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A comment on "The Effects of Racial Diversity in Citizen Decision-Making Bodies"

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Xilin Yang

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A Comment on “The Effects of Racial Diversity in Citizen Decision-Making Bodies”

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A comment on “The Effects of Racial Diversity in Citizen Decision-Making Bodies”*

Do Won Kim, Xilin Yang, and Do-Hoon Kim

August 9, 2024

Abstract

Karpowitz et al. (2024) examine the effect of racial diversity on group decision-making. The authors used OLS regression to analyze 2,694 citizens randomly assigned to 449 mock juries who are tasked to make decisions, and they find that the number of the people of color (POC) affects private decisions, but not so much on group decisions. We successfully replicated the main results of the paper with no coding errors, and we implemented the following robustness checks. First, we reset different seeds and found that they do not change the tables or the graphs, so the findings are not subject to arbitrarily chosen seed. Second, we applied multiple imputations rather than list-wise deletion for a few variables which the authors removed for containing missing values. While the original result continues to hold, our findings suggest that the presence or absence of even one individual of POC on the jury might be more significant than the incremental increases of the number of POC on the jury. Third, we shifted from using POC as the independent variable to using Black as the binary independent variable. When the group’s racial composition is framed as Black versus non-Black, we do not observe a significant impact on individual punitiveness after deliberation. In addition, juries with one or no Black members showed greater punitiveness in their initial verdicts compared to juries with two or more Black members, but this effect diminished by the second round.

KEYWORDS: OLS Regression, Robustness Testing

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Introduction

Karpowitz et al. (2024) investigate the impact of racial diversity among judges on their juristic decision-making. The authors expected that juries consisting of diverse races would make systematically different decisions compared to the ones with only white juries. Specifically, a jury with POC (People Of Color) jurors are expected to prefer higher punitive damages.

The authors conducted a mock-jury experiment where the participants were randomly assigned to six-member juries. After closely considering the cases involving an individual plaintiff and a corporate defendant, the participants were asked to decide the extent to which the corporate defendant should be punished. The authors found that (1) White and POC jurors tend to form different preferences, and (2) the existence of POC, who prefer greater corporate accountability, may bring out the change of the preferences of the group members. (3) However, the group decision was less affected by the preferences of POC jurors.

The robustness replication in this report followed three strategies. First, we tested whether the same result holds after setting different seeds from the ones used by the authors. This was done to see if the authors' specific seed values were arbitrarily chosen. Second, we tested the robustness check by conducting multiple imputation instead of list-wise deletion of missing data. Finally, we tested whether different ways of coding the main independent variable (e.g., from a binary POC (non-White) classification to a specific Black vs. non-Black categorization) would result in different outcomes. The results of these robustness checks are explained in the conclusion chapter.

Computational Reproducibility

In our report prepared for the Institute for Replication (Brodeur et al. (2024)), we utilized the publicly available replication package from the Harvard dataverse:¹ Raw data, the cleaning code, and analysis code were provided. We successfully computationally reproduced all the main results (*i.e.*, Tables 1, 2 and 3; Figure 2,3, and 4) from the raw data. See Table below for details.

Replication Package Contents and Reproducibility

Replication Package Item	Fully	Partial	No
Raw data provided	✓		
Analysis data provided	✓		
Cleaning code provided	✓		
Analysis code provided	✓		
Reproducible from raw data	✓		
Reproducible from analysis data	✓		

¹<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/suppl/10.1086/726946>.

Robustness Reproduction and Replication

After confirming that all the results were successfully reproduced, we ran a series of robustness checks by changing some component of the study.

Three strategies:

1. We tested robustness by simply setting different seeds for replication: “1004” and “42L.” In the original study, the authors employed seemingly arbitrary seed numbers (e.g., 9904, 23214) for their randomization processes. We were interested in determining whether these specific seed values were deliberately chosen.
2. We tested robustness by conducting multiple imputations instead of list-wise deletion of missing data. In our replication, we employed multiple imputation for handling missing data in demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, education, race) while maintaining the original paper’s approach of coding missing income as a separate category. In addition, we did not remove the juries with any jurors’ missing data.
3. We investigated whether recoding the main independent variable from a binary POC (non-White) classification to a specific Black vs. non-Black categorization would yield different results or alter conclusions. With such a modification, we tried to explore the implications of aggregating all non-white races into a single category and the nuances of inter-minority group heterogeneity. Note that we maintained consistency with the original study’s approach to handling missing data, ensuring comparability with the initial findings while focusing on the potential effects of this racial re-categorization.

Findings:

First, the findings remained consistent across different seed values in our replication. This consistency suggests that the original results were not an artifact of the specific seed numbers chosen.

Second, when we used different methods of imputation and deletion of the data, for most variables, our results aligned closely with those reported in the original study. Here, we only report divergence from the original results.

The original paper found that not reporting income, as opposed to being in the middle-income category, was associated with reduced punitiveness and this association was statistically significant.

In the original analysis:

- Cases with missing age, gender, education, or race were removed via listwise deletion.
- Cases with missing income were coded as ‘Missing Income’.
- This ‘Missing Income’ group showed less punitive attitudes compared to the middle income group.

In our **Modified Table 1** (Table 4), a replication of Table 1 in the original study, we applied multiple imputation to other demographic variables and did not remove missing jurors. As a result, the ‘Missing Income’ effect loses its statistical significance.

While these were not central to the main hypotheses of the original study, this change in results suggests that not only the missing data for income, but also the missing data for other demographic variables (age, gender, education, race) may not be missing completely at random (MCAR).

To put it another way, there might be a selective non-response where those who provided all demographic information except income may represent a distinct group, generally cooperative but reluctant to disclose financial data.

Moreover, in the original study (Table 2, both ‘4 Whites’ (= 1 POC in jury excluding self) and ‘5 Whites’ (= 0 POC in jury excluding self) showed statistically significant effects across all three model specifications (columns 1, 2, and 3). On the other hand, in our replication (**Modified Table 2** (Table 5)), which incorporates the multiple imputation approach for handling missing data instead of listwise deletion:

- The effect of ‘5 Whites’ remains statistically significant across all three models. Specifically, respondents in juries composed entirely of White members (excluding themselves) show less punitive attitudes compared to those in juries with two or more POCs.
- The effect of ‘4 Whites’ is significant in models 1 and 2 but loses statistical significance in model 3, once median pre-deliberation punitiveness is controlled ($p = 0.079$).

Although this does not refute the original result, our replication result indicates that the presence or absence of any POC on the jury may be more crucial than incremental increases in POC representation. At the same time, the effect of an all-White jury (5 Whites) appears robust, persisting even when controlling for median pre-deliberation preference.

This suggests that the absence of any POC representation has a distinct impact on individual juror’s post-deliberation decision. Overall, the findings suggest that having at least one POC juror might significantly alter individuals’ decision-making, while the difference between having one POC juror versus two or more may be less pronounced.

The use of multiple imputation typically provides greater statistical power by retaining more cases. Despite this increased power, the fact that the effect of ‘4 Whites’ became non-significant in our analysis suggests that the true magnitude of this effect may be smaller than originally estimated.

Modified Table 3 (Table 6) is a replication of Table 3 in the original paper. Despite our use of different methods for handling missing data, the main conclusions of the original study remain robust. The minor differences we observed, such as changes in the statistical significance of ‘2 men’ in Verdict Round 2, do not alter the overall findings.

Third, our analysis revealed intriguing outcomes when we modified the primary independent variable. Specifically, we shifted from using POC (which measured the presence of non-White jurors) to Black (which specifically measured the presence of Black jurors among POC).

Specifically, **Modified Table 4** (Table 7) replicates Table 1 from the original paper. Self-identification as Black, as opposed to non-Black, was significantly associated with more punitive attitudes in the pre-deliberation phase. This finding aligns closely with the original results, which demonstrated that individuals identifying as POC exhibited more punitive attitudes compared to those identifying as White.

Modified Table 5a (Table 8) replicates Table 2 from the original paper. The variables “4 non-Blacks” and “5 non-Blacks” represent juries with one Black member and zero Black members, respectively, out of five jurors (excluding the respondent). Contrary to the original findings, our analysis reveals no statistically significant difference in post-

deliberation preferences between juries with two or more Black members (baseline) and those with only one or zero Black members.

Modified Table 5b (Table 9) employs the same analytical approach as ‘Modified Table 5a’ but utilizes racial composition variables consistent with the original paper. Specifically, “4 Whites” indicates the presence of one POC other than the respondent, while “5 Whites” denotes an all-White jury excluding the respondent. The difference is that the model controls for the respondent’s race (Black vs. non-Black). Results indicate that juries with only one POC or no POCs exhibited reduced punitiveness in the post-deliberation stage compared to juries with two or more POCs.

What do these results suggest for the impact of jury racial composition on individuals’ post-deliberation preferences? When the group racial composition is framed as Black versus non-Black, we observe no significant effect on individual punitiveness following deliberation. This contrasts with our findings when the composition is categorized as POC versus White, which align with the original paper’s results. This may imply that the ‘White vs. non-White’ paradigm continues to shape significant social and legal contexts in American society. Overall, the original paper’s POC vs. White framework appears to better capture the impact of jury composition.

Modified Figures 2a and 2b (Figure 1): Figure 2a replicates the original study’s findings using a different method of dealing with missing data. Consistent with the original Figure 2, it demonstrates that both White and POC jurors wish to hold corporations more accountable for malfeasance when surrounded by more POCs.

Figure 2b presents a starker difference by replacing the POC variable with a specific Black juror variable. While the overall trend of decreasing punitiveness with increasing White jurors is maintained, the effect appears more pronounced for Black jurors compared to non-Black jurors. Notably, the gap in punitiveness between Black and non-Black jurors is wider when there are fewer White jurors in the group, and this gap narrows as the number of White jurors increases.

These findings suggest that while the presence of POC jurors generally increases punitiveness in post-deliberation preferences, the effect seems to be stronger for Black jurors.

Modified Table 6 (Table 10): This table replicates Table 3 from the original paper, with some key differences:

- Original: Baseline was 4 or fewer Whites out of 6 jurors; “5 Whites” meant 1 POC, “6 Whites” meant all-White jury.
- Replication: Baseline is 2 or more Black jurors; “1 Black” and “0 Black” categories are shown.

The replication study reveals an intriguing pattern: juries with one or zero Black members demonstrated increased punitiveness in their first-round verdicts compared to juries with two or more Black members. Interestingly, this effect dissipated by the second round. While the exact mechanisms behind this phenomenon are not definitively known, several interrelated factors may contribute to this seemingly counterintuitive result:

- **Enhanced Diversity Awareness:** Paradoxically, a lower number of Black jurors may heighten the salience of diversity within the group. This increased awareness could prompt all jurors to more consciously consider the minority view in their decision-making process.
- **Representation Burden:** The few Black jurors present may feel an amplified sense of responsibility to represent their entire community. This perceived burden could

lead them to adopt and advocate for stronger, more punitive positions, particularly in the initial stages of deliberation.

- Intra-minority Differences: In juries with fewer Black members, other POC might align more closely with perspectives typically associated with White jurors.

These factors, operating in concert, may explain the paradoxical observation of increased punitiveness in juries with fewer Black members, particularly during the initial phase of deliberation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our robustness checking shows that this paper performs well in scientific design. We are able to perfectly reproduce their results. In including and imputing the variables that were removed from the original analysis, we discovered that although the p-values changed a bit, our results did not challenge the original regression results of this paper. It is important to note that our replication using “black” versus “non-black” classification reveals several intriguing insights. For future studies, we encourage researchers to experiment with more diverse classifications in seeking other insightful findings. Overall, our replication confirms that this study is robust.

References


Brodeur, A., Mikola, D. and Cook, N.: 2024, Mass reproducibility and replicability: A new hope, *Discussion Paper 16912*, IZA.

URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4790780>


Karpowitz, C. F., Mendelberg, T., Elder, E. M. and Ribar, D.: 2024, The effects of racial diversity in citizen decision-making bodies, *The Journal of Politics* **86**(1), 199–215.

Figures

Our replication successfully reproduced all figures from the original study, demonstrating the robustness of the initial findings. In this analysis, we focus on presenting and discussing only those figures that offer particularly noteworthy insights.



((a)) Figure 2a



((b)) Figure 2b

Figure 1: Replication of Figure 2

Original Tables (Replicated)

Table 1: Original Table 1. Predictors of Predeliberation Individual Punitiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pre-Deliberation Preferences (t_0)	
	(1)	(2)
POC	0.069*** (0.015) p = 0.00001	0.071*** (0.015) p = 0.00001
Female	0.018 (0.011) p = 0.102	0.021 (0.012) p = 0.081
Young	0.035* (0.015) p = 0.021	0.036* (0.015) p = 0.019
Older	-0.018 (0.014) p = 0.195	-0.018 (0.014) p = 0.184
High School Grad	-0.001 (0.014) p = 0.935	0.001 (0.014) p = 0.939
College Grad	-0.009 (0.012) p = 0.445	-0.007 (0.012) p = 0.562
Low Income	0.004 (0.014) p = 0.773	0.002 (0.014) p = 0.861
High Income	-0.024 (0.013) p = 0.068	-0.024 (0.013) p = 0.068
Missing Income	-0.107* (0.043) p = 0.013	-0.119** (0.043) p = 0.006
4 Whites		0.004 (0.017) p = 0.794
5 Whites		-0.019 (0.017) p = 0.256
2 Men		-0.017 (0.014) p = 0.216
3+ Men		-0.012 (0.017) p = 0.464
1 Older		-0.020 (0.013) p = 0.112
2 Older		-0.008 (0.015) p = 0.606
3+ Older		-0.044 (0.025) p = 0.082
1 College Grad		-0.044* (0.021) p = 0.034
2 College Grad		-0.031 (0.020) p = 0.125
3 College Grad		-0.053* (0.022) p = 0.015
4+ College Grad		0.004 (0.028) p = 0.888
1 High Income		0.014 (0.018) p = 0.454
2 High Income		0.009 (0.018)

Continued on next page

Table 1 – continued from previous page

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pre-Deliberation Preferences (t_0)	
	(1)	(2)
3+ High Income		p = 0.618 0.006 (0.020)
Constant	0.511*** (0.023) p = 0.000	p = 0.749 0.566*** (0.036) p = 0.000
Legal Case Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,673	2,673
R ²	0.274	0.281
Adjusted R ²	0.268	0.271

Table 2: Original Table 2. Predictors of Postdeliberation Individual Punitiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Post-Deliberation Preference (t2)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
4 Whites	−0.040** (0.015) p = 0.007	−0.034* (0.015) p = 0.024	−0.030* (0.015) p = 0.048
5 Whites	−0.065*** (0.015) p = 0.00002	−0.056*** (0.015) p = 0.0003	−0.047** (0.015) p = 0.003
2 Men		−0.011 (0.012) p = 0.397	−0.007 (0.012) p = 0.576
3+ Men		0.011 (0.015) p = 0.489	0.017 (0.015) p = 0.255
1 Older		−0.010 (0.011) p = 0.403	−0.006 (0.011) p = 0.625
2 Older		−0.022 (0.014) p = 0.121	−0.013 (0.014) p = 0.345
3+ Older		−0.011 (0.023) p = 0.638	0.001 (0.023) p = 0.965
1 College Grad		−0.022 (0.018) p = 0.244	−0.017 (0.018) p = 0.360
2 College Grad		−0.020 (0.018) p = 0.281	−0.013 (0.018) p = 0.485
3 College Grad		−0.011 (0.020) p = 0.559	−0.005 (0.019) p = 0.805
4+ College Grad		−0.025 (0.025) p = 0.322	−0.019 (0.025) p = 0.450
1 High Income		−0.013 (0.017) p = 0.417	−0.016 (0.016) p = 0.323
2 High Income		−0.015 (0.017) p = 0.365	−0.017 (0.016) p = 0.313
3+ High Income		−0.050** (0.018) p = 0.005	−0.047** (0.018) p = 0.008
Individual Pre-delib. Preference	0.300*** (0.017) p = 0.000	0.298*** (0.018) p = 0.000	0.247*** (0.019) p = 0.000

Continued on next page

Table 2 – continued from previous page

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Post-Deliberation Preference (t2)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Jury Median Pre-delib. Preference			0.264*** (0.035) p = 0.000
Constant	0.479*** (0.024) p = 0.000	0.553*** (0.034) p = 0.000	0.417*** (0.038) p = 0.000
Legal Case Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Indiv. Demographic Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,655	2,655	2,655
R ²	0.453	0.460	0.471
Adjusted R ²	0.449	0.452	0.463

Table 3: Original Table 3. Predicting Punitiveness of Verdicts among Nonhung Juries

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Verdict (Round 1) (1)	Verdict (Round 2) (2)
5 White	−0.024 (0.035) p = 0.493	−0.040 (0.032) p = 0.212
6 White	−0.003 (0.039) p = 0.939	−0.068* (0.034) p = 0.046
2 Men	0.012 (0.046) p = 0.794	−0.085 (0.044) p = 0.053
3 Men	−0.015 (0.047) p = 0.750	−0.062 (0.042) p = 0.140
4+ Men	−0.126 (0.084) p = 0.134	−0.009 (0.070) p = 0.898
1 Older	0.003 (0.033) p = 0.928	0.0003 (0.028) p = 0.991
2 Older	0.044 (0.038) p = 0.247	−0.017 (0.034) p = 0.617
3+ Older	−0.011 (0.051) p = 0.829	−0.016 (0.044) p = 0.716
2 College Grad	−0.033 (0.042) p = 0.432	−0.005 (0.036) p = 0.890
3 College Grad	−0.009 (0.037) p = 0.808	−0.020 (0.031) p = 0.519
4+ College Grad	−0.068* (0.034) p = 0.046	−0.010 (0.029) p = 0.731
1 High Income	0.001 (0.054) p = 0.985	−0.090* (0.045) p = 0.046
2 High Income	−0.093 (0.059) p = 0.115	−0.094 (0.048) p = 0.050
3 High Income	−0.096 (0.064) p = 0.134	−0.095 (0.052) p = 0.068
4+ High Income	−0.028 (0.053) p = 0.597	−0.083 (0.045) p = 0.065
Median Pre-Delib. Preference (t0)	0.799*** (0.058) p < 0.001	0.565*** (0.072) p < 0.001
Constant	0.288** (0.089) p = 0.001	0.583*** (0.095) p < 0.001
Observations	449	449
R ²	0.771	0.643
Adjusted R ²	0.750	0.612
ρ	1.424	−0.471
Inverse Mills Ratio	0.389*** (0.097) p < 0.001	−0.098 (0.108) p = 0.364

Modified Tables

Table 4: Modified Table 1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pre-Deliberation Preferences (t_0)	
	(1)	(2)
POC	0.065*** (0.014) p = 0.000	0.067*** (0.014) p = 0.000
Female	0.018 (0.010) p = 0.081	0.021 (0.011) p = 0.064
Young	0.032* (0.014) p = 0.024	0.034* (0.014) p = 0.019
Older	−0.017 (0.013) p = 0.200	−0.017 (0.013) p = 0.200
High School Grad	−0.002 (0.013) p = 0.882	−0.0004 (0.013) p = 0.975
College Grad	−0.013 (0.011) p = 0.256	−0.012 (0.012) p = 0.289
Low Income	0.006 (0.013) p = 0.627	0.005 (0.013) p = 0.691
High Income	−0.021 (0.012) p = 0.088	−0.021 (0.012) p = 0.091
Missing Income	−0.026 (0.031) p = 0.390	−0.029 (0.031) p = 0.346
4 Whites		−0.005 (0.016) p = 0.765
5 Whites		−0.023 (0.016) p = 0.144
2 Men		−0.020 (0.013) p = 0.127
3+ Men		−0.012 (0.015) p = 0.429
1 Older		−0.006 (0.012) p = 0.640
2 Older		0.008 (0.014) p = 0.592
3+ Older		−0.021 (0.023) p = 0.369
1 College Grad		−0.041* (0.019) p = 0.034
2 College Grad		−0.033 (0.019) p = 0.083
3 College Grad		−0.046* (0.021) p = 0.027
4+ College Grad		0.002 (0.027) p = 0.942
1 High Income		0.006 (0.017)

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Table 4 – continued from previous page

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pre-Deliberation Preferences (t_0)	
	(1)	(2)
		p = 0.728
2 High Income		0.003 (0.017)
		p = 0.877
3+ High Income		0.002 (0.018)
		p = 0.916
Constant	0.515*** (0.022)	0.570*** (0.034)
	p = 0.000	p = 0.000
Legal Case Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,038	3,038
R ²	0.274	0.278
Adjusted R ²	0.268	0.269

Table 5: Modified Table 2

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Post-Deliberation Preference (t2)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
4 Whites	−0.035* (0.014) p = 0.015	−0.029* (0.014) p = 0.044	−0.025 (0.014) p = 0.079
5 Whites	−0.060*** (0.014) p < 0.001	−0.052*** (0.014) p < 0.001	−0.045** (0.014) p = 0.002
2 Men		−0.016 (0.012) p = 0.180	−0.013 (0.012) p = 0.257
3+ Men		0.005 (0.014) p = 0.735	0.009 (0.014) p = 0.536
1 Older		−0.018 (0.011) p = 0.095	−0.016 (0.011) p = 0.125
2 Older		−0.024 (0.013) p = 0.065	−0.020 (0.013) p = 0.127
3+ Older		−0.015 (0.022) p = 0.502	−0.007 (0.022) p = 0.758
1 College Grad		−0.008 (0.017) p = 0.635	−0.004 (0.017) p = 0.823
2 College Grad		−0.007 (0.017) p = 0.704	0.0002 (0.017) p = 0.993
3 College Grad		−0.007 (0.019) p = 0.725	−0.001 (0.018) p = 0.974
4+ College Grad		−0.015 (0.024) p = 0.545	−0.009 (0.024) p = 0.699
1 High Income		−0.012 (0.015) p = 0.418	−0.014 (0.015) p = 0.375
2 High Income		−0.023 (0.015) p = 0.138	−0.022 (0.015) p = 0.143
3+ High Income		−0.055*** (0.017) p = 0.001	−0.051** (0.016) p = 0.002
Individual Pre-delib. Preference	0.298***	0.295***	0.249***
Continued on next page			

Table 5 – continued from previous page

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Post-Deliberation Preference (t2)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Jury Median Pre-delib. Preference	(0.016) p < 0.001	(0.017) p < 0.001	(0.018) p < 0.001 0.230*** (0.033) p < 0.001
Constant	0.473*** (0.023) p < 0.001	0.553*** (0.033) p < 0.001	0.436*** (0.036) p < 0.001
Legal Case Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Indiv. Demographic Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,006	3,006	3,006
R ²	0.442	0.449	0.458
Adjusted R ²	0.439	0.442	0.451

Table 6: Modified Table 3

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Verdict (Round 1)	Verdict (Round 2)
	(1)	(2)
5 White	−0.037 (0.032) p = 0.248	−0.049 (0.031) p = 0.114
6 White	−0.019 (0.034) p = 0.576	−0.081* (0.034) p = 0.017
2 Men	0.024 (0.041) p = 0.558	−0.094* (0.046) p = 0.041
3 Men	−0.007 (0.041) p = 0.865	−0.078 (0.043) p = 0.070
4+ Men	−0.104 (0.071) p = 0.143	−0.011 (0.065) p = 0.866
1 Older	0.007 (0.029) p = 0.809	−0.003 (0.027) p = 0.911
2 Older	0.044 (0.033) p = 0.182	−0.020 (0.031) p = 0.519
3+ Older	−0.016 (0.045) p = 0.722	−0.011 (0.043) p = 0.798
2 College Grad	−0.018 (0.038) p = 0.636	0.003 (0.035) p = 0.932
3 College Grad	−0.026 (0.032) p = 0.417	−0.022 (0.030) p = 0.464
4+ College Grad	−0.064* (0.031) p = 0.039	−0.005 (0.029) p = 0.863
1 High Income	−0.023 (0.047) p = 0.624	−0.069 (0.044) p = 0.117
2 High Income	−0.100* (0.050) p = 0.046	−0.070 (0.046) p = 0.128
3 High Income	−0.133* (0.057) p = 0.020	−0.079 (0.051) p = 0.122
4+ High Income	−0.054 (0.046) p = 0.241	−0.058 (0.043) p = 0.177
Median Pre-Delib. Preference (t0)	0.766*** (0.055) p < 0.001	0.530*** (0.067) p < 0.001
Constant	0.328*** (0.082) p < 0.001	0.618*** (0.095) p < 0.001
Observations	495	495
R ²	0.754	0.634
Adjusted R ²	0.734	0.605
ρ	1.338	−0.704
Inverse Mills Ratio	0.335*** (0.083) p < 0.001	−0.154 (0.106) p = 0.146

Table 7: Modified Table 4

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
Pre-Deliberation Preferences (t_0)		
	(1)	(2)
Black	0.081** (0.029) p = 0.005	0.087** (0.029) p = 0.003
Female	0.017 (0.011) p = 0.116	0.019 (0.012) p = 0.113
Young	0.040** (0.015) p = 0.010	0.040** (0.015) p = 0.010
Older	-0.021 (0.014) p = 0.132	-0.022 (0.014) p = 0.116
High School Grad	0.003 (0.014) p = 0.818	0.006 (0.014) p = 0.691
College Grad	-0.011 (0.012) p = 0.359	-0.009 (0.012) p = 0.488
Low Income	0.008 (0.014) p = 0.576	0.006 (0.014) p = 0.677
High Income	-0.024 (0.013) p = 0.066	-0.024 (0.013) p = 0.068
Missing Income	-0.100* (0.043) p = 0.020	-0.108* (0.043) p = 0.012
4 non-Blacks		0.076 (0.100) p = 0.450
5 non-Blacks		0.063 (0.099) p = 0.523
2 Men		-0.015 (0.014) p = 0.280
3+ Men		-0.009 (0.017) p = 0.603
1 Older		-0.023 (0.013) p = 0.078
2 Older		-0.012 (0.015) p = 0.436
3+ Older		-0.049 (0.025) p = 0.054
1 College Grad		-0.046* (0.021) p = 0.025
2 College Grad		-0.034 (0.020) p = 0.098
3 College Grad		-0.054* (0.022) p = 0.013
4+ College Grad		0.005 (0.028) p = 0.856
1 High Income		0.014 (0.018) p = 0.443
2 High Income		0.012 (0.018) p = 0.499
3+ High Income		0.007 (0.020) p = 0.736
Constant	0.517*** (0.023) p = 0.000	0.501*** (0.105) p = 0.00001
Legal Case Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,673	2,673
R ²	0.271	0.277
Adjusted R ²	0.265	0.267

Table 8: Modified Table 5a

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Post-Deliberation Preference (<i>t</i> 2)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
4 non-Blacks	0.041 (0.089) p = 0.648	0.013 (0.090) p = 0.885	-0.001 (0.089) p = 0.992
5 non-Blacks	0.001 (0.088) p = 0.991	-0.022 (0.089) p = 0.807	-0.031 (0.088) p = 0.724
Individual Pre-delib. Preference	0.302*** (0.017) p = 0.000	0.298*** (0.018) p = 0.000	0.246*** (0.019) p = 0.000
Jury Median Pre-delib. Preference			0.271*** (0.035) p = 0.000
R ²	0.452	0.459	0.471
Adjusted R ²	0.448	0.451	0.463

^aNote: This table shows selected key variables. All other results are consistent with the original table.

Table 9: Modified Table 5b

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Post-Deliberation Preference (<i>t</i> 2)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
4 Whites	-0.041** (0.015) p = 0.007	-0.034* (0.015) p = 0.023	-0.030* (0.015) p = 0.045
5 Whites	-0.064*** (0.015) p = 0.00003	-0.055*** (0.015) p = 0.0004	-0.046** (0.015) p = 0.003
Individual Pre-delib. Preference	0.301*** (0.017) p = 0.000	0.298*** (0.017) p = 0.000	0.247*** (0.019) p = 0.000
Jury Median Pre-delib. Preference			0.265*** (0.035) p = 0.000
R ²	0.454	0.460	0.472
Adjusted R ²	0.450	0.453	0.464

^aNote: This table shows selected key variables. All other results are consistent with the original table.

Table 10: Modified Table 6

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Verdict (Round 1)	Verdict (Round 2)
	(1)	(2)
1 Black	0.397* (0.176)	-0.125 (0.225)
0 Black	0.396* (0.175)	-0.173 (0.230)
2 Men	0.011 (0.048)	-0.082 (0.044)
3 Men	-0.013 (0.048)	-0.055 (0.043)
4+ Men	-0.126 (0.087)	-0.006 (0.069)
1 Older	0.006 (0.034)	-0.005 (0.028)
2 Older	0.047 (0.039)	-0.023 (0.034)
3+ Older	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.022 (0.044)
2 College Grad	-0.036 (0.043)	-0.008 (0.035)
3 College Grad	-0.003 (0.038)	-0.022 (0.030)
4+ College Grad	-0.068 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.029)
1 High Income	-0.002 (0.056)	-0.096* (0.045)
2 High Income	-0.103 (0.061)	-0.101* (0.047)
3 High Income	-0.084 (0.066)	-0.100 (0.052)
4+ High Income	-0.031 (0.055)	-0.082 (0.045)
Median Pre-Delib. Preference (t0)	0.805*** (0.057)	0.574*** (0.072)
Constant	-0.129 (0.200)	0.698** (0.261)
Observations	449	449
R ²	0.772	0.642
Adjusted R ²	0.751	0.610
ρ	1.444	-0.392
Inverse Mills Ratio	0.407*** (0.101)	-0.081 (0.114)