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## Medical certificates and sickness absence: Who stays away from work if monitoring is relaxed?

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# Medical certificates and sickness absence: who stays away from work if monitoring is relaxed?

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## Abstract

Sickness insurance guarantees employees the right to take leave from work when they are sick, but is vulnerable to excessive use because monitoring of recipients' health is difficult and costly. In terms of costs, it would be preferable to focus monitoring on individuals whose sickness absence it strongly affects. This paper studies targeted monitoring in the setting of a large-scale randomised experiment where medical certificate requirements were relaxed for some workers. I employ a machine learning method, the generalised random forest, to identify heterogeneous effects on the duration of workers' sickness absence spells. This allows me to compute treatment effect estimates based on an extensive set of worker characteristics and their potentially complex relationships with each other and with sickness absence duration. The individuals who are most sensitive to monitoring are characterised by a history of extensive sick leave uptake, low socioeconomic status, and male gender. The results suggest that a targeted policy can achieve the same reduction in monitoring costs as took place during the experiment at a 51 percent smaller loss in terms of increased sickness absence. Monitoring all insured individuals is estimated to be inefficient, but the benefits of targeted monitoring are estimated to exceed the costs.

*Keywords:* Sickness Absence; Monitoring; Heterogeneous Effects; GRF

*JEL codes:* C21; J22; I18

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## 1. Introduction

Paid sick leave is a right enjoyed by most workers in developed countries today, allowing them to stay at home when their health is too poor to be able to work. It prevents incapacitated individuals from facing the choice of working in spite of their condition or losing their income or employment. Workers are shielded from the economic effects of health shocks and are able to smooth their consumption over time in a way that would otherwise be unfeasible.

However, as with any insurance system, insuring workers against bad health carries a risk of moral hazard. Workers might stay at home for longer than their health warrants, leading to increased sick leave costs and lost productivity. Society has an interest in making sure that workers go back to work when they are able to do so, both to guarantee proper use of public funds, as well as to ensure that the social insurance system is fair and legitimate. This is especially imperative in light of the substantial public spending on sickness and disability insurance, amounting to two percent of GDP in OECD countries in 2017 (OECD, 2021).

As sickness insurance recipients have better knowledge of their health than the insurer does, monitoring, in the form of doctor's visits or otherwise, is used to reduce the information discrepancy. However, monitoring is costly, as it typically involves assessments by medical professionals, the opportunity cost of whose time is high. Therefore, focusing monitoring efforts on the most responsive workers would improve the system's efficiency and reduce costs. Identifying how different groups of workers respond to different monitoring requirements is thus of key policy relevance.

This paper investigates the sensitivity of different worker groups to monitoring using a large-scale randomised controlled experiment conducted in two Swedish regions. In the experiment, individuals were randomised into treatment and control groups based on whether they had odd or even dates of birth. Those with odd dates of birth were required to provide medical certificates if their sick leave spell was longer than seven days (as normal), while those born on even dates were only required to provide certificates if their spell exceeded 14 days. Register data make it possible to comprehensively characterise workers with respect to sickness absence-related factors such as sick leave history, socioeconomic status, family, career and place of residence.

I use a machine learning approach, the generalised random forest (GRF, Athey et al., 2019), to identify heterogeneous effects of the change in monitoring on the behaviour of different groups of workers based on this extensive set of characteristics. GRF has strong advantages in this setting, as it has been designed specifically for studying treatment effect heterogeneity. In contrast to traditional sample splitting approaches, the choice of characteristics and thresholds when splitting the sample is completely data-driven. This makes it possible to include a large number of characteristics in the analysis and minimises the researcher's ability to select splits that fit a particular hypothesis. GRF also employs a set of measures to avoid fitting predictions to statistical noise that is present in the data by chance, and identifies systematic predictors of treatment effect heterogeneity. Furthermore, GRF is nonparametric, and is thus able to capture complex nonlinear functional forms and interactions.

I identify substantial heterogeneity in workers' responsiveness to monitoring. The least sensitive quartile of workers is estimated to increase the duration of their sick leave spells by

0.42 days on average, compared to 2.04 days for workers in the most sensitive quartile. The probability that a worker in the least sensitive quartile ends his or her sick leave spell in its second week is estimated to increase by 3 percentage points, compared to 25 percentage points for a worker in the most sensitive quartile. The most important predictors of strong worker responsiveness to monitoring are a history of high sickness absence, low socioeconomic status in terms of education, income and reliance on social payments, male gender, high sick leave uptake by colleagues and partners, low socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood of residence, and weaker attachment to the main job. For policy, sick leave history is particularly important, as it is observed by the insurer and might be seen as a fairer reason for focusing monitoring efforts than other characteristics. The results regarding peer effects suggest that behaviour of colleagues is important and that interventions by firms to improve the work environment or morale can be useful.

Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that if monitoring intensity is reduced for workers who are estimated to be non-sensitive, rather than for a random subset of workers, losses in terms of increased sickness absence can be limited. Relaxing the monitoring regime for the half of workers with the smallest predicted treatment effects (rather than for a randomly selected half of workers as in the experiment) would result in absence rising by 51 percent less than was observed. If monitoring is relaxed based only on workers' sick leave history, absence would still increase 24 percent less compared to a random relaxation of monitoring. Based on comparisons of healthcare provision costs and savings in terms of reduced absence, monitoring all workers after seven days is estimated to be inefficient from a social point of view. However, monitoring the most sensitive workers, based on either the full GRF model or on high past sick leave uptake, results in considerable social benefits. The break-even point is when the 81 percent of workers who are most sensitive according to the full model or the 57 percent of workers with the highest past sick leave uptake are monitored more stringently.

There are relatively few earlier studies of the effects of monitoring on sickness absence, but a substantial literature has focused on identifying worker characteristics which are correlates of sickness absence uptake (Paringer, 1983; Winkelmann, 1999; Barmby et al., 2002; Bratberg et al., 2002; Frick and Malo, 2008; Markussen et al., 2011; Treble and Barmby, 2011; Lindbeck et al., 2016). It is well-established that sickness absence is higher among women, public sector employees, low-paid workers, high-tenured workers, and employees at large workplaces. While I find that some factors associated with high uptake, such as having low earnings and residing in a neighbourhood with high average sick leave, are correlated with high responsiveness to monitoring, this is not the case for a number of other covariates. In particular, women and public sector workers are less sensitive to monitoring than men and private sector workers. Some other correlates of sick leave uptake, such as age, marital status and workplace tenure do not have strong relationships with monitoring responsiveness. On the other hand, some factors which have not seen much attention in the literature, such as having a low education and working in the manufacturing industry, are strongly associated with large effects of monitoring.

Ferman et al. (2021) and Boeri et al. (2021) study sensitivity to monitoring directly. Both focus on public sector workers, using a policy change in a Norwegian municipality and an experiment in Italy respectively. The studies arrive at opposing conclusions, with Ferman et al. (2021) finding no increase in sickness absence when medical certificate requirements are relaxed, and

Boeri et al. (2021) finding that random visits to the homes of absent employees do have an absence-reducing effect.

Earlier work on the Swedish monitoring experiment has found that the relaxed rules caused a substantial increase in the duration of sickness absence spells among treated workers. If applied nationally, the less stringent rules have been estimated to increase costs by about one billion SEK (200 million 2021 EUR), representing three percent of the outlays of the sickness insurance system (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989; Hartman et al., 2013). Some previous studies have investigated how the experiment's effects differed based on worker characteristics such as age, gender and income (Hesselius et al., 2009; Hartman et al., 2013; Hesselius et al., 2013; Johansson et al., 2019). In this paper, the question is approached in a systematic way, by considering heterogeneity across a total of 56 individual characteristics. This is possible thanks to using the GRF instead of traditional approaches to studying treatment effect heterogeneity, as outlined above. The findings of earlier studies regarding higher sensitivity among men and individuals with low incomes are confirmed by my analysis. However, the key importance of sick leave history, social payment share in income, partner behaviour, and neighbourhood characteristics has not been identified previously.

There are large and persistent cross-country discrepancies in levels of sickness absence (see, e.g., Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007), the reasons for which have not been conclusively identified. Explanations put forward include differences in monitoring regimes, replacement rates, workforce health, as well as cultural factors (Barmby et al., 2002). Differences in income tax rates across countries might also contribute to differences in absenteeism (Dale-Olsen, 2013). Evidence from Sweden (Johansson and Palme, 2002; Henrekson and Persson, 2004) and Germany (Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010) suggests that lowering replacement rates and excluding the first day of sickness absence from insurance coverage reduces absence rates. Although differences exist, Sweden's public corporatist sickness insurance system is broadly similar to those found in the rest of Scandinavia and continental Europe. Provisions in place at the time of the experiment, such as high replacement rates, lack of an unpaid initial waiting period and lack of monitoring for short absence spells were quite generous, but they are not unlike those prevailing in other European countries today (Palme and Persson, 2020). The results thus provide an insight into how monitoring affects recipient behaviour in an institutional setting characteristic of many developed countries.

The issue of monitoring sickness insurance recipients rose to renewed prominence during the Covid-19 pandemic. Many countries relaxed rules for obtaining sick leave (OECD 2020). For example, in Sweden, the maximum period a worker could spend on sick leave before having to provide a doctor's certificate was increased from seven to 21 days during many phases of the pandemic (Försäkringskassan, 2021). This relaxation of monitoring intensity was very similar in spirit to the changes effected by the experiment studied in this paper.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background about the Swedish sickness insurance system and the context in which the monitoring experiment took place. The sickness absence outcomes, as well as the worker characteristics considered as possible drivers of treatment effect heterogeneity, are covered in Section 3. An overview of the machine learning approach used to identify conditional treatment effects is given in Section 4. Section 5 provides evidence that the experimental randomisation was successful and Section 6

presents and discusses the results. Section 7 provides simple policy-relevant calculations and Section 8 concludes.

## **2. Background**

### ***a. The Swedish Sickness Insurance System***

Sweden has a comprehensive sickness insurance system, where practically all employees are entitled to paid sick leave. In 1988, at the time of the experiment, government-run social insurance funds, each responsible for a certain geographic area, covered the vast majority of sick leave expenses. Recipients were entitled to payments from these funds starting from the first day of absence. Normally, workers were required to provide the insurance funds medical certificates proving that they were sick if the duration of absence was eight days or longer. Workers were reimbursed 90 percent of their wages while they were on sick leave (SOU 1981:22). However, benefits were capped for workers whose annual earnings were greater than 193,500 SEK in 1988 (equal to about 69,000 2020US\$). About 7.8 percent of the workers involved in the monitoring experiment had earnings in excess of this cap.<sup>1</sup> There was no time limit on benefit duration. Leave for taking care of sick children was, and has remained, separate from sickness absence in the Swedish system (SOU 2015:21). The rules for such leave were unaffected in the 1988 experiment (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989).

Since 1988, a number of changes have been enacted to the system, mostly with the aim of reducing moral hazard and overuse. Replacement rates have been reduced to 80 percent of wages, limits on the maximum duration of sickness absence benefits have been introduced, recipients are no longer reimbursed for the first day of sick leave (the “qualification day”) and the first two weeks of sick pay are now paid by employers rather than the public insurance system (SOU 2015:21). However, the Covid-19 pandemic brought about a loosening of some rules. Most notably, the qualification day rule was not applied and recipients were reimbursed for all their days of sick leave. Also, monitoring in the form of medical certificate requirements, which had been required from the eighth day of absence, only took place from the 21<sup>st</sup> day of absence (Försäkringskassan, 2021).

### ***b. The “Extended Right to Self-Accorded Sickness Absence” Experiment***

In 1984, the Swedish government implemented a trial known as the “Free Municipality Experiment”, which meant that a number of municipalities gained the right to try out new policies regarding, among other fields, healthcare, schools, social planning, labour market policy and environmental policy (SOU 1991:68). Within the framework of this experiment, Jämtland county in northern Sweden implemented a policy known as “Extended Right to Self-Accorded Sickness Absence” starting on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1987. This involved extending the time of sickness absence that individuals could take out without providing the government-run insurance fund with a medical certificate from 7 to 14 days. This affected all workers, without the date of birth differences that were introduced by the later experiment. The motivation was

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<sup>1</sup> For some workers, such as municipally employed workers and white-collar workers in many industry-specific collective agreement fields, there was an additional amount paid by their unions. For these individuals, the replacement rate of sickness insurance could amount to 100 percent for short to intermediate length spells. This also mitigated losses for those with earnings in excess of the reimbursement cap (SOU 1981:22). The rules for providing medical certificates for these additional reimbursements were also changed in line with the experiment (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989), meaning that affected individuals faced no asymmetric incentives.

that examining workers on sick leave and writing certificates for them was a waste of doctors' time, which could be better spent on treating seriously sick patients. Another motivation was that sick individuals, who might find doctor's visits a nuisance, would stay at home until full recovery, thus improving their future health and reducing future sickness absence. Also, workers were expected to return to work as soon as they felt well enough to do so, rather than after the number of days the doctor had specified on the medical certificate had passed; thus, some spells were actually expected to become shorter. A final reason for the change in policy was that travel distances to the nearest medical establishment can be very large in rural Jämtland, placing an undue burden on insured workers (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989).

The local authorities in Jämtland considered the new policy successful, but the Central Insurance Agency wanted a more rigorous evaluation, involving a prominent urban area, as sickness absence in Sweden was higher among urban workers at the time. Thus, a randomized experiment was set up involving the 70,000 sickness insurance recipients in Jämtland county and the 240,000 recipients in Gothenburg, Sweden's second largest city. Those born on odd dates were required to provide doctor's certificates starting on the eighth day of their absence spell, while those born on even dates were required to provide certificates starting on the fifteenth day. Thus, the experiment represented a loosening of the rules in Gothenburg and a tightening of the rules in Jämtland. Nevertheless, in line with norms prevailing nationally, I refer to those who had to provide certificates on day eight as the **control group** and those who had to provide certificates on day fifteen as the **treated group**. The experimental rules applied to sickness absence spells which began between July 1<sup>st</sup> and December 31<sup>st</sup> 1988. There was a substantial information campaign to inform the insured about the experiment, involving leaflets distributed at workplaces, as well as articles in the press. Subsequently, evaluators at the Central Insurance Agency assessed recipients' understanding of the experimental rules as very good, although there were a few isolated misunderstandings involving individuals in the control group thinking that looser rules were also applicable to them (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989).

Already at the preliminary stage of result collection, there were strong indications that the duration of the treated group's sickness absence spells had increased substantially and the experiment was discontinued, with everyone in both Jämtland and Gothenburg having to provide medical certificates from the eighth day of absence for spells which began on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1989 or later. Evaluators at the Central Insurance Agency (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989) later estimated that the less stringent rules would have led to an increase in costs of about 1 billion SEK (some 3 percent of the total costs for the entire sickness insurance system) if applied nationally. The findings of Hartman et al. (2013) confirm this, showing substantially longer absence duration for the treated group, with sharp changes in spell survival and hazard rates indicative of moral hazard.

Some groups of workers were excluded from the experiment for administrative reasons. The largest of these, some 11 percent of the workforce, were individuals whose employment contracts were regulated by the central government, including teachers, postal workers, government agency employees, railway employees, police, military servicemen, sickness insurance fund employees, customs and border guards, government-owned forestry company workers, Church of Sweden clergy, university employees, and others. The reason for the exclusion was that sick pay to these workers was provided directly by their government

employer, who was in turn reimbursed by the social insurance funds. There was also a very small group of individuals who were required to provide medical certificates already on the first day of sickness absence, mostly due to prior misuse, to whom the experiment did not apply (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989).

### **3. Outcomes and Characteristics**

Thanks to unusually rich microdata collected by Statistics Sweden, I am able to include a broad set of worker characteristics in the analysis. These contain information on sickness absence (starting in 1986), demographic characteristics, place of residence, employment relationships and earnings (all starting in 1985) and family situation (imputed from 1990 data).

#### **a. Outcome Definitions**

Earlier work on the experiment by Hartman et al. (2013) has found sizeable effects on the duration of treated workers' sickness absence spells, but no evidence of an effect on sickness spell incidence. Because of this, my analysis focuses on the intensive rather than the extensive margin.

##### *Duration of Sickness Absence Spell*

The main outcome studied is the duration of sickness absence spells in days. This is a natural margin to consider, as costs to the employer and insurer scale with absence duration. There were a total of 261,127 sickness spells started by individuals in the studied sample between July 1<sup>st</sup> and December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1988. In the main analysis, I exclude spells whose duration makes it unlikely that they were affected by differences in monitoring between days 7 and 14. The survival and hazard graphs in Figure 3 strongly suggest no differences between treated and controls for spells shorter than four and longer than 21 days. These two categories comprise 111,020 and 21,305 spells respectively. Including long spells is problematic, as they might have outsize effects on estimates due to being numerical outliers. The very large number of short spells would also serve to conceal patterns of behaviour during the period when monitoring intensity varied. For this reason, only spells between four and 21 days in duration are used in the main analysis.

To ensure that this choice does not materially affect the results, I perform sensitivity analysis using spells of all durations, but with the duration of spells longer than 30 days set to 30 to avoid outlier effects. Results are similar as shown in Table B2 in Appendix B and explained in Section 6.b.

##### *Probability of Sickness Absence Spell Lasting 8-14 Days*

Another way of measuring responsiveness to the experiment is by studying the probability of a sickness absence spell ending during its second week. For this outcome, spells shorter than four and longer than 21 days are retained, as outlier effects are absent due to its binary nature. The results thus serve as robustness tests for both the outcome definition as well as for the sample restrictions imposed in the main analysis. As explained in Section 6.b, the two set-ups produce qualitatively similar findings.

#### **b. Worker and Spell Characteristics**

The selection of worker characteristics into the analysis is based on factors which have been identified as important correlates of sickness absence by previous literature. A total of 56

variables are included. Most of them have not been directly linked to monitoring sensitivity. Nevertheless, a simple hypothesis would be that groups of workers with high sickness absence also react more strongly to being monitored.

### *Health-Related*

An individual's health status is, in the absence of moral hazard and reporting costs, the only determinant of sick leave duration. Unfortunately, the data do not allow me to fully characterise individuals' health.<sup>2</sup> However, I am able to use two indirect measures of individual health. The first of these, *the total number of days of sickness absence in earlier periods*, is based on the individual's spells which began between January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1986 and June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1988.<sup>3</sup> This measure contains information not only on the individual's health, but also on any overuse of sickness insurance that the individual might have been prone to. A measure much more directly related to serious health issues is *the total number of days spent in inpatient care* between January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1987 and June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1988.

Another variable connected both to health and to sickness absence behaviour is the *number of short sickness absence spells in earlier periods*. Short spells are defined as those 1-21 days in length. This measure puts less weight on long spells, instead focusing on whether the individual has taken many short absences in the past, which might be indicative of misuse. The number of short spells is measured between January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1986 and June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1988.

### *Demographic*

There are well-established differences between demographic groups in terms of their sick leave uptake. For example, a *female* dummy is included because women tend to have a higher uptake than men (Paringer, 1983). Also, health deteriorates with *age*, which has been shown to affect sick leave (Barmby et al., 2002). Finally, in the Scandinavian setting, immigrants tend to have higher rates of sickness absence more than natives (Markussen et al., 2011; Helgesson et al., 2015). This factor is captured using an *immigrant* variable which takes the value 0 for individuals born in Sweden, 1 for those born in other Scandinavian countries, 2 for those born in the rest of Europe and 3 for those born in the rest of the world. The GRF is able to correctly handle ordinal variables such as this, unlike regression-based methods.

### *Family*

Family factors have been found to play a role in workers' use of sickness insurance. The presence of partners may affect behaviour through provision of an additional source of income, and married individuals tend to have higher sick leave uptake than unmarried ones (Barmby et al., 2002; Angelov et al., 2011). To analyse the importance of such effects, dummies are included for being *married*,<sup>4</sup> *divorced*, *single*, and *widowed*. Furthermore, the *individual's share of household income* directly measures the importance of insurance by a partner's income.

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<sup>2</sup> Information about inpatient care spells and diagnoses received during such spells is only available from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1987. Data on outpatient care contacts and diagnoses, which constitute the vast majority of medical treatment in Sweden, are unavailable for the period studied.

<sup>3</sup> The length of the pre-period considered is dictated by data on sickness absence becoming available from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1986.

<sup>4</sup> Including those cohabiting with a partner with common children.

Having children is connected to higher sickness absence, especially for women (Bratberg et al., 2002; Angelov et al., 2013). The family situation with respect to children is measured by the variables *number of children younger than 18* and the *age of the youngest child*. As data on children start only in 1990, I impute information for 1988 by subtracting two years from children's ages in 1990. While leave for taking care of sick children is separate from sick leave in Sweden, parents might nevertheless register such spells as own sickness absence. For this reason, I include the *number of days spent taking care of sick children* in the January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1986 – June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1988 pre-period. The *share of the family's sick child days* variable captures the intra-household division of childcare responsibilities. For those without children, age of the youngest child and share of family's sick child days are set to missing. The GRF deals smoothly with missing values by grouping them in turn with those with high values of the covariate, those with low values of the covariate and as a separate group when evaluating the splitting criterion. Methodological details in this regard are provided in Section 4.

### *Education*

Education is a strong correlate of factors identified as important for sick leave uptake, such as earnings and occupation, and may also have an independent effect on sickness absence (Piha et al., 2010). To flexibly capture education, I have included both the *years of education*, as well as dummies for broad education fields. The fields are *general education* (found at the low levels of educational attainment), *teacher training*, *administration/law/social science*, *science/engineering*, *health* and *services*.

### *Neighbourhood*

There is evidence that individuals can be affected by the sickness absence attitudes and behaviour of their neighbours (Lindbeck et al., 2016). For this reason, I include several leave-one-out characteristics of the neighbourhood where the sickness insurance recipient lives. The neighbourhoods (called SAMS by Statistics Sweden) are small, corresponding to several urban blocks or small portions of the countryside. The median number of inhabitants aged 18-64 in each neighbourhood is 398, with the mean being 586. Neighbourhood characteristics included are *average annual earnings*, *average share of social payments in income*, *share of inhabitants with a post-secondary education* and the *immigrant share*. These four measures are constructed based on the population aged 30-64, not taking into account those past working age, or those who are likely to not have completed their education.

The costs of obtaining a medical certificate increase with the *distance to the nearest doctor*. I measure this as the Euclidian distance between the worker's neighbourhood and the neighbourhood of the nearest establishment in the medical industry.<sup>5</sup>

### *Career-Related*

High-earning individuals are on sick leave less than their lower-earning peers. This could be due to better health, stronger intrinsic motivation, as well as lower income replacement rates, as is the case for individuals with earnings in excess of the replacement cap (Barmby et al.,

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<sup>5</sup> The cost of travelling to see a doctor was one of the reasons provided by the Jämtland region for introducing more liberal rules regarding certificates. I am not able to differentiate between primary clinics, which can provide certificates in cases of mild illness, and other establishments. Thus, there is some measurement error in this variable.

2002).<sup>6</sup> These effects are captured by an *annual labour income* variable. A related concept is the worker's *income rank at his or her workplace*. The rank is measured in relative terms, with 0 representing the worker who earns least and 1 the worker who earns most regardless of workplace size. This measure also captures key worker effects, which imply that workers who are more important for workplace functioning are less likely to be absent. This could be because they continue working even when their health status is bad, or because individuals with better average health select into such roles (Hensvik and Rosenqvist, 2019). Workplace *tenure* has been identified as a correlate of sickness absence in the literature, with tendencies for high-tenured workers to take out more sick leave than lower-tenured ones (Barnby et al., 2002). Tenure is also correlated with job security, which has been suggested to increase sickness absence (Bratberg and Monstad, 2015). The tenure measure goes from 0 to 3 years and is censored at the top because matched employer-employee data only become available from 1985 onwards. The *share of income from the main job* provides a measure of the worker's commitment to his or her main place of work.

Self-employed workers are eligible for paid sick leave in Sweden; in the absence of penalties from employers, colleagues or insurers, they have incentives to be on sick leave for longer than other groups. However, a number of studies have found that absenteeism is lower among the self-employed than among other workers (Lechmann and Schnabel, 2014) and that moral hazard might be less of an issue for the self-employed (Spierdijk et al., 2009; Baert et al., 2018). Differences between self-employed and other workers are captured by the *share of income from self-employment*. Many Swedes, even among those who work, receive some amount of social payments, such as child benefits. The importance of these as a source of income relative to earnings is captured by the *social payment share in income*.

### *Workplace-Related*

Different sectors of the economy have traditionally experienced different sick leave rates (Barnby et al., 2002). This could be due to intrinsic differences in workforce characteristics, such as gender and age composition, differences in work environment quality, which cause ill health among the employees, or because some sectors are more permissive of overuse of sickness absence. The public sector has seen higher sickness absence rates than the private sector in many countries (Frick and Malo, 2008); for this reason, a *local government sector* dummy is included in the analysis, with the private sector being the baseline. This dummy takes on the value one for individuals employed at the municipality or county level. In 1988, the Swedish local government sector included healthcare, elderly care, municipal services and administrative staff. As central government employees were excluded from the randomisation, they are dropped from this study.

Differences between sectors are further captured by nine broad industry dummies: *primary, manufacturing, construction, utilities, wholesale and retail, business services, health, education and public administration*.

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<sup>6</sup> The annual earnings level of 2.6 percent of the individuals involved in the experiment was such that their replacement rates were lower than the otherwise stipulated 90 percent. At least some of these workers were however likely to be (partly) reimbursed for this loss by additional union-negotiated sickness insurance. For evidence on sickness absence being affected by replacement rates in the Swedish setting, see Johansson and Palme (2005).

The *number of workers at an establishment* has been suggested to affect sick leave uptake. This could be both because large workplaces are worse for employees' health and because the importance of a single individual decreases with workplace size, meaning that costs of unnecessary absence spells are lower (Winkelmann, 1999, Lindgren 2012).

Finally, I include the *distance to work*, measured as the Euclidian distance between the worker's neighbourhood and the workplace's neighbourhood. This is to capture higher costs of getting to work, which might induce individuals to stay at home (van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, 2011).

### *Peer Effects*

I consider three kinds of peer effects. The first is the behaviour of colleagues at the individual's place of work. This is measured as the *leave-one-out average number of sickness absence days* and *leave-one-out average number of short sick spells per worker* at the worker's workplace between January 1986 and June 1988. The second set of peer effects relates to the behaviour of neighbours, consisting of the *leave-one-out average number of sickness absence days* and the *leave-one-out average number of short spells* among employed individuals in the neighbourhood between January 1986 and June 1988. This measure is based on those aged 30-64 to be in line with the other neighbourhood variables. Finally, within-family peer effects are considered, captured by the *partner's number of sickness absence days* and *partner's number of short absence spells* during the pre-period.<sup>7</sup>

To capture behavioural effects of the experiment, the *share of colleagues treated* as well as a dummy for the *partner being treated* are included. The share of treated colleagues has been found to be important by Johansson et al. (2019).<sup>8</sup>

### *Aggregate Characteristics*

The *population density of the municipality where the individual resides* is intended to capture any differences between areas with different levels of urbanisation. Relative sick leave uptake between urban and rural areas in Sweden has varied over time and even reversed (Haugen et al., 2008). Given the GRF's nonparametric nature, this variable also nests regional differences between Gothenburg and Jämtland, as Gothenburg had a much higher population density (963 people/km<sup>2</sup>) than any municipality in Jämtland (at most 26 people/km<sup>2</sup>). The variable thus also captures any effects of the different directions of the experiment in Gothenburg (reduction in monitoring intensity) and Jämtland (increase in monitoring intensity).

### *Spell Characteristics*

The variables above are identical for all spells taken by the same worker. However, there is seasonal variation in sickness absence (documented at least since Watson, 1927; Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989), which is captured by the *spell's starting day* relative to July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1988. Seasonal sickness absence fluctuations are at least in part driven by higher respiratory

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<sup>7</sup> For those at single-worker workplaces, colleague peer effects are missing, and for those without a partner, partner peer effects are missing. The GRF is able to handle such missing values well, as discussed in Section IV.

<sup>8</sup> If colleagues' or partners' treatment status affects behaviour, SUTVA is violated, and this would have to be taken into account when designing a targeted monitoring policy. However, these two variables have little impact on GRF estimates of monitoring sensitivity, suggesting that the role of such spillovers is limited. For this reason, spillovers are not taken into account in the policy analysis in Section VII.

infection rates during the cold months of the year. In addition, shirking patterns may vary over the course of the year in response to changes in the opportunity cost of working (in line with Skogman Thoursie, 2004).

It is also possible that workers become more aware of the new monitoring rules as they take out sickness absence spells. This is captured by the worker’s *number of previous spells during the experimental period*.

#### 4. Empirical Approach

This section outlines and motivates the GRF approach used for estimating the heterogeneous effects of monitoring, and describes its implementation. A more detailed description of GRF can be found in Appendix A.

The goal is to identify the effects of monitoring on the sickness absence behaviour of different groups of workers, and whether it varies across their absence spells. Given the experimental setting, differences between treated and control spells in a group defined by a set of attributes  $\mathbf{x}$  should be considered causal effects of monitoring within this group. However, which particular characteristic drives the size of the treatment effect  $\tau_{\mathbf{x}}$  is ambiguous, as relevant characteristics can be correlated and interact with each other. Therefore, the focus is on identifying *predictors* of workers’ sensitivity to monitoring.

Traditional heterogeneity analysis involves choosing an attribute of interest and splitting the absence spells at a threshold value of this attribute. Then, it is possible to estimate how the treatment effect  $\tau_{\mathbf{x}}$  differs across this threshold. There are a number of problems with such traditional heterogeneity analysis. It is difficult to choose characteristics and threshold values for splitting the sample in an objective way, meaning that choices can be arbitrary. Characteristics that are important predictors of heterogeneity might be excluded from the analysis and splits might be made at suboptimal covariate values. Most worryingly, the researcher’s leeway in choosing covariates and splitting thresholds might lead to improper data mining and cherry picking to obtain statistically significant estimates of treatment effect heterogeneity. Furthermore, analysing heterogeneity across multiple characteristics involves testing multiple hypotheses. Without correcting for this, spurious heterogeneity might appear to be statistically significant (a problem known as *overfitting* in the machine learning literature).

Machine learning approaches to studying heterogeneity mitigate these problems. The GRF (Athey et al., 2019) used in this paper is fully data-driven. It identifies the variables and threshold values which maximise predicted heterogeneity without input from the researcher. Choosing characteristics which are important predictors of heterogeneity mitigates the overfitting problem, as irrelevant characteristics are not used in estimation. This means that all available characteristics which are *ex ante* expected to be related to sickness absence behaviour can be included in the analysis. Furthermore, estimation is repeated across multiple subsamples of the data, ensuring that the patterns uncovered by the model hold across different subgroups in the sample, further reducing overfitting.

GRF is fully nonparametric. The model chooses the covariate and threshold value which maximise heterogeneity, and splits the sample at this point. Splitting according to this principle continues in each “branch” until the spells have been grouped into a “leaf” together with other spells which are estimated to be similarly sensitive to monitoring. This procedure is repeated

multiple times for different subsamples of spells (a new “tree” is constructed in each case), and the result can be seen as nearest-neighbours matching with a highly flexible weighting kernel. The weight of each neighbour is given by how often they appear in the same “leaf” across all the “trees” in the forest. The estimator’s flexible nonparametric nature is able to capture complex functional forms and interactions between variables. It is furthermore able to smoothly handle ordinal variables and missing values. Ordinal variables can be included in the model, as the exact numeric value of a variable does not matter, as long as an observation is assigned to a given “leaf”. In the case of missing values, GRF tries grouping them in turn with high values and low values of the variable in question, as well as splitting them off as their own group. Because of this procedure, it is possible to include features of workplaces and partners in the analysis without dropping individuals who work at one-worker workplaces or are single.

GRF first estimates predictions of the outcome  $\widehat{y}_x$  (duration of a sickness absence spell or whether it ends during the second week) and the treatment propensity  $\widehat{e}_x$  (a worker being born on an even date). Both the outcome and propensity models are estimated by constructing regression forests based on the included characteristics. The outcome model is based on absence spells which fulfil the inclusion criteria, that is spells between 4 and 21 days in length in the main analysis. The propensity model is estimated based on workers, not spells, and uses all workers resident in Gothenburg and Jämtland, including those who did not have any sickness absence spells during the experiment.<sup>9</sup> Thanks to the experimental setting, estimating a propensity model is not strictly necessary, as all workers should have the same treatment propensity. However, the values of  $\widehat{e}_x$  among treated and controls can be used to check the quality of experimental randomisation, as discussed in Section 5.a.

The estimated  $\widehat{y}_x$  and  $\widehat{e}_x$  are used to calculate residual values of the outcome and treatment status for each observation. The final step in GRF involves estimating treatment effects  $\widehat{\tau}_x$  for different groups of spells based on these residualised values using a causal forest. The causal forest uses all the included worker and spell characteristics.

To make certain that the model is well-calibrated, I split the data into a training set containing 80 percent of observations and a held-out test set containing 20 percent of the observations. The model is constructed using the training set, and the quality of its predictions assessed using the test set, the information from which has not been used in model training. Splitting into the training and test sets, as well as sampling into different trees in the forests, is based on family clusters. The estimation of  $y_x$ ,  $e_x$  and  $\tau_x$  in the training set is done out-of-bag, that is based only on trees into which the absence spell’s or worker’s family cluster was not sampled. This means that predictions are based on the absence spells of individuals from other families, and do not fit idiosyncrasies in the behaviour of particular individuals or their partners.

I estimate my model using the `grf` package in R. Several model parameters can be tuned by cross-validation, and this is implemented in the baseline model. However, using the tuned parameters gives very similar results to using the default parameters, as shown in Table B2 in Appendix B.

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<sup>9</sup> Only workers who fulfil the inclusion criteria listed in Section 5.a. are included in the propensity model. As randomization takes place on the worker level, the spell-specific characteristics (spell start date and spell order) are not included in the propensity model.

GRF has been shown to perform competitively compared to other machine learning methods by Knaus et al. (2021). Key reasons for selecting GRF for my analysis are its flexibility with regard to functional form and ability to handle missing values. A parametric machine learning method such as LASSO entails making at least some functional form assumptions and excluding characteristics whose values are missing for some workers (or dropping the associated workers from the analysis). Nevertheless, I estimate a LASSO model based on a subset of workers and covariates (as well as their higher-order terms and interactions), as explained in Appendix A, and compare the results in Tables B2 and B3 and Figure B14 in Appendix B. The GRF and LASSO models' predictions have a correlation of 0.73. Although both perform well in predicting monitoring sensitivity out-of-sample, the results indicate that GRF is able to classify workers and spells better. An unpenalised OLS model performs clearly worse in the test set than either GRF or LASSO.

## 5. Randomisation and Balancing

### a. *Experimental Population and Validity of Randomisation*

To be eligible for the experiment, workers had to be registered with the Gothenburg or Jämtland local social insurance funds and not have their wages and working conditions set by the central government. Registration, as well as the location of residence on which it is based, is observed on an annual basis. To make sure that everyone included in the analysis was exposed to the experiment for its entire duration (not moving into or out of Gothenburg or Jämtland for part of the period), I drop those who lived in another region or were registered at another local insurance fund in 1987 or 1989. There is no exact information on dates when workers entered and exited central government employment, but I am nevertheless able to identify this group with a high degree of certainty. The population of central government employees in September 1988 is identified in the data. Those who worked at establishments with a central government employee share higher than 50 percent in other months are also dropped.<sup>10</sup> I also exclude workers under the age of 18 and those with very low annual labour earnings (below 23,000 SEK).<sup>11</sup> This leaves 125,541 workers who took out 261,127 sickness absence spells of any length.<sup>12</sup> In the main analysis, when only spells between four and 21 days in length are retained, the results are based on 128,802 spells taken out by 82,011 individuals.

While date of birth considered over the entire year is correlated with many important characteristics and outcomes (see e.g. Bedard and Dhuey, 2006), having an odd or even date of birth should be random, as parents are unlikely to be able to determine the exact timing of

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
<sup>10</sup> This second restriction excludes workers who are likely to have been central government employees for part of the experimental period, but not in September 1988. I also exclude sailors (a very small group in Gothenburg) as they likewise had special sickness absence rules.

<sup>11</sup> The threshold of 23,000 SEK corresponds to three times the monthly wage at the tenth percentile of the private sector blue-collar wage distribution. The reason for excluding those marginally attached to the labour market is that I want to focus on the behaviour of those whose main source of income is labour earnings. While unemployed individuals, as well as some who have marginal employment, are eligible for paid sick leave in Sweden, their behaviour is likely to be influenced by other factors than that of employed individuals. From the point of view of public finances, paid sick leave for these groups results in shifting costs between different support mechanisms. This makes cost-benefit estimations difficult. When these marginally attached workers are included in the model, their absence duration is estimated to be highly sensitive to medical certificate requirements, comparable to the most sensitive workers in the final sample.

<sup>12</sup> 86,757 eligible workers took no sickness absence during the experiment.

birth.<sup>13</sup> As Swedish social insurance numbers, used for reporting sick leave, include the birth date, manipulations in response to the experiment would have been prohibitively costly. The lack of differences between the behaviour of sickness insurance recipients born on odd and even dates in the pre-period is confirmed by the graphs in Figure 1.<sup>14</sup> The left panel plots the survival curve, identifying the share of sickness spells still ongoing a given number of days after their start date. Most sickness spells are short, with some 75 percent being over within a week. Importantly, there are no visually discernible differences between workers born on odd and even dates. A fairly sharp drop in the survival rate is evident after seven days of absence, when workers in Gothenburg (77 percent of the sample) were required to provide medical certificates. There is a smaller drop at 14 days of absence, when workers in Jämtland were required to provide certificates. These drops are confirmed by the hazard graph in the right panel of Figure 1, which shows the probability of a spell which has been going on for a given number of days ending on the next day. A sharp spike in hazard is evident after seven days of absence, and a smaller one after 14 days of absence. Furthermore, there are smaller spikes at each multiple of seven; this is because Swedish doctors tend to prescribe sick leave in full weeks (Riksförsäkringsverket, 1989). The hazard graph also shows very similar patterns of behaviour for individuals with odd and even dates of birth.

**FIGURE 1.** SURVIVAL AND HAZARD RATES FOR SICKNESS ABSENCE SPELLS OF TREATED AND CONTROL WORKERS IN GOTHENBURG AND JÄMTLAND BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT.



*Note:* The hazard rate represents the probability that a worker who has been absent for a given number of days returns to work on the next day. Spells which began between July 1<sup>st</sup> and December 31<sup>st</sup> 1987 (pre-period). Control workers born on odd dates, treated workers on even dates.


A more formal balancing table is shown in Table B1 in Appendix B. The treated and control groups are very similar with regard to all the characteristics considered. There are a few numerically small, but statistically significant differences between variable means. This is driven by non-European immigrants, who constitute 2.6 percent of the control group and 2.3 percent of the treated group, being more likely to be registered as born on odd dates. This is due

<sup>13</sup> There are no laws or other policies that have a differential effect based on date of birth in Sweden, so incentives to manipulate the date outside of the setting of the 1988 experiment are lacking.

<sup>14</sup> Figure 1 is based on the second half of 1987, that is the part of the year that corresponds to the 1988 experiment. Results for the first half of 1987 and for the first half of 1988 closely align with those for the second half of 1987 and likewise reveal no differences in the behaviour of treated and control workers.

to individuals who are not certain of their exact birth date often being registered as born on certain days of the year (commonly January 1<sup>st</sup>). This difference carries over to other characteristics correlated with being a non-European immigrant, such as neighbourhood variables. None of the differences are likely to be economically significant, however. If non-European immigrants are removed from the sample, the means of two variables are statistically different at the five percent level and of three more at the ten percent level.<sup>15</sup> This is in line with what is expected when testing for differences in means of 56 variables following a successful randomisation.

**FIGURE 2.** PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATES FOR TREATED AND CONTROLS FROM GRF.



*Note:* GRF estimates of probability of entering treatment based on the included worker characteristics, plotted separately for treated and control workers (including those without any absence spells during the experiment). Controls born on odd dates, treated on even dates. Bin width = 0.01.

A final test of the randomisation is provided by the GRF's estimated treatment propensity scores  $\hat{e}_x$  for all eligible workers in Gothenburg and Jämtland (including those with no sickness absence spells during the experiment). All worker characteristics are included when estimating  $\hat{e}_x$ , but not the spell-specific start date and order, which are not defined on the worker level. Histograms of  $\hat{e}_x$  for treated and control workers are shown in Figure 2. The average propensity score is 0.49, reflecting the fact that there are slightly fewer even than odd dates. All sickness insurance recipients' propensity scores lie within 0.08 of the mean, and the distributions are very similar for both treated and controls. The GRF is thus unable to predict selection into


<sup>15</sup> The variables are education in law, administration or social science and having a treated partner (at the five percent level) and the number of short absence spells before the experiment, working in the construction industry, and working in the education industry (at the ten percent level).

treatment, in spite of its nonparametric nature and ability to capture complex interactions between different variables.

### **b. Main Effect of the Experiment**

The experiment has been evaluated by both Riksförsäkringsverket (1989) and academic literature (Hartman et al., 2013) as having had a sizeable effect on the duration of sickness absence spells. Hartman et al. (2013) find that the average duration of sickness absence spells among treated workers increased by 0.6 days, but no evidence that the incidence of absence spells per worker responded to the experiment. In Figure 3, survival and hazard rates for sickness spells which began in the second half of 1988 are shown. There are striking differences in the behaviour of the treated and controls, which were absent in the pre-period (Figure 1). The survival curve for the treated is consistently above the one for the controls between days 6 and 14. The fact that the difference is present while monitoring intensity differs suggests that it is indeed caused by the discrepancy in monitoring rules. The experiment's impact is confirmed by the hazard graph, which shows large spikes in the probability of exiting sick leave at 7 days for the treated and 14 days for the controls. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the experiment continued to affect worker behaviour after it went out of effect. Figure B1 in Appendix B shows survival and hazard rates among workers in Gothenburg and Jämtland for the first and second halves of 1989. Those born on odd and even dates behave identically in both post-experiment periods.

**FIGURE 3.** SURVIVAL AND HAZARD RATES FOR SICKNESS ABSENCE SPELLS OF TREATED AND CONTROL WORKERS IN GOTHENBURG AND JÄMTLAND DURING THE EXPERIMENT.



*Note:* Spells which began between July 1<sup>st</sup> and December 31<sup>st</sup> 1988. The hazard rate represents the probability that a spell which has been ongoing for a given number of days ends on the next day. Control workers born on odd dates, treated workers on even dates.


## **6. Results**

### **a. Extent of Heterogeneity**

The distribution of estimated heterogeneous effects of the relaxed monitoring rules on spell duration is shown in Figure 4. Virtually all spells are predicted to become longer if monitoring is reduced; this highlights the nonparametric nature of the GRF, as a regression-based model would have been likely to provide theoretically unreasonable negative treatment effect values

for some observations. The median effect is 1.01 days,<sup>16</sup> but there is substantial variation in estimated sensitivity to monitoring across workers and spells. For the least sensitive decile, treatment effects are estimated to be at most 0.47 days, while for the most sensitive decile they are estimated to be 1.67 days or more. A corresponding histogram of treatment effects where the outcome is the probability of returning to work on days 8-14 is shown in Figure B2 in Appendix B. The median spell is estimated to be 12 percentage points more likely to end in the second week of absence if the worker is treated. This is a very sizeable effect, as the baseline probability for spells of control group workers is eight percent. There are also large heterogeneities across groups of spells; the effects are estimated to be smaller than six percentage points for the least sensitive decile and larger than 22 percentage points for the most sensitive decile.

**FIGURE 4.** DISTRIBUTION OF PREDICTED TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SICKNESS ABSENCE SPELL DURATION.



*Note:* Out-of-bag treatment effect estimates for training set workers. Bin width = 0.05 days.

The model's performance can be assessed using an omnibus best linear predictor test (Chernozhukov et al., 2020). The best linear predictor test assesses whether both the average treatment effect and variations around this average effect are predicted correctly. The test uses GRF's estimates of treatment effects  $\hat{\tau}_x$ , orthogonalised spell duration  $\tilde{y}_i = y_i - \hat{y}_x$  and orthogonalised treatment status  $\tilde{W}_w = W_w - \hat{e}_x$ . The  $\tilde{y}_i$  are regressed on a function of  $\tilde{W}_w$  and  $\hat{\tau}_x$  as follows:

<sup>16</sup> This figure is larger than the 0.5-0.7 days found by Hartman et al. (2013) because I drop spells shorter than four and longer than 21 days, whereas they include spells of all durations (censoring spells longer than 28 days).


$$\tilde{y}_i = \alpha(\bar{\hat{\tau}}_x \tilde{W}_w) + \beta((\hat{\tau}_x - \bar{\hat{\tau}}_x) \tilde{W}_w) + \varepsilon_i, \quad \bar{\hat{\tau}}_x = \frac{\sum_i \hat{\tau}_x}{N}$$

The parameter  $\alpha$  estimates how well the average predicted treatment effect fits the data and the parameter  $\beta$  measures whether heterogeneity in treatment effects is correctly captured. For the baseline model with spell duration as the outcome,  $\alpha = 1.01$  ( $SE = 0.02$ ) and  $\beta = 1.38$  ( $SE = 0.05$ ). In the model where the outcome is the probability of returning to work in the second week,  $\alpha = 0.99$  ( $SE = 0.01$ ) and  $\beta = 1.34$  ( $SE = 0.03$ ). Both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are close to one, indicating that the estimates adequately capture the average effect of reduced monitoring, as well as deviations from this average in different worker and spell groups. The null hypothesis of no heterogeneity (i.e.  $\beta = 0$ ) is strongly rejected at conventional levels of significance. However, the models underfit the true heterogeneity in treatment effects somewhat, compressing estimates of  $\hat{\tau}_x$  to the mean.

Because of this, I focus on using the estimated  $\hat{\tau}_x$  for ranking absence spells into quantiles of predicted sensitivity to monitoring, and estimating the treatment effect within each quantile using other methods. Due to experimental randomisation, a valid approach is to simply estimate the difference in the duration of treated and control spells within each quantile of  $\hat{\tau}_x$ . A more sophisticated approach, which makes use of the GRF estimates  $\hat{y}_x$ ,  $\hat{e}_x$  and  $\hat{\tau}_x$ , involves estimating augmented inverse propensity weighted (AIPW) scores (Robins and Rotnitzky, 1995). The average of the AIPW scores in a quantile of  $\hat{\tau}_x$  is a doubly robust estimate of the average treatment effect in that quantile, meaning that it is consistent as long as either the outcome model or the propensity model is correctly specified (but not necessarily both).

I subdivide the spells into four quartiles, with Quartile 1 containing those with the smallest  $\hat{\tau}_x$  and Quartile 4 containing those with the largest  $\hat{\tau}_x$ . Figure 5 shows the average  $\hat{\tau}_x$  within each quartile, the mean treated-control difference in duration along with the 95 percent confidence interval, and the average AIPW score. As expected, treatment effects according to each of these measures increase when moving up the quartiles. This confirms that the  $\hat{\tau}_x$  estimates correctly rank the spells in terms of sensitivity to monitoring, in spite of being somewhat compressed towards the mean in the upper tail. The simple treated-control difference and the average AIPW score are almost identical in all cases, suggesting that correction for selection into treatment is not necessary, as expected in a randomised experiment. The average treatment effect is quite small for spells in Quartile 1, 0.42 days, compared to a sizeable 2.04 days for spells in Quartile 4. Estimated treatment effects in each quartile are distinct at the 95 percent confidence level from those in other quartiles.

**FIGURE 5.** TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR QUANTILES OF SPELLS RANKED BY THEIR ESTIMATED  $\hat{\tau}_x$ .



*Note:* Quartiles defined by ranking spells based on treatment effects estimated by GRF. Q1 contains spells estimated to be least affected and Q4 spells estimated to be most affected. Treated-control differences in duration within each quartile estimated as  $\hat{\tau} = \bar{y}_i|(W_w = 1) - \bar{y}_i|(W_w = 0)$ . Effects for training set workers; out-of-bag estimates of  $\hat{\tau}_x$  and AIPW scores. Confidence intervals at the 95 percent level for the treated-control differences.

To confirm that the GRF model has identified persistent relationships between worker and spell characteristics and sensitivity to monitoring, I use it to predict treatment effects for absence spells of workers from the held-out test set. I then rank the test set spells by their  $\hat{\tau}_x$  and divide them into quartiles analogously to the training set. The survival and hazard rates of spells in each of these test set quartiles are shown in Figure 6. The graphs confirm that GRF has correctly identified spells with different responsiveness to monitoring. The survival curves for treated and control spells in Quartile 1 align quite closely. A gap between the two groups appears around day 7, but, crucially, it closes completely already before day 14. The maximum difference in the shares of treated and control spells which are still ongoing is 0.11, on day 8. The gap between treated and controls becomes wider when moving up the predicted treatment effect quartiles. For those in Quartile 4, a large gap opens up already on day 6, and does not close until day 15. The maximum difference between shares of treated and control spells which are still ongoing is 0.38, on day 8.

The hazard rate spikes on days 7 and 14 for all groups of spells, but the size of this spike increases when moving up the quartiles. Control spells in Quartile 1 have a 48 percent hazard rate on day 7, while treated spells have a 50 percent hazard rate on day 14. For spells in Quartile 4, the corresponding rates are higher, with 54 percent of control spells that are ongoing as of day 7 ending on day 8 and 72 percent of treated spells ongoing on day 14 ending on day 15.

This is further evidence that differences in behaviour between the quartiles are driven by different responsiveness to monitoring.

Overall, Figure 6 confirms that the GRF model has identified relationships between worker characteristics and monitoring which hold across different groups of workers in the data. To test external validity further, I implement a robustness check where I train a model on a training set consisting only of the spells of workers from Gothenburg. The correlation between the predictions of this model and of the baseline model is 0.94 for the Gothenburg sample. Then, I use this model to predict the sensitivity of absence spells of workers in Jämtland. For them estimates from the Gothenburg-based model are also very similar to those of the baseline model, with a correlation coefficient of 0.92. I test the validity of the Gothenburg-based predictions for workers in Jämtland through exercises analogous to those in Figures 5 and 6, with results presented in figures B3 and B4 in Appendix B. They confirm that behavioural patterns observed in Gothenburg can be used to infer the sensitivity of workers and absence spells in Jämtland. This means that relationships between monitoring sensitivity and sickness absence behaviour are stable across two very different Swedish regions. Thus, there is reason to believe that the model's predictions are at least somewhat externally valid.


#### ***b. Predictors of Monitoring Sensitivity***

In order to review hypotheses about why worker behaviour changes, it is necessary to know which worker and spell characteristics predict monitoring sensitivity. Characteristics of sensitive and non-sensitive individuals can provide evidence in favour of or against mechanisms such as health, replacement rates, career ambitions, irreplaceability in the workplace, family responsibilities, social conscientiousness, peer influence and learning about the new rules over time. Furthermore, policymakers are unlikely to have information about all the characteristics included in the GRF model's training, and some characteristics are unfeasible to use for moral or legal reasons. If a given characteristic or set of characteristics is a strong predictor of monitoring sensitivity, it can be used as an approximation of the full model.

In this part of the analysis, I continue dividing the sample into four quartiles, with Quartile 1 containing absence spells with the smallest  $\hat{\tau}_x$  and Quartile 4 containing absence spells with the largest  $\hat{\tau}_x$ . Differences between the characteristics of workers and spells in Quartile 4 and Quartile 1 are presented in Figure 7. The left-hand panel shows differences in terms of continuous characteristics, which have been normalised by their mean and standard deviation. The panel on the right considers dummy characteristics, with the bars representing differences between the two quartiles in terms of the share who have the given characteristic. Both panels are ordered from the smallest difference to the largest; variables with higher values among non-sensitive workers and spells are at the top, and those with higher values among sensitive workers and spells are at the bottom.

Several factors stand out as strong predictors of monitoring sensitivity. Strong responsiveness to monitoring is associated with high past sick leave uptake, low socioeconomic status, male gender, weak workplace attachment, and having peers with high sick leave uptake.

**FIGURE 6. SURVIVAL AND HAZARD RATES OF ABSENCE SPELLS OF WORKERS IN THE HELD-OUT TEST SET, RANKED BY QUANTILES OF PREDICTED TREATMENT EFFECTS**



*Note:* Rates for absence spells of the 20 percent of workers randomised into the held-out test set. The hazard rate represents the probability that a spell that has been ongoing for a given number of days ends on the next day. Workers divided into quartiles based on predicted  $\hat{\tau}_x$ . Q1 contains spells estimated to be least affected and Q4 spells estimated to be most affected. Controls born on odd dates, treated on even dates.

Both the number of days of sick leave and the number of short sickness absence spells in the past predict monitoring sensitivity. On average, workers in the most sensitive quartile took 125

days of sick leave and 8.8 short sickness absence spells in the two and a half years before the experiment. The corresponding figures for workers in the least sensitive quartile are 37 days of sick leave and 6.1 short absence spells. The strong association between past sickness absence and responsiveness to monitoring could be due to workers in Quartile 4 having poorer health, or due to relaxed attitudes to shirking among this group.

Responsive workers have lower socioeconomic status than non-responsive workers. This is most apparent in the higher share of social payments in their income (23 percent versus six percent), lower education (9.4 years versus 11.6 years) and lower earnings (84 thousand SEK versus 118 thousand SEK).<sup>17</sup> Immigrants are also overrepresented among sensitive workers. Lower sensitivity among workers with high earnings is in line with the results of Hartman et al. (2013), but the share of social payments in income, which they do not study, turns out to be a stronger predictor of sensitivity. These patterns might be driven by causal effects of socioeconomic status, or by its correlation with factors such as health.

A somewhat surprising finding is that women's sickness absence is much less sensitive to monitoring than men's. It is well-established that women on average take out more sick leave than men, and that sickness absence is more prevalent in the public sector, where women are overrepresented (see, e.g., Paringer, 1983, and Frick and Malo, 2008).<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, uneven division of family responsibilities and childcare might give women stronger incentives to use sickness absence to gain time for work in the home. The results show no evidence in favour of such hypotheses. On the contrary, women constitute 69 percent of the least sensitive quartile and only 27 percent of the most sensitive quartile. This is in spite of past sick leave uptake, which is higher among women, being strongly associated with responsiveness to monitoring. As women are concentrated in the public sector, public sector employees are on average not sensitive to monitoring. The same holds for the female-dominated health industry (which includes elderly care). On the other hand, workers in manufacturing, which skews heavily towards men, react much more strongly to monitoring. The results are consistent with a higher conscientiousness among women, or with an aversion to obtaining medical certificates among men even when they are sick. An interesting finding is that there are no strong connections between monitoring responsiveness and days spent taking care of sick children in the pre-period or with the person's share of total family sick child days. This suggests that family responsibilities are not a major factor in determining sickness absence behaviour.

Those who are less important for or less attached to their workplaces react more to monitoring. Sensitive workers have a lower earnings rank at their workplace, suggesting a lower position in the workplace hierarchy, and are more likely to have income from an additional job or from self-employment.

The results provide strong evidence of peer effects or sorting in terms of sickness absence behaviour across neighbourhoods, workplaces and families. A whole range of neighbourhood variables are strongly correlated with sensitivity to monitoring. Sensitive workers tend to live in neighbourhoods with low socioeconomic status as reflected in low average earnings, small shares of highly educated inhabitants, high reliance on social payments and high shares of

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<sup>17</sup> Having education in a "general field" is also much more common among sensitive workers (56 percent compared to 27 percent). This is closely associated with lower levels of education.

<sup>18</sup> However, Hartman et al. (2013) have found that the experiment had smaller effects on women than men.

immigrants. In particular, their neighbours take more days of sick leave and more short sickness absence spells. This is consistent with neighbourhood effects driving differences in local benefit cultures, as identified by Lindbeck et al. (2016), but might also be due to residential sorting. There are similar, but weaker, patterns when it comes to colleagues' days of sickness absence.<sup>19</sup> Finally, sensitive individuals have partners who have taken more sick leave and more short spells in the past. This is consistent with, for example, correlations in health or attitudes to sickness absence among partners, staying at home to help partners with weak health, or shirking from work to spend time with a partner.

The spell-level variables are not particularly strong predictors of monitoring sensitivity. However, more sensitive spells on average start earlier in the experimental period and at the same time are taken out by individuals with more previous spells during the experiment. This seeming contradiction is due to sensitive workers taking more absence spells (1.65 on average for workers in Quartile 4, compared to 1.24 in Quartile 1). If an individual takes more absence spells, he or she is likely to both take some spells early in the experimental period, and to have had more spells before a given spell. This is consistent with the pattern that workers who have high sick leave uptake are more responsive to monitoring. Importantly for policymakers, there is no evidence of workers adjusting their behaviour over time in response to the changed monitoring policy. When conditioning on individual fixed effects, the estimated sensitivity of spell duration to monitoring does not increase with the number of previous spells.

The high predictive power of the individual's sick leave history on responsiveness to monitoring is encouraging, as this characteristic is readily available to policymakers and its use is not counter to legal restrictions. Another characteristic that can be of interest for policymakers is the average sickness absence at a plant. The relevance of this variable for predicting monitoring sensitivity suggests that policymakers should encourage employers with high sick leave uptake among the workforce to provide healthier working environments. If improved working environments can reduce sickness absence uptake, this would benefit both the employer and society in general.

A worry with implementing targeted monitoring policies is whether individuals are affected by their peers' treatment status, in other words whether the SUTVA assumption holds. This concern is not borne out by the results, as the sensitive and non-sensitive groups do not differ in terms of partner's and colleagues' treatment status. Furthermore, individuals who live in Gothenburg and Jämtland are quite evenly represented in Quartile 1 and Quartile 4. This is interesting because of the differences between the regions, but also because the experiment involved a loosening of the rules for the treated group in Gothenburg, and a tightening of the rules for the control group in Jämtland. There is thus no evidence of e.g. control workers in Jämtland staying on sick leave for longer because they perceive that they are unfairly treated or of treated workers in Jämtland taking out more sick leave because they have gotten more used to the relaxed rules over time. Overall, this suggests that adaptation to monitoring policies over


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<sup>19</sup> Interestingly, the association between responsiveness to monitoring and the average number of short spells per worker at the workplace is instead weak and negative.

time or in response to others' treatment status is limited.<sup>20</sup> Because of this, I do not take these aspects into account in the policy discussion in Section 7.

Classifying individuals and spells as sensitive or not based on the probability of returning to work on days 8-14 has little effect on who is identified as sensitive to monitoring, as the correlation between the two measures is 0.86. Differences between the most and least sensitive quartiles based on the probability measure, corresponding to Figure 7, are shown in Figure B5 in Appendix B. The same patterns are apparent as when using the duration-based measure of sensitivity to monitoring.

**FIGURE 7.** DIFFERENCES IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUAL AND SPELL CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN THE QUARTILES MOST AND LEAST RESPONSIVE TO MONITORING.



*Note:* Quartiles defined based on GRF  $\hat{t}_x$  so as to include equal numbers of spells. Continuous variables normalised to have mean zero and standard deviation one. For dummies, differences are based on shares with the given characteristic. Positive differences mean higher values among the most sensitive (Quartile 4), negative differences mean higher values among the least sensitive (Quartile 1). Spells of training set workers.

To measure which characteristics drive the model's predictions of sensitivity, I estimate partial dependence functions for each variable. This entails setting the variable to a given value for all workers and spells in the sample, while keeping the other characteristics at their empirically

<sup>20</sup> This is further shown by the exercise presented in Figures B3 and B4 in Appendix B where I use the spells of workers in Gothenburg to estimate the sensitivity of spells of workers in Jämtland. The estimates of the model that only uses spells of workers from Gothenburg are very highly correlated with those of the baseline model, and predict the monitoring sensitivity of spells of workers in Jämtland well. This suggests a limited role for behavioural effects driven by the direction of the experiment.

observed values, and predicting  $\hat{\tau}_x$  using the GRF model.<sup>21</sup> The value of the partial dependence function is given by the mean  $\hat{\tau}_x$  when one of the variables has been set to a particular value in this way. If the  $\hat{\tau}_x$  are strongly affected, the characteristic which was manipulated is an important driver of the model's estimates of monitoring sensitivity.

I evaluate the partial dependence function at the first – ninth decile values for continuous variables and at zero and one for binary variables. For variables that are concentrated at a few mass points, I evaluate the partial dependence function at values with five or more percent of observations. In the case of variables where most individuals have a value of zero, partial dependence functions are evaluated at zero and at the average value among those with nonzero values. If many observations have missing values for a variable (e.g., partner's previous sick leave among those who do not have a partner), partial dependence functions are also evaluated for the case when the variable is set to missing. Plots of the partial dependence functions for each variable are provided in Appendix B. Demographic and health-related characteristics are considered in Figure B6, family-related characteristics in Figure B7, education in Figure B8, work-related characteristics in Figure B9, sector of work in Figure B10 and neighbourhood of residence in Figure B11.

The estimates in Figures B6-B11 reinforce the conclusions from Figure 7. If all workers' previous sick leave duration is set to five days (the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile value), the estimated average increase in spell duration is 0.89 days; if it is set to 180 days (the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile value), the estimated average increase is 1.15 days. Similar patterns hold for the social payment share of income, with average increases in spell duration amounting to 0.87 days and 1.25 days when all workers' shares are set to the 10<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentile values (two percent and 30 percent) respectively. The model predicts that workers would respond more strongly to monitoring if they had low earnings or less than high school education, but the relationship becomes flat at higher values of these variables. Consistent with Figure 7, workers are estimated to be less sensitive to monitoring if they would all behave as if they were women or worked in the public sector or health industry.

An interesting difference compared to Figure 7 is the pattern that emerges with regard to the start date of the spell. Spells which start at the beginning of the period (late July) are highly sensitive to monitoring, whereas spells which start in the fall months are less sensitive. However, spells which start in December, and especially around Christmas, are again sensitive to monitoring. This pattern seems difficult to explain by medical factors and indicates increased rates of shirking at times of the year when the opportunity cost of working is higher.

It is often unrealistic to manipulate variables separately, as different characteristics can be highly correlated. For instance, the correlation between average neighbourhood earnings and the share of highly educated individuals is 0.73; spells taken out by women comprise 76 percent of public sector spells and 88 percent of health industry spells. Figure 8 presents partial dependence functions when groups of related variables (sick leave history, socioeconomic status, gender and gender-typical industry and sector, attachment to main job, colleague and

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<sup>21</sup> Theoretically, the partial dependence function should be evaluated over the population distribution of the variables which are not manipulated. In practice, the sample distribution of the other variables serves as an approximation of the population distribution.


partner behaviour, neighbourhood socioeconomic status) are manipulated at the same time.<sup>22</sup> It is apparent that socioeconomic status, as measured by education, earnings and social income share, is an important driver of the model's monitoring sensitivity predictions. The average increase in spell duration would be 0.75 days if all workers had high socioeconomic status and 1.47 days if all workers had low socioeconomic status. Sick leave history, as well as gender and gender-related work sector choices are also important drivers of GRF predictions, followed by neighbourhood socioeconomic status. Variables which capture the behaviour of peers and importance at or attachment to the workplace are not as important for driving the predictions. These findings confirm that a significant share of the variation in sensitivity to monitoring across individuals can be captured by socioeconomic status, sick leave history and gender.<sup>23</sup> It is thus possible to use these groups of variables when designing targeted monitoring policies.

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<sup>22</sup> Sick leave history is captured by days of previous sick leave and number of short spells; socioeconomic status by annual earnings, years of education and share of social payments in income; gender-related variables by dummies for female gender, public sector, health industry and manufacturing industry; job attachment by share of main job in income, share of self-employment income and earnings rank at the main workplace; peer behaviour by partners' and colleagues' previous sick leave uptake and number of short spells; neighbourhood factors by average earnings, share of highly educated, share of immigrants, average sick leave uptake and average number of short spells. The values of variables in the manipulated groups are set to the 10<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentile values among the observations in the study. This avoids using extreme variable values. Fewer than 10 percent of the observations have any self-employment income; thus, self-employment share is set to zero for weak attachment to the main job and its empirically observed value for strong attachment to the main job.

<sup>23</sup> The `grf` package also has a simple built-in variable importance measure, intended as a rough diagnostic of the model. The measure is based on the number of times the causal forest's trees split on a characteristic up to depth=4. Each split is weighted by the depth at which it is made, with a split at depth  $d$  having half the weight of a split at  $d - 1$ . This importance measure is presented in Figure A10 in the Appendix, where the bars represent the weighted share of times each characteristic was used for splits up to depth=4. The variables picked out as important by other measures are also important according to this metric, but there is also some noise; plant size and average sick leave uptake among colleagues are identified as much more important than by the complete partial dependence analysis in Figure A7.

**FIGURE 8. PARTIAL DEPENDENCE OF GRF ESTIMATES ON GROUPS OF CHARACTERISTICS.**



*Note:* Spells of training set workers. Estimates are means of GRF  $\hat{t}_x$  evaluated when groups of variables are set to given values for all observations, while remaining variables are held at their empirically observed values. The variables whose values are manipulated are: *Panel A:* days of previous sick leave (low – 5 days, high – 180 days); number of previous short spells (low – 1, high – 15); *Panel B:* annual earnings (high status – 152 kSEK, low status – 46 kSEK); education years (high status – 14 years, low status – 6 years); social income share (high status – 0.02, low status – 0.30); *Panel C:* female dummy (women – 1, men – 0); public sector (women – 1, men – 0); health industry (women – 1, men – 0); manufacturing industry (women – 0, men – 1); *Panel D:* share main job in income (attached – 1, non-attached – 0.67); share of self-employment in income (attached – 0, non-attached – empirically observed value); workplace income rank (attached – 0.88, non-attached – 0.13); *Panel E:* colleagues' previous sick leave (low – 23, high – 75); colleagues' previous short spells (low – 2.8, high – 6.5); partner's previous sick leave (low – 0, high – 167); partner's previous short spells (low – 0, high – 11); *Panel F:* neighbourhood earnings (low status – 89 kSek, high status – 122 kSEK); neighbourhood highly educated share (high status – 0.39, low status – 0.06); neighbourhood immigrant share (high status – 0.03, low status – 0.37); neighbourhood sick leave (high status – 34, low status – 76); neighbourhood short spells (high status – 2.9, low status – 5.1).

## 7. Targeted Monitoring Policy

GRF predictions of  $\hat{\tau}_x$  can be used for selective monitoring of workers. Since monitoring is costly, especially because it takes up medical professionals' time, it may be beneficial to monitor workers with high  $\hat{\tau}_x$  more and workers with low  $\hat{\tau}_x$  less. The targeted monitoring policy that I consider involves monitoring more sensitive workers after seven days, as is done currently, while monitoring less sensitive workers after 14 days.

A targeted monitoring policy implies tension between efficiency in terms of the optimal use of limited resources in the healthcare system on the one hand and equity and fairness in terms of treating all recipients of paid sick leave equally on the other. Limitations on how policymakers can target in practice arise because of ethical considerations and anti-discriminatory laws. Discrimination based on characteristics such as ethnicity, gender and age is legislatively forbidden in many countries, including Sweden. While basing a targeted policy on socioeconomic status using variables such as earnings and the share of social payments in income might not be explicitly illegal, it would be seen as unfairly targeting low-income individuals and is unlikely to be politically feasible.

The most promising way of designing a targeted monitoring policy would be to base it on recipients' history of sickness absence. This would entail a more relaxed monitoring regime for those with little past sick leave uptake (and perhaps few short absence spells) and a stricter regime for those with high past sick leave uptake. The advantage of such a system is that it self-regulates against misuse among the less stringently monitored group. If a sick leave recipient increases his or her sick leave uptake in response to reduced monitoring, he or she will eventually end up in the more stringently monitored group.<sup>24</sup>


I estimate the gains of implementing policies based on GRF and on previous sickness absence using workers from the held-out test set. The results, compared to a random relaxation in monitoring, as took place during the experiment, are shown in Panel A of Figure 9. The reduction in sickness absence  $a$  is measured as a share of the total possible reduction if all workers are monitored more intensely. It is plotted against the share of workers  $s$  assigned to stricter monitoring under different policies. Monitoring all workers after seven days, as under the current regime, reduces sickness absence by  $a = 1$ . The blue line corresponding to the 45° line shows the reduction in sickness absence duration if the workers in  $s$  are randomly selected; in expectation, absence duration is reduced by  $a = s$ . Using the  $\hat{\tau}_x$  from the GRF model allows

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<sup>24</sup> In Figure B13 in Appendix B I provide estimates corresponding to those in Panel A of Figure 9 for monitoring based on the social payment share of income. The gains of targeting monitoring using the social payment share are similar to those achieved by using past sick leave when it comes to identifying sensitive workers, but slightly smaller when it comes to identifying non-sensitive workers. Furthermore, I estimate optimal policy trees (Athey and Wager, 2021) to identify the best simple rules for selecting workers and spells in the top quartile, top half and top three quartiles of monitoring sensitivity. The rules identified by the trees involve selection based on social payment share in income and on whether the individual works in the health industry. A policy based on both the social payment share and a health industry indicator does slightly better than using sick leave history (Figure B13). However, I focus on the sick leave history policy, as using the social payment share of income is likely to be politically unfeasible. Formal rank-weighted average treatment effect (RATE, Yadlowsky et al., 2021) metrics for different targeting rules are presented in Table B3 in Appendix B. As measured by the QINI coefficient, the GRF model outperforms the simple rules, although the simple rules perform significantly better than randomisation. Using information on social payment share in income and a health industry indicator as suggested by the optimal policy trees achieves a higher RATE than using either past sickness absence or social payment share on its own.

for greater efficiency. If  $s$  contains the  $s \times N$  workers with the highest  $\hat{t}_x$ , the reduction in absence for a given  $s$  is indicated by the maroon line. This lies far above the blue line, showing that it is possible to reduce sickness absence by  $a \gg s$ , and providing further validation of the model on held-out data. The green line shows the performance that can be achieved if the policymaker only uses information about previous days of sickness absence, monitoring those with highest sickness absence first.<sup>25</sup> About half of the gains of the full GRF model are retained if only sick leave history information is used. In particular, consider the case of monitoring the same share of workers as in the experiment,  $s = 0.51$ . In expectation, randomising who gets monitored gives  $a = 0.51$ . Targeting based on the GRF model can significantly improve performance, and is estimated to decrease sickness absence by  $a = 0.76$  when  $s = 0.51$ ; only using sick leave history yields  $a = 0.63$  for  $s = 0.51$ . The full-information policy thus allows reducing monitoring for the same share of workers as in the experiment for a 51 percent smaller loss in terms of extra sickness absence; the sick leave history policy still results in a 27 percent smaller loss.

**FIGURE 9.** COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MONITORING POLICIES.



*Note:* Effects of monitoring spells of workers in the test set according to different rules. Monitoring based on full model assumes workers are ranked based on their estimated  $\hat{t}_x$  and those with higher estimated treatment effects are monitored first. Monitoring based on sick leave history assumes workers are ranked from highest to lowest past sickness absence and those with higher past sickness absence are monitored first. Order of monitoring among those with equal numbers of days of sick leave in the past is random.  $\text{Pr}(\text{monitored})$  in experiment = 0.51.

It is possible to quantify the costs and benefits of relaxed monitoring under assumptions about the costs of monitoring and the output lost due to absence from work. In the following analysis,

<sup>25</sup> Among those with equal past sickness absence, selection into who is monitored first is random.

I assume that the costs of reduced monitoring are equal to the individual's pre-tax wage times the increase in spell duration. The benefits are assumed to equal the saved cost for a visit to a primary clinic; the cost of a primary clinic visit is assumed to be a constant,  $K$ , across worker types. It is thus optimal to monitor a worker  $w$  less stringently when  $wage_w \times \Delta absence_w \leq K$ . This suggests that monitoring efforts should be focused on workers who have high wages and whose sickness absence reacts strongly to monitoring.

I assume that  $K$  is equivalent to 1941 SEK (192 USD), the cost per primary care patient calculated by the Western healthcare region, of which Gothenburg is part, in 2022 (Västra sjukvårdsregionen, 2022).<sup>26</sup> This number corresponds to the reimbursement that the regional authority receives from other regions when providing healthcare to non-resident patients and should reflect the true cost of provision. The median monthly pre-tax wage in Sweden, including payroll taxes, was 44 946 SEK (4 439 USD)<sup>27</sup> in 2022. This is equivalent to 1 478 SEK (146 USD) per day for an average month.<sup>28</sup> For someone who has a median wage, the medical certificate must thus reduce absence by at least 1.31 days in order to break even from a social point of view (ignoring any costs of worse long-term health or contagion arising from premature returns to work). However, workers with different incomes are not equally sensitive: those who increase their absence more when monitoring is relaxed tend to have lower incomes on average. To take this into account, workers' wages are rescaled to 2022 values, keeping the size of their wage relative to the mean the same as in 1988.<sup>29</sup> The resulting cost-benefit analysis of monitoring workers according to different policies is shown in Panel B of Figure 9.

On average, monitoring workers more stringently, as under the current system, is estimated to be socially inefficient. The expected benefit of monitoring a random worker is 1682 SEK (166 USD), as shown by the blue line, amounting to only 87 percent of the cost. However, relaxing monitoring for non-sensitive workers, and only leaving the current regime in place for sensitive workers can lead to a socially efficient outcome. The benefit of monitoring the most sensitive workers according to the full GRF model amounts to over 4000 SEK (395 USD), which is well above the cost. If workers are arranged according to their monitoring sensitivity as estimated by the full model, monitoring the 81 percent who are most sensitive breaks even from a social point of view. Monitoring those with a history of taking out more sick leave in the past also has potential for gains relative to monitoring everyone. If medical certificate requirements are retained at seven days for the 57 percent with the highest sick leave in the past, and relaxed to fourteen days for the remainder of workers, this would result in the average social benefit being equal to the social cost. While simplified, this analysis suggests that the current monitoring regime may be made more efficient through a targeted relaxation of the monitoring rules.

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<sup>26</sup> The healthcare system in Sweden is run by regions, and the calculated cost may vary depending on region.

<sup>27</sup> This includes the median monthly pre-tax wage of 34 200 SEK and payroll taxes amounting to 31.42% of this amount.

<sup>28</sup> Wages in Sweden are typically paid monthly, and do not depend on the number of days in a month. Thus, to obtain the "daily wage", I divide the monthly wage by 30.4, the average number of days in a month.

<sup>29</sup> Annual earnings are observed for all workers, while monthly wages are observed only for a large sample (collected by the Wage Structure Statistics). To avoid excluding workers, I proxy monthly wages by the average wages of workers with similar earnings. For most workers, the imputed monthly wage is the average wage among those in their 1000 SEK earnings cell, while the top percentile is pooled together into one cell, as the number of workers in each 1000 SEK earnings cell becomes small for top earners.

## 8. Discussion

There is a strong case for ensuring that the sickness insurance system is fair, adequately compensating those who have temporarily lost the ability to work, while providing minimal incentives for overuse by healthy individuals. A common way of attaining this goal is by having qualified medical professionals monitor recipients. However, the opportunity cost of these professionals' time is high and it is important to know where it is put to the best use. This paper studies this question by assessing which workers' behaviour responded the most when medical certificate requirements were relaxed in a randomised experiment.

The evidence points to substantial heterogeneity in worker's behavioural responses. Sickness absence spells are estimated to have been only 0.47 days longer for the least sensitive decile of individuals, compared to 1.67 days longer for the most sensitive decile. The key predictors of strong behavioural changes when monitoring intensity is varied are high previous sick leave uptake, low socioeconomic status and male gender. There is also evidence that the degree of attachment to the job, as well as colleagues' and neighbours' behaviour have an effect. A key finding is that many predictors of high sick leave uptake, such as female gender and working in the public sector, are not predictors of high sensitivity to monitoring. The existence of workplaces with high sick leave uptake and high monitoring responsiveness suggests that the management at such establishments should take steps to improve working conditions. This is especially pertinent in light of findings that such measures are effective in reducing absenteeism (Huber et al., 2015).

For policymakers, selective monitoring of sickness insurance recipients can be a way of reducing costs while minimising the effect on sickness absence uptake. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that monitoring could be reduced by the same amount as in the experiment, but causing only 49 percent of the increase in sickness absence if efforts are targeted using all the characteristics included in this study, or 77 percent of the increase if only sick leave history is used. Simple cost-benefit calculations favour such selective monitoring policies. I estimate that the current policy of monitoring all workers after seven days of sickness absence is not socially efficient, suggesting that monitoring of workers who are estimated to not be sensitive should be relaxed. For groups who are estimated to be sensitive, on the other hand, the benefits of the current monitoring regime exceed the costs.

While targeted monitoring has high potential when it comes to increasing efficiency, ethical concerns must also be taken into account when designing policy. Monitoring based on many of the worker characteristics included in the full GRF model would likely be seen as discriminatory or unfair. In particular, it would be highly controversial to use variables such as gender, immigrant background, or income for monitoring purposes. A policy which varies monitoring intensity based only on sick leave history would thus be preferable for ethical and practical reasons. Another upside of such a policy is that it self-regulates against overuse by individuals who have little past sick leave uptake. If these workers increase their sickness absence by a significant amount in response to the reduction in monitoring, they will eventually end up in the more intensely monitored group.

Another concern to keep in mind is that not all reductions in sick leave are socially beneficial. If there are monetary or time costs of obtaining a medical certificate, workers might forgo days of absence which would have been medically motivated. This might lead to both negative

longer-term effects on the worker's own health (see e.g. Marie and Vall Castelló, forthcoming) and to the infection of others at the workplace, an issue which has been prominent during the Covid-19 pandemic. The design of a policy which takes these broader issues into account is left for future research.

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## Appendix A: Methodological details

The goal is to estimate treatment effects  $\tau_x$  for groups of spells  $i$  defined by a vector of characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_i$ . As treatment  $W$  is randomised at the level of workers  $w$ , the heterogeneous treatment effects that are the object of interest can be written as:

$$\tau_x = E(y_i | \mathbf{x}_i, W_w = 1) - E(y_i | \mathbf{x}_i, W_w = 0)$$

Given the large number of characteristics and values which can be used for splitting the sample, there are extremely many possible partitions of the sample for which it is possible to estimate  $\tau_x$ . It is impossible to study all the possible ways of splitting the sample using traditional methods. For this reason, the variables and threshold levels used for making splits in heterogeneity analysis have traditionally been selected based on theory. However, there often are many different theoretical predictions, and evaluating all of them is prohibitively time-consuming. Furthermore, theoretical predictions are almost always to some degree inexact, and choosing variables and threshold values for sample splitting always involves some degree of arbitrariness.

GRF, on the contrary, identifies the characteristics and threshold values which yield the maximum heterogeneity in  $\tau_x$  in an entirely data-driven way. GRF involves first estimating a model for selection into treatment (the propensity model)<sup>30</sup> and a model for the value of the outcome (the outcome model) based on the attributes  $\mathbf{x}_i$ , but without using information on treatment status  $W_w$ . These models are estimated using regression forests (Breiman, 2001). The resulting propensity scores  $\hat{e}_x$  and predicted outcomes  $\hat{y}_x$  are used to calculate residualised treatment status  $\tilde{W}_w$  and outcome  $\tilde{y}_i$ . The residualised values are used for estimating heterogeneity in  $\tau_x$  using a causal forest (Athey et al., 2019). The different components of GRF, as well as how I have implemented it in practice in this paper are explained below.

### a. Training and Test Sets

I split the observations into a training set and a held-out test set prior to estimating treatment effects using GRF. The training set contains 80 percent of the families in the sample and their associated sickness absence spells, while the test set contains the remaining 20 percent of families. The training set is used for constructing the GRF, while the test set is used to validate that the model predicts sensitivity to monitoring well out-of-sample. This shows whether there are, for instance, problems with overfitting (that is, the model replicating patterns in the data which are not due to stable relationships between covariates and the outcome, but rather due to random noise). If the model is able to predict sensitivity well out-of-sample, it is likely that it has been able to identify persistent relationships between the characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_i$  and the outcome. The division into sets is based on families rather than spells to ensure that the training data contain no information on the individual's or their partner's behaviour.

### b. Regression Trees and Causal Trees

Regression forest and causal forest estimation relies on constructing a large number of recursive “trees”. Regression trees (Breiman et al., 1984) divide observations into groups with similar

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<sup>30</sup> Strictly speaking, if experimental randomization holds, estimating conditional propensity scores  $\hat{e}_x = W_w | \mathbf{x}_w$  is unnecessary, as then  $\hat{e}_x = e = 0.49 \forall \mathbf{x}$ . However, to be more conservative, and to avoid some minor balancing issues as discussed in Section 5, I estimate  $\hat{e}_x$  using GRF. This estimation provides little gain compared to the naïve model of perfect randomisation.

values of an outcome  $y$ , while causal trees (Athey and Imbens, 2016) divide observations into groups with similar treatment effects  $\tau$ . In both cases, the divisions are based on a vector of characteristics  $\mathbf{x}$ . A tree is grown as follows:

1. The full set of absence spells is randomly divided into two groups,<sup>31</sup> which constitute the splitting and estimation subsamples. The trees are grown using only the workers in the splitting subsample; the estimation subsample is used to populate the leaves of the tree after the splits have been made, and for calculating estimates. This is required for a property known as honesty, which ensures consistency and asymptotic normality of forest estimates (Athey et al., 2019).
2. The full set of sickness absence spells in the splitting sample is considered.
  - a. It is split into child nodes (“left” and “right”) in turn at every possible threshold value of each included characteristic. The number of possible threshold values can be large for variables such as annual earnings, or just one for a binary variable such as gender.
  - b. The criterion of interest is evaluated for each possible partition into child nodes. In the case of regression trees, it is heterogeneity with regard to an outcome  $y$ , while in the case of causal trees, it is heterogeneity with regard to estimated treatment effects  $\tau$ . The split which maximises the criterion is selected.
  - c. Steps a-b are repeated, but each of the child nodes is now in turn considered as the parent node. Each child node is split according to the variable and threshold value which maximise the criterion of interest. Splitting continues until the observations have been grouped into “leaves” with similar outcomes or treatment effects.
3. The splitting sample is not used for predicting the outcome or the size of the treatment effect in the “leaves”. The observations in the estimation subsample are “pushed down” into the tree, and sorted into “leaves” based on their characteristics. These estimation subsample observations are used for making predictions using the tree. When making predictions for an observation, that observation is “pushed down” analogously to the estimation subsample observations, ending up in a particular leaf. The outcomes or treated-control differences among observations in the leaf are then used to predict the outcome or treatment effect for that observation.

It is this splitting procedure which results in the GRF being nonparametric. It is also able to correctly handle ordinal variables, as the distance between two values of a variable has no effect on estimates. What matters is only whether a split was made between the two values or not; if a split was made, observations with different values of the variable will be placed in different leaves, otherwise not. The tree’s estimates are based on within-leaf neighbours, without adjusting for covariate distance between them. Furthermore, trees are able to smoothly handle missing values. When evaluating what split to make, those for whom the variable is missing are first grouped together with those with high values, then with those with low values and finally as a group by themselves.

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<sup>31</sup> Half and half in the default settings of the `grf` package.

### c. Regression Forests and Causal Forests

While a single tree finds the best fit for treatment effect heterogeneity among the sample considered, the estimates of single trees can be non-robust, and their standard errors are difficult to estimate. For this reason, regression and causal forests, which are large ensembles of regression and causal trees respectively, are constructed. Each tree is constructed based on a random subsample of absence spells. This enables the forest to reveal relationships that hold consistently across random subsamples of the data. To further increase randomness, not all spell characteristics  $\mathbf{x}$  are evaluated when choosing which splits to make; only a random sample is used, and this sample is redrawn for every split in a tree.

The forest combines the output of each tree to be predict an outcome or treatment effect for different combinations of  $\mathbf{x}$ . In effect, a forest provides a highly flexible kernel for matching observations for which predictions are to be made to observations used in its training. The weight of each training set observation in this kernel is determined by how many times it appears in the same leaf of a tree as the observation for which predictions are to be made.

In a regression or causal forest of  $B$  trees, with the number of observations in the appropriate leaf  $l_b$  of each tree given by  $N_b$ , a training observation's weight is given by:

$$\alpha_j = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{b=1}^B \frac{\mathbb{1}\{j \in l_b\}}{N_b}, \quad j \in i, w$$

The estimated values of  $\hat{e}_x$ ,  $\hat{y}_x$  and  $\hat{t}_x$  for observations with a given combination of covariates  $\mathbf{x}$  are calculated as:

$$\hat{e}_x = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{w=1}^N \alpha_w W_w, \quad \hat{y}_x = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \alpha_i y_i \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{t}_x = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \alpha_i \tilde{y}_i \tilde{W}_w}{\sum_{i=1}^N \alpha_i \tilde{W}_w^2}$$

The values  $\tilde{y}_i = y_i - \hat{y}_x$  and  $\tilde{W}_w = W_w - \hat{e}_x$  are residual values of the outcome and treatment propensity after the regression forest estimates have been subtracted. This is known as Robinson's transformation and makes GRF an efficient R-learner (Nie and Wager, 2019).

Overlap in terms of characteristics  $\mathbf{x}$  between the treated and control groups is required for valid estimation. Thus, for each combination of characteristics among workers in the treated or control groups, there must be a corresponding subpopulation in the other group. Without overlap, the estimates would effectively involve extrapolation based on subpopulations with similar characteristics. This condition is shown to be satisfied in Figure 2 in the paper, as the distributions of  $\hat{e}_x$  are very similar for treated and control workers.

When making predictions for observations in the held-out test set, all trees in the forest are used. However, for training set observations, out-of-bag estimation is employed. This entails only using those trees into which the observation was not sampled. Out-of-bag estimation mitigates the overfitting inherent when using information about a particular observation when predicting outcomes or treatment effects for that observation. Because of this, on average half of the trees in the forests are used for making predictions for training set observations.

#### **d. Practical Implementation of GRF**

The data contain natural clusters in the form of sickness spells experienced by the same worker and his or her partner. To account for this structure, family-level clusters rather than single spells are drawn when selecting the sample used for constructing each tree and when dividing into splitting and estimation subsamples according to the honesty procedure. Furthermore, family clusters are reweighted when estimating  $\hat{\tau}_x$  so that families who have had different numbers of sickness spells during the experiment get equal weight. Standard errors of the predicted  $\hat{\tau}_x$  are cluster-robust. For computational feasibility reasons, all forests are ensembles of 5000 trees.

The models in this paper are constructed using the `grf` package in R. There are a number of parameters involved in constructing a GRF which can be varied. In the main model, all of these parameters are tuned using 50 small GRF models containing 200 trees each. The parameters selected as optimal by this tuning procedure are: fraction of data sampled into each tree = 0.47 (default = 0.50), number of variables randomly available for each split = 28 (default = 27 with 56 variables in  $\mathbf{x}$ ), minimum leaf size = 1 treated and 1 control observation (default = 5 treated and 5 controls), share of splitting subsample = 0.60 (default = 0.5), maximum split imbalance = 0.04 (default = 0.05), soft imbalance penalty = 0.91 (default = 0). The effects of monitoring predicted by the default and tuned models are however very highly correlated, as can be seen in Table B2 in Appendix B.

#### **e. Comparison of GRF and OLS and LASSO estimates**

Tables B2 and B3 and Figure B14 in Appendix B compare the predictions of GRF to those of LASSO and OLS. Comparisons to parametric models are problematic, as they are not able to handle missing values. As variables related to colleagues and partners are missing for those at single-worker establishments and for singles respectively, some variables or observations have to be excluded when implementing parametric estimation. I exclude variables related to partners (partner's previous days of sick leave, number of short spells and treatment status), as 55 percent of spells in the sample involve single workers.<sup>32</sup> The age of the youngest child is missing for individuals without children under 18 years of age in the household, and is also excluded. Those at single-person establishments (two percent of observations) are dropped, as it is impossible to assess variables relating to colleagues' behaviour for them. For workers without a fixed establishment (nine percent of observations), workplace size is set to the number of workers without a fixed establishment within the firm, and distance to work is set to the sample mean.

I include quadratic terms and first-order interactions between variables, as well as a quartic in age, when estimating the OLS and LASSO models. The optimal penalty parameter for LASSO is selected through grid search and cross-validation across five folds.

As shown in Table B2 in Appendix B, GRF estimates are quite strongly correlated with LASSO estimates ( $\rho=0.73$ ), but quite weakly correlated with OLS estimates ( $\rho=0.39$ ). This is expected, as both GRF and LASSO are designed to minimise overfitting, while OLS estimates are not regularised. I then estimate how well the different models perform when assessing the sensitivity of absence spells of test set workers. Estimates of rank-weighted average treatment effects (RATE, Yadlowsky et al., 2021) are shown in Table B3 in Appendix B. These suggest

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<sup>32</sup> The high share is partly explained by cohabiting couples without common children not being identifiable in the data.

that GRF outperforms both LASSO and OLS, although the 95 percent confidence intervals of the RATE estimates overlap. Finally, the gains of targeted monitoring based on the GRF, LASSO and OLS models, as compared to random monitoring, are visualised in Figure B14 in Appendix B. Targeting based on the LASSO model does somewhat worse than GRF for the vast majority of shares of targeted workers. Targeting based on OLS does clearly worse than either using GRF or LASSO, and is similar to targeting based on the simple rules in Figure B13.

## Appendix B: Additional Results

**TABLE B1.** BALANCING TABLE FOR CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATED AND CONTROL WORKERS

	Mean, controls (N=108,321)	Mean, treated (N=103,977)	Difference
Days of sick leave in past 2.5 years	47.0	46.5	-0.542
Number of short spells in past 2.5 years	4.35	4.32	-0.036*
Days in hospital in past 2.5 years	0.553	0.575	0.022
Age	38.7	38.6	-0.036
Female	0.476	0.475	-0.001
Native	0.873	0.877	0.004***
<b>Immigrant:</b>			
Nordic	0.051	0.051	0.000
Other Europe	0.050	0.049	-0.001
Rest of World	0.026	0.023	-0.003***
Married	0.446	0.444	-0.003
Never married	0.434	0.436	0.003
Divorced	0.105	0.105	0.000
Widowed	0.014	0.015	0.000
Share of family earnings	0.765	0.766	0.001
N children	0.717	0.715	-0.002
Age of youngest child	7.95	7.95	-0.008
Sick child days	1.21	1.17	-0.034
Share of family's sick child days	0.096	0.096	0.000
Partner's sickness absence, past 2.5 years	47.6	47.4	-0.116
Partner's short spells, past 2.5 years	3.89	3.88	-0.013
Partner treated	0.492	0.486	-0.006*
Education level	10.7	10.7	-0.001
<b>Education field:</b>			
General	0.419	0.418	-0.001
Teacher	0.028	0.028	0.000
Administration, law, social science	0.160	0.165	0.005***
Science and engineering	0.225	0.224	-0.001
Health	0.113	0.111	-0.002
Services	0.045	0.044	-0.001
Annual labour income	113,139	113,207	68
Social payment share	0.082	0.083	0.000
Self-employment share	0.049	0.048	-0.001
Main job share	0.927	0.927	0.000
Distance to work	15.6	15.5	-0.04
Number of workers at plant	914	921	6.782
Tenure	2.63	2.64	0.002
Earnings rank at plant	0.552	0.552	0.001
Mean sick leave of colleagues, past 2.5 years	45.2	45.1	-0.056
Mean N short spells of colleagues, past 2.5 years	4.44	4.44	-0.004
Share of colleagues treated	0.490	0.489	-0.001
Local public sector	0.297	0.295	-0.002
<b>Industry:</b>			
Primary	0.021	0.021	0.000
Manufacturing	0.208	0.207	-0.001
Construction	0.062	0.064	0.002*
Utilities	0.086	0.086	0.000

	Mean, controls (N=108,321)	Mean, treated (N=103,977)	Difference
Sales	0.209	0.208	-0.001
Business services	0.099	0.101	0.002
Health	0.228	0.228	0.000
Education	0.033	0.031	-0.001*
Public administration	0.036	0.036	0.000
Population density in municipality	748	749	0.986
Gothenburg	0.773	0.774	0.001
<b>Neighbourhood:</b>			
Mean days of sick leave in previous 2.5 years	48.4	48.3	-0.122*
Mean N short spells in previous 2.5 years	3.78	3.77	-0.003
Share with post-secondary education	0.214	0.215	0.001
Mean annual earnings	106,995	107,144	149**
Mean social payment share	0.087	0.087	-0.000*
Immigrant share	0.131	0.130	-0.001
Distance to medical establishment	1.59	1.58	-0.019
<b>Outcomes during experiment:</b>			
Total absence	17.4	18.1	0.684**
N absence spells	1.24	1.22	-0.018***
Mean spell duration	17.7	18.6	0.884**

*Note:* Statistics for treated and control workers who fulfil the restrictions on being included in the main analysis, that is are aged 18-64, have annual earnings at least three times a “minimum” monthly wage (defined as the tenth percentile among blue-collar workers) and do not work for the central government. To make sure that workers were exposed to the experiment for its entire duration, only those who lived in Gothenburg or Jämtland in 1987, 1988 and 1989 are included. Workers who did not have any sickness absence spells during the experimental period are retained. Variables pertaining to partners or colleagues missing for singles and those at single-employee workplaces respectively. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

**TABLE B2.** CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSIVENESS TO MONITORING ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT MODELS

Model	$\rho$ between model and baseline
GRF with default hyperparameters	0.97
GRF on spells of all durations (duration censored at 30 days), tuned hyperparameters	0.78
GRF on spells of all durations, Pr(spell ends on days 8-14) as outcome, tuned hyperparameters	0.86
LASSO (sample with non-missing colleague characteristics only)	0.73
OLS (sample with non-missing colleague characteristics only)	0.39


*Note:* Correlations with estimates from the baseline model (GRF on duration of spells 4-21 days in length, tuned hyperparameters) for spells of training set workers with durations of 4-21 days.

**TABLE B3.** RATE ESTIMATES OF GRF MODEL AND DIFFERENT SIMPLE TARGETING RULES ON THE TEST SET

Model	QINI coefficient (x10)	SE (x10)
GRF (baseline model)	2.04	0.16
Past sick leave	0.92	0.15
Social payment share of income	0.90	0.15
Health industry and social payment share of income (optimal simple rule)	1.30	0.15
LASSO (sample with non-missing colleague characteristics only)	1.64	0.14
OLS (sample with non-missing colleague characteristics only)	1.58	0.15


*Note:* Spells of test set workers ranked according to different rules, rank-average treatment effects estimated based on how treatment effects among those at or below different quantiles according to each ranking differ from the average treatment effect in the sample. Gains of each prioritisation rule assessed by QINI, which reweights the area under the targeting operator characteristic curve to give equal weight to observations at different quantiles. *GRF*: ordering spells from highest to lowest  $\hat{\tau}_x$ . *Past sick leave*: ordering spells based on worker's pre-experiment days of sick leave, highest first. *Social payment share of income*: ordering spells based on worker's social payment share of income, highest first. *Health industry and social payment share of income*: ordering workers based on whether they work in the health industry, and by social payment share within health industry and non-health industry, highest social payment share first within the industry groups. *LASSO*: ordering spells from highest to lowest  $\hat{\tau}_x$  as estimated by a LASSO model with quadratic terms and first-order interactions between all variables, as well as a quartic in age. *OLS*: ordering spells from highest to lowest  $\hat{\tau}_x$  as estimated by an OLS model with quadratic terms and first-order interactions between all variables, as well as a quartic in age. Only observations with non-missing colleague characteristics are included in the sample on which LASSO and OLS are estimated. These models excluding variables which capture partner characteristics, as discussed in Appendix A.

**FIGURE B1.** SURVIVAL AND HAZARD RATES FOR SPELLS OF WORKERS IN GOTHENBURG AND JÄMTLAND IN THE FIRST AND SECOND HALVES OF 1989.




*Note:* Spells which began between January 1<sup>st</sup> and June 31<sup>st</sup> and July 1<sup>st</sup> and December 31<sup>st</sup> 1989 respectively. The hazard rate represents the probability that a spell which has been ongoing for a given number of days ends on the next day.

**FIGURE B2.** THE DISTRIBUTION OF PREDICTED TREATMENT EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF A SICKNESS ABSENCE SPELL ENDING ON DAYS 8-14.



*Note:* Estimates for spells of training set workers. Bin width = 0.01.


**FIGURE B3.** CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL TRAINED ON WORKERS IN GOTHENBURG.




*Note:* Spells of trainings set workers (i.e., workers who lived in Gothenburg during the experiment). Quartiles defined by ranking spells based on treatment effects estimated by GRF. Q1 contains spells estimated to be least affected and Q4 spells estimated to be most affected. Treated-control differences in duration within each quartile estimated as  $\hat{\tau} = \bar{y}_i|(\mathcal{W}_w = 1) - \bar{y}_i|(\mathcal{W}_w = 0)$ . Effects for training set workers; out-of-bag estimates of  $\hat{\tau}_x$  and AIPW scores. Confidence intervals at the 95 percent level for the treated-control differences.

**FIGURE B4.** SURVIVAL AND HAZARD RATES OF ABSENCE SPELLS OF WORKERS IN JÄMTLAND, RANKED BY TREATMENT EFFECTS ESTIMATED USING THE MODEL TRAINED ON WORKERS IN GOTHENBURG

Panel A: Survival rates




Panel B: Hazard rates




*Note:* Rates for absence spells of workers who lived in Jämtland during the experiment. The hazard rate represents the probability that a spell that has been ongoing for a given number of days ends on the next day. Workers divided into quartiles based on monitoring sensitivity predicted using the spells of workers who lived in Gothenburg. Q1 contains spells estimated to be least affected and Q4 spells estimated to be most affected. Controls born on odd dates, treated on even dates.

**FIGURE B5.** DIFFERENCES IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUAL AND SPELL CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN THE QUARTILES MOST AND LEAST RESPONSIVE TO MONITORING DEFINED BY PROBABILITY OF RETURNING TO WORK ON DAYS 8-14.




*Note:* Quartiles defined based on GRF  $\hat{\tau}_x$  so as to include equal numbers of spells. Continuous variables normalised to have mean zero and standard deviation one. For dummies, differences are based on shares with the given characteristic. Positive differences mean higher values among the most sensitive (Quartile 4), negative differences mean higher values among the least sensitive (Quartile 1). Absence spells of training set workers.

**FIGURE B6.** PARTIAL DEPENDENCE PLOTS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH COVARIATES.




*Note:* Average increase in spell duration (y-axis) evaluated by the GRF model if the covariate is set to a given value (x-axis) for all workers and spells, while all other covariates are kept at their empirically observed values. Value choice is dictated by values at 1<sup>st</sup> – 9<sup>th</sup> deciles for continuous variables, values with five or more percent of observations for variables which are concentrated at a few mass points, and zero and one for binary variables. In the case of variables where most individuals have a value of zero, partial dependence functions evaluated at zero and at the average value among those with nonzero values. Dashed navy line indicates mean  $\hat{t}_x$  estimate of the baseline model.

**FIGURE B7. PARTIAL DEPENDENCE PLOTS FOR FAMILY COVARIATES.**




*Note:* Average increase in spell duration (y-axis) evaluated if the covariate is set to a given value (x-axis). Value choice dictated by values at 1<sup>st</sup> – 9<sup>th</sup> deciles for continuous variables, values with five or more percent of observations for variables concentrated at a few mass points, and zero and one for binary variables. For variables where most individuals have a value of zero, partial dependence functions evaluated at zero and at the average value among those with nonzero values. If a covariate is missing for many workers, the partial dependence function is also evaluated when it is set to missing. Dashed navy line indicates mean  $\hat{\tau}_x$  estimate of the baseline model.

**FIGURE B8.** PARTIAL DEPENDENCE PLOTS FOR EDUCATION COVARIATES.




*Note:* Increase in spell duration in days (y-axis) evaluated when the covariate takes on its different possible values (x-axis). Individuals with >2 pre-school age children and >3 school age children present in the data, but effects not evaluated due to their small proportion. For population density, each category represents the density in one municipality, ordered from least densely populated to most densely populated. Dashed navy line indicates mean  $\hat{t}_x$  estimate of the baseline model.

**FIGURE B9. PARTIAL DEPENDENCE PLOTS FOR WORK COVARIATES.**




*Note:* Increase in spell duration in days (y-axis) evaluated when the covariate takes on its different possible values (x-axis). Individuals with >2 pre-school age children and >3 school age children present in the data, but effects not evaluated due to their small proportion. For population density, each category represents the density in one municipality, ordered from least densely populated to most densely populated. Dashed navy line indicates mean  $\hat{\tau}_x$  estimate of the baseline model.

**FIGURE B10.** PARTIAL DEPENDENCE PLOTS FOR SECTOR COVARIATES.




*Note:* Increase in spell duration in days (y-axis) evaluated when the covariate takes on its different possible values (x-axis). Individuals with >2 pre-school age children and >3 school age children present in the data, but effects not evaluated due to their small proportion. For population density, each category represents the density in one municipality, ordered from least densely populated to most densely populated. Dashed navy line indicates mean  $\hat{\tau}_x$  estimate of the baseline model.

**FIGURE B11.** PARTIAL DEPENDENCE PLOTS FOR LOCATION COVARIATES.



*Note:* Increase in spell duration in days (y-axis) evaluated when the covariate takes on its different possible values (x-axis). Individuals with >2 pre-school age children and >3 school age children present in the data, but effects not evaluated due to their small proportion. For population density, each category represents the density in one municipality, ordered from least densely populated to most densely populated. Dashed navy line indicates mean  $\hat{t}_x$  estimate of the baseline model.

**FIGURE B12.** VARIABLE IMPORTANCE ACCORDING TO THE GRF PACKAGE'S SIMPLE BUILT-IN MEASURE




*Note:* Importance is measured as share of splits up to depth 4 within the trees (ignoring splits made at further depths). Splits at lower depth  $d$  given two times the weight of those at  $d + 1$ . Total importance sums to 1.

**FIGURE B13.** COMPARISON OF TARGETED MONITORING POLICIES BASED ON THE FULL MODEL AND ON DIFFERENT SIMPLE RULES



*Note:* Share of reduction in sickness absence duration captured by targeted monitoring based on different prioritisation rules. Spells of workers in the test set. Monitoring based on GRF assumes spells are ranked based on their estimated GRF  $\hat{t}_x$  and those with higher estimated treatment effects are monitored first. Monitoring based on sick leave history and social payment share assumes workers are ranked from highest to lowest past sickness absence and social payment share respectively and those with higher past sickness absence or social payment share are monitored first. Order of monitoring among those with equal numbers of days of sick leave in the past or with equal social payment share is random. Monitoring based on social payment share and health industry is suggested by optimal policy trees of depth 2 (Athey and Wager, 2021) and involves monitoring non-health industry workers first based on their social payment share, and then health industry workers based on their social payment share.  $\text{Pr}(\text{monitored})$  in experiment = 0.51.

**FIGURE B14.** COMPARISON OF TARGETED MONITORING POLICIES BASED ON THE GRF MODEL AND ON LASSO AND OLS MODELS



*Note:* Share of reduction in sickness absence duration captured by targeted monitoring based on different prioritisation rules. Spells of workers in the test set who are employed at establishments with more than one worker, as explained in Appendix A. Details of how the LASSO and OLS models are estimated are provided in Appendix A. Monitoring based on GRF, LASSO and OLS assumes spells are ranked based on their estimated  $\hat{\tau}_x$  from these models and those with higher estimated treatment effects are monitored first.  $\text{Pr}(\text{monitored})$  in experiment = 0.51.