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Racial Restrictions on Voting: Evidence from a New Pan-Anglophone Dataset, 1730-2000

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Racial Restrictions on Voting: Evidence from a New Pan-Anglophone Dataset, 1730-2000

Abstract

A substantial literature studies franchise extension, focusing primarily on class-based – rather than race-based – voting restrictions. This paper constructs and analyzes a novel dataset that codes the presence of race-based restrictions on voting in 131 jurisdictions over 1730-2000 (consisting primarily of English-speaking subnational jurisdictions with substantial power to determine their electoral law). It documents extensive variation in these restrictions over time and across jurisdictions. To explain this variation, the paper uses a framework that emphasizes the distinction between centralized imperial control versus the empowerment of local European settlers. A difference-in-difference analysis of the impact of US independence (using “Loyalist” British colonies in the Americas as a control group) suggests a substantial positive effect of US independence on the probability of a racially restrictive franchise. More generally, a stacked event study analysis implies that the independence of colonies of settlement (and, to a lesser extent, other forms of settler empowerment) had a substantial positive effect on the probability of a racially restrictive franchise. These results are robust to controlling for the existence and abolition of property qualifications for voting. They are consistent with a framework in which an imperial government is less subject to capture by local settler elites, and thus more likely to promote franchise extension than is an empowered local settler-dominated government.

JEL-Codes: D720.

Keywords: voting, franchise extension, race, discrimination.

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1) Introduction

Ignatius Sancho (1729-1780) was born on a slave ship heading from Africa to the Caribbean. Brought to England at the age of two, he came under the tutelage of the Duke of Montagu, who introduced him to literature, music, and the visual arts. After serving the Montagu household as a butler, he received a bequest from the Montagu estate that enabled him to pursue his interests in musical composition and literature. His correspondence with leading literary figures of the time was posthumously published under the title “Letters of the Late Ignatius Sancho, an African.” From around 1773, he owned a grocery store in London at No. 20 Charles Street in Westminster (where a plaque now commemorates his life and historical significance). Sancho acquired sufficient property to satisfy the property qualification for the electoral franchise. As such, in 1774, he became the first person of color (and the first formerly enslaved person) known to have voted in a British parliamentary election (Barker-Benfield, 2023).

The story of Ignatius Sancho suggests that a nonracial electoral franchise was the default rule for voting in Britain and its colonies. Racial restrictions on the electoral franchise (hereafter, RREFs) only existed where explicitly provided for by statutes enacted by colonial legislatures. Despite the background presumption of a nonracial franchise, the history of the United States (US), Canada, Australia, South Africa, and other former colonies of settlement has been marked by formal limitations on voting on the basis of race. While this history has given rise to scholarly discussion of race and the electoral franchise, this literature – primarily in history and political science - has typically been in the context of a single country or region (e.g., Kousser (1974) and Keyssar (2009) for the US).¹

There is, in addition, a substantial literature in economics and political science on the historical extension of the franchise. The central puzzle, especially when viewed from a rational-choice perspective, is why incumbent elites would ever expand the franchise to include non-enfranchised groups. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) develop a model that explains franchise extension with reference to the threat of revolution, combined with the inability of incumbent elites to commit to future redistributive policies. Thus, extending the franchise (rather than making policy changes that could potentially be reversed in the future) can successfully ward off revolution. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) develop a model in which positive shocks to the value of public goods (relative to rent-seeking activity) can lead incumbent elites (or some faction

¹ There are, however, some partial exceptions that adopt a comparative perspective, such as Evans et al. (2003).

thereof) to extend the franchise to groups that have a stronger preference for public goods provision. Przeworski (2009) empirically analyzes data on 187 countries over a long time period dating back to the 1800s and concludes that franchise extensions are typically compelled by pressure from non-enfranchised groups rather than being voluntarily granted by incumbent elites. This literature, however, focuses on class-based franchise extensions (which typically occur through the relaxation of property qualifications, with the Reform Act of 1832 representing the canonical example on which this literature focuses). It does not address the restriction or extension of the franchise across racial or ethnic lines, even though these are arguably of comparable or greater historical importance.

This paper seeks to fill this significant gap in the literature. It unifies and extends existing national-level research on RREFs, moving towards a pan-Anglophone perspective by collecting data on the universe of English-speaking colonies of settlement. Moreover, it also moves beyond a case study approach towards larger-scale quantitative analysis. In particular, this paper constructs and analyzes a novel dataset that codes the presence of RREFs in 131 jurisdictions over the period 1730-2000. The jurisdictions in the dataset are primarily English-speaking subnational jurisdictions with substantial power to determine their electoral law (and hence the characteristics of voters). They are mostly colonies of settlement that have or once had substantial populations of European settlers and their descendants, and that are or were associated with the British Empire and/or the US. These jurisdictions can be divided into five regional groupings – Canada, the Caribbean, Oceania, southern and eastern Africa (hereafter SE Africa), and the US.

For these jurisdictions, RREFs are coded by consulting relevant statutes, constitutional provisions, or other sources of law pertaining to the electoral franchise. The emphasis in the coding is on the existence of formal racial restrictions. However, as discussed in Section 2.2 below, some extreme examples of formally nonracial restrictions that were clearly intended to deprive racialized groups of the franchise are also coded as RREFs (in a manner consistent with the historical literature, such as Kousser (1974)). Table 1 lists all jurisdictions in the dataset, along with the years for which they are coded as having an RREF or as having a nonracial franchise. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for an RREF; it is reported only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature.

Using this dataset, the paper documents extensive variation in RREFs, both longitudinally (within a given jurisdiction over time) and cross-sectionally (within each regional grouping of jurisdictions at a given point in time). Indeed, relatively few jurisdictions never have RREFs over this timespan. The paper begins with a descriptive account of the history of RREFs globally and within each regional grouping. In particular, it is possible to identify waves of both franchise restriction and extension, rather than a pattern of continuous extension. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, US independence in 1783 was followed by a substantial increase in the prevalence of RREFs among US states and territories. In contrast, Caribbean jurisdictions abolished RREFs around 1830. The Reconstruction era (and especially the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment) involved a dramatic extension of the franchise in US jurisdictions. However, this was followed in the final decades of the nineteenth century by an increase in the prevalence of RREFs across most regions, with the well-known experience of the former Confederate states of the US being mirrored to a substantial degree in all other regions apart from the Caribbean. Following WWII, and especially in the 1960s, RREFs tended to disappear across all regions (apart from southern Africa, where this did not occur until the 1990s).

To explain some of this variation, the paper draws on the historical literature that emphasizes the importance of the empowerment of local European settlers (in contrast to a system of centralized imperial control) in determining the inclusiveness of the electoral franchise and other social institutions. In particular, it seeks to isolate the causal impact of settler empowerment using two distinct empirical designs. The first is a difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis of the impact of US independence on the likelihood that a US jurisdiction has an RREF. Those colonies that rebelled against the Crown and became part of the independent US are the treatment group, and Loyalist British colonies in the Americas – i.e., those colonies that did not join the US – are the control group. Because different jurisdictions within a given region may experience the same treatment (e.g., US independence in 1783) or face common shocks that lead to correlated error terms, standard errors are clustered at the regional level. This analysis suggests a substantial positive effect of US independence on the probability of a racially restricted franchise; in the baseline specification, the magnitude of the estimated effect entails that US independence increased the probability of an RREF by about 0.3 (relative to a mean of 0.21 among US jurisdictions in 1782).

While the Loyalist colonies are a natural counterfactual for the US, there remain questions about their comparability. The rebel and Loyalist colonies exhibit parallel trends in RREFs in the years prior to 1783. However, there is a substantial difference in levels in the pre-period, with Loyalist colonies being substantially more likely to have RREFs at the time of US independence. In addition, the very high initial probability of RREFs in the Caribbean colonies makes it mechanically impossible for this probability to increase. As discussed in Section 3 below, it is also possible that Caribbean jurisdictions had characteristics that made them reluctant to rebel against the Crown and also rendered them less able to resist metropolitan pressure from London for the abolition of RREFs than would have been the case for mainland American jurisdictions. However, excluding the Caribbean jurisdictions from the analysis leads to results that are quite similar (though somewhat smaller in magnitude), with a much smaller difference in the likelihood of RREFs between treatment and control groups in the pre-period. It is also possible that the results are confounded by compositional effects due to new US territories and states created after US independence. However, the result is robust to using only a balanced panel of jurisdictions that appear in the dataset prior to US independence.

This paper also analyzes the impact of a broader set of events - the achievement of responsible government and dominion status, as well as of independence - that enhanced settler control. Responsible government refers to a constitutional structure in which the executive is responsible to an elected local legislature (as opposed, in particular, to executive power being vested in a governor appointed by the Colonial Office in London). Dominion status entails a substantial degree of self-government approaching full independence. Different jurisdictions experienced these events at different times, and some jurisdictions in the dataset never experienced them (or did not do so while European settlers exercised *de facto* control). The latter set of jurisdictions constitutes the “never-treated” control group.

As the treated jurisdictions were treated at different times, the paper uses a staggered difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, implemented using a stacked event study analysis (e.g., Cengiz et al., 2019; Baker, Larcker and Wang, 2022). This entails constructing a series of mini-datasets (or stacks), each consisting of a cohort of jurisdictions that were treated in a given year, along with the never-treated control jurisdictions. For instance, the 1783 stack consists of all US jurisdictions that existed at the time (all of which received the treatment of independence that year) along with the never-treated control jurisdictions. The 1965 stack consists of Zimbabwe

(where a government dominated by European settlers declared independence that year in rebellion against the Crown), along with the never-treated control jurisdictions. The stacked dataset is used to estimate the coefficients of a series of event-time indicator variables, ranging from ten years before to ten years after independence (with the coefficient on event-year -1 being normalized to zero). Because different jurisdictions within a given region may experience the same treatment (as with US independence in 1783) or face common shocks that lead to correlated error terms, standard errors are clustered at the region-by-stack level.

The stacked event study analysis implies that independence had a large positive effect on the probability of a jurisdiction having an RREF. Moreover, there are no discernible pre-trends in the ten years prior to independence, implying that a causal interpretation of the estimated effect of independence may be warranted. The baseline estimates entail that independence led to an increase of about 0.6 in the probability of an RREF ten years after independence (relative to a mean probability of an RREF in the dataset of 0.33).

However, it is possible that this result may be confounded by compositional effects for jurisdictions that are already independent (or part of a larger federal polity that is independent) when they enter the dataset. For example, Alabama enters the dataset in 1817 and is coded as being independent from that year (as US independence had already been achieved in 1783). As reported in Table 1, Alabama had an RREF in 1817; however, it is possible that this is attributable not to US independence, but to unobservable characteristics that may have resulted in an RREF regardless of whether Alabama was part of the US or a British colony. Addressing this concern by restricting the analysis only to jurisdictions that experienced a change in independence status during the sample period leads to estimates that are smaller in magnitude but that remain statistically significant ten years after independence.

Responsible government and dominion status have weaker impacts in the probability of an RREF than does independence. However, pooling all three forms of settler empowerment suggests a substantial impact of these events on the probability of an RREF, leading to an increase of about 0.4 in the probability of an RREF ten years after the event (relative to a mean probability of an RREF in the dataset of 0.33).

An important potential alternative explanation for these results is that the enactment of RREFs primarily reflects the abolition of property qualifications for the franchise. In this alternative account, property qualifications are thought to have substantially eliminated the

franchise for non-Europeans without the need for RREFs; when egalitarian pressures within the European settler community led to the abolition of property qualifications, RREFs were enacted but (in this view) had no significant practical impact on the actual exercise of the franchise. To address this possibility, the paper codes the existence of property qualifications for the franchise, and controls for property qualification in the stacked event study analysis of the impact of independence (and the impact of settler control more generally) on the probability of RREFs. The effects of independence and settler empowerment are virtually identical when controlling for property qualifications, casting doubt on the alternative explanation.

It is also possible to use a stacked event study framework to test the impact of the abolition of property qualifications on the probability of an RREF. This exercise finds no evidence for a causal impact of the abolition of property qualifications on the probability of an RREF, casting further doubt on the alternative explanation. There is also historical evidence that free people of color exercised the franchise in nontrivial numbers in colonial North America and that the franchise extension in the Caribbean colonies led in a relatively short period of time to the election of significant numbers of legislators of color (Carvalho and Dippel, 2020; Wilmot, 2020). Thus, franchise extensions and RREFs appear to have been far from inconsequential, even apart from their enormous symbolic value.

These results shed light on the broader question of how to explain franchise extension. In particular, the results in this paper suggest that the extension of the franchise across racial lines has been driven by a very different set of mechanisms than was the extension of the franchise across class lines. In particular, the major episodes of franchise extension identified in the descriptive account above – beginning with the abolition of RREFs in the Caribbean islands around 1830 – appear to result from a top-down process in which the influence of the imperial government over local jurisdictions was crucial. This influence arguably reflects not necessarily a greater inclination towards egalitarian ideals on the part of the imperial government, but a different set of incentives relative to those of local settler elites. Notably, the relative insulation of the imperial government from accountability to (and capture by) local settler elites appears to be crucial. In this respect, the federal US government in Washington ultimately came to somewhat resemble an “imperial” government, especially during the Reconstruction era and the “Second Reconstruction” of the 1960s, two of the other major franchise extensions in the dataset. Of course, activism and protest from below were also clearly important. Even so, the dichotomy

between settler control and imperial control appears to explain much of the variation in RREFs over time and across jurisdictions.

As noted earlier, there is very little prior quantitative analysis of RREFs in a global setting. The most closely related prior work is Paine (2019), which constructs and analyzes a dataset consisting of 144 countries over 1600-2000. These correspond mostly to present-day countries, and the sample consists of postcolonial states (most of which are developing countries, including both former settler colonies and former non-settler colonies). In contrast, the sample in this paper consists of settler colonies as they existed historically, mostly within present-day developed countries. These differences reflect the papers' differing research questions. Paine (2019) seeks to understand the impact of postcolonial countries' colonial experience with electoral institutions on their current level of democracy, and derives two main results. The first is that British colonies were more likely than non-British colonies to have colonial legislatures. The second is that what Paine (2019) terms "European settler oligarchies" had ambiguous effects on democratization, in that they spurred the creation of elected legislatures but also subsequently resisted franchise extension. The latter result is broadly consistent with – but quite distinct from – the findings of this paper (which are about the impact of the empowerment of settlers within settler colonies). In addition, Paine (2019) primarily uses associational analysis and a series of case studies, whereas this paper seeks to use causal inference methods.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and its construction and provides a descriptive account of RREFs. Section 3 presents the DiD analysis of the impact of US independence. Section 4 presents the stacked event study analysis of the impact of independence and settler control. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results, addresses potential alternative explanations, and elaborates on the conceptual framework. Section 6 concludes.

2) Data

2.1) The Choice of Jurisdictions

As foreshadowed earlier, this paper constructs and analyzes a novel dataset that codes the presence of RREFs in 131 jurisdictions located in different parts of the world over the period 1730-2000. The aim in choosing jurisdictions for inclusion in this dataset is to encompass the universe of English-speaking colonies of settlement that are or were associated with the British

Empire and/or the United States. Colonies of settlement are jurisdictions where permanent European settlers – as opposed to transient colonial officials, missionaries or businesspeople – constituted a significant element at some time in the jurisdiction’s history (even if they were a numerical minority). To be included, jurisdictions are required to have electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature for all or part of the 1730-2000 period (as described below, the RREF variable is constructed only for jurisdiction-years to which these criteria apply). For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. Thus, many of the jurisdictions have nonmissing data for only part – in some cases, a relatively short subperiod – of the 1730-2000 period. Note, however, that determining whether the electoral franchise is restricted by race is meaningful only where some form of electoral franchise exists.

As the jurisdictions are predominantly subnational, an important question is whether they can be viewed as constituting independent observations. To address this issue, an additional requirement for inclusion in the dataset is that a jurisdiction has the power to determine eligibility for its franchise independently of other jurisdictions. In this sense, the observations on different jurisdictions can be viewed as being independent. However, some of the treatments analyzed below (such as US independence) apply at the regional level (i.e., for all US jurisdictions) rather than at the jurisdiction level (e.g., Abadie et al., 2023). Moreover, it is possible that jurisdictions within a region are subject to common shocks that lead to correlated error terms. Thus, standard errors are clustered at the regional level (rather than the jurisdiction level) in the analysis below (more specifically, at the regional level for the analysis in Section 3 and the region-by-stack level for the analysis in Section 4).

At the beginning of this period in 1730, the sample consists of 19 British colonies in the Americas, spanning the Caribbean and what would later become the US.² This number grows to 28 jurisdictions by 1775, by which time they also include jurisdictions that would later become part of Canada. Beyond this core set of original jurisdictions, all US states and territories (including those that did not exist in the colonial era) are also included. This is because one of the aims of the analysis is to understand the consequences of national independence for the inclusiveness of the franchise, and this requires comprehensive data on post-independence outcomes (both for those jurisdictions that existed prior to independence and those that were

² The classification of Caribbean colonies reflects their historical rather than current boundaries; many correspond to present-day independent states, but others – such as Nevis and Tobago – do not, being instead part of larger present-day states.

created subsequently, although there are some caveats about the inclusion of the latter that are discussed below). Jurisdictions that later became part of Canada enter the dataset from 1758 (when electoral institutions were introduced in Nova Scotia). Jurisdictions established after Canadian confederation in 1867 are included in the dataset from the time that they acquire electoral institutions. Settlement colonies that were subsequently established elsewhere in the world – for instance, the Australian colonies and New Zealand - are added to the sample at the time that they develop electoral institutions (beginning in 1843 for New South Wales).

Coverage of Africa begins with the Cape Colony, which instituted a nonracial franchise from 1853. It extends subsequently to a number of jurisdictions across southern and eastern Africa where European settlement was significant, or which at some point came under the control of European settlers. These include what were known as the “Boer” or “freebooter” republics (primarily Transvaal and the Orange Free State). These were formed in the interior of southern Africa by a segment of the Cape Colony’s Cape Dutch community that emigrated *en masse* from the Cape Colony in the 1830s (apparently in protest at the British Empire’s abolition of slavery). These republics were established firmly on the basis of racial exclusivity, practicing what was later to become globally infamous as *apartheid*. Although not originally English-speaking, they are included in the dataset as they were ultimately absorbed into the Empire following the Boer War (1899-1902). Also included are polities (Griqualand East and Rehoboth) established by the Griqua and related peoples (descended primarily from the indigenous Khoikhoi people of southwestern Africa) outside the borders of the Cape Colony in parts of present-day South Africa and Namibia (e.g., Knoll, 1935). These also were eventually absorbed, directly or indirectly, into the Empire.

The choice of the 1730-2000 period is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Some colonial legislatures date back to the seventeenth century. However, starting in 1730 avoids some problems associated with coding RREFs in the very early years of colonial legislatures, when information is often scarce. It also allows for a substantial pre-period with respect to US independence, which is important for the analysis in Section 3. The dataset ends in 2000, by which time RREFs have disappeared among all jurisdictions.

2.2) The RREF Variable

The RREF variable is coded by consulting relevant statutes, constitutional provisions, and other sources of law pertaining to the electoral franchise, and are verified using secondary academic sources. The variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted by race. For most jurisdiction-years, determining the value of the RREF variable is relatively straightforward. However, in certain cases, some judgment is required. These instances and the issues they raise are discussed below.

For the most part, the coding of the RREF variable follows a formalist approach – i.e., it is based on whether electoral laws or constitutional provisions explicitly restrict the franchise by race. In some instances, though, a substance-over-form approach appears warranted. Consider the example of Natal, which was granted responsible government in 1893. At the time, British Indians constituted about 6% of voters, qualifying for the electoral roll by virtue of having British nationality and meeting the (nonracial) property qualification. Soon thereafter, Natal’s European settler elite sought to disenfranchise them on explicitly racial grounds as “persons belonging to Asiatic races” (Evans et al., 2003, pp. 169-170; Guha, 2013). This attempt was rejected by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain. He sought to dissuade Natal from disenfranchisement, noting that two “Indian gentlemen” had recently been elected to the House of Commons from constituencies in London.³ Failing in this endeavor, he eventually accepted a nominally nonracial 1896 law that disenfranchised voters whose countries of origin lacked representative legislative institutions (while grandfathering current voters). The sequence of events makes clear the motivation underlying the policy, and hence Natal is coded as having an RREF from 1896.

In the post-Reconstruction era, the ex-Confederate states of the US introduced voting restrictions with the clear (and openly stated) aim of disenfranchising African-Americans. These restrictions were thought to be compatible with the Fifteenth Amendment. However, given the context, the dataset follows Kousser (1974) in coding a combination of poll taxes, literacy requirements, grandfather clauses, and related measures as in substance an RREF. Note that this is a conservative approach in some ways, as it does not account for the impact of violence, intimidation, and terrorism directed at African-American voters on the exercise of the franchise.⁴

³ This was a reference to Dadabhai Naoroji (elected to represent Central Finsbury) and Mancherjee Bhownagree (elected from North-East Bethnal Green).

⁴ Mickey (2015) characterizes these states as authoritarian enclaves within a wider democratic polity, and discusses several case studies of the democratization of these states in the mid-twentieth century.

Apart from the examples above, the paper adopts a formalist approach to defining RREFs. Although the dataset includes information about property qualifications for the electoral franchise, even a profoundly disparate racial impact of property qualifications is not considered to amount to an RREF (outside the specific context of the ex-Confederate states discussed above). In addition, while gender-based voting restrictions are of course also of great historical importance, they are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses exclusively on racial restrictions.

In Canada in the late nineteenth century, most provinces and the federal government introduced franchise restrictions on certain categories of indigenous people.⁵ These restrictions did not apply to all those of indigenous descent, but only to what were termed “status Indians.” Thus, it might reasonably be questioned whether these restrictions were truly race-based. However, the definition of RREFs used in this paper involves any differential treatment by race with respect to the franchise, and need not involve the complete disenfranchisement of an entire racialized group. The Canadian policies effectively conditioned the franchise for indigenous people on abandoning membership of indigenous communities (a process that was referred to as “enfranchisement”) and so treated indigenous and nonindigenous individuals differently. Thus, these restrictions are coded as RREFs in the baseline analysis.⁶ However, the main results below are robust to recoding Canadian jurisdictions as never having RREFs, and to excluding Canadian jurisdictions from the analysis.

Like the Canadian restrictions described above, restrictions imposed by US states on voting by Native Americans typically did not apply to everyone of indigenous descent, but to those described as belonging to categories such as “Indians not taxed” (e.g., Wolfley, 1990; Bassett, 2011). In constructing this dataset, these restrictions are not treated as RREFs until 1924 (with the exception of those in Alaska, where a different set of circumstances prevailed).⁷ In 1924, Congress conferred US citizenship on all Native Americans. Thereafter, the differential treatment of Native Americans (or some subset thereof) by US states (mostly western states such

⁵ See, for instance, this official Canadian government publication: <https://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp175-e.htm>

⁶ An analogy is provided by New York, which for much of the nineteenth century imposed a higher property qualification threshold for African-Americans. This, too, is coded as an RREF, even though it did not disenfranchise all African-Americans.

⁷ There exists some case law suggesting that the 1867 treaty between the US and Russia that ceded Alaska conferred US citizenship on indigenous Alaskans - see *In re Naturalization of Minook*, 2 Alaska, 224. Although there is also some contrary authority (e.g. Christen, 2019), the dataset codes Alaska’s restrictions on indigenous people as RREFs from 1912.

as Arizona, New Mexico, and Washington, but also including Maine and Mississippi) is coded as an RREF. However, the main results below are robust to instead coding the post-1924 restrictions as not being RREFs.

The nineteenth-century Cape Colony maintained its nonracial franchise in what was otherwise a very inhospitable environment in southern Africa. Although somewhat eroded by (ostensibly race-neutral) increases in the property qualification, this nonracial franchise even survived the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Its practical impact was somewhat questionable - in the early twentieth century, Europeans formed about 25% of the population and 85% of voters (Evans et al., 2003), and no non-European legislators were elected until 1910.⁸ Nonetheless, the Cape's franchise was symbolically important and provided a sharp contrast to the neighboring Boer republics. Determining when the Cape's nonracial franchise ended is not straightforward, as it was eroded by Union-level measures over time (though some non-European voting rights survived until the 1950s). In this dataset, it is coded as ending in 1930, when Union-level legislation extended the franchise to European (but not non-European) women, thereby creating an explicit racial distinction that had hitherto been avoided by the Cape's political leadership.

In a few cases, the jurisdictions in the dataset overlap territorially. In particular, this is because federal jurisdictions (such as Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia) are included along with their subnational components, if each jurisdiction has its own separate rules on eligibility for the franchise and maintains its own electoral roll (note that the US does not enter the dataset separately from its subnational components, as there is no federal US electoral roll separate from that of US states). However, the main results below are robust to excluding these federal jurisdictions (and hence eliminating the territorial overlap).

To make the coding fully transparent, Table 1 lists each jurisdiction in the dataset and summarizes its history of RREFs. As noted earlier, the RREF variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in the cases discussed above, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. Thus, missing data in Table 1 indicates that there were no such institutions for those jurisdiction-years.

⁸ Walter Rubusana, a Xhosa leader, was elected to the Cape Provincial Council in 1910.

2.3) A Descriptive Account of the History of Racial Restrictions

Descriptive statistics for the dataset are provided in Table 2. Potentially, there are 35,501 possible observations for the 131 jurisdictions over 1730-2000. However, there are only 18,330 observations at the jurisdiction-year level (around 52% of the potential number of observations) for which there exist electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. Among these, about a third of jurisdiction-years have RREFs. The dataset also codes the years in which jurisdictions achieved independence, responsible government, or dominion status under the control of European settlers (concepts that are described more fully in Section 4 below). It also codes the existence of property qualifications (i.e., requirements for the franchise involving the ownership of property, specific income levels, or tax payments) and the year in which property qualifications were abolished. While property qualifications are not the focus of this paper, Section 5.2 below considers in detail the relationship between RREFs and property qualifications.

The dataset also includes information on the population of each jurisdiction, the percentage of European settlers and their descendants in each jurisdiction, and an indicator variable for whether European settlers and their descendants constituted a majority of the population. As these variables are not readily available for much of the 1730-2000 period, they are collected only for the year 1900 (or the closest available year) based on census data and various other sources. The percentage of Europeans also draws on the dataset constructed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), although that data is restricted to present-day sovereign states (thus, the European percentages for the large number of subnational jurisdictions in this paper's dataset are based on other sources, primarily census data). The observations are divided among five regional groupings: about 55% of jurisdiction-years are for US jurisdictions, about 18% of jurisdiction-years are for Caribbean jurisdictions, 8% are in SE Africa, 11% are in Canada and 7% in Oceania.

Using this dataset, it is possible to document quite extensive variation in RREFs across time and across jurisdictions. Longitudinally (i.e., within a given jurisdiction over time), there is considerable movement between a nonracial franchise and an RREF, with relatively few jurisdictions never having RREFs over this timespan. For example, among US states that existed prior to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, only three (Massachusetts, New Hampshire,

and Vermont) never had RREFs. There is also considerable variation among jurisdictions within each regional grouping of jurisdictions at a given point in time. Based on this variation, this subsection provides a descriptive account of the history of RREFs globally and within each regional grouping. As this is a purely descriptive account, no claims are made here as to any causal mechanisms (although Sections 3 and 4 seek to move in this direction).

An important general lesson from the dataset is that – even though a majority of jurisdictions had RREFs in 1730 and none did in 2000 – it is possible to identify waves of both franchise restriction and extension, rather than a pattern of continuous liberalization of the franchise. In particular, there was a tendency to move from RREFs to a nonracial franchise in the middle decades of the nineteenth century (up to around 1870) that was subsequently reversed in the later decades of the nineteenth century. This somewhat cyclical pattern contrasts with the generally unidirectional pattern of class-based franchise extension (e.g., Przeworski, 2009), and with the general tendency of property qualifications to disappear over the last two centuries.

Figure 1 plots the fraction of the jurisdictions in the dataset with RREFs over 1730-2000; here, each jurisdiction is weighted equally, although a population-weighted version of Figure 1 is shown in the Appendix Figure A1.⁹ It might be thought that patterns with respect to RREFs may differ between jurisdictions where Europeans formed the majority of the population (primarily in the US, Canada, and Oceania) and those where they were a numerical minority (primarily in the Caribbean and SE Africa, though also including some US jurisdictions such as Mississippi and South Carolina). Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the fraction of RREFs separately for European-majority and European-minority jurisdictions and shows that there is no consistent difference between them.¹⁰

Initially, among the 19 jurisdictions that existed and had an electoral franchise in 1730, 11 (about 58%) had RREFs (e.g., Olbrich, 1912; Wrong, 1923, Squire, 2012). For several decades,

⁹ The population-weighted version (Appendix, Figure A1) essentially represents the fraction of the total population of all jurisdictions in the dataset that lives in jurisdictions with RREFs (where population is measured in or around 1900). Figure A1 shows a generally similar pattern over time to Figure 1. The initial prevalence of RREFs in the eighteenth century, however, is lower because RREFs were concentrated among small Caribbean jurisdictions. In addition, the Caribbean franchise extension around 1830 is less pronounced due to the small populations of Caribbean jurisdictions. However, it remains noticeable as an interruption to the otherwise continuous increase in RREFs among US jurisdictions in the first half of the nineteenth century.

¹⁰ As shown in Figure A2, European-minority jurisdictions were substantially more likely to have RREFs in the eighteenth century. This, however, was reversed over the period from about 1830 to the 1860s. From 1870 until the mid-twentieth century, the two groups of jurisdictions followed a very similar path (of an increasing propensity to have RREFs). In the latter half of the twentieth century, RREFs tended to be eliminated later in European-minority jurisdictions (in particular, those in southern Africa).

this fraction was quite stable. However, following US independence in 1783, there was a substantial increase in the prevalence of RREFs in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (e.g., Weeks, 1894; Wesley, 1947). This increase occurred exclusively among US states and territories, and is illustrated more clearly in Appendix Figure A3, which shows the fraction of US jurisdictions with RREFs over 1730-2000. As a result, the fraction of jurisdictions with RREFs increased to over 0.7 by the 1820s.

Subsequently, however, Caribbean jurisdictions abolished their RREFs, beginning in the 1820s and especially around 1830, as shown in Figure A4 in the Appendix (Wesley, 1934). Note that this was a distinct phenomenon from the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean (which was legislated by the imperial Parliament in 1833 as part of the general abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire); in contrast, the Caribbean franchise extensions were enacted by the legislature of each colony (albeit with the strong encouragement of colonial governors) and extended the franchise to free people of color who met the property qualifications for voting. Although their effects were muted by the property qualifications, these reforms had a substantial practical impact (Carvalho and Dippel, 2020; Wilmot, 2020). As a result of the Caribbean reforms, the fraction of RREFs among jurisdictions fell below a half by the early 1830s, despite the continuous growth of US jurisdictions with RREFs. Thereafter, this fraction grew until the early 1860s due to US states and territories' RREFs. By 1864, 89% of US jurisdictions, including 81% of states and territories in the North as well as all those in the South, and 57% of all jurisdictions had RREFs.

As is well-known, the Reconstruction era (and especially the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment) gave rise to a dramatic extension of the franchise in US jurisdictions. However, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment poses something of a paradox in the context of the continued growth of RREFs in US jurisdictions up to the Civil War.¹¹ In particular, in a substantial number of states (including those that were pivotal for ratification), state legislatures voted to adopt the Fifteenth Amendment, even though their state's law included an RREF that would be invalidated by the Fifteenth Amendment. In other words, two alternative indicators of the preferences of a state's voters – state electoral law or state constitutional provisions relating to the franchise on the one hand, and the decision of the state legislature to ratify the Fifteenth

¹¹ See Crum (2022) for a discussion of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Malone (2002) highlights the prevalence of RREFs in northern US states, and presents some case studies this phenomenon.

Amendment – are in fundamental tension with each other. There are, of course, a number of possible explanations, such as “agency slack” between voters and state legislators, or changes in voter preferences that had not yet been incorporated into state law due to political transaction costs. However this tension is resolved, it underlines the extent to which RREFs were deeply embedded in US political life (even outside the Confederacy).

Around 1870, RREFs completely (albeit briefly) disappeared from both the British Empire and the United States.¹² However, RREFs reappeared shortly thereafter in 1872 in Queensland (a colony in northeastern Australia where settlers had obtained responsible government in 1859), in 1875 in British Columbia, and (in substantive terms) in the ex-Confederate US states after the withdrawal of US troops in 1877. This was followed in the final decades of the nineteenth century by an increase in the prevalence of RREFs across most regions. The well-known experience of franchise restriction in the former Confederate states of the US was thus mirrored to a substantial degree in most other regions (as shown in the Appendix in Figure A5 for Canadian jurisdictions,¹³ Figure A6 for jurisdictions in Oceania,¹⁴ and Figure A7 for African jurisdictions¹⁵). The exception was the Caribbean, where RREFs never returned after the reforms around 1830. However, in several Caribbean jurisdictions, legislatures decided to abolish themselves, or to replace themselves with legislative bodies that were entirely or predominantly appointed by the colony’s governor. This was apparently done to forestall the prospect of legislators of color gaining a majority of seats, though other explanations exist as well (Paine, 2019; Carvalho and Dippel, 2020).

¹² There are five jurisdictions in the dataset that maintained RREFs, but arguably none of these were part of either the Empire or the US at the time. These are Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Boer republics that were then independent), Fiji (where European settlers exerted de facto control over a nominally independent indigenous kingdom), and two jurisdictions – the Chickasaw Nation and Griqualand East – with non-European dominant ethnicities.

¹³ Until the 1850s, Canadian jurisdictions had no RREFs. Thereafter, there is an essentially continuous increase until over 90% of Canadian jurisdictions have RREFs in the 1930s. All of these RREFs are subsequent to the achievement of responsible government, and most follow Canadian confederation in 1867 (which led to a substantial measure of national independence).

¹⁴ There were no RREFs prior to the granting of responsible government to the Australian colonies. Subsequent to responsible government, some jurisdictions in Oceania (such as Queensland) established RREFs, while others (such as New Zealand and New South Wales) did not. As in other regions, the fraction of RREFs increases in the late nineteenth century and then becomes relatively stable. In the 1960s, there is a sharp drop in the fraction to zero.

¹⁵ Note that, as discussed above, the dataset only includes a subset of African jurisdictions, those where European settlement was significant and that were associated with the British Empire at some point in their history. Initially, the fraction of RREFs is zero (reflecting the nonracial franchise of the Cape Colony), but increases sharply with the establishment of the Boer republics. Thereafter, the fraction is very high compared to other regions, and remains quite substantial for a longer period than elsewhere. Ultimately, RREFs are eliminated only in 1994 with the end of *apartheid*.

Thereafter, the fraction of jurisdictions with RREFs rose to nearly a half (somewhat lower than, but comparable to, that in 1730) and remained fairly stable in the 1920s and 1930s. Following WWII, and especially in the 1960s, RREFs tended to disappear across all regions (apart from southern Africa, where this did not occur until the 1990s, as shown in Figure A6 in the Appendix).

3) The Impact of US Independence: A Difference-in-Difference Approach

To explain some of the variation characterized in the descriptive account above, the paper draws on the historical literature that emphasizes the importance of the empowerment of local European settlers (in contrast to a system of centralized imperial control) in determining the inclusiveness of the electoral franchise. In particular, it seeks to isolate the causal impact of settler empowerment using two distinct empirical designs. The first is a difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis of the impact of US independence on the likelihood that a US jurisdiction has an RREF. As previously noted, Figure A3 in the Appendix shows an essentially continuous increase in the prevalence of RREFs among US jurisdictions following US independence in 1783 through the early 1860s. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, this increase was widespread across various subgroups of US jurisdictions. While particularly strong in the South, this phenomenon was also important among northern jurisdictions. It was apparent both among the original 13 colonies that formed the US, and among new territories and states that were created after independence. However, while Figures 2 and A2 indicate a strong association between US independence and RREFs, this is not in itself evidence of a causal relationship.

Moving towards causal inference – i.e., the claim that US independence caused this increase in the probability of RREFs – requires a counterfactual that enables inferences about the path of RREFs in the treatment group (those jurisdictions that experienced independence as part of the US) absent the treatment. In this section, Loyalist British colonies in the Americas – i.e., colonies in the Caribbean and in what was to become Canada – are used as the control group for those colonies that rebelled against the Crown and became part of the independent US.

Figure 3 compares the fraction of US jurisdictions with RREFs to the fraction of Loyalist jurisdictions with RREFs over 1730-1835. Initially, the fraction is much higher for the latter. However, the pre-trends over 1730-1782 are quite similar and the fraction is relatively stable for each group. Following US independence, however, the fraction rises almost continuously for US

jurisdictions for the rest of this period. In contrast, the fraction initially falls gradually for Loyalist jurisdictions, before a sharp fall around 1830 that reflects the Caribbean colonies' abolition of RREFs. By 1835, the Loyalist fraction has fallen to zero (i.e., all Loyalist jurisdictions had a formally nonracial franchise). This suggests that the increase in RREFs among post-independence US jurisdictions was not part of a more general phenomenon among all English-speaking jurisdictions in the Americas.

However, there is a large difference in levels in the pre-period in Figure 3. In particular, about 87% of Loyalist colonies have RREFs at the time of US independence, while only 21% of US colonies do. This difference is largely due to the Caribbean jurisdictions in the control group, all of which have RREFs during the pre-period. While this level difference is eventually reversed in subsequent years (see Figure 3), it raises some questions about how comparable the Loyalist and US jurisdictions might be. In addition, the very high initial probability of RREFs in the Caribbean colonies makes it mechanically impossible for this probability to increase in the post-period (although the fact that this probability ultimately decreases to zero around 1830 – while it continues to increase among US jurisdictions – provides some reassurance that the relative increase in RREFs among US jurisdictions is not driven by this mechanical effect).

The large level difference in the pre-period can be addressed by focusing on subgroups of jurisdictions within the treatment and control groups that exhibit greater similarity in levels (as well as trends) in the pre-period. For instance, omitting Caribbean jurisdictions makes the level difference between US and Loyalist (in this instance, Canadian) jurisdictions much smaller. In particular, Figure 4 compares northern US jurisdictions to Canadian jurisdictions. Both groups had no RREFs prior to US independence (and hence had identical levels and trends in the pre-period). After US independence, Canadian jurisdictions continue to have no RREFs (through 1835), while the probability of an RREF among northern US jurisdictions starts rising from about 1800 and exceeds 0.6 by 1835. This suggests that the basic pattern shown in Figure 3 is not particularly confounded by the large difference in pre-period levels between the treatment and control groups.

It is possible to estimate the impact of US independence more formally using a straightforward DiD regression specification. The dependent variable $RREF_{it}$ in the specification shown in Equation (1) below is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 in the presence of an RREF in jurisdiction i in year t , and is otherwise zero. The independent variable is an

interaction between an indicator variable (US_i) for those jurisdictions that became part of the US and an indicator variable ($Post1783_t$) for the years after US independence (note that the $Post1783_t$ variable is defined as including the year 1783). The empirical specification is a linear probability model of the following form:

$$RREF_{it} = \beta(US_i * Post1783_t) + \mu_i + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

The hypothesis that Equation (1) tests is whether the probability of an RREF is higher in US jurisdictions (relative to Loyalist jurisdictions) following US independence: i.e., that $\beta > 0$. The specification in Equation (1) includes jurisdiction fixed effects (represented by μ_i) and year effects (represented by ν_t); ε_{it} is the error term. Note that US_i and $Post1783_t$ do not enter the regression specification separately because they are absorbed by the jurisdiction fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. Because all US jurisdictions experience the same treatment (i.e., US independence in 1783) and more generally may face common shocks that lead to correlated error terms, standard errors are clustered at the regional level, rather than the jurisdiction level (e.g., Abadie et al., 2023).

The results from estimating Equation (1) over 1730-1835 are shown in Column 1 of Table 3. The results suggest a large positive effect of US independence on the probability of a racially restricted franchise; in Column 1 of Table 3, the magnitude of the estimated effect entails that US independence increased the probability of an RREF by about 0.3 (relative to a mean of 0.21 among US jurisdictions in 1782). This effect is statistically significant, despite the conservative approach of clustering at the region level that results in a relatively small number of clusters.

While the Loyalist colonies are surely the best counterfactual to the US that history provides, there remain questions about how good a comparison group they represent. As shown in Figure 3 and discussed above, the rebel and Loyalist colonies exhibit parallel trends in RREFs the years prior to 1783, but there is a large difference in levels driven primarily by the Caribbean jurisdictions high propensity to have RREFs. As discussed above, there is also the mechanical difficulty of increases in the fraction of RREFs among Caribbean jurisdictions. In addition, there is another possible concern with the Caribbean jurisdictions. Consider Barbados and South Carolina (two colonies that had fairly similar histories up to US independence). It is possible that

Barbados had characteristics unobserved in this dataset (such as a dependence on the Royal Navy for military protection) that made its elite reluctant to rebel against the Crown. These same characteristics may also have rendered the Barbadian elite less able or willing to resist pressure from colonial governors appointed from London for the abolition of RREFs. Had South Carolina counterfactually remained a colony, its settler elite may have had greater success in resisting such pressure. This would, if true, limit the extent to which Barbados can serve as a reasonable counterfactual for South Carolina.

Both these issues can be addressed by excluding Caribbean jurisdictions from the analysis, as is done in Column 2 of Table 3. This reduces the sample size substantially (from 3203 observations on 52 jurisdictions to 2013 observations on 37 jurisdictions). However, the results are quite similar. The magnitude is somewhat smaller – implying that US independence increased the probability of an RREF by about 0.24 (relative to a mean of 0.21 among US jurisdictions in 1782) – but remains substantial and statistically significant. Importantly, there is now a much smaller difference in the probability of RREFs between treatment and control groups in the pre-period: the Canadian jurisdictions in the control group have a mean of zero (relative to a mean of 0.21 among US jurisdictions in 1782).

It is also possible that the results are confounded by what may be termed compositional effects due to new US territories and states that came into existence after US independence. These may have had unobservable characteristics that would have caused them to have RREFs regardless of whether they were part of the US or were British colonies. For example, Alabama enters the dataset in 1817 and is coded as being independent from that year (as US independence had already been achieved in 1783). As reported in Table 1, Alabama had an RREF in 1817; however, it is possible that this is attributable not to Alabama being part of the independent US, but to unobservable characteristics that may have resulted in an RREF regardless of whether Alabama was part of the US or a British colony. To eliminate the influence of these “new” US jurisdictions, the analysis in Column 3 of Table 3 is restricted to the set of 28 jurisdictions for which data exists in 1775 (and for which data exists continuously for all years over 1775-1835). As shown in Column 3 of Table 3, while the sample size is considerably smaller, the result is virtually identical to the baseline result in Column 1. The magnitude implies that US independence increased the probability of an RREF by about 0.32 (relative to a mean of 0.21 among US jurisdictions in 1782).

It should also be noted that the magnitude of this “US independence” effect tends to grow over time. If the model in Equation (1) is estimated over the longer time period 1730-1860, then (as shown in Column 4 of Table 3) the estimated magnitude implies that US independence increased the probability of an RREF by about 0.68 (relative to a mean of 0.21 among US jurisdictions in 1782). However, it is more difficult to argue for a causal effect of US independence the farther removed in time the purported effect is from the event.

4) The Impact of Independence and Settler Control: A Stacked Event Study Approach

The “US independence” treatment analyzed in Section 3 represents only one example of a transfer of power from the imperial government to local settler elites. Thus, it may be viewed in a global context as an instantiation of a wider phenomenon. Historians and other scholars studying the history of settlement colonies have emphasized the importance of the distinction between centralized imperial control and the empowerment of local European settlers in determining various outcomes, including the inclusiveness of the electoral franchise. For instance, Evans et al. (2003, p. 36) characterize a standard view as follows (while also highlighting the limitations of this view, and in particular the nuances associated with differences across different colonies in how this process operated):

“A [standard] model of what happened to Indigenous political rights in British colonies of settlement in the second half of the nineteenth century [is along the following lines]: as political power was devolved from London to the separate self-governing colonies, the political rights of the Indigenous peoples were accordingly diminished. . . The basic explanation of how this happened lies in the grant of responsible government to these colonies, which removed the Indigenous peoples of those countries from the salutary protection of . . . the Colonial Office in London.”

This section thus analyzes the impact of a broader class of events that enhanced settler control. British colonies of settlement experienced transitions to local (settler) self-government through a variety of mechanisms. The rebellion against the Crown by US jurisdictions was not widely emulated subsequently (except by Ian Smith’s regime in Zimbabwe in 1965). However, broadening the scope of the analysis beyond US jurisdictions leads to the addition of several episodes where non-US jurisdictions obtained independence (outside the British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations) under the control of European settlers.¹⁶ In the dataset, 54

¹⁶ The independence of the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State was recognized by the British Empire in the 1850s. As noted previously, these republics were created in the interior of southern Africa by a

jurisdictions (accounting for 10,080 observations) achieve independence as defined here (or are part of a federal polity that achieves independence).

More commonly, settler colonies achieved “responsible government” through constitutional reforms enacted by the imperial parliament. The term “responsible government” refers to a constitutional structure in which the executive is responsible to an elected local legislature (as opposed, in particular, to executive power being vested in a governor appointed by the Colonial Office in London). Responsible government was achieved by several Canadian jurisdictions beginning in 1848, by New Zealand and the Australian colonies starting in the 1850s, and the Cape Colony in 1872. A further step towards independence was “dominion status,” which entailed a very substantial degree of self-government approximating full independence, as defined in the 1931 Statute of Westminster. In the dataset, 16 jurisdictions (accounting for 3036 observations) achieve responsible government, while 26 jurisdictions, accounting for 3946 observations) achieve dominion status (or are part of a federal polity that achieves dominion status). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for these variables.

To analyze the impact of these “settler control” events, the dataset codes for each jurisdiction the year in which major transitions that enhanced settler control occurred. For example, for US jurisdictions that existed prior to 1783, the year of independence is coded as 1783. For US jurisdictions that enter the dataset after 1783, the year of independence is the first year for which data for that jurisdiction exists. About a quarter of observations are for jurisdictions that never experienced these events (or at least did not do so while European settlers exercised *de facto* control). For instance, the Caribbean jurisdictions did not achieve responsible government until the latter half of the twentieth century, by which time European settler elites no longer exerted disproportionate political control. Other jurisdictions in the dataset (such as

segment of the Cape Colony’s Cape Dutch community that emigrated *en masse* from the Cape Colony in the 1830s (apparently in protest at the British Empire’s abolition of slavery). Subsequently, other small Boer republics (also known as “freebooter” republics) were formed, of which Stellaland – which enjoyed a brief period of independence in the 1880s – is included in the dataset. From 1840, Hawaii was an independent kingdom ruled by an indigenous monarchy. However, in 1887, a coup by European settlers led to *de facto* settler control, though the monarchy survived until 1893 (Rowland, 1943); this also meets the criteria here for an event involving independence under the control of European settlers. The creation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961 and its departure from the Commonwealth of Nations constitutes another independence event. Finally, a settler-dominated regime in Zimbabwe unilaterally declared independence in 1965 in protest at the British government’s denial of independence until the achievement of African majority rule (a principle known at the time as “No Independence before Majority African Rule” or NIBMAR).

Kenya) bypassed settler self-government and moved to majority African rule. Such jurisdictions constitute the “never-treated” control group in the analysis described below.

As the treated jurisdictions were treated at different times, the analysis uses a staggered difference-in-difference (DiD) approach. Traditionally, applied researchers used a two-way fixed effects approach (analogous to Equation (1) but with dates of treatment varying across different units of the treatment group) to estimate staggered DiD models. However, a recent methodological literature has highlighted potential problems of dynamic treatment effects and treatment effect heterogeneity that the two-way fixed effects model fails to address. Thus, the analysis is implemented here using a stacked event study approach (e.g., Cengiz et al., 2019; Baker, Lareker and Wang, 2022). This entails constructing a series of mini-datasets (or stacks), each consisting of a cohort of jurisdictions that were treated in a given year, along with the never-treated control jurisdictions. For instance, in analyzing the impact of independence, the 1783 stack consists of all US jurisdictions (which achieved independence that year) along with the never-treated control jurisdictions, while the 1965 stack consists of Zimbabwe along with the never-treated control jurisdictions.

Within each stack, a series of event-time dummies are constructed, and are denoted by b_{its}^k , where $b_{its}^k = 1$ when in stack s treatment jurisdiction i is k years before or after independence in year t (and zero otherwise). For control jurisdictions that are never treated, all event-time dummies are equal to zero. In the results reported in the figures below, k takes on values from -10 to +10. In the regressions, the data are binned at the endpoints such that $k = -11$ includes all observations that are 11 or more years before independence and $k = 11$ includes all observations that are 11 or more years after independence. The event-year immediately prior to independence ($k = -1$) is excluded; the coefficient on this indicator is normalized to zero and used as the benchmark.

The stacked event-study specification can be expressed as follows:

$$RREF_{its} = \sum_{\substack{k=-11, \\ k \neq -1}}^{11} \varphi_k b_{its}^k + \mu_{is} + \delta_{ts} + \epsilon_{its} \quad (2)$$

where, noting that $1\{\cdot\}$ is the indicator function:

$$b_{its}^k = \begin{cases} 1\{t - t_{is}^* \leq -6\} & \text{if } k = -11 \\ 1\{t - t_{is}^* = k\} & \text{if } k \in [-10, 10] \\ 1\{t - t_{is}^* \geq 6\} & \text{if } k = 11 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Here, t_{is}^* is the year of independence in stack s (for instance, 1965 for the stack in which Zimbabwe is the treatment jurisdiction). $RREF_{its}$ is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 in the presence of an RREF in jurisdiction i in year t within the mini-dataset (or stack) s , and is otherwise zero. φ_k represents the estimated coefficients of the event-time dummies, shown graphically in the figures below. μ_{is} is a jurisdiction-by-stack fixed effect, and δ_{ts} is a year-by-stack fixed effect. ϵ_{its} is the error term. Note that estimation of this model uses a linear functional form, and its results can thus be interpreted in the same way as in a linear probability model. Because different jurisdictions within a given region may experience the same treatment (as with US independence in 1783) or face common shocks that lead to correlated error terms, standard errors are clustered at the region-by-stack level (e.g., Abadie et al., 2023).

Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients of the event-time dummies for independence events. Importantly, there are no discernible pre-trends in the ten years prior to independence, implying that a causal interpretation of the estimated effect of independence is warranted. Following the independence event, there is a large increase in the probability of an RREF. The estimates shown in Figure 5 entail that a settler control event led to an increase of about 0.6 in the probability of an RREF ten years after the event (relative to a mean probability of an RREF in the dataset of 0.33). The stacked event study analysis thus suggests that these events had a large positive effect on the probability of a jurisdiction having an RREF.

However, it is possible that this result may be confounded by compositional effects for jurisdictions that enter the dataset while already under settler control. Recall the example of Alabama, discussed above. Alabama enters the dataset in 1817 and is coded as being independent from that year (as US independence had already been achieved in 1783). As reported in Table 1, Alabama had an RREF in 1817; however, it is possible that this is attributable not to Alabama being part of the independent US, but to unobservable characteristics that may have resulted in an RREF regardless of whether Alabama was part of the US or a British colony. This concern also applies to the stacked event study analysis – it is possible that the large and immediate estimated impact of independence may be driven by the unobservable characteristics of these “new” jurisdictions rather than by a causal effect of independence events.

To address this concern, Figure 6 plots the estimated coefficients of the event-time dummies from Equation (2), restricting the analysis only to jurisdictions that experienced a change in the independence variable during the sample period. In particular, about 21% of

observations are for jurisdictions which experience a change in independence status (i.e., for which the year of independence comes strictly after the first year in which data exists for that jurisdiction). This excludes Alabama and many other jurisdictions (especially US jurisdictions, but also Transvaal and the Orange Free State) that enter the dataset as independent polities (or as part of an independent federal polity). Figure 6 shows that excluding these jurisdictions leads to estimates that are smaller in magnitude and weaker in statistical significance. Specifically, these estimates imply that independence led to an increase of about 0.22 in the probability of an RREF ten years after the event. However, this remains a quite substantial magnitude, and the estimates for years that are nine to ten years after independence are statistically significant (while estimates for several other years are of borderline statistical significance). It should be remembered that the approach in Figure 6 is highly conservative in positing that nothing can be learned about the effects of US independence from jurisdictions such as Alabama or Wisconsin that did not exist prior to 1783; hence, there are only a limited number of independence events – for US jurisdictions that existed in 1783, for Hawaii in 1887, the Republic of South Africa in 1961, and Zimbabwe in 1965. The clustering of standard errors at the regional level is also quite conservative. Even so, Figure 6 shows that the basic result is robust.

The impact of responsible government and of dominion status on the probability of RREFs is weaker than the effect of independence shown in Figure 5. However, pooling all three forms of settler empowerment into a single “settler control” variable leads to the result that settler control (defined in this way) has a substantial positive impact on the probability of an RREF. This is shown in Figure 7, where the estimates imply that a settler control event – whether the achievement of independence, responsible government, or dominion status – leads to an increase of around 0.4 in the probability of an RREF. This is somewhat smaller in magnitude than the estimated effect of independence events alone, but it nevertheless represents a quite large effect.

5) Discussion

5.1) The Impact of US Independence

The findings in Section 3 on the impact of US independence are noteworthy in the light of recent revisionist historiography of the US War of Independence. This revisionist view places slavery and race – specifically, the desire to preserve the institution of slavery – at the heart of

the colonists' rebellion against the Crown (e.g., Blumrosen, 2007; Waldstreicher, 2011; Gilbert, 2012; Horne, 2014). For instance, Blumrosen (2007) highlights the impact of *Somerset v. Steuart*¹⁷ on the American colonies and their decision to rebel. James Somerset was enslaved by Steuart in Massachusetts and was brought to England by his enslaver. There, he escaped but was recaptured and was to be transported to be sold in Jamaica. Lord Mansfield's judgment in *Somerset v. Steuart* ordered Somerset's release, holding that Somerset could not be forcibly transported out of England for the purpose of being sold into slavery. The presumption (articulated by Lord Mansfield) that chattel slavery did not exist in the law of England and Wales did not directly threaten the institution of slavery in colonies where it had been established by the colonial legislature. However, combined with the principle of the primacy of the imperial Parliament over colonial legislatures, the incipient abolitionism revealed by this case raised the prospect that Parliament could one day abolish slavery throughout the British Empire (as indeed it did, albeit not until the 1830s). This fear, in the view of revisionist historians, played a significant role in motivating the rebellion against the Crown (especially among the southern colonies).

This central revisionist claim is reinforced by evidence presented by these historians that officials of the Crown emancipated large numbers of enslaved people (the "Black Loyalists") who escaped and joined the armies of the Crown during the US War of Independence. Moreover, in 1783 the Crown rebuffed the victorious colonists' desire to re-enslave the Black Loyalists, evacuating them to safety in British territories such as Nova Scotia and the new colony of Freetown in Sierra Leone. Gilbert (2012) characterizes the complex Revolutionary era as involving two revolutions – a successful political revolution by the colonists against the Crown, and an unsuccessful social revolution undertaken by Black Loyalists – with significant support from the Crown – against those same colonists. Horne (2014) more explicitly characterizes the colonists' rebellion as a preemptive "counter-revolution" against the possibility that Parliament would abolish slavery throughout the British Empire. In the revisionist view, the rebellion of 1776 was thus not so very different from the rebellion of 1861.

This paper does not address the issue of slavery, nor does it take any stand on the conventional versus revisionist historical accounts of the US War of Independence. However, it is worth noting some significant empirical difficulties for the revisionist perspective. First,

¹⁷ 98 ER 499 (King's Bench, 1772).

several (northern) US jurisdictions abolished slavery shortly after the Revolutionary period, well in advance of abolition by the (supposedly anti-slavery) Empire. Second, the aim of preserving slavery should have appealed above all to settlers in the Caribbean colonies, yet they remained loyal to the Crown (of course, there may have been other factors, such as military dependence on the Royal Navy, that might account for this, but it nonetheless seems anomalous from a revisionist perspective).

The findings described in Section 3 suggest a related but distinct account of the impact of US independence. In particular, these results suggest that historians who believe that there was a “counter-revolutionary” element to US independence should perhaps focus on its impact on the electoral franchise, rather than on slavery. Essentially, US independence appears to have led US jurisdictions to adopt RREFs in ever-increasing numbers, while at the same time such restrictions disappeared – albeit not permanently – from the British Empire.

5.2) A Potential Alternative Explanation: The Abolition of Property Qualifications and RREFs

An important potential alternative explanation for the results in Section 4 is that the enactment of RREFs primarily reflects the abolition of property qualifications for the franchise (rather than the effects of independence or settler empowerment). In this alternative account, property qualifications might be thought to have substantially eliminated the franchise for non-Europeans without the need for RREFs; when egalitarian pressures within the European settler community led to the abolition of property qualifications, RREFs were enacted. For example, Moeller and King (2019, p. 5) argue that:

“Elites wishing to exclude certain types of voters could no longer rely comfortably upon discriminations based on wealth. Instead, states became more explicit to disqualify using ascriptive categories . . . many of the original states (including Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania) added formal prohibitions against non-white voting.”

In this view, RREFs had no significant practical impact on the actual exercise of the franchise.

To address this possibility, the paper’s dataset codes (in addition to RREFs) the existence of property (and other economic) qualifications for the franchise. The property qualification variable is coded 0 for the absence of a property qualification for voting and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by property ownership, income, or tax payments. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for this variable, which is available for 17,669 observations at the

jurisdiction-year level (about 96% of the 18,330 observations for which the RREF variable exists). This information is also used to code the year in which property qualifications were abolished (i.e., the year in which property, income, or tax requirements for voting ceased to exist; this is missing for those jurisdictions that never imposed such restrictions).

In the overall dataset, there is a positive correlation of about 0.2 between RREFs and property qualifications (rather than the negative correlation that the alternative hypothesis might suggest). However, this correlation is negative (-0.2) over the earlier part of the sample period (1730-1860) and is larger in magnitude (about -0.3) for US jurisdictions over 1730-1860. Thus, the alternative explanation outlined above has some plausibility. This seems especially true for the period from US independence to around 1860 when there was both widespread abolition of property qualifications (e.g., Moeller and King, 2018) and a rapid spread of RREFs (as illustrated in Figures 2 and A3), a combination that marked the rise of what historians term “*Herrenvolk* democracy” in the Jacksonian era (e.g., Frederickson, 1981). There are also some historical instances that seem to correspond closely to the alternative explanation – for example, in 1854 Nova Scotia abolished its property qualifications and introduced racial restrictions at the same time.

The most straightforward way to take account of the alternative explanation outlined above is to control for the presence of property qualifications in the stacked event study analysis of the impact of independence (and the impact of settler empowerment more generally) on the probability of RREFs. Figure 8 shows the coefficient estimates from a specification that is identical to that in Equation (2) and Figure 5, apart from the addition as a control variable of an indicator equal to 1 for jurisdiction-years with property, income or tax qualifications for voting and 0 otherwise. If the enactment of RREFs is driven by changes in property qualifications rather than by independence events, then it would be expected that the effects of the event-time indicators based on the year of independence would be absorbed by the control variable. However, as shown in Figure 8, the effect of independence on RREFs is virtually identical when controlling for property qualifications. Again, there are no discernible pre-trends in the ten years prior to independence, implying that a causal interpretation of the estimated effect of independence is warranted. The estimates shown in Figure 8 entail that independence led to an increase of about 0.57 in the probability of an RREF ten years after the event (relative to a mean

probability of an RREF in the dataset of 0.33). Thus, the results in Figure 8 cast some doubt on the alternative explanation.

It is also possible to use a stacked event study framework to test whether there is a causal impact of the abolition of property qualifications on the probability of an RREF. One challenge in doing so is that all jurisdictions ultimately abolished property qualifications (or never imposed them). Thus, there is no “never-treated” group of jurisdictions, as is ideally required for a stacked event study analysis. In these circumstances, a common approach is to truncate the dataset at a point in time when there remain some “never-treated” units. To allow for the strongest possible effect of property qualifications (in the Jacksonian era in the US that was previously highlighted as being characterized by a negative correlation between RREFs and property qualifications), the dataset is truncated by dropping years after 1860. Jurisdictions that retained property qualifications in 1860 constitute the “never-treated” control group, while jurisdictions that abolished property qualifications prior to 1860 constitute the treatment group.

Figure 9 shows the coefficient estimates from a stacked event study analysis of the impact of the abolition of property qualifications on the enactment of RREFs. Note first that there appear to be significant pre-trends: jurisdictions that subsequently abolish property qualifications have a higher propensity to have RREFs about 8-10 years earlier. This indicates potential selection-into-treatment and undermines a causal interpretation of any apparent effect of the abolition of property qualifications on the enactment of RREFs. Moreover, the estimated treatment effects (after the abolition of property qualifications on the enactment of RREFs) are quantitatively small (especially in relation to the estimated effects of independence events) and statistically insignificant.

There are a considerable number of US states (such as Wisconsin in 1836) that enter the dataset over the 1730-1860 period with no property qualifications and an RREF. Because we do not ever observe these jurisdictions with property qualifications, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that they would not have had RREFs had they counterfactually had property qualifications. To address this, it is possible to treat these jurisdictions as having “abolished” property qualifications in the year that they enter the dataset (e.g., by coding Wisconsin as having abolished property qualifications in 1836). Doing so leads to quite similar results to those in Figure 9, with the pre-trends being even stronger.

Thus, this exercise finds no evidence for a causal impact of the abolition of property qualifications on the probability of an RREF, casting further doubt on the alternative explanation.¹⁸ Moreover, the results in Figure 9 are quite consistent with the raw descriptive facts – in particular, the abolition of property qualifications in this period typically occurs after (and in some cases long after) RREFs are established. For example, Ohio had an RREF from 1802 and abolished property qualifications in 1851, New Jersey had an RREF from 1807 and abolished property qualifications in 1845, Connecticut had an RREF from 1818 and abolished property qualifications in 1845, while Virginia had an RREF predating 1730 and abolished property qualifications in 1851. It thus seems difficult to sustain the argument that the abolition of property qualifications caused the enactment of RREFs.

In addition to this quantitative evidence, there is also historical evidence that casts further doubt on the potential alternative explanation. In particular, historical evidence suggests that free people of color exercised the franchise in nontrivial numbers in colonial North America and in US states prior to the enactment of RREFs. For instance, Kelley (2015, p. 1) writes that prior to their disenfranchisement in 1835: “Though a fraction of the voting population . . ., free men of color in antebellum North Carolina were a viable force in local elections, where even the smallest number of votes could have an impact.” The notion that franchise restrictions and extensions across racial lines had no significant practical impact is also belied by the time and attention devoted to deliberations on this issue, and the relatively close divisions of opinion. For example, in North Carolina’s 1835 constitutional convention that imposed an RREF:

“The outcome of disfranchisement was not a foregone conclusion at the beginning of the debate but was closely contested. Delegates initially discussed nonwhite suffrage for two days on June 12 and 13, where they approved of a disfranchisement amendment by a vote of 66 to 61.” (Kelley, 2015, p. 3).

The alternative explanation would also imply that franchise extensions that left property qualifications in place – as in the Caribbean franchise extensions around 1830 – would have little practical effect. However, the abolition of RREFs in the Caribbean colonies led in a relatively short period of time to the election of significant numbers of legislators of color. Carvalho and Dippel (2020) code the race of legislators in ten Caribbean colonies and find substantial

¹⁸ Note that Figure 9 does not necessarily cast doubt on the notion of *Herrenvolk* democracy (e.g., Frederickson, 1981). The causal claim on which that idea rests is that the enactment of RREFs led to the abolition of property qualifications; this is quite distinct from (and in some ways the reverse of) the causal claim on which the alternative explanation addressed in this subsection is based.

representation in most by legislators of color within a short period following the franchise extension. Wilmot (2020) presents case studies highlighting the alacrity with which free people of color sought legislative office following the franchise extension in Jamaica. Thus, franchise extensions and RREFs appear to have been far from inconsequential, even apart from their enormous symbolic value.

5.3) Towards A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Race-based Franchise Extensions

The results in this paper shed light on the broader question of how to explain franchise extension. In the most general terms, these results suggest that the extension of the franchise across racial lines has been driven by a very different set of mechanisms than was the extension of the franchise across class lines. In particular, the new dataset constructed in this paper reveals three major episodes of franchise extension (as identified in the descriptive account in Section 2.3 above): the abolition of RREFs in the Caribbean islands around 1830, the expansion of the franchise in US states following the Civil War and during the Reconstruction period, and the expansion of the franchise in US states following the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The data also reveals two major episodes of franchise restriction – one following US independence from the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, and the other following the end of Reconstruction in the US (and the spread of responsible government and dominion status among British colonies in Australia, Canada, and southern Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In general, franchise extensions appear to have resulted from a top-down process in which the influence of an imperial or federal government over local jurisdictions was crucial.

This paper's results suggest that the empowerment of local (settler-dominated) jurisdictions has a causal impact on franchise restrictions. This is particularly the case when settlers obtain independence – the baseline results imply that independence leads to an increase of about 0.6 in the probability of an RREF. These results are consistent with framework in which franchise restrictions in settlement colonies are caused by shifts in power towards local settlers and franchise extensions are caused by shifts in power away from settlers and towards imperial or federal governments. Such a framework fits the various episodes of franchise extension and restriction described in Section 2.3 quite well.

The Caribbean extension of the franchise around 1830 reflects the influence of reformist ideals emanating from London, rather than the structure and ethos of planter society in the Caribbean; thus, arguably, this franchise extension was possible only because Caribbean colonies did not become independent (as did US states, which in contrast exhibited an increasing propensity towards RREFs in the same time period). Franchise extensions during Reconstruction and the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s clearly reflect interventions by the US federal government.

Franchise restrictions, on the other hand, reflect shifts in power in the opposite direction. The increasingly restrictive franchise in post-independence US states and territories reflects – according to the results in Sections 3 and 4 – a causal effect of US independence. From the 1870s, the revival of RREFs in certain US states is a clear consequence of the withdrawal of US troops from the former Confederacy and the consequent shift in power to these states. Over the same period, the growth of RREFs in Australia, Canada, and SE Africa appears to be caused by the granting of responsible government and dominion status.

Crucial to this framework is an explanation of why imperial and federal governments were more inclined to extend the franchise. A basic canon of rational choice theory is to avoid explanations based on preferences (for instance, a greater inclination towards egalitarian ideals on the part of among imperial/federal versus local officials). Rather, it is possible to understand this difference in terms of the differences in incentives faced by imperial/federal officials relative to those faced by local settler elites. Particularly important is the relative insulation of the imperial government from accountability to (and capture by) local settler elites. For example, in eighteenth-century colonial North America, the Crown sought to some extent to balance the interests of European settlers and Native Americans, as manifested for instance in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 that restricted European settlement west of the Appalachian mountains (e.g., Clinton, 1989). Such balancing was of course abandoned once US independence shifted power towards the European settlers. It is straightforward to hypothesize that a similar dynamic may have operated with regard to the inclusiveness of the electoral franchise.

This conceptual framework is succinctly encapsulated by the historian Sir Charles Lucas, writing in the late nineteenth century specifically about the history of the Caribbean, albeit in terms that are arguably more widely applicable:¹⁹

“Again and again the history of colonisation has shown that the safeguard of [people of colour] consists in a strong Home [i.e., Imperial] government outside and beyond local influences, and that home rule for a [settlement colony] . . . has in past times meant for the majority of its inhabitants not so much the gift of local freedom as the withdrawal of Imperial protection”

As with much of rational choice theory, it is possible to trace this framework back to Adam Smith, specifically to his comparison in *The Wealth of Nations* of the French and British colonies in the Caribbean. The former were governed by royal officials, while in the latter local representative assemblies (dominated by planters) exerted significant influence. Smith argued that conditions for enslaved people tended to be worse in the British colonies due to the influence of local settler interests (Lewis, 1967, p. 5), a claim that is broadly consistent with the framework described here.

Importantly, this account is not intended to downplay other potential causes of franchise extensions. As with class-based franchise extension, activism and protest from below undoubtedly played an important role. For example, the Caribbean franchise extensions around 1830 were preceded by petitions made by free people of color in the Caribbean in the 1820s (e.g., Wesley, 1934), while the US civil rights movement played a significant role in creating the conditions for the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s. It is notable, though, that in these cases petitions and protests tended to be directed to the imperial or federal government rather than to local settler elites. There are also episodes (as in South Africa in the 1990s) where the threat of revolution was an important factor in franchise extension. Even acknowledging these factors, the results in this paper suggest that the dichotomy between settler control and imperial control appears to explain much of the variation in RREFs over time and across jurisdictions.

The analysis in this paper has been entirely positive rather than normative – i.e., focused on explaining the presence of RREFs rather than on their normative desirability. However, if one adopts the normative perspective that RREFs are undesirable, then an implication that seems to follow is that the British Empire appears to have been altogether too eager to concede

¹⁹ Sir Charles Lucas, *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, 8 vols, Oxford, 1887-1920. Vol. II, pp. 70-71, quoted in Lewis (1967, p. 4).

independence, responsible government, and dominion status to settlement colonies; placing greater weight on the welfare of non-European British subjects may arguably have delayed or prevented such concessions. On the other hand, though, it should be remembered that the most significant independence event – for the US – was the result of a (presumably involuntary) military defeat. Imperial forces also made extraordinarily hard work of conquering two relatively small Boer republics in the Boer War (1899-1902).²⁰ In the shadow of these examples, the bargaining power of settlers may have been considerable even when warfare was off the equilibrium path.

This point – that the empowerment of settlers may not have been as discretionary for the Empire as it may seem – also helps address a different potential objection to the conceptual framework articulated here. This is that the consequences of settler empowerment – including franchise restrictions – are likely to have been anticipated at the time, so that settler empowerment cannot be the ultimate cause of franchise restrictions. That is, when the imperial government and settlers jointly choose settler empowerment, some more fundamental cause (such as a change in attitudes in both the imperial metropolis and the colony) may be operative. It is true that the consequences of settler empowerment were predictable to some extent, and were indeed predicted in some cases by contemporary observers (e.g., Evans et al., 2003). However, this concern is assuaged to the extent that settler empowerment was not chosen at the discretion of the imperial government, but was seized by settlers by force (or in the shadow thereof).

6) Conclusion

The topic of franchise extension remains of enduring interest across law, history, and the social sciences. This paper brings a new perspective to this topic by focusing on franchise extension across racial lines (rather than on class-based franchise extension, the primary focus of the past literature). This paper constructs and analyzes a novel dataset that codes the presence of race-based restrictions on voting in 131 jurisdictions over 1730-2000 (consisting primarily of English-speaking subnational jurisdictions with substantial power to determine their electoral law). First, it provides a descriptive account of the extensive variation in these restrictions over

²⁰ The Treaty of Vereeniging (ending the war in 1902) contained a provision relating to the electoral franchise – namely, that a nonracial franchise would not be imposed by the victorious Empire on the defeated Transvaal and Orange Free State republics.

time and across jurisdictions. Second, the paper seeks to explain this variation within a conceptual framework that emphasizes the distinction between the incentives of imperial or federal governments and those of local European settler elites. In this framework, an imperial or federal government is less subject to capture by local settler elites, and more likely to promote franchise extension than is an empowered local settler-dominated government.

The paper presents two forms of empirical analysis, with generally consistent results. First, a difference-in-difference analysis of the impact of US independence (using “Loyalist” British colonies in the Americas as a control group) suggests that there was a substantial positive effect of US independence on the probability of a racially restrictive franchise. Second, a stacked event study analysis implies that the independence of colonies of settlement (and, to a lesser extent, other forms of settler empowerment) had a substantial positive effect on the probability of a racially restrictive franchise. A potentially important alternative explanation entails that the abolition of property qualifications for voting – rather than settler empowerment – led to the enactment of racial restrictions. However, the basic results are robust to controlling for the existence of property qualifications. Moreover, there is no evidence of a causal impact of the abolition of property qualifications on the enactment of racial restrictions.

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Table 1: List of Jurisdictions and Summary of Racial Restrictions on Voting

Jurisdiction	Region	Nonracial Franchise (Coded 0)	Racially Restrictive Franchise (Coded 1)
Alabama	USA	1868-1900, 1965-2000	1817-1867, 1901-1964
Alaska	USA	1959-2000	1912-1958
Alberta	Canada	1965-2000	1905-1964
American Samoa	USA	1979-2000	
Anguilla	Caribbean	1980-2000	
Antigua and Barbuda	Caribbean	1831-1898, 1937-2000	1730-1830
Arizona	USA	1870-1923, 1948-2000	1863-1869, 1924-1947
Arkansas	USA	1868-1890, 1965-2000	1819-1867, 1891-1964
Australia (Commonwealth)	Oceania	1962-2000	1901-1961
Australian Capital Territory	Oceania	1980-2000	
Bahamas	Caribbean	1833-2000	1730-1832
Barbados	Caribbean	1831-2000	1730-1830
Belize	Caribbean	1854-1870, 1935-2000	
Bermuda	Caribbean	1834-2000	1730-1833
Botswana	SE Africa	1960-2000	1920-1959
British Columbia	Canada	1866-1874, 1949-2000	1875-1948
British Virgin Islands	Caribbean	1833-1867, 1937-2000	1773-1832
California	USA	1870-2000	1849-1869
Canada (Federal)	Canada	1960-2000	1885-1959
Cape of Good Hope	SE Africa	1853-1930	1931-1986
Cayman Islands	Caribbean	1831-2000	
Central African Federation	SE Africa	1958-1963	1953-1957
Cherokee Nation	USA	1866-1907	1827-1865
Chickasaw Nation	USA		1856-1907
Choctaw Nation	USA	1866-1907	1838-1865
Colorado	USA	1870-2000	1861-1869
Connecticut	USA	1730-1817, 1870-2000	1818-1869
Delaware	USA	1730-1791, 1870-2000	1792-1869
District of Columbia	USA	1867-1874,	1802-1866

		1973-2000	
Dominica	Caribbean	1831-1898, 1924-2000	1775-1830
Eswatini	SE Africa	1963-2000	1920-1962
Fiji	Oceania	1962-2000	1870-1874, 1904-1961
Florida	USA	1870-1884, 1965-2000	1822-1869, 1885-1964
Georgia	USA	1866-1876, 1965-2000	1761-1865, 1877-1964
Grenada	Caribbean	1832-1877, 1936-2000	1766-1831
Griqualand East	SE Africa		1862-1874
Griqualand West	SE Africa	1873-1880	
Guam	USA	1950-2000	
Guyana	Caribbean	1831-2000	
Hawaii	USA	1840-1886, 1894-2000	1887-1893
Idaho	USA	1870-1923, 1950-2000	1863-1869, 1924-1949
Illinois	USA	1870-2000	1809-1869
Indiana	USA	1870-2000	1816-1869
Iowa	USA	1870-2000	1838-1869
Jamaica	Caribbean	1830-1865, 1884-2000	1730-1829
Kansas	USA	1870-2000	1854-1869
Kentucky	USA	1792-1798, 1870-2000	1799-1869
Kenya	SE Africa	1961-2000	1920-1960
Lesotho	SE Africa	1959-2000	
Louisiana	USA	1868-1897, 1964-2000	1812-1867, 1898-1963
Maine	USA	1820-1923, 1954-2000	1924-1953
Malawi	SE Africa	1960-2000	1956-1959
Manitoba	Canada	1870-1885 1952-2000	1886-1951
Maryland	USA	1730-1782, 1870-2000	1783-1869
Massachusetts	USA	1730-2000	
Mauritius	SE Africa	1885-2000	
Michigan	USA	1869-2000	1827-1868
Minnesota	USA	1868-2000	1849-1867
Mississippi	USA	1867-1874,	1817-1866,

		1968-2000	1875-1967
Missouri	USA	1870-2000	1820-1869
Montana	USA	1870-2000	1864-1869
Montserrat	Caribbean	1822-1866, 1937-2000	1730-1821
Muscogee (Creek) Nation	USA	1866-1907	1818-1865
Namibia	SE Africa	1989-2000	1925-1988
Natal	SE Africa	1856-1895	1896-1986
Nebraska	USA	1870-2000	1854-1869
Nevada	USA	1870-2000	1861-1869
Nevis	Caribbean	1833-1877	1730-1832
New Brunswick	Canada	1785-1888, 1963-2000	1889-1962
New Hampshire	USA	1730-2000	
New Jersey	USA	1730-1806, 1870-2000	1807-1869
New Mexico	USA	1870-1923, 1948-2000	1850-1869, 1924-1947
New South Wales	Oceania	1843-2000	
New York	USA	1730-1820, 1870-2000	1821-1869
New Zealand	Oceania	1852-2000	
Newfoundland and Labrador	Canada	1832-1933, 1946-2000	
Norfolk Island	Oceania	1979-2000	
North Carolina	USA	1735-1834, 1868-1899, 1965-2000	1730-1734, 1835-1867, 1900-1964
North Dakota	USA	1870-2000	1861-1869
Northern Mariana Islands	USA	1978-2000	
Northern Territory (Australia)	Oceania	1962-2000	1947-1961
Northwest Territories (Canada)	Canada	1960-2000	1888-1959
Northwest Territory (US)	USA	1798-1803	
Nova Scotia	Canada	1758-1853, 1863-2000	1854-1862
Nunavut	Canada	1999-2000	
Ohio	USA	1870-2000	1802-1869
Oklahoma	USA	1890-1909, 1940-2000	1910-1939
Ontario	Canada	1791-1873, 1954-2000	1874-1953
Orange River Colony (Free State)	SE Africa		1854-1900, 1907-1986
Oregon	USA	1870-2000	1843-1869

Pennsylvania	USA	1730-1837, 1870-2000	1838-1869
Prince Edward Island	Canada	1773-1921, 1963-2000	1922-1962
Puerto Rico	USA	1900-2000	
Quebec	Canada	1791-1914, 1969-2000	1915-1968
Queensland	Oceania	1859-1871, 1965-2000	1872-1964
Rehoboth Gebied/Republic	SE Africa		1872-1924
Rhode Island	USA	1730-1821, 1842-2000	1822-1841
Saint Christopher/Kitts	Caribbean	1833-1878, 1937-2000	1730-1832
Saint Helena	SE Africa	1966-2000	
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	1924-2000	
Saint Vincent	Caribbean	1833-1877, 1936-2000	1766-1832
Saskatchewan	Canada	1905-1907, 1960-2000	1908-1959
Seminole Nation	USA	1866-1907	1856-1865
Seychelles	SE Africa	1948-2000	
South Africa (Union)	SE Africa	1994-2000	1910-1993
South Australia	Oceania	1851-2000	
South Carolina	USA	1867-1894, 1965-2000	1730-1866, 1895-1964
South Dakota	USA	1870-1923, 1951-2000	1861-1869, 1924-1950
Stellaland/Goshen	SE Africa		1882-1885
Tasmania	Oceania	1852-2000	
Tennessee	USA	1796-1833, 1867-1888, 1965-2000	1834-1866, 1889-1964
Texas	USA	1870-1901, 1965-2000	1836-1869, 1902-1964
Tobago	Caribbean	1831-1877	1768-1830
Transvaal	SE Africa		1855-1900, 1906-1986
Trinidad	Caribbean	1925-2000	
Turks and Caicos Islands	Caribbean	1848-1873, 1962-2000	
US Virgin Islands	USA	1970-2000	
Utah	USA	1870-1923, 1957-2000	1850-1869, 1924-1956
Vancouver Island	Canada	1856-1866	

Vermont	USA	1777-2000	
Victoria	Oceania	1851-2000	
Virginia	USA	1867-1901, 1965-2000	1730-1866, 1902-1964
Washington	USA	1870-1923, 1974-2000	1853-1869, 1924-1973
West Indies Federation	Caribbean	1958-1962	
West Virginia	USA	1870-2000	1863-1869
Western Australia	Oceania	1870-1892, 1962-2000	1893-1961
Wisconsin	USA	1866-2000	1836-1865
Wyoming	USA	1868-2000	
Yukon	Canada	1900-1918, 1960-2000	1919-1959
Zambia	SE Africa	1959-2000	1926-1958
Zimbabwe	SE Africa	1899-1968, 1980-2000	1969-1979

Note: This table lists each jurisdiction in the dataset and summarizes its history of racial restrictions on the electoral franchise. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation
Indicator for Racial Restriction = 1	18,330	0.330	0.470
Year of Independence	10,080	1820.867	39.385
Year of Responsible Government	3,036	1867.925	27.225
Year of Dominion Status	3,946	1892.156	20.385
“Never-treated” Jurisdictions = 1	18,330	0.247	0.431
Indicator for Property Qualifications = 1	17,669	0.408	0.491
Year Property Qualifications Were Abolished	14,918	1915.61	51.515
<i>Cross-sectional Variables</i>			
Population in 1900	92	1155204	1515312
Percentage of Europeans in 1900	91	53.77	41.44
European Majority in 1900 = 1	126	0.571	0.497
<i>Regions:</i>			
SE Africa = 1	18,330	0.081	0.273
Canada = 1	18,330	0.113	0.316
Caribbean = 1	18,330	0.183	0.386
Oceania = 1	18,330	0.072	0.259
USA = 1	18,330	0.551	0.497


Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the dataset constructed in this paper. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The year of independence, the year of responsible government (which entails that the executive is responsible to an elected legislature), and the year of dominion status (all under European settler control) are coded using historical information on the constitutional development of each jurisdiction, combined with information on the ethnic origins of the ruling elite. These variables are missing for those jurisdictions that did not experience independence, responsible government, or dominion status under European settler control. “Never-treated” jurisdictions are those that never achieved independence, responsible government, or dominion status under European settler control. The property qualification variable is coded 0 for the absence of a property qualification for voting and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by property ownership, income, or tax payments. The year that property qualifications were abolished is the year in which property, income, or tax requirements ceased to exist, and is missing for those jurisdictions that never imposed such restrictions. Population in 1900 is collected from census data and various other sources for the year 1900 (or the closest available year around 1900). The percentage of Europeans in the population in 1900 is based on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) but is collected from census data and various other sources for those jurisdictions that they do not cover. This variable is used to determine whether or not the jurisdiction had a European majority (>50% of the population) in 1900.

Table 3: The Impact of US Independence on the Probability of Racial Restrictions

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Excluding Caribbean Jurisdictions	(3) Balanced Panel	(4) Full Sample
	Dependent Variable: Indicator = 1 for Racial Restrictions on Voting			
US*Post-1783	0.316***	0.235***	0.321***	0.675***
	(0.012)	(0.0001)	(0.012)	(0.051)
Jurisdiction and Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Period	1730-1835	1730-1835	1730-1835	1730-1860
Number of Observations	3,203	2,013	2,623	4,800
Number of Jurisdictions	52	37	28	80
R squared (within)	0.148	0.234	0.187	0.206


Note: This table reports regression results from linear probability models of an indicator (= 1) for the existence of racial restrictions on voting at the jurisdiction-year level. The primary variable of interest is the interaction between a post-1783 indicator (for years beginning in 1783) and an indicator for US jurisdictions. In Columns 1 and 4, the sample consists of all jurisdictions in the Americas (Canada, the Caribbean, and the US). The treated jurisdictions are those that became part of the US from 1783, and the control jurisdictions are those that did not become part of the US. In Column 2, Caribbean jurisdictions are omitted. In Column 3, the sample is restricted to (treatment and control) jurisdictions for which data on racial restrictions is available from 1775-1835. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1: Fraction of Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-2000




Note: This graph plots the fraction of the jurisdictions in the dataset with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year.

Figure 2: Fraction of US Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-1835




Note: This graph plots the fraction of US jurisdictions in the dataset with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-1835. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year. The fraction is also shown separately for southern US jurisdictions, northern US jurisdictions, and for the original 13 colonies that formed the United States. The vertical dashed line shows the year (1782) immediately prior to US independence in 1783.

Figure 3: Fraction of US v. “Loyalist” Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-1835




Note: This graph compares the fraction of US jurisdictions and “Loyalist” jurisdictions (i.e., British colonies in the Americas that did not become part of the US) with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-1835. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year. The vertical dashed line shows the year (1782) immediately prior to US independence in 1783.

Figure 4: Fraction of Northern US v. Canadian Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1758-1835




Note: This graph compares the fraction of northern US jurisdictions and Canadian jurisdictions (i.e., jurisdictions that later became part of Canada) with racial restrictions on voting over 1758-1835. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year. The vertical dashed line shows the year (1782) immediately prior to US independence in 1783.

Figure 5: Stacked Event Study Plot of the Impact of Independence on the Probability of Racial Restrictions




Note: This graph plots event-time coefficients and 95% confidence intervals estimated from a stacked event study specification using a linear probability model of an indicator (=1) for the existence of racial restrictions on voting at the jurisdiction-year level. The variables of interest are a series of event-time indicators (-10 to +10) relative to the year of independence (under the control of local European settlers). The regression specification also includes event-time indicators (not shown in the graph) for years that are 11 years or more from an independence event and 11 years or more prior to an independence event. The coefficient of event-year -1 (the year prior to an independence event) is normalized to zero. The analysis uses “never-treated” jurisdictions (those that never experienced independence, dominion status, or responsible government under the control of local European settlers) as the control group. It uses all jurisdictions that ever experienced independence as the treatment group, including those jurisdictions that are classified as being independent (or part of a larger independent federal polity) from the first year in which they had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. Robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level.

Figure 6: Stacked Event Study Plot of the Impact of Independence on the Probability of Racial Restrictions (Excluding Jurisdictions that do not Experience Changes in Independence Status)




Note: This graph plots event-time coefficients and 95% confidence intervals estimated from a stacked event study specification using a linear probability model of an indicator (=1) for the existence of racial restrictions on voting at the jurisdiction-year level. The variables of interest are a series of event-time indicators (-10 to +10) relative to the year of independence under the control of local European settlers. The regression specification also includes event-time indicators (not shown in the graph) for years that are 11 years or more from an independence event and 11 years or more prior to an independence event. The coefficient of event-year -1 (the year prior to an independence event) is normalized to zero. The analysis uses “never-treated” jurisdictions (those that never experienced independence, dominion status, or responsible government under the control of local European settlers) as the control group. It uses jurisdictions that experienced independence as the treatment group, excluding those jurisdictions that are classified as being independent from the first year in which they had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. Robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level.

Figure 7: Stacked Event Study Plot of the Impact of Settler Control on the Probability of Racial Restrictions




Note: This graph plots event-time coefficients and 95% confidence intervals estimated from a stacked event study specification using a linear probability model of an indicator (=1) for the existence of racial restrictions on voting at the jurisdiction-year level. The variables of interest are a series of event-time indicators (-10 to +10) relative to the year of events (the achievement of independence, responsible government, or dominion status) that empowered local European settlers vis-à-vis the imperial government in London. The regression specification also includes event-time indicators (not shown in the graph) for years that are 11 years or more from a “settler control” event and 11 years or more prior to a “settler control” event. The coefficient of event-year -1 (the year prior to a “settler control” event) is normalized to zero. The analysis uses “never-treated” jurisdictions (those that never experienced any of the types of events that are defined here as enhancing settler control) as the control group. It uses all jurisdictions that ever experienced such an event as the treatment group, including those jurisdictions that are classified as being under settler control from the first year in which they had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. Robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level.

Figure 8: Stacked Event Study Plot of the Impact of Independence on the Probability of Racial Restrictions, Controlling for Property Qualifications



Note: This graph plots event-time coefficients and 95% confidence intervals estimated from a stacked event study specification using a linear probability model of an indicator (=1) for the existence of racial restrictions on voting at the jurisdiction-year level. The analysis controls for the property qualification variable (which is coded 0 for the absence of a property qualification for voting and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by property ownership, income, or tax payments). The variables of interest are a series of event-time indicators (-10 to +10) relative to the year of independence (under the control of local European settlers). The regression specification also includes event-time indicators (not shown in the graph) for years that are 11 years or more from an independence event and 11 years or more prior to an independence event. The coefficient of event-year -1 (the year prior to an independence event) is normalized to zero. The analysis uses “never-treated” jurisdictions (those that never experienced independence, dominion status, or responsible government under the control of local European settlers) as the control group. It uses all jurisdictions that ever experienced independence as the treatment group, including those jurisdictions that are classified as being independent (or part of a larger independent federal polity) from the first year in which they had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. Robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level.


Figure 9: Stacked Event Study Plot of the Impact of the Abolition of Property Qualifications on the Probability of Racial Restrictions, 1730-1860



Note: This graph plots event-time coefficients and 95% confidence intervals estimated from a stacked event study specification using a linear probability model of an indicator (=1) for the existence of racial restrictions on voting at the jurisdiction-year level over 1730-1860. The variables of interest are a series of event-time indicators (-10 to +10) relative to the year in which property qualifications for voting (i.e., a franchise that is restricted formally by property ownership, income, or tax payments) were abolished. The regression specification also includes event-time indicators (not shown in the graph) for years that are 11 years or more from an independence event and 11 years or more prior to an independence event. The coefficient of event-year -1 (the year prior to the abolition of property qualifications) is normalized to zero. The analysis uses “never-treated” jurisdictions as of 1860 (those that had property qualifications for voting in 1860) as the control group. It uses all jurisdictions that abolished property qualifications before 1860 as the treatment group. Robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level.


Appendix

Figure A1: Population-Weighted Fraction of Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-2000




Note: This graph plots the population-weighted fraction of the jurisdictions in the dataset with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year. Population is measured in 1900 or the closest available year.

Figure A2: Fraction of European-Majority and European-Minority Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-2000




Note: This graph plots the fraction of the jurisdictions in the dataset with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-2000, separately for jurisdictions in which European settlers and their descendants form the numerical majority of the population (“European-majority” jurisdictions) and those where they form a numerical minority (“European-minority” jurisdictions). The classification of jurisdictions into these two categories uses demographic data for 1900 (or the closest available year). The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year.

Figure A3: Fraction of US Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-2000




Note: This graph plots the fraction of US jurisdictions (states, territories, and the District of Columbia) with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year. The vertical dashed line in shows the year (1782) immediately prior to US independence in 1783.

Figure A4: Fraction of Caribbean Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1730-2000




Note: This graph plots the fraction of Caribbean jurisdictions with racial restrictions on voting over 1730-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year.

Figure A5: Fraction of Canadian Jurisdictions with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1758-2000




Note: This graph plots the fraction of Canadian jurisdictions with racial restrictions on voting over 1758-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year.

Figure A6: Fraction of Jurisdictions in Oceania with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1843-2000



Note: This graph plots the fraction of jurisdictions in the Oceania region with racial restrictions on voting over 1843-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year.

Figure A7: Fraction of Jurisdictions in SE Africa with Racial Restrictions on Voting, 1853-2000



Note: This graph plots the fraction of jurisdictions in the African region with racial restrictions on voting over 1853-2000. The racial restriction variable is coded 0 for a nonracial franchise and 1 for a franchise that is restricted formally by race (or in some cases, restricted informally by race where discriminatory intent is obvious). The variable is constructed only for those jurisdiction-years in which the jurisdiction had electoral institutions and an (at least partially) elected legislature. For jurisdiction-years without electoral institutions, the variable is missing. The fraction shown here is calculated using the (nonmissing) observations for each year.