

Bisht, Tulsi Charan

Working Paper

Forced displacement: A rapidly rising vulnerability and its challenges for an inclusive and sustainable Asia and the Pacific

ADB Working Paper, No. 1465

Provided in Cooperation with:

Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo

Suggested Citation: Bisht, Tulsi Charan (2024) : Forced displacement: A rapidly rising vulnerability and its challenges for an inclusive and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, ADB Working Paper, No. 1465, Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo, <https://doi.org/10.56506/JXPD1578>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305399>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/>



ADBI Working Paper Series

FORCED DISPLACEMENT: A RAPIDLY RISING VULNERABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGES FOR AN INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Tulsi Charan Bisht

No. 1465
July 2024

Asian Development Bank Institute

Tulsi Charan Bisht is a Senior Social Development Specialist, Policy and Technical Services, Office of Safeguards, Asian Development Bank.

The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.

Discussion papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published.

The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI's working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication.

Report prepared under the Adjunct Fellowship Program of Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo, Japan

Suggested citation:

Bisht, T. C. 2024. Forced Displacement: A Rapidly Rising Vulnerability and Its Challenges for an Inclusive and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific. ADBI Working Paper 1465. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available: <https://doi.org/10.56506/JXPD1578>

Please contact the authors for information about this paper.

Email: tbisht@adb.org

My sincere thanks to the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) for providing me this opportunity to research on forced displacement in the Asia and Pacific region under the institute's Adjunct Fellowship program. The research revitalized my experience and interest of researching on this topic. My gratitude is to Bruce K. Dunn, Director, Policy and Technical Services, Office of Safeguards, ADB, for his support and encouragement to undertake this research and providing some financial support for secondary data extraction and editing of this report. My thanks to Manoj Kumar Tiwari, consultant, for helping me in data extraction and Maria Cristina Velez, consultant, for support in editing this report. I hope that this report will serve as an initial foundation stone to build on this important area of work and will help develop further evidence-based knowledge and interventions to tackle the challenge of forced displacement in the Asia and Pacific region.

Asian Development Bank Institute
Kasumigaseki Building, 8th Floor
3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 100-6008, Japan

Tel: +81-3-3593-5500
Fax: +81-3-3593-5571
URL: www.adbi.org
E-mail: info@adbi.org

© 2024 Asian Development Bank Institute

Abstract

Forced displacement results from some form of direct or indirect violence or factors known as push factors. Such migration is not an outcome of volition but of coercion. Based on a systematic review of relevant literature, this report presents rapidly rising trends of forced displacement in the Asia and Pacific region. Three main causes of forced displacement are outlined and discussed—violence, inequality and environment and climate change. Following a political economy analysis, the report stresses the intersectionality of the three factors that ultimately results in forced displacement. The report highlights systemic inequality as the root cause for forced displacement and concludes that force displacement, if remains unchecked, could pose challenges to achieve the goals of inclusive and sustainable development as well as achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 in the region. The report recommends recognizing forced displacement as an emergent vulnerability that would require a coordinated humanitarian and developmental approach to tackle its rapid rise.

Keywords: forced displacement, forced migration, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, environmental refugees, climate change-induced displacement, reverse migration, forced migration theories

JEL Classification: O19

Contents

1.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
2.	DEFINITION, TYPOLOGIES, AND TRENDS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	5
3.	CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT	18
4.	CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT.....	33
5.	THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT	49
6.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	61
	REFERENCES	65
	ANNEXES	
1	Forced Displacement in ADB Developing Member Economies	82
2	International Legal Frameworks on Forced Displacement.....	86
3	International Frameworks for Climate Refugees	89

1. INTRODUCTION

Migration is a common human tendency and people have been migrating from one place to another for thousands of years. It is a complex process shaped by a mix of underlying factors that decide the kind of migration that is to take place. Current literature often divides migration into two broad categories: (i) voluntary migration; and (ii) involuntary or forced migration.

Voluntary migration is explained as being mainly driven by economic factors, with people migrating for better economic opportunities. Such migration is volition based, and a migrant generally has control over the migration process. Forced migration, on the other hand, is undertaken under some kind of threat, coercion, or duress. Those fleeing have no, or very little, control over their movement. Under this scenario, bodily harm or even death could result if an individual or a group does not flee. However, it is becoming more accepted that confining migration into these two watertight categories is limiting and fails to present a comprehensive picture because both categories of migration often exist within the same spectrum and overlap.

This report focuses on forced migration, also referred to as “forced displacement,” and its trends and impacts on the countries across the Asia and Pacific region where the numbers of forced displaced are rapidly rising because of conflict, violence, disasters, natural hazards, and adverse economic conditions. Climate change, environmental degradation, and their associated impacts are expected to result in an increasing number of people becoming forced migrants. Estimates show these figures could become staggering if underlying causes remain unaddressed. Forced migration has adverse impacts not only on those who migrate but also on the host communities and populations where forced migrants seek refuge.

This report is based on the analysis of secondary literature and data. Sourcing relevant literature, reviews, analyses, and interpretations was undertaken from a specific perspective that increasing forced migration in the Asia and Pacific region can have potential adverse effect upon the processes of inclusive and sustainable development and subsequently in attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the region. It presents an initial assessment of the forced displacement situation in the region, which could serve as a useful starting point for further primary, field-based research to support policy development and program interventions.

Systematic Literature Review. The report is prepared following a systematic review (SR) of relevant literature on forced displacement. SR is a well-established methodology for undertaking review of literature to respond to a specific and well-formulated research question. Cochrane Collaboration defines it as “a review of a clearly formulated question that uses systematic and explicit methods to identify, select, and critically appraise relevant research, and to collect and analyze data from the studies that are included in the review” (2011: 264). The important SR processes as explained by Rhoades (2011: 65) include defining the topic and research question; identifying relevant information; inclusion/exclusion criteria and keywords; conducting literature search; excluding irrelevant studies; scrutinizing and reviewing relevant studies; extracting data; develop evidence synthesis; report conclusions and recommendations. The step-by-step SR approach followed for this report is explained below.

Research Question: Developing the “research question” was the most critical methodological aspect for this report. This was achieved by undertaking an initial assessment of the trends and patterns of forced displacement in Asia and the Pacific

and its potential impacts on the countries in the region. The report revolves around the core question “Is forced migration a new vulnerability in Asia and the Pacific and what are its potential consequences for inclusive and sustainable development in the region?”

Methodology: The research methodology was divided into two phases. The first phase involved developing a bibliography and the second involved a review and analysis of the selected sources and writing the report. Developing the bibliography followed a systematic approach, identifying and selecting secondary data sources on forced displacement. A search strategy was developed to identify relevant sources based on the following predefined keywords: “forced displacement,” “forced migration,” “refugees,” “asylum seekers,” “internally displaced persons,” “stateless persons,” “environmental refugees,” “climate change-induced displacement,” “reverse migration,” and “forced migration theories.” Keywords were truncated into relevant word combinations, phrases, and concepts.

The inclusion criteria for the resources were defined as follows:

- A. Online publications of major international organizations and portals focused on the field of forced migration and refugees. These include
 1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) | <https://www.unhcr.org/>
 2. OECD International Migration Data Base | <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG>
 3. The World Bank <https://www.worldbank.org/>
 4. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) <https://www.internal-displacement.org/>
 5. International Organization for Migration (IOM) | <https://www.iom.int/>
 6. Migration Data Portal | https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2019
 7. Asian Development Bank (ADB) | <https://www.adb.org/>
 8. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) | <https://www.unescap.org/>
- B. Articles and research papers were selected and curated from leading journals and periodicals on forced migration and forced displacement keywords. These include:
 1. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal | <https://journals.sagepub.com/home/amj>
 2. Comparative Migration Studies | <https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/>
 3. Forced Migration Review | <https://www.fmreview.org/>
 4. International Migration | <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14682435>
 5. International Migration Review | <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17477379>
 6. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies | <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjms20/current>

7. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies | <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/wimm20/current>
 8. Journal of Internal Displacement | <https://journalofinternaldisplacement.org/index.php/JID>
 9. Journal of Migration and Refugee Issues | <https://www.informit.org/product-details/615/JMRI/titles>
 10. Journal of Refugee Studies | Oxford Academic | <https://academic.oup.com/jrs>
 11. Migration Letters | <https://journals.tplondon.com/ml>
 12. Migration Policy Practice | https://publications.iom.int/search-books?keyword=&category=463&subject=All&book_lang=All&country=All&year=All
 13. Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration | <https://www.oxforcedmigration.com/>
 14. Refugee Survey Quarterly | Oxford Academic | <https://academic.oup.com/rsq>
- C. Focus on Asia and the Pacific: The systematic literature search focused on research and data on Asia and the Pacific, which includes East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. Segregating data for Central Western countries was difficult as various sources generally present data for the whole of Europe. Additionally, some sources on global trends were also included to enable a comparative analysis of related forced migratory processes.
- D. Year of publication: The review offers a current list of research and reports that provide a comprehensive overview of modern theoretical, practical, and policy approaches to the issue of forced migration. For a theoretical underpinning of forced migration, and to provide relevant historical background information, a limited selection of the relevant twentieth-century studies on forced migration was added to this review as well.
- E. Resources in English: The bibliographic resources and all papers, books, and reports used for this report are entirely in English.
- F. Open-access and not-freely accessible resources: Both open-access and not-freely accessible resources were collated for this review.

The exclusion criteria was informed by the inclusion criteria and information sources that did not fall within the inclusion criteria were excluded. Any publication other than English language was excluded; data sets from 20th century and reports based on such data sets were excluded; academic research papers from 20th century were excluded except in cases where these contribute directly to the theoretical formation on forced displacement. The SR, therefore, used a systematic approach in finding relevant literature on forced displacement and excluding nonrelevant literature.

Due to limited time and resources, no primary research or data collection was undertaken for this report. Collecting primary data for such a vast region requires large-scale collaboration of several agencies and individuals spread over many countries. The enormity of the data collection challenge is evident that despite many agencies and institutions are dedicated to research and primary data collection, the data on forced displacement remain estimations based on modeling and extrapolation. Existing data sources provide information to outline the trends and impacts of forced displacement in the Asia and Pacific region. During the systematic literature review,

new sources were included based on their relevance to the research question. These new sources are part of the reference bibliography.

One caveat is that the SR processes for this report do not have the rigor of academic research. The reason is deliberate, as the report rather than being an academic exercise is meant for the practitioners with an objective to present data and analysis to inform policy and interventions on forced displacement by development agencies. Therefore, certain methodological aspects of SR such as meta-analysis were not employed. These omissions were also influenced by time and resource constraints.

The SR process was guided by Cooper's (1988) sixfold taxonomy, which consists of focus, goal, organization, perspective, audience, and coverage.

1. *Focus* refers to the material that is of central interest for the reviewer and was achieved through carefully selecting keywords based on an initial mapping of the existing literature and applying inclusion and exclusion criteria.
2. *Goal* refers to what the reviewer hopes to accomplish from the systematic review process. In this SR, the goal was to assess and identify the extent and trends of "forced migration" in the region and its potential impacts on inclusive and sustainable development processes, and to provide a background for further work to develop knowledge and policy interventions.
3. *Perspective* is the "point of view" the reviewer employs in discussing and presenting the review of relevant literature. It could be a neutral, objective presentation or a subjective expression of a specific position or perspective. Clarity on perspective is crucial, as it defines the subjectivity of the researcher, which may influence outcomes of the review. In this report, the "political economy approach" drove the researcher's perspective to answer how forced displacement is produced, distributed, and sustained in a social system, and why certain groups are more vulnerable than others to the stressors that could result in their forced migration. This approach examines economic, sociocultural, political, and environmental variables, how they intersect to result in forced displacement, and how entrenched inequalities result in the continued suffering of these vulnerable groups. Political economy analysis (PEA) is a dominant approach used in academic research, and is being used increasingly by multilateral financing institutions (MFIs), to evaluate development projects and analyze the barriers that prevent certain populations from fully benefiting from such interventions.
4. *Organization* refers to how research is organized and presented. The main report has four sections.
5. *Audience*: The report is written and organized for a specific target audience, namely staff from ADBI, ADB, or other MFIs interested in the issues of forced displacement.
6. *Coverage* is the extent to which the reviewer finds and includes materials and makes decisions on their suitability. An extensive search through data sources including two academic databases, using well-defined keywords and inclusion criteria, helped ensure the required coverage for the report. However, as the inclusion criteria required only material in the English language, there is a high probability that some high-impact resources in other languages might not have found a place in the selected literature in this report.

Research Approach and Reflexivity: The limitations of this study, including the lack of academic rigor, are explained with reference to the study objectives and its target audience. Reflexivity is a social science research tool commonly used in qualitative research acknowledging that the subjectivity of the researcher might influence the research process. Olmos-Vega et al. define reflexivity as: “a set of continuous, collaborative, and multifaceted practices through which researchers self-consciously critique, appraise, and evaluate how their subjectivity and context influence the research processes” (2023: 242). Reflexivity, therefore, explains the limitations that could result from the specific objectives of a study and specific perspective of the researcher. It acknowledges that the research is not undertaken in a value-neutral manner. It reflects on how the research processes could be influenced by the researcher’s assumptions and analytical moorings that shape data collection, interpretation, and presentation. Acknowledging how these potential biases may have influenced the research processes and outcomes provides a lens through which to make a judgment about the research processes and outcomes. This is known as “bracketing,” which involves examining the researcher’s own judgments, practices, and belief systems during data collection, its interpretation, and presentation. Reflexivity ran throughout the entire research cycle spanning from the choice of data collection methods, data analysis, and ultimately the writing of the report. The report builds on such reflexivity and acknowledges the gaps, some degree of lack of rigor and the purposive manner that guided the framing of research question, literature search, interpretation, and writing of the report.

Analytical Perspective: The report uses PEA which investigates the root causes of forced displacement and does not treat it as a “given condition.” This perspective treats forced displacement, including displacement resulting from disasters and climatic events, as a social construct driven by inequality and unequal power relations within a given system. It examines the moot question of “*how forced displacement is produced, distributed, and sustained within a society*”. The PEA is based on the vulnerability framework that comprises three elements, namely sensitivity, exposure, and adaptive capacity, and how these are distributed within a system.

Study Outcomes: The report aims to provide a timely initial assessment and recommendations on the issue of forced displacement in Asia and the Pacific. It concludes that forced displacement is an emergent vulnerability in the region caused by various intersecting factors, with persistent “inequality” being the main underlying factor. There is an urgent need to develop measures to deal with the challenges posed by forced displacement and its repercussions for inclusive development and its objective of “leaving no one behind”.

2. DEFINITION, TYPOLOGIES, AND TRENDS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The study of forced migration, according to Alexander Betts (2009), is based on the distinction between human migration that results from coercion and migration that people voluntarily undertake under their own volition. This distinction also relates and extends to policy responses, where certain groups of migrants, such as refugees, have specific rights under international protocols. Forced migration, or forced displacement, involves some form of coercion that makes people flee to escape persecution or conflict. Voluntary migration, on the other hand, is considered largely driven by economic motives. However, Betts further emphasizes that this distinction is

problematic; it is difficult to delimit the difference between coercion and volition. Both forms of migration exist on a spectrum and can vary across a continuum.

Voluntary or economic migration that is treated as resulting from free will and volition could also be influenced by coercion that results from structural inequalities and compromised economic and social well-being at home. To effectively determine how volition and coercion intersect and overlap, the structural constraints individual migrants face need to be considered. Betts (2009) further states that in certain cases, forced migrants may still retain a degree of agency to choose between different migration options. Betts (2009) points out even though refugees often face severe political constraints including violence, in many cases they can decide when and where they will move. He argues that while in theory the distinction between “voluntary” and “involuntary” migration appears reasonable, the classification can be challenging due to varying and inseparable migrant motivations.

Jane McAdam (2012) contends that forced migration means people migrate in reaction to difficult circumstances, which leave them with no choice. Should they remain where they are, they would fear for their life, and risk serious bodily harm or violence. In such cases, individual choice or a voluntary wish to leave does not set migration in motion. She argues that any reasonable actor would migrate to save themselves and/or their families from threats to their lives or health due to man-made causes or natural disasters, thus making forced migration clearly involuntary.

Hugo, Abbasi-Shavazi, and Kraly (2018) provide a migration typology based on the distinctions between migrants and migrations on the basis of: (i) the relative permanency of the move; (ii) the distance traversed by migrants; (iii) the kind of borders crossed; (iv) push factors behind their move; and (v) characteristics of the people who move. They quote early migration theory of William A. Petersen (1958), who states that the degree of force is instrumental in determining the characteristics of forced migration and identifies an “overlap” between voluntary and involuntary migration, and establishes an intermediate category, “impelled migration.” Petersen differentiated between impelled and forced migration as “impelled migration is when migrants retain some power to decide whether or not to leave, and forced migration, when they do not have this power” (Peterson 1958: 261).

Push and Pull Factors of Migration:

Push and pull factors are commonly used to differentiate between involuntary and voluntary migration. Push factors are forces that compel an individual or community to migrate from their original place. Migration is not undertaken willingly and could be driven by mortal fear or bodily harm if such a move is not made. War, conflict, social strife, disasters, and climatic events could be considered “push factors” for migration. On the other hand, pull factors are characteristics of particular places that attract people to move or migrate to these places. Better economic opportunities, enhanced educational, environmental, and healthcare systems, and better living conditions or social networks could make a place attractive for migration. Based on this typology, push factors are treated as resulting in forced migration, while migration resulting from pull factors is seen as voluntary.

E. F. Kunz (1973) proposed a kinetic model that distinguishes forced migration trajectory as a three-stage process, spanning from flight to asylum to resettlement. According to this model, most refugees that flee and settle elsewhere undergo either of two kinetic movements. The first is an *anticipatory* movement that follows a “push-permit” model where an individual, unsure about their current living

circumstances, anticipates that imminent problems will seriously undermine their present well-being. The individual may have time to prepare, determine, and select their destination and to some extent make plans for a new life. The second concerns *acute* refugee movements where the individual has no time to prepare or think and fears for their life due to a calamity or life-threatening circumstances. As a result, people cannot remain where they are and must flee immediately. This type of movement is described as a “push-pressure” model where people rush from their present abode or area to take shelter in a relatively safer place, which may involve crossing regional or international borders.

Studies underline the fact that forced migration often comes in waves resulting from specific events. The main distinction between forced migration and other forms of migration is that it is characterized by a steady flow of migrants. Forced migration, as Betts (2009) points out, is not a singular category and consists of various types and categories of human movements. According to Charles Martin-Shields (2017), developing a cohesive narrative, based on competing empirical findings, becomes even harder as the number of people forcibly displaced due to violence, economic pressure, disasters, climate, and environmental changes has rapidly escalated. New concepts and drivers of forced migration such as survival migration and mixed migration have emerged. Betts (2009) uses the term “survival migration” to refer to “people who are outside their country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.”

The International Organization on Migration (IOM) defines forced migration as “a migratory movement which although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion” (IOM 2019: 77). Erdal (2020) points out that the term “forced migration” is often used interchangeably with “forced displacement,” which is defined as “the movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters” (IOM 2019: 55).

It is therefore evident that forced displacement involves some kind of coercion or threat that compels a subject to flee from their normal place of residence and seek refuge or security in some other place. The intensity and degree of such a threat might result in different flight trajectories. Where the threat is imminent and has serious consequences, including bodily harm or death, the flight is quick and without much of a decision-making process.

Typologies of Forced Migration

Forced migration consists of subcategories of displaced peoples, based on the causes of their migration, post-migration rights, and opportunities for resettlement. As explained by Kunz’s kinetic model, forced migration, especially in the case of refugees and asylum seekers, is often seen as consisting of three stages – displacement, flight, and refuge. *Displacement* refers to the myriads of factors that compel an individual, household, or community to leave their home. The intensity of coercion decides whether flight will be abrupt or will have some planning behind it. *Flight* refers to the transitory period, wherein displaced people look for immediate safety and subsequent resettlement options. This could include repatriation when the threat no longer remains. If repatriation is not an option, alternative such as seeking asylum in a transit country is necessary. The flight stage can vary. It may result in immediate resettlement or get protracted over a long period of time. *Refuge or resettlement* is the stage when displaced people settle down with a home and an identity. While providing some

certainty, this stage does not necessarily result in a “normal life.” Studies have shown it could take a generation to get resettled and return to normal life. This largely depends on the host society’s attitude towards the resettled population as well as the policy and administrative setup of the host country.

Protracted displacement renders displaced people in limbo, where they can neither return home nor have workable options for resettlement. Tent cities, originally meant for temporary shelter, become permanent settlements. The World Bank’s analysis of UNHCR data by the end of 2018 finds that “the number of protracted refugees had been remarkably stable since 1991 at 5 to 7 million throughout most of the period, before dramatically jumping in the last 3 years. For this group, the average duration of exile increases over time – largely because of the unresolved situation of Afghan refugees which pushes averages up. It is now well over 20 years” (Devictor 2019). Ferris (2018) found that only 2.5% of refugees (552,000 people) were able to return to their home countries in 2016, and even fewer, 0.8% (or 189,300), were resettled through formal resettlement programs. An even smaller percentage (0.001%, or 23,000) were naturalized as citizens in 2016.

Forced migrants can be divided into two categories – people who migrate outside their national borders, while those who are forcibly displaced but remain within the national boundaries are referred to as “internally displaced persons” (IDPs). The following subcategories are generally recognized in forced migration or displacement literature.

Refugee: Often used loosely, the term “refugee” has a specific definition within international law, conferring specific entitlements on individuals whose status as refugees becomes established. It is defined with reference to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Convention (UNHCR 1951) and its 1967 Protocol, along with relevant regional statutes. The UNHCR defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” This definition underlines specific conditions for an individual to be granted refugee status, which include a well-founded fear of persecution, presence outside the territorial boundaries of one’s country, and unavailability of repatriation as it would result in irreparable harm.

A refugee is a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees).

Refugee rights are backed by the principle of “non-refoulement,” an “essential protection under international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law. It prohibits states from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill treatment, or other serious human rights violations” (UNHCR 1951).

People in Refugee-Like Situations: The process for determining the refugee status of an affected individual could take considerable time. Similarly, once refugee status is determined, the host country's requirements (e.g., health and security checks) also take time. In many cases, affected people remain in "transition" in refugee camps for a considerable period; they are in a "refugee-like situation." Their still undetermined status prohibits them from finding "durable settlement." People in refugee-like situations are "people outside their country or territory of origin, who face protection risks like those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained" (UNHCR n.d.).

Asylum Seeker: Individuals who have fled persecution or serious human rights violations and "seek international protection, but whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined," are considered asylum seekers (UNHCR n.d.). Such individuals have crossed the international borders and yet to apply and wait for determination of their refugee status. Often, they are already in the country they intend to seek asylum in and have missed the transition period of being in a camp or in the country of transition.

Environmental or Climate Change-Induced Forced Displacement: Environmental refugees are defined as "people who could no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, and other environmental problems, together with the associated problems of population pressures and profound poverty" (Myers 2002: 609). While the term gained currency in the 1970s and 80s, presently, it has become associated with the term "climate change refugee" and the two terms are often used interchangeably.

Stateless Peoples: A state is a politico-geographic entity comprising a permanent population living within a demarcated territory controlled and ruled generally by a centralized political apparatus. States may derive their power in different ways, depending on the ideology that defines them. A modern, democratic state derives its power from democratic means and institutions. An estimated 10 million people worldwide are considered stateless and denied nationality. The international legal definition of a stateless person is "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. Some people are born stateless, others become stateless" (UNHCR n.d.). A stateless person does not have a nationality or citizenship of any country. Due to their stateless status, they are deprived of basic rights, including freedom of movement. Statelessness could result from discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion, gender, or other differences. It could also result from the emergence of a new state or transfer of territories, gaps in nationality laws, or the deprivation of nationality by state policies. Aristide Zolberg (1983) contends that the creation of new states could result in a *refugee-generating process* where some people or groups could become stateless. Climate change also has the potential to produce stateless people, especially in SIDS, where due to their potential submergence, the population is likely to become stateless.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): These are forced migrants who, because of threats to their individuality, homes, livelihoods, health, or even their lives, seek safety within their own countries, without crossing international borders. They migrate from their normal habitation to other locations where threats either do not exist or are less severe. According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, "IDPs" are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border" (OHCHR n.d.).

Returned IDPs: Internally displaced persons who are beneficiaries of UNHCR protection and assistance and have since returned to their areas of origin or habitual residence are considered returned IDPs (UNHCR 2001–2023).


Returnees: These are former refugees who have returned to their country of origin but are yet to be fully integrated. Such returns normally only happen in conditions of safety and dignity. The UNHCR defines returnees as “people who have returned to their country of origin or habitual residence after a period of displacement, either within their own country (as internally displaced persons) or across an international border (as refugees) (UNHCR 2001–2023). Returnees are often vulnerable and may require support to reintegrate into their communities, rebuild their homes and livelihoods, and access basic services.

People Displaced by Development Projects: Large-scale projects such as dams, mining operations, or other infrastructure projects result in large-scale forced migration. Cernea (2008) notes that in the absence of robust resettlement policies, infrastructure projects result in significant negative impacts. He estimates that 20 million people are displaced annually by such projects, resulting in the loss of their homes and livelihoods. According to Cernea, such displacement could result in “various types of impoverishments” unless effective measures are developed and implemented to resettle such affected peoples. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and other multilateral financing institutions (MFIs) have developed safeguards for such displacement resulting from projects they finance.

Human Smuggling and Trafficking: Other forms of forced migration include the rapidly rising criminal activities of human smuggling and trafficking across national or international borders. The smugglers and traffickers often target vulnerable people trying to escape their precarious conditions in unsafe and illegal ways. Human trafficking also termed as ‘modern slavery’ is quite rampant in the Asia Pacific region. The 2016 Global Slavery Index estimates about 45.8 million people worldwide are subject to some form of modern slavery. 58% of this population lives in five countries of Asia (Walk Free Foundation 2017).

Figure 1 indicates the preexisting vulnerabilities that are exploited by traffickers and human smugglers:

Figure 1: Percentage of Cases by Pre-existing Factors that Traffickers Have Taken Advantage of



Source: Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (GLOTIP) 2020. The same case may report multiple factors, therefore % adds up more than 100% (UNODC 2020: 9)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, based on 223 court cases out of a total of 489 collected by the UNODC, describes migrant smuggling as “facilitation, for financial or other material gain, of irregular entry into a country where the migrant is not a national or resident.” Human trafficking is described as “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of people through force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them for profit” (UNODC website, no year). In both cases, victims are exploited due to their difficult circumstances, and the entire process of such illegal migration is violent and could result in victims losing their lives. Even if victims reach their desired destination, there is no guarantee they can resettle there. Unless granted asylum, they could be deported.

While smuggling and trafficking appear to be identical, they are different. “Smuggled migrants have a consensual relationship with their smugglers and are free at the end of their journey; trafficked persons are enslaved and exploited by their traffickers” (Shelley 2014: 3). People resort to using smuggling organizations to migrate to countries into which they would not be legally admitted. They pay smugglers a fee to get them to a destination country and, as Stephen Castles (2006) notes, participate in a voluntary commercial transaction, albeit on unequal terms, which may result in debt bondage. Human trafficking, on the other hand, operates on the basis of deception and coercion and is mainly meant to exploit the victims. Gallagher (2002) points out that profit in trafficking does not come from the movement of persons but from the sale of a trafficked individual’s sexual services or labor. Most smuggled migrants are men. Most trafficked persons are women and children.

Shock Mobilities: Such mobilities are sudden human movements made in response to acute disruptions, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Xiang and Sørensen (2020) explain that shock mobility encompasses various degrees of forced migration and is categorized as reactive migration caused by a crisis. Forced migration often starts with shock mobility, but shock mobility does not always lead to protracted forced migration.

The Asylum-Migration Nexus: It is difficult to distinguish clearly between voluntary migration driven by economic reasons and forced migration under coercion. Most migrations could involve both coercion and volition and are probably motivated by several economic and sociopolitical factors. “It is this blurred reality that some authors have called asylum-migration nexus” (Mingot and da Cruz 2013). “Separating refugees and forced migrants and economic migrants only arises when receiving countries want to differentiate between the desirable and undesirable entrants, to better control them. The migration-asylum nexus is thus a discourse used to meet certain economic, political, or ideological objectives” (Castles 2009: 27).

The IOM has developed a sourcebook entitled *Glossary on Migration*, which is a useful resource for getting acquainted with the terms and concepts related to migration, including forced migration and forced displacement. As the typology indicates, forced migration is a broad concept incorporating different categories of forced migrants.

Forced Displacement Trends Resulting from War, Conflict and Violence


According to Betts (2014), alarmingly rising trends of forced displacement have led scholars to argue that forced displacement will be the defining problem of the 21st century. Many people have been forced to live outside their recognized communities and countries, with many confined in refugee camps and other containment facilities. The protracted nature of such displacement is evident in tent cities and refugee camps becoming permanent shelters. Similarly, many affected by environmental or climatic

events find their livelihoods and assets lost, leaving them utterly vulnerable. Such displacements extend beyond the scope of humanitarian aid and require long-term development interventions. Forced displacement, therefore, needs to be seen as a developmental challenge.

According to the UNHCR (2022), by the end of 2022 there were 108.4 million forced displaced people worldwide. Causes of such displacement are noted as conflict, violence, human rights violations, or events seriously disturbing public order (Migration Portal). Out of the total number of displaced people, 35.3 million are refugees, 62.5 million are internally displaced, 5.4 million are asylum seekers, and 5.2 million are others in need of international protection. For internally displaced, the figures do not include people displaced by natural disasters or other such events.

A UNHCR report quotes the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in stating that during the year 2022, 32.6 million internal displacements were reported due to disasters, with 8.7 million people remaining displaced at the end of the year. Disaster-related internal displacement accounted for more than half (54%) of all new displacements in 2022 (UNHCR). As the following graph indicates, there has been a sharp increase in the number of forcibly displaced worldwide during the last decade. There is a steep ascent in the graph from 2012 onwards and it is still rising by the end of 2022 (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2022



Source: UNHCR (2022).

Across the globe, in 2005, one out of 174 people (0.57%) was forcibly displaced; this figure increased to one out of 159 (0.63%) in 2010. By 2019, one out of 97 persons, or almost 1% of the world's population, was forcibly displaced (UNHCR 2020). The most recent UNHCR report indicates that the number of forcibly displaced people has crossed the 100 million mark, meaning one out of every 78 people on earth has been forced to flee. The increase has been even sharper in the case of IDPs. In 2010, the UNHCR aided IDPs in 26 countries. By 2020, this number had grown to 34 countries. The enormity of the challenge is further highlighted by the fact that in 2005, UNHCR worked with 6.6 million IDPs. By 2010, this number had more than doubled to 15 million. Ten years later, in 2020, this figure had more than tripled to an estimated 48 million IDPs worldwide. In sum, the number of IDPs increased sevenfold in only 15 years.

Moreover, contrary to the common thinking that forcibly displaced people are flooding countries of the global north, the majority remain within their own countries or migrate to neighboring ones. More than half (58%) of them are internally displaced and have not crossed their own country boundaries. Those who do cross national boundaries are mainly hosted in neighboring countries. Iran and Pakistan, for example, host 3.4 million and 1.7 million Afghan refugees, respectively. Having so many people living in a state of uncertainty, violence, human rights abuses, and other detrimental impacts poses a great challenge to achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Annex 1 of this report consists of two tables with data on forced displacement in the countries of the Asia and Pacific region. Data for these tables are extracted from the 2020 UNHCR report and present the trends and patterns of forced displacement in these DMCs. Table 1 presents the number of forcibly displaced people by country or territory of asylum. Among 52 countries that constitute the UNHCR Asia and Pacific region, 49 are ADB members. Accordingly, Table 1 shows the total population of concern to the UNHCR in ADB developing member countries (DMC), amounting to 11,153,206 people. For this report, 2020 UNHCR report data were extracted only for countries that are members of ADB.

Table 1 indicates that out of the six subregions, Central and West Asia account for the largest number of affected persons, a total of 5,749,088, making it home to more than 57% of forced displaced people. Afghanistan alone accounts for more than three million, followed by Pakistan with 1.5 million. This surpasses the total number of displaced peoples in South Asia and Southeast Asia combined, as these subregions each house little more than 2.4 million displaced people within their boundaries. The Pacific has fewer affected persons (26,251), and the overwhelming majority, 24,918, are in Papua New Guinea. Interestingly, the table also shows that in the Asia and Pacific region, only three countries host more than one million displaced persons each: Afghanistan (3,043,668), Bangladesh (2,205,009), and Pakistan (1,549,507). Myanmar may soon become part of this list; currently it houses just under one million affected people (973,317). The most remarkable statistic, however, is the sheer number of IDPs displaced within their own country's borders consisting of more than 4.4 million people. These data only include population groups internally displaced due to conflict. Those internally displaced by natural or human-made disasters are not included. More than 2.2 million people are classified as "[p]ersons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate." Finally, the table shows that developed ADB member economies host 171,629 displaced persons. Australia hosts more than 83%.

Table 2 in Annex 1 presents data for the ADB DMCs as origins for forced displacement. Central and West Asia again tops the list, with Afghanistan being the source of 5.8 million forced migrants, followed by Myanmar with around 1.5 million. Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines are other major contributors to this forced migration.

The table also indicates that the numbers of those categorized as refugees and those classified as IDPs are almost similar. While around 4.6 million are categorized as refugees, 4.4 million are classified as IDPs. The data distribution, therefore, reinforces the fact that most of the forced migrants either remain within their countries or move to neighboring ones within the region.

Tables 1 and 2 include people classified as returned refugees or returned IDPs who have returned to their original abode. There are 2,542 people in the category of returned refugees, and 155,113 people who are returned IDPs. Afghans comprise most of returned refugees at 90%. The Philippines, on the other hand, lists the greatest number of returned IDPs, i.e., 150,242 (97%).


Almost 67% of displaced people from the Asia and Pacific region originate from Central and West Asia. The regime change and civil war in Afghanistan continue to give rise to the largest number of displaced citizens from one single country. More than 5.8 million citizens of Afghanistan have been forcibly displaced and have either crossed international borders to seek refuge or have relocated to other regions in the country. Azerbaijan is the next hotspot, where 653,921 people are still internally displaced after the trigger event of the Nagorno-Karabakh war ended nearly three decades ago in 1994 (Modebadze 2021).

Southeast Asia is the second most affected region. Here, 2,343,832 persons have been forcibly displaced. A large percentage (65%) are members of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious Rohingya minority community who predominantly lived in the Northwestern Arakan State of Myanmar. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya had to flee the country to escape the systematic persecution and violation of their human rights by Myanmar's military junta regime. They live as refugees mostly in Bangladesh, but many have also fled to the Middle East, Malaysia, and Singapore (Faye 2021). In the Philippines, 300,610 persons were internally displaced. The major trigger point of displacements of concern to the UNHCR has been the southern island of Mindanao, due to the ongoing conflict between the government and the rebels of the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front. Almost half (150,242) of these IDPs have returned to their homes. This is the only substantial number of IDPs who are of concern to the UNHCR in Asia and the Pacific where IDPs managed to return in such large numbers.

In South Asia, only Bangladesh has more than half a million affected persons of concern to the UNHCR. Out of these 473,271 persons in the country do not fit into the main categories of people that require assistance but have nevertheless received protection and support from the UNHCR based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

For the Asia and Pacific region, out of top five countries as originators of 'refugees' and 'people in refugee-like situation', four countries are the DMCs of ADB. Figure 3 from UNHCR's report clearly indicates this trend.

Figure 3: Refugees and People in Refugee-Like Situation by Country of Origin in Asia and the Pacific, 2022



Source: UNHCR (2022: 12).

Christensen and Harild (2009) assert that trends reveal that the rapid increase of forced migration in the 21st century could aggravate conflict situations and lead to further forced displacement. Research also indicates that while refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs become forcibly displaced as a consequence of conflict, they themselves can be causes of conflict. According to Newman and van Selm (2003), the causes and consequences of displacement and efforts to rehabilitate affected groups require policy responses that factor in multidimensional security models, peace-building measures, and comprehensive plans for the post-conflict rebuilding of afflicted areas. For this reason, it is vital that the management of forced migration and the protection of displaced peoples are no longer seen as peripheral to conflict settlement and peace building, but rather as an integral part of international and national policies.

Forced Displacement Resulting from Disasters and Natural Events

IDMC report for 2021 recorded 23.7 million disaster and natural event-related displacements. Of these, floods and storms jointly caused 21.6 million internal displacements. IDMC data indicate that there were 13.69 million IDPs in East Asia representing 58% of the global total, with most of this displacement caused by typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. The People's Republic of China (PRC), Viet Nam, and the Philippines were the most affected countries. In South Asia, 5.25 million people were forcibly displaced due to disasters, accounting for 22% of the global total.

Cyclones and floods were the main disaster events resulting in this displacement. East Asia, including Southeast Asia, and South Asia together recorded 80% of global forced displacement resulting from disasters and natural events (Figure 4).


The Asia and Pacific region contributes to the majority of IDPs resulting from disaster/natural events-related displacement. Five of the top 10 countries with the most IDPs due to disasters are found in Southeast Asia and South Asia, indicating the prevalence of internal displacement in these subregions. Afghanistan and Myanmar are the two hotspots for conflict and violence-related displacement, while disaster-induced displacement happens in most other countries. East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia contribute to about 53% of the global *internal* displacement.

The IDMC points to the gaps in data collection and reporting. This includes gaps in identifying the year when the internal displacement occurs as well as the duration of living in a displaced situation. "This gap continues to be a major barrier to understanding the true scope and scale of protracted displacement globally" (IDMC 2022). It also highlights that the data on IDPs in several countries have not been verified and updated. "Collecting more disaggregated and up-to-date information on these populations is key to the design of tailored prevention and response measures intended to decrease their number" (IDMC 2022).

The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 and 2021 resulted in the internal displacement of people, who had to leave their routine workplaces and move back to their original homes. Sudden and abrupt lockdowns left many people with little choice resulting to make desperate moves. Apart from the colossal loss of life, the pandemic resulted in the loss of livelihoods and education, food insecurity, and high unemployment. People were forced out of jobs, businesses shut down, and health services were stretched to the limits. Robust data collection is necessary to understand and quantify the extent of pandemic-induced forced displacement, its severity, and its impacts on livelihood systems in the region.

Figure 4: Internal Displacements by Conflict, Violence and Disasters, per Region

Source: IDMC. 2022. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID).

Figure 5: Forced Displaced Population Groups in Asia and the Pacific 2020–2021


* Including displaced stateless persons.

Source: UNHCR 2021 Asia and the Pacific Regional Trends.

As the comparative graph in Figure 5 indicates, within the Asia and Pacific region, the number of forced migrants across all categories rose within just one year. The sharp increase in IDP numbers that surpassed the number of refugees reinforces the fact that many forced migrants remain within their national boundaries. One positive aspect is a corresponding increase in the number of IDP returnees, indicating that conditions may have become conducive for their return. In contrast, the small number of refugee returnees fell even further between 2020 and 2021, indicating that threats of violence and harm persist, discouraging the refugees from returning to their original homes.

Pakistan is the largest host country for forced migrants in the region followed by Bangladesh. Due to ongoing conflict and political instability, Afghanistan and Myanmar are the primary countries from where refugees originate. However, reasonably stable countries also contribute to the forced migrant population. As the UNHCR (2020) data shows, the number of people displaced inside their own countries due to armed conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations also continues to grow.

Figure 6: IDP Trends in the Asia and Pacific Region 2018 to 2022



Source: UNHCR (2022: 16).

As the graph in Figure 6 indicates, there has been a sharp increase in the number of IDPs just over a period of four years with the figure almost doubling from 2.6 million to 4.9 million. Under the UNHCR, the head count for IDPs is based on those displaced by conflict, generalized violence, and human rights violations. This does not account for the alarmingly large number of people displaced due to natural disasters, crop failures, and food insecurity, among other things. Based on available data, it is evident that forced displacement is a critical humanitarian and development challenge in the Asia and Pacific region. Though disasters and natural events are the main contributors, conflict, violence, and human rights abuse also contribute substantially to forced displacement.

Disaster-related displacement is often seen as a short-term phenomenon as affected people start returning to their homes once the impacts of natural event subside. However, the rising intensity and frequency of a natural event could prolong its impacts considerably and could force the affected people to become permanently displaced. The lack of reliable and disaggregated data poses problems for tailored approaches to dealing with forced displacement. The data presented here are taken from the UNHCR and IMDC, two of the most reliable agencies working on forced displacement. Both agencies acknowledge that forced migration data are mostly estimates and underscore the need for better data collection methods that incorporate systematic and gender disaggregated approaches. More rigorous data collection and analysis that includes qualitative studies will require multi-agency coordination and sufficient local, regional, and national resources to help develop informed interventions both at the humanitarian and developmental intervention levels.

Forced displacement also poses intractable challenges towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and will have corresponding impacts on achieving ADB's goals of inclusive and sustainable Asia and the Pacific under the Strategy 2030. It needs to be recognized that forced displacement is not just a humanitarian challenge but also a result of failed economic and developmental

priorities, and corresponding measures need to be found in the continuum of the humanitarian–development spectrum.

3. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT

The previous section presented the definition of forced displacement, its typologies, and trends in the Asia and Pacific region. This section examines its causes and consequences. This report outlines three major causes of forced displacement:

1. violence, war, conflict, and political persecution including human rights violations;
2. economic factors, inequality, and poverty;
3. natural disasters and environmental and climate change events.

Violence, War, and Conflict

War, conflict, violence, and political persecution are some of the major causes of forced displacement. In such cases, forced displacement results from some form of direct violence and coercion that threatens the safety, security, and well-being of the affected peoples. This compels individuals, households, or entire communities to leave their residence for places where violence, coercion, and threats ease or cease to exist. Such violence could result in individual- or household-level forced migration or the mass exodus of communities.


War between nations often results in forced displacement from the weaker side, as can be seen in the ongoing war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, with millions of Ukrainians seeking refuge in the neighboring countries. In cases of civil war, where warring parties try to take control of political power, affected populations are compelled to flee from their country and seek security elsewhere, or sometimes within the country where pockets of relative security and safety exist. Conflict and political persecution result in direct violence against targeted groups. Such targeted groups either do not accept a government's authority or are seen as not fitting within the sociocultural fabric of a nation state. In the latter case, violence can take the form of "ethnic cleansing."

The root causes of violent conflict can be found in ethnic, religious, and/or cultural discord; deep inequalities, injustices, and marginalization within society; weak or corrupt governance and institutions; poverty; and, increasingly, climate and environmental factors. If left unaddressed, these factors can contribute to instability, conflict, and large-scale forced displacement both within and across national borders. Conflicts can be self-perpetuating, causing continued internal displacement or the outflow of refugees (UNHCR Forced Displacement 2019).

Violence resulting in forced displacement could be of two types: (1) direct and manifest physical violence caused by war, conflict, and persecution that has a clear subject–object relation between the perpetrator and the victim; and (2) indirect and latent violence such as structural and institutional constraints that inhibit the well-being of individuals or communities. In the case of indirect violence, the subject–object relation is not as clear or straightforward. Galtung (1964) classifies violence into three categories – direct, structural, and cultural. He denounces the notion of violence simply

as “somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form)” and contends that “violence is present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realization” (Galtung 1969: 168). For Galtung, the difference between “actual” and “potential” is the main determinant for defining and measuring violence. Galtung’s theory explores the interconnectedness of structural, cultural, and direct violence resulting in the exclusion of a group of people that could lead to its forced displacement amongst other consequences (Figure 7).

Figure 7: A Typology of Violence



Source: Johan Galtung's article "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" (1969: 173).

Bourgeois argues that “violence plays out both in times of war and peace. He identifies four forms and expressions of violence – direct political violence (targeted physical violence and terror); structural violence (historically entrenched political and economic oppression and social inequality); symbolic violence (internalized humiliations exercised through misrecognition); and everyday violence (daily practices and expressions of violence on a micro-interaction)” (Bourgeois 2001: 5–34).

Direct Violence: Direct violence is manifest during war, conflict, and ethnic cleansing. Governments, in some cases, also persecute their own people. Armed conflicts lead to persecution of opposing groups or atrocities perpetrated on ethnically diverse groups. Forced displacement resulting from such direct and manifest violence is easier to identify, and protection for such displacement is established under international legal frameworks, as in the case of refugees. War and conflicts often result in the mass exodus of populations fleeing bodily harm, rape, torture, and often death. Affected people are forced to cross international boundaries or end up in refugee camps, such as the Afghans in Pakistan and Myanmar Rohingyas in neighboring Bangladesh. Others are internally displaced and forced to migrate within their own countries. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2016), in its Global Peace Index (GPI), forced displacement is a factor that negatively impacts peace. It states that the index of the least peaceful countries overlaps with that of countries experiencing major displacement crises.

Indirect Violence: Indirect violence, on the other hand, has no manifest subject–object relationship and is significantly more difficult to identify. Galtung (1969) contends that it is often accepted as a given condition, wherein social structures or institutions harm people, preventing them from meeting their basic needs.

Structural Violence: Structural violence is one form of indirect violence. Galtung defines structural violence as “violence that is built into the structures and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (1969). Violence in this form is usually not physical but could manifest in physical harm resulting from structural constraints. For example, an individual dying of a curable disease due to the inability to

pay for treatment, loses their life due to structural violence. Weigert (2008) states that, although less visible, structural violence is by far the most lethal as given structures provide individuals with settings whereby, they could cause other individuals harm, intentionally or unintentionally. She points out that in the case of structural violence, harm is preventable and there are no manifest perpetrators of such violence.

As inequality within a system rises, so does the intensity of indirect violence. Such preventable structural violence inflicts immense harm on human wellbeing. Mahatma Gandhi famously stated that poverty is the deadliest form of violence. Sen (1982) makes a similar argument in the case of famine and emphasizes that dealing with starvation requires creating entitlements, not just making food available. The lack of entitlements, as an outcome of structural violence, could lead people to starve even if the food is available. According to Demenchonok and Petersen (2009), structural violence is predictable and institutionally causes harm for which preventive measures could be taken. Examples include hunger and food insecurity, and rising poverty resulting from increasing inequality or natural disasters. All these keep people vulnerable; however, this could be addressed by effective policies.

Cultural Violence: Cultural violence is closely associated with structural violence and often reinforces it. It is “exemplified by religion and ideology, art and culture, and empirical and formal science used to justify or legitimize violence in its direct and structural forms” (Galtung 1990: 291). Galtung further states that cultural violence represents prevailing or prominent social norms that make direct and structural violence seem natural, right, or at least acceptable. Cultural violence helps explain how beliefs and cultural practices can become so dominant that they function unchallenged and are reproduced and followed over a *longue durée*. It represents features of culture that reflect arts, ideological and religious alignments, language, and other elements that represent a way of life that can be used to legitimize and normalize direct and structural violence. Such normalization results in both the perpetrator and victim accepting such violence as normal. An example is familial violence in a patriarchal society where a husband’s violent treatment of his wife is seen as “normal” by both parties.

Violence, therefore, needs a nuanced approach due to its impact on populations, particularly the vulnerable. In its direct form it drives people to flee to safety; in its indirect form it has far-reaching repercussions as it becomes normalized, systemic, and accepted. Using structural violence as an analytical tool demonstrates that the distinction between voluntary and forced migration is never watertight. Mobile people treated as economic and voluntary migrants may have been driven by systemic, structural inequalities that provide them with very little life chances, and migration becomes the only solution.

Economic Factors: Poverty, Inequality, and Economic Uncertainty

Economic factors such as slow growth or stagnant GDP, declines in agricultural output, wide income disparities, inequitable distribution mechanisms, lack of economic opportunities, lack of social protection and safety nets, and outcomes of global politico-economic regimes such as the WTO and IMF can force people to migrate. Lack of economic opportunity, poverty, and forced migration are inextricably linked. For example, according to the Food and Agricultural Organization’s annual Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC), nearly one billion people around the world are chronically hungry due to extreme poverty, and up to two billion people lack food security intermittently due to varying degrees of poverty (FAO GRFC 2022). The report found

that, in 2019, nine out of the ten countries with the largest numbers of IDPs experienced major food crises.

Poverty is a complex concept that is widely contested. International development organizations often define and evaluate poverty using statistical indicators. The World Bank defines “extreme poverty” as “people living on less than \$2.15 per person per day” (World Bank 2024). The United Nations Development Program uses the Human Poverty Index and defines it as a “composite index measuring deprivations in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index (HDI)—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living” (UNDP n.d.). According to Kothari (2002), key to understanding the role of migration in chronic poverty is an analysis of social exclusion, poverty-related capitals, and social relations.

Poverty is a key determinant for forced migration. It does not necessarily trigger such migration because the poor often lack the monetary resources, networks, and supportive policies required to migrate. Studies indicate that if such forced migration happens, it is usually confined to short distances, within a region or country. Migration driven by poverty and the lack of livelihoods is usually considered economic and voluntary migration.

Inequality lies at the core of poverty and economic uncertainties within a society. The Kuznets (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002) curve demonstrates the relationship between inequality and income – when economies start growing leading to the production of wealth, inequality rises. As countries become richer, the curve starts going downwards, indicating decreasing inequality. Political and social elements also determine how deeply entrenched inequality will be in a society. Public policy and governance are vital to wealth redistribution. For example, a taxation regime that taxes high-income groups and uses revenues for social development and social protection could see a decrease in inequality. In highly stratified societies, government interventions and policies supporting education, employment, housing, and healthcare could result in gains for those on the lower rungs.


A political economic analysis of inequality focuses on how inequality is produced, distributed, and sustained within a society.

Inequality refers not only to income, wealth, or economic factors but also includes the social and political relationships between different groups in a society. It is intersectional and an individual who is excluded in one area also lacks the resources to do better in others. Inequality also manifests itself in the existing power relationships that determine entitlements within that society. Within international development, inequality is seen as an outcome of two conditions. The first is “*differences in circumstances*” that result in social and economic exclusion that hampers the upward mobility of groups and individuals deprived of entitlements. Addressing such inequality requires effective policy interventions by identifying differentiated positions that act as drivers of inequality. The second refers to “*differences in efforts*,” which is treated as fair, acceptable, even desirable, as it provides incentives to citizens who work harder, seek opportunities, and take risks (Kanbur, Rhee, and Zhuang 2014).

Inequality is a major form of structural violence. It results in people being deprived of life chances and entitlements. UNESCAP (2018) states that inequality could trigger forced displacement in the Asia and Pacific region where it continues to rise despite the economic gains over the last few decades. The World Inequality Report 2022 (Chancel et al. 2022) presents a dismal scenario of the worldwide spread of inequality, whereby the bottom 50% of the world population has only an 8.5% share in global income, while the top 10% garners a share of 52%. The gap is even starker in the case of wealth,

whereby the top 10% owns 76% of global wealth, while the bottom 50% owns a paltry 2% (Figure 8).


Figure 8: Global Income and Wealth Inequality, 2021



Source: World Inequality Report 2022.

As Figure 9 shows, inequality patterns in the Asia and Pacific region are equally stark when compared to global patterns. While the East Asia region seems more egalitarian and inclusive, income ownership of its lower rungs is no better than other Asia and Pacific subregions. South and Southeast Asia have large income gaps between the top 10% owning 55% of national income and the bottom 50% owning just about 12%. Such stark inequalities could force people to look for better economic opportunities and migrate.

Figure 9: Comparative Income Ownership Among Three Societal Groups Across the Different Regions



Source: World Inequality Report 2022.

A comprehensive study by ADB on inequality in the Asia and Pacific region indicates that the entire development process has been ailing due to a sharp rise in inequality in the region. It notes that “rapid growth has significantly improved living standards and reduced extreme poverty. During 1990–2010, the region’s average per capita GDP in 2005 PPP terms increased from \$1,602 to \$4,982. The proportion of the population living on or below the \$1.25-a-day poverty line fell from 54% in 1990 to 22% in 2008, as 700 million people were lifted out of poverty” (Kanbur, Rhee, and Zhuang 2014). The ADB study distinguishes between the “inequality of outcome” and “inequality of opportunity,” presents estimates of both dimensions, develops a framework of drivers of inequality, and identifies key policy interventions that Asian governments will have to consider in addressing rising inequality. It is argued that efforts and programs aimed at addressing inequality could adversely impact economic growth. Hence, any policy or political intervention needs to be well thought out, ensuring that such an intervention does not strangle the growth. However, unregulated growth can result in a sharp divide between the haves and have nots, threatening social cohesion and the sustainability of growth. Governments need a balanced approach that, along with enhancing economic growth, also ensures the redistribution of wealth.

Institutional Factors and Forced Displacement

Institutions come to play a vital role in forced displacement. Previous sections on violence and inequality demonstrate that institutions could become both direct and indirect perpetrators of violence resulting in forced displacement. However, institutions can also play a vital role in addressing the root causes of forced migration and in post-migration resettlement and reconstruction. Institutional analysis at various levels is therefore required. The following sections deal with broader institutional factors that play a role in the processes of forced displacement.

Governance and the State

Governance has a direct causal linkage with forced displacement. While war, conflict, violence, economic crisis, and environmental change are viewed as its main causes and drivers, forced displacement also needs to be studied from a governance perspective (GNDR 2022). Weak governance results in the deprivation of rights for citizens, which compels them to seek fulfillment of those rights elsewhere. “What ultimately determines whether international protection is needed is the quality of governance in the country of origin. In states with weak governance, the only available means to acquire protection may be to leave the country” (Betts 2013: 1). Similarly, Gros (1996) contends that to be effective, a state must fulfill contractual obligations to its citizens by providing services such as law and order, public security, health services, education, employment, and social safety nets. In turn, this contractual obligation also requires citizens to follow the state’s legal framework and accept its authority.

According to Gravingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum (2015), statehood is based on three interrelated dimensions – authority, capacity, and legitimacy (CAL). *Authority* refers to legitimized power and the state’s ability to hold the monopoly of such legitimized power that is recognized by its citizens. A diminished authority reduces the state’s ability to define and execute rules and protect citizens from willful violence. By implication, authority is thus related to the degree to which the state can guarantee the physical integrity of its citizens. *Capacity* is characterized by the state’s ability to provide basic services to the people. This is a contractual relationship between the state and society and a state is expected to fulfill this obligation to hold authority. *Legitimacy* refers to the citizenry’s acceptance of the state’s claim to be the only legitimate actor to set and

enforce rules, and law and order. Low levels of legitimacy could turn a state into a repressive regime.

Governance refers to the role of the state from a wider, contractual perspective whereby the state must fulfill certain functions to hold authority and legitimacy. This widens the scope of forced displacement resulting not just from persecution but also from the state's failure or inability to fulfill its contractual obligations to its citizens. The state's role as a conduit for forced displacement therefore needs to be examined, whether as a "perpetrator of violence" or as a "failed" or "fragile" state unable to provide safety, security, and other rights to its citizens. Ineffective governance either results from the state deliberately ignoring governance principles as with dictatorial regimes, or it could result from the state's failure or fragility, and both these scenarios could result in forced displacement of the citizens.

Failed State

A state is defined as "failed" when it is unable to enforce its laws or provide its citizens with basic goods and services. Factors such as conflict, a lack of governance, and corruption contribute to a state's failure. Failed states "are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy" (Rotberg 2003). Rotberg contends that in the hierarchy of political goods, human security is the most critical and enables the delivery of other goods. The freedom of citizens to participate in the political process is fundamental, followed by the delivery of services such as education, employment, economic stability, health, transportation, etc. Based on these criteria, a modern state may be judged strong, weak, or failed.

Strong states ensure effective control over their territories and deliver a full range of political goods to their citizens. Weak states, apart from their inability to provide human security and services, are marred by ethnic, religious, and other intercommunal tensions that further erode their authority. Rotberg (2003) further argues that there is no failed state without disharmonies among communities. The sectarian divide reflected in internal violence between social groups or state-persecuted groups treated as "the others" can lead to forced internal or cross-border migration. Internecine strife also weakens institutions and a failed state's ability to control its borders. Rotberg posits that a failed state's institutions are often partisan, giving preference to one population group over others, and further perpetuating intergroup disharmonies and conflict. He notes that failed states are economically weak, marked by a lack of development, economic deprivation, and a paucity of livelihood opportunities. The poor and vulnerable, including minorities, are mainly impacted and forced to migrate. He adds that another feature of a failed state is the lack of freedom that restricts the political participation of marginalized groups who denounce the authority of the state and could seek autonomy.

A failed state is marked by an overall breakdown of its political, economic, and sociocultural institutions that undermines the CAL of the state. A failed state is unable to fulfill its contractual obligations to its citizens. As a result, it loses its legitimacy, and its authority is not accepted by all citizens. Such states are also marred by parochial and partisan policies that widen the socioeconomic, cultural, and political divide within the society and lack the capacity to provide essential services. As a result, people seek these services by migrating to other countries or areas. Institutional failure or fragility is, therefore, a precursor to forced displacement resulting from conflict, violence, a lack of effective governance, or other reasons.

Fragile State

The term “fragile” has emerged as a critique against the notion of a “failed state” and calls for careful assessment of what failure and fragility mean when describing states. According to Bøås and Jennings (2005), the “failed state” concept is a Western construct, indicating that a country is seen as a security risk to the global north. For example, Afghanistan under the Taliban regime was seen as “failed” more from the perspective of the Taliban being a security threat to Western nations and their interests rather than to Afghan citizens themselves. As a result, in some cases, as Martin-Shields contends, the attributes that make some countries failed are favored for political and economic reasons by developed countries.


“Fragility” has become a frequently used concept for a weak state. Call (2008) dismissed the subjective concept of “failure” for the more objective “fragile” and developed a “gap framework” that identifies three key areas where a state can no longer provide the necessary services to its people. These gaps relate to 1) capacity, when the state cannot effectively deliver basic goods and services to the people; 2) security, when the state is unable to protect its population from armed invasion; and 3) legitimacy, when a large section of population rejects the authority of the state and refuses to follow its laws and regulations (Call 2010). Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum (2015) further contend that state fragility relates to a state’s ability to fulfill its basic functions that depend on its interaction with a given society. Statehood is about state–society relations. Fragile statehood is characterized by a wide range of dysfunctional state–society relations, including the state’s ability to control territory and support their population, and their failure to convince the population of their legitimacy.

Within the arena of international development, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) since 2013 has employed the MDB Harmonized Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FCAS) classification system. ADB defines a fragile state as a country that exhibits the following characteristics (ADB 2021):

1. weak institutional capacity, meaning that their government structures, policies, and systems are not well developed or functional. This can result in poor governance, corruption, and limited-service delivery;
2. political instability, including conflict, violence, and instability in leadership. This can result in instability in policymaking, a weak rule of law, and limited accountability;
3. economic vulnerability, including low levels of economic growth, high levels of poverty, and limited economic opportunities. This can result in social exclusion, inequality, and limited access to basic services;
4. social fragility, including social exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination. This can result in social unrest, conflict, and violence.

In 2022, ADB classified 12 developing member countries as FCAS. Small island developing states (SIDS) are another cluster of countries grouped together with FCAS. SIDS self-identify as a group of countries with specific social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities. SIDS in the Asia and Pacific region are affected by a fragility that can threaten lives and livelihoods, strain state capacity and service provision, and exacerbate local tensions over land issues and other resources. SIDS can share similar structural constraints to FCAS.

Figure 10: ADB's Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations and Small Island Developing States



Source: ADB (2021: 3).

The World Bank uses Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) to categorize states based on a multidimensional measure of state capacity, “primarily grounded in economic management and public administration processes” (World Bank n.d.). The World Bank has been using CPIA to assess state fragility since 2004. The assessment process evolved over the years and the yearly classification has been grouped under four headings: (i) Low Income Countries Under Stress List (2004–08); Fragile States list (2009–10); Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (2011–2020); List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FY20 onwards).

State fragility, therefore, emphasizes the contractual relationship between the state and its citizens. In a mature relationship, both parties enjoy their rights and follow their obligations. The state’s authority has continued acceptance among its citizens, including the state’s right of monopoly over legalized violence. Citizens, on the other hand, expect the state to follow its obligations to provide them with security, economic and livelihood resources, civic amenities, and other services. This contractual relationship is sustained by Capacity, Authority, and Legitimacy (CAL). Weakness in any of its domains indicates fragility. Martin-Shields (2017) notes that the quality and outcome of how a state provides economic, social, and physical safety influence decisions to migrate.

Survival Migration: Human Rights and Forced Displacement

Survival migration is based on human rights principles and is closely related to the concept of a state’s role in fulfilling its contractual obligations to its citizens. Betts (2013) contends that fewer people are fleeing state persecution today; more are fleeing due to the unwillingness or inability of weak states to ensure fundamental rights.

People displaced due to “state persecution” have international legal entitlements, those displaced due to a state’s “failure to fulfill its obligations” have no such entitlements. Such displaced peoples are generally treated as economic migrants and the principle of non-refoulement does not apply to them.

Survival migration “is based on the recognition that what matters is not privileging particular causes of movement but clearly identifying a threshold of fundamental rights which, when unavailable in a country of origin, requires the international community to allow people to cross an international border and receive access to temporary or permanent sanctuary” (Betts 2013: 4–5). Betts argues that “people fleeing fundamental human rights deprivations resulting from state fragility, environmental change, and food insecurity within their own country need to have a recognized entitlement to receive international protection. Otherwise there remains a massive inconsistency in how states respond to survival migrants fleeing serious human rights deprivations” (2013). Crisp (2008a) notes that new categories such as the “asylum-migration nexus,” “mixed migration,” and “migration and refugee protection” emerged under the human rights-based approach. Stewart Patrick (2011) points out that fragility correlates strongly with gross human rights abuses and refugee movements. The human rights perspective, therefore, provides a wider lens not confined to “persecution” but emphasizes the violation of human rights and the failure of a state to meet its obligations as core drivers of forced displacement.

Globalization and Forced Displacement

While globalization is a modern, late twentieth century concept, as a process it is not new. Global trade and the exchange of cultures, artifacts, and ideas precede the rise of modern-day capitalism. The end of the cold war paved the way for the growth of globalization. One of its objectives was to integrate nation states that were part of the Soviet regime or socialist bloc into a unified, global market system. This was accompanied by IMF-driven structural adjustment programs directed at limiting the role of states in their economies and markets. Its impacts are not only economic but also sociocultural and political.

Globalization, often seen as an economic process is a rather complex phenomenon encompassing economic, sociocultural, and political dimensions. Giddens, for example, defines it as the “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990: 64). Globalization concept was premised on a new world order based on neoliberal ideology and global integration of markets that would result in increased productivity and wealth, equitable distribution of global wealth, and general prosperity. It was originally argued that globalization will result in “prosperity and improved quality of life for the people of the global economy” (Ohmae 1995: 149). However, since its advent, there has been ample evidence that globalization has neither been egalitarian nor fair. It has mostly benefited the global north, and its benefits are monopolized by the affluent classes of the global south. Castles (2006) states that globalization brings about vast increases in human insecurity and inequality, and poverty continues to thrive. As the World Inequality Report states, today, a very small number of people control a major part of global and national resources and wealth. Furthermore, structural adjustment requirements imposed by global financial institutions mean that states are unable to take up welfare measures. Their populations are exposed to the vagaries of an unstable and unpredictable economic environment and are unable to benefit from the globalized market system. Various authors (Beck 1997; Castells 1996; Hoogvelt 1997) contend that globalization has become a system

of selective inclusion and exclusion of specific areas and groups, which maintains and exacerbates inequality.

Current trends of economic migration and forced displacement need to be studied through the globalization lens. With the increasing penetration of global capital in the economies of the global south, some experience higher incomes while others find their livelihoods lost and workplaces destroyed, forcing them to migrate in search of better opportunities.

International migration originates in the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the expansion of capitalist markets into nonmarket or premarket societies. In the context of a globalizing economy, the entry of markets and capital-intensive production methods into peripheral nonmarket or premarket economies disrupts existing social and economic arrangements and brings about widespread displacement of people from customary livelihoods, creating a mobile population of wage laborers who actively search for new ways of achieving economic sustenance (Massey 1999).

While globalization favors the unfettered movement of capital and goods, it is more selective with the movement of people. Skilled and qualified individuals from the global south can move more easily to the north, while unskilled or semi-skilled people are unwelcome. Immigration policies and regulatory frameworks including “border protection” or “border control” programs prevent or prohibit their entry and encourage human smuggling, resulting in severe exploitation of migrants. Crisp (2008b) points out that globalization provides the infrastructure and the resources that people need to move even to places where they are unwelcome. It creates perfect conditions for forced displacement, and understanding the current trends of forced migration requires an understanding of the globalization process. Marfleet (2006) contends that the uneven development and lopsided distribution of globalization benefits create the context within which specific factors, including political repression, social conflict, and climate and environmental crises, more readily trigger forced migration. Similarly, the “globalization of financial, commercial and other international relations is bringing about enormous and significant changes in the broader political, economic and social context in which cross-border immigration takes place and forced displacement is a crucial part of the globalization process” (Collinson 1999: 2).

International migration and globalization are reciprocal processes. Globalization drives international migration, while migration generates and facilitates globalization. Gibney (2004) notes that in addition to the ethnic and civil conflicts towards the end of the twentieth century, unequal and uneven globalization played a significant role in the rapid increase in forced migration. He sees recent waves of refugees responding not only to violent conflicts but also to the uneven distribution of security and welfare across states. Castles (2003) makes a similar point, that weak economies result in a weak state that fails to provide the required services to its citizens and is accompanied by human rights abuses leading to an “asylum-migration nexus” that blurs the distinction between economic and forced migration.

The emerging shape “migration” is taking due to globalization is resulting in: 1) the globalization of migration as countries are seriously and simultaneously affected by migration movements; 2) the growth and acceleration of migration; and 3) migration differentiation (migration is increasingly taking place for many countries and frequently in all forms, such as labor migration, refugees, and permanent settlers; 4) migrant

feminization as women are increasingly participating in immigration; and 5) immigration being increasingly politicized and 6) transition resulting in emigration countries becoming immigration countries (Castles and Miller 2009: 16).

Consequences of Forced Displacement

The consequences of forced displacement vary depending on the nature and intensity of the actual displacement process. These are often divided into “short-term” and “long-term” consequences. For example, in the case of natural events or short-lived conflicts, if displaced populations remain within their countries and return is a possibility, the consequences are short term. For those who cross international borders and are living in camps, or awaiting resettlement in a third country, the impacts could be long term. In cases of ongoing conflict or natural disasters without comprehensive recovery programs, the impacts could be long term too, as in such cases returning and resuming one’s disrupted livelihood is not possible. Similarly, state-perpetrated violence and human rights abuses could also have long-term impacts, especially in autocratic states.

Loescher et al. (2008) state that large numbers of refugees are living in camps in remote and insecure parts of the world and have been in exile for many years. Horst and Grabska (2015) add that many studies have shown that European asylum systems increasingly produce cases of individuals who are left in limbo for decades in asylum camps or temporary lodgings. The World Bank website indicates that 67% of refugees had been displaced for five or more years by the end of 2022. Similarly, in the case of disasters and environment/climate change-induced displacement, consequences could be short or long term. Post disaster, if the affected people are able to return and resume their livelihoods, the consequences could be short term. In cases where such impacts are severe and without any effective recovery programs, impacts could be long term and rebuilding livelihoods and other support systems could be a difficult process. The consequences of forced displacement are closely related to the severity of the impact and the vulnerability of the affected peoples and communities. In cases where communities are resilient and are supported by effective recovery programs, the consequences could be more easily managed. In these cases, if the people are vulnerable and there are no recovery programs, the consequences are long term and recovery becomes very difficult.

Forced displacement has massive consequences for displaced peoples as they face deprivation with no access to economic, social, and legal safety nets. Even if they can return, they may find their properties destroyed and pillaged and that they need to start from the scratch. Psychological impacts from the loss of family members, friends, identity, and a sense of belonging have deep and long-term consequences for displaced populations. Family breakups are normal. Even in cases where displaced persons find a durable solution in the form of resettling in a third country, reuniting with the family takes a long time under the quagmire of the legal and medical procedures of the third country. A study of Rohingya in Bangladesh finds that “living conditions inside the overcrowded camps remain dismal” (Milton A. H. et al. 2017: 942).


Displaced people find it difficult to get their education, skills, and expertise recognized in a new country. Language barriers and discrimination further exacerbate this situation, compelling displaced persons to accept menial jobs detrimental to their self-esteem. Developing new social networks and friendships becomes challenging and largely depends on the attitude and efforts of the host society. Manby (2016) also points out that the lack of identification may be both a consequence and a cause of forced displacement. Documents are lost or destroyed because of conflicts or disasters that force people to flee their homes, or during arduous journeys to a new country.

In the case of development-induced displacement, Cernea (2002) conceptualizes an “impoverishment risk and reconstruction model identifying eight types of impoverishment risks.” Kibreab (2004) found Cernea’s model useful in the case of refugees too. As this impoverishment risk typology indicates, forced displacement impacts cover a broad spectrum of economic and sociocultural impacts. Displaced people mainly depend on the support provided by humanitarian agencies. Even after resettlement, their dependence on humanitarian agencies continues for a long time due to the lack of employment, nonrecognition of their education and skills, language barriers, and discrimination from host communities. Forced displacement impacts are therefore multipronged and could have long-lasting impacts on the displaced people.

Forced Displacement and Women: The Gender Perspective

Castles and Miller (2009) point to the “womenization or feminization of migration,” which is also true about forced migration and displacement. Women make up almost half of the forced displaced population worldwide. The IDMC estimates that there were 48 million IDPs worldwide at the end of 2020. Of these, women and girls accounted for approximately 50.4% (or just over half) of the total number of IDPs. Similarly, Statista (2023) data indicate that 50% of refugees are women, as shown in the following chart.

Figure 11: Distribution of Refugee Population Worldwide in 2022, by Age Group and Gender



Source: Statista 2023.

As Figure 11 indicates, men and women refugees are evenly distributed across age groups as well. Women refugees in the age group 18–59 outnumber men refugees by 1%. Women and girls face specific vulnerabilities from the onset of flight. They get separated from their families and communities and face heightened risks of gender-based violence, rape, and loss of economic and social support systems, extreme poverty, and a lack of access to basic infrastructure, services, and livelihood opportunities. Cazabat et al. (2020) note that displaced girls and women living in camps are particularly vulnerable to human and sex trafficking and other forms of exploitation. The risks they face through their displacement journey – from the onset of their flight, through to transit and resettlement – are often lifelong.

Interruptions in education that further limit opportunities are also more common for girls than boys. "Girls are more likely to drop out of school in displacement situations than boys" and "displacement can worsen gender inequalities and harmful social norms, leading to discrimination and devaluation of girls' education" (UNHCR 2019). Economically, women can have very restricted access to livelihood avenues. According to the IDMC (2020), displacement reinforces preexisting gender norms that perpetuate and amplify women's socioeconomic disadvantages and can increase their dependence on humanitarian agencies. Women who were not engaged in formal employment find it particularly difficult to find employment opportunities. Forced displacement could also alter women's traditional roles and requires them to take up the role of the household head and provider in the absence of a male partner. This adds to the stress of the increased demand to provide, despite having limited abilities, skills, and opportunities. The IDMC (2022) reports that living in foreign surroundings and facing barriers to social integration pose new threats to displaced people, particularly women and girls. The IDMC notes that studies show an increase in domestic violence potentially linked to higher levels of stress and trauma following displacement. Thus, women become the receptors of violence from displaced men who are unable to adequately provide for their families and lose self-esteem when women take on the provider role. The IDMC (2022) adds that during the transitional phase the camps may not have enough female staff or staff properly trained in the gender- and culture-specific needs of displaced women and girls. Health services during the flight and transition phases may not adequately cater to women's needs. Limited facilities and services, the stigma around sexual and reproductive health, a lack of child-friendly and gender-sensitive information and limited financial capacity result in a big gap in health services for displaced women (IDMC 2020).

Gaanderse (2013) notes that in humanitarian assistance there are still unintended risks and consequences for women such as "abuses of authority during land allocation, physical limitations on collecting and transporting distributed food and relief items, and an increased vulnerability to violence and abuse stemming from distances traveled for firewood or water collection." A gender-based perspective is therefore necessary to understand the experiences women go through during forced displacement, including settling down post-displacement. "Women, men, girls, and boys experience forced displacement in dramatically different ways due to socially ascribed gender roles and relations in both their place of origin and their place of refuge. Though such experiences could be part of everyday life due to gender inequality, these become harsher due to breakdown of the social structures and norms in cases of forced displacement" (Gaanderse 2013: 108).

A recent World Bank report by Klugman (2022) presents outcomes on gender and displacement in four core areas – poverty, livelihoods, intimate person violence (IPV), and gender norms. It found that gender has important impacts on individual deprivations within households and highlights the need to understand and address the intersection of gender and forced displacement, close gender gaps in education and paid work, and reduce the risk of gender-based violence. It notes that the gender dimensions of displacement have implications for both humanitarian and development programming and emphasizes the importance of comprehensive, intersectional approaches to women's empowerment (Klugman 2022). It also cautions about gender stereotyping that treats women as a group with "special needs" as this could undermine their agency. The UNHCR has taken the position that gender-based persecution is an abuse of human rights and that when governments are unwilling or unable to protect women from such persecution, the international community should provide asylum.

Children

UNICEF 2023 data show that children are dramatically overrepresented among the world's refugees. Between 2010 and 2022, the global number of forcibly displaced child refugees and asylum seekers more than doubled from around 20.6 million to the current number of 43.3 million. The experience of violence, family breakdown, and losing the sense of home and place at an early formative stage of life could leave lifelong scars on children. Mooney (2005) found that displaced children, left to fend for themselves, are at a heightened risk of abuse and are especially vulnerable to acts of violence and human rights violations, including roundups, forced conscription, and sexual assaults. Stigmatization is another consequence as they may also be viewed with suspicion and hostility in their host societies.

In cases of protracted displacement and the loss of family and community support, children often lose their normal childhood experiences. UNESCO data show that only 50% of refugee children are in primary school and 25% of refugee adolescents are in secondary school. Without avenues for a normal education, they are deprived of opportunities to improve their economic life. Many are unaccompanied and separated from their parents or guardians and are vulnerable to peddlers and organized syndicates engaged in human and drug trafficking and other crimes, including becoming child soldiers for warlords. There have been very few studies on the gendered nature of childhood displacement. Often the data on children/young people affected by conflict and war are presented from a nongender perspective, relegating displaced girls' needs to the backburner.

Host Communities

Forced displacement could have significant impacts and consequences for the host communities that receive displaced people. Most research on host community impacts is based on refugee resettlement in the global north. Very little research and evidence are available on the consequences of forced internal displacement or south–south displacement.

From an economic perspective, the impacts of forced displacement on host labor markets and populations are sometimes seen as positive, particularly for countries in the global north facing a scarcity of workers and stagnant population growth. New resettled people may add to the consumer market, providing some stimulus to the economy. Such migration also provides labor for low-paying jobs such as cleaning, aged and disability care, and public transport. Refugees or displaced persons are usually forced to take low-paying jobs because their education and skills are often not recognized. This could result in conflict with the lower classes of the host communities as forced migrants compete and accept lower wages for the same jobs.

In rural settings, the sudden arrival of forced displaced peoples may not only result in conflict with the host communities over resource sharing but could also adversely impact resources such as potable water, forests, firewood, and other ecosystem services. The lack of adequate sanitation in camps could result in pollution and degradation of the water bodies and soil. Jacobsen (1997) discusses how forced displacement in the global south increases the demand for resources such as land for cultivation, firewood, and water and could result in deforestation and land degradation, soil erosion, and the pollution of water resources near refugee camps. This results in forced migrants often getting categorized as “resource degraders.”

Healthcare and education are also impacted by the arrival of displaced people. Existing facilities are not usually able to cope with the additional pressure from the new arrivals. In host countries of the global south, the inflow of international aid and resources mainly meant for the displaced population could result in jealousy, confrontation, and hostility as well. Host populations may find it unjust to have to share their available resources, yet they themselves do not benefit from humanitarian aid.

Forced displacement also has consequences for states that are the source of refugees or forced displaced peoples. It erodes their legitimacy, and they could face economic and political sanctions. This global response could result in other impacts, including increased unemployment, rapid inflation, international economic sanctions, lack of foreign exchange, and other factors that can cripple national economies. When forced displacement is internal, services in receiving cities could be overwhelmed and large-scale unplanned population inflows could result in ghettos that further exacerbate existing social problems.

Thus, the consequences of forced displacement are multidimensional and impact both those that have been forcibly displaced and the host communities. A review of existing literature clearly points towards a lack of studies on consequences resulting from internal displacement or regional displacement within the Asia and Pacific region. More applied research in this area would go a long way towards developing better policy interventions.

4. CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Academician and author Amitav Ghosh, in his recent book *The Nutmeg's Curse: Parables for a Planet in Crisis*, traces the roots of climate change to centuries-old Western colonial geopolitics, a mechanistic worldview, and the profiteering attitude of a neoliberal global economic regime. Supported by violence against nature and less fortunate humans, and a continuing discourse of mechanistic modernity, this economic regime seeks solutions to all ills, including climate change, in technocratic, technocentric, and market-based solutions. In his book, Ghosh weaves a complex web of power, politics, violence, and exploitation that started with the colonization process a few centuries back and continues unabated till today, becoming more entrenched with the processes of globalization.

This section covers climate change-induced migration and displacement in detail. Despite skepticism among some policymakers, businesses, and sections of the public who question the validity and impending impacts on people and the planet, climate change is a scientifically established reality. Human activities, especially since the Industrial Revolution, have been contributing to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and resulting in the warming of the earth. "Average global temperatures have increased by 2.2 degrees Fahrenheit, or 1.2 degrees Celsius, since 1880, with the greatest changes happening in the late 20th century" (Rosen 2021: 1). The impacts will be in the form of sea level rises, glacial melts, extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and wildfires, and unpredictable weather conditions impacting agricultural activities with the potential to threaten food and water security.

A review of nearly 1,000 global papers indicates that despite disagreement over the amount and direction of change, "virtually all professional climate scientists agree on the reality of human-induced climate change, but the debate continues on tempo and mode" (Oreskes 2007: 74). Rosen (2021) adds that by the 1990s, the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had concluded that evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate. As the leading

agency for knowledge on climate change and its impacts on the coupled human–nature system, the IPCC has produced a large repository of scientific research.

The IPCC (2007) defines climate change as “any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.” UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) definition differs from that of the IPCC and treats climate change as “a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (IPCC n.d.a).

Environment and climate change-induced forced displacement is emerging as a major concern for current and future generations. Three decades ago, the IPCC warned that “the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions are uprooted by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and agricultural disruption” (IPCC 1990: 103). Since then, numerous efforts to quantify and project future climate change-induced migration and displacement trends have been made to develop mitigation and adaptation policies and strategies.

According to IDMC, in its Global Report on Internal Displacement (2022), 40.5 million new internal displacements were recorded in 2020. Out of these, 30.7 million displacements were due to disasters, including climate-related events such as storms, floods, and wildfires. The remaining 9.8 million displacements were caused by conflict and violence. The report points out that the Asia and Pacific region experienced the highest number of disaster-related displacements, with countries like the PRC, India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines among the most affected.

Myers cautioned: “[E]nvisage 150 million destitute abandoning their homelands, many of them crossing international borders. They would be even more disruptive in a world struggling to cope with a plethora of environmental problems. Yet, amid discussions of global warming and its impacts, we hear all too little about environmental refugees” (Myers 1993). He predicted that by 2050, “when global warming takes hold about 200 million people will be overtaken by sea-level rise and coastal flooding, by disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, and by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration.” While this figure of 200 million is cited in IPCC publications, Black (2001) states that accurately predicting climate change-induced migration is difficult due to the complex and interconnected nature of factors such as economic, social, and political factors that drive migration along with environmental and climate change.

Migration outcomes, as McLeman and Hunter (2010) argue, rarely emerge in a simple stimulus-response fashion. They are influenced by the interaction of environmental or climate events with social, economic, and political processes. Migration is one possible form of adaptation within a broader set of potential responses. While migration could prove to be an adaptive coping strategy, many people and communities do not have the foresight, resources, or wherewithal to move to, or resettle in, safer places, temporarily or permanently. Such people or groups normally prefer to stay put unless compelled or forced to move out due to a crisis or threat. Furthermore, migration does not necessarily provide relief from the vagaries they leave behind. For such peoples, flight and resettlement are painful and rife with intractable problems during their move and at the new place of arrival. Similarly, an ADB report (2012) states that “climate change is expected to become a key migration and displacement driver in Asia and the Pacific, not only because of its direct impacts on migration patterns, but also because of its impacts on different migration drivers, such as poverty, joblessness, and conflict over resources.”

Disaggregating climatic or environmental factors of displacement from other socioeconomic factors is difficult and defies logic. Climate change studies strongly emphasize a coupled human–nature relationship that requires a holistic understanding of human responses to climate change, including assessment of socioeconomic, political, and climate constraints as complex, interrelated systems. This complexity makes it difficult to predict the impacts, patterns, and trends of climate change-induced displacement. Disaggregating the role of climate or environmental change from economic, political, and social factors that drive migration, while simultaneously considering migrants’ perception and behavior in relation to such change, is a significant challenge.

Climate-induced migration is a highly complex issue which needs to be understood as part of global migration dynamics. Migration typically has multiple causes, and environmental factors are intertwined with other social and economic factors, which themselves can be influenced by environmental changes. Environmental migration should not be treated solely as a discrete category, set apart from other migration flows (ADB 2012: viii).

Climate change is but one aspect of a much broader planetary crisis: it is not the prime cause of dislocation, but rather a cognate phenomenon. In this sense climate change, mass dislocations, pollution, environmental degradation, political breakdown, and the Covid-19 pandemic are all cognate effects of the ever-increasing acceleration of the last three decades. Not only are these crises interlinked – they are all deeply rooted in history, and they are all ultimately driven by the dynamics of global power (Amitav Ghosh 2021).

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) while new data gathering technologies, techniques, and methodologies such as satellite and remote sensing imagery have improved data collection and climate modeling, major gaps and inconsistencies in data remain, particularly in the case of environment and climate change-induced migration. The lack of consistent and comparable data is a significant barrier to understanding the scale of climate change displacement. The IFRC (2021) adds that accurate data would enable the development of better-informed laws, policies, and approaches; facilitate prevention, adaptation, preparedness, and response measures; and help identify and monitor ongoing challenges.

Climate change-induced displacement and its trends and future predictions are still at a formative stage. The number of empirical studies on the current impacts of climate on migration is still small. Several studies have documented historical evidence for a link between climate and migration there are fewer contemporary examples. Surkhe and Hazarika (1993) points out that research literature on environmental migration has tended to fall into two categories: (1) “minimalists,” who suggest that the environment is merely a contextual factor in migration decisions; and (2) “maximalists,” who claim that the environment directly forces people to move. She further asserts that the term “environmental refugee” naturalizes and depoliticizes economic and political causes, masks the important role of institutional responses, and overlooks the underlying causes that make specific populations more vulnerable. In other words, the term puts the blame on nature rather than on socioeconomic and political factors.

Climate change-induced migration primarily takes place within countries, and affected groups are technically referred to as IDPs rather than refugees. Whether these trends will change in the future and such migration will become cross-boundary or international is still unknown (IOM 2009). More studies will be required in this area. Similarly, more research is required on the temporal aspects of the migration whether such migration is permanent or temporary, in which case people are able to go back. Despite these challenges, a robust body of research has emerged demonstrating that “climate change has impacted upon, and will continue to impact upon, ecological and social systems potentially causing substantial human displacement” (Boano 2008).

Both short- and long-term impacts of climate change on the natural environment determine how impacted social systems will respond. While catastrophic impacts such as submerged shorelines and mass evacuations of coastal populations are often used as examples, slow-onset events are taking place at regular intervals. Frequent droughts or intense rainfall are adversely impacting the weather-based subsistence agriculture prevalent in the Asia and Pacific region, threatening rural livelihoods, causing food insecurity, and prompting affected communities to migrate. “The more people are dependent on climate-sensitive forms of natural capital, and the less they rely on economic or social forms of capital, the more at risk they are from climate change” (Barnett and Adger 2007: 3).

More focused research is therefore required on the interplay between climate change, multilayered vulnerabilities, and institutional responses that subsequently affect migration decision-making. This, along with the lack of methodological tools, has led to a limited understanding of how climate change leads to or induces displacement. An immediate concern is defining climate change-induced displacement. Despite the concept of coupled human–nature system serving as the foundation that underlies climate change displacement research, expertise on how to capture, analyze, and draw conclusions from the interplay of components of this integrated system is quite limited. For example, “environmental choking” and “scorched earth” strategies are used in conflict situations, and people fleeing such situations are victims of both environmental impacts and conflict. Such cases also indicate the way conflict and violence could inflict environmental damage leading to forced migration of the population – hence the need to adopt an integrated approach that along with climate change factors also takes in account political and socioeconomic factors (Walter 2020).

Climate change-induced displacement is a growing area of interest for scholars, activists, policymakers, and other parties who are still grappling with the ways of understanding and addressing this phenomenon. Oliver-Smith emphatically points to this, “The contingent nature of predicting environmental impacts, the vast disparities in predictions of numbers of people to be affected, the elusive nature of definitional issues, the difficult question of causation and the overall complexity of human–environment relations, all present serious challenges to researchers attempting to analyze the relationship between environment and migration” (Oliver-Smith 2012; 1061). While the interplay between environmental, socioeconomic, and political elements is increasingly evident, developing adequate analytical tools is still lagging. According to the UNHCR, it has become increasingly difficult to categorize displaced people because of the combined impacts of conflict, environmental, and economic pressures. The UNHCR outlined five displacement scenarios emerging in the near future: (i) hydro-meteorological disasters; (ii) population removal from high-risk areas; (iii) environmental degradation; (iv) the submergence of small island states; and (v) violent conflict (UNHCR 2009: 4).

The relationship between the environment and migration is complex and challenging. Oliver-Smith (2012) points out that this results in difficulties in developing appropriate policy responses for environmentally or climate-displaced peoples, and currently at the international level such migrants are treated as “economic migrants.” It is argued that understanding environmental/climate change and its impacts, such as population displacement, requires “reframing nature-society relations from a duality to a mutuality, essentially positing that nature and society are inseparable, interpenetrating, each implicated in the life of the other, each contributing to the resilience and vulnerability of the other” (Oliver-Smith 2012). In this understanding, people are not just vulnerable to environmental/climate changes, but also environmental and climate changes are increasingly the result of human activity, in terms of human alteration of the environment.

Environmental and climate change-related events are specified by their temporal aspects such as a sudden-onset disaster like a hurricane or cyclone, or a slow-onset event of slowly depleting groundwater or a sea level rise. This temporal dimension has implications for population movements. The two typologies, however, should not be treated as distinct as there are similarities between the two. Various political economy factors, such as vulnerability, adaptive capacity, structural inequalities, and access to institutional and policy responses, come to play a similar role in both cases.

Sudden-Onset Disasters or Events

Natural events that take place suddenly and have an immediate impact on the living and natural world such as floods, hurricanes, typhoons, and cyclones, or mudslides caused by heavy rainfall, and forest wildfires, are referred to as “sudden-onset events.” These can trigger large-scale displacement and incur massive economic costs. The debate continues over whether these events are simply recurring weather phenomena or induced by climate change. Climate science foresees a relationship between human-induced climate change and the increased frequency and intensity of such phenomena. Their untimeliness and unpredictability are a sign that established weather patterns are changing and sudden-onset disasters are becoming more intense and frequent.

Slow-Onset Events

Events that slowly but definitively result in degradation of the environment and nature over time are termed as slow-onset events. Such events could include rising sea levels, the increased salination of groundwater and soil, long-term effects of recurrent flooding, thawing permafrost, droughts, and desertification. Their cumulative impacts on livelihoods and economic well-being are felt over a longer period and could induce migration from affected areas. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2012) recognizes eight slow-onset events: (i) sea level rise; (ii) increasing temperature; (iii) ocean acidification; (iv) glacial retreat and related impacts; (v) salinization; (vi) land and forest degradation; (vii) loss of biodiversity; and (viii) desertification.

Slow-onset events evolve gradually from incremental changes occurring over many years or from an increased frequency or intensity of recurring events, whereas a rapid-onset event may be a single, discrete event that occurs in a matter of days or even hours.

UNFCCC (COP 17 2011): SYNOPSES SERIES: SLOW-ONSET EVENTS

According to the IDMC, Pacific Island states present a special case of slow-onset disasters and bear the greatest displacement risk relative to their population size. These island states vulnerability including exposure and sensitivity of the infrastructure to climate change could result in the populations of these island migrating not only internally but also across borders. Shamoun et al. (2021) highlight the case of Kiribati, where a 1-meter sea level rise could inundate two thirds of the country, forcing communities to move. The World Risk Report (2021: 6) ranked the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu as the three most vulnerable countries to the effects of disasters and climate change globally, and other countries including Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Timor-Leste are also ranked highly. In 2009, the Maldives, an island nation, threatened by sea level rises, held an underwater cabinet meeting of its ministers, vice-president, and president after which the Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed stated: “We are trying to send our message to let the world know what is happening and what will happen to the Maldives if climate change isn’t checked” (Reuters 2009). As Cazabat et al. (2022) highlight, PNG is more vulnerable to sea level rises than the global average, and coastal erosion has already caused internal displacement. The Carteret islands were among the first documented cases worldwide of displacement caused by the phenomenon. Tens of thousands of PNG inhabitants could face permanent inundation by 2070 to 2100.

Will Tuvalu remain a Member State of the United Nations if it is finally submerged? Who can help us, and will they help us? Without answers to these difficult questions, sustainable development for low-lying countries will only be wishful thinking. Tuvalu is coping and adapting, as statelessness is not an option, but the international community must think of ways to protect the rights of people affected by climate change and to avoid chaotic responses to uncontrolled mass climate displacement.

Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Kausea Natano,
addressing the United Nations General Assembly

Allen (2007) states that while sudden and slow-onset events may appear as natural phenomena, there is a strong sociopolitical dimension to them, as their impacts are felt disproportionately. For example, slow-onset events, such as sea level rises, threaten the existence of several SIDS, even though their contribution to anthropogenic global warming is miniscule. Similarly disadvantaged groups suffer the most from the impacts of sudden-onset events, as was the case with the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, which disproportionately affected poor black communities.

A PEA that locates the underlying factors of climate-induced displacement in a multifaceted perspective is, therefore, crucial to help address the root causes of vulnerability and ensure that vulnerable populations are not further marginalized by the impacts of climate change. Various studies (McAdam 2010) also highlight how large-scale forced displacement due to climate change also has the potential to trigger unrest and lead to violence or even armed conflict, particularly in regions where essential resources such as water, arable land, and grazing grounds are scarce and where poverty limits the ability to adapt. Conflict could also take place between forced migrants and the host populations of areas where they take shelter or refuge. Boano (2008) makes a similar point that the gloom vision associated with climate change-induced displacement could lead to increased political tensions, conflicts, and destabilization of international regimes due to the great pressure environmental-induced migration could have on both sending and receiving states.

Hunter (2005) attempts to classify various migration theories based on the role of the environment in the process of migration decision-making and migration (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Classic Migration Theories and the Potential Placement of Environmental Hazards

Petersen	1958	General typology of migration
Key citation: "A general typology of migration." <i>American Sociological Review</i> . 23: 256–266. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As ecological "push" factor yielding migration as an "innovative" response.		
Wolpert	1966	Stress-threshold model
Key citation: "Migration as an adjustment to environmental stress." <i>Journal of Social Issues</i> . 22, 4:92–102. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As "stressors"		
Zelinsky	1971	Mobility transition hypothesis
Key citation: "The hypothesis of the mobility transition." <i>Geographical Review</i> . 61:219–249. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As related to "personal preferences."		
Speare	1974	Residential mobility decision-making model
Key citation: "Residential satisfaction as an intervening variable in residential mobility." <i>Demography</i> 11, 2: 173–188. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As "locational characteristics"		
Various contributors		Neo-classical migration models
Summary: DaVanzo, J. 1981. "Microeconomic approaches to studying migration decisions." in De Jong, G.F. and R.W. Gardner (Editors), <i>Migration decision making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries</i> . pp. 90–129. New York: Pergamon Press. Example: Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro. 1970. "Migration, unemployment and development: A two-sector analysis." <i>American Economic Review</i> . 70: 126–142. Example: Graves, P.E. 1983. "Migration with a composite amenity: The role of rents." <i>Journal of Regional Science</i> , 23(4): 541–546. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As a "location-specific disamenity."		
DeJong and Fawcett	1981	Value-Expectancy model
Key citation: "Multidisciplinary frameworks and models of migration decision making" in De Jong, G.F. and R.W. Gardner (Editors), <i>Migration decision making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries</i> . pp. 13–58. New York: Pergamon Press. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As a personal value/goal of "comfort."		
Gardner	1981	Macro--micro decision-making model
Key citation: "Macrolevel Influences on the Migration Decision Process" Chapter 3 (pp. 59–89) in G.F. De Jong and R.W. Gardner (Editors), <i>Migration decision making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries</i> . New York: Pergamon Press. Potential placement of environmental hazards: As a locational characteristic in conflict with "what people value."		

Source: Hunter. 2005. *Migration and Environment Hazard*. Population and Environment.

Hunter's classification attempts to categorize how various migration theories locate the role of environment as a factor resulting in migration. As indicated in the table above, Petersen's theory sees hazardous environmental factors as "push" factors and migration is seen as an innovative strategy to deal with the push factors associated with environmental hazards.

The "stress-threshold model" developed by Wolpert incorporates noneconomic aspects. Under this model, environment is conceptualized as a "residential stressor" that results in considering migration as a response to the residential stress. The process, at the same time, also evaluates the destination to determine its 'place utility'. While 'residential stressors' include environmental disamenities such as pollution, congestion and crime, 'place utility' is assessed based on anticipated satisfaction derived from relocation to a particular locale.

Similarly, the “value–expectancy” model of De Jong and Fawcett defines migration motivation as a function of the value placed on certain goals combined with the perceived likelihood that a chosen behavior will lead to those goals. The model’s basic components are goals and expectations. A number of values/goals are outlined and according to Hunter the goal of ‘comfort’ by providing a more pleasant residential location could refer to the environmental factor resulting in migration decision.

The Zelinsky model based on “mobility transition hypothesis” sees a direct correlation between the processes of modernization and migration. Modernization results in increases in personal freedom and breaking ties with traditional residential locales is not necessarily difficult. The model, therefore, sees individual decision making having a big role in the migratory process. The environmental element under this model derives from individual preferences for residential environments free of environmental hazards.

In summary, as emphasized by the IOM study (Laczko and Aghazarm 2009), while there is no conclusive evidence of a direct correlation between environmental stresses or shocks and migration, studies show that: 1) short-term internal migration can be influenced in socioeconomic contexts by environmental stresses and shocks; 2) international migration flows following environmental shocks and stresses increase or decrease, depending on the socioeconomic and psychological contexts and barriers to migration of those exposed; and 3) the measurement of environment–migration linkages is sensitive to the available data and the ways in which such data are analyzed.

Environmental Refugees, Climate Refugees, Climate Migrants, and Climate Change-Induced Displaced Persons

In the existing literature, there is also confusion around terminology. People displaced by climate change impacts are interchangeably called “environmental refugees,” “climate refugees,” “climate migrants,” or “climate change-induced displaced persons,” among other names. Initially, the term “environmental refugees” was used during the 1970s and 80s, when the emphasis was more on localized impacts of environmental degradation and its effects on populations.

El-Hinnawi’s (1985) work is often seen as a starting point for the concept of the “environmental refugee”. Working with the UNEP, El-Hinnawi provided the following definition: “Those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition is meant any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life” (El-Hinnawi 1985: 4). However, “the term ‘environmental refugee’ is simplistic, one sided and misleading. It implies a mono-causality which very rarely exists in practice” (Castles 2002: 8). In the mid-1990s, as climate change science grew, and as phenomena like melting glaciers and ice caps became associated with climate change, the term “environmental refugee” was replaced by “climate refugee”.

The IOM developed a working definition that defines environmental migrants as: “... persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” (IOM 2019). The IOM, however, prefers the use of the term “environmental migrants” and states that

while the use of the term “refugee” shows the urgency to provide affected peoples with a safe environment, it has legal implications. Under international conventions, the term “refugee” puts the signatories under specific obligations and these countries would not necessarily stretch their resources to accommodate climate refugees.

Advocates of “refugees” also prefer not to dilute the definition of refugees by including climate refugees. “Migrant,” on the other hand, connotes “pull” factors rather than the impending “push” factors in the use of the term “climate migrant.” Alternatively, the IOM proposes the use of the term “forced climate migrants.” The main critique of this definition is that it does not differentiate between the types of environmentally induced migration. Studies demonstrate that the decision to move or migrate is determined by cognate factors and segregating “environment” or “climate” as the determining factor is fraught with complexities except in cases of sudden disastrous events. More and more studies are proposing a spectrum or continuum scale to represent different reasons and motives for migration.

Continuum of Control over Migration Decision in Situations of Environmental Change

Involuntary Environmental Refugees	Compelled Environmental Migrants	Voluntary Migrants
---------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-----------------------

Source: Dian C Bates. 2002. Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change.

Bates explains this continuum from the perspective of control over the migration decision in the case of environmental change. Therefore, only people who don't have control over the migration process and are forced to flee fall immediately under the category of “environmental refugees.” Hugo (1996) proposed a similar continuum with reference to environmental refugees, stating that environmental disruptions could have varied responses from the affected population. Some disruptions that pose an immediate threat to life could result in outmigration with little control over such a move, while others that evolve slowly and damage local economies and livelihoods allow some control over migration decision-making. The migration continuum proposed by Hugo places migrations from environmental disasters at the involuntary end while migration resulting from a slow onset is located toward the voluntary end.

Climate Change-Induced Displacement and International Legal Frameworks

While environmental and climate change-induced migration have been part of the forced migration discourse for four decades, it remains nascent, and international responses remain limited. The reason could be that such forced population movements have mostly been limited to internal migration within the national boundaries or, at the most, south–south in nature.

Annex 3 provides a summary of legal frameworks for environment and climate change-induced forced displacement. However, no specific international legal framework provides comprehensive and binding protection for individuals displaced by climate change or other environmental disasters. This has resulted in calls for a new international instrument to protect them. McAdam (2011) contends that slow-onset climate change processes do not fit easily within international refugee protection frameworks, which do not adequately address preemptive and staggered movement.

Vulnerability, Adaptation and Resilience

Vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience are the core elements in the study of climate change impacts, both at theoretical and policy levels. These concepts and their correlation with forced displacement are explained in the following section.

Vulnerability: Assessing vulnerability is critical to understanding climate change impacts on the coupled human–natural system and for developing mitigation and adaptation measures. Vulnerability has been defined by the IPCC as the “susceptibility of a species, system or resource to the negative effects of climate change and other stressors” (IPCC 2014). The study of migration in the context of anthropogenic or human-induced climate change is often approached using this concept (McLeman and Hunter 2010). Vulnerability analysis requires an assessment of three core elements: (i) exposure – the extent to which, and the rate at which, a system experiences direct or indirect impacts of climate change and depends on the rate and magnitude of climate change; (ii) sensitivity – characteristics or endowments of a system that are dependent on specific environment conditions and the degree to which it is likely to be affected by climate change; and (iii) adaptive capacity – the ability of a species or a system to cope and persist under changing conditions (Massachusetts Wildlife n.d.).

Several approaches to understanding and analyzing climate change vulnerability have evolved. Füssel (2007) presents a fourfold classification of approaches: (i) a risk–hazard approach based on pure determinism that nature causes hazard; (ii) a mechanistic engineering approach emphasizing that technology can be used to reduce vulnerability and losses; (iii) a human ecology approach that argues for the importance of human perception and behavior; and (iv) a political ecology approach arguing that structure, not nature, technology, or agency, creates vulnerability.

This report undertakes a PEA of climate change including how vulnerability is produced and distributed across a system. This approach allows us to understand why certain groups within a system are disproportionately exposed to a natural hazard or climate vulnerability and how the availability of institutional responses either enables them to respond to the impacts of a natural event or prevents them from doing so. Unlike environmental degradation, whose impacts are largely localized, climate change is a global phenomenon. However, its impacts across the globe are felt locally and differentially. Wisner et al. (2004) argue that several root causes are interrelated within a society and the world economy that affect the allocation and distribution of resources among different sections of the population. Correspondingly, mitigative and adaptive measures need to be guided by global and national political economies.

Poorer nations are hardest hit, even though they contribute only a fraction of historically emitted greenhouse gases. They have a high degree of vulnerabilities across the geographical, economic, and sociopolitical spectrum and limited adaptive resources. At the global level, these countries are also affected by processes like globalization, the World Trade Organization, and structural adjustment requirements of international financial institutions. They struggle hard to ensure that global responsibilities for climate change get shared differentially based on historical contributions of GHG emissions and their developmental requirements. A political-economy approach to climate change vulnerability explains it at global, national, and local levels. Local climate change events are explained with reference to the wider national and global perspectives.

Assessing inequalities, and barriers to policy responses, is critical to conducting vulnerability analyses to demonstrate how different socioeconomic groups are exposed to hazards and how their accessibility to entitlements and institutional responses is determined. While the entire population of a socioeconomic system might suffer the impacts of a climatic or environmental event, the vulnerable and disadvantaged within the system are often disproportionately affected. Compelled to live in degraded lands, they squat in places easily exposed to the vagaries of climate and weather. Inundation of such areas in the cities in developing countries is an annual occurrence. Rising house prices and costs of living belie their hopes of obtaining affordable, secure housing. The rapid rise of rural to urban migration rates exacerbates the situations in urban centers that find it difficult to cope with the rising populations. Biswas and Tortajada (2015) note that intense urbanization in developing Asia is taking place within a few short decades, adding that “all future population growth in Asian developing countries to 2050 will occur in urban regions, which are neither well prepared nor have the capacity to assimilate such steady flow of migrants within very limited timeframes” (2015: 1).

Ribot (2011) points out that despite the multidimensional and intersecting nature of vulnerability, research on climate change vulnerability remains more focused on climatic or natural aspects, and socioenvironmental and political economy aspects of vulnerability remain masked. For this reason, there is a “need to conceptualize the relational dynamics of vulnerability, where the relative security of some social groups is achieved through the production of insecurity among others” (Taylor 2013, p. 318). There is also a need to focus more on the multidimensional concept of vulnerability that intersects various fields, including natural, sociopolitical, and economic, to help identify root causes of climate change vulnerability and its relationship with forced displacement.

Adaptive Capacity: Vogel and O'Brien (2006) state that vulnerability assessment is associated with adaptive capacity assessment in examining the potential responses of a system to climate variability and change. A third element of “resilience” comes to determine the consequences of a natural event. Whether a community or group of people will migrate or not after a natural event depends on the three interrelated factors of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and resilience.

UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines adaptation as “adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. This refers to changes in processes, practices, or structures to moderate or offset potential damages or to take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in climate. It involves adjustments to reduce the vulnerability of communities, regions, or activities to climatic change and variability” (quoted in McCarthy et al. 2001: 643). The adaptive capacity of a social system involves the ability to take deliberate and planned actions to achieve desired results in the face of changed or changing conditions. This includes the ability to “react to evolving hazards and stresses [well in advance] to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence and/or the magnitude of harmful outcomes resulting from climate-related hazards” (Malone 2009: 6). Furthermore, adaptive capacity includes the “ability to take advantage of a disturbance and to build or bounce back better and learn from the legacy of recurring shocks and stresses” (Manyena et al. 2011).

Adaptation viewed through a political economy lens considers the differentiated positioning of the individuals and communities within a system. Discussions over adaptation responses increasingly acknowledge the differentiated vulnerability of individuals or communities to socioenvironmental stressors. Since the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006, potential benefits of migration for

development are now well recognized. The role and potential benefits of migration within the discourse of climate adaptation are also gaining rapid recognition. As a planned and voluntary coping mechanism, migration can play an important role and serve as a social safety net. It could save lives from unpredictable natural disasters and save livelihoods as migrants seek alternative livelihoods. It can also sustain the livelihoods of those who haven't migrated through remittances, ensuring that they do not fall into poverty. It can alleviate pressure on already degraded lands and could support regeneration of such lands. However, there are empirical and conceptual gaps regarding whether migration is an adaptation strategy or points to an inherent vulnerability and a failure to adapt by running away from the actual crisis event (Upadhyay, Vinke, and Weisz 2023).

Resilience: As a counterpart to vulnerability, resilience refers to the innate ability of a system to effectively respond to a stressor. Holling (1973) defines it as the persistence of relationships within a system; a measure of the ability of systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist. While, Adger (2000) defines resilience as ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change. UN defines resilience as “the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing, in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure” (UNISDR 2009: 5). Folke et al. (2002) point out that resilience broadly consists of three elements: (i) response to a disturbance; (ii) capacity to self-organize; and (iii) capacity to learn and adapt. Resilience, therefore, allows a system under stress to absorb the impact and retain its erstwhile state or reorganize and to adapt to the newer changes resulting from a natural event. Response time of a system is, therefore, an important aspect. A more resilient system can respond and recover quicker than lesser resilient systems.

Building resilience of the coupled social–natural system is one way of dealing with the challenges of climate change and resultant forced displacement. The UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (formerly DFID)-funded Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) is one of the largest resilience building programs in the world and aims to help people become more resilient to climate-induced shocks and stresses and treats resilience as the “ability to anticipate, avoid, plan for, cope with, recover from and adapt to (climate related) shocks and stresses” (DFID 2015). These capacities can be divided into interlinked absorptive, anticipatory, and adaptive capacities. A social system with these capacities is less likely to be undermined by shocks and stresses. According to Carpenter et al. (2001), a growing body of literature recognizes that resilience is highly contextual and pathways to enhancing it vary greatly from one location to the next. Building resilience requires the capacity to anticipate, adapt, and absorb (the 3As) climate extremes and disasters, and the 3As framework can help organize practical actions or processes (Bahadur et al. 2015).

Understanding climate change-induced forced displacement, therefore, requires an assessment of the three integrated concepts of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and resilience. These three aspects are mediated and impacted by the wider political economy of the system, especially by the policies and institutional arrangements that determine how these three components will be distributed across various social groups, communities, and individuals.

Climate Change Mitigation and Forced Displacement

The IPCC has called for stronger mitigation measures to cap greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly since the 2015 Paris Agreement, which sets targets for such mitigation measures to “limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels. To achieve this long-term temperature goal, countries aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions to achieve a climate neutral world by mid-century” (UNFCCC 2023). Mitigating climate change refers to reducing the flow of GHG into our atmosphere. This requires evolving and implementing newer technologies in the areas of energy, transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and other such sectors. The role of forests is seen as an important measure in climate change mitigation by absorbing and storing GHGs. Programs such as afforestation, reforestation, and greening are seen as necessary to cap the levels of global warming and are promoted as carbon sinks. Roe et al. (2019) point out that to achieve the 1.5 °C goal of the Paris Agreement, deforestation must decline by 70% by 2030 and by 95% by 2050. However, such programs have the potential to result in large-scale forced displacement of communities.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)

Afforestation and reforestation have been integrated into global climate policies since the 1990s. Under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) program, such projects in developing countries could earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits (IPCC 2007). The protocol also introduced “removal units,” primarily associated with land use, land use change, and forestry that sequester GHG in “carbon sinks.” In 2008, the UNFCCC introduced the reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) program. The program pays and incentivizes developing countries to stop deforestation and encourages forest regeneration. It is estimated that tropical deforestation alone is the source of 12%–17% of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from human activities (Butler 2012).

The Copenhagen Accord (2009) acknowledged the role of REDD+ and agreed on the need for a mechanism for climate change mitigation. REDD+ requires “full engagement and respect for the rights of Indigenous Peoples (IPS) and other forest dependent communities” (UN-REDD 2011). The REDD+ program impacts on communities could disrupt indigenous and local people’s livelihoods and sociocultural systems. It has been pointed out that “land acquisition, unfair free prior and informed consent, and the introduction of monoculture plantations by powerful stakeholders have far-reaching negative impacts on the lives and livelihoods of the Indigenous Peoples” (Corbera, Hunsberger, and Vaddhanaphuti 2017).

Forestation-related mitigation programs require vast tracts of land; these programs often increase competition for land with other land use requirements for agriculture, food, and water security and could easily result in the forced displacement of rural and indigenous communities evicted from lands appropriated for carbon sinks or renewable energy projects. These communities are deprived of the ecosystem services from existing and established forests that they have relied on for centuries. Afforestation, reforestation, and the protection and conservation of old forests in the form of natural parks and protected areas also have the potential to displace indigenous and rural communities physically, economically, and culturally.

Skutsch and Turnhout (2020) assert that deforestation mainly results from the market-driven expansion of large-scale commercial agriculture, including plantations and cattle rearing. International trade in agricultural products is seen as a major cause of global forest loss. Estimates indicate that just over a quarter of the loss is directly due to (export-led) commodity production, while the rest is roughly evenly spread between logging, wildfires, and small-scale local agriculture. Skutsch and Turnhout undertook a detailed assessment of scientific research papers on the causes of deforestation and forest degradation, including those that argue that subsistence agriculture, particularly slash and burn farming, is a root cause of deforestation. They conclude that “although small scale farming at community level is recognized in academic studies as one of the drivers of deforestation, in most of the countries we include in our study, it is by no means the most important” (2020).

A World Bank report estimated that global agricultural investment acquired 45 million hectares of land between 2005 and 2009. The report found that “some countries have transferred large areas to investors, the extent to which such land is used productively remains limited, and in many cases the nature and location of lands transferred and the ways such transfers are implemented are rather ad hoc based more on investor demands than on strategic considerations” (World Bank 2010: 4).

Forest carbon projects have been criticized for “leakage” as they can displace and/or postpone environmental damage from one site to another, and “activity leakage” can also occur when populations displaced for offsets move into other forested areas (Vigil 2018). The UNFCCC uses the FAO’s definition of forest that approves industrial, monoculture tree plantations as forest. Commercial farming such as palm tree plantation, therefore, could be seen as afforestation and eligible for carbon credits. Forest-based climate mitigation measures, therefore, could result in forced displacement, as Corson, MacDonald, and Neimark (2013) argue that green credentials are used to acquire land and natural resources. The communities that rely on such lands and resources are disenfranchised and their land rights trampled upon, potentially forcing them to migrate. Forest-based climate mitigation measures, therefore, could result in forced displacement where green credentials are used to justify the expropriation of land and resources.

Green Grabs: With a population of nearly 4.6 billion people, Asia and the Pacific houses some of the most populated countries, including the PRC, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. A large percentage of this population still relies on agriculture as their primary source of livelihood. Vulnerability to climate change, natural disasters, and a gradual degradation of land and other productive resource bases are growing problems. Additionally, rapid urbanization, infrastructure development, mining, and other such sectors put extra pressure on the available land. While the linkage between climate change and displacement has long been studied, “very little attention has been given to the interactions between climate change policies, land grabs, and displacement” (Vigil 2018: 370).


Over the last three decades, the interests of transnational organizations in large-scale land deals in developing countries of the global south have risen rapidly. According to Scoones et al. (2013 and 2019), the impacts of this process, referred to as “land rush,” on national economies and the livelihoods of people in the global south are seen as far-reaching and irreversible. These land transactions are promoted as to improve agricultural productivity, food security, local employment generation, the generation of green energies, both biofuels and alternative sources such as solar and wind energy, climate change mitigation, and others.

Green Grab refers to the capturing or control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve large-scale capital that often shifts resource use orientation into extractive character, whether for international or domestic purposes, as capital's response to the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, climate change mitigation imperatives, and demands for resources from newer hubs of global capital (Borras and Franco 2012).

The acquisition and expropriation of land is a historical phenomenon particularly attributed to industrial development based on resource extraction. Climate change has reinvigorated the trend considerably with novel discourses around climate mitigation being deployed as justifiers (Vigil 2018).

Land Matrix, an independent land monitoring initiative, maintains an open-access platform for major land deals for a range of intended uses, such as agricultural production, timber extraction, renewable energy production, carbon trading, industry, conservation, and tourism. Land Matrix's 2022 update on large-scale land deals in Asia is presented in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Number and Size of Land Deals Undertaken




Source: Land Matrix Website: <https://landmatrix.org/observatory/asia/> (accessed 2 November 2022).

Such land deals have been criticized for taking advantage of climate change mitigation and green credentials to justify the expropriation of land. They are defined as “the appropriation of land and nature for environmental ends” (Fairhead et al. 2012: 238).

Land-intensive biofuel production, solar and wind farms, and forest carbon projects meant for climate change mitigation are becoming more and more prominent. Environment and climate change are used as instruments to expropriate lands, resulting either in direct displacement of communities or indirect displacement by restricting their access to the land and resource bases on which they have relied for centuries. As the IPCC recently cautioned, “[a]daptation strategies that seek to reduce exposure to climate change carry risks of disrupted livelihoods, displaced populations,

deterioration of valued cultural expressions and practices, and in some cases violent conflict” (Adger et al. 2014). According to the International Land Coalition biofuels were responsible for around 52% of all land grabs between 2000 and 2010. Data from Land Matrix show that 78% of all recorded deals are for agricultural production, of which three quarters are for biofuels.

Figure 14: Agricultural Drivers of Land Acquisition



Source: Land Matrix (2017).

It is evident from Figure 14 that only 8% of the land acquired is used for “food crops” while the rest of the land is acquired for other commercial reasons and profiteering, including 37% for nonfood crops. While large-scale land grabs and associated environmental impacts have received considerable attention, very scant attention has been paid to social impacts on forced displacement (Robledo-Abad et al. 2017). A better understanding of social impacts, including forced displacement resulting from such land-intensive mitigation measures, is urgently required.

The impacts of climate change on the coupled human–nature system are multifarious. Migration is one response that results from the adverse impacts of climate change on human habitation and livelihood systems. Several predictions and modeling are making efforts to quantify the extent of potential climate change-related migration. However, as indicated in this section, underlining climate change as the sole factor resulting in mass migration is problematic. Such forced migration results from a multiplicity of factors, climate change being one of these.

Mechanisms to manage climate change-induced displacement are still in their early stages. The IOM (2009) notes that there is a widespread perception that climate change may lead to a substantial increase in migration to developed countries; however, such movements are most likely to be internal or to the closest international border within a region. Important protection gaps remain, especially regarding “trans-border” movement and in cases where people can become “stateless” as their country disappears due to climate change, as could occur in the case of the SIDS.

Understanding the likely impacts of climate change requires a shift in the migration research agenda towards internal migration (IOM 2009) with an emphasis on developing countries where most migration is taking place or is likely to take place. The understanding that migrants move within or between developing countries that will be most affected by climate change needs to guide any policy response. Research and

policy responses also need a greater focus on slow-onset environmental changes that occur gradually over time and are not immediately noticeable.

Initial research could focus on identifying climate hotspots within the Asia and Pacific region. Case studies of such hotspots could be used to develop a good understanding of how climate change impacts intersect with other socioeconomic and political factors potentially resulting in forced migration. These case studies could also be used to comprehend the behavioral aspect of migration regarding both the desire and the decision to leave as well as to stay put. These qualitative studies could subsequently guide large-scale quantitative studies to develop models to predict the likely extent of climate change-induced displacement. Data collection tools and methodologies such as household surveys and remote sensing and satellite imagery data that include variables not yet connected need to be sourced or developed. Apart from the usual demographic and socioeconomic indicators, questions on climate stressors, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity, along with behavioral causes for decisions to migrate or to stay put, will need to be incorporated into survey instruments. This will require sufficient, dedicated resources to adequately develop models for future predictions and projections on the role that environmental degradation and climatic change play in inducing migration. Case studies could deepen our understanding of, and insights into, the numerous intersecting variables that influence migratory decisions. Ultimately, research and data technologies must be shared with, and transferred to, DMCs to build their internal capacity and knowledge base to help them face, address, and even mitigate the problem by developing and implementing policies on migration stimulated by climate-related factors. A notable initiative in this direction is the 'environment change and the forced scenario (EACH – FOR) project cosponsored by European Commission. The project is directed to assess the impacts of environmental change on migration at the local, national, regional and international level (Warner 2011). As a multidisciplinary study, the project employs diverse research methods such as quantitative surveys, qualitative case studies and diverse data sources to better understand the role of environmental change in forced migration. Such studies could provide a good knowledge base including how to develop project design and undertake fieldwork and synthesize the research outcomes to arrive at clearer conclusion on the relationship between environmental/climate change and migration.

5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT

This section undertakes a PEA of forced displacement. It examines the underlying principle of inequality and its multidimensional role in the production and distribution of vulnerability and subsequent forced displacement within a society. It argues that marginalized groups disproportionately bear the brunt of forced displacement as they are forced to live in precarious circumstances, which exacerbates their vulnerability and results in their forced displacement.

This section argues that preexisting vulnerabilities of individuals or communities make them prone to stressors that ultimately result in their forced displacement. These vulnerabilities result from structural inequalities that deny certain people opportunities to develop sufficient resilience and adaptive capacity to manage the stressors. When forced displacement results from direct or manifest causes such as conflict and violence, vulnerability plays a decisive role. In such cases, sections or groups of people become receptors of violence perpetrated by those in positions of power and control.

During war or conflict, or after a natural calamity, those most affected have very limited capacity to effectively respond to the situation, including migrating in a planned way. In such cases, migration could be a positive response and could save lives. However, migration requires resources that vulnerable groups find hard to mobilize. When displacement results from indirect and latent causes, a PEA could unearth the barriers that prevent certain sections of the population from benefiting from economic processes and policy interventions. Thus, a PEA analyzes forced displacement beyond the “humanitarian response” and within the “humanitarian-development” spectrum and uses a vulnerability lens for a deeper analysis.

Political economy is a vast, interdisciplinary approach that has gained acceptance in international development where it is used to analyze persistent barriers preventing sections of population to benefit from development interventions. Politics and power are important aspects of the political economy approach examining the role of governments and the decisions taken at the global level and their political and economic implications at national, regional, and local levels. Power relationships need to be analyzed to understand how they determine individual access to wealth, goods, and services. Those who hold power have more access to economic, political, social and cultural capitals and also have power to influence decision making (World Bank, Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis: The World Bank’s Experience.)

Political economy approach is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes within a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time (Collinson 2003: 3).

Forced displacement analysis needs to focus on why certain groups are more vulnerable to different types of stressors that result in forced displacement. Economic migration, forced migration, and the unorganized subterranean movement of humans such as trafficking need to be treated as related processes and contextualized within the vulnerability framework through a connected grid of local, national, and global factors and forces.

“Forced migration should be studied because it has become an integral part of globalization, a system of selective inclusion and exclusion that exacerbates inequality and the North–South divide in social rather than geographical terms. This system produces conflicts, forced displacement, and tends to blur distinctions between economic and forced migration. There can be no compartmentalized theory of forced migration. Theory, in this area, means analyzing forced migration as a pivotal aspect of global social relations and linking it to an emerging new political economy” (Castles 2003: 27). Castles further argues that beyond the north–south geographical divide, forced migration needs to be viewed through the web of the socioeconomic and political relationships that tie them together and that have roots in a historically exploitative process that is strengthened and sustained by globalization.

PEA is “the study of historical legacies, structural drivers, and the incentives of leaders and citizens, as well as formal and informal institutions” (World Bank 2014: 8). It emphasizes that forced displacement should not be considered just a humanitarian matter, because its consequences, including its often-protracted nature, are difficult to address with humanitarian assistance only. It outlines that the PEA of forced displacement needs to focus on the “actors,” “factors,” and “interests” related to a displacement crisis. “Factors” refers to different variables and a combination of relevant

contextual factors that will be specific and unique to each forced displacement crisis. “Actors” refers to key groups, institutions, or individuals that instigate, or are affected by, forced displacement. “Interests” refers to the motives of actors that are related to the displacement crisis. It concludes that such threefold analysis is necessary to understand why displacement results from the factors and behavior of actors in a crisis.

The Vulnerability Framework of Forced Displacement


Anthony Oliver-Smith (2009) emphasizes the need to study the interplay between economic wealth and social and political power in the production and distribution of resources, whether in disasters or reconstruction. He argues that vulnerability is inherently political-economic in nature and defines how social systems generate the conditions that place different groups of people, often differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or age, at different levels of risk from the same hazard. He contends that “vulnerability” is comparatively the best framework for a PEA to studying forced displacement. Frequently used in disaster and climate change studies, vulnerability is important in understanding the causes and consequences of forced displacement. Vulnerability plays a dual role in forced displacement: first, as a cause and contributing factor as vulnerable people are the most susceptible to the stressors resulting in forced displacement; and second, as a consequence, forced displacement leaves displaced people vulnerable to further stressors.

Vulnerability is “generated through a chain of root causes embedded in ideological, political, social, historical and economic systems” (Wisner et al. 2004: 51). Vulnerability is seen as a social construct influenced by entrenched arrangements within a system and enforced by political and economic processes and ideologies. Guillaumont, Jeanneney, and Wagner (2017) states that vulnerability can be assessed through intervening economic, sociopolitical, or environmental variables, for countries, communities, households, or individuals. The most widely accepted vulnerability framework is the one developed for sustainability science that treats humans and their environment as an integrated system or coupled human–environment system. “The term coupled human–environment system is used to highlight the fact that human and environmental systems are not separable entities but part of an integrated whole” (Schröter, Polsky, and Patt. 2005: 576).

As Figure 15 indicates, the fallout of a calamitous event is experienced as a complex outcome determined by various factors including institutional responses and policies. The vulnerability of a system is determined by how frequently it is exposed to an event and how sensitive it is to the impacts of such events. A resilient system will have less sensitivity as it will have more resources to cope with impacts. Resilience is built of both sociopolitical and environmental elements and mediated by institutional policies and practices. Thus, the impacts of flooding are not experienced in the same way by all people impacted. Various groups are differently positioned in the power structures and have different degrees of adaptive capacity and resilience. Similarly, impacts of war or conflict are not experienced in the same way by everyone impacted.

Resilience is inversely related to vulnerability. According to Pinto et al. (2014), displacement risk, therefore, can be mitigated by building resilience, reducing risk factors (the underlying inequalities), and improving adaptation strategies. They add that when people find themselves displaced and cut off from social, physical, and financial assets as well as viable livelihood opportunities, they are rendered highly vulnerable, their resilience markedly diminished, making them susceptible to future shocks, which can trigger cyclical or repeated displacements. Boano makes a similar point: “In the face of significant external stress, population displacement is often an indicator of the breakdown of social resilience” (2000: 349).

Figure 15: Details of the Exposure, Sensitivity, and Resilience Components of the Vulnerability Framework



Source: Turner et al. (2003).

The role of political economy is also relevant in assessing the post-displacement states of humanitarian assistance and resettlement, which can be influenced by unequal power relations. Those better positioned could extract more benefits. For example, post-displacement humanitarian responses are usually gender-biased, and displaced men often benefit more than displaced women. A PEA therefore is an ongoing requirement, and its results can only be fully achieved once the unequal power relations within a system are categorically eliminated. Political economy-based interventions, therefore, need to analyze and assess the unequal power relations and exclusionary practices, but also challenge and dismantle these through targeted interventions and facilitating inclusive and egalitarian outcomes.

Securitization and Forced Displacement: Securitization adds another dimension to the political economy of forced displacement. It contextualizes the unequal relationship between the global north and the global south that continues to impact the forced migration trajectories and discourses. This historically rooted power relationship is evident in the ways forced migration is perceived, understood, and presented in a discourse. This includes problematization and management solutions and the way the international legal regimes become part of this process rather than providing just solutions to the forced displaced.

Betts (2009) posits that events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US have resulted in increasing securitization that bears consequences for migration in general and forced migration in particular. Even though most forced migration

happens within the south, it is increasingly viewed as a threat to the security of the global north. Border controls keep out unwanted migrants and asylum seekers, and migration management in the global north has increased. Michael Collyer (2006) states that racial discrimination could play a major role in the north's perception, which connects displacement and terrorism, and actions are taken against migration to prevent terrorism.

The Copenhagen School of International Relations describes securitization as a "discursive process by which an actor (a) claims that a referent object is existentially threatened, (b) demands the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with the threat, and (c) convinces an audience that rule-breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified" (Van Munster 2012: 1). Forced migration is seen as a security issue, which needs to be dealt with urgently and decisively without necessarily following democratic processes and respecting human rights. A narrative is constructed around forced migrants, who are seen as potentially having criminal or terrorist backgrounds and pose security threats to host societies of the global north. This narrative is not always factual, yet over time it begins holding sway as migrants are increasingly seen through this lens. The "securitization" perspective justifies stringent measures to deal with forced migrants.

The Paris School argues for broadening the Copenhagen School's approach that sees securitization emerging from political processes and government policy responses. It acknowledges the importance of language in the securitizing process and defines the production of securitization that includes actors engaged in the production of securitization discourse. "Securitization discourse is not merely the outcome of perlocution but involves a number of other agents and practices. Though the narrative of securitization is still required, it is enhanced by agents and institutions such as media, local agencies through policies, and everyday practices." These eventually result in constructing securitization as a practice-based discourse and reifies migrants as threatening others that must be kept away and restrained. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) argue that defining forced migration as a security issue convinces audiences to accept forced migrants as a perceived threat, underlining the need to deal with such a threat. In such cases the state could take extraordinary measures, and debate on the legality of such measures is closed.

Ironically, the UNHCR, whose mandate is to protect refugees and people in refugee-like situations, has contributed significantly to this discourse. Hammerstad (2011) details the UNHCR's central role in the emergence of the "securitization" paradigm. She identifies its beginning in October 1990 with UNHCR High Commissioner Stoltenberg's speech describing the UNHCR as a "global security organization," while his successor Sadako Ogata redefined the "UNHCR's purpose from the original goal of protecting the rights of refugees to the broader purpose of furthering international peace and security" (Hammerstad 2011: 243).

Pan-European agencies like FRONTEX, which helps EU and Schengen countries manage their external borders, have emerged. These efforts are strengthened by the introduction of the European border surveillance system (EUROSUR) to provide EU states with the infrastructure and tools to improve their awareness and capability in terms of detecting, preventing, and combating illegal immigration. Similar imagery has come from the US where armed vigilante groups, along with state apparatus, secure and patrol the US–Mexican border to keep migrants from Central and South America away. Within Asia and the Pacific, Australia has implemented mandatory detention and offshore processing for people attempting to arrive in boats. Enforcement of stricter border controls often results in forced migrants falling prey to human smugglers and other criminal elements, risking their lives during precarious journeys. Even if granted

asylum, the identity and stigma make it extremely difficult for forced migrants to live a normalized life.

Responding to Forced Displacement Challenges

This report outlines three main causes leading to forced displacement – war, conflict, and violence; inequality and economic factors; and environmental and climate change. The following sections provide relevant and macro measures that could assist in addressing the causes of forced displacement. However, in all these three cases, inequality and related vulnerability are noted as the underlying reason for forced displacement.

Addressing Conflict and Violence, Peace Building, and Good Governance

War and conflict-related violence are major causes of forced displacement. Within the Asia and Pacific region, Afghanistan and Myanmar are two major hotspots for this, and addressing the causes of conflict and peace building are critical processes. The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) calls for the prevention and resolution of forced displacement within humanitarian, peace, and development activities. It notes that “tackling root causes of protracted forced displacement, including through heightened international efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, constitutes the most effective way to achieve solutions for displacement” (UNHCR 2020).

Addressing the drivers of forced displacement, protecting rights and promoting durable solutions for those who are affected by forced displacement are necessary to prevent the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of conflict and thus to restore and sustain peace, and achieve solutions to displacement. Not integrating forced displacement considerations in humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions is likely to leave conflict triggers unaddressed and can even reinforce or create them (UNHCR 2020).

A report prepared by the Advisory Group of Experts for the UN peace-building architecture (United Nations Advisory Group of Experts 2015) clearly establishes an early need for peace building, well before conflict arises. It emphasizes that “peace building should not be left as an afterthought: under-prioritized, under-resourced and undertaken only after the guns fall silent.” It calls for a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace through conflict prevention, peace keeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. It emphasizes that the “success of such an approach critically relies on uniting the peace and security, human rights, and development ‘pillars’ of the UN.” For an effective peace process, the report calls for fostering inclusive national ownership to drive efforts to sustain peace and calls on member states to take responsibility for sustaining peace.

UN peace building is usually directed when member states are involved in war or violent conflict. However, there are localized conflicts where the UN does not get involved that often escalate into large-scale violence leading to the protracted displacement of affected populations. These conflicts are often based on ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic divides within a nation state, triggered by the issues of sharing of resources, both natural and man-made, or the response or reaction to the repressive and partisan policies of the state. A state’s fragility could also result in conflicts if it is not strong enough to provide security and ensure law and order for all sections of society. Such localized conflicts often result in internal displacement rather than the affected people crossing international borders. However, they could also result

in cross-border forced migration. For example, due to ongoing internal conflict there is a steady stream of cross-border forced migration from the Kachin/Shan and Chin states in Myanmar to neighboring countries. Such cases call for building strong institutions within the state, including its CAL components, observing and protecting human rights and addressing the root causes of such conflict and displacement. Institution building, however, needs to be inclusive, egalitarian, and respectful of human rights.

Good governance is a useful mechanism for addressing conflict and other factors such as inequality that could result in forced displacement. There is no universally accepted definition of good governance. Previous sections of this report outline the contractual relationship between the state and its populace. It also refers to the hierarchy of goods and services that a state is expected to provide to its citizens. Good governance along with strong and inclusive institutions strengthen this contractual relationship. Governance broadly refers to the way political, economic, and social affairs are run within a nation state and requires developing and implementing a legal and policy framework to achieve the objectives of governance.

The world today has become closely integrated, and national governance is often impacted and influenced by global governance. Transnational agencies play an influencing role in national governance. Good governance is defined variously by international agencies based on their charters. For example, the World Bank only refers to nonpolitical aspects of good governance, while the UN and its agencies define good governance from the perspective of human rights and empowerment. The UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific outlines the characteristics of good governance: "It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It ensures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are considered and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society" (UNESCAP n.d.). Good governance, therefore, could play an important role in addressing systemic inequalities by being inclusive, participatory, and respectful of the human rights of all citizens. This would allow the removal or at least the lessening of institutional barriers that would otherwise prevent certain sections of a society from benefiting from the policies and interventions of the state.

Addressing forced displacement resulting from war, conflict, and violence, therefore, requires the root causes of war, conflict, and violence to be identified and developing and implementing strategies to deal with the potential drivers of war, conflict, and violence. A preemptive approach to address these drivers is necessary, and peace building and good governance could play an important role.

Addressing Inequality: Over the last few decades, Asia and the Pacific has emerged as the region driving worldwide economic growth. However, there is ample evidence that despite the high growth, inequality has risen sharply and the wealth gap between rich and poor has widened. This gap is manifest across the spectrum, where those at the bottom are deprived of basic necessities such as housing, health, sanitation, drinking water, food, education, economic opportunities, leisure, and safety and security. Such deprivation results in their lack of empowerment and in a lack of participation in the democratic processes. Persistent inequality results in systemic structural violence. The forced displacement outcomes of such structural violence are not explicit, occur over a period of time, and could often go unnoticed. Lacking opportunities and empowerment, people move out in desperation, and such forced migration could manifest as internal or cross-border displacement in the form of human smuggling and trafficking (Zhuang, Kanbur, and Rhee 2014).

Systemic inequalities embedded in institutional, ideological, and interactional aspects of a society result in inequality being accepted as normal, which results in the reproduction of inequality. Systemic inequality, therefore, not only hampers economic development but also adversely impacts other aspects of human development including participation and empowerment. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz cautions that rising inequality is detrimental to economic growth and requires public policy initiatives that could lead to more investment in public goods. Economic growth measured in GDP will not address the systemic inequalities and would require redistributive policies as well.

Inclusive Development

As a concept inclusive development is a quite broad and takes in account many aspects of human life. These include secure livelihood and decent living conditions, access to education, health and other civic amenities, cleaner environment and a sense of security. Inclusive development is both a process and an outcome. As a process, it refers to participatory development processes. As an outcome, it results in less inequality, and people becoming more empowered, capable, and resilient. Sound policies on wealth distribution such as social protection, social safety nets, and good governance that empower vulnerable people could help address systemic inequalities. Growth is inclusive if all members of a society equally participate in and contribute to growth, regardless of their individual circumstances (Ali and Zhuang 2007: 10). Equal access to opportunities allows individuals to realize their full productive potential that results in increased growth and wealth generation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also recognizes that inclusive growth has increasingly become central to national goals, even explicitly in the development plans of some countries.

Inclusive development is a strategy towards equity and empowerment based on poverty reduction, human capital development (education, health care), social capital development (participatory decision-making and community-based steering), gender development (health, welfare and participation in societal development for women) and social protection (reducing risks and vulnerabilities associated with age, illness, disability, natural disasters, economic crises and civil conflict) (Runiyar and Kanbur 2010).

Within international development, the concept of inclusive development first appeared in an ADB Working Paper by Rauniyar and Kanbur in 2010. The paper presents a comparative assessment of the countries in the Asia and Pacific region against several human development and economic indicators. It concludes that despite a rapid decrease in extreme poverty, inequalities in the region are also rising rapidly and could pose a major risk to social and economic progress in the region. The paper emphasizes that DMCs of Asia and the Pacific would require the implementation of policies that are conducive to “inclusive development” and these policies would need to be based on principles of “high and sustainable growth” and “social inclusion” by “expanding human capabilities, good policies and sound institutions and social safety nets” (Rauniyar and Kanbur 2010).

MFIs are adopting an integrated approach of economic, sociopolitical, and environmental aspects of development used by the SDGs. The World Bank’s Green, Resilient, and Inclusive Development (GRID) approach promotes economic growth along with environmental goals and social inclusion. ADB’s Strategy 2030 states that ADB “will sustain its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty and expand its vision to achieve a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and Pacific region.”

Strategy 2030 aims to achieve this by promoting “quality infrastructure investments that are green, sustainable, resilient, and inclusive” (ADB 2018).

Inclusive development can be a way to counter persistent inequality and mitigate the causes and consequences of forced migration. Gupta, Pouw, and Ros-Tonen (2015) postulate that inclusive development should include disenfranchised people, marginalized sectors, and countries. Inclusive development is commonly cast in terms of better health, skills, and social and political empowerment for a larger portion of the world population. For this, its social and material benefits need to be evenly distributed along earning levels, regional status, and gender, religion, or ethnicity. According to Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya (2015), another prerequisite is that inclusive development is an adaptive learning process, enough to respond to changing circumstances, and can mitigate new risks of exclusion and marginalization.

Social Protection: Social protection has an important role in reducing inequality and promoting inclusive development (Kanbur, Rhee, and Zhuang 2014). It is an important part of welfarism for a state to fulfill its contractual obligation towards its citizens. Polanyi (2001), in his seminal book *The Great Transformation*, states that a market-based economy requires disembedding of the economy from the society and the polity. This process dismantles the collective reciprocity and informal exchange practices of premarket economies, leading to inequality and economic insecurity. Polanyi states that to avoid potential social upheavals resulting from persistent inequality and economic insecurity, the economy needs to be re-embedded in the society and the state. Social protection is a way of re-embedding the economy with the society whereby the state adopts several socioeconomic roles to avoid economic uncertainties, social disorders, and anomic situations. Social protection allows the state to take redistributive measures that are necessary to keep inequality and other economic insecurities in check.

Social Protection Definitions:

Set of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people’s exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and the interruptions and loss of income (ADB 2001).

Set of policies and programs aimed at preventing or protecting all people against poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion throughout their life-course, with an emphasis on vulnerable groups (UNICEF, Social Protection Framework 2019).

A collection of measures to improve or protect human capital, ranging from labor market interventions, publicly mandated unemployment, or old-age insurance to targeted income support. Social protection interventions assist individuals, households, and communities to better manage the income risks that leave people vulnerable (World Bank 2003).

It is argued that social protection needs to be viewed beyond the narrow lens of a “safety net” approach and more towards its “transformative potential” that could address “power imbalances in society that encourage, create and sustain vulnerabilities” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 10). The authors outlined the fourfold typology of social protection based on its objectives: (i) protective measures – with the objective of providing relief from deprivation; (ii) preventive measures – seeking to avert deprivation; (iii) promotive measures – with the aim of enhancing real incomes and capabilities; and (iv) transformative measures – seeking to address

concerns of social equity and exclusion. From this perspective, social protection is not merely about providing handouts to the disadvantaged, it underlines the need to treat such people as active change agents who can transform their lives with the help of state welfare and redistributive measures. The approach, therefore, sees social protection as an empowering measure.

In a pre-displacement context, social protection could help address the existing vulnerabilities of disadvantaged groups who are most likely to face forced displacement threats, and builds the resilience of such groups to reduce their chances of being forcibly displaced. Measures could help people deal with adverse post-displacement consequences, especially for women and children, who are particularly vulnerable and in some cases resort to dehumanizing acts such as survival sex. Social protection, therefore, not only sustains vulnerable groups economically, it also allows them to live with dignity and to find their own agency to rebuild their lives. Moreover, a forcibly displaced person often deals with massive abuse of their human rights, including the right to be a citizen of a country. Social protection helps build this state–citizen relationship and aids in restoring human rights.

A World Bank report states that “...forcibly displaced populations are typically excluded from state social protection and are usually served by internationally financed humanitarian programs that are often short-term and unsustainable” (Klugman 2022: 29). Social protection, therefore, needs to be seen as a “right” of the poor and disadvantaged that is “grounded in social justice and equal rights and entitlements” (Piron 2004: 4). The Global Compact for Refugees (2018) highlights the need for greater collaboration between humanitarian assistance and development interventions to strengthen the humanitarian and development nexus. This approach needs to be adopted for social protection as well by extending state-run social protection measures to forced displaced people, sustaining the support provided by humanitarian measures and eventually building their resilience. Social protection, therefore, can be pivotal towards achieving inclusive development goals, reducing inequalities, empowering the poor and vulnerable, and building resilience that would allow them to deal with stressors that could otherwise result in their forced displacement.

Coordinated Approach: Humanitarian and Development Nexus

Humanitarian and development interventions are seen as two distinct realms of international development, often working in parallel and lacking coordination. Their objectives are seen as different. Humanitarian interventions focus on urgent, immediate requirements following a disaster, conflict, or violence that could result in the loss of life and livelihoods. Development interventions are planned processes aimed at achieving long-term economic and social well-being. The political-economy analysis underscores the entrenched vulnerabilities that stem from the persistent inequalities within societies. It demonstrates that vulnerable groups requiring humanitarian assistance are excluded from development benefits and fail to develop the resilience to respond to events that could result in their forced displacement. Therefore, there is a need to develop a coordinated, complementary approach or humanitarian development nexus that brings together humanitarian and development interventions.

The concept of the humanitarian development nexus gained prominence with the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. This humanitarian development nexus refers to “the transition or overlap between the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the provision of long-term development assistance” (Lie 2020: 104). The approach has a proactive element of addressing the humanitarian crisis situation or nipping it in the bud by responding to its root causes, an area in which development intervention can play a key role. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA), the average humanitarian crisis lasts more than nine years. In such situations, keeping people dependent on humanitarian aid, as passive recipients, undermines their agency and prevents them from building normalized lives. Providing humanitarian assistance for such a protracted displacement is also a challenging task requiring an uninterrupted supply of funds.

Humanitarian relief, development programs and peace building are not serial processes: they are all needed at the same time. It focuses on the work needed to coherently address people's vulnerability before, during and after crises (ReliefWeb).

In the context of forced displacement, an ecosystem of organizations is often already extending services to forcibly displaced people. Displacement-context economic inclusion programs often build on this humanitarian support, and many government programs use the expertise of these humanitarian organizations for targeting and serving displaced populations (World Bank 2022).

Data trends indicate a constant rise in the number of people being impacted by humanitarian crises and in need of assistance. The OECD (2017) asserts that the sheer number of people in need and the limited funding and human resources for humanitarian interventions make it difficult to aid all the needy ones. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit reflected on this complex nature of crises and emphasized “the need for new, more effective ways of delivering humanitarian assistance and funding humanitarian operations, so that it remains effective in saving lives and preserving livelihoods” (OECD 2017). Because crises are complex, displacement protracted, and durable solutions are not easily available, resulting in displaced people living in limbo for a prolonged period, the need for coordination between the humanitarian and development interventions is being emphasized. Relevant outcomes of the 2016 summit were to recommend: (i) a new global approach to managing forced displacement, with emphasis on ensuring hope and dignity for refugees or internally displaced people, and support for host countries and communities; and (ii) adopting new approaches to respond to protracted crises and recurrent disasters, reduce vulnerability, and manage risk, by bridging the divide between development and humanitarian partners (World Humanitarian Summit 2016).

International development agencies are therefore stressing the need to bring humanitarian and development approaches onto a single platform to enhance effectiveness. As the OECD points out, delivering an effective emergency response and building people's resilience to shocks requires a broad range of measures that address both emergency humanitarian needs and long-term developmental needs (2017). The “New Way of Working” is a UN and World Bank initiative to deliver the nexus approach. It acknowledges the need to pay special attention to populations living in fragile and conflict-affected settings and the need to strengthen the connections between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding to better reduce risks and vulnerabilities and leave no one behind (OCHA 2017). The New Way of Working is also evident in the way in which multilateral financing institutions (MFIs) could play a role in delivering the nexus. Following the New York Declaration, the UN has set up two compacts, namely (i) the Global Compact on Refugees and (ii) the Global Compact on Migration, for this purpose.

However, developing and implementing such a nexus is easier said than done. Despite the innate need to combine the two together to effectively respond to situations of conflict, disaster, and displacement, there exists a chasm between these two approaches that gets more complex with the rapidly rising forced displacement, the

scarcity of resources – including funding and human resources – the protracted nature of such events, and the entirely disjointed objectives of the two processes. Lie (2020) points to a discursive disconnect between the two approaches that makes it difficult to put the nexus into practice. He states that “[h]umanitarian action and development assistance represent two distinct discursive and institutional segments of the international system that are hard to juxtapose” (2020, p.1). He provides an example that, “the idea that humanitarian action is about the here and now, not what occurs before or after the crisis is being undermined by humanitarian involvement in prevention and reconstruction activities” (2020: 3). Despite these differences at philosophical, institutional, and temporal levels, both the processes remain committed to providing help to the most vulnerable around the world, when they are in need. And with the rising instances of vulnerability and inequality, those in need of support require a robust process that could result in providing such population groups with better life chances. Those in need of support do not necessarily differentiate between the support coming from these two different processes. Hence, the ground realities require a more coordinated approach directed toward addressing inequalities and vulnerabilities and building the resilience of such a population group, allowing them to deal with the vagaries of forced displacement.

The best results are likely to be achieved when humanitarian and development actors work together. The humanitarian-development nexus has long been seen as sequential, with an initial humanitarian response followed by a development effort when the situation becomes protracted. In fact, rather than replace or succeed each other, both sets of actors can engage in complementary efforts for greater impact throughout the entire period of forced displacement. Humanitarian and development agencies have different objectives, counterparts, and instruments: this can be a source of strength. They can both contribute to a comprehensive effort from the onset, learn from each other, and build synergies based on their respective comparative advantages (World Bank 2017: 2).

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also calls for a similar approach in its report “Saving lives today and tomorrow: managing the risks of humanitarian crisis” (2014). The report seeks to take a proactive rather than a reactive approach to dealing with humanitarian crisis. It states that humanitarian assistance, rather than responding to a crisis event once it has taken place, should work towards preventing such occurrences and recognizes that such an approach will need coordinated efforts with other similar players.

A PEA could provide strong support for such a coordinated approach. The PEA underlines the genesis of forced displacement in inequality and corresponding vulnerability. Forced displacement most severely affects the vulnerable peoples and further accentuates their vulnerabilities once they have been displaced. Such vulnerabilities directly result from persistent inequalities resulting in reduced or nonexistent resilience of certain groups in responding to a crisis situation. Inequities are systemic, resulting from uneven power relations that strangle the opportunities for those who are at the receiving end and result in unequal and lopsided development. Hence, those faced with disproportionate impacts of a crisis event are also deprived of development benefits. This establishes a clear nexus between development and humanitarian processes, and despite the foreseeable challenges in bringing together the humanitarian and development approaches, there is clearly a need to be able to effectively deal with the forced displacement crisis and to allow such affected populations to live with dignity by finding durable solutions.

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Rapidly rising forced displacement could pose significant challenges to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as to ADB's Strategy 2030 objectives of an inclusive and sustainable Asia and the Pacific and "leaving no one behind." Various factors that result in forced displacement are outlined in this report. Vulnerable groups are at the highest risk. The political economy-based vulnerability framework used in the report demonstrates that vulnerability is multifaceted and intersectional across a spectrum of variables, such as race, gender, economic and sociocultural status, political and governance factors, religious beliefs, educational attainments, and others. Vulnerability is both a cause and a consequence of forced displacement – it results in forced displacement and forced displacement also makes people vulnerable. A PEA helps in understanding how forced displacement is produced and distributed within a system. It also unearths the factors that result in certain groups becoming more vulnerable to forced displacement than others. The report highlights that rising inequality is directly related to vulnerability, and addressing inequality could reduce vulnerability to forced displacement.

Rising inequality and climate change are defining contemporary international development issues. As the available data indicate, forced displacement is already a rapidly growing concern in the Asia and Pacific region. Climate change is expected to become a key migration and displacement driver in Asia and the Pacific, not only because of its direct impacts on migration patterns but also because of its role with regard to the different migration drivers, such as poverty, food and water insecurity, the loss of livelihood resources, and conflict over such resources.

Current trends indicate a rapid increase in internal displacement within the countries of the global south. Within the Asia and Pacific region, there are a few hotspots for conflict-generated forced displacement where displaced people are forced to cross international borders. Otherwise, the majority of forced displaced people remain within the boundaries of their countries. Such displaced people have no international legal protections, and, in many cases, there might not be any protections at the national level either. Despite the acknowledgement of rapidly rising forced internal displacement, insufficient thought has been given to this phenomenon. Most research and knowledge remains focused on international displacement, particularly from the countries of the south to those of the north. Immediate attention needs to be given to studying the causes, patterns, and consequences of internal displacement, and evidence-based policy interventions need to be developed and implemented.

Except for refugees, other categories of forced displaced people lack adequate international protection. In the case of refugees too, despite such protection, many of them endure prolonged displacement in camps, depriving them of normal life, straining resources and potentially leading to social tensions. Only a small number of refugees or those in refugee-like situations find durable solutions and are resettled in third countries. A more desirable approach would be to address refugee-generating factors in the first place, so that people don't need to flee in desperation.

Responding to climate change-induced forced migration will also require a stronger focus on internal migration, and more emphasis on migration within the developing countries. Discussions on mechanisms for managing climate change-induced displacement are still in their early stages. There is a widespread perception that climate change may lead to a substantial increase in migration to developed countries, but such movements are most likely to be internal or to the closest international border within a region. The research and policy response also needs to have a greater focus

on slow-onset environmental changes that occur gradually over time and may not be immediately noticeable or easily attributed to specific causes. To understand better the potential benefits of mobility, research needs to explore how migration can become a strategy for adapting to climate change. This also needs to include specific policy interventions that ensure that the most vulnerable groups could also benefit from such a strategy.

More and more, it is now being recognized that migration decisions are based on a multiplicity of factors. Categorizing migration as ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ based on ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors might not provide a full picture of migration decision making. In some cases such as imminent violence, migration could appear to be driven by a push factor, still a number of other factors will play a role in the decision making process and actual migration. The growing body of literature now recommends to look at forced migration along a continuum of push and pull factors. A PEA to forced migration is highly desirable as it helps in unfolding how forced displacement gets produced, distributed and sustained within a social system. The vulnerability framework is an important instrument to undertake a PEA as it unpacks the exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity/resilience of different social groups to a particular stressor that could result in forced displacement. Policy initiatives and interventions to address exposure and sensitivity and building resilience to the stressors could play a vital role in addressing the forced displacement challenges.

The data on forced displacement mainly come from agencies such as the UNHCR and IDMC. Both these agencies acknowledge that the data on forced migration are estimates. They also point to the need for better data collection, including systematic and gender disaggregated approaches to data collection methods. More focus needs to be given to internal and interregional displacement. The quantitative data collection could be supported by qualitative case studies on specific hotspots of forced migration. Such an effort will require multi-agency coordination and sufficient resources at the local, national, and regional (Asia and the Pacific) levels. Such studies will be helpful in developing informed interventions both at the humanitarian and developmental levels. A collaborative approach amongst government agencies, CSOs, academic and research institutions, and multilateral financial institutions to collecting, storing, and disseminating data on forced displacement for research and policy purposes will enhance its understanding and support better policy and program interventions.

Based on a systematic review of the literature on forced displacement, this report concludes that forced migration is an emergent vulnerability in the Asia and Pacific region and could have significant repercussions for achieving goals of inclusive development and attainment of SDGs. Persistent and systemic inequality remains the main factor generating vulnerability.

Recommendations

A number of agencies working on forced displacement propose recommendations for dealing with its challenges. As indicated in this report, there are multiple actors involved, including countries and their governments, international humanitarian and development agencies, civil society organizations, displaced people, and host communities. As their roles intersect, the following recommendations are presented collectively.

1. Recognize rapidly rising “forced displacement” a developmental challenge and if it remains unaddressed it will result in serious repercussions for development interventions including achieving an inclusive and sustainable Asia and Pacific region and achieving the SDGs. The multifarious causes and consequences of

forced displacement have the potential to undermine the development effectiveness in the region.

2. Forced internal displacement is a major concern with limited attention paid to it. Concerted efforts are needed to better understand its trends, underlying causes and consequences, and developing potential preventive and recovery measures. As a large proportion of forced displaced people remain, and will continue to remain, within their own countries, focus needs to be placed on country-specific studies and interventions. Country programming processes could include developing development interventions for the hot spots of such migration.
3. Recognize “forced displacement” as a “vulnerability” with its intersectionality across a spectrum of variables, such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, religion, class, disabilities, and spatial factors. Development interventions would require a differentiated approach to address the challenges of forced displacement.
4. Recognize persistent and systemic inequality as the main underlying factor for the multidimensional vulnerabilities and develop measures to address inequalities, including identifying its structural anchors, and develop and implement measures to dismantle these anchors that act as barriers for certain groups to access the institutional measures. Effective and good governance will require to be strengthened to address structural inequalities.
5. Develop coordination within global and regional agencies such as the UNHCR, IDMC, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, Bali Process, and others to develop robust databases and analytical studies that would support evidence-based policy and program interventions.
6. Develop knowledge base on intraregional forced migration within the Asia and Pacific region by focusing on patterns of such displacement and its causes and consequences. Assessing impacts on host communities would require equal importance. Such a knowledge base would help in developing intervention programs and building the capacity of countries to respond to the causes of forced displacement.
7. Develop linkages between humanitarian responses and development interventions and look at ways to supplement the humanitarian responses by developing intervention backups to build the resilience of the populations impacted by humanitarian crises and to help develop durable solutions to avoid incidents of forced displacement.
8. Promote collaborative work amongst the MDBs and other bilateral funding agencies on forced displacement under the Global Compact on Refugee and Forced Migration. Such collaborations should consider taking up the advocacy role with the countries of the region and develop a shared approach towards durable solutions.
9. Undertake more analytical studies including case studies of hotspots of forced migration to find the root causes of forced displacement and explore development interventions for durable solutions with the countries concerned. Consider funding such initiatives and in collaboration with other relevant players. Development intervention in such cases could be implemented as preventive measures rather than a post event recovery measure.

10. Rapid urbanization in the region is fueling rural to urban migration that is not necessarily voluntary and inclusive. It is driven, to a large extent, by shrinking employment and livelihood opportunities in rural areas. Rural migrants face exploitative employment practices. Limited and expensive services (housing, education, medical) result in ghettoization in the cities where migrant populations live in precarious conditions making them more vulnerable to shocks and stressors. The ongoing initiative of making cities livable and sustainable should view migrant/forced migrant population groups as important stakeholders to achieve the objectives of livable and sustainable cities initiative.
11. Climate change-induced forced displacement will require looking beyond the natural factors and considering social, political, and economic factors as well. Specific instruments will need to be developed to understand how these various factors come together to influence the decision-making process regarding migration in the case of a climate event. An important aspect of developing such instruments would be focusing on slow onset events, how these unfold impacting different aspects of life and eventually resulting in migration.
12. Good governance and egalitarian institutional set up are important for addressing forced displacement. MDB could work with their counterpart governments to strengthen these aspects by providing technical assistance. A human rights-based approach calling for the governments' obligation to meet its basic responsibilities to every citizen needs to be considered.
13. Development and humanitarian agencies could coordinate with the countries in the region on developing robust social safety nets and social protection measures with targeted inclusion of vulnerable populations. Development interventions should direct more resources towards such programs.
14. Support building sustainable livelihoods. The lack of effective livelihood programs in a rapidly changing Asia and Pacific region is one of the main causes of forced displacement and is often disguised as economic migration in the region. Building sustainable livelihoods that respond to emerging needs could not only result in limiting forced displacement but will also ensure that affected vulnerable population groups don't fall into the poverty trap.
15. Develop robust disaster management strategies by linking and supporting these strategies with development interventions.
16. Recognize forced displaced persons as active change agents with the capacity to contribute towards improving their circumstances. This will require respecting their rights and entitlements that will allow them access to various resources and capitals. Inclusive policies and interventions that target systemic inequalities are required in such cases.
17. Host communities play an important role in accommodating displaced people and sharing precious resources with them. The interventions, therefore, must need to include host communities as well, not just for providing them with support but also to ensure harmony and social cohesion between the two.

REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. 2002. The Political Economy of Kuznets Curve. *Review of Development Economics* 6(2): 183-203. https://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/908_jr_kuznets.pdf (assessed 23 August 2022).
- Adger W. N., Pulhin, J. M., Barnett J., Dabelko G. D., Hovelsrud G. K., Levy M., Spring Ú. O. and Vogel C. H. (2014) Human security Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ed C B Field et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 755–91.
- Adger, W. N. 2000. Social and Ecological Resilience: Are They Related? *Progress in Human Geography* 24(3): 347–364. <https://doi.org/10.1191/030913200701540465> (assessed 18 March 2023).
- Agenda for Humanity. No Date. World Humanitarian Summit 2016. <https://agendaforhumanity.org/summit.html> (accessed 23 May 2022).
- Ali, J. and J. Zhuang, 2007. Inclusive Growth Towards a Prosperous Asia: Policy Implications. Economics Research Department Working Paper No. 97 Manila Asian Development Bank. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28210/wp097.pdf> (assessed 9 May 2023).
- Allen, T. D. 2007. Katrina: Race, Class, and Poverty: Reflections and Analysis. *Journal of Black Studies* 37(4): 466–468. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40034317> (assessed 23 June 2022).
- Anseeuw, W., M. Boche, T. Breu, M. G. J. Lay, P. Messerli, K. Nolte. 2012. *Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in the 'Global South': Creating Evidence on a Global Level*. GLP News 9–11.
- Ashford, N.A., Hall, R.P., Arango-Quiroga, J., Metaxas, K.A., Showalter, A.L. Addressing Inequality: The First Step Beyond COVID-19 and Towards Sustainability. *Sustainability* 2020, 12, 5404. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12135404> (accessed 23 June 2023).
- Asian Development Bank. 2012. *Addressing climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific*. Philippines. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29662/addressing-climate-change-migration.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2023).
- . 2018. *Strategy 2030: Achieving a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific*. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/435391/strategy-2030-main-document.pdf> (accessed 12 January 2023).
- . 2021. *Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situation and Small Island Developing States Approach*. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/699041/fragile-conflict-affected-sids-approach_0.pdf (accessed 20 October 2023).
- . 2022. *Social Protection Directional Guide 2022–2030: Toward Inclusive and Resilient Social Protection* <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/870411/strategy-2030-social-protection-directional-guide.pdf> (assessed 28 June 2023).

- Bahadur, A. V., K. Peters, E. Wilkinson, F. Pichon, K. Gray and T. Turner. 2015. The 3As: Tracking Resilience across BRACED. Working Paper. http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/The_3As_Tracking_Resilience_Across_BRA_CED.pdf (accessed 22 June 2023).
- Barnett, J., and W. N. Adger. 2007. Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. *Political Geography* 26(6): 639–655. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.03.003> accessed 22 November 2022 (accessed 11 June 2022).
- Bates, D. C. 2002. Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change. *Population and Environment* 23(5): 465–477. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27503806> (accessed 11 June 2022).
- Bayrak, M., and L. Marafa. 2016. Ten Years of REDD+: A Critical Review of the Impact of REDD+ on Forest-Dependent Communities. *Sustainability* 8(7): 620. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su8070620> (accessed 14 June 2022).
- Beck, U. 1997. *Was it Globalization?* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Betts, A. 2009. *Forced Migration and Global Politics*. 1st ed. Wiley. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444315868> (accessed 22 March 2022).
- . 2013. *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . 2014. International Relations and Forced Migration. In *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, edited by E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long and N. Sigona: Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Betts, A., and G. Loescher. 2011. Edited *Refugees in International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Biswas, A. K. and C. Tortajada. 2015. Water Security, Climate Change and Sustainable Development: An Introduction, in *Water Security, Climate Change and Sustainable Development*, edited by A. K. Biswas and C. Tortajada), Springer, Singapore.
- Black, R. 2001. Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? *UNHCR Working Paper No. 34. New Issues in Refugee Research*. University of Sussex. <https://www.unhcr.org/media/environmental-refugees-myth-or-reality-richard-black> (accessed 21 July 2022).
- Blutstein, H. 2022. Globalization and World Trade Organization. In *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*, edited by A. Farazmand, 5597–5604. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3_3193 (accessed 18 November 2022).
- Boano, C. 2008. Forced Migration Online, *FMO Research Guide on Climate Change and Displacement*, January. https://www.academia.edu/1777949/Forced_Migration_Online_FMO_FMO_Research_Guide_on_Climate_change_and_displacement (accessed 9 April 2022).
- Bøås, M., and K. M. Jennings. 2005. Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the 'Failed State.' *The European Journal of Development Research* 17(3): 385–395. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09578810500209148> (accessed 8 November 2022).
- Boer, H. J. 2018. The Role of Government in Operationalising Markets for REDD + in Indonesia. *Forest Policy and Economics* 86 (January): 4–12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2017.10.004> (accessed 7 January 2023).

- Borras Jr, S. M., and J. C. Franco. 2012. Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of Agrarian Change: A Preliminary Analysis. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 12(1): 34–59. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2011.00339.x> (accessed 19 March 2023).
- Bourgois, P. 2001. The Power of Violence in War and Peace: Post-Cold War Lessons from El Salvador. *Ethnography* 2(1): 5–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14661380122230803> (accessed 8 January 2023).
- Brown, S., J. Grävingholt, and R. Raddatz. 2016. The Securitization of Foreign Aid: Trends, Explanations and Prospects. In *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, edited by S. Brown and J. Grävingholt, pp. 237–255. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56882-3_11 (accessed 22 February 2023).
- Butler, R.A., 2012. REDD (Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). <https://worldrainforests.com/redd/> (accessed 25 June 2023).
- Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J. de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publication.
- Call, C. T. 2008. The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State.’ *Third World Quarterly* 29(8): 1491–1507. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802544207> (accessed 20 December 2022).
- Call, C. T. 2010. Beyond the ‘Failed State’: Toward Conceptual Alternatives. *European Journal of International Relations* 17(2): 303–326.
- Carling, J. 2017. Review of Alexander Betts, Ed., *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52(2): 332–333. <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9780801468964/html> (accessed 13 March 2023).
- Carmenza Robledo-Abad, Hans-Jörg Althaus, Göran Berndes, Simon Bolwig, Esteve Corbera, Felix Creutzig, John Garcia-Ulloa, Anna Geddes, Jay S. Gregg, Helmut Haberl, Susanne Hanger, Richard J. Harper, Carol Hunsberger, Rasmus K. Larsen, Christian Lauk, Stefan Leitner, Johan Lilliestam, Hermann Lotze-Campen, Bart Muys, Maria Nordborg, Maria Ölund, Boris Orlowsky, Alexander Popp, Joana Portugal-Pereira, Jürgen Reinhard, Lena Scheffle, Pete Smit (2017), Bioenergy production and sustainable development: science base for policymaking remains limited. *GCB Bioenergy* (2017) 9, 541–556, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/gcbb.12338> (accessed 22 July 2023).
- Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J. and N. Able. 2014. From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to What?. *Ecosystems* 4, 765–781 (2001). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10021-001-0045-9> (accessed 22 February 2023).
- Castle, S. 2002. Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate. *Working Paper No. 70, Refugees Studies Centre, University of Oxford*. <https://www.unhcr.org/media/environmental-change-and-forced-migration-making-sense-debate-stephen-castles> (accessed 8 February 2023).
- . 2003. Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation. *Sociology*, 37 (1) 13–34. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0038038503037001384> accessed 24 May 2022 (accessed 8 January 2023).

- Castles, S. 2006. Global Perspectives on Forced Migration. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 15(1): 7–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/011719680601500102> (accessed 7 January 2023).
- Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. 2009. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 4th edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Castree, N. 2003. Commodifying What Nature? *Progress in Human Geography* 27(3): 273–297. <https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132503ph428oa> (accessed 23 May 2023).
- . 2010. Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(10): 1565–1586. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489381> (accessed 9 January 2023).
- Cazabat C., V. Anzellini, V. Fung, A. O'Connor, S. Ponserre and F. Teppe. 2022. *Disaster Displacement: Papua New Guinea country briefing*. IDMC and Asian Development Bank. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/842806/disaster-displacement-papua-new-guinea.pdf> (accessed 10 June 2023).
- Cazabat, C., A. Clémentine, V. Fung, R. Montandon, H. Patten, S. Ponserre and L. Yasukawa. 2020. *Women and Girls in Forced Displacement*. IDMC, IMPACT, and Plan International. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/202003-twice-invisible-internally-displaced-women.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2023).
- Cerneia, M. 2002. Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement. In *Risks and Reconstruction Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees*, pp. 11–55. World Bank https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_cerneia_population_resettlement_backgroundpaper.pdf (accessed 23 June 2022).
- . 2008. Compensation and Benefit Sharing: Why Resettlement Policies and Practices Must Be Reformed. *Water Science and Engineering* 1(1): 89–120. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1674-2370\(15\)30021-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1674-2370(15)30021-1) accessed 6 January 2023 (accessed 18 November 2022).
- Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G. World Inequality Report 2022, *World Inequality Lab* wir2022.wid.world (accessed 18 January 2023).
- Christensen, A., and N. Harild. 2009. *Forced Displacement: The Development Challenge. Conflict, Crime and Violence Issue Note*. World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/27717> (accessed 21 February 2023).
- Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions Version 5.1.0. 2011. Edited by J. Higgins and J. Thomas). <http://handbook.cochrane.org/> (accessed 18 June 2022).
- Collinson, S. 1999. Globalization and the Dynamics of International Migration: Implications for the Refugee Regime, New Issues in Refugee Research. *Working Paper No. 1* Geneva: UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3ae6a0c60.pdf> (accessed 15 June 2022).
- . 2003. Editor, Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian action, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 13. <https://media.odi.org/documents/289.pdf>.
- Collyer, M. 2006. Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities. *Mediterranean Politics* 11(2): 255–270. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390600682974> (accessed 12 September 2022).

- Cooper, H. M. 1988. Organizing Knowledge Synthesis: A Taxonomy of Literature Review. *Knowledge in Society*, 1 (104). <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03177550> (accessed 4 March 2022).
- Corbera, E., C. Hunsberger, and C. Vaddhanaphuti. 2017. Climate Change Policies, Land Grabbing and Conflict: Perspectives from Southeast Asia. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 38(3): 297–304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2017.1343413> (accessed 27 May 2023).
- Corson, C., MacDonald, K. I. and B. Neimark (2013). Grabbing “Green”: Markets, Environmental Governance and the Materialization of Natural Capital. *Human Geography*, 6(1): 1–15.
- Crisp, J. 2008(a). Beyond the Nexus: UNHCR’s Evolving Perspective on Refugee Protection and International Migration. *Research Paper No. 155. New Issues in Refugee Research*. UNHCR. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c2325646.html> (accessed 24 May 2022).
- . 2008(b). Globalization, Poverty and Mobility: An Introduction to the Developmental Dimensions of International Migration. UNHCR. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c23256c0.html> (accessed 24 May 2022).
- De Jong, G. F., and J. T. Fawcett. 1981. Motivations for Migration: An Assessment and a Value-Expectancy Research Model. In *Migration Decision Making* edited by G. F. De Jong and R. W. Gardner: 13–58. Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-026305-2.50008-5> (accessed 6 June 2022).
- Deininger, K., D. Byerlee, J. Lindsay, A. Norton, H. Selod, and M. Stickler. 2011. *Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits*. World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8591-3> (accessed 13 July 2023).
- Demenchonok, E., and R. Peterson. 2009. Globalization and Violence: The Challenge to Ethics. *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 68(1): 51–76. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27739760> (accessed 11 November 2022).
- Devereux, S. and R. Sabates-Wheeler. 2004. *Transformative Social Protection*, IDS Working Paper 232, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, England.
- Devictor, X. 2019. *How Long do Refugees stay in Exile? To Find Out, Beware of Averages*. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/dev4peace/2019-update-how-long-do-refugees-stay-exile-find-out-beware-averages> (accessed 7 May 2022).
- DiMento, J. F., and P. Doughman. (Eds). 2014. *Climate Change: What it Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Dryzek, J. S. 2017. *The Politics of the Earth*. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780199696000.001.0001> (accessed 9 June 2023).
- El-Hinnawi, E. 1985. *Environmental Refugees*. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environmental Programme.
- Erdal, M. B. 2020. Migration, Forced. *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (Second Edition)*: 105–110. Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10336-1> (accessed 26 July 2022).
- European Union European Border and Coast Guard Agency. No Date. https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/search-all-eu-institutions-and-bodies/frontex_en. (accessed 24 May 2023).

- European Union Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). 2013. OJ L. Vol. 295. <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1052/oj/eng> (accessed 24 May 2023).
- Fairhead, J., M. Leach and I. Scoones. 2012. Green Grabbing: A New Appropriation of Nature? *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(2): 237–361. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.671770> (accessed 2 August 2023).
- Faye, M. 2021. A Forced Migration from Myanmar to Bangladesh and Beyond: Humanitarian Response to Rohingya Refugee Crisis. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*: 6(1): 13. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-021-00098-4> (accessed 18 March 2023).
- Ferris, E. 2018. *When Refugee Displacement Drags On, Is Self-reliance the Answer?* <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-refugee-displacement-drags-on-is-self-reliance-the-answer/> (accessed 22 June 2022).
- Folke C., S. Carpenter, T. Elmqvist, L. Gunderson, C.S. Holling, B. Walker. 2002. Resilience and Sustainable Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a World of Transformations. *AMBIO A Journal of the Human Environment*, 31(5): 437–40.
- Food and Agriculture Organization. 2022. *Global Report on Food Crisis*, [https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/cd91dde3-e05b-48b3-b8c1-c93497a1d78f/content#:~:text=This%20sixth%20annual%20Global%20Report,Security%20Information%20Network%20\(FSIN\)](https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/cd91dde3-e05b-48b3-b8c1-c93497a1d78f/content#:~:text=This%20sixth%20annual%20Global%20Report,Security%20Information%20Network%20(FSIN)) (accessed 12 May 2023).
- Ferris, E. 2018. *When Refugee Displacement Drags On, Is Self-reliance the Answer?* <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-refugee-displacement-drags-on-is-self-reliance-the-answer/> (accessed 22 June 2022).
- . No Date. *Migration, Agriculture and Rural Development*. <https://www.fao.org/3/cb9997en/cb9997en.pdf>. (accessed 20 May 2023).
- Fritz, V., L. Brian, and R. Ort. 2014. Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis: The World Bank's Experience. *Directions in Development--Public Sector Governance*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16389> (accessed 11 July 2023).
- Füssel, E., L. M. Hunter and C. L. Gray. 2014. Measuring the Environmental Dimensions of Human Migration: The Demographer's Toolkit. *Global Environment Change* 28 (September): 182–191. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.001>.
- Füssel, H.-M. 2007. Vulnerability: A Generally Applicable Conceptual Framework for Climate Change Research. *Global Environment Change* 17(2): 155–67. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.05.002>.
- Gaanderse, M. 2013. Gender and Forced Displacement: Practical Issues and Challenges at Field Level. *St Antony's International Review* 9(1): 108–117. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26229104> (accessed 23 April 2022).
- Gallagher, A. 2002. Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights: Tricks and Treaties. *Forced Migration Review* 12: 25–28.

- Gallagher, P. L. 1996. Review of *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* by K. Ohmae. *The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association* 29(1): 87–90. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1315260> (accessed 22 November 2022).
- Galtung, J. 1964. A Structural Theory of Aggression. *Journal of Peace Research* 1(2): 95–119.
- . 1969. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3): 167–191. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301> (accessed 23 April 2022).
- . 1990. Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 27(3): 291–305.
- Ghosh A. 2021. *The Nutmeg's Curse: Parable for a Planet in Crisis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gibney, M.J. 2004. *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gisselquist, R. M. 2017. Disaggregating State Fragility: A Method to Establish a Multidimensional Empirical Typology. In *Fragility, Aid, and State-Building: Understanding Diverse Trajectories*, edited by J. Grävingholt, M. Kreibbaum, and S. Ziaja. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315115344> (accessed 11 May 2022).
- Global Compact on Refugees. 2018. <https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/overview/global-compact-refugees> (accessed 13 May 2022).
- Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR). 2022. Forced Displacement: Global Paper. [file:///Users/T29/Downloads/Forced-Displacement-Global-Paper-EN%20\(2\).pdf](file:///Users/T29/Downloads/Forced-Displacement-Global-Paper-EN%20(2).pdf) (accessed 18 March 2023).
- Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. 2022. <https://globalplatform.undrr.org/2022/language/bahasa-indonesia.html> (accessed 20 October 2023).
- Grävingholt, J., S. Ziaja, and M. Kreibbaum. 2015. Disaggregating State Fragility: A Method to Establish a Multidimensional Empirical Typology. *Third World Quarterly* 36(7): 1281–1298. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1038340> (accessed 30 April 2022).
- Gros, J.-G. 1996. Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti. *Third World Quarterly* 17(3): 455–472. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599615452> (accessed 30 April 2022).
- Guillaumont, P., Jeanneney, and S., Wagner L. 2017. How to Take into Account Vulnerability in Aid Allocation Criteria and Lack of Human Capital as Well: Improving the Performance Based Allocation, *World Development, Special Section: Reforming Performance-Based Aid Allocation Practice*. 90: 27–40. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15002740> (accessed 23 September 2022).
- Gupta, J., N. R. M. Pouw, and M. A. F. Ros-Tonen. 2015. Towards an Elaborated Theory of Inclusive Development. *The European Journal of Development Research* 27(4): 541. https://www.academia.edu/17978292/Towards_an_Elaborated_Theory_of_Inclusive_Development (accessed 23 July 2023).

- Hammerstad, A. 2011. *UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration*. In: Betts, Alex and Loescher, Gil, eds. *Refugees in International Relations*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 237–260.
- Heisey, J., Inés Arévalo Sánchez, and Alexi Bernagros. 2022. Working for Inclusion: Economic Inclusion in Context of Forced Displacement. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development | The World Bank, Washington DC. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099556006202228844/pdf/IDU0abfb964c0c472049740948308daba72f688a.pdf> (accessed 9 November 2022).
- Hickey, S., K. Sen, B. Badru Edited .2015. *The Politics of Inclusive Development: Interrogating the Evidence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722564.001.0001> (accessed 13 July 2023).
- Holling, C. S. 1973. Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems. *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 4: 1–23. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096802> (accessed 23 July 2023).
- Horst, C., and K. Grabska. 2015. Introduction: Flight and Exile—Uncertainty in the Context of Conflict-Induced Displacement. *Social Analysis* 59(1): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.3167/sa.2015.590101> (accessed 22 June 2022).
- Hugo, G. 1996. *Migration, Development and Environment*. Draft Paper for Research Workshop on Migration and the Environment: Developing a Global Research Agenda, Munich, Germany.
- Hugo, G., M. J. Abbasi-Shavazi, and E. P. Kraly. 2018. Introduction: Advancing the Demography of Forced Migration and Refugees. In *Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration* edited by G. Hugo, M. J Abbasi-Shavazi, and E. P. Kraly. International Studies in Population, Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67147-5_1 (accessed 11 June 2022).
- Hunter, L. 2005. Migration and Environmental Hazards. *Population and Environment*. March 26(4): 273–302.
- Institute for Economics and Peace. 2016. *Global Peace Index 2016*.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 1990. *First Assessment Report*. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_full_report.pdf (accessed 3 June 2023).
- . 2007. Synthesis Report. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr.pdf (accessed 27 July 2023).
- . 2014. Summary for Policymakers. In *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*: 1–32. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . No Date. *AR5 Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> (accessed 20 October 2023).
- . No Date. Assessment Reports. <https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=689> (accessed 12 September 2023).
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2020. Women and Girl in Internal Displacement. <https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/202003-twice-invisible-internally-displaced-women.pdf> (accessed 26 December 2022).

- . 2022 a. *Global Report on Internal Displacement*. https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC_GRID_2022_LR.pdf (accessed 6 January 2023).
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Asian Development Bank. 2022 b. *Disaster Displacement in Asia and the Pacific: A Business Case for Investment in Prevention and Solutions* <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/823176/disaster-displacement-asia-pacific.pdf> (accessed 14 July 2023).
- International Federation of Red Cross. 2021. *Displacement, Climate and the Data Gap*. https://ctk.climatecentre.org/downloads/modules/training_downloads/2g%20FactSheet%2013%20-%20Displacement%20and%20Climate%20-%20The%20Data%20Gap.pdf (accessed 16 August 2023).
- International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2009. *Migration, environment and climate change: Assessing the evidence*. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf (accessed 15 July 2023).
- . 2019. *Glossary on Migration*. International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf (accessed 4 March 2023).
- . n.d. *Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows*. MRS No. 33. <https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-no-33-climate-change-and-migration-improving-methodologies-estimate-flows> (accessed 24 May 2023).
- International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. No Date. *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities*. Extracts from the Final Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/1037_hyogoframeworkforactionenglish.pdf (accessed 21 June 2023).
- Jacobsen, K. 1997. Refugees' Environmental Impact: The Effect of Patterns of Settlement. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 10(1): 19–36. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/10.1.19> (accessed 23 July 2023).
- Jain-Chandra, S., T. Kinda, K. Kochhar, S. Piao, and J. Schauer. 2016. *Sharing the Growth Dividend: Analysis of Inequality in Asia*. IMF Working Papers 2016/048, International Monetary Fund.
- Kanbur, R., C. Rhee, J. Zhuang. Edited 2014. *Inequality in Asia and Pacific: Trends, Drivers and Policy Implication*. Asian Development Bank and Routledge. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/41630/inequality-asia-and-pacific.pdf> (accessed 16 April 2024).
- Kibreab, G. 2004. Displacement, Host Governments' Policies, and Constraints on the Construction of Sustainable Livelihoods. *International Social Science Journal*, 15 (175): 57–67. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2451.5501006> (accessed 13 May 2022).
- Klean Industries. 2021. *The Science of Climate Change Explained*. <https://kleanindustries.com/resources/environmental-industry-market-analysis-research/the-science-of-climate-change-explained/> (accessed 9 October 2023).
- Klugman, J. 2022. *The Gender Dimensions of Forced Displacement: A Synthesis of New Research*. UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/90857> (accessed 23 June 2022).

- Kneebone, S., and F. Rawlings-Sanaei. Edited 2007. *The Migration–Asylum Nexus and Regional Approaches. New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead. Studies in Forced Migration*, 20. New York: Berghahn Books
- Kothari, U. 2002. Migration and Chronic Poverty. *Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester Working Paper No 16*. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128092/WP16_Kothari.pdf (accessed 18 August 2022).
- Kunz, E. F. 1973. The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement. *International Migration Review* 7(2): 125. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3002424> (accessed 12 March 2022).
- Laczko, F. and C. Aghazarm. Edited 2009. *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*. International Organization for Migration, Geneva. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf (accessed 8 August 2023).
- Land Matrix. <https://landmatrix.org/> (accessed 16 July 2023).
- Laure-Helene, P. 2004. *Rights-based Approaches to Social Protection*. Department for International Development (DFID), UK.
- Lie, J. H. S. 2020. The Humanitarian-Development Nexus: Humanitarian Principles, Practice, and Pragmatics. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 5(1): 18. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-020-00086-0> (accessed 23 June 2022).
- Loescher, G., J. Milner, E. Newman and G. Troeller. 2008. *Protected Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications*. United Nations University Press.
- Malone, E. 2009. *Vulnerability and Resilience in the Face of Climate Change: Current Research and Needs for Population Information*. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Vulnerability-and-Resilience-in-the-Face-of-Climate-Malone/6e77676a0574427c9b440c3fadbd71a27eba866> (accessed 23 June 2023).
- Manby, B. 2016. *Identification in the Context of Forced Displacement*. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank. Washington DC. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ar/375811469772770030/pdf/Identification-in-the-Context-of-Forced-Displacement-Identification-for-Development-ID4D.pdf> (accessed 6 July 2022).
- Manyena, B., G. O'Brien and P. O'Keefe. 2011. Disaster Resilience: A Bounce Back or Bounce Forward Ability? *Local Environment* 16(5): 417–424. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2011.583049> (accessed 9 November 2022).
- Marfleet, P., 2006. *Refugees in a Global Era*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Massey, D. S. 1999. International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century: The Role of the State. *Population and Development Review*, 25(2).
- McAdam, J. 2011. Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty Is Not the Answer. *International Journal of Refugee Law* 23(1): 2–27. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeq045> (accessed 14 March 2023)
- . 2012. *Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- . Edited 2010. *Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.
- McAfee, K. 2012. The Contradictory Logic of Global Ecosystem Services Markets. *Development and Change* 43(1): 105–131. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01745.x> (accessed 24 June 2023).
- McCarthy, J.J., O. F. Canziani, N. A. Leary, D. J. Dokken, and K. S. White. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. *Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge University Press, UK.
- McLeman, R. A., and L. M. Hunter. 2010. Migration in the Context of Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights from Analogues. *WIREs Climate Change* 1(3): 450–461. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.51> (accessed 12 June 2023).
- Milton, A.H., M. Rahman, S. Hussain, C. Jindal, S. Choudhury, S. Akter, S. Ferdousi, T.A. Mouly, J. Hall, J.T. Efirid. 2017. Trapped in Statelessness: Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 14(8): 942. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14080942> (accessed 13 March 2023).
- Mingot, E. S., and J. de Arimatéia da Cruz. 2013. The Asylum–Migration Nexus: Can Motivations Shape the Concept of Coercion? The Sudanese Transit Case. *Journal of Third World Studies* 30(2): 175–190. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45198687> (accessed 26 November 2022).
- Modebadze, V. 2021. The Escalation of Conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and the Problems of Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh War. *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs* 6(3): 102–110.
- Mooney, E. 2005. The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern. *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 24(3): 9–26. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45053998> (accessed 16 December 2022).
- Morales-Gómez, D. 1999. *Transnational Social Policies: The New Development Challenges of Globalization*. Ottawa; London: Earthscan, International Development Research Centre.
- Myers, N. 1993. Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World. *BioScience* 43(11): 752–761. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1312319> (accessed 24 June 2023).
- . 2002. Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences* 357(1420): 609–613. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3066769> (accessed 24 June 2023).
- Newman, E. and J. van Selm (Eds). 2003. *Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State*. Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press.
- Ober, K. 2014. *How the IPCC Views Migration. An Assessment of Migration in the IPCC AR5*. <https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.4318.6889> (accessed 21 July 2023).
- Ober, K. and P. Sakdapolrak. 2017. How Do Social Practices Shape Policy? Analyzing the Field of 'Migration as Adaptation' with Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice.' *The Geographical Journal* 183(4): 359–369. <https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12225> (accessed 23 August 2022).

- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2014. Saving Lives Today and Tomorrow Managing the Risk of Humanitarian Crises. *OCHA Policy and Studies Series*. <file:///Users/T29/Downloads/OCHA%20SLTT%20Web%20Final%20Single.PDF> (accessed 6 September 2022).
- . 2017. New Way of Working. *OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB)*. <https://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/20170228%20NWOW%2013%20high%20res.pdf> (accessed 22 April 2023).
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. No Date. *About Internally Displaced Persons: Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons*. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-internally-displaced-persons/about-internally-displaced-persons#:~:text=Once%20persons%20have%20been%20displaced,freedom%20of%20movement%20and%20residence%2C> (accessed 23 August 2022).
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner. 2009. The Political Economy of Hazards and Disasters. In *Anthropology and Political Economy of Disasters. Journal of International Development* 24(8): 1058–1070. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2887> (accessed 23 March 2023).
- Öhman, K. 1995. *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*. New York: Free Press Paperbacks.
- Oliver-Smith, A. 2004. Theorizing Vulnerability in a Globalized World: A Political Ecological Perspective. In *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People*, edited by G. Bankoff, G. Frerks, D. Hilhorst. Earthscan, London (2004), pp. 10–24.
- Olmos-Vega, F. M., R.E. Stalmeijer, L. Varpio, and R. Kahlke. 2023. A Practical Guide to Reflexivity in Qualitative Research. *AMEE Guide No. 149, Medical Teacher*, 45 (3): 241–251.
- Oreskes, N. 2007. The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How do We Know We're not Wrong?. In *Climate Change What it Means for Us, Our Children and Grandchildren*, edited by J.F.C. Dimento and P. Dougman: 105–48. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qf76d.8> (accessed 24 August 2023).
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2017a. *Humanitarian Development Coherence*. Paris, France. <https://www.oecd.org/development/humanitarian-donors/docs/COHERENCE-OECD-Guideline.pdf> (accessed 13 May 2023).
- . 2017b. *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development Peace Nexus*, OECD/LEGAL/5019. <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf> (accessed 12 February 2023).
- Petersen, W. 1958. A General Typology of Migration. *American Sociological Review* 23(3): 256–266. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089239> (accessed 22 March 2022).
- Pinto, G., J. Attwood, N. Birkeland, and H. S. Nordbeck. 2014. Exploring the Links between Displacement, Vulnerability, Resilience. *Procedia Economics and Finance* 18: 849–856. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671\(14\)01010-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(14)01010-7) (accessed 24 February 2023).
- Piron, L-H. 2004. Rights Based Approach to Social Protection. Report. UK Department of International Development (DFID). <https://socialprotection-humanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Rights-based-approaches-to-social-protection1.pdf> (accessed 20 June 2023).

- Polanyi, K. 2001 reprint. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.
- Rauniyar, G.P. and R. Kanbur. 2009. *Conceptualizing Inclusive Development: With Applications to Rural Infrastructure and Development Assistance*. ADB. <https://www.adb.org/documents/conceptualizing-inclusive-development-applications-rural-infrastructure-and-development> (accessed 8 March 2023).
- . 2010. *Inclusive Development: Two Papers on Conceptualization, Application, and the ADB Perspective*. <https://doi.org/10.22004/AG.ECON.57036> (accessed 8 March 2023).
- ReliefWeb. 2019. The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-what-does-it-mean-multi-mandated-organizations> (accessed 9 October 2023).
- Reuters. 2009. *Maldives Sends Climate SOS With Undersea Cabinet*. 19 October 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-environment-idUSTRE59G0P120091017/> (accessed 6 July 2023).
- Rhoades, E. A. 2011. Literature Reviews, *Volta Review*, 111(3): 353–368.
- Ribot, J.C. 2011. Vulnerability Does Not Just Fall from the Sky: Toward Multi-scale Pro-poor Climate Policy. In *Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World*, edited by R. Mearns, A. Norton. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Roe, S., C. Streck, M. Obersteiner, and M. Frank. 2019. Contribution of the Land Sector to a 1.5 °C World. *Nature Climate Change* 9(11): 817–828. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0591-9> (accessed 22 April 2023).
- Rohwerder, B. 2016. *Women and Girls in Forced and Protracted Displacement*. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. <file:///Users/T29/Downloads/HDQ1364.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2022).
- Rosen, J. 2021. The Science of Climate Change Explained: Facts, Evidence and Proof. The New York Times, November 6, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/article/climate-change-global-warming-faq.html> (accessed 23 March 2023).
- Rotberg, R. I. 2002. The New Nature of Nation-State Failure. *The Washington Quarterly* 25(3): 85–96. <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/6/article/36708> (accessed 18 August 2022).
- . 2003. The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair. In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, edited by R. I. Rotberg, pp. 1–50. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schröter, D., C. Polsky, and A. G. Patt. 2005. Assessing Vulnerabilities to the Effects of Global Change: An Eight Step Approach. *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change* 10(4): 573–595. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-005-6135-9> (accessed 18 May 2023).
- Scoones, I., R. Hall, S. M. Borrás, B. White, and W. Wolford. 2013. The Politics of Evidence: Methodologies for Understanding the Global Land Rush. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 40(3): 469–483. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.801341> (accessed 19 May 2023).
- Scoones I., R. Smalley, R. Hall, and D. Tsikata. 2019. Narratives of Scarcity: Framing the Global Land Rush. *Geoforum* 101:231–41.

- Sen, A. K. 1982. The Food Problem: Theory and Policy. *Third World Quarterly* 4(3): 447–459. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3990688> (accessed 12 February 2023).
- Shamoun, J., A. Chen, J. Taranta, E. Rodriguez, A. Tarasov. 2021. *Climate Change and Forced Migration: A Focus on Kiribati*. <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/608e0f2830634711b0a4e4d8910716ad> (accessed 23 July 2023).
- Shelley, L. 2014. *Human Smuggling and Trafficking into Europe: A Comparative Perspective*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/BadActors-ShelleyFINALWEB.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2022).
- Skutsch, M. and E. Turnhout. 2020. REDD+: If Communities Are the Solution, What Is the Problem? *World Development* 130 (June): 104942.
- Smoltczyk, A. 2009. Maldives President Leads the Charge against Climate Change. *Der Spiegel*, October 30, 2009, sec. International. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-underwater-obama-maldives-president-leads-the-charge-against-climate-change-a-658373.html> (accessed 11 April 2023).
- Stapleton, S.O., R. Nadin, C. Watson and J. Kellett. 2017. *Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: The need for a Risk-informed and Coherent Approach (Report)* UNDP, New York. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/Migration_Report.pdf (accessed 18 June 2023).
- Statista (2023) Global Refugees by Age and Gender 2022. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/742528/age-structure-of-the-global-refugee-population/> (accessed 20 October 2023)
- Stepputat, F. and N. N. Sørensen. 2014. Sociology and Forced Migration. In *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, edited by E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long and N. Sigona. Oxford Handbook Online. https://www.academia.edu/10708250/The_sociology_of_forced_migration (accessed 10 October 2022).
- Stewart P. 2011. *Weak Links, Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stiglitz, J. E. 2015. *Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity*. WW Norton & Company.
- Stoutenburg, J. G. and J. Mcadam. 2011. Edited Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary Perspectives. *European Journal of International Law* 22(4): 1196–1200. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chr077> (accessed 18 July 2023).
- Suhrke, A. and Hazarika, S. 1993. *Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1374%20pressure-points-environmental-degradation.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2023).
- Taylor, M. 2013. Climate Change, Relational Vulnerability and Human Security: Rethinking Sustainable Adaptation in Agrarian Environments *Climate and Development*, 5 (2013): 318–327.
- The World Risk Report (2021) https://weltrisikobericht.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/WorldRiskReport_2021_Online.pdf (accessed 20 June 2023)

- Turner, B. L., R. E. Kasperson, P. A. Matson, J.J. McCarthy, R.W. Corell, L. Christensen, N. Eckley, J. X. Kasperson, A. Luers, M.L. Martello, C. Polsky, A. Pulsipher and A. Schiller. 2003. A Framework for Vulnerability Analysis in Sustainability Science. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 100(14): 8074–8079. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1231335100> (accessed 2 July 2023).
- UK Department of International Development, DFID. 2015. *Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED)*.
- United Nations Advisory Group of Experts. 2015. *For the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*. Report. https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/07/300615_The-Challenge-of-Sustaining-Peace.pdf (accessed 22 September 2023).
- United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation .2011. *The UN-REDD Program Strategy (2011-2015)* <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UN-REDD%20Programme%202011-2015%20Strategy%20-%20English.pdf> (accessed 13 May 2023).
- United Nations Development Program (No date), *Human Development Index*, <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI> (accessed 28 June 2023).
- United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. No date. *What is Good Governance?* <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf> (assessed 9 July 2022).
- . 2018. *Inequality in Asia and the Pacific in the Era of the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development: Executive Summary*. <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/01ExecutiveSummary.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2023).
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2012. *Synopses Series: Slow Onset Events*. https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/soe_synopsis.pdf (accessed 23 May 2022).
- . 2023. *Key Aspects of the Paris Agreement*. <https://unfccc.int/most-requested/key-aspects-of-the-paris-agreement#:~:text=The%20Paris%20Agreement's%20central%20aim,further%20to%201.5%20degrees%20Celsius> (accessed 6 July 2023).
- . No date. *Article 1: Definitions*. <https://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/zimbab/conven/text/art01.htm#:~:text=2.,observed%20over%20comparable%20time%20periods> (assessed 14 March 2023).
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 1951. *The 1951 Refugee Convention*. <https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention#:~:text=The%201951%20Convention%20provides%20the,'guardian'%20of%20these%20documents> (accessed 6 February 2022).
- . No Date. *Persons Who are Forcibly Displaced, Stateless and Others of Concern to UNHCR*. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/methodology/definition/> (accessed 13 June 2022).
- . No Date. *Who is an 'Asylum Seeker'?* <https://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers> (accessed 16 February 2022).

- . 2002. *UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women and Guidelines on Their Protection: An Assessment of Ten Years of Implementation*. <https://www.refworld.org/reference/themreport/wcr/2002/en/70505> (accessed 12 June 2022).
- . 2009. Climate Change, Natural Disaster and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective. <https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2009/en/69637> (accessed 23 November 2023).
- . 2019. *Global Trends Forced Displacement 2019*. <https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/globaltrends2019/#:~:text=During%202019%2C%20an%20estimated%2011.0,solutions%20for%20rebuilding%20their%20lives> (accessed 12 February 2022).
- . 2020. *Thematic Paper on Forced Displacement and Sustaining Peace*. https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/unhcr_thematic_paper_on_forced_displacement_and_sustaining_peace_200117_0.pdf (accessed 22 May 2022).
- . 2021. *UNHCR Regional Trends 2021, Regional Bureau of Asia and the Pacific*. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/UNHCR_Regional_Trends_2021_StatsCafe_18Jul2022.pdf (accessed 18 December 2022).
- . 2022. *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2022*. <https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends-report-2022#:~:text=At%20the%20end%20of%202022,events%20seriously%20disturbing%20public%20order> (accessed 14 March 2023).
- United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 2009. *Terminology and Disaster Risk Reduction*. Geneva, Switzerland. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf (accessed 13 May 2023).
- United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. 2020. *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020*. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3. United Nations, New York. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tip/2021/GLOTIP_2020_15jan_web.pdf (accessed 15 June 2022).
- Upadhyay, H., K. Vinke and H. Weisz. 2023. “We are Still Here” Climate Change, Gender and Immobility in Highly Mobile Himalayan Communities. *Climate and Development*, 16 (47):1–15. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17565529.2023.2230176> (accessed 11 November 2023).
- Van Munster, R. 2012. *Securitization*. *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0091> (accessed 18 July 2022).
- Vigil, S. 2018. Green Grabbing-Induced Displacement. *Routledge Handbooks Online*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315638843-29> (accessed 27 August 2023).
- Vogel, C. and K. O'Brien. 2006. Who Can Eat Information? Examining the Effectiveness of Seasonal Climate Forecasts and Regional Climate-Risk Management Strategies. *Climate Research* 33 (December): 111–122. <https://doi.org/10.3354/cr033111> (accessed 22 August 2023).
- Walk Free Foundation. 2017. *The Global Slavery Index 2016*. <file:///Users/T29/Downloads/The%20Global%20Slavery%20Index%202016%20pdf.pdf> (accessed 27 June 2024).
- Walter, L. F. edited. 2020. *Handbook of Climate Change Resilience*. Springer Cham.

- Warner, K. 2011. Environmental Change and Migration: Methodological Considerations from Ground-Breaking Global Survey. *Population and Environment* 33(1): 3–27. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41487561> (accessed 20 July 2023).
- Weigert, K.M. 2008. Structural Violence. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*. Edited by L. R. Kurtz. 2nd ed. San Diego: Academic Press. file:///Users/T29/Downloads/Structural_Violence.pdf (accessed 23 April 2022).
- Wisner, B., C. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis (Edited). 2004. *At Risk: Natural Hazards, Peoples' Vulnerability, and Disaster*. 2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge.
- World Bank Global Program on Forced Displacement. 2014. *Political Economy and Forced Displacement: Guidance and Lessons from 9 Country Case Studies*. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/813101468333059729/pdf/917680WP0BNPP000Box385343B00PUBLIC0.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2022).
- World Bank. 2017. *Forcibly Displaced: Towards a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/104161500277314152/pdf/117479-PUB-Date-6-1-2017-PUBLIC.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2022).
- . 2022. *Extreme Poverty 2015-2022*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty> (accessed 12 May 2023).
- . No date. Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations> (accessed 23 June 2022).
- . No date. *Forced Displacement: Refugees, Internally Displaced and Host Communities*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/forced-displacement> (accessed 11 October 2023).
- . No date. World Bank and Social Protection Overview. <https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/safetynets/1.%20Yemtsov%20Overview%20SSN%20Course%202013.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2023).
- World Humanitarian Summit, United Nations. 2016. *Too Important to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian and Financing Gap*. High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing Report to the Secretary-General. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/sites/default/files/migrated/2017-02/hlp_report_too_important_to_failcoaddressing_the_humanitarian_financing_gap.pdf (accessed 23 May 2022).
- Xiang, B., and N. N. Sørensen. 2020. Shock Mobility: Long-Term Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Lock-Down. *Danish Institute for International Studies*. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26348> (accessed 12 May 2022).
- Zhuang, J., R. Kanbur, and C. Rhee. 2014. Rising Inequality in Asia and Policy Implications. *ADBI Working Paper* 463. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available: <http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2014/02/21/6172.rising.inequality.asia.policy.implications/> (accessed 29 August 2023).

ANNEX 1: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN ADB DEVELOPING MEMBER ECONOMIES

Table 1: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees (Refugees and IDPs), Stateless Persons, Others of Concern to UNHCR by Economy/Territory of Asylum (End-2020)

Economy/Territory of Asylum or IDPs ^a	Refugees ^b	People in Refugee-like Situations ^c	Total Refugees and People in Refugee-like Situations	Asylum Seekers Pending Cases ^d	Returned Refugees ^e	IDPs of Concern to UNHCR ^f	Returned IDPs ^g	Persons Under UNHCR Statelessness Mandate ^h	Others of Concern to UNHCR ⁱ	Total Population of Concern
Central and West Asia										
Afghanistan	72,278	–	72,278	167	2,311	2,886,317	–	–	82,595	3,043,668
Armenia	3,379	104,551	107,930	154	–	–	–	1,000	–	109,084
Azerbaijan	1,582	–	1,582	46	–	653,921	–	3,585	–	659,134
Georgia	1,198	602	1,800	1,282	–	288,538	–	531	–	292,151
Kazakhstan	445	–	445	224	–	–	–	7,999	–	8,668
Kyrgyz Republic	334	–	334	343	–	–	–	18	–	695
Pakistan	1,438,955	–	1,438,955	9,796	14	98,898	1,782	47	62	1,549,507
Tajikistan	5,588	–	5,588	408	–	–	–	6,385	–	12,381
Turkmenistan ^j	20	–	20	–	–	–	–	3,924	–	3,944
Uzbekistan ^k	18	–	18	–	–	–	–	69,791	–	69,809
Subtotal	1,523,797	105,153	1,628,950	12,420	2,325	3,927,674	1,782	93,280	82,657	5,749,088
East Asia										
PRC ^l	303,410	–	303,410	748	–	–	–	–	–	304,158
Hong Kong, China	198	72	270	–	–	–	–	–	–	270
Korea, Republic of	3,498	–	3,498	20,073	–	–	–	203	–	23,774
Mongolia	10	–	10	10	–	–	–	–	8	28
Taipei, China	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	307,116	72	307,188	20,831	0	0	0	203	8	328,230
South Asia										
Bangladesh	866,534	–	866,534	18	–	–	–	866,457	472,000	2,205,009
Bhutan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
India	195,403	–	195,403	11,221	–	–	–	18,174	–	224,798
Maldives	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
Nepal ^m	19,565	–	19,565	42	–	–	–	371	560	20,538
Sri Lanka	1,013	–	1,013	225	212	25,013	97	34	–	26,594
Subtotal	1,082,515	0	1,082,515	11,506	212	25,013	97	885,036	472,560	2,476,939
Southeast Asia										
Brunei Darussalam	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	20,863	–	20,863
Cambodia	–	–	–	12	–	–	–	57,444	–	57,456
Indonesia ⁿ	10,134	–	10,134	3,608	–	–	–	874	170	14,786
Lao People's Democratic Republic	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
Malaysia ^o	128,798	1,144	129,942	49,837	–	–	–	111,298	–	291,077
Myanmar ^p	–	–	–	–	5	370,320	2,992	600,000	–	973,317
Philippines ^q	744	–	744	397	–	150,368	150,242	387	129,513	431,651
Singapore	5	–	5	–	–	–	–	1,109	–	1,114
Thailand	49,433	46,781	96,214	855	–	–	–	480,695	146	577,910
Timor–Leste	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
Viet Nam	5	–	5	–	–	–	–	32,890	–	32,895
Subtotal	189,119	47,925	237,044	54,709	5	520,688	153,234	1,305,560	129,829	2,401,069
The Pacific										
Cook Islands	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Fiji	14	–	14	5	–	–	–	–	–	19
Kiribati	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Marshall Islands	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Micronesia, Federated States of	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nauru	1,084	–	1,084	90	–	–	–	140	–	1314
Niue	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Palau	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Papua New Guinea	10,801	–	10,801	108	–	14,000	–	9	–	24,918
Samoa	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Solomon Islands	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tonga	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tuvalu	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Vanuatu	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	11,899	0	11,899	203	0	14,000	0	149	0	26,251
Developed ADB Member Economies										
Australia ^r	57,451	–	57,451	80,803	–	–	–	5,221	46	143,521
Japan	1,137	–	1,137	23,765	–	–	–	707	–	25,609
New Zealand	1,808	–	1,808	691	–	–	–	–	–	2,499
Subtotal	60,396	0	60,396	105,259	0	0	0	5,928	46	171,629
Grand Total	3,174,842	153,150	3,327,992	204,928	2,542	4,487,375	155,113	2,290,156	685,100	11,153,206

^a Economy or territory of asylum or IDPs.

^b Refugees include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws, those recognized in

accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection. In the absence of government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized economies based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.

^c This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their economy or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

^d Asylum-seekers (with pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this table refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2020, irrespective of when those claims may have been lodged.

^e Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during 2020.

^f IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population includes only conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance.

^g IDPs of concern to UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during 2020.

^h Refers to persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. This category refers to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some economies may also include persons with undetermined nationality. The figure reported includes stateless persons who are also refugees or asylum-seekers from Myanmar, IDPs in Myanmar, or others of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a methodology that reports on one legal status for each person of concern only. However, due to the extraordinary size of the displaced stateless population from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status that this population group possesses. Additional stateless refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs will be reported on as UNHCR continues to review and improve its reporting on stateless persons with a dual status.

ⁱ Refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups above but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

^j In the absence of official data, the figure reported refers to stateless persons and persons with undetermined nationality identified by UNHCR partner organizations in Turkmenistan. The decrease in the reported figures is due to naturalization in Turkmenistan and confirmation of nationality by a third country.

^k The statelessness figure refers to stateless persons with a permanent residence reported by the government of Uzbekistan in November 2020 under the XII Report on Compliance of Uzbekistan with CERD. Information on other categories of statelessness is unavailable.

^l The 303,100 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection from the Government of the PRC.

^m Various studies estimate that a significant number of individuals originally from Nepal lack citizenship certificates. While these individuals originally from Nepal are not all necessarily stateless, UNHCR has been working closely with the Government of Nepal and partners to address this situation.

ⁿ There are indications that a potentially sizable population of non-displaced stateless persons exists for whom no data is available.

^o The total stateless population in Malaysia includes 9,040 non-displaced stateless persons who may be entitled to Malaysian nationality under the law. This number of non-displaced stateless persons is based on a registration and community legal assistance programme undertaken in West Malaysia by a local NGO with technical support from UNHCR.

^p The estimated figure of persons of concern under the statelessness mandate relates to stateless persons of Rohingya ethnicity in Rakhine State and also includes stateless IDPs in Myanmar. The number of persons of undetermined nationality residing in other states or regions in Myanmar is not currently available. The number of stateless persons remaining in Rakhine State following violence in 2016 and 2017 and large scale departures to Bangladesh is based on detailed estimates for each village tract made by UNHCR, other UN agencies and NGOs in early 2018, which concluded that between 532,000 to 600,000 Rohingya remained in Rakhine State (including an estimated 140,886 of those Rohingya who have been internally displaced).

^q The updated figure is based on improved information concerning persons of Indonesian descent who have acquired nationality.

^r The methodology for estimating the number of refugees in Australia is under review and subject to adjustment in future reports. The asylum-seeker figure is based on the number of applications lodged for protection visas.

Note: ("—") indicates that the value is zero, not available, or not applicable.

Source: *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020*. UNHCR. 2021. Only data on ADB member countries have been culled. For more details, please see <https://www.unhcr.org/2020-global-trends-annex>.

Table 2: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees (Refugees and IDPs), Stateless Persons, Others of Concern to UNHCR by Economy of Origin (End-2020)

Economy of Origin ^a	Refugees ^b	People in Refugee-like Situations ^c	Total Refugees and People in Refugee-like Situations	Asylum Seekers (Pending Cases) ^d	Returned Refugees ^e	IDPs of Concern to UNHCR ^f	Returned IDPs ^g	Persons Under UNHCR's Statelessness Mandate ^h	Others of Concern to UNHCR ⁱ	Total Population of Concern
Central and West Asia										
Afghanistan	2,594,770	5	2,594,775	238,799	2,311	2,886,317	–	–	87,499	5,809,701
Armenia	10,518	–	10,518	8,854	–	–	–	–	–	19,372
Azerbaijan	10,980	90,551	101,531	6,427	–	653,921	–	–	–	761,879
Georgia	7,358	–	7,358	15,410	–	288,538	–	–	–	311,306
Kazakhstan	2,776	–	2,776	5,974	–	–	–	–	–	8,750
Kyrgyz Republic	2,896	–	2,896	2,699	–	–	–	–	–	5,595
Pakistan	133,133	13	133,146	61,396	14	98,898	1,782	–	2,735	297,971
Tajikistan	2,224	–	2,224	2,461	–	–	–	–	–	4,685
Turkmenistan	515	–	515	582	–	–	–	–	–	1,097
Uzbekistan	3,133	–	3,133	5,178	–	–	–	–	–	8,311
Subtotal	2,768,303	90,569	2,858,872	347,780	2,325	3,927,674	1,782	0	90,234	7,228,667
East Asia										
PRC	175,585	–	175,585	107,866	–	–	–	–	6	283,457
Hong Kong, China	20	–	20	487	–	–	–	–	–	507
Korea, Republic of	156	–	156	698	–	–	–	–	–	854
Mongolia	2,290	–	2,290	4,119	–	–	–	–	8	6,417
Taipei, China	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	178,051	0	178,051	113,170	0	0	0	0	14	291,235
South Asia										
Bangladesh	18,959	34	18,993	64,624	–	–	–	–	473,271	556,888
Bhutan	6,808	–	6,808	411	–	–	–	–	–	7,219
India	12,423	5	12,428	69,950	–	–	–	–	269	82,647
Maldives	83	–	83	21	–	–	–	–	–	104
Nepal	7,485	12	7,497	10,299	–	–	–	–	396	18,192
Sri Lanka	142,713	5	142,718	15,045	212	25,013	97	–	–	183,085
Subtotal	188,471	56	188,527	160,350	212	25,013	97	0	473,936	848,135
Southeast Asia										
Brunei Darussalam	20	–	20	10	–	–	–	–	–	30
Cambodia	11,845	56	11,901	915	–	–	–	–	–	12,816
Indonesia	12,071	968	13,039	4,950	–	–	–	–	170	18,159
Lao People's Democratic Republic	6,681	–	6,681	463	–	–	–	–	–	7,144
Malaysia	1,078	–	1,078	21,467	–	–	–	–	–	22,545
Myanmar	1,056,517	46,781	1,103,298	40,207	5	370,320	2,992	–	151	1,516,973
Philippines	473	20	493	4,967	–	150,368	150,242	–	129,467	435,537
Singapore	42	–	42	74	–	–	–	–	–	116
Thailand	162	22	184	3,756	–	–	–	–	–	3,940
Timor–Leste	11	–	11	324	–	–	–	–	–	335
Viet Nam ^l	316,717	5	316,722	9,447	–	–	–	–	68	326,237
Subtotal	1,405,617	47,852	1,453,469	86,580	5	520,688	153,234	0	129,856	2,343,832
The Pacific										
Cook Islands	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Fiji	516	–	516	2,683	–	–	–	–	–	3,199
Kiribati	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Marshall Islands	7	–	7	50	–	–	–	–	–	57
Micronesia, Federated States of	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nauru	5	–	5	16	–	–	–	–	–	21
Niue	18	–	18	7	–	–	–	–	–	25
Palau	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Papua New Guinea	515	–	515	650	–	14,000	–	–	–	15,165
Samoa	–	–	–	133	–	–	–	–	–	133
Solomon Islands	37	–	37	267	–	–	–	–	–	304
Tonga	36	–	36	731	–	–	–	–	–	767
Tuvalu	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Vanuatu	–	–	–	150	–	–	–	–	–	150
Subtotal	1,134	0	1,134	4,687	0	14,000	0	0	0	19,821
Developed ADB Member Economies										
Australia	30	5	35	10	–	–	–	–	–	45
Japan	40	–	40	122	–	–	–	–	–	162
New Zealand	35	–	35	32	–	–	–	–	–	67
Subtotal	105	5	110	164	0	0	0	0	0	274
Grand Total	4,541,681	138,482	4,680,163	712,731	2,542	4,487,375	155,113	0	694,040	10,731,964

^a Economy or territory of origin.

^b Refugees include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized economies based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.

^c This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their economy or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

^d Asylum-seekers (with pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this table refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2020, irrespective of when those claims may have been lodged.

^e Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during 2020. Source: economy of origin and asylum.

^f IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population includes only conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance.

^g IDPs of concern to UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during 2020.

^h Refers to persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. This category refers to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some economies may also include persons with undetermined nationality. The figure reported includes stateless persons who are also refugees or asylum-seekers from Myanmar, IDPs in Myanmar, or others of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a methodology that reports on one legal status for each person of concern only. However, due to the extraordinary size of the displaced stateless population from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status that this population group possesses, pending a review of UNHCR reporting on statelessness.

ⁱ Refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups above but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

^j The 303,100 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection from the Government of the PRC.

Source: *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020*, UNHCR. 2021. Only data on ADB member countries have been culled. For more details, please see <https://www.unhcr.org/2020-global-trends-annex>.

ANNEX 2: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT

1950 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950 to provide aid to the forcibly displaced people in Europe after World War II. Entrusted with the duty of implementing the internationally agreed rights of refugees, the UNHCR continues efforts to persuade UN member states to provide solutions for forcibly displaced persons. One such effort was the launch of the Global Consultations on International Protection, which revitalized the framework for refugee protection and led to an Agenda for Protection. The role played by the High Commissioner's annual dialogues on Protection Challenges has been crucial in maintaining the UNHCR's relevance. Since 2007, these dialogues have served as an international forum, enabling member states, international organizations, refugees, civil society, the private sector, and experts to discuss policy frameworks and action plans for issues like equitable responsibility sharing, prolonged stays in containment facilities for refugees, urban refugees, displacement caused by climate change, and mixed migration flows.

1951 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or The Refugee Convention is the main international legal instrument for the confirmation of refugee status through the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). It defines the term "refugee" and details the protections they should be provided with, including the right of non-refoulement that ensures refugees cannot be returned to a country where they would face serious threats to their lives and freedom.

1954 The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was adopted in September 1954 and entered into force in June 1960. It defines a "stateless person" as someone "who is not considered as a national by any state under operation of its law." The Convention outlines standards of treatment for stateless persons, which should, at the minimum, be the same as for other nonnationals and their rights to freedom of religion, education for their children, association, employment, and housing.

1961 The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was adopted in August 1961 and entered into force in December 1975. It is the leading international instrument that sets rules for the conferral and nonwithdrawal of citizenship to prevent new cases of statelessness and complements the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.

1967 The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is an international agreement that removed the temporal and geographic restrictions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It states that the definition of a refugee and the protections they are entitled to under the Convention apply to all refugees, regardless of when and from where they fled persecution. This protocol allowed countries to continue to recognize refugees who fled their country before the adoption of the 1951 Convention, as well as those who fled their country due to events after its adoption. It is an essential element of the current international refugee protection regime and has been ratified by 146 countries.

1969 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa is the regional legal instrument governing refugee protection in Africa, which builds on the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

1984 The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is a regional nonbinding instrument in Latin America. It comprehensively broadened the definition of refugees as “persons who have fled their country because their lives, security, or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”

1998 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement consist of 30 principles that ensure the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) during displacement, flight, and resettlement and state that “IDPs are entitled to enjoy, without discrimination, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country.” The GPs came into being following the realization that the number of internally displaced had risen to 20 to 25 million by 1995. Unlike refugees, IDPs live within their own country boundaries and have not crossed any international border, hence no international legal framework could safeguard them and protect their rights. It recognizes the right of IDPs to protection from violence and discrimination, the right to basic needs such as food, water, and shelter, the right to access to healthcare and education, and the right to participate in decisions that affect their lives. They also provide guidance on issues such as registration, documentation, and durable solutions, such as voluntary return, resettlement, or local integration. Adopted in 1998, the GPs are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law, and though they are not a binding legal instrument, the UN General Assembly recognizes them as an international framework for IDP protection and encourages relevant actors to use them in situations of internal displacement.

1997 The Dublin Convention and 2003 Dublin II Regulation are similar regional instruments on refugee protection and management developed in the European Union to streamline refugee- and asylum-processing procedures. This includes determining the specific state responsible for examining an application for international protection made in a participating EU state.

2000 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in 2000 and came into force on 29 September 2003. It is the main international instrument for fighting transnational organized crime. It is supported by three protocols, two of which are specifically relevant to human trafficking, human smuggling, and trade. These are: (i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and (ii) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.

2002 The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational Crime is a nonbinding international and multilateral forum aimed at facilitating cooperation and collaboration, information sharing, and policy development on irregular migration in the Asia and the Pacific region and beyond. It has a membership of 45 states and four member organizations, 18 observer states, and nine observer organizations. In 2012, it founded a Regional Support Office for delivering practical, on-the-ground support for the Bali Process.

2003 The UNHCR Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern comprises three tools: (i) Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR); (ii) the 4Rs of Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction; and (iii) Development through Local Integration (DLI). These were based on the understanding that the development needs of refugees and returnees have not been systematically incorporated into transition and recovery plans by concerned governments and donors, and the UN system. Addressing these needs would require additional development funding and broad-based partnerships between governments

and humanitarian and multi- and bilateral development agencies. However, these initiatives were short-lived since donors offered limited additional funding for activities and durable solutions for refugees, and refugee-hosting nations made limited commitments to solutions focused through self-sufficiency and local integration for refugees and returnees.

2016 The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2016. It reaffirms the importance of the international refugee regime and contains a wide range of commitments by member states to strengthening and enhancing mechanisms to protect people on the move.

2018 The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility sharing, recognizing that a sustainable solution for displaced persons cannot be achieved without international cooperation, and it provides a blueprint for governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders to ensure that host communities get the support they need and that refugees can lead productive lives. Ratified in 2018 by the UN General Assembly, the GCR has four main objectives: (i) easing pressures on host countries; (ii) enhancing refugee self-reliance; (iii) expanding access to third-country solutions; and (iv) supporting conditions in countries of origin for returning in safety and dignity. It also looks for MDBs/IFIs to play a role in refugee rehabilitation and, through development interventions, to ameliorate conditions that could otherwise result in refugee situations.

The GCR calls for the prevention and resolution of forced displacement within humanitarian, peace, and development activities. It notes that tackling the root causes of protracted forced displacement, including through heightened international efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, constitutes the most effective way to achieve solutions for displacement. The UNHCR takes a similar position and states that addressing the drivers of forced displacement, protecting rights, and promoting durable solutions for those who are affected by forced displacement are necessary to prevent the outbreak, escalation, recurrence, or continuation of conflict, and thus to restore and sustain peace, and achieve solutions to displacement.

ANNEX 3: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CLIMATE REFUGEES

2001 The National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA 2001) is an instrument under the UNFCCC supported by the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund to fund the preparation and implementation of NAPAs. As LDCs are constrained by their high level of vulnerability and limited adaptive and coping capacities, these countries will be faced with relatively higher occurrences of climate-induced displacement. NAPAs provide a process for LDCs to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs where prominence is given to a bottom-up approach grassroots community-level input. Priority sectors/areas are agriculture and food security, water resources, coastal zones, and early warning and disaster management. Developing resilience in these sectors with community-based responses could be a useful mechanism for addressing climate-induced displacement.

2010 The Cancun Agreements were a set of decisions that set out a framework for addressing climate change, including provisions on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. Adopted at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in Cancun, Mexico, the Parties agreed that enhanced action is required to support the implementation of actions aimed at reducing the vulnerability and building the resilience of developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable. Specifically, the Cancun Adaptation Platform, which was established as part of the Agreements, invited Parties "to enhance action on adaptation by undertaking measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change-induced displacement and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels."

The Cancun Agreements recognized that climate change could lead to displacement and migration, particularly in vulnerable regions such as small island developing states, low-lying coastal areas, and areas affected by droughts, floods, and other extreme weather events. They called for measures to enhance understanding of the drivers and impacts of climate-induced displacement, as well as strategies to address this issue, including planned relocation where necessary. The Agreements called for enhanced cooperation and support for affected communities, including the development of early warning systems and the provision of assistance to those displaced by climate change. The Cancun Adaptation Framework also established an Adaptation Committee and a work program on loss and damage in particularly vulnerable developing countries, which further addressed the issue of climate-induced displacement.

2012–2015 The Nansen Initiative was a response to the need for a "global guiding framework" on displacement relating to climate change and natural disasters. This was given impetus by developments in 2010–11 and 2013, including the adoption of paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which invited states to "enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels." This initiative helped reframe the debate on climate change-induced displacement, emphasizing practical solutions grounded in existing state practice that can be implemented now, rather than leaving the issue as a future problem. It also highlighted the importance of addressing the issue at the local and regional levels, rather than relying on international policymaking. Overall, the Nansen Initiative was an important step in addressing the challenges posed by climate change-induced displacement and helped to bring attention to the practical solutions that can be implemented to protect those who are most vulnerable to its impacts.

The initiative resulted in the adoption of the "Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change" in October 2015.

2013 The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) is a mechanism established at the 19th Conference of the Parties (COP 19) that aims to address the loss and damage associated with the impacts of climate change, including displacement and migration, and to enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities. The WIM has three main functions related to displacement and migration: i) to enhance the knowledge and understanding of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including displacement and migration; ii) to strengthen dialogue, coordination, and cooperation among relevant stakeholders to address the impacts of climate change on displacement and migration; and iii) to facilitate the mobilization of support for affected populations, including through financial assistance and technology transfer.

2015–2030 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is a 15-year, voluntary, nonbinding agreement adopted by UN member states in March 2015 in Sendai, Japan, aimed at reducing disaster risk and building resilience. It has been instrumental in shaping global policy on climate change-induced displacement by emphasizing the need to integrate disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation measures. It has fostered better collaboration among countries in addressing root causes of displacement, such as by investing in early warning systems, strengthening infrastructure, and improving land use planning. These efforts help minimize the forced migration of vulnerable populations due to disasters driven by climate change.

The Sendai Framework ultimately recognizes that displacement is one of the most devastating consequences of disasters, and that disaster risk reduction requires “protecting persons and their property, health, livelihoods and productive assets, as well as cultural and environmental assets, while promoting and protecting all human rights.” Furthermore, it encourages countries to develop policies and strategies that prioritize the needs of displaced persons in the context of disaster risk reduction. This has led to a greater focus on addressing the unique challenges faced by displaced populations, including the provision of adequate housing, social services, and livelihood opportunities.

2015 The Paris Climate Change Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change adopted on December 12, 2015, at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, France that aims to limit global warming, enhance countries’ ability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, and enable finance flows towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. It also recognizes the importance of addressing the root causes of displacement, such as climate change impacts on natural resources, livelihoods, and infrastructure. It calls for the establishment of a task force, under the auspices of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. Signatories to the UNFCCC negotiating text for COP 21, released in February 2015, included proposed language calling for the creation of a “climate change displacement coordination facility” that “(i) provides support for emergency relief, (ii) assists in providing organized migration and planned relocation, and (iii) undertakes compensation measures” for persons displaced by climate change.

2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) In 2015, 193 countries adopted the 2030 SDGs, which address both migration and climate change. SDG 13 on climate action outlines several targets that address the climate crisis. 13.1: Strengthen resilience and the capacity to adapt to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries; 13.2: Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies, and planning; 13.3: Improve education, awareness raising, and human and institutional capacity regarding climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warning. Although the SDGs do not explicitly link climate change and migration, SDG target 10.7 calls for signatories to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed policies.”

2016 Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) Following up on the work started by the Nansen Initiative and implementing the recommendations of the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda, as the PDD has been instrumental in shaping the Global Compact on Refugees, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2018. As a result of the PDD’s advocacy efforts, Objective 2 of the Global Compact on Refugees includes a specific commitment to enhancing the protection and assistance for people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change. This is a significant achievement that recognizes the unique challenges faced by this group of people and highlights the importance of addressing their protection needs in the context of the global response to refugee situations. Rather than calling for a new binding international convention on cross-border disaster displacement, the Platform focuses on the integration of practices by states and subregional organizations into their own normative frameworks in accordance with their specific situations.

2016 The World Humanitarian Summit was held in Istanbul in May 2016 upon the calling from the UN Secretary-General. The objective of the summit was to ensure commitment to the universality of humanitarian principles supported by concrete actions to better prepare and respond to conflict and disasters, and share best practices. Stressing the SDG objective to “leave no one behind,” the Secretary-General argued that this “place[d] a new obligation on us all to reach those in situations of conflict, disaster, vulnerability and risk first so that they benefit from and contribute to sustainable long-term development,” thus recognizing the large number of people displaced by disasters and natural events and the potential of climate change to exacerbate the situation and highlighting “the need to prepare for cross-border displacement owing to disasters and climate change.” He emphasized that “[n]ational legislation and institutional and operational measures should be put in place alongside regional cooperation frameworks to prepare countries to receive and protect people displaced across borders owing to disasters and climate change who do not have the protection of refugee status”. He also emphasized the need for particular attention to be given to the populations in SIDS that are likely to be severely affected by climate change and sea level rises.

2018 The Global Compacts Recent UN initiatives on people’s movement, forced or voluntary, resulted in two compacts: The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (adopted by 164 countries, December 2018) called on countries to make plans to prevent the need for climate-caused relocation and support those forced to relocate. The Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed by an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly in 2018, recognizes that “climate, environmental degradation and disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements. People affected by environmental and climate change impacts, who choose to move, do so with little legal protection. Current international law is not equipped to protect climate migrants, as no legally binding agreements oblige countries to support climate

migrants. UNHCR has thus far refused to grant these people refugee status, instead designating them as ‘environmental migrants.’”

2022–2025 UNHCR – Refugee Environment Protection Fund; Operational Strategy for Climate Resilience and Environmental Sustainability 2022–2025

Given its official mandate to refugees and asylum seekers, the UNHCR had previously expressed its inability to work on environmental or climate change-induced displacement issues. It was also constrained by the limitations of the international legal framework within which it works. However, with climate change-induced displacement becoming more real with scientific evidence, it was imperative that the UNHCR work on this nascent area within its mandated domain. The UNHCR Operation Strategy for 2022 to 2025 includes improving engagement with stakeholders to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to emergencies brought on by climate-related hazards, incorporating climate and environmental considerations into operational responses, and improving the sustainability of supply chains. The goal is to mitigate the impacts of climate change on vulnerable communities, including refugees and their hosts, and to support efforts to rapidly scale up prevention. The UNHCR has urged all parties to work together to achieve global net-zero emissions, mobilize finance, and protect communities and natural habitats.