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**Working Paper**

## A comment on "The people think what I think" by Furnas and LaPira (2024)

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No. 171

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**November 2024**

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**Grant Baldwin<sup>1</sup>, Clayton Becker<sup>1</sup>, Emily Ortiz<sup>1</sup>, Josh Goetz<sup>1</sup>**

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# A comment on “The people think what I think” by Furnas and LaPira (2024)

Grant Baldwin<sup>1</sup>, Clayton Becker<sup>2</sup>, Emily Ortiz<sup>3</sup>, and Josh Goetz<sup>4</sup>  
(University of California, Los Angeles)

## Abstract

Furnas & LaPira (2024) examine the extent to which unelected political elites in the United States misperceive nationwide public opinion on salient policy issues. They find that unelected elites consistently misperceive public opinion in the direction of their own opinions on average. They estimate that unelected elites that strongly oppose (support) a policy perceive public opinion in favor of that policy to be about ten percentage points below (above) the actual level of public support. These results persist when considering the ideological underpinnings of each issue, elite partisanship, the relevance of partisanship in profession, elite professional community, and elite trust in partisan information sources. We attempt to reproduce these findings through three methods. First, we run the data analysis code as it was provided by the authors and successfully reproduced the paper’s main findings. Second, we test the robustness of the results by generating estimates of public opinion from a separate nationally representative survey administered at the same time as the authors’ survey. Lastly, we run additional robustness tests by examining whether results hold under different model specifications. We find that the authors’ results are largely robust to these additional analyses.

## (1) Introduction

Alexander Furnas and Timothy LaPira (2024) examine the impact of unelected elites’ policy opinions on their perceptions of nationwide public opinion in the United States. Existing literature finds that reelection-motivated elites systematically perceive public opinion as more conservative than it actually is (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Hertel Fernandez et al 2019). Unelected elites make up a larger share of those that influence policy than elected elites. Systematic misperceptions among elected elites may have a direct effect on the responsiveness of policy to public opinion.

To test whether such a misperception exists, the authors conduct two original surveys. The first is the 2020 Survey of Political Elites and Public Servants (SPEPS). The SPEPS sampled from a sample frame of identified political elites and public servants. They include all respondents holding unelected positions and weight responses by gender, number of different

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jobs held, and professional tenure. The second survey is a companion survey of 1,098 likely voters that answered the same battery of questions as the elites. The likely voter survey was fielded between December 16th and December 17th, 2020. Respondents in both surveys reported whether they support or oppose ten policy proposals. Elites were additionally asked to report what percentage of the public they think supports each policy. The key dependent variable—elite misperception—is the difference between the elite’s conception of the level of public support for a policy and the actual level of public support. Positive misperception values indicate that the elite believes public support for the policy is higher than it actually is, while negative values indicate that the elite believes public support is lower than reality.

The authors estimate a series of two-way fixed effects (TWFE) models where an elite’s misperception of public support for a policy is the dependent variable and coefficients correspond to dummy variables for elite respondents’ reported level of support for the policy, with “neither support nor oppose” as the reference category. The models include fixed effects for each respondent and each policy issue. These fixed effects ideally control for any unobservable attributes of each respondent and policy into the model to pin down the independent effect of level of support on misperception.

The models produce statistically significant differences between the levels of support and opposition on elite misperception. Holding all else equal, elites that strongly support a policy believe it is between 10% to 12% more popular than it is in reality (Furnas and LaPira 2024, 7). Likewise, those that strongly oppose a policy believe it to be between 10% to 12% less popular than the public opinion survey reports. These results persist when subsetting the sample of elites by partisan identification. From these results, the authors conclude that misperception of public opinion does not swing monotonically in an ideological direction, but is swayed by each elites’ own policy preferences. That is, unelected elites, regardless of party, systematically believe public opinion on a policy to be more aligned with their own than it is in actuality. These results persist when considering the ideological underpinnings of each issue, elite partisanship, the relevance of partisanship in profession, elite professional community, and elite trust in partisan information sources.

## (2) Analysis Plan

In the present paper, we investigate whether Furnas and LaPirna’s (2024) main findings are reproducible and replicable. We further test the robustness of their results by utilizing a different source of data to calculate public support for the policies drawn from a nationally representative survey administered at the same time as the authors’. This test uses data from UCLA’s Nationscape, which interviewed individuals from nearly every county, district, and mid-size city in the U.S. in the lead up to the 2020 election. Additionally, we run supplemental robustness tests by examining whether the results hold when controlling for additional covariates and under different model specifications.

For our replication exercise, we followed the framework laid out by Dreber and Johannesson (2023) for evaluating replicability and reproducibility. For our robustness replication, we recoded the dependent variable so that it included those that “don’t know” as distinct from those that refused to answer. Additionally, we broke down misperceptions by policy

issue area and reweighted the trust in media scores using different approaches to media bias. For our supplementary replication, we utilized data from UCLA's Nationscape project which had similar policy related questions to that of the original survey.

## (3) Results

### Part 1 - Direct Replication:

Using the replication code provided by the authors in their replication archive, we reproduced all of the figures and tables in the paper. The following dyads show the figures and tables from the paper next to the figures and tables generated from the code when we attempted to reproduce the results. Most figures and tables reproduce quite well, with only small differences between some of the dyads. We believe this is likely because we are using a different version of R to produce the figures, but we were not able to definitively determine the reason. In any case, except as noted in the following paragraph, these differences are cosmetic rather than substantive.

We note that there were some complications in reproducing tables from the Supplementary Information (SI) appendix. First, we were unable to reproduce SI Tables 2 and 5. Specifically, while the LaTeX is produced when we run the code, it does not compile. For other figures, we were able to modify the dependencies and packages to obtain the compiled results, but - despite much trial and error - we were unable to determine why these two tables did not compile. There was also a slight discrepancy in the reproduction of SI table 1. As can be seen below, despite following exactly the procedure laid out in the replication code, the Weighted N's are different for all groups. SI Tables 3 and 4 are solely descriptive (i.e. not part of the analysis), and there was no code provided in the replication file to reproduce them.

|                      |                            |
|----------------------|----------------------------|
| Figure 1A from Paper | Figure 1A from Replication |
|----------------------|----------------------------|




Figure 1B from Paper




Figure 1B from Replication




Figure 2 from Paper




Figure 2 from Replication




Figure 3 from Paper




Figure 3 from Replication




Figure 4 from Paper




Figure 4 from Replication




Figure 5b from Paper




Figure 5b from Replication






Figure 6a from Paper




Figure 6a from Replication




Figure 6b from Paper





Figure 6b from Replication



SI Table 1 from Paper

SI Table 1 from Replication

| Sample group            | Weighted N |              | x      |
|-------------------------|------------|--------------|--------|
| Corporate               | 266.38     | Corporate    | 227.36 |
| Courts                  | 283.54     | Courts       | 283.13 |
| Federal gov (executive) | 717.72     | FederalGov   | 695.06 |
| Lawyers & lobbyists     | 390.63     | LawLobbyists | 346.02 |
| Media                   | 305.14     | Media        | 290.35 |
| Non-Profit              | 921.71     | NonProfit    | 839.45 |
| State & local           | 199.89     | StateLocal   | 198.32 |

| SI Table 6 from Paper |                 |                 |                  |                  | SI Table 6 from Replication |       |       |       |       |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                       | Strongly oppose | Somewhat oppose | Somewhat support | Strongly support |                             | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     |
| All                   | 0.000           | 0.000           | 0.000            | 0.000            | m1_p                        | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Democrats             | 0.000           | 0.000           | 0.000            | 0.000            | md_p                        | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Republicans           | 0.000           | 0.000           | 0.000            | 0.000            | mr_p                        | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Federal gov           | 0.000           | 0.000           | 0.000            | 0.000            | fg_p                        | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Non profit            | 0.000           | 0.008           | 0.000            | 0.000            | np_p                        | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Lawyers & lobbyists   | 0.000           | 0.002           | 0.000            | 0.000            | ll_p                        | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Media                 | 0.012           | 0.679           | 0.008            | 0.000            | med_p                       | 0.012 | 0.679 | 0.008 | 0.000 |
| Courts                | 0.000           | 0.090           | 0.001            | 0.000            | ct_p                        | 0.000 | 0.090 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| State & local         | 0.035           | 0.062           | 0.007            | 0.001            | sl_p                        | 0.035 | 0.062 | 0.007 | 0.001 |
| Corporate             | 0.000           | 0.072           | 0.000            | 0.000            | corp_p                      | 0.000 | 0.072 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

| SI Table 7 from Paper | SI Table 7 from Replication |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|

|                  | All Respondents        | Democrats              | Independents           | Republicans            |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Strongly oppose  | -10.302***<br>(0.691)  | -12.162***<br>(1.084)  | -11.336***<br>(2.426)  | -10.286***<br>(1.037)  |
| Somewhat oppose  | -4.251***<br>(0.601)   | -5.204***<br>(0.889)   | -2.114<br>(1.762)      | -5.005***<br>(0.933)   |
| Somewhat support | 6.359***<br>(0.501)    | 6.845***<br>(0.670)    | 5.964***<br>(1.466)    | 6.929***<br>(0.843)    |
| Strongly support | 11.378***<br>(0.605)   | 12.185***<br>(0.759)   | 10.968***<br>(2.005)   | 10.641***<br>(1.438)   |
| Num.Obs.         | 12 133                 | 7920                   | 1130                   | 3083                   |
| R2               | 0.603                  | 0.610                  | 0.586                  | 0.582                  |
| R2 Adj.          | 0.502                  | 0.510                  | 0.468                  | 0.476                  |
| R2 Within        | 0.172                  | 0.139                  | 0.147                  | 0.175                  |
| AIC              | 98717.6                | 64 101.0               | 9281.7                 | 25 298.0               |
| BIC              | 116 908.4              | 75 341.2               | 10 544.3               | 29 044.9               |
| Log.Lik.         | -46 901.783            | -30 439.507            | -4389.874              | -12 027.990            |
| Std.Errors       | Clustered (Responseld) | Clustered (Responseld) | Clustered (Responseld) | Clustered (Responseld) |
| FE: issue        | X                      | X                      | X                      | X                      |
| FE: Responseld   | X                      | X                      | X                      | X                      |

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| R2 Adj.          | 0.502                 | 0.510                 | 0.468                 | 0.476                 |
| R2 Within        | 0.172                 | 0.139                 | 0.147                 | 0.175                 |
| R2 Within Adj.   | 0.172                 | 0.139                 | 0.143                 | 0.174                 |
| AIC              | 98717.6               | 64101.0               | 9281.7                | 25298.0               |
| BIC              | 116908.4              | 75341.2               | 10544.3               | 29044.9               |
| RMSE             | 11.55                 | 11.30                 | 11.77                 | 11.97                 |
| Std.Errors       | by: Responseld        | by: Responseld        | by: Responseld        | by: Responseld        |
| FE: Responseld   | X                     | X                     | X                     | X                     |
| FE: issue_num    | X                     | X                     | X                     | X                     |

SI Table 8 from Paper

|                  | Strong Partisans       | Weak Partisans         | Partisan Leavers       | Independents           |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Strongly oppose  | -8.774***<br>(1.042)   | -10.989***<br>(1.488)  | -12.379***<br>(1.724)  | -10.915***<br>(2.483)  |
| Somewhat oppose  | -3.745***<br>(0.971)   | -4.668***<br>(1.195)   | -5.232***<br>(1.287)   | -1.862<br>(1.808)      |
| Somewhat support | 7.101***<br>(0.810)    | 5.138***<br>(1.075)    | 6.811***<br>(1.066)    | 6.515***<br>(1.531)    |
| Strongly support | 11.727***<br>(0.907)   | 10.909***<br>(1.491)   | 12.196***<br>(1.232)   | 11.292***<br>(2.002)   |
| Num.Obs.         | 7128                   | 2682                   | 2947                   | 1264                   |
| R2               | 0.544                  | 0.537                  | 0.550                  | 0.504                  |
| R2 Adj.          | 0.446                  | 0.439                  | 0.455                  | 0.382                  |
| R2 Within        | 0.166                  | 0.170                  | 0.200                  | 0.154                  |
| AIC              | 57 674.5               | 21 444.9               | 23 914.0               | 10 260.6               |
| BIC              | 66 339.8               | 24 215.2               | 26 992.2               | 11 551.3               |
| Log.Lik.         | -27 576.243            | -10 252.439            | -11 443.025            | -4879.319              |
| Std.Errors       | Clustered (Responseld) | Clustered (Responseld) | Clustered (Responseld) | Clustered (Responseld) |
| FE: issue        | X                      | X                      | X                      | X                      |
| FE: Responseld   | X                      | X                      | X                      | X                      |

SI Table 8 from Replication

|                  | Strong Partisans     | Weak Partisans        | Partisan Leavers     | Independents         |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Strongly oppose  | -6.170*<br>(2.557)   | -16.512***<br>(3.246) | -3.546<br>(7.008)    | -5.852<br>(3.924)    |
| Somewhat oppose  | 0.342<br>(2.304)     | -6.304**<br>(2.139)   | 1.580<br>(2.564)     | 0.032<br>(2.881)     |
| Somewhat support | 10.081***<br>(2.026) | -0.178<br>(1.915)     | 11.242***<br>(2.427) | 12.714***<br>(2.564) |
| Strongly support | 16.743***<br>(2.570) | 11.040***<br>(2.267)  | 13.651***<br>(2.815) | 14.221***<br>(2.423) |
| Num.Obs.         | 24060                | 11658                 | 30245                | 6500                 |
| R2               | 0.517                | 0.594                 | 0.557                | 0.664                |
| R2 Adj.          | 0.490                | 0.577                 | 0.549                | 0.650                |
| R2 Within        | 0.224                | 0.263                 | 0.111                | 0.236                |
| R2 Within Adj.   | 0.224                | 0.263                 | 0.111                | 0.236                |
| AIC              | 188934.2             | 85083.7               | 218621.2             | 43679.4              |
| BIC              | 199133.6             | 88544.7               | 222896.2             | 45381.0              |
| RMSE             | 11.65                | 8.93                  | 8.83                 | 6.70                 |
| Std.Errors       | by: Responseld       | by: Responseld        | by: Responseld       | by: Responseld       |
| FE: Responseld   | X                    | X                     | X                    | X                    |
| FE: issue_num    | X                    | X                     | X                    | X                    |

SI Table 9 from Paper

|                  | All Elites           | Dem Elites            | Ind Elites           | Rep Elites            |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Strongly oppose  | -9.721***<br>(1.181) | -11.223***<br>(1.134) | -10.579**<br>(3.108) | -10.454***<br>(1.226) |
| Somewhat oppose  | -3.823**<br>(0.871)  | -4.397**<br>(0.991)   | -3.852*<br>(1.458)   | -4.610**<br>(1.211)   |
| Somewhat support | 5.732***<br>(0.420)  | 6.314***<br>(0.518)   | 4.543**<br>(1.127)   | 6.754***<br>(0.938)   |
| Strongly support | 10.829***<br>(0.717) | 12.148***<br>(0.864)  | 8.294***<br>(1.532)  | 11.298***<br>(1.326)  |
| Num.Obs.         | 12 133               | 7920                  | 1130                 | 3083                  |
| R2               | 0.195                | 0.187                 | 0.146                | 0.215                 |
| R2 Adj.          | 0.194                | 0.186                 | 0.136                | 0.211                 |
| R2 Within        | 0.147                | 0.107                 | 0.110                | 0.165                 |
| AIC              | 100 525.8            | 65 406.5              | 9445.8               | 25 636.9              |
| BIC              | 100 629.4            | 65 504.2              | 9516.2               | 25 721.3              |
| Log.Lik.         | -50 248.888          | -32 689.250           | -4708.878            | -12 804.426           |
| Std.Errors       | Clustered (issue)    | Clustered (issue)     | Clustered (issue)    | Clustered (issue)     |
| FE: issue        | X                    | X                     | X                    | X                     |

SI Table 9 from Replication

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| Num.Obs.         | 12133                | 7920                  | 1130                 | 3083                  |
| R2               | 0.195                | 0.187                 | 0.146                | 0.215                 |
| R2 Adj.          | 0.194                | 0.186                 | 0.136                | 0.211                 |
| R2 Within        | 0.147                | 0.107                 | 0.110                | 0.165                 |
| R2 Within Adj.   | 0.146                | 0.106                 | 0.107                | 0.164                 |
| AIC              | 100525.8             | 65406.5               | 9445.8               | 25636.9               |
| BIC              | 100629.4             | 65504.2               | 9516.2               | 25721.3               |
| RMSE             | 15.22                | 15.01                 | 15.61                | 15.40                 |
| Std.Errors       | by: issue_num        | by: issue_num         | by: issue_num        | by: issue_num         |
| FE: issue_num    | X                    | X                     | X                    | X                     |

## Part 2 - Robustness Checks

The authors of the paper made some questionable coding decisions. First, when calculating public support for a policy, they lumped “neither support nor oppose” in with “somewhat oppose” and “strongly oppose”. Inspection of the raw data revealed that “neither support nor oppose” was a very common answer, meaning that this coding decision led to significant underestimation of public support for some policies. We viewed this as a potential major threat to the authors’ conclusions, especially because the main alternative theory to the authors’ conclusion is that elites - regardless of personal political opinions - consistently perceive public opinion to be more conservative than it actually is. However, the authors, at the end of their replication code and in the supplementary appendix, did address this issue. They ran a robustness check of their own and found that the results were robust to this coding decision. When “neither support nor oppose” responses were dropped from the data, the results appeared more or less the same.

Another odd decision made by the authors was to subset the dataset into quartiles or terciles based on values of certain variables, and run separate regressions for each quartile/tercile. For example, one variable the authors collect is the degree of occupation-based partisan relevance (OBPR) for each elite. They divide the dataset into three separate subsets - one containing only elites with low OBPR, one containing only elites with medium OBPR, and the third containing only the elites with high OBPR. They examine the effect of an elite’s policy support on their level of misperception separately for each subset, and show the results graphically. They claim that the estimates of elite policy support on level of misperception are indistinguishable across party relevance groups. This claim could be made substantially stronger by showing the results of a regression model that includes both elite policy support and OBPR, but such a model is curiously absent from the paper. The authors make a similar decision when discussing another variable - trust in partisan media sources. Here again, they subset the data into quartiles based on an elite’s score on the trust index, and run models separately for each quartile. Likewise, they claim that trust in partisan media sources has no effect on the elite misperception, but neglect to include a regression model that takes into account this variable in conjunction with elite policy support.

To ensure that these decisions were not made to conceal undesirable results, we conducted a robustness check by running a model which included elite policy support, trust in partisan media sources, and OBPR. We examined the results (shown in the table below), and found that the author’s conclusions are supported. Looking across all ten policy issues, the two variables of interest - OBPR (shown as “sqpr” in the table) and trust in partisan media (shown as “con\_trust\_slant” in the table) - generally do not correlate significantly with misperception. There are some policies for which one or the other variable is a significant predictor of misperception, but the correlation is often only marginally significant and the direction is not consistent across policy issues. Clearly, these variables have much less predictive power than elite policy support, which is a highly statistically significant predictor in virtually all model specifications. Overall, the results from this robustness check support the authors’ conclusion that unelected political elites’s level of misperception is not significantly influenced by OBPR or by trust in partisan media sources.

|   | Dependent variable:      |                          |                           |                           |                           |                              |                          |                           |                           |                           |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|   | Carbon Tax               | Clean infra low income   | Carbon free 2035          | Medicare for All          | Public Option Healthcare  | Citizenship for Undocumented | Paid Family Leave        | Wealth Tax                | Increases Deportation     | Senior Healthcare         |
|   | (1)                      | (2)                      | (3)                       | (4)                       | (5)                       | (6)                          | (7)                      | (8)                       | (9)                       | (10)                      |
| relevel(policy_opinion, ref = "Neither support nor oppose")Strongly oppose  | -7.538***<br>(1.326)     | -3.635***<br>(1.251)     | -7.034***<br>(1.327)      | -6.160***<br>(1.224)      | -10.132***<br>(1.463)     | -14.627***<br>(1.764)        | -0.432<br>(1.641)        | -10.721***<br>(1.648)     | -10.813***<br>(0.884)     | -16.114***<br>(0.866)     |
| relevel(policy_opinion, ref = "Neither support nor oppose")Somewhat oppose  | -2.754**<br>(1.347)      | 0.032<br>(1.054)         | 0.942<br>(1.273)          | -0.790<br>(1.184)         | -3.196**<br>(1.608)       | -1.884<br>(1.696)            | -2.311*<br>(1.259)       | -2.227<br>(1.690)         | -5.899***<br>(0.865)      | -6.710***<br>(0.822)      |
| relevel(policy_opinion, ref = "Neither support nor oppose")Somewhat support | 8.331***<br>(0.925)      | 8.450***<br>(0.847)      | 9.581***<br>(0.988)       | 8.495***<br>(1.136)       | 6.150***<br>(1.204)       | 1.733<br>(1.356)             | 6.459***<br>(1.002)      | 5.849***<br>(1.553)       | 5.702***<br>(1.015)       | 5.568***<br>(0.830)       |
| relevel(policy_opinion, ref = "Neither support nor oppose")Strongly support | 8.852***<br>(0.998)      | 6.265***<br>(1.008)      | 15.019***<br>(0.974)      | 19.568***<br>(1.179)      | 13.508***<br>(1.208)      | 3.715***<br>(1.338)          | 10.778***<br>(1.007)     | 14.187***<br>(1.478)      | 16.683***<br>(1.296)      | 10.233***<br>(1.229)      |
| con_trust_slant   | 0.026<br>(0.090)         | 0.035<br>(0.094)         | -0.123<br>(0.082)         | 0.357***<br>(0.096)       | -0.314***<br>(0.082)      | -0.513***<br>(0.072)         | 0.085<br>(0.092)         | 0.560***<br>(0.099)       | 0.004<br>(0.082)          | -0.098<br>(0.088)         |
| sqpr  | 0.241<br>(0.234)         | -1.387***<br>(0.287)     | 0.223<br>(0.217)          | 0.576**<br>(0.249)        | 0.020<br>(0.217)          | -0.903***<br>(0.200)         | 0.981***<br>(0.233)      | -0.167<br>(0.248)         | -0.444*<br>(0.234)        | -0.810***<br>(0.243)      |
| Constant  | 41.343***<br>(0.847)     | 35.691***<br>(0.676)     | 41.305***<br>(0.910)      | 39.607***<br>(1.035)      | 50.400***<br>(1.154)      | 54.236***<br>(1.298)         | 54.001***<br>(0.897)     | 53.993***<br>(1.444)      | 54.239***<br>(0.760)      | 44.823***<br>(0.608)      |
| Observations  | 3,209                    | 2,280                    | 3,465                     | 2,201                     | 3,473                     | 3,489                        | 2,414                    | 3,251                     | 2,623                     | 3,081                     |
| R <sup>2</sup>  | 0.110                    | 0.089                    | 0.201                     | 0.268                     | 0.225                     | 0.107                        | 0.106                    | 0.205                     | 0.246                     | 0.211                     |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>   | 0.108                    | 0.087                    | 0.199                     | 0.266                     | 0.223                     | 0.106                        | 0.104                    | 0.203                     | 0.244                     | 0.210                     |
| Residual Std. Error   | 11.082 (df = 3202)       | 12.518 (df = 2273)       | 10.334 (df = 3458)        | 11.919 (df = 2194)        | 10.379 (df = 3466)        | 9.701 (df = 3482)            | 10.895 (df = 2407)       | 12.194 (df = 3244)        | 10.993 (df = 2616)        | 11.945 (df = 3074)        |
| F Statistic   | 65.645*** (df = 6; 3202) | 37.030*** (df = 6; 2273) | 144.792*** (df = 6; 3458) | 133.618*** (df = 6; 2194) | 167.236*** (df = 6; 3466) | 69.579*** (df = 6; 3482)     | 47.485*** (df = 6; 2407) | 139.021*** (df = 6; 3244) | 142.015*** (df = 6; 2616) | 137.054*** (df = 6; 3074) |

Note:



\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

## Part 3 - Supplementary Replication with Nationscape Data

When seeking to use alternative data, we turned to an example of gold standard modern public opinion polling - Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape project. The only issue with using Nationscape as a data source is that most of the questions asked in the Nationscape survey did not perfectly align with the questions asked in the SPEPS survey. Without good alignment, no meaningful comparison could be made. However, there were three issue areas examined by Furnas and LaPira which were asked in a very similar manner on the SPEPS and Nationscape surveys - “Public Option”, “Path to Citizenship”, and “Medicare for All”. Thus, we were able to re-run part of Furnas and LaPira’s analysis using the Nationscape data on these issues.

These figures show a comparison of Figure 1A in the paper to our version of Figure 1A from the replication. Our version includes public opinion data from Nationscape, using responses from the wave conducted the same week as the Furnas and LaPira’s survey. Arguably, the Nationscape data is a more representative sample of the opinion of the general public and of voters.

The results are relatively consistent between the paper and our replication, although it seems that on two of the three issues - a public option and medicare for all - Republican elites perceive the public opinion to be more conservative than it actually is in the Nationscape sample, while Democrats estimate it correctly. Conversely, our results match up more precisely with theirs on the popularity of a path to citizenship.

Their figure 1AOur figure 1A

Of course, this extension must be viewed as supplemental support as the Nationscape questions were not worded in exactly the same way as they were in the authors' survey. With question wording effects an ever present concern in survey research, the fact that our results do not perfectly replicate the original analysis should not be considered a dispositive knock on the paper.

## (4) Conclusion

Our team attempted to replicate the results of Furnas and LaPira's paper, and were able to do so mostly successfully. The results of the paper appear robust to different model specifications and reasonably robust to the substitution of their data with alternative data sources. Their replication code successfully reproduces virtually all of the figures and tables from the paper. Overall, we are more substantially convinced that the authors' conclusions are correct than we were before completing this replication exercise.

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