.
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51. Fröhlich, "Niger's Constant Struggle against Violence."
52. McGowan and Johnson, "African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment."
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54. See note 16 above, 7–8.

55. Ibid., 9.
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57. Londregan and Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power"; McGowan and Johnson, "African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment."
58. See note 16 above.
59. Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état."
60. Mehrl and Escribà-Folch, "The Dictator's Legionnaires: Foreign Recruitment, Coups, and Uprisings."
61. See note 16 above., 144.
62. See note 19 above.
63. Ibid., 193–4.
64. Ibid., 210.
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66. Ibid., 1052.
67. Chacha and Powell, "Economic Interdependence and Post-coup Democratization."
68. Miller, "Debunking the Myth of the 'Good' Coup d'état in Africa."
69. Derpanopoulos et al., "Are Coups Good for Democracy?" 3.
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72. Zuo et al., "From Poverty to Trust"; Byaro and Kinyondo, "Citizens' Trust in Government and their Greater Willingness to Pay Taxes in Tanzania."
73. Inglehart, "Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy."
74. Navia and Osorio, "Attitudes toward Democracy and Authoritarianism before, during and after Military Rule. The Case of Chile, 1972–2013."
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76. Sarigil, "Public Opinion and Attitude toward the Military and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey."
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78. Hern, "Preferences without Platforms."
79. Ibid., 79.
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81. I have deliberately used the word "semblance" while referring to civil liberties in Niger because it has a history of democratically elected governments exhibiting authoritarian tendencies.
82. Bester, "Predatory Rule and the Rise of Military Coups," 12.
83. Ibid.
84. Hinton and Montalvo, "Crime and Violence across the Americas," 3.
85. De Juan and Pierskalla, "Civil War Violence and Political Trust."
86. Hong and Kang, "Trauma and Stigma."
87. Hall and Werner, "Trauma and Trust."
88. Keenan, "Uranium goes Critical in Niger," 450.
89. The population estimate was obtained from the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. To access this information, visit: <https://minorityrights.org/country/niger/>. (Accessed December 5, 2023). In the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey dataset, Tuaregs constitute 12.4 percent of the respondents.
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100. See note 31 above.
101. Note 31., 185.
102. See note 24 above.
103. See note 29 above.
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111. E.g., Bruederle and Hodler, "Nighttime Lights as a Proxy for Human Development at the Local Level"; Weidmann and Schutte, "Using Night Light Emissions for the Prediction of Local Wealth."
112. See note 7 above.
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114. Kuenzi and Lambright, "Who Votes in Africa?."
115. See note 80 above.
116. Note 31; note 80; note 76.
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Acknowledgements

Thanks to the journal's editors and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Thanks to Roisin Cronin for editorial assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Data availability statement

The data and do-files underlying this study are available in the Harvard Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/C24ILN>

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