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Book

Kretek Capitalism: Making, Marketing, and Consuming Clove Cigarettes in Indonesia

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KRETEK CAPITALISM

MAKING, MARKETING, AND CONSUMING
CLOVE CIGARETTES IN INDONESIA

MARINA WELKER



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Kretek Capitalism

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Kretek Capitalism

*Making, Marketing, and Consuming Clove
Cigarettes in Indonesia*

Marina Welker



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Introduction

Causing harm and death when used as intended, the cigarette is no ordinary commodity.¹ The kretek, in turn, is no ordinary cigarette.

The Indonesian government makes a simple distinction between kretek and “white cigarettes” (*rokok putih*): kretek tobacco filler contains cloves, while white tobacco filler does not. The difference is also communicated through product packaging; kretek must be sold in packs of twelve or sixteen and white cigarettes in packs of twenty, and three-letter acronyms on the side of Indonesian cigarette packs indicate whether they are kretek or white (*sigaret kretek* or *sigaret putih*) and hand rolled or machine rolled (*tangan* or *mesin*). Hand-rolled cigarettes must be made with hand-operated tools like wood-handled rollers with canvas belts.

In everyday vernacular, Indonesians often reserve the term *kretek* for hand-rolled clove cigarettes and classify machine-rolled cigarettes, whether or not they contain cloves, as white. Machine-rolled kretek are made on European machines and look like white cigarettes with their uniform rod shape, synthetic filters, and decorative flourishes (brand names, colored bands, white or faux-cork filter covers).

All kretek afford a distinct sensory experience, beginning with their powerful clove scent and saccharine-coated tips, which deposit sweetness on smokers’ lips. When clove fragments ignite as smokers inhale, kretek sometimes make the crackling sound that is the source of their onomatopoeic name. Smokers associate kretek with sensations of warmth and heat (*hangat, panas*), tastes of sweetness and spice (*manis, pedas*), and, especially in the case of the hand-rolled kretek and its smoke, qualities of thickness and heaviness (*tebal, berat*). The white cigarette, by contrast, is bland, tasteless, and light (*rasa tawar, enteng*) and tends to disappear quickly; once lit, the wind stealthily consumes it even if it’s not actively smoked. A white cigarette takes about five minutes to smoke, compared to ten minutes for a machine-rolled kretek and a half-hour time commitment for a hand-rolled kretek. The latter weigh two grams, whereas machine-rolled cigarettes weigh a single gram or less.

The kretek industry and its supporters celebrate kretek in museums and books and on social media as embodying a valuable cultural heritage. In the new millennium, as government regulations over tobacco have modestly tightened and civil society restrictions have significantly loosened, a kretek nationalist movement has gathered around the claims that the commodity is culturally distinct due to its combination of indigenous cloves and New World tobacco and that the industry provides employment and government revenue crucial to national development. Well-resourced kretek nationalist organizations and advocates work to contest tobacco control, which they portray as a foreign, neocolonial threat.

Indonesians smoke over three hundred billion cigarettes a year. The world's fourth most populous country, Indonesia has the second largest cigarette market, made up of approximately 75 percent machine-rolled kretek, 20 percent hand-rolled kretek, and 5 percent white cigarettes (World Bank 2018, 4). In addition to its colossal size and unique product composition, the market features striking gender disparities; two thirds of men smoke compared to only about 5 percent of women. Mass cigarette consumption produces mass debility and death, with tobacco-related diseases claiming an estimated 290,000 Indonesian lives each year, over 50,000 of which are attributable to secondhand smoke exposure.²

This book asks how kretek capitalism—understood as the accumulation of capital through the making, exchange, and consumption of clove cigarettes—enlists Indonesians to labor on its behalf in fields and factories, at retail outlets and social gatherings, and online. I focus on the efforts of Sampoerna, a Philip Morris International (PMI) subsidiary that claimed about one third of the Indonesian cigarette market during the 2010s. *Kretek Capitalism* charts how Sampoerna uses contracts, gamification, self-improvement logics, and class, gender, and age hierarchies to extract overtime, shift, seasonal, gig, and unpaid labor from workers, influencers, artists, students, retailers, and consumers.

By centering labor, I develop an account of kretek capitalism that acknowledges but goes beyond the addictive hold of nicotine over individual smokers. Scientists have found that tobacco is harder to quit than alcohol, cocaine, and opiates, underscoring the lively and agentive potential of plants and their significant role in shaping human life (Bennett 2010; Galvin 2018; Langwick 2021; Myers 2017; Russell 2019). The younger a person is when they start using tobacco, the more likely they are to become addicted. Adolescent nicotine exposure disrupts normal brain development, changing how synapses are formed and harming the brain's capacity for attention and learning. Scientists have explicated the physiological mechanisms through which nicotine is absorbed, moving from the lungs into the blood and altering the chemistry of the brain and central nervous system by flooding the brain's reward circuits with dopamine and sparking an adrenaline rush that increases heart rate and raises blood pressure.³

This kind of universal biochemical rendering of nicotine addiction is critical but insufficient to understanding kretek capitalism because it rests on an individualizing, internalizing, and often pathologizing logic that neglects “broader

issues of context, history, power, meaning, violence, inequality, and subjectivity” (Garriott and Raikhel 2015, 479, 486). The biology of nicotine addiction cannot explain why smoking rates have increased in Indonesia while falling elsewhere or why most Indonesian men smoke and most Indonesian women do not.⁴ Warren Buffett praised the cigarette industry for making an addictive product for a penny and selling it for a dollar, but this special ability does not rest on the commodity’s addictiveness alone; it also depends on cultivating exploitable labor, natural resources, media, government, and consumers (Proctor 2011, 42). The industry has never shied away from “making the Government a little more dependent on the habit,” as one Philip Morris vice-president put it (Rosenblatt 1994). Tobacco capitalism is not simply a consumer-driven phenomenon, and cigarettes are not born on store shelves or in smokers’ mouths (Benson 2012). Kretek capitalism thrives by fostering attachment and dependency among leaf buyers, farmers, factory workers, influencers, athletes, artists, students, journalists, retailers, and governments. By claiming an essential role for itself, it reworks more than brain synapses; it also reworks society itself (Russell 2019, 66, 69).

For Indonesians who are proponents of or work for the kretek industry, *kretek capitalism* may sound troubling if not outright offensive. A supervisor in one hand-rolled factory I toured fumed, “Someone called Philip Morris capitalist [*kapitalis*]. I got angry at them. Don’t talk like that!” At her feigned punch, the plant manager jokingly warned, “She’s a thug [*preman*]!” Although for more than half a century, Indonesia has been a staunchly anti-communist country that encourages foreign investment and domestic private industry, *capitalist* remains a jarring, dirty word, a slur reserved for enemies (Welker 2014, 109). Capitalism evokes negative connotations and asocial imperatives such as maximizing profits, exploiting labor, externalizing social and environmental costs, and taking license to reap private benefits from social suffering—a set of associations that help explain why ordinary Indonesians might take umbrage at the notion that the kretek is the product of processes that are both cultural and capitalist. For those who regard kretek as Indonesian cultural heritage, *kretek capitalism* is, moreover, oxymoronic, because that which is traditional, cultural, and valued cannot be capitalist. This kind of reaction is indicative of the perennially vexed nature of the relationship between culture and capitalism, which has led some social theorists and anthropologists to omit culture from analyses of capitalism, to treat it as an external resource for capital, or to approach culture as the province of subalterns (e.g., workers, indigenous peoples, downstream communities) in contrast to bourgeoisie, who are supposedly governed by a universal capitalist logic (Yanagisako 2002). Against such approaches, Yanagisako (2002, 21) insists that capitalism is always and everywhere a cultural phenomenon. I share her perspective; my use of the term *kretek capitalism* is deliberately provocative and meant to promote reflection on how capitalist goals shape the industry, but it does not preclude recognition of cultural processes and meanings or the nongeneric ways in which tobacco capitalism flourishes in particular historical contexts and geographic settings (Benson 2012).

TABLE 1 Cigarette classifications and excise taxes, 2016

Brand	Cigarette type (govt. classification)	Excise tax/ stick (rupiah)	“Flavor” and price (industry classification)*	Tar (mg)	Nicotine (mg)
Sampoerna Hijau/A	Hand-rolled kretek	245	FF budget	38	2.2
Dji Sam Soe	Hand-rolled kretek	320	FF premium	39	2.3
Magnum Black	Machine-rolled kretek	480	FF mid-priced	33	2.3
U-Bold	Machine-rolled kretek	480	FF budget	32	2.1
A-Mild	Machine-rolled kretek	480	LTLN premium	14	1
U-Mild	Machine-rolled kretek	480	LTLN budget	14	1
Marlboro Red	Machine-rolled white	495	FF premium	13	1
Marlboro Black Menthol	Machine-rolled white	495	LTLN premium	8	0.6

* The industry classifies brands as “full flavor” (FF) or “low tar, low nicotine” (LTLN).

Kretek capitalism is shaped by the often competing political and economic interests of a wide variety of actors. Among these, four in particular are worth highlighting: the Indonesian government, the tobacco control movement, the kretek nationalist movement, and the large companies that produce most of the cigarettes that Indonesians smoke. The Indonesian government’s own ambivalence toward the cigarette industry manifests in mandatory pack features. Text on the side of packs states, “Sale to children under 18 years or pregnant women is forbidden,” while front and rear pictorial and textual warnings stress the hazards of secondhand smoke and graphically depict tobacco-related cancers. But excise tax stickers underscore the revenue that enters government coffers with each pack purchase. Indonesia has an unusually complex multitiered cigarette excise tax structure that reflects producer size, cigarette type, number of cigarettes produced, and per-unit maximum retail price. It has been simplified since 2011 (when there were nineteen tiers), but it continues to reflect the state’s moral valorization of kretek over white and hand-rolled over machine-rolled cigarettes, as well as small producers over large (World Bank 2018, 5). The number of small producers and the hand-rolled market share have declined despite these protections. The government also requires that packs display nicotine and tar data, which creates the misleading impression that these are amenable to precise scientific measurement, that some cigarettes are safer than others, and that people can make responsible decisions about what they smoke based on these numbers. Table 1 illuminates the contradictions that characterize the government’s moral taxonomy, most notably that cigarettes that are taxed lower because of their purportedly pro-social qualities (e.g., employing more workers, incorporating cloves, budget pricing) appear to impose greater health costs on individual smokers in the form of more tar and nicotine.

International tobacco control regulations and tobacco industry research have singled out the clove cigarette among its “killer commodity” peers for harboring special dangers (Singer and Baer 2009). Kretek are effectively banned in forty countries in response to public health regulations combatting industry reliance on flavors as a way of marketing cigarettes to youth and masking tobacco smoke’s harshness.⁵ Studies by Philip Morris found that tar from white cigarettes and kretek is equally toxic but that kretek deliver far more tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide per stick than white cigarettes. British American Tobacco (BAT) research found that clove-derived eugenol is toxic when inhaled and implicated in acute illness, pulmonary hemorrhage, and edema (Hurt et al. 2012, 307). Eugenol’s topical anesthetic properties decrease “the harshness of smoke inhalation by numbing oropharyngeal pain receptors,” allowing smokers “to deeply inhale smoke containing more tar and particulate matter” (Hurt et al. 2012, 307). Mentholated cigarettes, which have an anesthetic effect similar to kretek, are considered easier to inhale deeply and harder to quit. Notably, the cigarette industry has disproportionately targeted Black people with menthols, with racialized marketing tactics helping to make tobacco the number-one killer and disabler of Black people in the United States (Jain 2003, 296–97; Wailoo 2021). PMI’s and BAT’s decisions to acquire Indonesian kretek companies similarly enacts “predatory inclusion” by targeting a vulnerable population with a product that arguably contains “enhanced risks” (Taylor 2019).⁶

Indonesian industry activists reject any attempt to position the kretek as a pariah commodity. The industry has historically spoken for itself through the powerful kretek producer association *Gabungan Pengusaha Pabrik Rokok Indonesia* (GAPPRI), which sometimes was allied with the white cigarette association *Gabungan Produsen Rokok Putih Indonesia* (GAPRINDO), but recent decades have seen the emergence of various kretek nationalist NGOs and coalitions that promote industry interests and style themselves as grassroots champions of kretek smokers, tobacco and clove farmers, factory workers, home industries, and peddlers.⁷ Often closely tied to and funded by the industry, they lobby the government, stage protests, publish books, and use websites and social media accounts to disseminate the beliefs that making, selling, and smoking kretek are patriotic acts and that tobacco control is part of a neocolonial plot to destroy Indonesia.

Like kretek nationalists, I am interested in the ordinary people who are involved in the kretek industry and the mundane labor they perform. Unlike kretek nationalists, I accept the scientific consensus that cigarettes (with or without cloves) are harmful and addictive, and I aim to understand how everyday kretek labor serves the interests of the large producers who orchestrate and exploit it using global tobacco technologies. Kretek capitalism is a “harm industry” predicated on “practices that are destructive or harmful to people and the environment”; harm has been “part and parcel” of kretek capitalism’s “normal functioning” from the outset (Benson and Kirsch 2010, 461). But the factors that shape kretek’s occasioning

of harm—who controls the means of production; which technologies and people are involved in making, promoting, and exchanging kretek; the extent of public knowledge of tobacco’s harms; and the social distribution of benefits and harms—have shifted over time.

PMI’s \$5 billion acquisition of Sampoerna in 2005 heralded a new era of increasing foreign control of kretek capitalism. BAT and Japan Tobacco International (JTI)—major international tobacco companies that previously confined themselves to the shrinking white cigarette sector—subsequently indigenized by taking over Indonesian kretek producers, soon realizing a combined foreign market share of over 40 percent. As PMI, BAT, and JTI have invested heavily in expanding production and sales of conventional combustible cigarettes in Indonesia, they have made commitments to harm reduction and a “smoke-free future” central to their public relations platform in higher-income countries. Such deep contradictions and inequalities, however, are not new to kretek capitalism; these kinds of tensions have animated it since it first emerged as a Central Javanese cottage industry at the end of the nineteenth century.

CLOVES, TOBACCO, AND THE GENESIS OF KRETEK CAPITALISM

Before the kretek industry turned Indonesia into the world’s largest consumer and importer of cloves, the spice historically played a fairly minor function in local cuisines and pharmacopoeias, with cloves primarily used to flavor and fasten together betel quids (Reid 1985, 536). Indigenous to the Spice Islands of Maluku, cloves, together with nutmeg and mace (which derive from the same plant), nevertheless fulfilled an outsized historical role in galvanizing regional trade and colonial competition, warfare, and violence. Beginning early in the Common Era, a network of Javanese, Malay, Indian, Arab, and Persian traders transported the Maluku spices as far afield as China, India, the Middle East, and Europe. Known in various languages as “spice nails,” cloves have been valued not only as a culinary spice and garnish but also as a food preservative, perfume, deodorizer, fumigant, incense ingredient, embalming agent, aphrodisiac, dentifrice ingredient, dental analgesic, disinfectant for open wounds, and ingredient in respiratory, digestive, muscular, and rheumatic medicinals variously inhaled, ingested, and dermally absorbed (Donkin 2003; Freedman 2008; Turner 2004).⁸

After 1500, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, and French competed for direct access to and control over the spice. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC) won control and pursued a “radical policy of exploitation” that aimed to concentrate plantation production on Ambon and small adjacent islands and extirpate it elsewhere (Andaya 1993; Bulbeck et al. 1998; Donkin 2003, 169; Ellen 2003; Wright 1958). This brutal strategy disrupted ancient trade patterns and depopulated islands, although

the Dutch never entirely succeeded in preventing smuggling or the cultivation of “unauthorized” clove trees. In the 1770s, French and English traders broke the Dutch monopoly by capturing clove seedlings, and the plant was soon successfully cultivated in Zanzibar.

The history of the kretek’s other key ingredient—tobacco—is equally tied to the global history of colonialism. Christopher Columbus was searching for a western passage to the spice trade in 1492 when he landed in the Caribbean and accepted a gift of tobacco from Taíno people whom he would later subjugate and enslave (Ortiz 1995). The New World crop reached the Spice Islands and Java in the sixteenth century, although historians have disagreed over whether it was brought by Portuguese colonizers pursuing spices or by trade networks radiating out from the Philippines under Spanish colonialism (Courtwright 2001; Reid 1985). Small-scale tobacco cultivation spread across the archipelago and into the uplands, and during the 1800s, the crop was also subject to forced cultivation and plantation production (Boomgaard 2004; Stoler 1995). In 1863, Jacobus Nienhuys established the first commercial tobacco plantation in Deli, North Sumatra, which produced cigar leaf and relied on Chinese laborers from Singapore. People smoked tobacco in pipes or wrapped in dried banana leaves or cornhusks called *klobot*, but mostly they chewed it in betel quids. Tobacco expanded the repertoire of additives such as cloves, cardamom, and gambier that garnished the quid’s core elements of areca nut, lime, and a betel leaf wrapper. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the introduction of the Manila cigar and cigarettes and with betel chewing and spitting increasingly regarded as unhygienic and uncivilized by colonial and postcolonial modernizers, tobacco smoking gradually supplanted betel chewing. Whereas betel chewing was an accessible and affordable indulgence across gender and status differences, smoking is largely reserved for men, and cigarette brand and price tiers serve as prominent wealth and status markers (Reid 1985, 542).

Popular accounts credit Haji Djamhari, a resident of the Central Javanese town of Kudus, with inventing the *klobot kretek* in the 1870s or 1880s. Rubbing clove oil on his chest to relieve his asthma inspired Djamhari to incorporate finely cut cloves into his *klobot*. Touting the purported medicinal benefits of these *klobot*, which he claimed had miraculously cured his affliction, Djamhari marketed them in pharmacies. Although Djamhari realized little profit before his death in 1890, a cottage *klobot kretek* industry quickly sprang up in Kudus. Nitisemito, a local aristocrat who wed a *klobot* maker called Nasilah, scaled up *klobot kretek* production by hiring middlemen to oversee home-based pieceworkers and modernized *klobot* marketing by launching the Bal Tiga brand in 1906 and hosting promotional events with extravagant prizes like imported ceramicware, bicycles, and automobiles (Hanusz 2000, 32–49).⁹ As the new *klobot* grew more popular, Chinese entrepreneurs entered the market, and manufacturers began using paper rather than cornhusk wrappers, signaling the emergence of the contemporary kretek form.

INDONESIAN NATIONALISM, CHINESE INDONESIANS,
AND SAMPOERNA

Long a site of nationalist impulses and conflict, the kretek industry was implicated in the devastating 1918 anti-Chinese riots in Kudus. The early twentieth century was a period of growing Chinese and proto-Indonesian nationalism in the Dutch East Indies, with both Tionghoa (Chinese) and *bumiputra* or *pribumi* (native or indigenous) communities establishing schools, newspapers, and religious and political organizations. Soon after its 1912 founding in Surakarta, Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), which evolved into a mass movement against colonialism, organized a boycott of Chinese middlemen who dominated batik supplies, sales, and marketing (Brenner 1998, 43). In Kudus, pribumi resentment rose against Chinese kretek producers, whom pribumi accused of undercutting market prices and luring workers with better wages and credit. On October 30, 1918, Chinese residents held a ritual procession to honor religious figure Tua Pek Kong and ward off the influenza epidemic. Some Javanese Muslim observers found procession participants dressed in Arab and haji garb insulting, which led to a brawl, Sarekat Islam's involvement, and tensions that escalated the next night when Javanese rioters burned homes and businesses in the Chinese district. Nine Chinese residents died, and some two thousand—about half the Chinese population—fled the city. The precise role of pribumi kretek producers and workers in the riots is unclear, although some speculated that producers instrumentalized religious sentiment to destroy Chinese businesses (Budiman 1987; Carkner 2019; Castles 1967; Hana 2018). Pribumi kretek producers' subsequent imprisonment instead created more opportunities for Chinese kretek producers (Badil 2011, 146; Kartajaya 2005, 81–82). The Dutch responded to the riots with arbitrary mass arrests and by militarizing Kudus.

Dutch colonial policies were largely responsible for pitting Tionghoa and pribumi against one another in the first place. Under the VOC, the Dutch recruited Chinese labor, granted some Chinese middlemen tax-collecting positions and monopoly trade power, and created a hierarchy relegating Chinese to a status below Europeans but above pribumi. After the 1799 VOC nationalization, the Dutch reduced Chinese privileges and restricted where they could live, travel, and own land. With the so-called Ethical Policy in 1901, the Dutch condemned Chinese for exploiting pribumi. Chinese were often more visible and accessible, and certainly less able to defend themselves, than Dutch colonial oppressors, and they have faced recurrent racial scapegoating in the colonial and postcolonial eras. The Chinese Indonesian families who built and ran the four largest kretek producers in the twentieth century would have to navigate the harmful “wealthy Chinese” stereotypes they came to epitomize and often emphasized their connections to Indonesian culture and nationalism and their respect for Islam.

Of the four Chinese Indonesian companies that would dominate the kretek industry, Sampoerna was founded first. Liem Seeng Tee, Sampoerna's founder, was

born in 1893 in Fujian Province. He lost his mother in 1897, and the following year, his father took five-year-old Liem and his six-year-old sister to Penang. Unsatisfied with conditions there, Liem's father continued on to the port city of Surabaya, leaving his daughter behind with a Hokkien family because he could not afford passage for all three. Liem was orphaned six months later when his father died of cholera. Adopted by a Hokkien family in Bojonegoro, Liem lacked access to formal education and moved to Surabaya to work in a restaurant at age eleven. He later peddled charcoal from a secondhand bicycle and sold food on railway cars. In 1912, at the age of nineteen, Liem wed Siem Tjiang Nio, a fifteen-year-old Peranakan (culturally hybrid Chinese) girl, and they began selling general provisions out of a stall in front of their house.¹⁰ After briefly working for a cigarette manufacturer in Lamongan where he learned to blend tobacco, Liem began selling his own blends, both directly through his wife's stall and to retailers and wholesalers. In 1913, he incorporated the business as HM (*Handel Maatschappij* or trading company) Liem Seng Tee. When an opportunity arose to buy tobacco cheaply from a trader going bankrupt, Siem funded the purchase with a wad of cash she had saved and stashed in the bamboo roof, illustrating the role women's capital often plays in family businesses and challenging narratives that center masculine enterprise and patrifilial succession (Yanagisako 2002).

Liem Seeng Tee's family and business grew over the ensuing decades. Siem gave birth to two sons, Swie Hwa (1914) and Swie Ling (1915), followed by three daughters, Sien Nio (1921), Hwee Nio (1926), and Kwang Nio (1928). Liem began selling a blend of tobacco, cloves, and the heavy flavoring mix known as *sau*s (sauce) under the brand *Dji Sam Soe*, Hokkien for "two three four." In 1930, Liem changed the business name to HM Sampoerna, using a Sanskrit-derived Malay term that evokes perfection, wholeness, and completion. Liem embraced the auspicious number nine—the sum of two, three, and four—wherever possible, from domestic and business street addresses to license plates, workers' wages, the nine-lettered brand and company name, and the arc of nine nine-pointed stars gracing *Dji Sam Soe* packs. Reflecting their increasing wealth, Liem and Siem educated their sons abroad; Swie Hwa studied business in Chicago, and Swie Ling attended high school in China and then the English Catholic University in Beijing. In 1932, Liem bought a former orphanage that dated to 1864. He renamed it Taman Sampoerna and converted the compound into a family residence, warehouse, and factory. He renovated an auditorium as a cinema and theater with a rotating stage visited by Chinese acrobats, *wayang* (traditional puppet theater) performers, Charlie Chaplin, and future president Sukarno, who in 1938 gave some of his trademark rousing speeches calling for Indonesian independence on the Taman Sampoerna stage. Because machine-rolled cigarettes were more prestigious than hand-rolled kretek, Liem also expanded into white cigarette production, buying seven semiautomated machines that could operate around the clock (Sampoerna 2007, 46).

When the Japanese invaded in 1942, Sampoerna was one of the three largest cigarette producers. Within hours of the Dutch surrender, Japanese troops arrived at Taman Sampoerna, confiscated family assets, and arrested Liem, who was accused of supporting China's war against Japan and imprisoned. Taman Sampoerna was converted to manufacturing Fuji cigarettes for troops. Liem's family hid near Malang, although his sons were also eventually arrested and interned. On August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, Sukarno declared Indonesia's independence. The Dutch attempted to reassert control, and bloody battles between colonial forces and revolutionary nationalists ensued until the Dutch finally acknowledged Indonesian independence on December 27, 1949. Liem, who had been released on August 27, 1945 (and subsequently declared the auspiciously numbered day Sampoerna's birthday), reconstituted his business amid the fierce independence battles unfolding in Surabaya and changed his company's name to Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna. Liem and Siem also supported their sons' business efforts; Swie Hwa ran a tobacco trading company in Central Java, and Swie Ling founded the cigarette factory PT Panamas in Bali in 1954, although he and his Dutch Chinese wife, Nan, spent a period abroad after 1945 out of fear that they might be targeted by revolutionary nationalists.

President Sukarno's leftist administration was conducive to militancy among the low-paid workers whom kretek capitalism relied on exploiting, making the first decades after Indonesian independence challenging for Sampoerna. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) became a significant political force, boasting two million members in 1955 and garnering 16 percent of the national vote and nearly 30 percent of the vote in East Java where Sampoerna was located. By 1965, the PKI claimed around 3.5 million members, with 20 million more in affiliated mass organizations for women, youth, peasants, workers, and other groups (Robinson 2018, 9). The feminist, PKI-affiliated Indonesian Women's Movement or Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia) had three million members in 1965 and supported women workers, women's equality, and political, economic, and social rights. Communist organizing and unionization spread in Sampoerna's factory where laborers worked eleven- to twelve-hour shifts, seven days a week. By 1954, Liem Seeng Tee ceased visiting the shop floor out of fear that labor activists might threaten his personal safety (Sampoerna 2007, 40, 49). After Liem died of heart failure in 1956, his daughters Sien and Hwee and their husbands took over Sampoerna. To reduce the company's labor dependence and vulnerability to union activism, they invested heavily in the machine-rolled white cigarette market but struggled to compete against foreign firms like BAT and Philip Morris. By 1959, the company was edging toward bankruptcy. At the request of Swie Hwa, Swie Ling returned and took over the faltering business; he terminated white cigarette production and invested in revitalizing the neglected *Dji Sam Soe* brand, raising worker wages and bonuses to secure their loyalty.

KRETEK MECHANIZATION AND MARKET GROWTH IN THE SUHARTO ERA

On September 30, 1965, six Indonesian army generals and a lieutenant were killed in an alleged communist coup attempt. General Suharto used the murders to justify a massive, military-led anti-communist campaign that incited civilian participation in targeting Communist Party members and their allies (despite the legal status of the party before its ban in 1966). The anti-communist crusade served as cover for opportunistic extrajudicial killings of leftist activists, intellectuals, teachers, artists, musicians, dancers, peasants who threatened large landholders, and ethnic Chinese tainted by their association—however tenuous—with a communist country. Gerwani-affiliated women were targeted based on a fabricated, sensation-alist account of members sadistically mutilating the generals' genitalia and dancing naked in the Lubang Buaya (literally, crocodile pit) region where some of the men were killed and their bodies were dumped down a well. Casualty estimates from the slaughter that followed range from five hundred thousand to one million Indonesians. Corpses were dumped in rivers and mass graves. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were also imprisoned, often without trial. Those who survived the harsh prison conditions became a political underclass and often faced social ostracization and difficulty finding employment upon their release due to the “economically and socially deadly practice” of stamping their identity cards with the initials ET (for *eks tahanan politik*), marking them as former political prisoners (Larasati 2013, 57). Enjoying support from the United States with its Cold War mission of communist containment, Suharto ousted the leftist Sukarno and maneuvered himself into the presidency in 1967. Over his thirty-two years of New Order rule, Suharto invoked the bogeyman of communism to inspire fear, depoliticize citizens, and ensure support for his economic development agenda.

Kretek capitalism, and large Chinese Indonesian kretek producers, would flourish under Suharto's rule, which encouraged mechanization and curtailed labor rights. Through most of the New Order, unauthorized strikes were illegal and suppressed with military force. Workers were limited to a single government-sanctioned, management-friendly union that dominates Sampoerna factories to the present day. Kretek producers ousted men from their hand-rolling workforces and replaced them with women, whom the New Order targeted for gendered depoliticization. Each year, the government forced schoolchildren to watch a traumatizing propaganda film (*Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, the 30 September Movement/PKI Treason), which rehashed Gerwani members' fictional sexually depraved role in the alleged coup attempt (Larasati 2013). Against this political and sexual threat, the state espoused the primacy of a conservative housewife (*ibu rumah tangga*) identity, even for women workers (Suryakusuma 1996). Buoyed by high oil prices, Suharto's administration supplied cheap credit to domestic

businesses and encouraged kretek mechanization. Suharto presided over decades of rising foreign investment, national prosperity, and consumption levels and increased access to formal education. The middle class grew, but deepening inequalities, rural dispossession, environmental degradation, and urbanization also increased, and Suharto, along with his family members and cronies, were accused of rampant corruption and nepotism.

The Sampoerna family benefited economically under Suharto but experienced renewed cultural suppression. The administration's approach to the so-called Chinese problem involved forced cultural assimilation while underscoring differences that kept Chinese Indonesians forever foreign and potential targets of racial scapegoating. Laws passed in 1966 and 1967 forced once vibrant Chinese schools and media to close, compelled Chinese Indonesians to adopt Indonesian-sounding names, and prohibited Chinese religious and ritual expression in public. The government insisted on using the derogatory term *Cina* rather than the preferred term *Tionghoa* and built on Sukarno-era demands for Chinese Indonesians to acquire and, upon demand, display extra proof of their citizenship status (Warga Negara Indonesia or WNI). Documentary evidence of their bureaucratic belonging only underscored their exclusion from the full national belonging enjoyed by their *asli* (authentic, indigenous) Indonesian neighbors (Strassler 2010).

In response to government pressure to assimilate, Liem Swie Ling adopted the first name Aga and family name Sampoerna in 1966. In 1967, he launched a budget kretek to appeal to smokers who could not afford expensive Dji Sam Soe. The green packaging featured a large white A for Aga on a red background. The brand became known as Sampoerna Hijau (Green Sampoerna) or alternatively Sampoerna A or Sampoerna Kretek. Perhaps because the failed attempt to shift to machine-rolled white cigarettes in the 1950s remained fresh, Sampoerna, under Aga's direction, confined itself to hand-rolled production.

The Suharto administration began granting kretek manufacturers permission to import cigarette-rolling machines in 1968, overturning the Sukarno administration's policy of discouraging kretek mechanization to shelter hand-rolling jobs. In 1974, Bentoel was the first kretek producer to exercise the option to mechanize kretek and confer on them features associated with "modern" white cigarettes.¹¹ In 1976, Bentoel launched the machine-rolled Biru (blue) International brand, which quickly became a hit. By the end of the 1970s, two other major producers—Djarum and Gudang Garam—had also mechanized.¹²

Mechanization enabled kretek producers to gain dominance over white cigarette makers and to claim a share of Indonesians' rising disposable income. White cigarettes, which were regarded as prestigious, modern, and cosmopolitan compared to the cheaper traditional hand-rolled kretek, claimed over 75 percent of the market in the 1960s (Reid 1985, 541). But starting in the 1970s, Indonesians could smoke machine-rolled kretek, which evoked an alternative national modernity. They were soon so popular that the government intervened to protect the labor-intensive hand-rolled sector; in 1979, the director general for duty and

excise required that large manufacturers produce one hand-rolled for every two machine-rolled kretek, a ratio relaxed in 1986 to one to four. When companies routinely violated these policies, the government implemented the tiered taxation system to keep hand-rolled kretek cheaper (Hanusz 2000, 112–15).

Tien Pao, the second of Nan and Aga Sampoerna's three sons, would bring his overseas business training to bear on modernizing Sampoerna and mechanizing its production. Born in the Netherlands in 1947, Tien Pao was first educated in Hong Kong and Melbourne. He met his future wife, Kathleen Chow (Katie Sampoerna), while attending college at the University of Houston. The couple moved to Singapore, where his horseracing-obsessed father had established Agasam Stables.¹³ Tien Pao eventually became involved in the Sampoerna and Panamas kretek factories, joining Sampoerna's board of directors in 1977 and leading the company from 1978.

Over the 1980s and 1990s, Putera Sampoerna, as Tien Pao was publicly called in Indonesia, embarked on a mission to apply global tobacco and business technologies to modernize every facet of Sampoerna's business, from financing and sourcing supplies to production, marketing, distribution, and inventory control. He established new Surabaya corporate headquarters at Rungkut Industrial Park in 1983 and proceeded to wrest control of Sampoerna's tobacco procurement and cigarette distribution networks from the traders and agents on whom the company had historically relied. Putera enrolled his cousin Boedi Sampoerna to set up tobacco buying stations that enabled them to buy directly from farmers and bypass the Chinese Indonesian traders who had long controlled tobacco purchase and storage. Traders allegedly retaliated with personal threats and arson attempts on the buying stations (Kartajaya 2005, 123–27; Sampoerna 2007, 117). Putera proceeded to dismantle the agent distribution system established by his grandfather and continued under his father. From his perspective, the agents, some of whom were third generation, had grown “fat and spoiled” and were not motivated to increase Sampoerna's market share or do the hard work of marketing new products or extending marketing to places where Sampoerna did not already enjoy a devoted consumer base. At an emergency meeting in 1986, Putera informed agents that the company was ending their contracts and was prepared to buy their assets and employ their managers and salespeople. Overcoming distributors' resistance and threats, by 1989 Sampoerna claimed control over the most extensive distribution system in the country.¹⁴ The company also invested heavily in new information management systems to enhance quality, inventory, and marketing control (Kartajaya 2005, 127–35, 145–47; Sampoerna 2007, 121–22).

For Putera Sampoerna, mechanizing cigarette production with global technologies was key to transforming Sampoerna from “a niche player in the upper price segment of the kretek market” into a “world-class” manufacturer and “major volume player in Indonesia's lucrative cigarette industry” (Kartajaya 2005, 118, 136; Sampoerna 2007, 125). In 1987, Sampoerna began constructing its new “world-class” facility on a 153-hectare plot of land in Sukorejo, forty-seven kilometers south of Surabaya. Built in stages, it included long-term storage warehouses for

tobacco and cloves, a primary tobacco and clove processing and mechanized blending factory, a secondary factory for making and packing cigarettes, finished goods warehouses, and supporting units like the power plant, logistics, HR, training, security, and maintenance. Confronting delays on German and Italian cigarette making and packing machines, Sampoerna converted used machinery (procured from a Semarang BAT plant in 1989) from white cigarette to kretek production (Kartajaya 2005, 136–44). A lavish Science and Development Center was tasked with creating new products and testing and controlling the content, taste, and budgets of existing product lines.¹⁵ To raise more capital for its ambitious expansion, Sampoerna listed twenty-seven million shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange at 12,600 rupiah per share on August 27, 1990.¹⁶ Bentoel and Gudang Garam became public companies the same year.

During the business-friendly Suharto period, four large Chinese Indonesian family firms thus used mechanization to consolidate control over the majority of Indonesia's cigarette market and shift it from white cigarettes to kretek by the close of the twentieth century. The following sections provide a more detailed account of the factors undergirding their success, which was predicated not only on their turn to mechanization but also on an ability to incorporate seemingly opposing discourses of tobacco control and commodity nationalism into their kretek engineering and marketing. Mechanized factories and kretek museums are paradigmatic sites in which kretek producers address tobacco control and kretek nationalism, respectively. In mechanized factories, firms bring to bear on the kretek a host of global technologies not only to make production faster and cheaper but also to create the appearance of a safer cigarette. In museums, kretek producers conversely center the hand-rolled kretek and the industry's cultural, indigenous, and artisanal features. Hidden from view, the mechanized factory is focused on the future, on speed, and on volume. Open to the public, the kretek museum stages slow production and kretek's past.

TOBACCO CONTROL

Even as abundant scientific evidence emerged over the course of the twentieth century about the addictive nature of cigarettes and their toxic and carcinogenic effects on active and passive smokers, proponents of tobacco regulation have faced a steep uphill battle in Indonesia due to the industry's close government ties, influence, and reputation as a key taxpayer and employer (Lawrence and Collin 2004). During Suharto's administration (1967–98), the industry became the country's largest revenue source after oil, gas, and timber and its second largest employer after the government (Reynolds 1999a, 89). The government began requiring small, weakly worded health cigarette pack warnings ("Smoking can harm your health") in 1991, but it lifted a ban on television advertising the same year. Through ownership stakes in television stations and an outdoor advertising

business, Suharto's children benefitted from extravagant cigarette advertising budgets (Reynolds 1999b, 87–88). In the 1990s, four large kretek producers controlled 85 percent of the industry and produced the majority of their cigarettes in mechanized factories. Of the seven known billionaires (USD) in Indonesia in 1997, three owed their fortunes to tobacco (Putera Sampoerna, Gudang Garam's Rachman Halim, and Djarum's Hartono; see Reynolds 1999a, 90). Yet continued hand-rolled production and small kretek producers maintained the impression of a diverse and employment-generating industry.

Limited in number, resources, and geographic reach, Indonesia's tobacco critics confront public condemnation, mockery, and even death threats (McNeil 2018). Government officials and civil servants, whose upper ranks consist mostly of men who are more likely to smoke or be sympathetic to fellow male smokers, rarely see tobacco control as part of their remit unless they are in health-related positions, which are often more feminized and less powerful. Industry, trade, and agriculture ministries openly side with the tobacco industry, and even the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth and Sports claim they need tobacco money for scholarships and sports (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2020). Journalists often smoke, and media relies on tobacco industry advertising revenue and can be swayed by industry threats, bribes, and journalism awards. As an activist cause, tobacco control is largely supported by Jakarta-based nonprofits that focus on consumers, children and youth, tobacco “victims,” and heart and lung health (e.g., Yayasan Lentera Anak, Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia, Yayasan Jantung Indonesia). Although only a small number of activists overtly support the tobacco industry, smoking is widespread in activist circles dominated by youth—cigarette companies' favorite demographic—who might otherwise oppose corporate capitalism but often use cigarettes to forge relations of reciprocity and to alleviate boredom, hunger, and tension (Lee 2016).

In the world's largest Muslim country, the tobacco industry has faced Islamic opposition but also mustered considerable support. In 2009, the government-sponsored council Majelis Ulama Indonesia issued a fatwa (religious opinion) declaring smoking in public and any smoking by children and pregnant women as *haram* (prohibited) and smoking more generally as *makruh* (discouraged). Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which boasts thirty to thirty-five million members, objected to the fatwa, declaring smoking less harmful than alcohol and beneficial for clear thinking (Byron et al. 2015, 2). In collaboration with Bentoel, NU invested in a hand-rolled kretek factory in 2002, then sold its share in 2007 when the plant required more capital.¹⁷ The brand it launched in 2003, Tali Jagat (rope of the universe), bore a logo resembling NU's, with nine stars in an arc around a globe. The marketing focus was purportedly to recruit NU smokers (*warga nahdliyyin*) so as to bolster both NU's economic fortunes and those of tobacco and clove farmers, many of whom are NU members.¹⁸

In 2010, Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second largest Muslim organization, with a reformist, modernist orientation and twenty-five million members, issued a fatwa declaring cigarettes haram. Grounded in the rationale that smoking is a slow form of suicide and harms family members and bystanders, the fatwa's impact was limited. Although a Muhammadiyah Tobacco Control Center leader claimed that the organization was like a state that could issue orders that reached down to its roots and were scrupulously followed by loyal members, many smokers found the fatwa too extreme and dismissed it as a misinterpretation (*salah menafsirkan*), asserting that people were allowed to smoke but earned blessings (*pahala*) by avoiding it.¹⁹ Others reproduced claims that the fatwa was money motivated; kretek nationalist organization Komunitas Kretek sought to discredit it as a political maneuver and a performance for the Bloomberg Initiative, which awarded Muhammadiyah a grant of \$393,000 in 2009 (Emont 2016). (To put such tobacco control funding into perspective, consider that the tobacco industry spent \$378 million—almost a thousand times the size of the grant—on Indonesian tobacco advertising in 2017.)²⁰

Indonesia's tobacco control activists seek membership in a global order of tobacco control that promises rights to knowledge, industry regulation, an environment free of smoke and cigarette advertising, and a healthier and more prosperous future for Indonesian citizens. Many of these activists work within the framework of tobacco control justice, which involves challenging the industry's targeting of vulnerable countries and communities. Such an approach means paying particular attention to how social inequalities interact with the environmental, health, and economic dimensions of tobacco violence. Tobacco plays a role in Indonesia's five leading causes of death (ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, tuberculosis, diabetes, and chronic respiratory diseases), and tobacco-related diseases strain and jeopardize the country's drive toward universal health coverage.²¹ In 2015, the Ministry of Health estimated the total direct and indirect health costs of smoking at nearly \$34 billion, three times the amount generated by the tobacco tax (World Health Organization 2020, 2, 8, 12). In terms of gender inequality and violence, boys and young men experience intense social pressure to demonstrate their masculinity and adulthood by smoking. Of the 7 percent of Indonesian women killed by tobacco-related diseases, many have never actively smoked a cigarette. Girls disproportionately lose education opportunities due to tobacco-related illness among parents (World Health Organization 2020, 9). In Indonesian households where the father smokes, tobacco accounts for 22 percent of average weekly household expenditures, curbing spending on food, education, and health care, contributing to high rates of child malnutrition and stunting, and diminishing health and economic life chances (World Bank 2018, 2–3). People in Indonesia's lowest income bracket smoke at twice the rate of Indonesians in the highest income bracket, implying that the poor bear the greatest burden of tobacco-related diseases and risk of financial devastation due to chronic illness and the premature death of key household providers (World Health Organization

2020, 12). The heavy toll of tobacco use on the poor has led some to question the orthodoxy that cigarette tax increases are necessarily regressive (Verguet, Kearns, and Rees 2021). While statistical evidence on smoking rates in Indonesia's queer community is lacking, anecdotal observations and ethnographic accounts suggest a higher prevalence than among straight Indonesians, consistent with trends in other countries (Blackwood 2010; Boellstorff 2005). Cigarettes facilitate new relations and identities but also create additional health risks for LGBTQ individuals and exacerbate others they already disproportionately face.²²

Tobacco control has gained some ground in the post-Suharto period, but Indonesia has not joined the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), a 2003 treaty ratified by over 180 countries. Indonesian government delegates who actively participated in establishing, drafting, and approving the convention saw industry interference in the Sukarnoputri administration's abrupt withdrawal of support just as they were preparing to sign the treaty. In the Indonesian government, only the Ministry of Health prohibits tobacco industry collaboration; politicians and political parties are not required to report tobacco industry contributions, and industry influence over policymaking is rife (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2020). The Tobacco Transparency Index ranked Indonesia among the five countries with the highest levels of industry interference; its 2021 report cited Sampoerna's leveraging of the pandemic to gain access to senior government officials and its letter requesting that a regent in Bali revoke an outdoor cigarette advertising ban (Assunta 2021, 4–5, 36, 57). Not being party to the FCTC also means that Indonesia is unable to influence its direction or access member resources, including funding for farmers transitioning away from tobacco (Chamim et al. 2011, 61–82).

After President Yudhoyono's administration signed Regulation 109 into law in 2012, followed by Health Ministry Regulation 28 a year later, Indonesia became the only country with pictorial warning labels that also allowed rampant cigarette advertising in conventional mass media, including television, radio, print media, and billboards (Anshari 2017, 28). The new laws prohibited tobacco companies from distributing free cigarettes or showing cigarettes in advertising but allowed television and radio advertising between 9:30 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. Local governments were empowered to craft smoke-free legislation but at their own discretion and without a deadline; the process has unfolded slowly and unevenly and has been subject to politicians' priorities and industry influence (Kramer et al. 2023). Companies were forbidden from creating new brands with "misleading descriptors" like "mild" or "light," but existing brands could keep using these terms. Prohibitions on cigarette sales to pregnant women and to children under the age of eighteen go unenforced.

Indonesia's refusal to sign the FCTC may have had the important upshot of attracting PMI to acquire Sampoerna in 2005, thereby setting in motion the current era of increasing foreign stakes in kretek capitalism (Chamim et al. 2011, 69). Indonesian kretek company acquisitions are strikingly at odds with the

public commitments to harm reduction and a “smoke-free future” that PMI, BAT, and JTI have made. PMI boasts that it has invested \$9 billion since 2008 in “reduced risk products,” resulting in the launch of various e-vapor products and heated (rather than burning) tobacco devices such as IQOS that are meant to “disrupt” the conventional combustible cigarette industry.²³ The company has set striking targets, such as ending cigarette sales in the United Kingdom by 2030 and seeing “at least 30 percent of PMI’s adult consumers who would otherwise continue smoking switch to PMI’s smoke free products by 2025” (Jackler 2022, 134; Sampoerna 2022, 159). Meanwhile, PMI aggressively pursues conventional combustible product growth in Indonesia, where it claimed the largest market share beginning in 2006 and celebrated a new milestone in 2012 with over one hundred billion sticks sold. PMI constructed a \$250 million mechanized kretek factory near Jakarta at the same time as it was building a (\$120 million) reduced-risk product facility in Switzerland and launching IQOS in Japan.

By becoming major kretek capitalism players, foreign firms have pursued growth and reaped profits from conventional combustibles while confronting dramatic smoking declines in higher-income countries where they more heavily market “reduced risk products.” Critics claim that PMI uses profits from growing deadly production and sales in lower- and middle-income countries like Indonesia, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, and Egypt to develop and promote its “reduced risk products” in higher-income countries (Chaudhuri 2017; Jackler 2022, 131–34). PMI has not issued bold calls for an end to cigarette sales outside of the United Kingdom and has instead spent millions of dollars opposing tobacco control policies in underdeveloped countries. Kretek capitalism thereby provides vital support to foreign tobacco firms and shareholders at the expense of ordinary Indonesians.

COMMODITY NATIONALISM

In their efforts to promote and defend the commodity, kretek nationalists appeal to nationalist sentiments of both love and hatred. The most prominent voice of kretek nationalism, Komunitas Kretek (kretek community), evokes these sentiments with its self-description as a “fun community that celebrates kretek as the cultural heritage of Indonesia . . . upholds national independence and opposes foreign threats toward a local commodity.”²⁴ Founded in 2010 and abbreviated as Komtek, the organization refuses to disclose its funding sources but claims that it accepts money exclusively from domestic rather than foreign-owned firms. Djarum is widely rumored to be the group’s primary funder. The Komtek website recommends a range of “LTLN” (low-tar, low-nicotine) kretek brands for the starting smoker, all artfully arranged and photographed to hide grotesque warning labels.²⁵

Komtek stages the kretek as an affectively and ethically potent “matter of care” when it emphasizes the vulnerable “little people” (*wong cilik* Jv) who depend on the industry and the lofty ideals of cultural heritage and national independence (Puig

de la Bellacasa 2011). Whereas tobacco control activists often depict Indonesia's lax regulatory environment as embarrassingly backward, kretek nationalists insist that Indonesia's bestselling tobacco product is a distinctive cultural heirloom and should be a source of pride rather than shame (Sunaryo 2013). One of Komtek's taglines insists, "The kretek is not a cigarette" (*kretek bukan rokok*), and Komtek members occasionally employ neologisms like *to kretek* (*mengkretek*) and *kreteker* (*pengkretek*, Handayani 2012b) to underscore the commodity's distinctiveness and distance it from conventional terms derived from the Dutch term for smoking (*roken*, i.e., *rokok* [cigarette], *merokok* [to smoke], *perokok* [smoker]).²⁶ Kretek nationalists celebrate as heroes (*pahlawan*) women smokers who brave public condemnation and factory workers and farm laborers who "selflessly struggle for a form of independence, in pursuit of lofty goals for the nation" (Yoska 2012, 175). Books and photos offer a nostalgic, aestheticized, and romanticized view of the industry, evoking seductive sights, textures, and aromas through bucolic agrarian imagery of tobacco and clove agriculture, scenes of factory workers and cigarette peddlers, smokers convivially interacting or enjoying a solo smoke, reproductions of colorful and whimsical vintage cigarette labels, and depictions of *cethe*, the art of inscribing delicate and intricate swirling designs on cigarettes with toothpicks dipped in coffee grounds (Badil 2011; Basjir et al. 2010; Hanusz 2000; Puthut 2013; Santosa 2012).

In 2015, kretek industry supporters snuck an article into a culture bill that was up for debate in the House of Representatives; the article's language subversively coopted UNESCO definitions of intangible cultural property and heritage by listing kretek as cultural heritage (*warisan budaya*). This would have obliged the government to inventory, document, facilitate, and promote the industry. Kretek protections were struck from the law, but attempts to weaken tobacco control legislation by having kretek declared a national heritage item persist (Astuti and Freeman 2017).

In their more oppositional mode, kretek nationalists stir up fear, hatred, revulsion, and anger toward tobacco control, which they portray as part of a foreign, neocolonial, capitalist plot bent on destroying Indonesia and its cherished commodity and callously killing off industry dependents (Abhisam, Ary, and Harlan 2011; Daeng 2011; Pinanjaya 2012; Wibisono and Yoandinas 2014). They intensify run-of-the-mill commodity nationalism—that is, marketing and advertising agencies' tactic of interpellating potential consumers by invoking a communion with unknown fellow patriotic consumer-citizens achieved through consumption (Foster 2002; building on Anderson 2006)—by infusing it with postcolonial affect and counterhegemonic appeal as a purported expression of opposition to colonialism. Although cigarette demand tends to be fairly inelastic and shifts very slowly in response to regulation and price hikes due to the addictiveness of nicotine, kretek nationalists treat the tobacco control threat as urgent, with a histrionic "sudden death" myth casting regulation as tantamount

to immediate and total closure (*Industri mati besok pagi!*; see Chamim et al. 2011, 57–58). Komtek denounces as foreign threats both tobacco control and multinational takeovers of domestic kretek firms alike, claiming that tobacco giants like PMI and BAT are scheming to stealthily convert Indonesian consumers to white cigarettes by gradually eliminating cloves from kretek.²⁷ Kretek nationalists constitute themselves as a counterpublic that holds a threatened, endangered underdog status in relation to a purportedly dominant public and tobacco control orthodoxy (Warner 2002, 86). They claim that tobacco control criminalizes and pathologizes smokers as sick, addicted, and infectious and victimizes them in ways akin to organized discrimination based on age, gender, class, race, and sexual orientation (Arymami 2012, 301). Kretek nationalists proffer an alternative and oppositional identity through kretek consumption and “a sense of active belonging that masks or compensates for the real powerlessness of human agents in capitalist society” (Warner 2002, 81).

By focusing on little people and the cultural and historical significance of kretek, Komtek avoids engaging with the kretek industry as a capitalist phenomenon. Kretek nationalist literature even figures the commodity as antithetical to capitalism; Handayani (2012a, 30) describes an artist and Sampoerna A-Mild smoker named Willy who dismisses white cigarettes as not delicious, referring to them as “capitalist cigarettes.” Willy is either unaware of or unperturbed by the fact that his kretek brand is made by a PMI subsidiary. Similarly, Aini (2012, 218) insists, “Kretek belong to the people [*rakyat*] because they are produced and consumed by the people. It is not a mass product and does not belong to giant global capital. Even when the kretek is produced by a large company with global distribution reach, the kretek serves as a national ambassador because it carries the unique taste of Indonesia.” The claim that the kretek is not a mass-produced product is as extraordinary as the claim that the companies producing them are not part of global capital. Giving up kretek culture, another kretek nationalist writes, is the same as giving in to capitalist culture, which destroys everything (Prasetyaningrum 2012, 227). If loving kretek is identical with loving Indonesia (Prasetyaningrum 2012, 229), tobacco control is equivalent to murdering Indonesia and those who rely on the tobacco industry (Abhisam, Ary, and Harlan 2011).

Kretek nationalists frequently advance their claim that tobacco control represents sinister neocolonial interests (*kepentingan*) by pointing to Big Pharma in general—and former New York mayor and philanthropist Michael Bloomberg specifically—and their goal of creating a nicotine replacement product market (Kurniawan 2012). As kretek nationalists uncover this hidden agenda and excoriate the Indonesian traitors (*penghianat*) and lackeys (*antek-antek*) who support tobacco control, they fail to question the more basic and obvious motivations of kretek capitalists, for example whether the three wealthiest Indonesians (Djarum’s Hartono brothers and Gudang Garam’s Susilo Wonowidjoyo) make and sell kretek to promote national interests (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2020). Kretek nationalists claim to follow Spivak in clearing space for subalterns to speak, but their

work ventriloquizes for the industry and stifles industry critique (Ardianti 2012, 35). And although kretek nationalists cast tobacco control as foreign and incite hatred toward Indonesian tobacco control activists, they voice no objection to the kretek industry's uptake of foreign technologies for making and marketing kretek. A closer examination of what transpires in mechanized factories and of the kretek that emerge from them reveals how thoroughly large kretek producers have incorporated global tobacco materials, technologies, and deceptions.

MECHANIZED FACTORIES AND MACHINE-ROLLED KRETEK

Heralding a “cleaner, healthier, enjoyable taste” (*lebih bersih—lebih sehat—rasa nikmat*) and a filter “kretek revolution” (*revolusi kretek*), Bentoel's taglines for Biru International, the first machine-rolled kretek, illustrate how the mechanizing kretek industry adopted global manufacturing and marketing technologies to provoke and allay health fears. Mechanized kretek factories were designed to make tobacco control discourse work to the industry's advantage via global technologies. Bentoel promised an Indonesian taste—cloves and saus—with white cigarette features that made machine-rolled kretek appear more modern, prestigious, uniform, and quality controlled and healthier than unfiltered hand-rolled kretek, which were stigmatized as low class, coarse, dirty, and cheap (Kartajaya 2005, 101). Brand names with English words like “International” signaled cosmopolitan aspirations, and although relatively few would be exported and consumed abroad, the machine-rolled kretek would indeed be made on imported machines with imported tobacco, cloves, and other ingredients.

Mechanized kretek producers purchased and tailored machinery made by European companies rather than adopting an import substitution path by developing Indonesian machinery specific to kretek. This remains the case in Sampoerna's mechanized factories today. Machines made by Italian firms Comas and Garbuio dominate the primary process of treating tobacco, cloves, and additives and converting them into tobacco filler. German Hauni brand machines make filters and cigarettes, and German (Focke & Co.) and Italian (Senzani) machines package cigarettes with supplies printed on Swiss (Bobst) machinery. British (Cerulean) and German (Borgwaldt) machines smoke cigarettes in Sampoerna's labs to generate deceptive nicotine and tar numbers.²⁸

Kretek producers have adopted global technologies for manipulating tobacco to make cigarettes with a lower quality and smaller quantity of tobacco. Through a process akin to papermaking, reconstituted tobacco (“recon”) is made from a pulp of mashed tobacco stems and dust that would otherwise go to waste. Sprayed with nicotine, the pulp is sliced to look like shredded leaf tobacco. Recon now appears not only in machine-rolled but also in hand-rolled kretek, which are thus subject to transformation through mechanization, even as Sampoerna markets brands like Dji Sam Soe as unchanging tradition. Along similar lines,



FIGURE 1. In this vintage ad in the Bentoel Museum, the company markets new machine-rolled kretek with filters to the middle and upper class as a “revolution” advancing cleanliness, health, and pleasure. Photo by author.

machine-rolled kretek brands often employ puffed or expanded tobacco made from leaves that are saturated with freon and ammonia gases and then freeze-dried, doubling in size and enabling the manufacture of cigarettes with smoke that is supposedly lower in tar.²⁹

Kretek also incorporate many of the same additives as white cigarettes. Tobacco filler contains as many as six hundred additives, which constitute about 10 percent of the weight of a white cigarette, and more for kretek with their cloves and heavier flavoring (Cross and Proctor 2014, 66). “Casing”—a combination of humectants, treatments, and flavorants—forms the “foundation” that diminishes negative tobacco tastes. The “after cut” or “top flavor,” which is applied later, adds “notes” or a “signature,” endowing branded cigarettes with their particular taste. Flavorants create an appealing “pack aroma” and improve tobacco’s taste and mask its harshness. The casing’s moistening agents or humectants, such as glycerine and

diethylene glycol, help stabilize the moisture content, make tobacco more pliable, and prevent finished cigarettes from rapidly drying out. Freebasing agents such as urea and ammonia help nicotine reach the lungs, blood, and brain more efficiently. Burn accelerants—oxidizing agents such as potassium citrate—keep cigarettes lit and exacerbate the fire hazard associated with discarded or accidentally dropped cigarettes. Cocoa and licorice, both common additives, appear to act as bronchial dilators that make smoke “smoother” and facilitate deep inhalation (Proctor 2011, 501). Sugary additives such as invert sugar also make tobacco smoke less alkaline and thus easier to inhale.³⁰ Cigarette makers often underscore that they use “food-grade” additives in cigarettes. Foods, however, are meant to be ingested rather than burned and inhaled into lungs. Combustion induces chemical shapeshifting that turns relatively innocuous substances like sugar, protein, and glycerine into potent carcinogens (Proctor 2011, 490, 499). Typical kretek flavorants, according to Sampoerna’s flavor specialist, include cacao, licorice, vanillin, furaneol (“sweet like candy”), prune extract, plum extract, jackfruit, black pepper, clove oil, nutmeg, and basil.³¹ Beginning in 1957 with Dutch firm Polak and Schwarz, European flavoring companies have established branches in Indonesia to supply the kretek industry; others include Mane (French), Quest (Dutch), Givaudan (Swiss), and Firmenich (also Swiss).³²

Kretek paper also incorporates global tobacco technologies; it is bleached white, inked with brand labels, and permeated with burn accelerants. Cigarette designers manipulate paper porosity, thickness, width, weight, color, tensile strength, stretch, opacity, texture, spots, and pinholes (Proctor 2011, 366). Circular striations called burn rings evidence two-paper thicknesses, which serve to slow the burn rate when cigarettes are not being smoked to prolong consumption then speed it up when smokers inhale to maximize smoke intake.³³ The paper, which typically constitutes 5 percent of a cigarette by weight, is burned and inhaled into the lungs alongside the tobacco filler (Cross and Proctor 2014, 77).

In public perception, synthetic filters are probably the most significant features distinguishing machine-rolled from hand-rolled kretek. If rising incomes made machine-rolled cigarettes more affordable, health fears made them more appealing. The global industry popularized filters in the 1950s, using a wide variety of materials (including asbestos) and manufacturing technologies to counter growing health fears. Today, most are made with synthetic fibers, typically cellulose acetate. The industry engineered filters to turn brown when smoked, imparting the impression that they effectively trap tar (Brandt 2007, 245). Proctor (2011, 346, 355, 357) argues that filters are best understood as fraudulent gimmicks that lower manufacturing costs, keep tobacco bits out of smokers’ mouths, and, most importantly, impart the false impression of a safer cigarette (Benson 2010). Filters encourage and perpetuate smoking rather than making it less lethal.

Kretek manufacturers have drawn on the global industry playbook by combining filters, ventilation holes, paper porosity, and puffed tobacco to create cigarettes

that yield lower tar and nicotine readings when smoked by machines. In the early 1970s, the global industry began marketing such cigarettes as (ultra) “light” and “mild.”³⁴ These terms are now banned in many countries as “misleading descriptors.” PMI adheres to this position on its website, which dutifully informs smokers that they “should not assume” that the variety of “brands with different features . . . means that one cigarette is less addictive or less harmful than others.”³⁵ Its suggestive pale metallic and pastel palettes and advertising nevertheless imply lower risk for certain brands. The industry has long known that actual smokers tend to unconsciously cover tiny ventilation holes and inhale longer and harder to get their nicotine fix (and accompanying tar) from LTLN cigarettes, thereby negating the features that produce low machine readings. Deep inhalation increases smokers’ risk of developing lung cancers that are harder to detect and treat (Brandt 2007; Proctor 2011). Djarum first developed “low-tar” kretek in 1986 for the health-alarmed US market (Hanusz 2000, 143), and Sampoerna bet heavily on an LTLN kretek for the domestic market when it launched A-Mild in 1989. Initially disparaged as a cigarette for trans women (*banci*, a derogatory term), A-Mild is today the most widely smoked brand in Indonesia (Kartajaya 2005, 433). Like many LTLN kretek, its tar and nicotine levels equal or exceed those of “full flavor” Marlboro Reds. LTLN kretek are marketed using English terms *mild* or *light* rather than their Indonesian equivalent *ringan*.

Kretek mechanizers also adopted global packaging features such as flip-top cardboard packs, shiny interior foil, and transparent exterior film with pull-tabs. Philip Morris pioneered the flip-top hard pack design in 1955 when it masculinized Marlboro, a brand hitherto marketed to women (Cross and Proctor 2014, 77). Bentoel adopted this design for Indonesia’s first machine-rolled kretek. For kretek as much as for white cigarettes, package design is critical for creating the impression of brand differences amid the basic homogeneity and sameness of mechanized cigarettes (uniform length, nicotine content, and so forth; Bell 2020; Cross and Proctor 2014, 82).

KRETEK MUSEUMS

Museums, coffee-table books, and websites that celebrate kretek as Indonesia’s cultural heritage tend to gloss over or omit entirely discussion of recon, puffed tobacco, burn accelerants, humectants, urea, ammonia, plasticizers, synthetic filters, and German machines that produce ten thousand or more kretek per minute. The international technologies that turned the Indonesian cigarette market from majority white cigarette in the 1960s to mostly kretek by the 1980s play a muted role, if they appear at all, in kretek nationalist narratives that emphasize feminine hands, natural ingredients, slow smoking, and a rustic past rather than high-speed machines, synthetic additives, and an industrial present.

Kretek nationalists use cloves to claim a distinctive tobacco history and trajectory, but Indonesia is far from unique in celebrating cigarettes as objects of



FIGURE 2. The House of Sampoerna museum with columns resembling the *Dji Sam Soe krek*. Photo by author.

nation-building and displaying pride in museums, films, artwork, and literature. Claims of national heritage represent another global tobacco industry commonplace. The industry has deployed cultural pride and heritage discourses and yoked wartime patriotism to tobacco production and cigarette provisioning in soldiers' rations, in countries ranging from China to Bulgaria, Canada, France, and Egypt (Brandt 2007; Klein 1993; Kohrman 2018; Neuburger 2013; Proctor 2011; Rudy 2005; Russell 2019; Shechter 2006). Tobacco boosterism in the United States downplays how production was rooted in slavery and remains mired in racial inequalities today (Benson 2012; Griffith 2009; Kingsolver 2011; Milov 2019; Swanson 2014).

Indonesia's *krek* museums present the history of the commodity in a nostalgic and flattering light and frame *krek* manufacturers as benevolent patrons. Commemorating "Indonesia's first indigenous capitalists" and celebrating the commodity in its birthplace, the Kudus *Krek* Museum, which opened in 1986, glosses over Chinese-*pribumi* conflict and anti-Chinese violence (Weix 1997). The Jember government in East Java runs a small tobacco museum and library, and BAT has become the custodian of Museum Bentoel in Malang, which depicts the company as a positive family enterprise.

The elaborate House of Sampoerna complex in the East Javanese port city of Surabaya, spearheaded by Putera's wife, Katie Sampoerna, is the grandest and

most ambitious of Java's kretek museums and reinforces kretek nationalist narratives and aesthetics. Since opening in 2003, it has become a popular and acclaimed tourist destination in Indonesia's second largest city, earning gushing reviews and awards and attracting over two hundred thousand domestic and international visitors a year.³⁶ Inside the museum, a tiny bamboo and palm-frond kiosk topped with taxidermied chickens recalls the humble origins of Sampoerna's founder. Family heirlooms, including furniture, textiles, horseracing trophies, and Ming dynasty porcelain, frame the Sampoerna family's creolized Chinese Indonesian identity as unthreatening cultural rather than political difference (Strassler 2010). Photos, artwork, and vintage artifacts (matchbox covers, cigarette cases, refillable lighters, grooved glass matchstick holders) from the family collection recall the rich material culture around smoking and its association with masculine social activities and traditions like cockfighting. Once-modern lab equipment and an ancient German printing press render kretek research and marketing quaint and unthreatening. Visitors often pose as vendors inside a Sampoerna-branded vending stall; stocked with cigarettes, snacks, sachets, a plastic stool, a grass mat, and a pillow, the display evokes the entrepreneurial gumption and precarity of the "little people" who depend on the industry. From behind floor-to-ceiling windows upstairs, visitors used to gaze down on a living factory exhibit (the source of the pungent clove scent permeating the museum until the factory closed in 2019). As throbbing music broadcast on "Radio Sampoerna" filtered through the glass, hundreds of women rolled, trimmed, and packed kretek at astonishing speeds.

The House of Sampoerna's historical and cultural ambition stretches beyond the museum. Meticulously maintained colonial-era buildings in the compound include a private family wing, a gift shop, a restaurant serving Western, Asian, and "heritage" menu items, and a gallery hosting free exhibits of work by established and emerging artists. The House of Sampoerna also offers free historical tours of Surabaya in a colorful bus custom designed to resemble a tram. Tours explore the Indonesian nationalist struggle and Dutch colonial occupation, old trading sites, and the city's European, Chinese, and Arab neighborhoods with their characteristic commercial, religious, and domestic features. Sampoerna has also decorated a lengthy stretch of the decaying Kalisosok Prison walls with colorful murals celebrating Sampoerna's hand-rolled kretek workers and Indonesian cultural diversity. In this way, Sampoerna presents itself as an important feature of the historical landscape and a generous patron of regional and national arts, culture, and history.

Like other official memory projects, kretek museums are always sites of forgetting as well as remembering (Nora 1989). Nostalgically portraying the commodity as full of wonder, pleasure, and possibility and as the artifact of an agrarian past, national tradition, and family enterprise, kretek museums necessarily omit the materials, speed, labor, and technologies that mark the industrial present and the tobacco-related diseases and deaths the industry has inflicted. I address kretek nationalist narrative omissions by taking into account contemporary kretek



FIGURE 3. The House of Sampoerna's living factory exhibit in 2007. The large billboard evokes patrilineal transmission of the brand. Photo by author.

capitalism's increased foreign ownership, mechanized production methods, and marketing tactics. As this book tracks the trajectory of kretek from tobacco and clove seeds to smoke and ash, it brings into focus the labor Sampoerna requires across different stages of the commodity's life and its methods of enrolling this labor.

THE WORK OF KRETEK CAPITALISM

I carried out most of the research for this book over a year in Indonesia (2015–16) that built on prior one-month visits (in 2007 and 2014). My research was predominantly located in the East Javanese college town of Malang, host to one of Sampoerna's hand-rolling factories, but also extended beyond Java to the islands of Bali and Lombok. Fatma Mustikasari and Shahnaz Priwingsatiningrum, who were then recent graduates from Brawijaya University, assisted me with my research. As a white agnostic professor from the United States in my early forties, I was extremely fortunate to have two young Muslim Indonesian researchers who were adept Javanese speakers, intimately familiar with Malang and the college scene, members of the age demographic Sampoerna targets for its top-selling cigarette brand, skilled at navigating Indonesian social media and connecting with potential interlocutors, and wonderful companions on excursions to tobacco

farms, cigarette factories, and promotional events. The evidence and analysis presented throughout this book has benefited from their work and insights.

The first three chapters focus on more familiar, obvious, and conventional forms of wage labor in fields and factories, including seasonal and contract work. Chapter 1 argues that kretek capitalism has been able to maintain its enrollment of tobacco and clove agricultural labor and to sustain the kretek nationalist narrative by exerting strong hierarchical control at every level of the supply chain. This keeps farmers attached to the industry even as many express hesitancy about its profitability. Chapter 2 shows that in factories producing hand-rolled kretek staffed by a female-dominated workforce, labor is shaped by a gendered paternalism that allows Sampoerna both to benefit from the public image of noble (and often suffering) female kretek heroes and to mask the high-pressure and tightly controlled work in the rhetoric of protective care. In factories producing machine-rolled product, where chapter 3 is sited, Sampoerna secures worker consent not only by offering relatively high pay in a tough labor market but also, just as importantly, via managerial techniques that magnify personal responsibility on the part of workers and teams and render collective organizing unappealing and ineffective.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 explore how Sampoerna recruits less obvious and sometimes unpaid forms of labor from youth, community groups, artists, and influencers, as well as retail owners and smokers themselves. Chapter 4 assesses how Sampoerna has harnessed global marketing tools associated with the influencer and content-creator economy to enroll young people as unpaid or underpaid brand producers for A-Mild, bolstering the brand's image by extracting these brand producers' creativity, community ties, and cool; this strategy evinces how kretek capitalism wrests valuable labor from a wide swath of Indonesians with only tangential connections to the tobacco industry. Turning to cigarette advertising and distribution, chapter 5 describes how Sampoerna extracts value from a network of small-scale independent retailers via the labor of salespeople who travel to these stores and via the Sampoerna Retail Community program, both of which involve the ongoing maintenance of relationships and retail infrastructure. Chapter 6 shows that despite the fact that decisions to smoke are shaped by a range of factors beyond a smoker's individual control (including norms around age, class, gender, and profession), smokers for the most part understand themselves as bearing individual responsibility and blame for their habits. The upshot of this is that narratives about smokers help tobacco companies deflect responsibility for smoking's harms and maintain their reputation as working for the nation's benefit.

A NOTE ON TRANSLATION

Where English words and terms are accompanied by parenthetical source-language translations, the translations are offered in Indonesian unless otherwise indicated as Javanese (Jv) or Sasak.

Kretek Agriculture

Hierarchy and Subjugation

When Indonesia's House of Representatives contemplates adopting new cigarette advertising restrictions or excise tax increases, tobacco and clove farmers routinely appear on Jakarta's streets alongside factory workers and pro-kretek groups to stage raucous, colorful demonstrations. Sporting peasant hats, farmers inhale giant smoldering cigarettes, wave the Indonesian flag, and hoist signs and banners accusing public health-inspired policies of callous disregard for their livelihoods and even homicidal intent. The tobacco industry uses carrot-and-stick methods to ensure farmer turnout, paying them honoraria to demonstrate and threatening to cease purchasing their crops if they do not comply (Chamim et al. 2011, 12, 160). Since Indonesia's post-Suharto transition to democracy, it has become "politically expedient for the tobacco companies to align themselves with popular forces" such as the Indonesian Tobacco Farmers Association (Asosiasi Petani Tembakau Indonesia or APTI, established in 2000) and the Indonesian Clove Farmers Association (Asosiasi Petani Cengkeh Indonesia or APCI, also established in 2000), although such organizations are typically led by wealthier and more powerful farmers (Rosser 2015, 78). The fact that protests are industry funded and elite led, though, does not necessarily delegitimize them in the eyes of Indonesian observers, who regard external funding and ulterior motives as uncontroversial features of demonstrations (Lee 2016).

By sponsoring tobacco farmer demonstrations, Sampoerna exaggerates the degree to which tobacco agriculture is capable of contributing to national prosperity and obfuscates its own multinational character, interests, and global sourcing of cheap tobacco. By appearing to align itself with ordinary Indonesian farmers, Sampoerna aims to generate attachment to kretek capitalism on the national stage and to downplay the subjugation of leaf buyers, farmers, and workers in the fields. The tension between the bold claims about the benefits of kretek

agriculture that industry-sponsored farmers make in public and the hierarchical, exploitative, precarious, and dangerous reality of work at multiple levels of the supply chain is at the heart of this chapter, which provides an account of how PMI and Sampoerna have been able to continue to enroll and control agricultural labor despite the nature of this work. I focus on tobacco as the primary agricultural ingredient in clove cigarettes, while also periodically calling attention to parallel dynamics and industry manipulations in clove cultivation and sourcing. Kretek manufacturers suppress clove prices and import significant quantities, but they also encourage clove farmers to demonstrate against tobacco control and play the part of rural, “little” people whose livelihoods are purportedly attached to the fortunes of single commodities. Clove farmers bear an outsized symbolic significance because, among the numerous ingredients that appear in kretek, cloves (*Syzygium aromaticum*, also *Eugenia caryophyllata*, *Jambosa caryophyllus*) most powerfully represent the nationalist claim that the commodity is indigenous and distinctive (Donkin 2003, 19). In practice, most tobacco and clove farmers derive their livelihoods from a range of economic pursuits beyond the two crops.

The following pages introduce Indonesia’s major tobacco-growing regions and cultivation and curing processes and then move down the supply chain to illuminate the relations of power and subordination that link cigarette manufacturers to leaf buyers, growers, and workers. PMI exercises ever closer control over Indonesian farmers by imposing its global turn toward contract farming (which it claims allows for better social, environmental, and product quality oversight), even while the company has been strategically distancing itself from the crop and rebranding around a “smoke-free future” that assigns an increasingly marginal role to tobacco. Working on behalf of PMI and Sampoerna, large leaf-buying companies that recruit, train, supervise, and grade tobacco farmers are replacing independent traders. Agents at these companies—field technicians, graders, managers—mediate between Sampoerna and the farmers and are evaluated based on their ability to extract large volumes of high-quality leaf from farmers at low prices. Tobacco farmers are precariously positioned as they assume debt to cultivate a capital-intensive and risky non-food crop. Tobacco laborers, finally, often take on this low-pay seasonal work due to a lack of rural employment alternatives, and they face unappealing and sometimes dangerous working conditions. Moving down the supply chain illuminates how maintaining a rigid, separate hierarchy serves as a powerful tool of capitalist exploitation.


GEOGRAPHY AND PRODUCTION PROCESS

Indonesia is the world’s second largest tobacco consumer but only its sixth largest tobacco producer, netting a lower leaf volume than China, Brazil, India, the United States, and Zimbabwe. In 2017, more than half a million Indonesian farmers produced 198,296 tons of tobacco (World Bank 2017, 18). By comparison, fewer than ten thousand tobacco growers in the United States produced 322,120 tons.¹

The sheer number of Indonesian tobacco growers points to the persistent small-holder—rather than large capitalist—character of tobacco production in the country and the complexity of supply chains linking hundreds of thousands of farmers to warehouses and factories (White 2018).

Indonesia's tobacco varieties are relatively diverse and heterogeneous. Whereas white cigarette blends are made up of Virginia, burley, and oriental tobacco, with leaves graded according to global standards that render them comparable and fungible, kretek blends can contain dozens of local tobacco varieties identified by type, processing methods, and growing conditions. The oriental variety grown on Madura Island, for example, is subdivided into lowland irrigated paddy (*sawah*), dryland (*tegal*), and upland (*gunung*) varieties, with upland varieties commanding a higher price but lower yield per hectare. From a genetic perspective, the distinctions between varieties may be insignificant, but from the perspective of the tobacco blender's connoisseurship or of farmers trying to figure out their crop value at the point of sale, they loom large (Hahn 2011). Comparing a kretek to a meal, a government tobacco librarian explained that Virginia is akin to the plain white rice (*nasi*) that makes up the starch base, while other tobacco varieties serve as the meat and vegetables (*lauk*).² The cloves and sauce (*saus*), in this analogy, contribute the spices (*bumbu*). Didit, one of Sampoerna's lead blenders, clarified that high-nicotine kasturi leaves contributed a chocolate, fermented taste; Madura leaves created a delicious (*gurih*, akin to umami) aroma and nutty flavor (*rasa kacang*); and Virginia from Lombok, China, or the United States sweetened the taste. He estimated that 15–20 percent of kretek tobacco is kasturi and 15–25 percent Madura.³ Because these varieties were so critical, Sampoerna maintained stocks in East and West Java in case disaster threatened either locale.

My research could only sample the diversity, complexity, and heterogeneity of Indonesia's tobacco cultivation practices. I spent time in six different tobacco-growing regions where farmers produced eight different types of tobacco. The crop is grown in fifteen of Indonesia's thirty-four provinces, but roughly 85 percent of production is concentrated in Central and East Java and 6–8 percent in West Nusa Tenggara, mainly on Lombok Island (Human Rights Watch 2016, 26; World Bank 2017, 18). In East Java, south of the city of Malang, I observed and took part in the major cultivation phases—from seedbed germination to curing—among first-generation contract farmers who produced cut and sun-cured Virginia tobacco for Sadhana, Sampoerna's leaf buyer. We met with contract and independent farmers in the Blitar area and Sadhana field technicians and managers at the buying station there and in Lumajang, where farmers grow burley tobacco. We also met with tobacco farmers and buyers in the East Javanese district of Jember and the island of Madura, which are both established tobacco growing regions.⁴ Madura's oriental tobacco occupies a special place in kretek, enshrined in the long-standing product claim on the back of Sampoerna's Dji Sam Soe packs: "These cigarettes contain high quality tobacco, with sweet-smelling Madurese tobacco and fragrant American tobacco mixed with select, finely cut cloves and a special



MAP 1. Tobacco and clove producing regions. Map by Bill Nelson.

sauce.” Madurese government officials told us they safeguarded local tobacco with police operations to prevent outside tobacco from being imported and passed off as local. Finally, we visited tobacco farmers and buyers on Lombok, which has gained renown for its tobacco-friendly soil, humidity, and mild night temperatures, leading to a concentration of leaf buyers and a crop boom since the 1990s.⁵

Tobacco is primarily a lowland crop, whereas cloves are grown in the uplands. As the clove tree spread far beyond its Maluku origins, it has become embedded in diverse labor, landownership, and trading arrangements. Over 70 percent of Indonesian clove production is now concentrated in the provinces of North Sulawesi and Central Java (World Bank 2017, 15). Cloves are grown on roughly five hundred thousand hectares, and over a million people engage in clove labor, but cloves constitute only a small proportion of total household economic activity and are rarely a source of fulltime employment (World Bank 2017). We met with clove farmers, pickers, traders, agronomists, and industry advocates in Java and Bali. Sampoerna sources large quantities of cloves from Sumatra, Java, Bali, and Sulawesi and has been quietly experimenting with cultivating the tree at low altitudes on the island of Sumba.

Farmers can sell clove to traders while it is still on the tree, just after it has been picked (*basah, mentah*), or after it has been dried. Under ideal sunny conditions, clove buds can dry in three days but often require five days or longer. In yards and alongside roads, farmers and traders spread cloves on bare concrete or plastic tarps, using wooden rakes to turn them every few hours so they dry evenly. Newly dried cloves lack the characteristic potent scent, which takes a year to emerge. Farmers can store cloves in hopes of better prices, but there is only a small price

advantage in selling more mature and pungent cloves (e.g., prices are 3 percent higher in Malang).

The more complex practices tobacco farmers and workers employ to wrest the commodity from the tobacco plant are a historically contingent outcome of changing legal and labor regimes, technologies, and cultural preferences that valorize and foster certain plant parts and qualities (e.g., light color, first-growth leaves, large leaf size) and suppress others (e.g., flowers, second leaf growth; see Hahn 2011).

The first stage in tobacco cultivation is preparing, planting, and maintaining the seedbeds. A week or so after paddy harvest, farmers and/or laborers create seedbed ridges using hoes or tractors, disperse and water seeds, and construct shelters with plastic sheeting and bamboo frames. Forty to fifty days after sowing, if all goes well, the farmer will have a crop of healthy seedlings, each ten to twenty centimeters in length, ready for transplanting. With tractors or hoes, farmers then prepare new fields by building ridges. One worker punches holes in the soil with a large stick and is followed by another who tucks seedlings into holes and pats the soil into place.

Workers water seedlings after transplanting; then, for the next two to three weeks, seedlings ideally enter a “stress period” during which they are denied water, which causes their roots to extend outward in search of moisture. Nicotine is manufactured in the roots, and the plants dislike “wet feet” (i.e., soggy roots). Workers water plants twice thereafter, fertilize them with nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, and apply pesticides from plastic spray cannisters that workers wear on their backs.

The dominant ideal for commercial tobacco is a round and squat profile, with thick and bubbled leaves growing broad and horizontal rather than slender and pointing skyward. To achieve these attributes, workers “top” plants when they reach the desired number of leaves for harvest by removing flowering blooms and/or part of the stalk and topmost leaves. They generally top plants at eighteen leaves, but they may allow twenty-one leaves for a robust crop or sixteen for a weaker crop. Farmers in Madura top plants at only twelve leaves, meaning that each plant produces a lower leaf volume. Topping breaks apical dominance—the plant’s tendency to grow vertically along the main stem—and concentrates growth instead into large, heavy leaves. Topping also encourages the proliferation of unwanted side shoots or axial buds called suckers (*wiwilan* Jv, *suli* Sasak), which workers break off and prevent by applying chemical suckercides.

Roughly three months after transplanting, when the leaves begin to yellow, they are ready for harvest or priming, which is done in stages. Workers first pick bottom leaves, which have seen less sun and more humidity, are dirtier and thinner, and contain less nicotine and sugar than upper leaves. Workers pick three to four leaves from each plant, necessarily squatting or stooping as they pick the lowest leaves (Jain 2006, 60–85). In the event that leaves yellow swiftly or farmers fear that swelling supply will drive down prices, workers may pick more (e.g., six top leaves, or “from the neck up”). They may also leave the lowest leaves on the stalk if warehouses



FIGURE 4. Workers wearing masks to protect against dust sort tobacco leaves in a Jember warehouse. Photo by author.

are refusing lower-quality leaves. As they work their way down the rows, workers make bundles for transport to the farmer's home by foot, car, or motorbike.

Tobacco is cured in several distinctive ways, each of which entails different capital outlays, labor requirements, and risks. In Lombok, growers mostly flue-cure tobacco in thirty- to forty-foot-tall brick ovens that are expensive to construct and fuel and require workers to tie and hang leaves and monitor flues.⁶ Leaves must be correctly positioned and the oven appropriately ventilated, maintained, and stoked to hold optimal temperatures over five to nine days for each batch, with thicker upper leaves requiring more time (Amigó 2010, 140). Lombok farmers must grow at least one hectare to fill a barn, and they flue-cure tobacco themselves because green leaf cannot be profitably sold. Implicated in deforestation and carbon emissions, flue-curing adds to tobacco's panoply of negative environmental impacts (Proctor 2011, 513–18).⁷

Farmers in the Malang and Blitar regions shred and sun-cure their tobacco. First, they ripen and ferment the tobacco indoors for three to five days until it yellows. Workers sort leaves for quality and ripeness before cutting. Sadhana required that farmers buy expensive cutting machines and set them at 2 mm, whereas independent farmers typically employ manual cutters who use hand-operated guillotines to slice tobacco more finely, to 0.5–1.5 mm.⁸ Chasing the sun, workers cut from around 6:00 to 9:00 a.m. and spread shredded tobacco by hand on bamboo trays that they place in the sun to dry in front of their houses, on the side of the

road, and sometimes in fields. Workers rotate the tobacco at midday, a two-person job that involves laying an empty tray onto the drying tobacco and flipping it over. It takes several sunny days to dry cut leaf.

In Jember, *kasturi* tobacco is hung whole, air-cured, and then ripened in warehouses filled with choking airborne tobacco dust. Sadhana's sister company, Adi Sampoerna, employs six to seven hundred low-wage workers—mostly young and unmarried, and 80 percent female—for two to three months to sort the leaf and pile it in enormous cubes. Workers monitor the tobacco temperature, aiming for 40–42°C, and periodically exchange interior leaves with cooler exterior ones to prevent them from overheating and blackening. PMI exercises agency over how the entire tobacco cultivation process unfolds from a strategic distance.

PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL

Large cigarette manufacturers have increased their power and control over tobacco farmers by using each ounce of tobacco more efficiently and orchestrating a shift to contract farming. The contract farming transition represents another global tobacco technology that has gained ground alongside increasing foreign control over *kretek* capitalism. In the United States, the contract farming shift unfolded after 2004 legislation allowed the government to dismantle New Deal-era tobacco support programs by paying off active landowners with quotas (“the buyout”) and eliminating leaf production restrictions, price supports, and subsidies (Benson 2012; Griffith 2009; Kingsolver 2011). Contract farming was introduced in tobacco-dependent Malawi in 2012, where it replaced a noncompetitive and monopolistic auction system through which leaf-buying companies colluded to suppress prices and paid substantial bribes for tobacco contracts and legislative influence (Otañez and Graen 2014). Under PMI, Sampoerna has been converting its Indonesian tobacco leaf buying from a multilayered open market system to contract farming through its main leaf supplier, PT Sadhana Arifnusa. Sadhana is a ramified family business owned by the descendants of Liem Swie Hwa, the firstborn son of Sampoerna founder Liem Seeng Tee. In 2011, Sampoerna sourced 12 percent of its leaf from contract farmers, but by 2015, this figure reached 70 percent, and Sadhana had contracts with over twenty-seven thousand farmers. As competition to recruit and retain contract tobacco farmers increased, leaf buyers and cigarette manufacturers expanded to new areas.⁹

Sampoerna and Sadhana representatives publicly frame the contract farming shift as a win-win situation benefiting all parties. From this upbeat perspective, farmers enjoy a more secure market and produce neither too much nor too little tobacco; leaf suppliers and cigarette manufacturers ensure the “sustainability” of tobacco, which must compete with food crops that the government favors and subsidizes; more stringent “product integrity” oversight mechanisms better shield consumers from the worst pesticide residues and non-tobacco related material

(NTRM) like plastics; and agricultural laborers are better protected by safety equipment and training, labor monitoring, and the introduction of labor-saving techniques to mitigate child labor risks. Under its Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) program, introduced in 2002, and in response to rising NGO critique, PMI developed the Agricultural Labor Practices (ALP) Code in 2011 based on the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and related ILO conventions. The code covers child labor, income and work hours, fair treatment, forced labor and human trafficking, work environment safety, freedom of association, and terms of employment.¹⁰ Contracts are supposed to facilitate PMI's third-party monitoring of suppliers and farmers, but critics question how well the code is upheld and enforced. Although PMI (2020, 66) claims "the right to terminate contracts immediately in cases of severe violations impacting people, the crop, or the environment," its softer expectation that suppliers "continuously improve the implementation of GAP principles and standards" suggests a more tolerant approach, while the downward pressure the company exerts on tobacco prices discourages adherence to minimum wage regulations.

These specific shortcomings in PMI's labor practices come in the context of a broader set of concerns regarding the political economy of contract farming. Contract farming often exacerbates unequal relations by reducing competition among buyers, weakening farmers' bargaining position, and rendering farmers vulnerable to termination by buyers who can always claim that they have fallen short of contractual obligations (Little and Watts 1994). Contracts tend to promote land concentration and to push out small producers by favoring those who scale up and mechanize. Further, contracts deskill farmers, who relinquish substantial control over what seeds they plant, when they plant, and how they tend and process their crops.

Even as PMI sponsors tobacco farmers' protests over Indonesian government measures to increase cigarette taxes and protect public health, the company has been reducing the amount of tobacco in an average cigarette and strategically distancing itself from the tobacco plant. Innovations like "puffed" and "reconstituted" tobacco manipulate and make ever more efficient use of the plant. As noted in the introduction, Indonesia's cigarette market has seen growing sales of machine-rolled filtered cigarettes that weigh one gram or less, while the market for heavier hand-rolled kretek that contain more tobacco has declined. PMI has been publicly positioning itself as the frontrunner in an industry race to corner the market in novel nicotine technologies, in the process marginalizing the tobacco plant. PMI claims to be building a future "on smoke-free products that are a much better choice than cigarette smoking" with the vision "that these products will one day replace cigarettes."¹¹ In this future, tobacco leaves, along with conventional cigarettes, are stigmatized and marked for obsolescence. PMI markets some of its next-generation products as "tobacco-free," despite the fact that they contain nicotine

“extracted from tobacco leaves.”¹² PMI is thus growing less dependent on tobacco and stretching it further, even as it exercises tighter control over leaf suppliers and tobacco farmers through contracts. PMI’s decreased dependence and increased control both work to reduce the power and influence of leaf buyers and especially farmers, making them more precarious and more exploited.

LEAF BUYERS AND TRADERS

Sadhana is heavily dependent on Sampoerna, which has its pick of alternative domestic and international leaf suppliers. Aidan, a white Sadhana manager from South Africa, told me that the company sold 97 percent of its product to Sampoerna, understatedly adding, “Honestly, it’s not good to have Sampoerna as our almost exclusive client.” Robert, a white Sadhana agricultural operations manager from Zimbabwe, tied his more blunt and dour assessment of the relation between the companies to the global asymmetry between leaf buyers and cigarette manufacturers. Claiming that the world’s largest leaf buyers earn a small fraction in annual profits compared to the billions enjoyed by BAT and PMI, he vehemently declared, “It’s not a balanced industry. I don’t have much love for Big Tobacco, even though that sounds hypocritical. You can’t see the chain around my neck, but I can assure you it’s there. Philip Morris is a large shareholder- and profit-driven company with no feel for the farmers.” The result, he explained, was a cascade of exploitation: “Philip Morris squeezes the merchants, like Sadhana, and they squeeze farmers, and they have no choice.” PMI squeezes Sadhana not only on price but also on quality and environmental and social responsibilities, which Robert grumbled are “yet another cost of business that gets pushed onto leaf buyers.”¹³

Despite their own misgivings, leaf-buying managers nevertheless dismissed as misguided farmers’ frequent complaints about low prices. They attributed the unprofitable nature of tobacco farming to various technical deficiencies that could be corrected by closely adhering to their requirements and counsel rather than an effect of structural inequalities (Kurian 2020). Imron, a manager in Madura for leaf buyer Alliance One, claimed that farmers ought to focus on expenditures and profits rather than obsess over price. “I say profit, not price!” he drilled, explaining that he urges farmers to consider their COP (cost of production), reduce water usage, minimize tillage, rent trucks collectively, and avoid agents. “But frankly,” he admitted, “we don’t pay them a high price.” Echoing this rhetoric, financial management was the central theme of a Sadhana manager’s PowerPoint presentation to contract farmers in Malang. Fuad urged them to invest their 2015 profits as capital for 2016 and to control their labor costs by mechanizing, among other practices. Mocking their “obsession” with “price, price, price,” he counseled, “Think instead about increasing your productivity and controlling your expenditures.” Sadhana’s Lumajang regional manager instructed technicians to encourage farmers to use family labor and to be present in their fields with workers so they would not stop

to smoke and chat. He gathered farmers to agree on a worker pay ceiling, exclaiming, “You can’t pay workers 50,000 rupiah a day because you’re afraid about not getting enough workers.”¹⁴ Managers thus equivocate, sometimes blaming farmers for being insufficiently savvy in handling their capital, inputs, and labor and at other times admitting that prices are simply too low to justify tobacco production—not only for farmers but for leaf suppliers, too.

At every stage of cultivation and curing, contract farming imposes precisely specified and rigidly enforced requirements on farmers for an already demanding crop. To be contract eligible, farmers must own or rent sufficient land to meet Sadhana’s regional minimum acreage. Sadhana tells farmers which variety they must plant and when. Fuad made an example of one farmer at the Malang meeting by loudly admonishing him for planting after the cutoff date, warning that Sadhana wouldn’t buy from him next year if he didn’t adhere to the schedule. He also rebuffed farmers’ requests to use their preferred seed variety the following year, insisting that such decisions rested with company leadership. Since Indonesia placed a moratorium on seed imports, Sadhana contracted US-based Gold Leaf Seeds to carry out the labor-intensive work of developing hybrid Virginia seed with sterile males to prevent farmers from producing their own seeds, which Robert cast as “a quality control and assurance mechanism.” Imron asserted that Alliance One’s efforts to get farmers to shift from “traditional” to “standard” practices started with seedbeds. The company tried to rectify farmers’ purported deficiencies by creating demonstration seedbeds and instructing farmers to prepare similar flat, one-by-ten-meter seedbeds rather than using irregular-shaped, sloping (*miring*) plots of land.

Serving as the primary intermediaries between leaf buyer and tobacco farmers, Sadhana’s field technicians bear responsibility for imparting PMI’s requirements and ensuring that they are met. Sampoerna claimed 177 field technicians working with 27,439 contract tobacco farmers in 2019. After the COVID-19 pandemic shrank the cigarette market and Sampoerna lost market share to budget brands, these numbers fell to 112 field technicians and 21,356 contract farmers in 2021 (Sampoerna 2022, 109). Farmers identified technicians as *petugas lapangan* or PL, the same term used for government agricultural extension agents such as those who had promoted the Green Revolution several decades earlier during the Suharto administration. Technicians may present as “listeners, friends and educators” and deploy the idioms and practices of public extension, but they work to promote private industry interests rather than being “invested in the broader mission of rural transformation, community development, poverty alleviation and social justice” that ostensibly motivates state PL (Aga 2019, 10). Technicians are all men and typically get around by motorbike, making them more approachable to farmers of modest means and allowing them to drive rather than walk to fields along narrow, muddy, and slippery dike paths. Technicians recruit farmers to tobacco, visit their fields and homes, demonstrate approved techniques, troubleshoot problems, and

sometimes pitch in and help them with various stages of cultivation. One technician recounted how farmers' insistent hospitality forced him to drink as many as seven cups of coffee in a day, leaving his hands shaking. Relations between farmers and technicians may be warm and friendly, but they are rooted in a hierarchy in which technicians, along with regional managers, assert and enforce PMI and Sadhana's requirements.

Field technicians often have agricultural degrees and are positioned as more knowledgeable than farmers whom they coach and lecture. This guidance begins with the work of planting and growing tobacco. Technicians encourage farmers to make large ridges with soft, well-aerated topsoil to promote drainage and root development before transplanting. They also instruct farmers to plant seedlings of similar size together so they will be ready to harvest around the same time and to uniformly space seedlings by tying knots in a rope tethered to stakes that can be inserted at each end of a row. Technicians tell farmers which inputs they should use and which are forbidden and instruct them to use spoons rather than hands to achieve a uniform fertilizer dose and to apply fertilizer close to roots. Robert insisted that Sadhana strictly controls chemicals including pesticides, using lower quantities and safer chemicals than in the past. He professed his love for the "natural" option of neem but noted its drawbacks; neem must be applied early and often, especially if it rains, demanding more labor than durable synthetic pesticides. Because neem does not instantly kill pests, farmers often question its efficacy. One speculated that neem's vile smell drives off insects. If technicians see buds sprouting on farmers' tobacco plants, they warn them that suckers curb their potential yield by fifteen kilograms per hectare per day.

Technicians' supervision extends into curing, with Sadhana telling farmers which curing methods to use and which fuels are acceptable for flue-curing. Sadhana's contract farmers near Malang initially built expensive flue-curing barns, only to be told a few years later to switch to sun-curing, which made them more weather dependent and, some found, yielded lower quality tobacco. When a technician saw tobacco falling through one farmer's bamboo trays, which had clearly seen better days, he clucked over the "lost production." Sadhana's specifications also encompass proper baling methods and materials. In Malang, growers had to stuff tobacco into collapsible wooden boxes (*pressbal*), then sew it with cotton thread into jute burlap rather than using plastic sacks. The natural materials were meant to reduce NTRM, moisture retention, mold, and chemical contamination. Sadhana issued farmers bar-coded tags to affix to each bale so they could be traced back to farmers. This, too, increases Sadhana's ability to control farmers; when, for example, the central warehouse finds NTRM contamination—including the grisly find of a human finger that Aidan dryly remarked was "rather special"—they return the offending material to technicians so they can show it to farmers. The company schedules when farmers are allowed to deliver harvests to buying stations.

Hierarchical relations are underscored by the grading system technicians use to rate farmers by loyalty and skill. Robert explained Sadhana's detailed metrics for quantifying farmers' worth:

An A farmer is very loyal, a D farmer is seen as not so loyal. They get different packets, as determined by the PL's assessment. Some just get a seedbed packet, others are eligible for much more, including loans. Each also has a skill rating: 1, 2, 3, 4. 1 is a very skillful farmer and an early technology adopter.¹⁵ The farmers build a history with the company. We also maintain records and scores for the tobacco on each visit. A score of 9 means we anticipate 2,500 kg of tobacco for fourteen thousand plants. Farmers should plant about fourteen thousand plants per hectare. . . . These estimates are important because they determine how much the farmer is expected to sell to Sadhana. Farmers are expected to sell their entire crops. We don't want a farmer coming up with more, passing off his brother's tobacco as his own. We need to ensure the integrity of the product.

To discourage "illicit side-selling" and to reward display of skills, farmers' prior performance and grade influence their quotas and the level of inputs extended to them on credit (Cockburn and Eaton 2013, 173). In Lombok, naughty farmers who "cheated" on their PL and sold to traders for a higher price were struck from the company's list.

Field technicians and their managers are in turn evaluated and compensated based on the performance of their contract growers. Technicians produce a constant stream of data documenting their activities, mentoring, troubleshooting, and yield projections, and they enjoy bonuses when the final quality and quantity of their assigned farmers' harvests is high. There is always room for improvement. "We will never achieve our targets," one regional manager noted, "and they will always be set higher."

Even more so than technicians, tobacco graders loom large for farmers as figures of extraordinary power mediating between them and the leaf-buying company. Graders judge the quality of tobacco and sometimes reject entire bales or truckloads, but they are constrained by the need to justify their decisions in relation to criteria set by the company and have no say over prices. Interactions between farmers and graders at Adi Sampoerna's imposing warehouse complex in Jember in 2015 were tense and somber after crops were compromised by months of ashfall from Gunung Raung, a nearby volcano.¹⁶ Agus, an Adi Sampoerna grader who preferred visiting farmers in their fields outside of harvest time, likened the walled warehouse environment to a prison. Once their turn arrived to back up their trucks to the unloading entrance, farmers palmed cash or cigarettes to men who unloaded their bales onto the conveyor belt to ensure they were handled with care. Workers opened bales and pulled bundles of leaves from the bales' midsection or other random spots for the grader to inspect. The grader eyed the tobacco, ran his hands over it, and inhaled its scent. Agus claimed he could smell forbidden pesticides and non-kasturi leaf varieties. Sadhana schools farmers on the range of

reasons why their tobacco might be rejected as “off-grade”: NTRM, mold, color (e.g., green or blackish-brown as opposed to the desired yellow-brown). If the appropriate grade was unclear, the grader halted the conveyor belt, rolled a cigarette from the leaf, and smoked it by a window (workers are otherwise forbidden from smoking in the dusty, dry, tinderbox-like warehouse atmosphere). To sustain their concentration, graders evaluate tobacco in two-hour shifts. The farmer’s technician would often stand beside the grader, knowing that the farmer’s harvest volume and quality would be incorporated into his own performance evaluation. A worker thrust black flags into rejected bales and green flags into those deemed “dirty” due to volcanic ash, which suffered a 10 percent price cut. In some cases, farmers could take rejected tobacco home and clean it for reevaluation. The grader rejected an entire lot belonging to one distraught farmer who had his young barefoot son in tow, perhaps to display poverty and elicit sympathy.¹⁷ Agus said farmers rarely disputed his grading evaluations in 2015 “because they feel they have no other choice. They are happy simply to have a buyer.” Even under ordinary circumstances, sellers might be reluctant to question graders’ judgements, fearing they might be struck from future rosters, although some had been known to threaten graders with violence.¹⁸

Leaf buyers emphasized the transparency of their grading process as an advantage of working with large contract suppliers rather than independent traders. Managers pointed to their use of digital scales with visible numbers, paper receipts, and instant cash or bank transfer payments. Imron said that farmers who sold outside their contracts for a seemingly higher price risked losing 5,000 rupiah here and there due to faulty weight measures, rounding, and estimation errors that were unlikely to favor them. Various transparency measures notwithstanding, there is a great deal of corruption talk and suspicion around the grading and buying process. Farmers complained that they had to pay to facilitate their transactions (*biar licin*). One Lombok farmer accused Alliance One graders of “treating contract farmers like stepchildren” and forcing them to “pay to get their bales in.” He cited one grader’s expanding irrigated land holdings as evidence of his ill-gotten gains. A Sadhana warehouse manager acknowledged that they had had to fire a security guard who was shaking down farmers the previous season. Various buyers’ tricks have their corollary in sellers’ tricks. Buyers complained that some farmers and traders added sugar, sand, soil, pebbles, and rocks to increase the weight of their tobacco.¹⁹

Similar tricks and dynamics obtain between clove farmers and traders, but the industry has sought to convert independent traders into company agents rather than contracting directly with farmers. Before they reach cigarette manufacturers’ warehouses, cloves are often transacted through a range of traders, beginning with upland traders who buy various forest commodities (e.g., coffee, cacao) and often run small retail shops and stalls out of their homes. Wayan, a shop owner in Bali who was also a member of the Sampoerna Retail Community program

that I analyze in greater detail in chapter 5, served as a Sampoerna clove buyer. He enjoyed a two-million-rupiah bonus if he met his monthly target of twenty-five tons and achieved Sampoerna's standards limiting rubbish and ensuring moisture content did not exceed 2 percent. Kadir (2017, 90–128) describes how traders in clove-harvesting regions of Maluku, who are often identified as ethnically and religiously distinct “outsiders” (for example, Chinese Indonesians), supply credit and goods to smallholders, entrapping them in debt bondage relations and coercing them to sell at below-market prices to their trading patrons to pay down outstanding debts. Large firms like Gudang Garam extend credit to successful traders, turning them into company agents. Smallholders believe they are routinely swindled by traders who collude to keep prices low and use doctored weights and deceitful weighing practices. Smallholders counter with their own tricks (e.g., adulterating the clove crop by inserting nails into clove buds before they dry to increase the weight) and by closely monitoring commodity prices and weighing practices (Kadir 2017, 169–214).

To the extent that tobacco and clove farmers perceive large tobacco buyers and traders as manipulating them and paying low prices, they blame those who are visible and in moral reach rather than the cigarette manufacturers, which source domestic and foreign tobacco and cloves as cheaply as possible (Scott 1985). In an attempt to reduce the company's tobacco dependency and the vulnerability it shares with farmers, Sadhana, like PMI, has therefore begun branching out beyond tobacco. Since 2009 in Lombok, Sadhana's “corporate policy has been to evolve into a mixed farming model entity, with tobacco comprising only part of an integrated farmer base” (Cockburn and Eaton 2013, 174). The role of the field technician has correspondingly changed. Whereas they used to discourage farmers from planting paddy (rice), some were now encouraging two crops of paddy followed by tobacco. And whereas technicians had previously served exclusively as agents for tobacco, now they promoted other commodities (paddy, soy, goats) that farmers could fall back on if they faced financial losses with tobacco. Sadhana is trying to diversify farmers and its own holdings to look beyond tobacco and safeguard the business for Sunarjo Sampoerna's sons, Edward and Andrew Sampoerna. Andrew Sampoerna pursued a master's degree in nutritional sciences at Cornell, writing a thesis on contract poultry farming. Sadhana's new approach, Robert explained, was “to manage smallholders for agriculture and not just for tobacco.” Sadhana could help farmers “grow seven tons of rice where they were only getting four tons . . . or they could grow maize or soy, which Sadhana could buy. Give them goats! A billy goat and four nanny goats, which could reproduce every eight months.” Sadhana rented fifteen hectares of land from the government for a training center where the company conducted agricultural trials with government and university partners. They had set up trial tobacco fields and curing barns producing cured leaf for smoking panels, but the company was also experimenting with goat breeding, vermiculture, and vermicomposting to improve the microbic status of soil,

breeding deer for forest release, growing elephant grass for goat feed and turi trees for tobacco curing, and establishing rice fields where Sadhana runs experiments on different varieties and growing techniques (e.g., direct sowing rather than bedding and transplanting). Sadhana also purchased a combine harvester and tractor that it rented out to tobacco farmers during paddy season. In its mechanization and diversification efforts, Sadhana sent consultants far afield, for example to West Papua to explore whether the region could be “the next rice bowl.” By pushing into new regions, they sought pliant farmers and geographical diversification that would secure the company’s supply chain against the threat of calamities such as Raung’s volcanic eruption.

FARMERS

Beyond the structural hierarchy in which tobacco farmers are subordinate to leaf buyers, who in turn are subordinate to cigarette manufacturers, farmers also describe a sense of subjugation to tobacco itself. They characterize the crop as fussy and demanding (*repot*), difficult (*susah*), and complex (*ribet*) due to its extravagant and burdensome claims on their time, space, labor, and capital. During tobacco harvesting and curing, the modest homes of farmers often overflow with tobacco in various stages of processing and packing, displacing furniture and people from porches and interior rooms. This spatial overflow echoes the crop’s temporal overflow; tobacco colonizes and consumes farmers’ time and thoughts as well as their domestic spaces. Farmers in Madura told us that they organize their lives around the season; if someone wants to build a house, hold some life-event celebration (*hajatan*), or even get sick, they must wait until after the tobacco harvest. Robert described it as a “touchy-feely crop,” demanding “drudgery, slavery almost,” with labor “performed precisely on time. You can’t go away for four days because a relative has died. In the meantime, your four-dollar tobacco becomes fifty-cent tobacco.”²⁰

Under the kretek nationalist narrative that shapes their participation in national protests, tobacco farmers are proud producers of a national heritage commodity and vital participants in a prosperous industry whose benefits accrue to the whole nation. Yet many of the farmers I spoke to—the following pages focus in particular on Syamsul, a former tobacco farmer in Lombok—provided a dissenting account of the rural subjects produced by kretek capitalism, one that emphasized the reality of subjugation, risk, and demanding labor.

Because of tobacco, lots of farmers have gone to Saudi Arabia or Malaysia as migrant laborers or sold their paddy land. Lots of farmers have hung themselves, killed themselves, drunk poison. Some suffered strokes. They looked around and saw everyone planting tobacco and thought, “I need to plant tobacco too!” They weren’t prepared. They calculated how much they would make, but they only calculated the profits. They went straight to planting five hectares. Then it rained. They started



FIGURE 5. A farmer feeds tobacco into a cutting machine while workers prepare it for sun-curing. Photo by author.

taking flashlights with them to fish in the middle of the day, pretending they had gone crazy so their creditors wouldn't try to collect. They didn't dare go home at night because they were sixty million rupiah in debt. If you always did well with tobacco, then houses around here would be three stories high. There are cases, though, of four or five family members in one house going on the hajj.

The allure of wealth and even a pilgrimage to Mecca attracted farmers to the crop even as the debt-ridden removed themselves from their homes and communities by pretending to be mentally ill, migrating, or committing suicide. The irrational tobacco farmer has emerged as a figure of both official tobacco control discourse and popular concern and serves as a foil for former tobacco farmers like Syamsul who claim it is rational to quit growing tobacco.

The World Bank uses statistics to paint an abject portrait of the average Indonesian tobacco farmer: a poor, middle-aged male with no more than five years of schooling.²¹ Seventy percent of Indonesian tobacco farming households live in poverty. Clove farmer demographics are similar.²² Tobacco farmers like Ibrahim in Malang, who owned 7.5 hectares (large by Indonesian standards though small in comparison to US norms), were outliers. Many tobacco farmers we encountered rented land or owned very small tracts. In Madura, the so-called zero point (*noll komma*) farmer with less than a hectare to his name was so common that Sadhana contracted with groups rather than with individual farmers, since most produced insufficient tobacco alone to warrant a cutting machine. The World Bank

found that compared to former tobacco farmers, current tobacco farmers generally had lower income, worse housing conditions, higher levels of food insecurity, and higher reliance on government benefits and social assistance such as rice-for-the-poor programs (Markus 2015; World Bank 2017, 29–33). Cigarette companies appear to concur with this assessment; they promote budget brands in tobacco-growing regions except during harvest when they briefly hawk expensive (“premium”) brands to rapidly relieve farmers of their cash influx. The World Bank (2017, 17) attributes Indonesia’s import of 30 to 40 percent of the tobacco it consumes to the “fact that tobacco farming may not be a lucrative endeavor for many farmers and does not attract enough farmers willing to undertake this agro-economic endeavor to satisfy domestic demand.”

Against this backdrop of diminishing economic prospects, tobacco control efforts that target farmers often revolve around demonstrating that the crop is unprofitable and that farmers fail to fully account for its costs. A Tobacco Atlas graphic, for example, shows profits and losses before and after being adjusted for labor costs, implying that farmers overlook these costs.²³ Showing minor losses or miniscule profits before factoring in labor and large losses once adjusted for labor costs, it makes the Indonesian tobacco farmer appear irrational indeed. Tobacco control proponents chide farmers for neglecting to assign a commodity value to familial labor, which could be hired elsewhere, and land, which could be rented out, and incorporating these values into their calculations. Farmers who perform their own labor may be motivated to save money or avoid the hassle of organizing workers for less labor-intensive cultivation stages like seedbed planting and maintenance. Some top plants or stoke ovens because they mistrust workers with these skilled and high-stakes tasks. The World Bank concluded that Indonesian tobacco farmers across all regions typically spent more on cultivation than the revenue they generated, underestimated the characteristically high cost of tobacco inputs, required loans, and faced high opportunity costs because tobacco prevented them from engaging in other economic activities. “Nearly 90% of farmers miscalculated their costs by more than 25%, and the average miscalculation was more than 50%” (World Bank 2017b, 9). The World Bank similarly found that “realized profits” from clove farming are often negligible or negative (2017a, 33).

Syamsul invoked such miscalculations to distinguish himself from his peers who were “lazy about taking notes” and unable to identify their weaknesses. “We should calculate our gas, our cigarettes, our labor, our land even if we own it. We could instead be renting the land to someone else, or planting something else. Then, if we’re not profiting on paper, why bother?” Syamsul began contracting with Sadhana in 1996, and at the height of his tobacco farming, he planted eleven hectares and operated seven flue-curing barns. Syamsul grounded his tobacco exit narrative in the observation that tobacco prices were failing to keep pace with the rising cost of inputs. Renting land had become too expensive and too competitive, and laborers who used to work for 25,000 rupiah a day now cost

60,000 rupiah—70,000 once you added their meal, afternoon snack, and coffee. “Workers are the bosses now, competing with one another to purchase cows after harvest. They have to be paid right away, before their sweat has dried, rather than at the end of the season.” After he ceased planting in 2012, a Sadhana field technician, manager, and grader all showed up at his house to find out why this A1-rated (loyal and skillful) farmer was quitting. “You shouldn’t have to ask,” he reproached, then pulled out the Excel spreadsheets meticulously documenting his expenditures and income and a pattern of meager profits or actual losses. Conceding the logic of his decision, the Sadhana representatives requested that he kindly not share his calculations with neighbors, since doing so might also deter them from planting tobacco.

Farmers evoked the irrational tobacco farmer identity in ways that were shaming and self-deprecating but also humorous. “We used to just plant a lot of tobacco,” one Lombok farmer dolefully admitted, “never calculating our expenditures.” In Madura, we heard that “fanatical farmers don’t calculate,” behaving as loyal tobacco soldiers who force themselves to produce tobacco even when it is clearly unprofitable. When World Bank (2017, 27) researchers queried a farmer about falling prices, he insisted, “Farmers here must not have that thought and they keep cultivating tobacco no matter what. . . . In any situation, no matter what, whether we suffer from loss or get advantage and profit, we keep cultivating. We are motivated to cultivate. We keep our spirit.” Fauzi, a tobacco farmer in Madura, presented himself as both fanatical and calculating. He considered and measured all his life choices, whether calculating the optimal age to have kids so as to be able to play with one’s grandchildren or taking careful note of each time he or a family member visited the tobacco field to perform some task. He recounted in lavish detail his 2015 tobacco expenditures and income, when the weather was good and he produced an ample, healthy crop. His narrative culminated in a pious expression of gratitude to God before he pronounced the season a bust due to low prices (*Alhamdulillah . . . rugi!*). In other seasons, he made a slender (*tipis*) profit margin, such as 300,000 rupiah after months of work. “Who knows,” he said, “maybe next season will be highly profitable!” Although he played up his irrational attachment to tobacco, he was in fact becoming more hesitant about tobacco farming; he had reduced the land he devoted to the crop, as had other members of his farmers’ group. Yet even if he suffered a net loss from cultivating tobacco, he still profited from a tobacco-centered side gig; due to his charisma and leadership, he served as a brand ambassador for Sampoerna Hijau under a community program we will return to in chapter 4. Sampoerna awarded him a ten-million-rupiah prize for his stellar marketing work.

Compared to conservative, subsistence-oriented food crops, tobacco has long been a risky, speculative, commercial boom-and-bust crop that promises riches while threatening ruin. Madurese farmers recalled how windfalls of bygone years had prompted wildly extravagant and absurd consumption practices. Mohamed

said Javanese merchants streamed into the island with mattresses, cars, and motor-bikes for sale. “We bought the lot, without even bothering to bargain. Before we had electricity, some bought refrigerators and stored their clothes in them! Farmers were so wealthy, they used Sprite instead of water to wash their hands!” His son, Burhan, recalled that when prices were high, it seemed you could easily convert five hundred thousand rupiah into five million. “It was hard not to obsess over the fortune you’d make if you only had more land and more capital.” In Madura, a profusion of pawn shops take advantage of farmers’ need for credit, and gold shops run a brisk trade by selling jewelry to tobacco farmers after harvest and then buying it back when they require capital for planting.

The very riskiness of tobacco once made growing it a display of masculine skill and daring in tobacco growing regions, to the point that farmers’ masculinity was questioned if they did not plant it. The term *farmer* (*petani*) is predominantly applied to male figures in nuclear or extended family households who play a public and conspicuous role in interacting with field technicians and securing land, labor, contracts, and the sale of the crop, even as their wives often play a significant decision-making role and may contribute their own labor depending on the age of their children, their economic means, and competing activities. Some tended tobacco seedbeds, hoed, operated cutting machines, cured tobacco, and prepared food and beverages for workers. During harvest season, it was easy to spot the more active, hands-on farmers because their clothes and hands were soiled black with sticky tobacco residue that is hard to remove once it builds up.

Some farmers now sought to redefine tobacco growing as a sign of irrational alterity rather than normative agrarian masculinity and as an ultimately emasculating pursuit in which leaf buyers toyed with and manipulated farmers (Prentice 2020). In contrast to old-fashioned (*kuno*) tobacco farmers, Syamsul declared himself a modern, cool (*keren*), enterprising farmer who, having turned to hydroponics, organic agriculture, and aquaculture with a freshwater catfish (*ikan lele*) operation that sold to restaurants, served as an example for others. Among a relatively well-off farmers’ group we met in Madura, only one of thirty-seven farmers was planting tobacco, although all had formerly done so. This outlier looked sheepish as his peers ribbed him for *still* planting tobacco. Another member spoke passionately about following the example of Balinese farmers by planting organic rice for export to Europe and offered to give his peers a tutorial on making organic fertilizer. “Now I’m done with the crop,” Burhan concluded. “I stopped planting five years ago. I was tired of leaf buyers’ games. They conspire to lower the price of tobacco. The golden plant is now a weed. I can plant other crops like watermelon, cucumbers, corn, sesame. Or even bonsai, which was hot for a while.”

Natural and anthropogenic disasters throw tobacco farmers’ risks into sharp relief and lead to condemnation of buyers, traders, and state actors who fail to help them. In 2015, after several months of ash fall from the Gunung Raung volcano, leaf buyers completely refused or paid only pitifully low prices for tobacco in the

Jember region. Contract farmers fared somewhat better, since leaf buyers still purchased their leaf, if at a significant discount due to its purportedly compromised quality. Independent farmers like Achmad, whose wife had lost her job at a Sam-poerna hand-rolling plant that closed in 2014, were especially hard hit. He invoked the Chinese racial scapegoating stereotypes that periodically appear in times of economic turmoil and license anti-Chinese violence and spoke with naked envy of contract farming peers (Kusno 2003; Sai 2006; Siegel 1998; Strassler 2010, 2019):

They have it good because they still have their daddies [contract companies] to turn to. Farmers like me are hard up. We're suffering from a conspiracy. Those who buy are Chinese, those who plant are black.²⁴ A group of us rented fifteen trucks to take our harvest to a warehouse. We were turned away, and then had to pay for the truck rental! If we could just find a willing buyer, we wouldn't care how little we were paid, how unfair and exploitative the price. Under these economic conditions, married couples are getting separated. Motorbikes and chickens are being stolen. There's unrest and insecurity.

Farmers widely complained about being manipulated by leaf buyers, but many were also angry at politicians who they felt should have offered assistance. They protested by burning tobacco. Jember is renowned for its fine cigar leaf (*na oogst*), which is mostly destined for export, and the Jember regency government promotes and celebrates tobacco, which is incorporated into the regional government symbol, batik textiles, regional costume, and dance. Feeling that this show of cultural support proved to be a sham in farmers' time of need, some farmers demanded that the leaf be removed from the region's flag.

La Niña unleashed a wet dry season (*kemarau basah*) in 2016 that had many tobacco farmers reliving the nightmarish 2010 season. Indonesia's tobacco yield fell by over a third from 2015 to 2016 as tobacco plants had no stress period and rampant weeds sprang up in the moist soil and absorbed fertilizers intended for tobacco plants.²⁵ Farmers hired extra workers to weed and hoe even as the potential quantity and quality of their crop deteriorated. In Lombok and Java, some could hardly face fields inundated by river water that also deposited sand and trash. Haji Ramli's crop in Lombok was additionally threatened by the tobacco mosaic virus, and he was trying to grow more seedlings to replace afflicted plants.²⁶ A loyal Sadhana contract farmer for twenty years, he had experienced a personal calamity the previous year when his barn caught fire in the midst of flue-curing, incinerating forty-five million rupiah's worth of tobacco within a half hour. "My kids cried, but I didn't. Profit or loss, you have to laugh," he stoically insisted.

While farmers might withstand a calamitous season or two, many saw an unacceptable trend of increasing costs and declining prices that prompted them, like Fauzi, to reduce growing tobacco or even to cease doing so altogether. Even a regional leader of the Indonesian Tobacco Farmers Association reduced his crop to eight hundred plants in 2015 and made the fortuitous decision to not plant in

2016. He also told us delicately that he was currently not smoking, because of a strange sensation on his tongue. In Lombok, abandoned and repurposed flue-curing barns bear striking testimony to farmers' quitting the crop. Some left the structures standing after they stopped growing or rented them to neighbors, while others used them for storage (*gudang*), converted them into shops, or, in a few cases, destroyed them after incurring large debts and left the rubble in a heap to remind themselves to never again plant the crop.

Indonesia's tobacco farmers face numerous challenges: debt, climate change, limited land, a lack of political bargaining power, and an aging workforce. These challenges will not be resolved by simply planting other crops, but farmers' ability to do so is an advantage from a tobacco control perspective. Most Indonesian tobacco farmers do not need to be introduced to "alternative" crops, because they are already skilled at cultivating them. The term *tobacco farmer* (*petani tembakau*) is in fact misleading, insofar as it implies that tobacco is the sole or main crop that farmers cultivate. Those who own their own land (or rent annually rather than seasonally) typically also produce paddy, Indonesia's staple crop. The tropical climate allows farmers to double or triple crop, often planting paddy during the wet season (roughly November through March) and tobacco during the dry season (roughly April through October) on a single plot of land. In regions with higher rainfall and on irrigated land, they may grow two crops of paddy followed by tobacco in a single year, while on dryer land, farmers may grow three different crops, such as paddy, tobacco, and corn. In more arid regions, farmers plant and harvest tobacco earlier and are typically limited to producing two crops a year. In fertile (*subur*) areas such as Lumajang or Blitar, farmers have multiple crop options, and leaf buyers must compete with alternative crops (e.g., sweet potatoes, chili, beans, tomatoes), whereas in dryer regions such as Madura or Jember, farmers identify as more tobacco dependent, "living and dying" (*hidup mati*) on the crop's fortunes. Even in the latter regions, however, farmers have found alternatives and have begun to reject tobacco farming as a mainstay.

Recognizing tobacco's labor-intensive and high-risk characteristics, many farmers are abandoning the crop, while those who remain are often hesitant and ambivalent about continuing to plant it. Facing such challenging conditions, Sadhana manager Robert complained that he couldn't exploit Lombok's real potential for tobacco agriculture, which he compared favorably to North Carolina's:

Now it's getting more and more difficult to find farmers. It used to be I could go outside and ring a bell to find tobacco farmers and they would all line up. Now I could ring the bell all day and wouldn't find one. Where there's good water, they tend to grow other crops. They probably don't feel they make enough of a profit. . . . In the south and east farmers are growing it because they can't grow anything else.

Yet despite the palpable sense of despair and decline in 2016, tobacco production across Indonesia subsequently rebounded and rose to new heights, reaching

nearly 270,000 tons in 2019.²⁷ This turnaround reflects the industry's persistent ability—despite Robert's pessimism—to recruit new farmers and to recapture hesitant tobacco farmers and renouncers.

Sampoerna has also sought to extend clove farming into new regions to manage widespread hesitancy among clove farmers who regard cloves as an unreliable plant and commodity. The trees cycle through bumper, ordinary, and small harvest years (*panen raya*, *panen sedang*, *panen kecil*), and small harvest years yield only about 20 percent of larger harvests. To produce a good crop, clove trees must be healthy from their roots up, but they are susceptible to protracted dry spells, worms that bore through trunks, and a virus that causes leaves to yellow and wither from the top down. Some farmers apply pesticides against worm infestations, while Sampoerna urges farmers to coat the lower trunks with dolomite lime. Protracted rain and humid conditions can lead to mold that lays waste to harvests during the three-to-five-day period when cloves are supposed to dry in the sun. Cloves are vulnerable to theft at multiple stages of production. An absentee plantation owner in Jombang, East Java, remarked that stealing was common in the region, with thieves picking clean the lower tree branches. When cloves are drying on roadside tarps, thieves can pull over with a car, snatch up the tarp with its contents, and throw it in their vehicle. Stored cloves can also be stolen by thieves who are stealthy or adept at using magic to paralyze people in their homes and steal from right under their noses.

Cloves are also subject to dramatic price fluctuations. In the 1920s, Indonesia went from being a net clove exporter to importer, with the kretek industry making it the largest consumer of the aromatic spice. An Indonesian government clove intensification program in the 1960s encouraged uplanders across the archipelago to cultivate clove trees. Clove prices peaked in 1979 in real terms, then precipitously declined as supplies rose and the government sought to maintain a floor price (Bulbeck et al. 1998, 21). In 1991, the Indonesian government authorized the creation of the Clove Support and Marketing Agency (Badan Penyangga Pemasaran Cengkeh, BPPC) ostensibly to raise prices for smallholders and stabilize supply. In practice, the agency served as a middleman monopoly, conferring exclusive rights to buy and sell cloves on an agency chaired by the president's son, Tommy Suharto (Hutomo Mandala Putra). President Suharto forced the central bank to finance the BPPC to the tune of \$350 million, which appalled the Indonesian technocrats and international agencies attempting to set the country on a deregulatory course. The usually politically quiescent Association of Indonesian Cigarette Companies (GAPPRI, Gabungan Perserikatan Pabrik Rokok Indonesia) vociferously opposed the clove monopoly, arguing that it would result in higher cigarette prices, reduced sales, job losses, and decreased government revenues. As the BPPC indeed raised clove prices for buyers, cigarette manufacturers experimented with reducing clove content in cigarettes and used up existing stocks rather than buying

from the agency, which became notorious for high prices and low quality. As clove supplies rose and prices fell, upset farmers, unable to find willing buyers, chopped down their trees and planted alternative crops (Hanusz 2000, 54–70; Schwarz 2000, 153–57). In 1998, as Suharto's hold over power was eroding, the International Monetary Fund forced his administration to disband the BPPC as part of a suite of deregulatory reform measures (Linebaugh 1998). Today, Indonesia is the world's largest clove producer, harvesting roughly one hundred thousand tons of cloves annually, 90 percent of which go into kretek (World Bank 2017, 11). Indonesia also imports cloves from Zanzibar and Madagascar, where agricultural life is punctuated by boom-and-bust commodity cycles tied to the distant fortunes of the kretek industry (Sodikoff 2012; Tilghman 2019).

Clove farmer hesitancy manifests in decisions to gradually reduce their investment by felling trees and not replacing dead ones. Uplanders typically grow clove trees alongside other cash crops including commercial wood (e.g., sengon), bananas, coffee, cacao, palm trees, durian, and non-tree crops such as sugar cane, shallots, chilis, paddy, and sweet potatoes. Even APCI leaders, who are among the most vocal and stalwart industry supporters, do not necessarily treat cloves as a mainstay. The organization's treasurer, for example, cultivated various crops on two mountainous hectares in East Java she inherited from her father, a former APCI leader who planted 418 trees in the 1980s, of which only about a hundred remained. Many of the remaining trees were afflicted by a virus. The provincial leader of APCI in Bali admitted that his family could not live on clove trees alone. He was down to 150 trees on 1.5 hectares. His family had chopped down two hundred trees after the BPPC precipitated a clove price plummet in the early 1990s. He planned to maintain the clove trees his parents had planted but did not envision adding any more, animatedly hyping bananas as a more lucrative investment that promised quicker returns. Whereas clove trees require seven years or more to begin flowering and can remain productive for seven decades or more, banana trees fruit six months after planting, can be harvested every two weeks, and produce well for about ten years.

Tobacco and cloves only partially constitute farmer identities and livelihoods, easing their partial or wholesale exit. Tobacco farming is temporally demarcated as a primarily dry-season activity on land where rice and other crops are grown outside of the tobacco season. Farmers may decide to not plant tobacco this year or to plant less than last year. Because years elapse between clove tree planting and harvesting, decisions to plant, maintain, fell, or replace trees entail longer-term investments and consequences. At the same time, clove farming is typically partial in terms of land use since clove farmers tend to plant other tree and non-tree crops. Kretek nationalists tend to misrepresent the activities and identities of tobacco and clove farmers as totalizing attachments rather than in their actuality as temporally and spatially partial, and often ambivalent, commitments.

WAGE LABOR

A profound ambivalence also runs through the discourse of tobacco growers, manufacturers, and promoters around the agricultural labor required to produce tobacco. On the one hand, they point to the creation of rural employment opportunities as an important industry virtue in Indonesia, a “labor surplus nation” with a long-standing pattern of jobless growth and urban migration (Li 2014, 2–3). Pro-tobacco groups, one Sampoerna executive conceded, even resort to wildly exaggerating the number of farmers and laborers involved in the industry. On the other hand, boasts about tobacco’s employment-generating capacity sit in tension with the seasonal and low-paid nature of tobacco work, the unappealing working conditions and difficulty sourcing workers, and an industry drive to decrease production prices and increase the use of time- and labor-saving chemicals and machines. Tobacco, one of the plantation crops most indelibly associated with slavery, continues to garner attention for the harmful and exploitative conditions of its production. NGOs have focused their attention on child labor, motivating leaf buyers and cigarette manufacturers to implement education programs and defend themselves against accusations of child labor in their supply chains. Yet the focus on child labor conveniently obscures the unfair pay and often hazardous conditions under which the mostly feminized and aging adult workforce labors.

Child labor in commercial tobacco cultivation provides a contemporary lightning rod for global NGO critique of the industry. Human Rights Watch published a lengthy report on child labor in US tobacco agriculture in 2014 and a similarly damning report on child labor in Indonesia two years later. Many of the underaged laborers the NGO interviewed in the United States were children of immigrants, and few worked on family farms (Human Rights Watch 2014). In Indonesia, by contrast, the organization found that children typically worked on family or neighbors’ farms (Human Rights Watch 2016). While the social dynamics of child labor diverged, Human Rights Watch pronounced effects of tobacco labor on child health and development similarly harmful (see also International Labor Organization 2007a, 2007b).

The claim that children should not engage in such forms of labor turns on understandings of the child as a special biological and social category of person. Biologically, they “are uniquely vulnerable to the adverse effects of toxic exposures as their brains and bodies are still developing, and they consume more water and food, and breathe more air, pound for pound, than adults” (Human Rights Watch 2014, 49). Socially, NGOs conventionally depict children’s sovereignty and agency as still limited and developing; they fall into the category of dependents rather than autonomous subjects.

In her ethnographic study of child tobacco laborers in Lombok, Amigó argues that conventional NGO perspectives on child labor overlook local cultural perspectives and economic realities and universalize an idealized conception of

childhood as a separate stage of life devoted to education and play that originated among the middle and upper classes in industrializing Western Europe and the United States (Eberhardt 2006; Nieuwenhuys 1996; Stephens 1995; Zelizer 1985). Children, Amigó asserts, “must be researched as active economic agents and the extent to which they are autonomous must be the subject of research rather than simply assumed” (2010, 45). She found that Sasak child tobacco laborers made decisions about when, for whom, and on which tasks they worked and how they allocated their earnings (similarly, see Li 2014, 64–65). They typically contribute the bulk of their wages to the household but also reserve money for themselves for snacks and larger consumption items (e.g., bicycles, stereos, schoolbooks, and clothes). They engaged in borrowing, lending, and even formed rotating credit associations (*arisan*).

Like other sectors of the Indonesian rural economy, Amigó observes, tobacco cultivation is organized into subtasks with age and gender associations that naturalize relations of power as inherent skills. Women and children occupy subordinate positions in labor hierarchies and perform lower-paid tasks associated with patience and carefulness, while men’s work is valorized, and higher pay is justified, for involving greater strength and risk. Tying tobacco leaves to bamboo poles (*gelanting*), for example, is a dull, piece-rate task that involves hours of squatting and is performed almost exclusively by children. Unlike harvesting leaves, which workers typically start early in the morning, leaf tying is also a task that can be performed after school, in the shade, by groups of children. Syamsul told us that most farmers use child labor and that light work like tying leaves was especially appropriate for children. Consistent with Amigó’s claim about children exercising agency, he described kids appearing unbidden in his yard, commencing tasks, and attempting to trick him by tying fewer leaves onto a pole than expected and stretching them out.

PMI pledged to eliminate all child labor from the tobacco supply chain since creating its Agricultural Labor Practices (ALP) code in 2011. The code’s fine print is more complicated, disallowing “hazardous” work for anyone under the age of eighteen but allowing—in developing countries where permitted, pursuant to ILO Convention 138—those as young as fourteen, or twelve in the case of family farms, to perform light agricultural labor. In Madura, Imron showed us that Alliance One collected data and conducted random checks to ensure that children were attending school. (The warehouse was not selling to PMI at the time, but Imron explained that being attentive to the ALP code made them ready to do so.) Sadhana field staff told me that they talked to farmers about keeping children out of tobacco or at least limiting their involvement to after-school hours and activities that minimized chemical exposure. But as a leaf-buying manager put it in an exasperated outburst, “Sadhana can’t watch the farmers twenty-four hours a day!” Human Rights Watch hammered home this point in its report, insisting that

companies like PMI could not ensure that their tobacco supply chain was free of hazardous child labor. The NGO credited PMI, among the companies it examined, for appearing “to have taken the greatest number of steps to be transparent about its human rights policies and monitoring procedures, including by publishing on its website its own progress reports as well as several detailed reports by third party monitors” but went on to castigate the company for failing to impose meaningful penalties and sanctions on those who continued to use child labor (Human Rights Watch 2016, 18, 96).

Sampoerna’s corporate social responsibility education initiatives are strategically designed to discourage child labor with programs “heavily concentrated in the areas where the company sources tobacco and cloves” (Sampoerna 2015, 22). Beginning in 2013, Sampoerna has devoted space each year in its annual reports to chronicling these initiatives and enumerating the dozens of schools and thousands of teachers, headmasters, children, and parents the company’s pedagogy has touched while expanding from the tobacco-growing regions of East Java, Madura, and Lombok to the clove-growing regions of Sulawesi. Sampoerna has also altered and refined the nature and content of these programs, sponsoring capacity-building training sessions for educators and more targeted women’s “empowerment” groups, enrolling mothers and charging them with preventing child labor, and bankrolling scholarships for “financially disadvantaged” children in tobacco growing regions and after-school programs in Lombok that are “carried out during tobacco harvest season to keep children busy with fun and creative learning activities . . . aimed at discouraging them from partaking in the tobacco harvest and curing” (Sampoerna 2018, 149).

I did not witness firsthand any cases of child labor in tobacco cultivation and processing, but I did see one case in clove picking. Child labor in tobacco agriculture (and Indonesian agriculture in general) appears to be a waning rather than an expanding phenomenon and more concentrated in certain regions and tasks, such as leaf tying in Lombok, rather than being a major scourge wherever tobacco is grown. Government agriculture officials in Madura told us that in the 1980s and 1990s, schools used to empty out during the tobacco harvest but that this was no longer the case. Robert offered an initially dismissive response to “all these child labor issues,” exclaiming, “That’s how you become a farmer!” He then reflected, “My farmers’ biggest wish and deepest dream is that their kids don’t become tobacco farmers. They want them in school. Of course you [i.e., activists, NGOs, anthropologists] can always get photographs [of children working].” When I spoke to a father and son as they picked cloves in Bali, the father said he hoped his child, who was still in high school, had a brighter future ahead of him than farm labor.

NGOs showed less interest in the kinds of workers I encountered in tobacco fields, who were typically in their late twenties or older, landless or land poor, with women far outnumbering men. Most workers were married, widowed, or divorced with school-aged or older children. Many were middle aged; some were



FIGURE 6. A father and son (*above*) pick cloves in Bali. Photo by author.

elderly. Young adults, farmers told me, found agricultural work too hot, too dirty, unappealing, and embarrassing, preferring factory jobs. Sun-bleached posters and calendars affixed to walls showed that PMI's anti-child labor efforts had reached farmers in Malang, where they paid lip service to addressing a problem that appeared insignificant given the workforce's composition. Landless workers were "free" in the Marxist sense; bereft of ties to productive property, they had to sell their labor as a commodity or risk starvation. The land-poor condition of workers was in some cases connected to the relatively land-rich status of the farmers who hired them. Wati, for example, was one of forty workers hired to tend Ibrahim's 7.5 hectares, and the same history that had helped Ibrahim secure his property had made it harder for people like Wati to hold onto or attain their own land. The Sukarno administration attempted to reduce stark inequalities in landholding with the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. Large landowners and religious institutions opposed implementation of the law and ensured that it moved at a sluggish pace, while the Communist Party (PKI) and Indonesian Peasant Front's (Barisan Tani Indonesia) efforts to accelerate land redistribution and go beyond the law's provisions provoked conflicts (Utrecht 1969). Peasants and land reform activists were among those murdered and suppressed in the wake of the alleged PKI coup attempt in 1965. In the 1970s, the Suharto administration embraced the Green Revolution's promise of increasing agricultural production through seeds, chemicals, and technologies. Along with higher taxes, this allowed wealthier rural households to grow and consolidate their landholdings while pushing marginal landholders off the

land (Hart, Turton, and White 1989; Scott 1985). While Wati spoke positively of Ibrahim, landless workers for another farmer with three hectares complained bitterly of their low wages but did not dare look for work elsewhere, fearing they would lose badly needed employment.

Women workers are routinely exposed to the tobacco risks that children are supposed to be sheltered from. While I was talking to a group of women as they brushed the suckercide Tamex onto topped plants, three described attending a training where they were informed that their children, whom they love so dearly, should not be involved in tobacco work since it could be dangerous to them. Wati pulled off her bamboo peasant hat to reveal a training souvenir: a red and black baseball cap with an image of an idealized nuclear family, mother and father embracing their two children. With no husband and five children, her own family structure bore little resemblance to this ideal. Wati wore black cotton gloves to protect her hands from the sun, but she had cut the gloves to expose her fingers and allow her to work swiftly and dexterously. The smell was fine, she said, as long as it did not become too strong in the heat. A male supervisor, whose fingers were stained yellow from the substance, had measured and mixed the chemical with five liters of water before pouring it into workers' makeshift containers, some of it sloshing over and spilling into the irrigation ditch he straddled. Tamex is considered highly toxic to fish and aquatic invertebrates. Users are supposed to wear protective eyewear, long-sleeved shirts and pants, shoes and socks, and chemical-resistant gloves. A corrosive agent capable of causing irreversible eye damage, Tamex is also harmful to skin, potentially fatal if it enters airways or is ingested, and suspected of causing cancer and genetic defects.²⁸ Wati held the Tamex solution in a used bottle in her left hand and the brush in her right hand. Other workers tied cut-open plastic bottles filled with suckercide around their waists or dangled them from their necks. While Wati's hat advocated protecting beloved and valued children, Tamex dribbled onto her bare fingers.

Farmers and workers had various idiosyncratic ideas about the hazards that inhered in tobacco cultivation and how to protect themselves (Markus 2015). Some risks to workers, such as heat stroke, dehydration, pesticide exposure, and excessive working hours, potentially pertain to any agricultural labor in Indonesia. NGOs single out tobacco for special attention due to its nicotine content and intricate, labor-intensive processing requirements. When workers interact with wet tobacco leaves, they absorb nicotine through their skin, which can lead to acute nicotine poisoning, known as green tobacco sickness (GTS). GTS symptoms include dizziness, headaches, nausea, vomiting, and insomnia. In flue-curing regions like Lombok, stokers who handle fuel and tend ovens work around the clock and risk serious burns, while workers hanging and unloading bamboo poles of tobacco leaves in curing barns risk dangerous falls (Amigó 2010, 135–37, 179). Lombok farmers told us that they had used more dangerous furnaces in the past, occasioning accidents and turning one stoker's body all white from extensive third-degree burns.

Methods of mitigating these kinds of risks can be haphazard. As a reward for turning in empty pesticide cannisters that might otherwise be discarded in irrigation ditches, Sadhana issued farmers a personal safety-gear set including protective glasses, mask, plastic gloves, and a shirt with a plastic apron sewn inside.²⁹ While farmers occasionally wore some of these items and distributed others to workers, the supply was highly limited. When, where, and how workers used protective gear was furthermore often ad hoc and arbitrary. One farmer had workers wear disposable face masks when they lay cut tobacco onto trays to dry, although their primary risk was likely absorbing nicotine through dermal contact with soaking wet tobacco. Workers never wore gloves for this task, although they said it made their hands bitter (*pahit*); I myself became dizzy after several hours of performing it.

After long stretches of picking tobacco, some workers described suffering from dizziness, nausea, and vomiting, which are symptoms of GTS. When picking tobacco, as with other forms of agricultural labor, workers generally wear multiple layers of clothing to protect their skin from the sun. They said the difference with tobacco is that it destroyed clothes, making them useless for other purposes or demanding special cleaning methods (e.g., warm water) and copious detergent. When workers began picking lower leaves early in the morning, their shirts were apt to become soaked over the course of several hours from sweat and contact with wet leaves. Some wore gloves to keep their hands from getting dirty, while others did not, because gloves slowed them down; when I tried wearing gloves while picking, I soon found that they tended to snag and to grow sticky. Some drank green coconut milk to alleviate dizziness and nausea; others drank herbal tonics (*jamu*) or sweet and sour concoctions that they felt dissipated any poisoning effect from the tobacco. Workers often attributed vomiting to pesticide residue and harsh chemicals rather than to nicotine. One told us it was specifically the first leaf picking that made her sick due to the Tamex. Workers also joked that instances of encountering an ancestor or a ghost in the field might in fact be chemically induced.

If Amigó is correct that Indonesian child workers possess a degree of autonomy and agency that NGOs presume they are lacking, adult tobacco workers' autonomy is constrained by gender ideology, land access, social norms, and knowledge. Tobacco labor furnishes workers with some income but not a livelihood. Such seasonal labor is always stitched together with additional low-wage work and small enterprise. Even when female workers performed physically demanding tasks such as hoeing, farmers consistently paid them significantly less for a day's work than their male counterparts, who are often additionally compensated with cigarettes. Women workers might have more wage labor opportunities in part because they are cheaper to hire, with men reserved for supervisory tasks and jobs like transporting picked tobacco via motorbike from the fields to the farmer's home for ripening. Wati and her fellow workers were organized into work groups with leaders. According to a third-party assessment that PMI commissioned, Sadhana staff,



FIGURE 7. Women workers hoeing tobacco in Java. Photo by author.

tobacco farmers, and workers in Lombok all had limited knowledge of legal work hours, benefits, and overtime. Workers were typically paid below minimum wage rates, and steep gender pay disparities meant women were especially underpaid. Women often earn 75 percent of men's wages, although this dipped as low as 64 percent on some farms.³⁰ The assessment also found fifteen children involved in tobacco labor, including activities considered hazardous (e.g., topping, harvesting, stringing, and loading and unloading the barn).³¹

Clove farming's contribution to rural employment is also limited. A single laborer suffices to tend a hectare of clove trees for most of the year, performing tasks such as clearing undergrowth, planting seedlings, monitoring tree health, applying water, fertilizers, and pesticide, and deterring thieves with their presence. During harvest, women and children often undertake low-skill piece-rate stemming work (1,000 rupiah per kilogram), while men and male adolescents pick cloves from trees that reach twenty-five to forty feet in height (eight to twelve meters).³² One worker can harvest up to thirty kilograms in a single day. Pickers use narrow, precarious bamboo ladders to reach the flower buds of tall clove trees, which they collect in woven plastic sacks. If a picker slips, his ladder breaks, or a branch splits off a tree, he can easily break a limb or lose his life. A trader in Java asserted that even as pickers tried to make their work safer by tying ladders to neighboring trees, "every year there's a victim." Due to the danger of the work, pickers earn higher wages than ordinary agricultural laborers, but the work is available only over two to three months during the harvest season and often

pursued intermittently.³³ Sampoerna's Leaf and Clove Department was experimenting with mechanizing picking and dwarfing the tree. Such innovations, if successful and scalable, would reduce the risks associated with picking but also diminish the scant employment cloves provide.

. . .

"Caution Anti-Kretek Danger" (Awat Bahaya Anti-Kretek) and "Save the Kretek, Save Indonesia!" (Selamatkan Kretek, Selamatkan Indonesia) urges a poster by kretek nationalist group Komunitas Kretek, which claims that six million tobacco and one and a half million clove farmers and workers depend on the industry. As we have seen, tobacco and clove farmers and laborers derive their livelihoods from a range of activities, and the extent to which they hinge on tobacco or cloves is part and parcel of their precarity rather than a source of upward mobility and prosperity. In the supply chain's hierarchical relations of subordination and exploitation, workers are squeezed by farmers, farmers by leaf suppliers, and leaf suppliers by cigarette manufacturers, which issue contradictory demands for extremely cheap and responsibly produced tobacco.

Albert Hirschman (1970) wrote that when institutions decline, deteriorate, and decay, members are often moved to choose between options of exit, voice, and loyalty. Smallholder clove and tobacco producers mostly exercise exit and loyalty. Hesitancy—skipping a tobacco season, reducing tobacco acreage, diversifying crop production, not replacing clove trees—suggests a half-hearted response, neither exit nor loyalty. Despite the existence of numerous groups that claim to represent their interests, both smallholders and agricultural laborers lack a political voice in the form of collective, credible, and independent organizations acting to transform kretek capitalism and advocate on their behalf to the industry and government (White, Graham, and Savitri 2023). Independent voices might demand limits on tobacco imports, higher commodity prices, more just and gender-equal agricultural wages, and more support for alternative crops. Instead, in their industry-sponsored appearances on the national stage, tobacco and clove farmers contest public health policies as if their interests and cigarette manufacturers' interests were identical. Yet cigarette manufacturers routinely enjoy extraordinary profits in the same years that farmers face mediocre returns or catastrophic losses. The same hierarchy that renders those who are visible and in moral reach the problem and enemy (e.g., stingy farmers, deceitful traders, corrupt government officials) shelters cigarette manufacturers from critique and enables them to posture instead as allies combatting the common enemy of tobacco control (Kurian 2023).

The clove association APCI epitomizes such industry ventriloquism. Most clove farmers had little awareness of the existence of APCI, which purportedly lobbies on their behalf. An APCI leader in Bali who described himself as an "NGO guy"—his NGOs being APCI and the pro-tobacco AMTI—said that when President Joko Widodo consulted his ministers about signing the World Health Organization's

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on World No Tobacco Day (May 31), their industry-sponsored NGOs quickly mobilized in opposition. They warned the ministers that Article 9 of the convention prohibits additives and would therefore make kretek illegal. They misrepresented Article 9, which provides for the creation of guidelines for regulating tobacco product contents while still allowing national government authorities to determine how to actually pursue regulation. Then they had a good laugh (*kami ketawa*), because they were successful and prevented Indonesia from blindly following (*ikut-ikutan*) other countries.

Sampoerna's efforts to enroll agricultural labor have enabled the maintenance of tobacco and clove production and ongoing rural poverty, especially among the older, female-dominated laboring workforce who bear the worst of agricultural labor's dangers and subjugation. The company's ability to mobilize rural subjects in support of the industry and in opposition to tobacco control illustrates how maintaining rigid separate hierarchies serves as a powerful tool for kretek capitalism.

Hand-Rolling Kretek

Class and Gender Paternalism

Hand-rolling kretek workers and the commodities they produce occupy a prominent position in kretek nationalist discourse; they are iconic and charismatic as well as threatened and endangered. The charisma of the hand-rolled kretek derives from its handmade heft and association with culture, tradition, and masculine sociality. It requires far more tobacco, cloves, and factory labor to manufacture than its machine-rolled counterpart and an anti-modern half hour for proper relaxed consumption. The worker who produces these commodities for the leisurely privilege of masculine consumption conversely toils under extraordinary time pressure. Her charisma derives from her marginal class and gender status in a capitalist patriarchy. This feminization of kretek production and masculinization of kretek consumption challenges gender stereotypes that assign men the valorized role of (rational) breadwinners and women the devalorized role of (potentially irrational and excessive) shoppers and consumers.

Sampoerna's marketing for its hand-rolled kretek plays up slow smoking as a core commodity feature associated with culture, tradition, and hypermasculinity. Sampoerna's first print ads for its "premium" Dji Sam Soe brand in 1992 featured "customer testimonials," such as a smoker recollecting how his father congratulated him on achieving manhood after he shot his first wild boar and rewarded him with a kretek (Reynolds 1999, 86). Television ads that followed in 1996 and 2000 used the tagline "history of good taste" (*sejarah cita rasa tinggi*) and showed men rhythmically repeating Sampoerna's auspicious and powerful (*sakti*) number Dji Sam Soe (Hokkien Chinese for two, three, four) while engaged in boat building, traditional dances, and the martial art *pencak silat* (Kartajaya 2005, 358). Ads released in 2003 celebrated ninety years of great pleasure (*kenikmatan tinggi sejak 1913*) with bucolic imagery of tobacco and cloves, blending, and slow-smoking rituals like slicing open the paper pack along its belly with a fingernail,

inhaling along the cigarette's seam, and massaging a dense cigarette between the fingers to release some tobacco (344–45, 349–50).


Dji Sam Soe's "younger sibling" brand, Sampoerna Hijau, which targets "class C" customers—farmers, fishermen, blue-collar workers, clerical staff, and petty entrepreneurs—treats similar themes of slow smoking and masculinity via slapstick humor (Kartajaya 2005, 376–430). Javanese clichés tying class to taste hierarchies figure the Dji Sam Soe smoker as refined (*halus*) compared to the coarse (*kasar*) Sampoerna Hijau smoker. Marketing language endows the latter with positive characteristics such as humbleness, simplicity, and companionability (Bourdieu 1984; Priyatna 2017). This core brand message—that cigarettes facilitate masculine fun, conviviality, and camaraderie—accordingly implies that not smoking (or smoking the wrong brand) leads to unhappiness, boredom, and social exclusion (Sebayang et al. 2012, 370). A 2016 television ad provides an especially clear example of this message and its logic. The commercial shows five men at a counter; the one on the right orders red bean milk, the one on the left chocolate milk, and then the three in the middle request sweet mung bean drinks, joyfully calling out "green"—Sampoerna Hijau's signature color—in unison (*es kacang ijo*). The two at each end soon polish off their drinks, which match their shirt colors and represent competitor brands Djarum and Gudang Garam, before gazing in envious bewilderment at the three buddies who keep contentedly and noisily sucking on their seemingly bottomless green drinks. Night has fallen by the time the trio finishes with a joint exhalation of "pleasure" (*nikmat*). In a final scene, their angry wives appear, one muscularly grinding a mortar and pestle and another demanding, "Where've you been all day?" as she threateningly cracks her knuckles. The cigarettes, and the homosocial fraternity they facilitate, offer a sanctioned form of escape and release from conjugal and broader familial obligations. The tagline—"Sampoerna, Dense Filling, Long-Lasting Taste"—underscores the hedonistic pleasure afforded by hand-rolled kretek.¹

This kind of pleasure is not confined to the idealized world of commercials. Whenever Dedo, an artist who smoked Dji Sam Soe, came across an especially dense kretek, he found himself wondering what the woman who made it was like. Such fantasies on the part of heterosexual male smokers draw on a long imaginative history, embodied in the popular Javanese folktale Roro (or Rara) Mendut. During the seventeenth-century reign of Sultan Agung, a Mataram nobleman named Wiraguna who helped quell a coastal rebellion against the central court is rewarded with the beautiful villager Roro Mendut. The rebellious Mendut, however, has no interest in becoming the old and unattractive nobleman's concubine or wife and spurns his advances. Wiraguna imposes a daily fine on her, which she pays by selling klobot (tobacco rolled in corn husks) that command a high price because they are sealed by her tongue and lit between her lips. She falls in love with a handsome commoner, Pranacitra, but the pair are caught when they try to run away together. After Wiraguna fatally stabs Pranacitra, Mendut seizes his dagger (*keris*) and kills herself with it, securing her afterlife with Pranacitra

and forever thwarting Wiraguna's lecherous carnal desire. The tale was adapted into popular Javanese theatre (*kethoprak*) in the twentieth century and reached a national audience when it was serialized in Indonesian by Y. B. Mangunwijaya (2008), a renowned literary figure, social activist, and Roman Catholic priest. Mangunwijaya also wrote a screenplay for a film version that was directed by Ami Priyono and released in 1982. In an early scene, Mendut (played by Meriam Bellina, an actor of Indonesian and European descent) inspires masculine lust and feminine envy as she dances, shimmying and swiveling her hips with a beautiful teasing smile and bare shoulders. In later scenes, she languorously tongues a conical klobot, inserting the larger and smaller ends into her mouth before lighting it and slowly inhaling and blowing out smoke. Cockfights held near her stall echo male jockeying for her klobot and attention. Whereas folktale and *kethoprak* versions of the story emphasized class conflict and lower-class resistance, the more eroticized film version—made in an era when class talk was politically dangerous—emphasizes female autonomy and resistance to patriarchy (Hatley 1988). Both class and gender resistance themes appeal to kretek nationalism, as does the hallowed place of Roro Mendut in Javanese folk tales and the Indonesian film and literary canon, with its resemblance to romantic tragedies such as Bizet's *Carmen* and Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*.

Sampoerna's living factory museum exhibit tended to shatter Roro Mendut-inspired masculine fantasies. A hand-rolling worker making three hundred to six hundred cigarettes an hour may be slow relative to machines that produce ten thousand a minute, but her movements are still fast enough to blur and difficult to track with the naked eye, giving the impression that she inhabits a cruelly sped-up version of reality. "Horrible" was how Kadir, a part-time grindcore musician and A-Mild influencer, described the sight of "so many women working so hard and so fast." Visitors who react negatively are often especially struck by workers whose tremulous head movements look like symptoms of a neurological disorder. Other visitors saw in the exhibit a reassuring display of essential blue-collar work in an era of declining manufacturing employment. A Balinese entrepreneur remarked to his buddies, "Without cigarettes, Indonesia would be destroyed [*hancur*]." Whether viewers classified Sampoerna's factory as an exploitative sweatshop or a vital bastion of working-class jobs, hand-rolled kretek production was clearly industrial in scale and subject to unrelenting and unerotic time pressure.

Hand-rollers' doubly marginal status as workers and women makes them especially sympathetic as everyday unsung kretek heroes when employed or as suffering subjects when faced with job loss. Reducing workers to noble kretek heroes or tobacco control victims, however, tells us little about the pleasures and pains of their actual work, how they relate to their work environment, tools, peers, and supervisors, how work and home life intertwine, and how their labor is subject to capitalist and patriarchal norms. Chapter 2 argues that in hand-rolled factories staffed by a female-dominated workforce, labor is shaped by a gendered paternalism that allows Sampoerna both to benefit from the public image of noble (and



MAP 2. Sampoerna's cigarette factories and third-party operators. Map by Bill Nelson.

often suffering) female kretek heroes and to mask the high-pressure and tightly controlled work in the rhetoric of protective care.

Exploring these themes, this chapter draws heavily on a month I spent working in Sampoerna's hand-rolling cigarette plant in Malang.² Sampoerna executives' willingness to grant me factory access should be seen in light of their conviction that workers were intensely loyal to Sampoerna despite the difficult nature of their work, the company's public exposure of the conventionally "hidden abode of production" through the living factory exhibit, and the privilege that academic researchers associated with prestigious institutions can enjoy in Indonesia (see also Saptari 1995, 15; Weix 1990). When a factory administrator first escorted me, a white woman dressed in a roller's uniform, to my place behind a rolling machine, a loud wave of noise spread across the shop floor as workers' curiosity was aroused.³ Over the course of the month, I interacted most closely with my immediate neighbors, but I had frequent exchanges with other workers before 6:00 a.m. when they would stop by to chat or take a selfie, over meal breaks in the canteen, and at the trough sinks where we crowded at the end of the day to rinse glue out of our tools.

FEMINIZED PIECEWORKERS AND THE AGE FACTOR

While female labor has historically predominated in the kretek industry, it was characterized by a more flexible gender division of labor until the mid-1960s. As discussed in the introduction, army general Suharto used the alleged communist coup attempt of 1965 to rationalize the massacre of trade union leaders and, after gaining presidential powers, the abolition of communist party-affiliated unions

and the creation of conservative government-controlled unions. Managers justified workforce feminization in this period by claiming that male pieceworkers protested too much and consumed too many cigarettes (Saptari 1995, 95–96; Weix 1990, 21–22, 126).

After facing labor militancy in the 1950s, Sampoerna sought to depoliticize its workforce as workers and as women in ways that aligned with New Order gender dogma. Although factory workers might spend more time with their rolling machines than with their husbands, through its radio show, the company still espouses the primacy of a conservative “state *ibuism*” (motherhood) housewife (*ibu rumah tangga*) identity that ideally defines women “as appendages and companions to their husbands, as procreators of the nation, as mothers and educators of children, as housekeepers, and as members of Indonesian society—in that order” (Suryakusuma 1996, 101). The good housewife props up her husband’s heteronormative masculinity and is the antithesis of the evil and emasculating Gerwani (women’s and workers’) activists whom the New Order depicted in fabricated and sensationalized accounts as killing and mutilating the genitalia of senior army officials (Larasati 2013). Whereas kretek consumption legitimizes masculine escape from familial obligations, then, kretek production is yoked to feminine fulfillment of familial obligations.

In contrast to more short-term patterns of youthful female labor recruitment for export commodity production (Lindquist 2009; Mills 2003; Ong 1987; Wolf 1992), the sector’s workforce has historically been grayer in addition to feminized, populated by older married women who often hold only an elementary-school education, commute from home, and remain in the same factory for long periods that often extend to lifetime employment (Saptari 1995, 87, 97–102, 224–25). The average worker age at the Malang plant was forty-four in 2016. At Sampoerna’s newest plant in Kraksaan, it was thirty-five—more youthful, but still a far cry from Meriam Bellina, who was a seventeen-year-old high school student when her sexualized performance as Roro Mendut appeared in Indonesian cinemas. I experienced an increasingly common ritual one day when a supervisor who had reached the retirement age of fifty-five walked down our line of rollers, shaking hands, saying farewell (*pamitan*), and blinking back tears. Another supervisor delicately confided that the “A factor” (*Faktor U, usia* or *umur*)—that is, age—presented the biggest challenge on the shop floor; workers inevitably slow down over time.

Retirements enabled the Malang plant to reduce its staff from 5,400 in 2010 to 3,922 in 2016. The workforce consisted of an all-female cohort of 3,631 pieceworkers (*borongan*, subdivided into 2,271 rollers, 765 cutters, 499 packers, and 96 labelers); 259 mixed but predominantly female daily wage workers (*harian*), including supervisors, tool maintenance workers, and box packers; and 32 managers and administrative staff on monthly salaries (*bulanan*), among whom were more men. Sampoerna contracted out to vendors support functions such as health care, janitorial services, and maintenance and construction.

Quotas subject pieceworkers to intense time pressure. “We’re not chasing time, time chases us” (*Kami tidak mengejar waktu, waktu yang mengejar kami*), a former roller who was laid off when Sampoerna closed its Jember factory in 2014 told me. Only some apprentices succeed in meeting quotas and achieve permanent worker status. Some quick workers in their prime get higher quotas, which means more pay but also more pressure. As pieceworkers age and slow, they once again experience difficulty meeting minimal hourly quotas, as they did as apprentices. I found quota pressure to be most intense among packers. My neighbor Bu Arti uttered a quick prayer at the start of each day of packing cigarettes, asking that she should be swift (*supaya lancar*). And whereas rollers often asked me how many cigarettes I had made (“*Dapat berapa?*”), packers frequently asked one another about their lack, how far short of their quotas they were currently falling (“*Kurang berapa? Kurang pira?*” Jv). Packers taught me the concept of *kepor* (not to be confused with *kempor*, exhausted), a state of falling behind in a task accompanied by a sense of urgency and anxiety. Toward the end of her menstrual cycle, Bu Rukmini was prone to fainting and falling off her stool. When this occurred, polyclinic staff instructed her not to think about anything, including her unfinished work and *kepor* state. Although packers occasionally paused to get a drink of water, they eschewed meal breaks. A shortage of tobacco tubs for rollers at the start of one day precipitated a subsequent shortage of cigarettes that left packers extraordinarily agitated and impatient, the possibility of achieving their quotas slipping away with each second of forced idleness.

The tremulous head movements that House of Sampoerna visitors find so disturbing are part of the quota speed complex. Workers claim that these movements help them work and that they are not involuntary. Bu Fitri, a speedy roller, deliberately engaged her head bob whenever she realized she was moving only her hand and arms and needed to pick up the pace. Supervisors sought to suppress workers’ bobs, which Sampoerna’s time-motion studies of workers classified as extraneous movements that could create a sensation of speed at odds with workers’ actual productivity. Cognizant of such disapproval, Arti said she wasn’t allowed to shake (*gak boleh goyang*) and should instead sit erect and move only her hands and arms as I did (*seharusnya seperti Mbak Marina*). She briefly imitated me, pronounced it uncomfortable (*tidak enak*), and resumed her bob. These bobs may be a byproduct of harmful, repetitive, high-speed labor, but workers experience them as an assertion of agency and idiosyncrasy over managerial efforts to keep their movements minimal, uniform, and efficient.

Pieceworkers’ bodies accumulate deleterious effects from factory labor. My short-term experience included finger cuts, aching arms at night, and pain when I sat on a regular chair at home after eight hours perched on a red plastic stool (supervisors called this *pantat panas* or hot bottom).⁴ Over time, the hands of cutters who trim cigarettes permanently reshape and bend around their scissors. Their right index fingers become crooked and warped (*bengkok*), and some develop

great blisters and calluses on the base of their right thumbs. They frequently slice open and split their left index finger, thumb, and nails, which are often bandaged because of a recent wound. After many years of accidentally shaving off their own flesh, the left thumbs of some are visibly shorter than their right. Workers complained of sore hands and arms (*pegel, linu*) in the morning, and one packer frequently shook out her hands, seeking elusive relief from the pins-and-needles sensation (*kesemutan*, literally a sensation of ants crawling, or paresthesia in medical parlance) that was likely a symptom of nerve damage due to repetitive strain. I heard a small commotion behind me one day and turned to see an older roller collapsed on the floor in the throes of intense muscle spasms. She resumed work after a neighbor massaged her back with her feet. Long sedentary days, minimal hydration, and delayed bathroom breaks also lead to potential kidney damage and severe hemorrhoids for some workers; I met one who had had hemorrhoid surgery three weeks earlier and was still unable to resume her regular duties.

Dr. Yasin, who had served in the factory's polyclinic for six years, characterized workers as unhealthy and initially blamed their own bad consumption habits. Observing that four had suffered strokes in the previous week, Yasin condemned their long-term use of hormonal contraceptives and their consumption of fried food. (I raised the role of smoke exposure in strokes with multiple Sampoerna factory doctors, but it always proved a nonstarter, and one even expressed uncertainty about whether kretek helped or harmed health, citing kretek nationalist misinformation.) He attributed workers' sleepiness and difficulty concentrating to their carbohydrate-rich, high-glycemic-index breakfasts. He worked with the plant manager to encourage canteen vendors to offer healthier options but generally despaired of having much impact on workers' dietary practices, saying that they relied on Sampoerna's health plan and were not motivated to change their lifestyles. Yasin estimated that 60 to 70 percent of workers were obese, a condition he linked to diabetes, hypertension, stroke, cardiovascular disease risk, and low-back pain. He claimed that workers would also "dope," taking supplements and steroids sold in front of the plant when they are tired or sick.

As we conversed, Yasin slowly shifted from blaming workers' poor health on their negligent and ignorant behavior as consumers to acknowledging them as producers whose working conditions played some role in their health. The sedentary nature of their jobs, he conceded, leads to obesity and hemorrhoids, while putting off drinking and urinating to chase quotas contributes to kidney stones. Yasin confessed that his ability to elicit a complete picture of workers' health was limited by their reluctance to disclose conditions that might lead to job loss. He always inspected workers' hands and frequently found that the pads at the base of their thumbs, which should be a little plump, were thin and worn from nerve damage, suggesting carpal tunnel syndrome. He wanted to detect and treat such conditions early, but workers lied when he asked if they suffered from pain. Were they more candid, Yasin believed, he could collect better data for management.

But it was not clear what management would do with such data beyond the ineffectual morning exercise routines it instituted. As long as Sampoerna maintained piecework quotas and fired workers who could not meet them, workers would continue to suffer to work as fast as they could.

Yasin also saw evidence of workers' contracting sexually transmitted infections, which he attributed to their husbands, who relied on their wives for cash and, with lots of time on their hands, had affairs. Some workers expressed concerns that reflected the doctor's clinical view. Although some were widowed and others had husbands employed in fields like construction or agriculture, workers were often the household's primary earners or "spine" (*tulang punggung*). One roller complained that her husband was engaged in many enterprises, all of which lost money. Some workers found gendered expectations that they attend to their husbands' sexual desires after their draining work oppressive. A plant manager in Kraksaan joked that workers' already long shifts do not account for the "overtime" (*lembur*) they must pull with their husbands. A supervisor told me that their work is so exhausting that husbands must understand that sex can be scheduled only for Saturday or Sunday, since on other nights, they are simply too tired. My neighbor, teasing a roller about supposedly having sex three times a night, scoffed at the supervisor's "old" perspective. On a more serious note, she expressed concern that her husband would get angry if she did not have sex with him (*marah kalau nggak dikasih*) and that he would buy it elsewhere. A packer, siding with the supervisor, said that her husband can just look at her and tell she's exhausted (*kecapaian*) and that he's not allowed to touch her (*gak boleh dipegang*). In this way, she added, sex twice a week turns to just once. Saptari (1995, 172) found that female factory workers' economic contributions won them household authority, enabling them to confront unfaithful husbands. At the same time, some husbands find opportunities—and justifications—for cheating during their wives' long work hours.

If kretek hand-rolling jobs are exhausting, grueling, and injurious and some workers described themselves as always suffering (*buruh yang selalu sengsara*), what makes these jobs desirable in the first place, and what keeps workers attached to them for decades? Even when they started work very young before child labor laws were enforced, workers tended to frame their entry into cigarette factories as their own decision, in some cases citing straitened family circumstances, such as having many siblings or their father's death (similarly, see Saptari 1995). A driver insisted that Sampoerna was the first place a woman (including his wife) seeking a factory job in Surabaya would apply and that among working-class circles in his youth, a Sampoerna uniform made a woman more appealing as a potential girlfriend or wife. When women applied for Sampoerna jobs or sought to reach quotas and pass their probationary period, they used various tricks to achieve dry hands that would allow them to work more rapidly. One who began as a roller in 1989 ate raw tofu each morning before work to make her hands less sweaty, while others poured gasoline on their hands to dry them out. Positive dimensions of Sampoerna

factory jobs include perks like scholarships for children, comprehensive and well-maintained amenities (canteen, toilets, drinking fountains, motorbike parking, lockers, prayer room [*mushollah*], lactation room, polyclinic, library, consumer cooperatives, and banks that provide low-interest loans), close friendships and social ties, and, until the 2014 factory closures, job stability. These factors make piecework jobs more tolerable and appealing, but overtime is the real key.

Sampoerna's hand-rolled kretek workers were historically accustomed to copious overtime, which entailed its own habit-forming dynamics; more work meant better pay but also less time spent at home and more exhaustion. Piecework rates are tied to regional minimum wages, and paychecks are larded with small bonuses rewarding strong team performance, consistent attendance, and forgoing menstrual leave.⁵ A normal workweek is Monday through Saturday, with shorter hours on Friday and Saturday. Workers receive 1.5 times their normal pay for their first hour of overtime and double for subsequent hours. On Sundays and vacation days, they earn double pay for the first seven hours, triple pay for an eighth hour, and quadruple pay for additional hours, meaning that nine hours of work on a Sunday would be compensated as twenty-one regular hours. Sampoerna adjusted to fluctuating market demand by increasing overtime. Managers found that workers welcomed fifty-hour workweeks but began complaining when they hit sixty hours. Before it closed for the New Year vacation in December 2015, the Malang factory ramped up production and operated nine-hour days, seven days a week, to manufacture kretek before the higher 2016 excise tax rate kicked in. Some workers who normally earned less than one million rupiah a week saw two-million-rupiah paychecks. They were grateful after having had barely any overtime in the three years since the hand-rolled market downturn began in 2013. The long-standing normalization of overtime made its absence feel like withdrawal, leading to sudden financial hardship and frugality (*ngirit*).

Prapto, the hand-rolled manufacturing director, deployed the charismatic potential of hand-rolling workers' class and gender identity—and their need for overtime and financial precarity in its absence—to craft a paternalistic appeal to masculinized marketing representatives and senior executives to invest in the flagging sector. To fulfill his job of “taking care of the ladies,” he commissioned multiple internal videos for Sampoerna's sales and marketing representatives and senior leadership team in which workers tearfully describe the profound hardship of working “only” seven-hour days. Having already lost her overtime, one cutter sold off a cherished necklace—a gift from her husband—after the auto repair shop where he worked closed. The videos conclude on a cheerful note as workers celebrate the return of overtime and thank the men (*bapak-bapak*) working to increase sales. Heru, a senior marketing executive, spoke impassioned about this:

The rollers [*ibu-ibu pelinting*] are our family. It's heartbreaking to know they don't get overtime. When you hear them say, “I want overtime.” There was a strong push

internally: don't think about brand or profit, think about the rollers. Talking to Paul [Janelle, Sampoerna president], he has been very clear. He does not want to close another factory. It was the worst thing he has done. Maybe very few people take it personally, maybe they think more about volume, but I do, I take it personally. Paul has said over and over that he doesn't want to close another factory, not an MPS [contractor].

Prapto mobilized “the ladies” to write letters to Sampoerna's board of directors and board of commissioners begging them to invest in and maintain hand-rolled brands. After they regained overtime, he solicited workers' thank-you letters, although he confessed that the overtime resulted more from factory closures and contractor cuts than from market rejuvenation. Such letters maintain the narrative that board members deserve credit for the positive aspects of hand-rolling work even when they do not but are not responsible for the negative aspects of their work (such as high quotas or low base pay) even when they are. “Don't give up!” Prapto implored management. “If they [senior executives] believe it's over, it's over. It's okay if SKT [hand-rolled kretek] are finished in another ten years. Just give workers enough time so that their children can graduate. At least do this for those who have given their lives to Sampoerna.” Managers also used workers' charisma to dissuade the government from imposing excise tax hikes on the hand-rolled sector by recruiting workers to write letters supplicating government officials to protect worker livelihoods. Executives' paternalistic sentiment reassured them of their own humanity and investment in tobacco industry benefits for class- and gender-marginalized workers. Yet it did little to protect workers from exploitation or job loss amid the changing landscape of kretek capitalism.

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS

The hand-rolling factory work that is masked under the rhetoric of paternalistic care is high pressure, physically demanding, and draining. Workers often rise for the dawn call to prayer a little after 4:00 a.m. and cook for their families before departing for work on minibuses or motorbikes, arriving around 5:30 a.m. to a chaos of other workers, vehicles, and vendors who set up a makeshift market around workers' arrival and departure times. To access the production units, persons of all ranks must submit to a pat-down by a same-sex security guard. One told me that the motion of thousands of workers passing by her eyes and through her hands initially made her dizzy and nauseous.

Tools

Although hand-rolled kretek embody the “traditional” side of the Indonesian cigarette industry, the tools and process used to make them are hardly static. Production today is a far cry from the old black-and-white photos reproduced in cigarette museums and coffee-table books of kebaya-and-sarong-clad workers rolling while seated on the ground. Sampoerna tasks engineers in its Hand-Rolled

Research Center with producing tool and process innovations to “continuously improve” hand-rolling quality and efficiency.⁶ Sampoerna is ambivalent about implementing the center’s innovations, rolling out new technologies unevenly across its company- and contractor-run plants when they are deemed likely to provoke resistance, displace workers, or lead to overproduction. For example, after the Research Center created a modified rolling machine that eliminated certain steps and substituted stainless steel for wood, the company limited its rollout to new factories, although it could have substantially increased productivity to 410 cigarettes an hour on the new machines rather than 325 (in Sampoerna factories) or 370 (in contractor factories) on the old machines.

For workers, even seemingly minor changes demand workflow adjustments. Whereas they used to draw their tobacco out of red plastic buckets adjacent to their stools, over the prior decade Sampoerna replaced buckets with rectangular stainless-steel bins that stand on their workstations. My neighbor Bu Nia told me that after these tobacco dispensers or “mini silos” were introduced, she had raked her knuckles against the opening until they bled. In some factories, workers apply glue by holding a stack of papers between their fingers and twisting them to and fro until a thin and even line across the tip of each was revealed, allowing rollers to apply glue to dozens of papers simultaneously with a single spatula swipe. In the Malang factory, rollers used glue applicators, which proved to be the bane of my own rolling efforts. Witnessing my travails, Nia absorbed some of the burden of my errors, using papers that were slightly torn or to which I had applied too much or too little glue and ironing out rumpled papers by placing them under her cigarette tub for later reuse. Nia’s help reflected the general ethos of mutual concern and assistance among workers, as well as an ingrained sense that all supplies were rationed, doled out in limited quantities, and used with care. Although the applicator sped up their work once they grew accustomed to it, Nia claimed that when they were first introduced, rollers cried over how they tore the papers, and some found the change so demoralizing that they quit their jobs.

Rolling machines have metal identification numbers and are rollers’ most important tool. Workers typically use the same machine for their entire career and liken them to a second husband (*suami kedua*) to which they grow attached (similarly, see Cross 2012). When their machines require maintenance, rollers always feel awkward and wrong (*kurang pas*) on the substitute. Elaborating on the husband analogy, a manager observed that workers spend a lot of time with their machines, often more than with their human husbands, and that workers and machines are obliged to take care of one another. Each morning, workers adjust their machines’ canvas belts using a plastic rod contoured to ideal cigarette dimensions. Bu Nurul helped me adjust mine at the start of the day (a supervisor rolled cigarettes on hers as she did so so that she would not fall too far behind quota), and at the end of the day, Nurul swiftly massaged conditioning oil on my canvas belt so it would operate smoothly and not get sticky and dirty. Sampoerna often retires machines alongside workers, preserving some used by famously productive

workers at its Surabaya headquarters. Deep grooves have been worn into their wooden handles where workers' hands grasped them over multiple decades while they made millions of cigarettes.

Much as workers are sensitive to tools, they are also attuned to changes in their supplies and environment. In the rainy season, tobacco is more pliable and easier to work with than in the dry season when it becomes friable. The downside of humid conditions is heavier cigarettes that are vulnerable to supervisors' rejection for falling outside of tolerable weight parameters due to using too much tobacco filler; the Malang plant temporarily raised the maximum weight for fifty cigarettes from 105 to 107 grams during the rainy month when I worked there. Glue, made daily in an air-conditioned room with cassava powder sourced from Thailand, also varies in viscosity and consistency from day to day. Supervisors complained that "yesterday the glue was nice, but today it's not" or that "watery glue has been causing problems all day." Workers and supervisors also note variations in the cigarette paper, observing that some batches are thin and hard to work with, making it difficult to produce a flawless (*mulus*) cigarette. I learned from a research and development manager in Surabaya that the differences workers perceived in papers were not accidental. Because hand-rolled cigarettes lack synthetic filters, Sampoerna relies on changing burn additives and paper thickness and porosity to help maintain consistent machine nicotine and tar readings in response to tobacco blend variability.

Rolling

Supervisors, begging my pardon as they wrapped their arms around me to demonstrate how to roll cigarettes, instructed me to pick up the tobacco as if I were gathering rice in my fingers to eat. They reprimanded me when I shook off loose tobacco since this motion was unnecessary and would leave me with tobacco too fine to roll into cigarettes at the end of the day. I learned to periodically massage my tobacco to distribute fine (*halus*) or broken (*rusak*) tobacco. If I spotted larger stems or NTRM (non-tobacco related material) such as a piece of plastic in the tobacco, I placed the offending substance in a small plastic receptacle attached to the tobacco dispenser. I learned to press finer tobacco into the middle of each cigarette while stuffing a pinch of the longer strands into both ends with my index fingers. I pressed the tobacco in sideways with my right hand, then with both hands pulled the machine down, up, and down again, halting at the pen lines supervisors or workers inked onto my canvas belt when they set it that morning. I then brushed off loose tobacco with my left hand, plucked a paper out of the glue applicator with my right-hand fingers, transferred the paper to my left hand while rotating it so that the glue end faced downward, then rolled the tobacco into the paper with my right hand, moving my left thumb to the top of the roller and catching it against my left index finger. I rotated the cigarette around with my right thumb and index finger while moving my left fingers to the bottom of the cigarette. After tracing my

right thumb down and back up the seam where the glue holds the paper together, I tossed the finished cigarette into a white plastic tub.

At first, I struggled to achieve the correct conical shape and dimensions (eight millimeters in diameter at the inhalation end, ten at the burn end). Workers can check cigarette proportions by inserting them in sample holders attached to the tobacco dispenser; too small and they fall through, too stout and they sit high. When I stuffed a good amount of longer tobacco into the cigarette ends, they would be packed and sturdy enough that the shaggy ends could be cut nicely; with too little tobacco, the ends had holes and felt loose when trimmed. Initially, I also struggled with wrapping the paper such that the seam met precisely at each end and around the yellow band; in quality control parlance, many of my early cigarettes were rejects because they were “out of alignment” (*mencelek* Jv, *miring*). Cigarettes with insufficient glue embarrassingly sprang open.

Supervisors corrected my posture and movements and tucked stray hair into my cap. When I forgot to tuck my apron into my workstation, a supervisor chided me that tobacco would fall to the floor and become “waste” (she used the English word). When my shoulders tensed and I leaned inward while angling my left hand to catch the cigarette as I rolled it off the machine, supervisors reminded me to keep my body loose and relaxed (*lemas*) rather than closely following my hands’ motions. Supervisors also identified and eliminated superfluous hand movements.

My sense of touch improved alongside my rolling ability, and I soon appreciated how relying on haptic rather than visual cues freed me to raise my head upright, relieving neck tension. With time and experience, my ability to pinch the correct quantity of tobacco and distribute finer and longer pieces improved. I could gauge the proper level of resistance when I rolled tobacco—too much made it tough to pull; too little and it would fly along too fast and freely. I gradually stopped making crooked-seamed rejects and enjoyed a sense of satisfaction when rolling went well—when the glue applicator produced a thin and even shadow of glue along the entire strip of each paper, when my cigarettes emerged firm and well formed—seams meeting perfectly, free of tobacco, and not sticky or wet with glue when I ran my thumb up and down them, ends shaggy with longer tobacco. By the end of my second week of rolling, I was making ninety-five cigarettes an hour.

While I was taught to follow a conventional sequence of “correct” steps, workers typically evolved their own styles and incorporated shortcuts. For example, Nurul minimized her movements by taking extra time to scoop the correct amount of tobacco, whereas Dina used a swift initial scoop then rapidly added or subtracted tobacco. Dina could roll as many as five hundred cigarettes an hour. Nurul, who could roll six hundred an hour, rolled the tobacco down just once, not multiple times. Rather than brushing stray tobacco off the canvas belt with her left hand, she blew it away with an exhalation, intertwining her breathing and rolling rhythms. Like other rollers, she also omitted the step of holding the cigarette in a standing position and running her thumb up and down the seam.

Cutting

I found cutting cigarettes the most brutal of the four main production tasks. As a roller, I trimmed my own cigarettes for an hour or two each day since no cutter was responsible for my output. My first time cutting, dull pain spread from my neck up into my head within twenty minutes. Whereas rollers can use their sense of touch to intermittently free their eyes and raise their heads upright, vision is imperative to cutting, and cutters bend their heads into their task for hours on end. This posture leads to an aching back, neck, and head. Scissors, meanwhile, gradually mutilate cutters' hands as described above. After cutting for a while, the second knuckle on my right index finger turned an angry red, and indentations formed on my thumb and index finger. I also nipped and nicked my left index finger and thumb multiple times, controlling my reaction so I would not elicit the concern of neighbors. Cutters attributed accidents to sleepiness, miming nodding off and snipping a finger or thumb.

Cutting is the least varied of the four main production tasks and most closely resembles assembly line-style deskilling of workers. Both cutters and tax labelers receive lower pay, commensurate with the lower skills imputed to the work. Cutters trim one thousand cigarettes an hour (I managed two hundred and fifty). They periodically pause to rapidly form bundles of fifty cigarettes that they stack in rows of three, four, five, six, seven, seven, seven, six, and five (a skill I practiced but never mastered) and encircle with a glued paper wrap. One cutter told me that as a novice, she constantly practiced rotating one of her father's cigarettes in her left hand at home and on her way to work. The cutters' left thumb and index finger should land precisely on the end she will cut. I often missed at first, falling short and then walking my fingers up to the correct spot. The cut, too, must be precise, ideally a single shearing movement that trims the tobacco as close to the paper as possible without pinching or tearing it, which could lead to rejection. One cutter works with four rollers. Nurul suggested that this relationship ideally lasts a lifetime, but her previous cutter was fired because she was quick to anger and brought problems from home to work. Cutters know the feel and flaws of their rollers' cigarettes; in the day I trimmed other rollers' cigarettes, I felt how some were characteristically firm while others were lighter and looser. Cutters are supposed to perform quality control checks on the cigarettes they trim, removing foreign matter and catching quality issues such as the presence of tobacco in the seam.

The cutter's tools, too, are subject to maintenance, study, and innovation. The scissors are catalogued, sharpened daily, and color coded, with the heavier, more effective pairs reserved for cutters rather than rollers (workers commonly complained that scissors were stuck [*nyekat*], hard [*atos*], broken [*njebul*], shaky [*kocak*], or clogged [*nyendat*]). A manager told me that Sampoerna had developed protective items for cutters' fingers and thumbs, but workers refused to use them since they diminished their speed and dexterity. In 2011, the Research Center invented a new technology, the push cutter, that would eliminate the self-cutting

and finger warping associated with scissors—although it required different repetitive actions that could induce upper arm and shoulder problems, and workers risked injury when changing the blades. A single right-handed pulling motion with the device trims both ends of a cigarette. When I tried using a push cutter, it was harder than I expected to line the cigarette up perfectly such that the blades did not fall short at one end and pinch the other. Sampoerna introduced push cutters in contractor-run factories and the newer Probolinggo company-run factory but not in its older company-operated factories. When I asked a Surabaya factory supervisor why workers weren't using the device, her puzzled expression betrayed her ignorance of its existence. When I put the same query to the plant manager, he took me aside and in a low voice begged me to keep its existence secret since it could create anxiety and unrest among workers who fear being displaced by faster technologies. Other managers assured me it was no secret, explaining that to preserve jobs, Sampoerna had decided not to roll it out in older factories, even though that also meant perpetuating the slow mutilation of cutters' hands by scissors. With push cutters, Sampoerna raised cutter quotas to 1,470 per hour (10,300 per seven-hour day; contract factories raised their quotas even higher, to 1,550 per hour). The Research Center boasted that this meant a 47 percent productivity increase and \$3.7 million annual savings.

Packing

After two weeks in rolling and cutting, I moved to packing, where workers recruited me to occupy the workstation of a neighbor who had taken the week off to mourn the loss of her four-year-old grandchild to dengue fever. My supervisor, Bu Titin, taught me how to set up my workstation, which consisted of a stainless steel surface with a packing box attached, a glue ring and wooden stand, a small bamboo spatula for spreading glue, a glue tube, a vertically propped box segregating cigarettes on each side (cigarettes with the inhalation end facing out were on the right, burn end facing out on the left), a plastic rejects container, and wooden receptacles that hugged twenty finished packs with removable stainless steel plates that allowed packs to dry without sticking. Titin wrapped her heavy arms around me as she taught me the complex sequence of steps, which begin with pulling a paper wrapper (pre-folded first thing in the morning) into a stainless-steel packing box that gives the pack its shape. She emphasized the importance of using a sense of feel to swiftly grasp the correct number of cigarettes in each hand before fanning six out into the pack with the right hand, slapping six atop these with the left hand, then moving every other bottom cigarette to a top position while simultaneously coaxing three top cigarettes to roll into a bottom position. The resulting configuration, with burn and exhalation ends alternately facing outward, fits the conical cigarettes together nicely. Next, the packer glues the pack's spine into place, slides a metal spatula in to press the cigarettes into the correct shape, and then turns the pack upright and folds the paper using a smaller metal slide, tucking



FIGURE 8. Packing kretek. Photo by author.

and gluing corners before placing the finished pack in a wooden container. As she taught me these actions, Titin repeatedly compared the work of packing cigarettes to wrapping a present (*kado*), a comparison made strange by the gift wrap's graphic warnings that smoking kills smokers, harms children, and leads to cancered lips, throats, and lungs.⁷ As my skill improved, I learned to engage my left pinky and ring finger to tap cigarettes into place and to work quickly and cleanly with glue so that it would not coat my fingers or stray parts of the pack, leading to sticky, dirty surfaces. My neighbors made as many as 150 packs an hour, while I managed 43 an hour after a week. Once they have five *slof* (one hundred packs, or one *pasok*), packers walk these over to a storage rack for excise tax labeling. They otherwise have little relief from their seated positions on the stools. Quotas, and pay, are adjusted to match worker capacity. My neighbors produced 1,150 to 1,200 packs over an eight-hour day, or 900 to 1,000 packs over a seven-hour day.

The packers' central struggle lay in meeting quantity rather than quality expectations. Whereas various flaws on cigarettes are tolerated within a certain range, to pass visual and tactile inspection packs should be uniform and flawless. With some training, I could reliably achieve an approximation of perfection. Titin initially reprimanded me for not turning out the bottom corner sufficiently to show a small margin of red beyond the packs' decorative white lines. This struck me as an absurdly minor flaw, but I learned to see and correct it. Packers told me rolling was less appealing work due to the unceasing threat of rejection and attributed rollers' higher pay to their burden of responsibility. In the interest of achieving tough quotas, they passed swift and unforgiving judgement on cigarette quality.

When they saw me halt to extract a piece of tobacco from a cigarette seam with my fingernail, an ordinary act among rollers and cutters to salvage a potential reject, they scolded me and insisted that I instead toss the cigarette in the reject bin and move on, singing “just reject it” (*direjek, direjek, direjek saja*).

Despite the intense quota pressure, my neighbors prided themselves on being more youthful and fun than other workers. They called one another “darling” (*sayang*), engaged in bawdy conversation, sang loudly when Radio Sampoerna played a popular song, and encouraged me to copy their dance moves.

Labeling

Labelers receive the same lower pay as cutters, but their work is more relaxed and less physically punishing. They apply excise stamps (*banderol*) to packs, carton packs, and box cartons. All this cardboard and paper handling can lead to nasty paper cuts, but these pale in comparison to cutters’ injuries. Labelers arrive later than other workers, close to 6:00 a.m., knowing they will not have finished packs to work with until later in the morning. Their routines involve intermittent relief from sitting on their stools since they stand when applying date and location tracking stamps to carton cardboard and pre-fold it (my height forced me to sit) and intermittently walk to retrieve more packs or give finished cartons to box packers. Labelers occasionally gathered around my workstation to chat while I worked at my slower tempo, sometimes occupying my neighbor’s stool. One who had tried advancing to higher-paid rolling and packing positions returned to labeling, concluding that she appreciated the intermittent rest it offered (*ada istirahat*). To be sure, labelers still work speedily, but their quotas seemed achievable even for older workers and were uniform rather than tiered based on capacity. Their quota was fifty-five *pasok* (of one hundred packs each) Monday through Thursday, forty-seven on Friday, and thirty-three on Saturday (my output started at eight and rose to fourteen).

I required, and received, far less training and supervision in labeling than in rolling and packing. Bu Narti, the supervisor, gave me limited instructions, and my neighbors rarely felt compelled to correct my work. Narti set me up with glue in a stainless-steel tray and a wooden block on which to array the *banderol*, which she fanned out and glued down at one end so they would stick in place but could still be picked up. She taught me to turn the packs toward me and apply the glue using my sticky right index finger to lift a label, then hold it with left thumb and index finger while running my right index finger and thumb along the length of it to get glue along the whole thing. Labelers had their own methods of applying *banderol*, which often involve applying glue to multiple labels at once rather than following the “correct” one-at-a-time technique that Narti taught me. Bu Delia warned me not to copy her improper technique.

Glue work involves a tension between sliding and sticking. To work at speed, one’s fingers should glide swiftly over the labels, but even when done well, the work and initial results while the glue was drying were messy. As glue built up on my



FIGURE 9. Applying excise tax stamps. Photo by author.

fingers, they lost sensation and dexterity. I was inclined to rub my fingers together to peel off the glue, but Bu Wahyu discouraged this, insisting that I wipe my hands on a rag instead. After labeling a couple hundred packs, labelers tuck them into cartons, grabbing five with each hand and placing them at the ends of the carton at the same time, then fitting five more with each hand into the middle. While filling cartons, I learned to keep my glue-coated index fingers poised aloft while my drier fingers performed the work.

Being blamed for missing excise tax stamps, which have monetary value akin to currency, is the greatest source of stress for most labeling workers and supervisors. After a labeler told Narti she was short one, Narti inspected her packs to ensure that she hadn't accidentally stuck two on a single pack. She then started hunting through all the labelers' trash cups in an intense but fruitless search. When I, too, later came up short one label, Narti happily concluded that what should have been sets of one hundred excise labels only contained ninety-nine, so we were not at fault. Once I started a set of labels, she insisted that I remain at my workstation until they were finished, since unattended labels could be stolen. Narti previously supervised rolling and only reluctantly agreed to switch to labeling to fill a vacancy. She feared the responsibility and trouble supervisors and workers face if *banderol* go missing. Anyone caught trying to leave the factory with tax labels would be fired. Workers recounted that after a labeler incorrectly labeled packs, she was forced to take an unpaid leave, and the supervisor lost her annual bonus. On one occasion at the Jember factory, stamps were missing, and no one

was allowed to leave until they were located (a worker had inexplicably tossed them in a trash can).

THIRD-PARTY OPERATORS

Outsourcing hand-rolled kretek production to “third-party operators” (TPOs) was one of Putera Sampoerna’s innovations and an ostensible example of Sampoerna’s commitment to corporate responsibility. Aligned with East Javanese Governor Sudirman’s 1990s “Return to the Village” initiative (*Gerakan Kembali ke Desa*, GKD), the TPOs were supposed to create rural employment, reduce urban migration, ease development inequalities (*pemerataan pembangunan*), and employ workers from the poorest (*prasejahtera* or “pre-prosperous”) families who could only afford to eat two meals a day. Putera Sampoerna initially envisioned working exclusively with cooperatives (*Koperasi Unit Desa*, KUD), but today, only a few of Sampoerna’s thirty-eight TPOs are organized in this fashion.⁸ A TPO manager in Ploso insisted that residents were proud to host a factory in their otherwise neglected, deficient region (*daerah tertinggal, daerah minus*) that lacked water and relied on hit-or-miss tobacco harvests in the dry season. TPOs have created new rural jobs, but they have also served Sampoerna’s interest in ensuring a cheap, geographically dispersed, and insecure labor force and using third parties to lobby the government on the industry’s behalf to oppose tobacco control and keep minimum wages low. If Sampoerna managers paternalistically treat workers in Sampoerna-operated factories like children, TPO workers—along with TPO owners and managers—are like stepchildren, always trying to do more work for less money to earn high ratings, rewards, and larger contracts.

We met with unfailing and practiced displays of hospitality during our Sampoerna-arranged visits to a dozen TPOs. TPO managers and owners, Sampoerna supervisors, and occasionally union representatives assembled with us in meeting rooms for welcome speeches, safety briefings, and operation overviews before tours commenced. TPO hosts expressed their loyalty and gratitude to Sampoerna and their zeal for producing the quality and innovation the company valued. Their eager-to-please demeanors and resolutely upbeat performances verged, at times, on servile and desperate and reflected their subordination to Sampoerna.

Prapto conceded that one of the primary advantages of TPOs over Sampoerna-run factories is that they pay much lower wages, easily offsetting the additional costs of transporting raw materials and finished products. TPO pieceworkers’ base pay is set to exactly 10,000 rupiah above the regional minimum wage (*Upah Minimum Kota/Kabupaten*, UMK), which ranged from roughly 1.3 million to 2.2 million rupiah per month in factories we visited in 2016. The gender profile of TPO workforces resembles that of Sampoerna-operated hand-rolling factories. Factories with higher minimum wages have lower turnover and older worker age profiles, whereas in regions with low minimum wages such as Yogyakarta, monthly

turnover rates reach 5–7 percent, as workers frequently quit to care for children or try other factories. Turnover typically peaks after workers collect their holiday bonus at the end of Ramadhan. Factories with high turnover may have dozens of non-uniformed, closely supervised apprentice workers (*magang*) who earn a pocket-money (*uang saku*) pittance and can remain in apprentice status for up to one year.⁹ Sampoerna managers are supposed to ensure that TPO managers aren't "naughty" (*nakal*) in taking advantage of this extremely low-wage class of workers.

TPO workers face tougher quotas than Sampoerna's factory workers. Rollers, for example, must produce at least 370 as opposed to 325 cigarettes an hour. Although a Sampoerna executive framed these higher targets as autonomously set by admirably ambitious and high-achieving TPOs, extracting more from workers who are paid less could instead be interpreted as a result of TPO subordination to Sampoerna that produces greater worker exploitation.

In response to changing corporate strategies and fluctuating consumer demand, Sampoerna also demanded more production-line flexibility from TPOs than Sampoerna-operated factories. Whereas Sampoerna-operated factories exclusively produce *Dji Sam Soe* twelve-packs, TPOs produce *Dji Sam Soe* twelve- and sixteen-packs, *Dji Sam Soe Premium*, *Panamas Kuning*, *Sampoerna Hijau*, and "Marlboro Crafted," a hand-rolled white cigarette twelve-pack that Sampoerna launched in November 2020 in Sumatra. Sampoerna's president claimed that Sampoerna-run factories produce only *Dji Sam Soe* twelve-packs because they represent the company's core product and historical pride, leaving TPOs to cover the company's hand-rolled brand spectrum and experiments. Prapto offered a competing rationale: "It's easy to introduce changes in TPOs because their unions aren't very strong." A quality assurance manager similarly observed with an indulgent smile that Sampoerna workers would yell in protest if asked to switch product lines, whereas vulnerable and less entitled TPO workers were in no position to resist. TPOs found it could take six months for workers to achieve target rates when brand changeovers required different skills and tools. *Dji Sam Soe premium* also requires a devoted air-conditioned "conditioning room" where cigarettes are dried, which alters the taste and drops their average weight from 2 to 1.97 grams. A TPO manager assured me that they were proud to be entrusted with this premium product but then admitted that it was mandatory for TPOs to show that they are loyal Sampoerna partners who stand ready to serve, whatever task they are given (*sebagai mitra harus sikapnya siap, setiap tugas diberi oleh Sampoerna*).

The language of partnership that frames the relationship between Sampoerna and its TPOs, which are known as *mitra produksi sigaret* (MPS, cigarette production partners) in Indonesian, obscures the hierarchical relationship between the two in which Sampoerna surveils, ranks, and disciplines TPOs. A Sampoerna supervisor and four or more additional Sampoerna employees conduct administrative and quality control work on TPO shopfloors and undertake special projects. Disclosing a crack in the façade of benign mutualism, one Sampoerna supervisor

confided in a low voice that overseeing a TPO was immensely burdensome (*paling berat*) and had earned him enemies.

Sampoerna rates TPOs as bronze, silver, gold, or platinum and distributes rewards and punishments accordingly. Ratings reflect product quality, cost, safety, lost-time injury, security, industrial relations, and other “observable factors” such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and worker satisfaction. Platinum winners should be outstanding in all parameters. Sampoerna issues performance scores at an annual meeting. Platinum and gold awardees are celebrated, while silver and bronze awardees go unmentioned; a TPO manager observed that the six bronze-rated TPOs were probably ashamed. Gold and platinum winners were eligible for various awards that were supposed to motivate workers such as a drinking water tap system, a fifty-two-inch TV, LCD projector, laptop, uniforms, and panaboard (electronic whiteboard). More importantly, Sampoerna favored platinum and gold winners for larger contracts. Observing that they had enjoyed some overtime that week, one TPO director turned to his Sampoerna supervisor and obsequiously thanked him for the favor. He coldly responded, “Achieve gold status, and you’ll get even more.” In Yogyakarta, a manager preened that his TPO was Sampoerna’s favorite because they liked to be relaxed but also pursue their targets (*santai tapi mengejar target*). TPOs feed Sampoerna data on their production and quality indicators on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis.

In competing for most-favored factory status, TPOs often reproduce or mimic the programs and amenities of Sampoerna factories, replicating the lean managerial ideology, hiring professional DJs or music programming complete with jingles, and hosting special celebrations and events for workers (Kartini Day and Earth Day, traditional dress competitions and aerobics competitions), and sponsoring CSR activities.¹⁰ Accompanied by cheerful music, TPO videos showcase these activities and awards and incorporate images of food stalls and of signs labeling rental units as full to illustrate the local economic stimulus or multiplier effect created by their factories. TPO managers have also developed programs tied to “key performance indicators”; some workers are rewarded with basic household goods (e.g., rice, cooking oil) for weeding out non-conforming cigarettes or foreign matter from tobacco, for example, while others receive safe-driving lessons to reduce accident rates. TPOs compete for Sampoerna recognition of their videos, hygiene, quality, and productivity and for recognition of their industrial and environment, health, and safety innovations, which are showcased at Sampoerna’s annual convention. They even incorporate Sampoerna’s auspicious number via acts like scheduling a factory opening for the ninth day of the month.

However elaborate their social responsibility programs or outstanding their quality indicators, TPOs in areas with higher minimum wage rates complained that they were uncompetitive because production costs factored so heavily into performance evaluation. “Labor made up 80 percent of our factory’s production costs,” a Jombang manager complained. “Yogyakarta factories can produce

2.5 packs for the same cost as a single pack in Mojokerto!” Sampoerna pressured TPOs to keep minimum wages low by, for example, joining the Indonesian Business Association (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia or APINDO) and exercising their influence as members. The Jombang TPO vigorously pursued this avenue of influence, while a Ngantang manager admitted that they belonged to the organization but exercised no meaningful influence over it. Pitting the TPOs against each other not only emphasizes their subordination to Sampoerna but also adds downward pressure on workers’ wages.

Besides helping suppress regional minimum wage levels, Sampoerna mobilizes TPOs to lobby the government against tobacco control policies such as raising excise taxes, protecting nonsmokers, and restricting advertising. Prapto explained that cooperatives, which are supposed to distribute their earnings, made for particularly appealing lobbyists: “If Sampoerna complains about the excise tax, the government can dismiss us, saying ‘You’re just a big company.’ But if you get a bunch of cooperatives that go to the government and talk about the impact that a rise in excise tax will have on them, the government must listen.” Some TPOs derived appeal from their religious or aristocratic associations. One of the Jombang and Ploso factory owners served as a teacher (*kyai*) at a local religious school from which the plant recruited fresh graduates as workers, and he projected the authority of a pious and successful Muslim businessman (Hoesterey 2015; Rudnyckyj 2010). The last TPO that Sampoerna established in 2012 was tied to Yogyakarta’s popular Sultan Hamengkubuwono. His first daughter, Gusti Kanjeng Ratu Condokiriono, became a director, and two of her sisters held senior positions in the company.¹¹

Despite the advantages they offer, from low labor costs and production-line flexibility to political capital in lobbying efforts, Sampoerna turned to its contractors to absorb the ongoing reduction in market demand after initially closing two company-operated factories in 2014. Rather than closing any TPOs, Sampoerna shrank their “packets” or order sizes by 27.5 percent. The Ploso factory, which used to manufacture over fifteen million cigarettes a week and sometimes subjected workers to brutal sixty-one-hour workweeks, was reduced to nine million sticks a week. My assumption that massive layoffs must have ensued was confounded by large signs in front of Yogyakarta factories announcing hundreds of open positions. Managers explained that high turnover could take care of shrinking their workforce when order reductions hit. Managers and union representatives in factories with high wages and low turnover offered divergent accounts of how they reduced their workforce. In Ngantang, union representatives claimed that the early retirement offer (*pensiun dini sukarela*) was so appealing that workers clamored to take it, so the union determined which workers economically needed to keep their jobs.¹² In other higher-wage TPOs, union representatives admitted that as they pursued a 10 percent workforce reduction they sought to oust workers who produced below quotas and attracted peer resentment.

In some TPOs, workers responded to the loss of overtime by displaying their attachment to the commodity. At the Jombang TPO, workers took home a pack of Sampoerna Hijau kretek each week for their spouses, sons, or brothers, with the cost automatically deducted from their weekly wage. A union representative in Ngantang told us that her husband, a middle school physical education teacher, smoked Sampoerna Hijau at her request. Some TPO consumer cooperatives also sold cheap cartons of Sampoerna cigarettes and ran programs that allowed workers to earn points on purchases of the brand they manufactured (with product coded from other factories to avoid accusations of factory theft) that they could redeem for branded T-shirts, thermoses, ashtrays, and lighters. Amid the hand-rolled market decline and the increasing precarity of TPO jobs, Sampoerna continues to extract value from rollers and their families, as both producers and consumers.

SUPERVISING QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND SOLIDARITY

As those immediately above workers in the factory hierarchy, supervisors constitute the human frontline of speed and quality control and can inspire fondness and loyalty or apprehension and dislike. Most workers interact minimally with the unit coordinator and factory manager, by whom they would prefer to go unnoticed. Workers pointed out a camera affixed to the unit wall that afforded the factory manager a 360-degree view of the shop floor and surveillance powers akin to those depicted in Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times*. Quality control lab technicians have a distanced relationship with workers since they primarily judge their anonymized products based on company standards. Sampoerna assesses everyone in this chain, from workers to team leaders, lab technicians, radio DJs, and factory managers, whom Sampoerna evaluates by comparing the quality, speed, and unit cost across factories. Ideally, no one should escape the dragnet of performance evaluation and continuous improvement.

Historically, Sampoerna recruited supervisors (*mandor*) from the ranks of ordinary workers, so many had low levels of formal education. One supervisor began working full time in a cigarette factory when she was ten, joined Sampoerna at thirteen, and was already promoted to supervisor at the age of sixteen. Another began at kretek manufacturer Grèndèl when she was twelve, later moved on to Bentoel, and joined Sampoerna at the age of twenty. In the past, she acknowledged, supervisors were selected by their friends in a "family system" (*sistem keluarga*). Classified as daily workers, supervisors use badges to check in and out of each workday and track their one-hour breaks with punch cards, often splitting the allotted hour into two shorter breaks: one to eat a meal and one to perform midday prayers that quota-chasing pieceworkers forgo.

After acquiring Sampoerna, PMI sought to dismantle the informal system for supervisor selection, which was vulnerable to charges of nepotism, by introducing new criteria (including a high school degree), openly advertising positions,

allowing anyone who met the criteria to apply, and subjecting applicants to standard testing procedures. PMI also instituted annual or biannual rotations of supervisors to different units and teams, whereas previously supervisors had remained with the same workers for five years or longer. A rolling supervisor told me the rotations gave them a fresh perspective, although it was always sad to leave behind workers whom they knew down to their strengths and weaknesses.

Workers are organized into teams—with supervisors acting as team leaders—in a structure that facilitates oversight, assignment of praise and blame, and a sense of collective rather than solely individual responsibility and competition. This would sometimes motivate individuals to work hard on days when they otherwise felt sluggish, although it could also make those who fell short an undesirable drag on team performance. In my unit, sets of forty-eight rollers and sixteen cutters formed teams with two supervisors assigned to each, while thirty-three packers formed a team with one supervisor, as did twelve labelers. Team leaders halted work to hold short pep (*semangat*) sessions every Thursday morning before Radio Sampoerna began broadcasting. Encircled by workers, the supervisor discussed their performance goals, achievements, and challenges and led cheers on themes having to do with product quality. One week, Bu Mainu praised her rolling and cutting team for achieving the second-best quality index, adding that if they reached number one, they would receive an extra 20,000 rupiah in their weekly pay. I later asked if her team often performed so well. Mainu shrugged, responding that workers were humans, not machines, so their work was sometimes good, sometimes bad.

Workers judged supervisors on how they used their position and authority. Some earned appreciation by contributing to workers' output. When a labeler left her workstation, Narti often occupied the vacant stool and labeled packs until she returned, and labelers praised her as kind (*baik*) and familial (*seperti saudara*). When Titin observed a packer struggling to make her quota, she sometimes stood beside her for a while and prepared sets of twelve cigarettes, correctly arranged. Packers contrasted Titin with an earlier, evil (*jahat*) supervisor who had sapped their enthusiasm and desire to work. Rollers contrasted a modest, hard-working, and diligent (*sregep* Jv) supervisor who was approaching retirement with another whom they accused of being engrossed in her phone and ignoring workers. If she had nothing better to do, they said, she should help cutters by bundling cigarettes and performing quality control. Workers speculated that supervisors who wore makeup and youthful, tight-fitting attire were morally suspect, enjoyed karaoke, and might be unfaithful to their husbands. The relationship between workers and team leaders—often familiar and friendly but fundamentally unequal—manifested memorably in an interaction between a cutter and a supervisor who were playfully smacking each other's bottoms until the cutter jokingly yelled "Assault!" (*Pelecehan!*).

Workers also judged supervisors on their approach to tracking and rationing material supplies like tobacco, glue, cigarette papers, packing paper and cardboard,



FIGURE 10. A supervisor inspects a roller's kretek. Photo by author.

and particularly excise stamps. Workers disliked it when supervisors were stingy (*pelit*), forcing them to scrounge around for supplies. Fearing a shortage, Nurul told me she used to hoard cigarette papers and hide them in her tobacco, which landed her in trouble. As Titin was stocking our glue at the start of one day, Arti loudly observed that everything is targeted and rationed, including glue, and that she would never be allowed to use glue in the wasteful and extravagant (*boros*) fashion that I did. Hearing Arti's words, Titin gave her a generous second squirt of glue.

Sampoerna urges pieceworkers to internalize responsibility for quality with red aprons emblazoned with "my best quality" (*kwalitasku terbaik*), but it also institutes multiple layers of external oversight and control. Some supervisors made examples of workers' shortcomings with loud comments. During my day as a cutter, a supervisor materialized at my side while I was working through a batch that included one cigarette with a visible chunk of plastic and another with a tobacco stem so large it stuck out at both ends. Appalled, she marched over to the responsible roller, offending cigarettes held aloft for all to see, and roared at her, ensuring that her remarks would be widely heard. On another occasion, she loudly, albeit less sharply, reprimanded my neighbor for producing tiny cigarettes (*rokok sampean cilik-cilik! Jv*).

Quality supervisors performed initial inspections on finished tubs containing six hundred cigarettes that cutters brought to their inspection station. They claimed that rollers used to make cigarettes however they liked, with minimal attention

given to matters like weight. After PMI acquired Sampoerna, the company forced rollers to produce more standard cigarettes. From each tub, supervisors inspected two bundles of fifty, weighing them to ensure that they fell within the acceptable range (98–105 grams), examining burn ends for loose or insufficient tobacco (*tipis*), pulling off the wrapper and fanning out the cigarettes, and yanking those with oil spots, tobacco in seams, too little filling (*gembos*), tobacco sticking out (*njebul, muncul*), too little glue, or wrinkles (*berkerut, lungset*). They also checked individual cigarette circumferences. A supervisor showed me how a worker had accidentally wrapped a cigarette with two papers. If they found twenty rejects in a single bundle, they rejected the entire batch of six hundred. “We had one of those today,” a supervisor informed me, casually adding that it was no big deal for a fast roller, although even the fastest would face an hour setback. To track problems, supervisors tossed rejects in boxes labeled with rejection rationales. After tabulating them, supervisors ripped rejects open to recycle the tobacco. Workers feared being reprimanded (*dipanggil*, “called”) by a quality supervisor or, worse yet, the unit supervisor.

Quality control also had a backstage lab dimension. Bu Sari intermittently appeared to pick up cigarette samples, which she placed in a plastic tub with a pink lid. Sari, along with five other *jilbab*-clad women, worked in an air-conditioned quality-control room. Their male supervisor occasionally ran shop-floor quiz competitions on quality-control themes, presenting winners with rewards like umbrellas and tote bags. I spent a morning observing inspections in the lab where technicians weighed and visually examined the burn and inhalation ends of the cigarette (*ujung bakar, ujung hisap*), rotated the cigarette in their fingers to check for wrinkles (guidelines illustrate low, acceptable, and high levels), and checked the seam for tears, insufficient glue, tobacco particles (guidelines specify the acceptable number and size of tobacco particles) and tobacco and clove oil spots (guidelines specify acceptable size and darkness of such spots). They enter numbers for all these variables into tables, generating a final cigarette score. Finally, they measure moisture content in a machine manufactured by German company TEWS. Sari insisted that quality-control ranking is directed at units rather than individuals, but critical scrutiny nevertheless fell on the latter. After Sari returned inspected cigarettes to the unit, the supervisor instantly called a packer to show her problems with the cigarettes she had packed, asking her to exercise more caution in the future. I felt that the worker was being upbraided, but Sari commented that the supervisor was providing motivation (*memberi motivasi*).

Social interactions among workers help make repetitive high-speed factory work tolerable, and mutual help and reciprocity buoy those struggling to meet daily quotas. Rollers, for example, might make an extra fifty or one hundred cigarettes for a peer who falls behind. Similarly, while we were washing our tools, Ana, who typically achieved her quota with ease, told me she had labeled an extra hundred packs for her neighbors that day. On an occasion when speedy Arti had

been assigned a reduced packing target because she had attended an environmental, health, and safety meeting as a worker representative (where she also won a prize glassware set), she gave multiple packs to her neighbors, dispelling potential envy. Because I was not subject to quotas, the modest quantity of cigarettes, packs, and cartons I produced were also subject to redistribution. Supervisors replaced rejected cigarettes with my output when it was fit for sale (*layak dijual*) and occasionally slipped some to workers who were behind. In packing and labeling, my supervisors distributed my finished packs and cartons among workers in their group or had me hand them out directly.

Workers also showed generosity toward one another in the canteen, where I typically joined rollers' 9:00 a.m. "lunch" breaks. Workers often bought tea and coffee for one another and stretched drinks by pouring a little for themselves into the saucer and handing the cup to a friend. (Although coffee is often seen as stronger and more appropriate for men, pieceworkers drank it to stay alert and chase quotas.) Workers spooned tasty food onto friends' plates or dipped their spoons into a neighbor's plate to sample meat, tofu, or vegetables. I was often on the receiving end of insistent hospitality, and Nia discouraged me from buying the cheap, tasty canteen food, bringing a full extra ration of her home-cooked food for me, especially the local tempeh specialty *mendol* that I was fond of. The polyclinic doctor cautioned workers, to no apparent avail, that such food sharing was unsanitary and transmitted contagious diseases.

Workers' lives intertwined beyond the factory walls. Some lived close to one another and commuted to work together, while those who lived further apart also entered one another's home lives, particularly around family weddings, births, illnesses, and deaths. Group excursions and home visits (*main ke rumah*) were common after the shorter Saturday work shift. I joined one of these excursions, cramming into the rear of a battered SUV to go to Batu along with rollers and cutters in a small caravan of cars and motorbikes. We caught only brief glimpses of the ostensible object of our journey, a roller's three-week-old granddaughter, who was nestled on her mother's chest in a sarong sling. While workers' husbands, who chauffeured us, sat on sofas and smoked in the front room, we sat on mats on the floor of the modest home, chatting and joking as workers took turns praying, ate a generous meal prepared by our hosts, and left with additional food packed into boxes.

Managers looked to the workers' union to ensure that solidarity among workers would not boil over into organized resistance. Workers in Sampoerna's hand-rolled factories and their TPO counterparts belong to the Cigarette, Tobacco, Food, and Drink (Rokok, Tembakau, Makanan dan Minuman) sector of the umbrella All Indonesia Workers' Union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, or SPSI), which is a legacy of Suharto's rule (1967–98).¹³ After violently suppressing more radical and militant unions in the wake of the Communist Party's alleged 1965 coup attempt, the Suharto administration created the state-backed union that became SPSI to

depoliticize and demobilize labor. Throughout the Suharto era, the government invoked the specter of communism to discredit labor disputes and unrest and threatened labor organizers by branding them as communist (Hadiz 1998). SPSI union representatives in Sampoerna factories largely embraced managerial goals, negotiated modest changes in a professional and unthreatening fashion, shared information with managers, and opposed both labor radicalism and tobacco control as existential threats to factory livelihoods.

The union leadership is dominated by daily-wage workers who often have different interests from, and supervisory authority over, the pieceworkers that constitute the majority the union is meant to represent. Union representatives insisted that pieceworkers are reluctant to assume leadership positions because the interruptions that accompany union service would make it hard to meet quotas. For daily workers, SPSI union positions can serve as a stepping stone to further promotion in the factory hierarchy.

Projecting the union's hallmark conservative, conciliatory, and nonconfrontational approach toward management, hand-rolled SPSI leaders in Kraksaan assured me that industry was safe there (*kondisi industri aman*) because workers never demonstrated (*nggak pernah aksi*) and knew to think twice before causing any trouble. They characterized their union as quiet (*nggak terlalu ramai-ramai*) and adherent to the religious precept of discussing matters thrice before taking action. They invoked the state ideology of Pancasila to legitimate discussing and conferring (*berunding*) with managers rather than making demands (*bukan tuntutan*). Similarly, Malang leaders depicted the union as a bridge between workers and managers and explained that they adhered to the SPSI path, emphasizing mediation and consensus (*musyawarah*) and avoiding street demonstrations (*tidak pakai cara turun jalan*).

SPSI leaders framed more independent and radical unions and approaches as existential threats, pointing to cases of "failed demonstrations" in which workers lost their jobs, suffered injuries, and had no one to cover their health care. "If Sampoerna were destroyed," one asked, "where would we work? Our livelihoods [*sawah ladang*] are at Sampoerna, and we need to look after the company." Based on surveys of other hand-rolling factories, Malang's SPSI representatives were confident that they enjoyed pay and benefit packages that compared favorably to other factory workers. An SPSI representative at the Jombang contract factory even asserted that they had it too good, with a high regional minimum wage that was deterring other companies from setting up shop in industrial parks.

SPSI trained union leaders in approved verbal communication techniques. At their annual wage and benefit negotiations with managers, which were held in moderately upscale hotels with Sampoerna covering food and lodging, union leaders showcased their research and professional skills with PowerPoint slide-shows. The union gave management feedback (e.g., when new uniforms were too hot or uncomfortable) and requested improvements and greater recognition (e.g., for annual medical checkups, health benefits for spouses and children, cooperative

shopping vouchers marking each five-year anniversary of a worker's tenure, and batik uniforms for workers to wear once a week).

In the Malang hand-rolling plant, I attended an inauguration ceremony for the new SPSI leadership that framed the kretek as a national commodity and positioned workers and managers in a mutually supporting rather than oppositional relationship. The seating arrangements, order of food distribution, speeches, and entertainment reflected the factory hierarchy by prioritizing managers over supervisors and supervisors over workers. Drawing on nationalist aesthetics in her speech, the new SPSI head underscored that the union leaders' uniforms were made of batik, which, like kretek, is part of Indonesia's cultural heritage. Another representative urged everyone's participation in safeguarding quality to ensure that Sampoerna survived for their grandchildren. Clutching a bag emblazoned with "SAVE TOBACCO," the elderly head of the Indonesian Tobacco Alliance AMTI gave a rousing speech. "Kretek have been smoked for hundreds of years," he falsely proclaimed, "so if [the mandatory warning that] 'smoking kills' [*rokok membunuhmu*] were true, then Indonesia would have been finished off long ago." Before managers, workers sang songs and performed traditional Javanese dances in elaborate makeup and dress. The event concluded with a lengthy photo session during which union representatives and managers pressed close for poses that reflected their harmonious and cozy relationship.

With the hand-rolled commodity in decline, Sampoerna managers invoke the importance of labor-management solidarity against common external threats like public health regulations. SPSI leaders considered government lobbying as one of the union's functions, and they had created banners, written letters to oppose excise tax hikes and tobacco import limits, and demonstrated against the health minister. A Kraksaan union leader said they also opposed regional laws requiring smoke-free areas and advertising restrictions, citing Bandung's and Surabaya's restrictions as examples to be avoided. A male union representative reminisced about the time when anyone could freely smoke anywhere and when people suffering a cough or sniffles smoked Dji Sam Soe to regain their health.

Managers also enrolled unions to remind workers of rules against "gossip." Managers regarded workers as emotionally volatile but also manipulable, credulous, and highly susceptible to gossip. The unit supervisor told me that agitators could easily lead on (*memancing*) workers. When the industrial relations director from Jakarta visited, he occupied my neighbor's stool and told me that as someone in charge of many workers, he had seen how trivial issues could balloon into huge problems. In 2008, he claimed, workers and supervisors went on strike over the rumor that Putera Sampoerna was going to pay them each thirty-five million rupiah.

Sampoerna found a worker-whisperer in Pak Salim who had a background in economics, worked for Sampoerna for thirty-two years, and continued to consult after retirement at the request of senior executives. He boasted about his knack for quelling demonstrations, which he had deployed in both Sampoerna- and contractor-run factories:

When TPO [contractor] leaders can't figure out how to deal with workers, they call me in. For example, there was a large demonstration in Lamongan organized by college students. The workers wanted to know why they weren't paid as much as those in Surabaya. I explained to them, "You are not a Sampoerna worker. You are paid according to the regional minimum wage." When you look around the factories, everything looks calm and fine, but there's a lot going on under the surface. That's people for you.

I asked if he could think of cases where workers had made reasonable demands. No, he responded dismissively, as if management were always right and protesting workers always wrong. If workers were easily misled, in his view they were also easy to distract and manipulate in management's favor. "If a fifty-three-year-old worker asks, 'Am I going to retire in rolling?,' do you tell her the truth? Do you say, 'Yes'? No! Instead you ask, 'How is your child? Wow, they graduated!' [Wah, sudah lulus!] You direct their attention elsewhere [*dialihkan*] so that they forget about the question they asked in the first place."

Salim routinely gave motivational speeches on his management philosophy called the Power of Bisa. *Bisa* (can, to be able) was an acronym for gratitude (*ber-syukur*), sincerity (*ikhlas*), and patience (*sabar*). The three core concepts, which he planned to monetize with a book, are religiously inflected and have Arabic roots. Elaborating on gratitude, Salim explained that people should be happy with what God has given them. If a cutter complains that rollers earn more, she won't be happy. If her husband doesn't work, she should be happy that he isn't stealing. She shouldn't complain that her children are naughty, because she could instead have none. As for sincerity (*ikhlas*), people should be genuinely grateful for what God has given. A worker showed me a slip of paper detailing their official monthly wages for the coming year that also reminded workers about the Power of Bisa. My neighbors also referred to the concept in discussing their husbands' and children's shortcomings and the accepting (*menerima*) attitude and "positive thinking" that they should adopt. Sampoerna's emphasis on women's positive domestic role suggests an anxiety that their capacity to generate collective anger around domestic issues (cheating spouses) could be a disruptive source of political agency and labor solidarity against the company.

RADIO SAMPOERNA: THE VOICE OF PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY

Managers relied heavily on Radio Sampoerna to modulate workers' emotional states, increase the quality and speed of their output, foster attachment to the company, and impart religious, moral, domestic, and health-related teachings. After a company survey found support for an industrial radio show that would fulfill three company goals—to inform, entertain, and motivate—Sampoerna called for tenders (Pradana 2012). Media consultancy firm Idego Tatakarsa submitted

the winning bid, and Radio Sampoerna went live in 2007 in Surabaya's Rungkut 1 factory (Pradana 2012, 5). As it was rolled out to other plants, Radio Sampoerna replaced the ordinary radios with which workers previously enlivened their work environment (Weix 1990).¹⁴ Radio Sampoerna imposes sonic structure on workers' days, weeks, and years with special thematic content tied to the Muslim calendar, national holidays, and company anniversaries. It commences at 7:00 a.m., an hour after production officially starts, halts from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. for the DJs' lunch break, and then concludes around the time workers are supposed to wrap up (about 2:00 p.m. when I worked in the Malang plant). It mingles with and dominates human voices and other factory sounds such as the clatter of metal and wooden tools.

Radio Sampoerna reinforces conservative gender norms by urging female factory workers to diligently fulfill their duties as housewives. The station ran programming on maintaining a well-run and peaceful household; notes from the kitchen, bathroom, and bedroom (*catatan dari dapur, sumur* [literally, the well, signaling bathing and toilet], *kasur* [mattress]); and tips on personal health, beauty, and physical fitness upkeep to encourage women to maintain themselves even after having achieved the life goals of marriage and children (Pradana 2012, 74–75).

The Radio Sampoerna infrastructure in each plant includes a soundproof, air-conditioned DJ office, a cable system, and numerous speakers. April, the Radio Sampoerna manager, admitted that “radio” was a misnomer because rather than being broadcast wirelessly as AM or FM, it was transmitted via cable, a system that entailed unexpected challenges; April had had to remind plants to maintain the quality and integrity of their sound systems after mice chewed through Rungkut 2's cables. In my unit, twelve large speakers affixed to the walls piped Radio Sampoerna's signature blend of music, edutainment, company jingles, and performance assessments.

Radio Sampoerna DJs draw on their professional, cultural, and linguistic knowledge to cultivate intimate and approachable on-air personae, appealing playlists, and accessible speech styles that were distinct from their off-air social identities, musical interests, and ways of speaking. Two or three worked at each plant, with two typically on air at a time. A female and male DJ often paired up to create a pleasing banter they called “duetting.” On air, DJs adopted pseudonyms combining syllables from the kretek brand name (Dji Sam Soe) with familiar Javanese honorifics that positioned them relationally as Sampoerna siblings (*dulur-dulur Sampoerna Jr*), such as “Ning Soe” and “Cak Dji” (Pradana 2012, 64). The DJs deliberately smile while speaking, knowing their sunny facial expressions are audible in their alternately happy, enthusiastic, soothing, and sympathetic voices and patter. To maintain these upbeat performances, they usually limited themselves to three-hour stretches on air. Just as there are photogenic faces, Cak Sam informed me, there are microphonogenic voices. Ning Dji explained that DJs try

to adopt a personal mindset on air, as if they are just interacting with one person. She drew on her Madurese background, while her colleague frequently used low and middle Javanese registers (*ngoko*, *kromo inggil*), speaking in short, simple Javanese sentences and limiting himself to single insertions of English terms such as “waste.” Cak Dji always translated acronyms like VQI (visual quality index) using accessible language (*bahasa yang membumi*). As he saw it, the DJ’s role is to find a language that connects (*nyambung*) to workers and their everyday speech, to bridge the massive inequalities between managers and workers with only an elementary school education. He avoided the formal speech characteristic of religion and print media (*Bahasa baku dibuang*, *bahasa Koran*, *bahasa cetak*) and formal words (e.g., *sehingga*, *walaupun*), embracing everyday speech and striving to produce a voice consistent with the spirit of the program (*satu jiwa dengan satu program*). DJs joked in workers’ language (*guyonan-guyonan bahasa mereka*) and socialized ideas in language that was clear (*bahasa gamblang* Jv) and accessible but not insulting (*dengan bahasa enak tapi tidak menyinggung mereka*).

DJs bore responsibility for, but held only partial control over, “The Voice of Productivity and Quality,” as one poster on their office wall called Radio Sampoerna. In general broadcast radio, where Ning Soe previously worked, she developed her own content such as talk shows on current issues, whereas at Radio Sampoerna the company provided content such as quizzes and information. DJs were nevertheless expected to perform multiple functions as radio operators, script writers, music directors, administrators, and call receivers (Pradana 2012, 65). They enhanced Radio Sampoerna’s professional quality by regularly inserting jingles and canned audience applause and laughter. DJs also had to fill out regular reports for April, who collected recordings of all DJ speech aired and randomly sampled recordings on a weekly basis to check for crude (*kasar*) or unclear language. She reprimanded DJs whose performance she found subpar.

Radio Sampoerna sculpted its “edutainment” offerings around company profits and worker well-being, with themes including adaptations from Japanese clean and lean workplace management ideology (discussed in further detail in chapter 3), environmental health and safety, mental and physical health and well-being, and religion (Pradana 2012, 73–75). April found that if Radio Sampoerna overemphasized “education,” workers complained about the “advertising” (*mereka bilang “iklan”*). With recorded sketches (*sandiwara*) voiced by plant managers, DJ adlibbing, and interviews, workers were reminded about locker cleanliness, urged to donate blood, forbidden from selling one another products or lending money, and tutored by the polyclinic doctor on themes such as dengue fever symptoms and prevention.¹⁵ Personal hygiene and quality-control goals overlapped in a handwashing segment, since Sampoerna does not want cigarettes rolled in greasy hands. Around 8:40 a.m. from Mondays through Friday, Radio Sampoerna called everyone on the shop floor (including supervisors and managers if present) to stand and follow a mandatory and rather dull and sedate short stretching routine

(*senam*) that polyclinic doctors had designed to exercise workers' hands, arms, and backs and prevent their fingers from shortening.¹⁶ To build pride in the company and understanding of its values, April noted that they also ran announcements on Sampoerna's approach to positive stakeholder relations—its so-called three-hands philosophy (*falsafah tiga tangan*)—and the company's brands so that workers could "share their knowledge with their neighbors."¹⁷ On Fridays, DJs play recorded sermons by popular religious figures, who often incorporated informal speech and Javanese, showcased voice mimicry skills, and included pro-Sampoerna messages such as "We need Sampoerna, and Sampoerna needs us" (*Kita membutuhkan Sampoerna, dan Sampoerna membutuhkan kita*).

DJs also do their part for quality control. Each hour, they remind rollers to insert sample cigarettes into holders to check that the conical dimensions are correct. They announce the daily and weekly best- and worst-performing units and groups in tones of gentle amusement that evoke loud responses of excitement or displeasure among those singled out for praise or rebuke. When our unit had the worst score (a high of 377 in a week with lots of oil spots), workers yelled their collective disappointment with great gusto. DJs also announce the performance quality index and attendance rates of other Sampoerna plants on a weekly basis.

Music occupies most of Radio Sampoerna's airtime. The music schedule is meant to be attuned to, and to modulate, workers' emotional states and production rhythms, which alter as the day progresses. Cak Soe explained that he strives to free workers of their burdens (*beban*) without their explicit awareness, to neutralize everything (*menetralisir itu semua*) such that their hardships from home will not lead to shoddy work (*garapan ikut jelek*) and flawed cigarettes (like most male DJs, Cak Soe smoked). Workers especially need their spirits lifted from noon onward so their work will not fall off, he claimed. April explained that Radio Sampoerna generally plays slow and older songs (*lagu nostalgia*) in the early morning, when workers are supposed to be calm and engrossed in their work. The occasional song is in English, such as Toni Braxton's ballad "Un-Break My Heart" or "The Actor" by Danish soft rock group Michael Learns to Rock (Rihanna's "Diamonds" was a popular request at Rungkut 1, but managers instructed DJs to play the song infrequently, perhaps because they classified it—either Rihanna, the song, or the video—as risqué). The tempo picks up with more lively, fast, and happy rhythms (*irama yang detar, yang lebih lancar, gem-bira*) around 10:00 a.m., then louder music (*sedikit keras*) and the Indonesian popular genre *dangdut* around 11:00 a.m., when workers begin to tire. They play songs workers especially enjoy (*yang menyenangkan*) toward the end of the day in popular Indonesian genres that show the influence of Indian, Middle Eastern, and American music (e.g., *pop Melayu, lagu Jawa, campursari*, and *dangdut*; see Weintraub 2010). DJs observed that workers' preferences for local or older or more contemporary content varied across factories in ways that reflected the location and age of plants and workers.

Managers policed the music to ensure that it kept workers awake and stimulated but not overly aroused and distracted. In December, when the union negotiated the next year's wages and workers were "easily provoked," managers instructed DJs to play calmer music (*lagu yang tenang*) and to avoid triggering (*terpicu*) workers. The Malang plant manager kept a window cracked in his air-conditioned office to monitor shop-floor sounds. When workers responded raucously to a song, he would sprint upstairs to tell DJs to avoid it in the future. DJs are supposed to steer clear of songs that "invite problems" (*mengundang masalah*) or are too vulgar or sexually suggestive (*dangdut yang anunya*). Cak Dji recalled that DJs had been forbidden under a previous manager from playing songs referencing the perennially hot topic of cheating (*yang berbau selingkuh-selingkuh*). A roller told me that if workers knew that a coworker's husband had cheated on her, they were obliged to yell loudly in solidarity when songs dealing with adultery played.

A distant intimacy characterizes DJ-worker relations. When I visited the DJ office, Ning Soe pulled me over to the window to show me how she could see workers' bodies moving in the production unit below. The DJs scrolled through countless requests from workers on their mobile phones and showed me a stack of handwritten requests on media ranging from dessert packaging (*kertas kue*) to feedback cards (*kartu stat*) and lined paper. They likened long messages to love letters (*surat cinta*). Workers and supervisors sent greetings (*titip salam*) to neighbors and friends in other units. DJs observed that workers often adopt pseudonyms (*nama samaran*) and initials when they submitted requests, especially if they made repeated requests. Ning Dji complained that some workers request beloved singalongs over and over, to the point that DJs tired of them (*kita juga bosan*). When regular radio programming was disrupted for some reason, workers sent DJs urgent text flurries alerting them to their sleepy state (*Ngantuk! Ngantuk!*). Managers sometimes intervene to regulate DJ-worker relations. When Radio Sampoerna at Rungkut 1 was swamped by hundreds of daily requests, managers limited the number accepted and demanded that they be written on special paper slips, noting that preventing workers from sending texts also meant fewer workflow disruptions. April recounted that Rungkut workers became especially attached to one DJ and threatened to cease work without him, but Sampoerna insisted that workers had to learn to handle DJ rotation schedules.

As these interactions suggest, workers were generally enthusiastic about Radio Sampoerna and its DJs. For my part, I enjoyed Radio Sampoerna immensely while working at the Malang factory, and after returning to the United States, I felt transported back to this time whenever I listened to the week of recordings Sampoerna supplied me with. If workers generally praised the broadcasts for keeping them alert and engaged, there were exceptions, like my neighbor in rolling who found it too noisy and relished the relative peace when it was turned off. As an interactive and engaging form of soft supervision, Radio Sampoerna exemplifies Sampoerna's

detail- and affect-oriented, paternalistic approach to labor management in its hand-rolled factories.

SHRINKING PRODUCTION, MARKETING, CONSUMPTION

During their Thursday morning pep rally, cigarette packers in Sampoerna's Malang factory gathered around their supervisor, who conducted them as they belted out the song she had penned.

Sampoerna siapa yang punya (3x) Yang punya kita semua	Sampoerna, to whom do you belong? You belong to all of us
Tidak kemana mana Sampoerna dimana dimana Mari kita jaga agar Sampoerna semakin jaya	Don't go anywhere, Sampoerna be everywhere Let us ensure that Sampoerna grows greater
Hai kawan kawan semua kualitas paling utama Hai kawan kawan semua marilah kita jaga	Hai friends, one and all, the very top quality Hai friends, let us all guard it together
Sampoerna didadaku Sampoerna kebanggaanku Ku yakin hari ini yang terbaik	Sampoerna in my heart, Sampoerna my pride I believe today will be the best
Sampoerna Sampoerna kami disini Sampoerna (2x)	Sampoerna, Sampoerna, we're here, Sampoerna

Marking my presence that week, Titin added lines calling on me to never forget Sampoerna and Indonesia (*Mbak Marina (3x) / jangan lupakan Sampoerna / Mbak Marina (3x) jangan lupa Indonesia*). It was hard to dispute packers' boasts that their team was the loudest and most enthusiastic. I found Titin's maudlin paean to the close and mutualistic relationship between Sampoerna and workers both troubling and poignant. It figured workers as capable of and responsible for ensuring a durable, lovingly enmeshed future with the company through the production of quality kretek. This vision of shared future prosperity, however, was

patently at odds with Sampoerna's hand-rolled factory closures and reduced production amid hand-rolled market declines that could not be attributed to, or forestalled by improvements in, cigarette quality. The end of Titin's own relationship with Sampoerna loomed, too, as she neared the retirement age of fifty-five.

Although managers professed to me their deep and abiding concern for the welfare of hand-rolling ladies and tended to grow somber and even tear up when recalling the 2014 plant closures, the Sampoerna ads that festooned the streets and buildings outside the factory exclusively and unabashedly promoted the company's machine-rolled brands. When I asked a marketing manager if he thought Sampoerna was doing enough to support the hand-rolled brands, he gave me a hard look and asked, "Pardon me, but when was the last time you saw a young person smoke a hand-rolled kretek?" Marketing experts insisted that any attempt to turn the venerable Dji Sam Soe into a youthful brand (*diremajakan*) would be folly. When I asked union leaders about diminishing marketing of their brands, they explained that managers told them Sampoerna must protect all its segments and cannot jeopardize one to promote another. The union left it to managers to determine what was best (*kita serahkan*), since they knew better (*mereka yang lebih tahu, berkompeten*). From managers' perspective, it was best if hand-rolled workers attributed job threats to a common external enemy (public health policies like higher taxes and smoke free areas) rather than to company decisions to invest in the profitable machine-rolling sector. Managers might slow the rollout of labor-displacing technologies like the new rolling machines or push cutters in some of its factories, but the rule of brand marketing budgets proportional to market volume would not be violated for the hand-rolled brands.¹⁸ This created a self-reinforcing cycle of increasing marketing and sales for machine-rolled cigarettes.

As it scaled back hand-rolled marketing budgets, Sampoerna broke off prior relationships. Stall and restaurant owners complained that Sampoerna Hijau had reduced or terminated sponsorship fees.¹⁹ Mask makers, dancers, and traditional snack makers stopped getting Dji Sam Soe contracts. I asked Tina, a marketing manager in Jakarta, what kinds of Dji Sam Soe marketing events remained. In Jakarta, she explained, Sampoerna had installed lounges in rest areas around bus terminals, train stations, and busy roadsides during Lebaran, the festive period at the end of Ramadhan when four to five million residents exited the city to visit relatives (*mudik*). Taking advantage of massive traffic jams that could turn an eight-hour journey into a two-day odyssey, Sampoerna provided free coffee, massage chairs, mobile phone charging, tents for resting, and "engagement" (approaches and offers from sales promotion girls). Rather than pursuing market growth, Tina explained, Sampoerna was focusing on consumer retention and loyalty with programs like Maha Karya (masterpiece), which invited smokers to describe their smoking experience and recalled the testimonials used in Sampoerna's initial print ads. Such competitions extract information for customer databases and potential brand promotion ideas. Around one hundred winning smokers toured the

House of Sampoerna in Surabaya and went to Borobudur one year and Mount Bromo another to celebrate “the greatness of Indonesia.” By embracing nostalgic themes of tradition and the past, Sampoerna quietly acknowledges *Dji Sam Soe*’s limited future.

Most pieceworkers’ husbands smoked, but given its expense, they rarely used the *Dji Sam Soe* brand their wives made. Many smoked machine-rolled brands with synthetic filters that impart the false impression of being safer. When I visited Bu Nurul’s home, she surprised me by pulling a pack of *Dji Sam Soe* off the top of her refrigerator. She had bought them to try to get rid of her husband’s stubborn cough, reflecting the specious claim that once appeared on the back of packs: *Dji Sam Soe* contain an “anti-cough sauce” that clears air passages and are a good alternative if other cigarettes lead to coughing (Kartajaya 2005, 354–55). Workers were also influenced by the graphic warnings about diseases, death, and bystander harm on cigarette “wrapping paper.” When I responded “no” to queries about whether my husband smoked, workers remarked that this was smart because smoking was a waste of money and bad for your health. The Sampoerna *Hijau mung* bean drink advertisement discussed at the outset of this chapter ends with a scene in which the male smokers are accosted by their wives who are furious with their absentee, nonproductive husbands. Beneath its humor, the commercial reflects an uncomfortable truth about the lives of female pieceworkers like Bu Nurul and her colleagues: while ongoing masculine *kretek* addiction provides—at least for now—the source of their employment, it also poses an economic and existential threat in their homes.

Machine-Rolling Kretek

Gamification and Individualization

What cultural ideals and social relations prevail in the mechanized factories that are the source of over three quarters of the clove cigarettes produced today? Yusuf, a production technician, claimed that culture was absent from rule-governed mechanized factories, lamenting, “What was great about Sampoerna in the past was Dji Sam Soe. Now it’s practically disappeared. . . . If we’re talking about culture, what built Sampoerna’s culture, it came from SKT [hand-rolled kretek]. In SKM [machine-rolled kretek] there’s just tight regulations.” Yusuf’s view of Sampoerna’s mechanized kretek factories as cultural voids was understandable. Humans are strikingly sparse in these cavernous buildings without natural light, dominated by imported machines that dwarf workers and drown out regular speech. Imported managerial techniques accompany imported machinery. Governing values and technocratic regulations are referred to in English, underscoring their foreign status: standard operating procedures (SOPs), safety, quality, volume, continuous improvement, best practices, lean manufacturing, key performance indicators (KPIs). Managerial orthodoxies often clash with practical realities; Sampoerna promotes “work-life balance” while imposing grueling shift schedules, for example, and emphasizes “safety” procedures while making a commodity that kills its consumers. There is little sense of the indigenous cultural and artisanal value that provokes kretek nationalist rhapsodizing in the hand-rolled context. From an anthropological perspective, however, imported managerial ideologies—as well as managerial techniques rooted in Indonesia’s domestic history—are also cultural artifacts, and understanding their attraction and uptake requires explanation, as do the social bonds and divisions among workers, managers, and machines.

Among Sampoerna’s methods of securing worker consent to difficult and deleterious working conditions, foremost on employees’ minds are the relatively

high pay and generous benefit packages the company offers in a tough labor market. Beyond these obvious material benefits, however, mechanized factories employ a range of other strategies for enrolling and controlling labor. Managerial techniques seek to capture increased value by gamifying labor—in doing so, transferring responsibility for factors like workplace safety on to individual employees. Workers' collective power is further undermined not only via the factories' use of machines but also by the unions that represent workers across Sampoerna's facilities. And both inside and outside of the wage relation, Sampoerna extracts value from their employees not only as producers but also as consumers of cigarettes.

Since acquiring Sampoerna, PMI has greatly expanded the company's investment in imported technologies and managerial practices, building on Putera Sampoerna's modernization efforts and construction of the Sukorejo facility in East Java in stages in the late 1980s and 1990s (as recounted in the introduction). PMI's 2008 investment of \$250 million in the new Karawang facility near Jakarta in West Java meant doubling down on kretek mechanization and conventional combustibles. It also mitigated disaster risk after supply and distribution lines to the company's Sukorejo plant were significantly disrupted by a fossil fuel industry–provoked mud volcano that erupted in Sidoarjo in May 2006 and proceeded to spew for over a decade.¹ In 2013, PMI consolidated its operations when it built a white cigarette factory adjacent to the Karawang kretek plant and transplanted machinery and workers from the PMI factory in Bekasi (on Jakarta's eastern outskirts). Whereas the Sampoerna plant in Karawang produces only three kretek brands—A-Mild, Magnum Blue, and Magnum Black—by 2015, the Philip Morris Indonesia (PMID) plant was producing 387 distinct products (stock keeping units or SKUs) under brands like Marlboro, Alpine, Chesterfield, Basic, L&M, Next, Peter Jackson, and Richmond. PMID sold 78 percent of its product domestically in 2015 and exported 22 percent, producing for thirty-one markets altogether, each of which had its own rules.² A quality assurance (QA) supervisor declared, “With PMID white cigarettes we have many more customers and they have higher standards. We have to uphold higher quality standards, expend extra effort.” Similarities in layout and operations across the Sampoerna and PMID factories, which are internally divided into primary factories for tobacco processing and mechanizing blending and secondary factories for making and packing cigarettes, illustrate how mechanized kretek production is closely modeled on white cigarette manufacturing. As part of its effort to expand the market for “smoke-free” tobacco and nicotine products, in late 2022 PMI opened a new US\$186 million manufacturing facility in Karawang to produce HEETS brand tobacco sticks (used with its IQOS device) for domestic and Asia Pacific distribution. This chapter draws on tours of Sampoerna and PMI's Sukorejo and Karawang factory facilities and interviews, many of which were conducted by Shahnaz and Fatma, who assisted me with this research.

THE FORTUNE AND MISERY OF KRETEK CAPITALIST
EXPLOITATION

Economist Joan Robinson's (2021, 41) observation that "the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all" is salient for millions of Indonesians who live in a cash-based capitalist economy with growing unemployment and underemployment. In Sampoerna's mechanized factories, worker expressions of appreciation and gratitude for their jobs—and broader public sentiment about the economic importance of Indonesia's tobacco industry—must be understood against a national and global backdrop of jobless growth, economic precarity, underemployment, stymied middle-class aspirations, and swelling ranks of the educated unemployed (Ferguson 1999, 2015; Li 2017; Millar 2014; Muehlebach 2012; Standing 2011). Being exploited by kretek capitalism, and Sampoerna/PMI in particular, entails both specific fortunes and specific miseries. Factory hierarchies are rigid and gendered, grueling shift schedules lead to poor health and social isolation, and some workers are ambivalent about the moral status of their work. Despite their many understandable misgivings, for most workers, being exploited by a large, stable, and prestigious cigarette manufacturer remains preferable both to unemployment and to lower-paid employment elsewhere and enables them to meet moral obligations to family members, experience a rising standard of living, and plan for the future.

Sampoerna recruits and hires employees into a labor hierarchy that broadly distinguishes between outsourced labor, permanent daily workers, monthly workers, and managers. It outsources many support functions, such as security, cleaning, food services, and health-care services, while limiting its employees to core production functions as required by the government (Ford 2013, 237). Sampoerna uses headhunting agencies to recruit managers and fills its lower ranks by advertising openings on the popular website Jobstreet, setting up stands at general public and college job fairs, and recruiting recent graduates from nearby vocational high schools (*Sekolah Teknik Menengah*, *Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan*). Candidates must pass Sampoerna's written test, interviews, and health test.

The worker hierarchy turns those at the apex into a labor aristocracy and helps preclude the emergence of a common identity and solidarity that would put organizational pressure on management. The tantalizing possibility of individual advancement across grades and categories (e.g., from contract to permanent worker) also dissuades workers from challenging management. "Daily workers" receive lower pay and enjoy fewer privileges than monthly workers and are identified as "general workers" or under more specific titles, such as forklift operator, that require technical training and testing. In tobacco warehouses, forklift operators are accompanied by lower tier "checkers" who ensure safety and cross-check that items being loaded or unloaded bear the correct barcode labels. On the shop floor, daily workers assist monthly workers with tasks like stocking, cleaning, neatening supplies, and manual feeds. Monthly workers are in turn organized into



FIGURE 11. Filter machine production technician and daily worker. Photo by author.

a technical-skills hierarchy that rises from operators to production technician or “prodtech,” maintenance mechanics and electricians, up to those with supervisory responsibilities such as team leaders and managers. Whereas monthly workers enjoyed access to cafeterias with extensive buffets and foosball tables to encourage interactive play, daily workers either brought food from home or purchased it from a limited canteen. This had the effect of reinforcing hierarchies; one daily worker, who described eating as a basic matter of refueling, was teased by colleagues for his monotonous diet of canteen meatball soup (*bakso*). Uniforms further underscored distinctions between workers, with Sampoerna hiring tailors to customize beige and batik uniforms for monthly workers and issuing daily workers polo shirts and black slacks in standard sizes.

Gender influences the experience of kretek capitalist exploitation in mechanized factory jobs that are gender polarized and favor men overall. Daily workers conducting quality checks in the print pack factory were all women, whereas warehouses were overwhelmingly staffed by men. Quality assurance was more gender balanced, while machine operation and maintenance was masculinized. Ani, a female production technician who had operated packing machines for five years, reflected, “Women aren’t as strong as men but must try to be equal.” In her experience, gender differences in strength were insignificant, since most tasks on heavily automated machines could either be performed solo or necessitated two workers, regardless of strength. She was very nervous initially about handling machine keys (*pegang kunci*), breaking out in a cold sweat and working slowly. “Women

tend to be more detail oriented. Thankfully there was another trainee who took even longer than me although he was a man.” She reflected on her longer-term experience: “There’s a tendency to underestimate women and treat them as inferior [*suka minder*]. [Male] colleagues will say, ‘Just let me do it!’ [*biar saya aja*] I let them sometimes!” A primary-team leader insisted that the company did not discriminate based on gender, but he naturalized the dominance of male workers by claiming that they were better suited to the enormous (*gede-gede*) leaf and clove processing and blending machines in primary with their tanks and pipes, where monitoring often required scaling tall ladders and the odor was powerful. Appealing to gender stereotypes, he claimed that smaller machines in the kitchen amid flavorant sacks or the rolling and packing machines in secondary were more appropriate for female workers.

In particular, gender could shape interactions that crossed departmental lines. Ika, a female QA technician, was often in the uncomfortable position of instructing more senior male employees to halt their machines. Whereas production workers regarded maintenance workers as partners in keeping machines running, QA always threatened to slow things down. Quality might trump volume as an official company value, but QA structurally favored the former and production the latter. As a QA technician working in the print pack factory, Ika was responsible for inspecting products on the floor and making appropriate and timely determinations about whether they were fit for market release. During afternoon and night shifts, she often had to decide without consulting a QA engineer or supervisor, since they typically went home by 5:30 p.m. Sampoerna tried to set a narrow tolerance zone for defects and to offer clear guidance, but there were always gray areas and multiple factors to weigh. Implementing technical knowledge about defects necessitated her social skills, and she worked to be nice yet authoritative with production employees so they would take her concerns seriously. She performed random inspections on pallets once every two hours, initiated investigations if she discovered defects, and worked with production technicians to devise corrective actions to ensure that they would not recur. She had to cross-check to ensure that the number of reported and actual defects matched. On the floor, she was known as “Miss Hold” because she often put products “on hold” with a yellow stamp (red stamps indicated rejects). Indra, a male QA supervisor, acknowledged that a tough aspect of the QA technician’s work was that they “need to face lots of production workers alone. There are lots of different characters and attitudes among production workers. Some readily accept feedback, others prefer not to hear it or actively oppose it.” He claimed that he had developed a successful approach by making “an effort to interact with them, befriend them, hang out with them, join them when they’re eating a meal together even though we’re not in the same department. People are more willing to accept suggestions from someone close who they already know, rather than having a stranger suddenly make suggestions or blame them because their product is substandard.” Making these social overtures among men would be easier for Indra than for Ika, who

would have to cross gender lines and whose motives for approaching male workers might be subject to speculation.

In contrast to Sampoerna's flexible requisitioning of overtime labor in hand-rolled factories to meet high market demand or take advantage of lower excise tax rates, shift work is a steady feature of certain shop floors in mechanized kretek factories. Prolonging the working day, according to Marx (1992, 367), was but a palliative to quench capitalism's "vampire thirst for the living blood of labour"; to overcome individual physical limits to being exploited night and day, capitalists developed shift systems that enabled the appropriation of labor twenty-four hours a day and ensured that expensive machinery would not sit idle. Sampoerna's shift demands were tied to mechanized processes and capacities, which meant that a higher position in the labor hierarchy would not necessarily protect workers from shift demands just as a lower position would not necessarily expose them. Logistics and the tobacco and clove warehouses operate a single day shift from Monday through Saturday and close on Sundays, with workers expected to complete tasks within normal hours and, barring special circumstances, to avoid overtime. Other departments operate double shifts or around-the-clock triple shifts to continuously produce cigarettes, demanding the presence and labor of daily workers, production technicians, maintenance engineers, QA technicians, and contracted cafeteria and medical support staff. The primary tobacco leaf-processing side of the Sampoerna and PMID factories runs a morning and an afternoon shift, only occasionally adding a third to cope with a problem or high demand. In the print pack and secondary factories, four groups of workers rotate through three shifts. After five days on the morning shift (6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.), workers get one day off, followed by five days on the night shift (10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) and two days off, five days of afternoon shift (2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.) and two days off, then back to the morning shift. The single day off after the morning shift, as well as the various holidays, mean that which days workers have off keep changing and only occasionally correspond to weekends when friends, spouses, and children are also off from work or school. For their grueling schedules, these "4G" (group) workers receive an extra allowance.

Researchers have found that shift work increases occupational injury risks, leads to sleep deprivation, impairs mental health, disrupts social and family life, may lead to preterm births and low birth weight outcomes for pregnant workers, is associated with gastrointestinal and cardiovascular disorders, and is a probable carcinogen.³ "The antidote for sleepiness should be sleep," Iqbal lamented, "but instead we drink coffee to stay awake." In addition to chugging caffeinated drinks, workers counteracted sleepiness with vitamins and by washing their faces with cold water. Night-shift meals were accompanied by small milk cartons that were supposed to nourish workers. "We are encouraged to maintain work-life balance," Wahid, an EHS manager, insisted. In reality, Sampoerna's schedules and demands often precluded any healthy balance and placed responsibility on workers to regularize their eating and opportunistically rest and sleep.

In addition to shift work, the factory location distanced many workers from social connections and from their families, whose economic well-being often justifies their sacrifices. As a QA technician hired fresh out of his undergraduate degree program, Indra said he soon stopped hanging out with college friends due to his shift schedule. Many employees bought homes or rented in bedroom communities where neighbors interacted little and were not bothered by irregular comings and goings. Although Sampoerna made a shuttle available to take employees from the industrial park to residential areas, those who could avoided it because it was inconvenient for reaching their ultimate destinations and/or because they did not want to prolong an already long day. One claimed that the shuttle was typically populated by workers who lacked their own vehicle and by women, suggesting that the factory's location and work hours could also deter female jobseekers and impose extra time costs on them. On motorbikes, workers risked daytime traffic jams and nighttime accidents. After dark, some coordinated with coworkers headed in the same direction to travel as a group for safety. Workers' wives sometimes opted to live in houses elsewhere or with their natal families, especially after having children. These workers often stayed in simple rentals and visited their spouse and children every few months when their schedules permitted travel, which could be draining and expensive. Locally recruited workers were more likely to live with their families, but the bustle and inescapable demands of family life could also make rest and recuperation from shift work challenging.

Other downsides of Sampoerna factory jobs were more specific to different arenas and tasks and exacted different mental and physical tolls on workers. As I detail further below, key performance indicators tailored to different jobs imposed a permeating stress on workers. Some tasks exposed workers to cumulative or catastrophic risk. In the clove warehouse, Julmansyah, a daily general worker who helped assemble production order loads, described lifting and hauling fifty- to fifty-five-kilogram sacks as "hot, exhausting, painful, hard work. There is nothing good about it."⁴ Tears streamed down his face when he started in the hot and fiercely pungent warehouse; masks had little effect on the clove scent that would fill his nose and throat. He had grown more accustomed to it over time but still found it overpowering each morning when they opened the warehouse, crying, "Ahhh, it really smarts!" (Aduh! Pedih banget!). A warehouse assistant unkindly joked that these workers got their exercise at work and didn't need to go to the gym. Sampoerna's print pack factory is also hot and filled with a vile and choking chemical stench. The plant manager assured us that EHS had determined that the air quality was fine and cheerfully boasted that the heat had helped him shed five kilograms. Fire risk in print pack was exacerbated by pictorial health warning labels. Whereas the company-branded portion of the label thickly applied a limited number of colors, machines used electrostatic assistance to create these thin and delicate multicolored warnings. The primary and especially secondary and print pack shop floors are also marked by high noise volume. Earplugs are mandatory, albeit not

consistently worn, in many of these spaces.⁵ In primary, the smell hovers between a deliciously sweet aroma and an overpowering synthetic stench. After inhaling this aroma day after day, one worker switched from smoking kretek to white cigarettes.

Despite these specific and sometimes severe miseries, workers often felt fortunate to have escaped the threat of unemployment and to be exploited by Sampoerna with its relatively high wages, benefits, and possibilities for advancement. Daily general workers in secondary described their pay as “decent,” with one adding that it was an improvement over his previous job at Yamaha. Hasan, a filter prodtech who used to work at a bank and pursued a bachelor’s degree in informatics through night classes, doubled his wages when he joined Sampoerna. Fajar, a maker prodtech whose pay “sometimes fell short of the minimum wage” in previous factories, was elated “to secure a job that paid 50 percent more than the regional minimum!” Tomas, a daily general worker in primary, enthused, “There are opportunities [*peluang*] at Sampoerna. It’s not easy to land a job here. My parents are proud. It’s much better than me becoming a thug [*preman*]!” Jarod, a daily forklift operator in secondary, said that between his and his wife’s wages, his family could “live well and afford everything we need, but it’s human to always feel dissatisfied and want more. As the Karawang saying goes: small and insufficient, large but still not enough [*kecil kurang, besar belum cukup*].”

Some workers experience moral ambivalence around the product they make and their working for a cigarette company, although others confidently pronounce their work as “good and halal.” After Yusuf completed a two-year contract in Batam working for an electronics firm in laptop assembly, he was interested in getting hired by a company like Nestle. “I didn’t want to work for a cigarette company,” said the maker prodtech. “Then a friend explained Sampoerna’s compensation structure, and I realized it was the most competitive job. Some colleagues at Sampoerna say it’s haram, but they still work here. They want to leave, but it’s hard because of their wages.” Like many male workers, Yusuf was himself a smoker with firsthand experience of the downsides of smoking. These and other drawbacks of the work, though, are for many workers weighed against the covetable material advantages of a Sampoerna job in the context of Indonesia’s difficult labor economy. Beyond the obvious draw of relatively high wages, mechanized factories employ a range of other strategies for enrolling labor and for controlling workers once they have first been enrolled.

WORKER GAMES AND CORPORATE GAINS

Sampoerna gamifies the workplace to more effectively extract value from workers and align their activities with company goals such as making cigarettes faster and more cheaply. In Hon’s (2022) critical appraisal, workplace gamification is often introduced under the pretext of making work more fun and fulfilling, but entails uncreatively layering “points, badges, rewards, and leaderboards on top of

existing task-tracking systems” to extract more effort and output, reduce labor costs and effective pay, and thereby respond to the market’s demand that capital and productivity grow unendingly (55, 61, 67, 230–31). Echoing a wider drumbeat of competition in society, such gamification instills “a drive for constant progress and improvement” regardless of particular circumstances, illness, aging, or frailty (41, 49). Governments employ this “fundamentally conservative technic” to uphold rather than transform existing systems and relations, while companies similarly use gamification to maintain stasis, keep workers in line, and funnel “profits to those who already have capital” (131, 241). Hon draws on Mumford to argue that where gamification is inescapable and constantly reinforces behavior, it is authoritarian. Those who accept its “magnificent bribe” (e.g., provisioning of food, housing, transportation, communication, medical care, entertainment, education) must in return consent to the gamification system’s rigidly defined goals and terms (160).

Kretek capitalism benefits from the myopia inherent in workplace gamification strategies. By encouraging workers to focus narrowly on specific tasks (e.g., reducing costs), Sampoerna obscures how accomplishing these tasks primarily benefits those who already have capital and may decrease broader social benefits (by reducing employment, for example) and perpetuate harms that are part and parcel of the tobacco industry (Benson and Kirsch 2010).

Sampoerna’s workplace gamification falls on fertile soil in Indonesia because it resonates with New Order government practices of engaging individuals, communities, and institutions in projects of competitive development, uplift, and improvement. Indonesia’s New Order government mobilized competitions (*lomba*) as a staple strategy for imposing social order, cultivating a mania for contests over village and household cleanliness and development that even extended into graveyards and domestic interiors (Baulch 2007, 90; Li and Semedi 2021, 135–36; Strassler 2010, 51–59). Building on the state’s imposition of values and invasive requisitioning of labor and resources under the guise of self-improvement and fun, Sampoerna brings competitions to (and beyond) factory shop floors. Corporate value judgements determine what constitutes improvement and uplift (*pembinaan*) and restricts the field of judgement to those arenas that further company goals. Participants are enrolled in a “system of desire” that posits rewards and potential advancement and mobility (Larasati 2013, 22, 77).

The ideology of continuous improvement helps secure workers’ participation and productivity by simultaneously recognizing their work and pressuring them to always improve it. Both people and processes are subject to this business orthodoxy, which pervades Sampoerna’s factories. Marketed since the 1980s as a key to Japan’s industrial success, continuous improvement enrolls workers to proffer suggestions that reduce expenses and improve efficiency, quality, and safety (Imai 1986). Sampoerna has also adopted and translated the Japanese 5S management ideology, which encourages workers to participate in creating and maintaining a

clean and lean workplace, into the five *Rs*: *rajin* (diligent), *rawat* (care and maintain), *resik* (clean Jv), *rapi* (tidy), and *ringkas* (practical).⁶

Sampoerna institutionalizes continuous improvement by setting targets, soliciting suggestions, and deploying rewards in ways that elicit the pursuit of both individual distinction and group participation (Prentice 2022). A factory poster explained that the company created “mini factories” to “give authority and responsibility” to lower organizational levels so “they can take actions to actively remove inefficiencies in their processes.” On a quarterly basis, monthly workers in each mini factory were eligible for awards for excellent, advanced, or good performance (450,000, 375,000, or 300,000 rupiah, respectively) based on points awarded—or subtracted—for key performance indicators tied to parameters such as safety (e.g., zero LTI [lost time injury] and medical treatment), quality (e.g., beetle population), productivity, cost, culture (e.g., number of implemented employee suggestions), and organized workplace (the 5S/5R patrol).⁷ Sampoerna awarded one point per implemented suggestion system idea. Production technicians and daily workers could also win “break the record” awards for beating previous figures for volume and quality (e.g., 500,000 or 200,000 rupiah on-the-spot vouchers for monthly and daily workers, respectively). Sampoerna evaluated teams on a shift and weekly basis for performance highs and lows. Maintenance workers could also win vouchers for accomplishing repair work under the target time for set tasks. The maintenance worker who processed the most work orders in a month or quarter also received rewards redeemable for household goods.

Many workers contributed to Sampoerna’s “suggestion system” (SS, also *sumbang saran*), submitting ideas to lower costs or improve quality, safety, or productivity. Sampoerna scaled its rewards and recognition to the suggestion’s impact, offering 50,000 rupiah at the low end for small suggestions that could be implemented or trialed by individuals and valuing suggestions with a safety component more highly. Ari, a tobacco warehouse daily worker, won a 100,000 rupiah reward voucher for his stock reorganization proposal, while a clove warehouse worker won the same amount for proposing a new forklift. Jarod, a daily forklift operator, won an award for his waste disposal improvement suggestion. “I’m proud of having received three stars in awards from the company,” he explained. “To be the best employee [*karyawan terbaik*], you have to closely follow the 5S and offer successful suggestions.” Tobacco warehouse assistant Razak’s proposal that Sampoerna reduce its tobacco warehouses from six to four won a gold award at the Sampoerna Open Convention and reduced annual expenditures by well over \$100,000. He explained that it was aligned with Sampoerna’s “lean program” for keeping stocks close to anticipated demand rather than maintaining a massive stockpile.

The lean program applied to workers, too. When Julmansyah began hauling sacks of cloves, he had ten coworkers. A few years later, six workers performed the same amount of labor. In another “special project,” Sampoerna reduced the size of its team of filter machine production technicians from six to four, putting

each production technician in charge of two machines rather than one, with a relief production technician on duty to assist colleagues and cover their breaks. Fajar had been a filter prodtech for only seven months when the new system was implemented and, as one of the most recent hires, had little choice but to switch positions and get retrained as a cigarette maker prodtech.

Sampoerna inculcates in workers the idea that their own advancement is linked to company advancement and that anyone, including those with limited formal education, can be promoted if they are sufficiently hardworking and motivated to learn new skills and contribute ideas. "Once you're permanent," a technical trainer effused, "you get your ID and login, access to the intranet, Sampoerna TV, email, career information, steps to advancement. We're very open! If you're enterprising [*giat*] and want to advance quickly, you can. If you're lazy, you can just move slowly." Maker prodtech Yusuf eagerly embraced opportunities to train on the filter and packing machines: "The more cross skills we get, the greater our chances of being promoted a grade. We're evaluated, and asked if we want to stay where we are or change." Lukman, a print pack factory team leader who had started out as a production technician, exemplified the idealized upward career trajectory, and contrasted Sampoerna favorably to the family-owned printing firm where he had previously worked; there, being a member of the owner's family was an unspoken prerequisite for promotion. Sunario, meanwhile, rose to his permanent monthly position from a contract position he took fresh out of his high school degree in mechanical automation. He was initially responsible for production waste, then quality checking. In 2011, he was among seven contract workers whom managers selected to try out for Sampoerna jobs. He and two others passed the initial tests and continued to three months of on-the-job training. Although he was younger and less experienced than the other two, he was the only one who passed and became a Sampoerna worker. He was thrilled: "Becoming a Sampoerna worker was my goal due to the better wages, benefits, meals and facilities." He advanced into a rotogravure printing press production technician position in 2015.

Sampoerna's mechanisms for evaluating and promoting workers include detailed job descriptions, performance review targets, biannual reviews, and a career development system. In their biannual reviews, workers present to senior panels (for example, a production technician might face a production team leader and maintenance representative) who have examined their written performance reviews and grades (on work efficiency, quantity, quality, and safety) and give them situational challenges: "Your machine develops problem X. How would you work to resolve it? At what point would you seek external help?" The panel dispenses advice about arenas for development. "Each year, we get a list of what we need to study, train in," Ika explained. "If we want to follow a certain career path, then our training should follow that direction." Sunario saw team leaders as equipped with trainings and strategies that help them make prudent decisions when confronted with dilemmas like "How do we deal with this person's issue? Do we need to stop

this machine?" He added, "We need to treat those below us as friends, not oppress them, make them upset."

Nevertheless, even those who praised Sampoerna's work in "developing people" acknowledged that opportunities for advancement were curtailed by limited job openings and interpersonal and structural antagonisms. Julmansyah felt stuck in his physically brutal dead-end clove warehouse work because for the foreseeable future, the number of employees and positions matched. Maintenance mechanic Rendy similarly lamented that "if you want to become a team leader, you might have to wait a long time for an opening." Dismissing unrealistic expectations of upward mobility, an industrial and employee relations manager said, "Any daily worker can pour their heart out [*curhat*] to their boss and share their interests and aspirations, but they have to have abilities that fit with our business needs." Not all bosses supported their subordinates' advancement. One warehouse assistant complained that his previous boss had stifled rather than fostered his abilities and autonomy, rendering him passive. Evaluations also played a role, and Ika believed that the structural antagonism between QA's quality drive and production's quantity drive could creep into her evaluation: "Our bosses have to gather information from people we interact with in production. It can be a bit subjective since people in production might not like to hear about quality issues." Maintenance workers and production technicians were also subject to competing imperatives when it came to reporting how long it took to resolve an issue; maintenance wanted the shortest time possible recorded for their task completion, whereas the prodtech who filled out the report might claim the machine was offline for longer to justify a production target shortfall. Iqbal found it aggravating when prodtechs exaggerated offline time, but he appreciated both perspectives, having spent a year as a prodtech before being selected for maintenance training: "As a prodtech, you're concerned with safety and attaining volume. As maintenance, you're concerned with troubleshooting and organization. Your KPI are safety first, quality, and productivity."

Continuous improvement, and all the incentive systems that accompany it, can make factory labor more appealing to workers by recognizing and responding to their knowledge and ideas. But it can also function like a treadmill that keeps increasing its intensity, forcing everyone to always run a little harder and faster. And it is each individual worker, notably, who is responsible for keeping pace and for dealing with any obstacles that might prevent them from matching their employer's expectation: continuous improvement and its accompanying gamification, that is, transfer risk and responsibility onto workers. Discussing key performance indicators such as safety, inventory accuracy, and quality, Razak admitted that outside of the tobacco warehouse, he frequently ruminated on his KPIs and feared he would fall short as they were set higher every year. Sampoerna declared the tobacco beetle "our biggest enemy." Traps were distributed around the tobacco warehouse, which also underwent monthly fumigation. To avoid stimulating

beetles into activity and reproduction, warehouse temperatures were kept within five degrees of 30°C (86°F), and human activity was supposed to conclude by 3:00 p.m., since the beetles became more active in warmer temperatures and later in the day. Despite such precautions, the beetles could eat substantial quantities of tobacco and could even appear in the finished product. At three millimeters in their larval and adult stages, they are visible to the naked eye. “If someone found a worm in their cigarette,” Razak fretted, “they might not want to buy them again!” (Indeed, cigarette company archives record customer complaints about bugs and revulsion over the idea of smoking worms and insect feces [Proctor 2011, 487–88]).

Sampoerna instills safety as a top priority through a range of globally circulated ideologies, tools, and mechanisms that economize safety, punish protocol breaches, and shift responsibility from the company to workers. Workers undergo general and machine-specific safety trainings, learn codified safety procedures, receive place- and task-specific personal protective equipment (e.g., earplugs, goggles, respirators, steel toe shoes, body harnesses, back support), perform pre-shift safety briefings, win prizes for accident-free work quarters and safety enhancement suggestions, face punishment when safety incident investigations find them at fault, and confront an environment embedded with safety reminders, from hazard warning stickers on specific machine parts to banners, posters, and doors decorated with safety themes. While safety has become a conventional shibboleth for large companies, its prominence in a setting where the product being manufactured kills its consumers when used as intended contains an element of irony. This is compounded by Sampoerna’s predilection for marketing safety to workers with the same slogans and trademark humor that it has so successfully deployed to attract customers to cigarettes (see chapter 4). A-Mild advertising slogans such as “Ask why” (*Tanya kenapa*) and “No bull” (*Bukan basa basi*) are recycled in factory safety messaging, marking a parallel between securing the labor of workers and consumption of smokers.

The hazards workers face are real and consequential. They recounted stories of colleagues suffering injuries—a worker who fell in the clove warehouse and was later transferred to a different department, a general worker who was hospitalized after a heavy box toppled on him in the tobacco warehouse, a fatally electrocuted maintenance worker, and workers caught in moving machines parts that cracked bones but fortunately did not lead to amputated limbs. Posters list the hazards associated with different work zones and machines—falls, back injuries, hand injuries, moving parts, forklift collisions, burn risk, chemical exposure, and so forth. A doctor or paramedic is present in the factory polyclinic around the clock.

Consistent with global corporate orthodoxy, Sampoerna tends to render safety as an economic concern over potential loss of productivity and profits rather than a moral concern over worker welfare and well-being. Concepts such as lost time injury (LTI) reinforce the economic risks rather than moral consequences of accidents (Welker 2014). “Our target is clear,” an EHS manager explained. “We must

avoid LTI, accidents that lead to lost work time, whether due to death or injury. They aren't allowed, they must be null. We also have targets for TRIR, the Total Recordable Incident Rate arising from accidents that require medical treatment, such as stitches and workplace injuries that prevent workers from carrying out their primary job, like a hand injury." This economization of safety can serve to legitimize it internally and help secure resources and funding, but it also directs attention toward (often more catastrophic) injuries that threaten profits and away from routine and accretive injuries due to loud noise, chemical exposure, shift work, and repetitive motion tasks. In this respect, too, workers and smokers occupy kindred positions within kretek capitalism; the slower forms of harm embedded in factory labor parallel the slow violence inflicted by cigarette consumption.

Sampoerna also follows global corporate safety orthodoxy with an approach that aims to instill safety "culture" and responsibility into workers. The EHS manager insisted that EHS representatives do not want to be "like traffic cops patrolling the facility. Our aim is to plant safety awareness and culture. We welcome ideas from users [workers] who directly experience the dangers of their work environments. We want them to report small incidents that could indicate potential for larger accidents." On the one hand, this approach demonstrates an appreciation for workers' knowledge, experience, and ideas. "Speak up" and "Demand a safe work environment," urges one poster. "Report safety hazards no matter how small," prods another, alongside an image of a deer encountering a future threat in the form of an adorable little lion cub. On the other hand, blame often follows where responsibility leads, and the "responsibilizing" of individuals tends to correspond to an "irresponsibilizing" of powerful institutions (Trnka and Trundle 2017). One poster brandishes the statistic "96% of accidents are caused by unsafe behaviors." Another shows how workers in a maze who obediently adhere to safety procedures return home to their loved ones, while careless, negligent, rule-violating workers wind up in the hospital. Workers have a duty to police themselves.

Workers were swift to acknowledge Sampoerna's emphasis on safety, and some subscribed to the company perspective that human behavior was the primary source of workplace injuries. Signaling the global origins of safety discourse, they consistently used the English term, inserting "safety first" or "safety, safety, safety is prioritized [*diutamakan*]" into Indonesian speech. Regarding safety lapses, prod-tech Hasan observed, "Incidents occur. It's human nature to be careless now and then." A maintenance electrician attributed his colleague's death to his failure to follow appropriate procedures. "Electricians are supposed to work in pairs, but he was working alone. He was trying to install the emergency stop but hadn't turned the panel off and got electrocuted by the emergency stop cable itself." Of himself he said, "Of course there is a sense of fear. But we follow LOTO [lock out, tag out] procedures so when we're working on a machine or taking it apart, it can't be activated. Machines are long and large, and we often don't know which part of it requires repair." Sampoerna's elaborate safety procedures and instructions support

forensic accounts of incidents and injuries that blame workers (Did someone bypass a sensor? Fail to store solvents in the flammable materials cabinet? Leave a veil dangling or long hair loose? Disregard prescribed work postures and lifting procedures? Neglect to wear or properly fasten their personal protective equipment?). This directs attention away from the intense time pressure and exhausting shift schedules under which they labor to continuously produce cigarettes.

MACHINE RELATIONS

If managerial strategies focused on gamification and safety procedures have the effect of inculcating a sense of individual responsibility on the part of each worker, a related series of strategies bring about a complementary outcome: undermining any sense of collective power among workers. This manifests perhaps most obviously in the factories' compromised and compliant labor union, as discussed below, but also in the role that machines have come to play in these facilities. Rizal recalled that when the machines arrived at the Karawang plant in 2008, they were "exactly as the Creator made them," evoking God (*Mesin masih full murni dari Sang Pencipta*). "We modified machines a lot so they'd meet our needs," the primary factory team leader explained. "For example, if a machine was supposed to process ten tons an hour, could we enlarge it and raise it to fifteen tons? If we found something unsafe, could we add extra protection?" Maintenance performed some modifications in house, while Sampoerna contracted others out to vendors. Cloves undergo cleaning, conditioning, cutting, and drying on retrofitted tobacco machinery from Italy.

Workers occasionally underscored how fully automated the machines were (*serba otomatis*), rendering humans marginal, mere accessories to the machines that performed the actual labor. Fajar, a cigarette maker prodtech, said the machines "appear complicated, but it's all computerized, so you control it at the screen." "Everything is standardized, all aspects of the product," his colleague Yusuf affirmed, "so the machine runs its own quality checks. If it's not up to spec, it will immediately shut down. It checks itself. Rejections are rare." Eko concurred: "We program the machines to produce a certain quantity of cigarettes or packs, and they shut down once they reach that number."

But despite the promise of simple, error-free production that these technologies held out, a hierarchy of experts and a raft of protocols were involved in monitoring, cleaning, and repairing the complex and temperamental machines. If a cigarette maker broke down five or fewer times per week, according to a maintenance technician, they were doing their jobs well. Maintenance scheduled regular parts replacement and conducted both "predictive maintenance," anticipating parts that were likely to break down (e.g., bearings that would need to be changed within a week), and "reactive maintenance," in which service team members were called to respond to indicator lights or larger issues. Workers' views of machines as



FIGURE 12. Cigarette maker. Photo by author.

largely self-operating and self-checking are troubled by the procedures, problems, and layered human oversight actually involved in keeping machines running, but this perspective is nevertheless suggestive of how such mechanized factory atmospheres can deemphasize the collective human labor involved.

Before workers interact with the machines for which they are responsible, they spend a week or longer acquiring general and machine-specific training in the Technical Training Department. The department's manager explained that Sam-poerna's machines, like a domestic refrigerator, might arrive with a manual, but it wouldn't cover all the knowledge needed to run it. In training, they used simple, universal language (*bahasa global*) and a discussion-based approach to discover what workers understand. Questions are posed and then answered in short, concrete words: "What does a motor do? It converts electrical into mechanical energy." Technical Training modules covered general knowledge, safety, troubleshooting, cleaning, and maintenance. After they leave the classroom, workers are typically assigned to work "in tandem" with experienced operators, gradually working more independently. Under the oversight of a more senior employee, Fajar recalled being allowed to work until he made a mistake or showed he didn't understand what to do. Fajar was initially trained on filter machines, which he described as not only more dangerous than cigarette makers and packers but also more fraught: "Filters are very expensive so you get in trouble when you waste them. Once something went wrong with mine and there was a huge amount of waste. Fortunately, the investigation found that I wasn't at fault." Due to the speed

and scale of the machines, a primary supervisor observed, it was easy to spew out a “bus-sized” reject batch before workers detected any problem. After three months of “on the job training,” Sampoerna evaluates new hires and decides whether to make them permanent. Technical training issues certificates to workers who pass their training and evaluation as operators of specific machine types. In addition to new hires, the division also trains workers who switch functions or are seeking more advanced skills.

Machine operators often described machines in warm, mutualistic, and intimate terms. Adib, a primary prodtech, explained that direct experience over time builds machinic awareness, using the English word *aware*. “It’s like knowing the voice of your child,” he elaborated, “when something is unusual, off, and the reason why. If it’s a new model, then you don’t yet know its voice, so you have to run it and get to know its voice first.” Ani also used a domestic analogy: “Packing machines are all the same, yet each feels different. Each has its own distinctive characteristics, its own tendencies towards problems. It’s like your own house, you want to keep it clean and orderly.” After spending five years with filter machines, Hasan knew the “small sounds” they made “where there’s trouble, like in the roller. And you know when they’re running well. Like a human, they need to be cared for, cleaned. I try to do my best for the machine. Before starting it, I do all my checks and cleaning.” Rizal explained that machines signal and communicate if one knows what to look for and listen to: “We know the flow of the machine. The longer we work with a machine, the easier it is to diagnose what’s normal and abnormal. The air pressure, the motor running. Maybe something’s going out, *dak-dak-dak*, *dacit-dacit*. We get the feeling, ‘This is going to have trouble.’ It’s nice. When machines change or act differently, we’ll feel it. Maybe it’s a dirty screen or the ventilator.”

Some workers used the idiom of friendship to describe their relations with machines. Yusuf regarded them as animate “partners” with souls (*nyawa*): “At first the machines are confusing, but after a while we know what they’re like. ‘You’re acting like this, I need to adjust that.’ Like with a friend. ‘Oh, you’re doing this, so that’s what you want.’” He nevertheless kept machines’ instrumental purpose in sight: “They have to be respected and handled with care so that we will walk in sync together. They have to keep running so that we will achieve our target volume.” When one worker first encountered the machines, he felt clumsy and tense (*kikuk*, *tegang*). As his knowledge and confidence grew, he developed a more alert and mindfully vigilant (*waspada*) disposition: “We know which areas are dangerous.”

While some workers compared machines to human companions, others appreciated their nonhuman qualities and found upsides to collaborating with machines rather than humans. A maintenance technician said, “Machines are easier to work with than people. They are inanimate objects [*benda mati*], so we can just decide what needs to be done. People have to be evaluated. ‘What’s this person like? How are they going to respond?’” Rizal was nostalgic for the machine-centered tasks he had engaged in before being promoted to team leader. “The keys, the oil, it’s a

pleasure for me. I enjoy managing machines. They don't get angry or feel offended. Managing people is different. Overseeing the performance of a machine is different to overseeing the performance of a person." He fondly evoked his motorbike: "I care for it, routinely change the oil, wipe it down after it rains." Such warm feelings toward machines, and the spatial and sonic dominance of machinery on the shop floor, do little to foster solidarity among workers. And neither, perhaps unexpectedly, does the labor union that workers belong to.

THE ANTI-UNION UNION

Daily workers in Sampoerna's mechanized factories, like daily workers and pieceworkers in Sampoerna's hand-rolled factories, belong to the cigarette, tobacco, food, and drink sector of the umbrella All Indonesia Workers' Union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia or SPSI) introduced in chapter 2. They share the same pro-management attitude, aspirations for individual worker promotion, and staunch opposition to labor radicalism and tobacco control.

The mechanized factory unions reinforced managerial efforts to make workers see themselves as agents of, and assume responsibility for, company productivity, quality, safety, and continuous improvement. The union examined worker performance, one leader explained, and asked, "What did we do wrong in 2015? For example, absenteeism. How do we adhere to disciplinary rules and prevent workers from reaching the stage where management sends them a warning letter?" The union advocated for workers accused of wrongdoing when charges seemed misplaced but supported management decisions if follow-up investigations found them guilty. Taufik, a Sampoerna union leader, cautioned workers to avoid the temptation to steal. "This is where we make our living. Don't even try taking something small; it might become an addiction, and you'll be tempted to take more, larger things." For Idham, the leader of the Philip Morris Indonesia union, informing workers about procedures was a priority—for example, how small violations (*pelanggaran kecil*) could be recorded, lead to warning letters, and get raised in annual reviews as disciplinary problems. "If you're absent, it will affect your work team's performance. The team leader will want someone different."

Managers contributed resources to SPSI, and representatives reciprocated by routinely informing them about workers. Management funded events, such as their annual meeting and invited speakers, and furnished Idham with a laptop that he used to document and record meetings. Taufik claimed that the union successfully lobbied management for better facilities like coffeemakers and a tripling of transport and meal subsidies. The union also requested representation and involvement in factory planning as part of a bid to be more valued and given an active role rather than being seen "solely as the helpers of operators and prodtechs." The unions submitted weekly reports to managers and met with them monthly, where, Idham explained, "mostly we discuss small issues [*kasus ringan*]. We tell

them what the problems are, and they send this information on to IR [Internal Relations] and HR [Human Resources] in Surabaya. We are the managers' eyes and ears on the floor. If anything inappropriate is going on, we let them know. We are their spies." The union leader declared, "I'm anti-demonstration. Let's take actions that will benefit us and the company."

Union leaders pursued internal hiring and promotions for members and recommended promising candidates to managers for monthly positions. Workers promoted to monthly status were not unionized but automatically became members of the internal Bipartite Cooperation Institution (Lembaga Kerja Sama Bipartit or LKSB), which heard complaints and suggestions at monthly meetings attended by managers and monthly workers representing various departments. LKSB dealt mostly with uncontroversial matters like parking, safety, projects, rules, and department-specific issues, but a maintenance electrician noted it could be used to circumvent hierarchies, "If you raise an issue with your boss, they might not bring it up to their boss, but if it is brought to LKSB then it comes up at the meeting."

Union leaders framed their approach as the antithesis of that taken by contract workers for the Swiss firm ISS who demonstrated for several months in 2013 for higher wages and better positions. Sampoerna's permanent workers had negative recollections of this period— long overtime shifts, sleeping at the factory, eating what was left at the canteen, getting stuck at work when they were sick, and being escorted by mobile brigade police after demonstrators beat up a manager. They blamed demonstrators for using violent tactics and making irrational demands for permanent workforce inclusion without submitting to Sampoerna's testing process. ISS demonstrators were fired, but Sampoerna kept working with the firm. Sampoerna added several hundred new trainee positions for daily workers in August 2013, but only a minority of ISS workers successfully passed Sampoerna's tests. Sampoerna sought to depoliticize permanent daily workers by encouraging them to form a local chapter of SPSI-RTMM under the guidance of a worker seconded from Sukorejo to the Karawang plant. Taufik explicitly contrasted their approach to that of the ISS union, which he claimed took advantage of the "hot culture" in Karawang:

They were very reactive. They blew up small problems. They only regarded demonstrations and actions [*aksi*] as real and didn't appreciate what can be accomplished by negotiating. We take a more familial approach and seek win-win solutions. Others call us the most aristocratic [*priyayi*] organization. The 2013 clashes made workers mistrust unions. We're trying to build a positive union image. We engage in positive rather than negative activities, team sports not demonstrations and anarchy. Our product is positive. We want to create industrial peace and harmony.⁸ Managers appreciate our good intentions.

Taufik seemed unperturbed by his union's aristocratic reputation, and he embraced marketing language and goals (positive image and product) and the union's success in pleasing managers.

Most daily workers readily identified as SPSI members (*anggota*) but were circumspect about their knowledge of or investment in union activities, maintaining a scrupulously neutral and distanced stance. Tobacco warehouse workers said they were uninterested in union positions since this required being articulate (*pintar omong*) and dealing with lots of people (*ngurusin banyak orang*). Rudi, a daily worker in secondary, said he was traumatized after witnessing layoffs in the wake of demonstrations at his prior job at Yamaha. He felt that workers were doing well enough and appreciated a consensus-building approach (*musyawarah*). Tomas described himself as “passive” vis-à-vis the union. He put the division of labor in simple terms that emphasized the union’s managerial function: “I’m here, earning money, they coordinate us.” Philip Morris daily workers ascribed neither positive nor negative impact to the union, remarking that the leaders were the active ones who held meetings, and ordinary workers didn’t know what union leaders did.

While they are reluctant to use street demonstrations or the idiom of struggle (*berjuang*) against the company, union representatives readily oppose government attempts to institute tobacco control measures aimed at protecting public health. Idham joined a group organized by Sampoerna’s public relations department that went to Sukabumi to express opposition to regional laws (*peraturan daerah*) introducing smoke-free zones. “If smokers start getting the impression that they’re not allowed to smoke over here and over there, they’ll be intimidated! It will also have an impact on cigarette sellers.” They left satisfied that the local (regency) government understood that if they created smoke-free areas in places like hospitals, they would need to invest in creating spaces where smoking was allowed. In his view, “The company has to prosper along with employees. It would be unfortunate if a clash occurred, or a production slowdown or other problems. We want stability for the company.” The union’s prioritization of company interests thus undermines both public health goals externally and effective collective action internally.

SMOKING WORK

Kretek capitalism exploits human labor in the classic Marxist sense and also exploits populations as consumers. And in certain circumstances, exploitation via wage labor is coterminous with exploitation via consumption: cigarette consumption is part of the work that unfolds at Sampoerna’s Sukorejo Science and Development Center.

Machines perform a portion of the consumption work in the center’s ISO-certified (International Organization for Standardization) lab. The lab’s ISO certification and imported machines enabled Sampoerna to produce “export-quality” cigarettes that met international regulations, which also affect the additives and flavorants in Sampoerna products.⁹ Whereas Indonesia required only tar and nicotine testing, Brazil set limits on sugar content, Malaysia and Singapore on testable tar. A lab technician showed us how twenty cigarettes turned a dry white filter

pad dark brown and moist with the tar that coats smokers' lungs. The Borgwaldt machine smoked twenty cigarettes in a rotating carousel, inhaling thirty-five milliliters per puff with a two-second puff duration and one-minute intervals between puffs (a Marlboro Red stick yielded seven or eight machine puffs). The lab also offered free testing services to various small domestic kretek companies. Helping these small competitors was a strategic move for two reasons. First, it encouraged companies to sell their product legally with excise tax and the required tar and nicotine labels rather than produce cheap black-market cigarettes that threaten to erode the market share of legal producers. (Sampoerna is a staunch and devoted ally in the state crusade against black market cigarettes.) Second, it fostered good relations and paved the way for Sampoerna to call on appealingly diminutive domestic companies to lobby the government on behalf of the industry.

The center also requires humans and their lung capital (*modal paru-paru*) for product testing. In the center's blender room, we encountered one young woman and eight men sitting around a table smoking, coffee pots in the background. The setting's resemblance to a break room belied the fact that the lead blender, two junior blenders, and trainees were engrossed in professional smoking work. The trainees were undergoing a compressed one-year training during which they would learn from seasoned blenders, make field observations in tobacco cultivation from planting to harvesting, and then assume responsibility for unspecified "special projects." Many of the cigarettes in the ashtrays were only partially smoked because, as with wine tasting, the purpose was to judge the product without getting intoxicated and dulling their senses. Didit, the lead blender, explained that mornings were the best time to taste. After lunch, their ability declined, although they kept working. He liked to inhale along the length of cigarettes before lighting up. Packs from different countries lay about; a manager joked that the fifty-pack from Australia adorned with an image of gangrenous flesh was a "family pack." In contrast to the convivial scene of collective sensory work in the blending room, a second lead blender, whom the manager had to coax out to meet us, labored alone in his office behind closed doors. He looked unhealthy, and his body was misshapen. He carried out his blending duties without actually smoking anymore, having stopped in 2012 after a severe but unspecified illness, which he said had made it easy to quit. It was hard not to speculate that he had experienced a life-threatening tobacco-related disease, but he nevertheless returned to his work, where his semi-sequestered presence served as a chilling reminder of smoking's potential consequences.

Sampoerna invited Sukorejo employees to volunteer for internal smoking panels at the center to help compare products and ensure taste consistency. Volunteers were rewarded with vouchers after serving for six months.¹⁰ When we visited the smoking panel room, one of the (lucky number) nine smoking booths was occupied by a worker. He typed his identity number into a keyboard and then received



FIGURE 13. Smoking panel volunteer. Photo by author.

trial cigarettes, lighter, ashtray, crackers, and a small water container for stubbing out cigarettes. On the other side of the wall, two employees monitored the switchboard that lit up when it was time to dispense trial cigarettes or collect waste. The company once had a roster of over a hundred internal test smokers, but by 2015, it attracted fewer volunteers. Those who remained were increasingly drawn from lower employee ranks, reflecting class stratification in who smoked.¹¹

Outside of formal testing, Sampoerna had ways of coercing and cajoling workers to smoke. A marketing consultant recalled that when Putera Sampoerna headed Sampoerna, he insisted that senior employees smoke Sampoerna products and that he tossed cigarettes at those who abstained during meetings. Taking a less bullying approach, company media like Sampoerna TV, which plays continuously in places like the spacious air-conditioned lobby of Sampoerna's Surabaya Rungkut headquarters and the open-air workers' canteen behind the building, screen Sampoerna/PMI-brand ads in addition to program updates, company news, and comical didactic segments on themes such as how to hold a good mentoring meeting. Sampoerna TV also featured a company campaign to drum up pride in—and consumption of—Sampoerna products. Mottoes included “I’m proud of Sampoerna” (*Saya bangga Sampoerna*) and “I’m proud of Sampoerna’s products” (*Saya bangga produk Sampoerna*). Employees paraded around offices in Sampoerna pride T-shirts (including Sampoerna president Paul Janelle, his T-shirt worn over his black uniform) and held signs aloft with declarations like “I’m not ashamed to smoke” (*gak malu merokok*). Sampoerna pride stickers adorned food vendors’ glass display cases in the canteen, too. The campaign thus countered the general public health shaming of smoking and disciplined workers who smoked non-Sampoerna products to fall into line with their employer. A Sampoerna factory production technician reluctantly admitted that he smoked Djarum’s LA Lights, but he tried to make light of his disloyalty by saying that he switched around and was not a very active smoker, consuming only one pack every two days.

Some workers who were happy to have their labor power exploited were tormented by their inability to withhold their consumer power. A Sampoerna factory worker whom we met at a café in Malang smoked ten Marlboros a day and pleaded for effective advice on quitting. He had tried hypnotherapy, which involved accessing memories of cigarettes that were not delicious, but he had failed to quit. He appreciated his job and its advancement opportunities for workers like him with low education levels, but he was desperate to quit the product he helped make. A supervisor at Sampoerna’s factory power plant was deeply disappointed when he discovered that his son, a first-year high school student, was spending his allowance (*uang saku*) on cigarettes. The adolescent met his parents’ scolding with silence. Hamzah, who chaperoned us around Sampoerna’s factory grounds, revealed that he had been a heavy smoker for years, consuming as many as three or four packs a day. He stopped after his third child, who had only recently begun talking, asked, “Why does father always smoke?” (*Kenapa ayah selalu merokok?*)

In machine-rolled factories, Sampoerna has secured worker consent not only by offering relatively high pay in a tough labor market but also, just as importantly, via managerial techniques that magnify personal responsibility on the part of each worker and render collective organizing unappealing and ineffective. Sampoerna gamifies smoking and production-line work in ways that classify participation as voluntary fun or forms of self-improvement rather than labor. In the chapters that follow, we will see how Sampoerna adopts contests and games outside of its factory settings to recruit and exploit paid and unpaid branding, distribution, and consumption work.

Branding Kretek

Influence and Creativity in the Gig Economy

On a rainy Friday evening, we arrived at a campground and adventure climbing park near Surabaya that Sampoerna had converted into “Averland: The land of discovery and inspiration,” where participants would, over the next two days and nights, “experience a journey of a lifetime,” courtesy of Sampoerna’s A-Mild brand.¹ Fatma and Shahnaz, who were assisting me with my research, had wrangled lanyards and tags that identified us as belonging to the dubious and vague category of “VIPs.” We felt like undesirable interlopers. Sampoerna had selected most of the event’s participants through a competitive process that it ran in seven Javanese college towns. Indonesia’s New Order government used competitions (*lomba*) to impose social order, while companies like Sampoerna mobilize them to engage youth and extract brand value and personal data.² Competition entrants had to form a group, which was to include at least one smoker, and submit creative ideas for promoting their city, an established corporate strategy for forging connections with particular locales (Banks 2022, 96, 138–39). Sampoerna supposedly selected the best ideas, although company goals like attracting youth and achieving some gender balance as well as representation across predetermined themes likely factored into their choices. Win or lose, each competition entry supplied Sampoerna with information on potential consumers, including email addresses and mobile phone numbers for SMS promotions and updates, and thereby extended its targeted or “below the line” marketing database for A-Mild kretek. Such marketing directly engages customers in activities and events, in contrast to “above the line” marketing strategies such as billboard or magazine ads that project brands in a more indiscriminate and less active fashion. Tobacco advertising restrictions that limit the latter approach have led cigarette companies to increase their investment and labor in the former.

We wandered Averland in search of food, taking in the free welcome haircut and reflexology booths, the graffiti wall where artists were busily spray-painting, and the music lounge that seemed to play the Red Hot Chili Peppers in an endless loop. After we occupied a table in front of a pop-up Sampoerna Retail Community shop, some event organizers and Sampoerna marketing agents from Malang pulled up chairs and joined us. As Pak Edy, a marketing manager with a bouncer's build, rocked up, he loudly joked that it stank like we had been eating durian (the pungent fruit was for sale nearby at the shop), and he wrestled Fatma into a headlock with his meaty arms. I asked an event organizer sporting a pack of A-Motion cigarettes in his shirt pocket what he thought of Sampoerna's latest "brand extension" (a new cigarette named A-Motion that drew on A-Mild's strong reputation).³ "Wow!" he enthused brightly in English, while pointing his finger under the table at the Sampoerna staff to indicate that he was not at liberty to respond candidly.

Eventually, MCs called everyone over to a stage, where giant screens projected A-Mild ads, audio booming from enormous speakers. Pak Tony, a Sampoerna manager, enthusiastically welcomed participants and praised them for being among the elect. From thousands of hopefuls, Sampoerna awarded coveted spots in Averland to but 350. Squeezing three brand slogans into a single sentence, he said that Sampoerna was looking for "go ahead people" who want to "change the ordinary" and "don't think twice." He called out the university towns represented—"Bandung, Jogjakarta, Malang, Purwokerto, Semarang, Solo, Surabayaaaa!"—provoking only a desultory response. Undeterred, he announced, "You'll compete further to creatively represent your cities, and"—he paused dramatically—"just maybe, the winners will get a chance to make their own advertisement for Sampoerna!" This made the crowd stand and cheer wildly. In fact, Averland participants were already involved in promoting A-Mild; most were just not getting paid for their labor.

In this chapter, I examine how Sampoerna recruits, directs, incentivizes, and monitors an assortment of actors—including sales promotion girls, artists, musicians, DIY entrepreneurs, hobby groups, event organizers, and students—to service, promote, and extend the A-Mild brand. I call them brand producers to emphasize how they actively make, rather than simply represent, the A-Mild brand (Foster 2008). In a broader industry context of tightening restrictions over its use of online and social media and traditional marketing channels, Sampoerna relies on brand producers to help consolidate, grow, and defend A-Mild's position as the top-selling cigarette brand in Indonesia. Posting tobacco product imagery on Instagram violates Indonesia's tobacco regulations (PP 109/2012 article 39), but sanction mechanisms are lacking. Sampoerna circumvents the rules by requiring contractors and ambassadors—and strongly encouraging event participants—to post on social media rather than doing so through its own offices and employees (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2018, 47). Sampoerna markets A-Mild as a

“premium” (as opposed to “budget”) “low-tar, low-nicotine” (LTLN) machine-rolled kretek and constructs its brand identity around youth, community, and creativity, centering values and aesthetics that are often coded as countercultural, transgressive, activist, and anti-capitalist (Frank 1997).

Creativity is an increasingly dominant theme in A-Mild marketing, which invites Indonesian youth not simply to consume but also to produce, create, and make. Claiming thirty-two thousand registrations, the brand’s Go Ahead People website encouraged visitors “to learn, meet, show, share and sell their own creative works” and hosted a virtual display of twenty-two thousand artworks created by users (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2018, 42; on a similar Djarum program, see Priyatna 2017, 135). Sampoerna’s ostensible rationale for Averland was both to celebrate and recognize (*apresiasi*) and to challenge and upgrade participants’ creative capacities and their ability to market their creative output, a mission that aligns the project with Indonesia’s vibrant youth do-it-yourself or DIY scene. Luvaas (2012) relates the rise of Indonesian DIY to the Asian financial crisis, which placed expensive consumer goods and brands out of reach. Dominated by impassioned male amateurs, Indonesian DIY challenges conventions of single authorship and fidelity to imported styles, celebrating instead fashion remixing, low-budget techniques, and limited-edition lines. These aesthetic strategies were often on full display at A-Mild events.

Sampoerna sought to reach this audience of young, community-oriented creatives by heavily promoting A-Mild in cities that featured a sizable young, middle-class, college-town demographic. Of the dozens of Sampoerna brand promotion events I attended in Malang, most were tied to A-Mild, although a couple promoted A-Motion. These events often featured professional or amateur live music, attractions like food photography or bodypainting, and small stands selling offbeat, small-batch, vintage, and homemade commodities.

A-Mild events were also sites for the distribution of branded swag, which participants acquired by winning prizes or taking advantage of special offers from sales promotion girls, such as a free T-shirt with the purchase of two packs of cigarettes. I justified my own acquisitive compulsion to collect an exemplar of each new item I came across on the grounds that all swag was research data, but I was also attracted to this brand kitsch. Before packing my bags to return to the United States, I laid out all the cigarette packs, T-shirts, jackets, mugs, lighters, selfie sticks, tote bags, waist packs, rain ponchos, and bracelets I had amassed and reluctantly weeded out precious packs and lighters to leave behind lest their total quantity land me in trouble with customs. Some of the swag that Sampoerna distributes is more personalized, such as individual and group studio photos taken against brand-themed backgrounds that served as event mementos or tote bags with a simple A that event participants—or one of Sampoerna’s sponsored artists—could hand-decorate with indelible ink markers. This swag encouraged youth to wear and declare their attachment to A-Mild, forged links between the brand and

quotidian practices such as drinking a beverage or taking a selfie, and embedded brand reminders into the broader environment—for example, in glimpses of branded backpacks worn by students on college campuses or on motorbikes.

Sampoerna exploits the context of precarity and un- or underemployment experienced by young Indonesians to align A-Mild with purportedly positive features of the gig economy, such as creativity, self-expression, and independence. A focus on creativity and community helps Sampoerna recruit cheap, flexible, and often unpaid labor to produce content and promote and populate brand events. Sampoerna flatters youth, nourishes and inflates their sense of agency, potential, and importance, and urges them to pursue their passions and improbable dreams. Sampoerna's strategy of courting creative youth as brand producers enables the company to extract valuable paid and unpaid labor from a wide swath of Indonesians, many of whom do not necessarily see themselves as performing labor for the tobacco industry. Thus, it not only enables Sampoerna to circumvent regulations on social media promotion of cigarettes but is also part of kretek capitalism's larger strategy of adopting global capitalist techniques to enroll and control a wide variety of labor. PMI, British American Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International, and Imperial Brands have all been accused of using deceptive social media marketing practices by recruiting influencers and issuing specific instructions to promote their products. One study found that 123 hashtags associated with cigarette manufacturers' brands attracted 25 billion global views, with 8.8 billion in the United States alone (Kaplan 2018). Support for the creative arts is also a staple global tobacco public relations strategy rather than a unique feature of kretek capitalism. Arts philanthropy serves to buy political support and silence from communities that might otherwise be critical, and it associates cigarette companies with appealing aesthetic and political projects. In New York alone, the Museum of Modern Art, American Folk Art Museum, Brooklyn Academy of Music, Guggenheim Museum, American Ballet Theatre, American Museum of Natural History, Dance Theater of Harlem, and Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater have all benefited from tobacco industry patronage, and the US tobacco industry has been especially active in sponsoring music, arts, and festivals associated with the Black and Latinx ethnoracial markets it targets (Martin 2007; Proctor 2011, 120–21; Wailoo 2021). With the Met and MoMA availing themselves of tobacco industry largesse, it is unsurprising that small groups and individuals in underfunded art scenes have done the same.

After exploring A-Mild's advertising history and brand persona, I structure the rest of the chapter around abbreviated portraits of brand producers. Analyzing how these figures speak to processes larger than themselves including commodification, class formation, and globalization, I suggest that brand producers evidence how Sampoerna has harnessed global marketing tools associated with the influencer economy and content creation to enroll young people as both workers for and consumers of the A-Mild brand (Barker, Harms, and Lindquist 2014). The

chapter complements scholarship on the rich and complex subjective experiences of youth by illuminating the symbiotic relationship between youth, commodities, and corporations, in which the latter provisions and parasitically appropriates the material and semiotic resources on which youth culture is based (Lee 2016; Luvaas 2012; Nakassis 2016). At the same time, it complements scholarship on marketing and branding by examining diffuse processes of labor elicitation and extraction. I first introduce sales promotion girls (SPGs) because their roles and the incentives and constraints under which they labor offer useful points of comparison with other brand producers. Although SPGs' bodies, dress, and social interactions are subject to rigid controls and their occupational category is socially stigmatized due to its resemblance to sex work, I propose that the overt and bounded nature of their work renders it less insidious than that of influencers and unpaid brand promoters. The chapter then proceeds down a hierarchy of brand producers—from influencers of national stature to regional influencers, event organizers, and unrewarded participants—before concluding with undesirable event participants, including myself, who threaten to undermine rather than generate brand value.

My short and fragmentary presentations of brand producers embrace “thin description” and reflect the shallow encounters and relations produced in the party atmosphere that pervades brand promotion fieldwork settings, where music was often so loud that one had to shout to be heard (Jackson 2013; Ferguson 1999, 18–19). Besides this uncondusive auditory environment, Shahnaz, Fatma, and I often felt inhibited around participants in these settings, which were by design suffused in social anxiety and where we were often regarded with suspicion (a point I will return to later). Shahnaz's efforts to connect with brand producers outside of promotional events yielded only a limited number of meetings, often under less than ideal conditions. We gathered in cafés and food courts where loud music played, and we found that some interlocutors were preoccupied with texting and were less than enthusiastic in conversing with us. These shallow encounters reflect the reality of the kind of labor that brand producers perform.

MEET A-MILD

Advertising and marketing experts often refer to brands as persons who possess unique traits and DNA, the ability to grow and change over time, and the capacity to anchor social relations and attachments with consumers (Manning 2010, 36).⁴ Over a chocolate martini at a swanky Jakarta bar, Heru, a senior Sampoerna marketing manager, explained to me, in English sprinkled with Indonesian, how A-Mild relates to Marlboro in Indonesia. “Marlboro is *sombong* [arrogant], a *bule* [white guy], a leader. He gets the *cewek cantik* [pretty girls]. He can't wear a sarong and drink tea with you. That's OK. A-Mild is looking over at Marlboro, thinking ‘Saya masih kumpul sama teman!’ [I'm still hanging out with my (male) buddies.]” Although Philip Morris has retired its Marlboro Man, Heru suggested

the durability of some of the iconic advertising campaign's themes when he personified Marlboro as mature, deep-voiced, attractive, authentic, and confident, in contrast to the quick speech and anxious adolescent masculinity of A-Mild.

Advertising agencies have played a key role over the decades in sculpting the themes, imagery, and language associated with A-Mild's "prosthetic personality" (Malefyt 2009; Malefyt and Moeran 2003; Manning 2010, 35; Mazzarella 2003; Schudson 1984).⁵ The book that Putera Sampoerna commissioned marketing consultants to write frames the A-Mild brand as Putera's brainchild and the first mass-produced, machine-rolled, LTLN clove cigarette brand in Indonesia when it was released in 1989 (Kartajaya 2005; Djarum developed an LTLN kretek in 1986 for the US market; see Hanusz 2000, 143). Sampoerna invested considerable resources into the new product and buried another brand, Sampoerna Exclusive, to convert its rolling machines to A-Mild production.

In a lavish 1990 ad that Sampoerna showcases in its museum and, for many years, ran around Independence Day, the company's 234-member marching band played their instruments while traversing the precipitous path toward Mount Bromo's volcanic crater, a Sampoerna helicopter circling overhead to enhance the drama. Sampoerna recruited marching band members from its hand-rolling cigarette factories, implying that these workers had participated in their future job displacement by promoting the new, ostensibly safer, machine-rolled kretek. But A-Mild's success was not instant. According to one of Sampoerna's marketing consultants, its first slogan, "Taste of the Future," invited the sarcastic response, "What taste?" Smokers found that the cigarette lacked the kick to which they were accustomed, even if, according to lab smoking machines, A-Mild packs as much nicotine as Marlboro Reds and more tar. Smokers mockingly dubbed A-Mild transvestite (*banci*) cigarettes, associating them with stigmatized transgender femininity and consumption practices (Boellstorff 2005, 9, 11). The "Taste the Future" ad may have been successful in stirring an emotional response and linking Sampoerna's new cigarette to East Javanese and national imagery, but it could also be seen as grandiose and pompous, too clearly meant to awe with its breathtaking scenery, swelling music, company helicopter, and the sonorous command to "taste the future."

A-Mild achieved greater success after Sampoerna ditched the sincere, grown-up act and began to more openly target youth with animation, humor, and gently subversive and countercultural themes. A-Mild's languishing sales picked up in 1994, when Sampoerna became the first Indonesian brand to deploy animation in its advertisements and adopted a new slogan, "How Low Can You Go?" As a cartoon A performed limbo and other funny feats on television and billboards, sales climbed from eighteen to fifty-four million sticks a month (Kartajaya 2005, 439–40). In 1996, Sampoerna launched a new campaign, *Bukan Basa Basi*, implying liberation from conventional cultural norms such as socially obligatory polite and idle chit-chat (*basa basi*).⁶ The new ads featured animated chattering teeth and subtly challenged the indirect, understated, hollow speech styles that were the

hallmark of elite political discourse under Suharto (Reynolds 1999, 87). Sampoerna went on to anoint itself the trendsetter and to accuse its competitors of being imitators (*ikut-ikutan*) in an “Others Can Only Follow” campaign that featured an assortment of adorable animated crustaceans, rabbits, and cows. A senior executive told me with false chagrin that Sampoerna’s use of animation had unfortunately led some to accuse the company of deliberately marketing to children.

After retiring its crew of animated animals, Sampoerna attached A-Mild to the cause of political and social reform, or *reformasi*, which was catalyzed by anti-Suharto protests in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Youth, especially middle-class college students who rapidly adopted activist practices and styles, saw themselves as central protagonists of the movement that toppled Suharto in 1998 after thirty-two years of authoritarian rule (Strassler 2010). Despite Sampoerna’s long-standing deference to and complicity with state authority, its new ads constructed the A-Mild brand as anti-authoritarian. An “If Things Could Talk” (*Kalau Barang Omong*) campaign gave voice to everyday and informal objects of student life with handwritten demonstration-style placards offering veiled political commentary on themes like protest purpose (a wok that demands not to be heated up for no reason), state violence against demonstrators (an alarm clock complaining about being beaten when it politely signals the time), sycophancy (a lollipop promising rewards to whoever licks the best), and the evergreen topic of corruption (boxer shorts weary of covering shame, a chocolate cake on which all will feast, and an armchair that requires cleaning to get rid of the bedbugs).⁷ A-Mild’s newfound penchant for political and social critique next spawned the “Ask Why” (*Tanya Kenapa*) campaign, which urged viewers to question authority. One ad features a young man approaching a vending machine with a great sack of coins, which he feeds into the machine until it coughs up a mortarboard graduation cap. A young woman lugging her own sack of coins queues up behind him. The ad goads, “Why is becoming smart so expensive?” (*Mau pintar kok mahal?*). Another ad critiques the old guard for its mistrust of youth, showing a classic senior male figure (*bapak*) in an office forcing a young man to adopt his short stature, paunch, bald head and mustache (*Yang lebih muda yang gak dipercaya*).⁸ Others take aim at the state. In one, two young men speedily cart furniture to the second story of their home, don flippers and mask, and dive from the upstairs window into the dun-colored river coursing through their street. Uniformed police bob along in a motorboat, waving cheerfully and advising residents to remain calm through a crackling megaphone, underscoring the perennially late and ineffectual government response to the floods that routinely devastate and displace Jakarta residents. “Banjir kok jadi tradisi?,” the ad quips. “Why have floods become a tradition?” Another criticizes state bureaucrats with their tiresome red tape and stamps for making simple tasks difficult (*Harusnya gampang dibikin susah*) and seizing ordinary citizens’ time (Verdery 1996). If satirical ads seemingly align Sampoerna with citizens against the state, they obscure the ways in which the

cigarette industry and the Indonesian state are deeply, if ambivalently, intertwined with one another in relations of “predatory reciprocity” (George 2010, 82).

By constructing A-Mild as the cigarette of choice for “progressive Indonesia,” Sampoerna offers brand identification and positions the act of smoking as a means to resolve the ambivalent political feelings its ads stir up (Sampoerna 2016). The term *progressive* strategically leaves room for interpretation concerning the kind of progress implied: individual or collective, material or social, modernizing or redistributive. The “Ask Why” ads embrace *reformasi* as a middle-class enterprise with a conservative rather than revolutionary critique of the present. They furnish a limited script for social action and leave nebulous whether political agency is located in individual or collective subjects. They provoke and prod but do not advise or resolve. They invite youth to reflect on their social position and lack of power but leave it unclear if they should do anything about this or just “relax and have a cigarette” and “wait until they come into their own” (Nichter et al. 2009, 105). The ads’ ambivalence vis-à-vis *reformasi* is reminiscent of how early advertisers in the United States served as “missionaries of modernity” through their tendency to “emphasize that which is new and changing and, at the same time, acknowledge, manage and alleviate signs of discontent with modernity” (Marchand 1985; Tinkler 2006, 83). Early cigarette ads framed women smoking as modern but unthreatening by subtly reasserting conventional gender relations (Tinkler 2006, 84).

A-Mild ads work at multiple levels, offering slapstick humor that appeals to all ages—down to very young TV viewers—and the pleasure of political critique delivered with a wink that demands interpretive work on the part of a more discerning audience. They are crafted to appeal to key Javanese tropes and rhetorical strategies valorizing indirect speech and word slippages that require an insightful and clever audience to decipher their meaning (Nichter et al. 2009, 104).⁹ Sampoerna marketing staff, in fact, admitted that even they often found A-Mild ads puzzling. The appeal is, in part, exclusionary, asking viewers whether they are among the initiated. One ad explicitly suggests that the viewer lacks in-group status but might someday acquire it: “In the future you’ll understand” (Nanti juga lo paham).

In addition to wordplay and punning, A-Mild copywriters and marketers rely heavily on English and informal sociable speech (*bahasa gaul*) to interpellate cosmopolitan Indonesian youth. Many ads connote informality in the way they present text, evoking the materiality of chalk, graffiti-style spray-painted and stenciled writing, and paint applied to media such as bricks or paper that is crudely sewn, crinkled, or lined as if ripped from a schoolbook. A range of lexical items connote sociable (*gaul*) speech: alternative spelling, acronyms, shortening of words (e.g., *gak* or *nggak* rather than *tidak* for “not”), insertion of particles (*kan*, *sih*, *nya*), and the pronouns *gue* (I) and *lo/lu/loe* (you), which derive from Hokkien Chinese and are commonly used in Jakarta but can sound marked and somewhat crass to non-Jakartans (Djenar, Ewing, and Manns 2018; Sneddon 2003). Gaul

emphasizes solidarity and shared social identity as opposed to status differentials, formality, and hierarchy, but it entails its own coercive appeal, status signals, and valorizations that distinguish those who are cool, modern, urban, and youthful from those who are old-fashioned, traditional, awkward, and rural (Smith-Hefner 2007). Although its roots are in “the world of social marginals,” gaul style has come to incorporate middle-class concerns as well as English words and phrases, becoming more strongly associated with “an increasingly cosmopolitan, Indonesian youth culture”—precisely the demographic that A-Mild’s marketing targets (Smith-Hefner 2007, 184, 197).

Sampoerna has freely deployed English in A-Mild slogans, ad copy, and marketing materials since the brand’s inception. Sampoerna’s “Go Ahead People” campaign marketing props invite youth to “Find Your Path,” “Follow Your Heart,” “Change Status Quo,” “Change the Ordinary,” “Take Risk,” “Deliver the Unexpected,” and “Don’t Think Twice.” A-Mild English often sounded grammatically off or peculiar to me, but I was not its intended target. It matched how young Indonesians use English in ways that signal their membership in a global youth community familiar with transnational flows of ideas without subordinating their expression to the rules and constraints of “proper” English grammar and spelling. In speech and social media, youth often code-switch or combine Indonesian, regional languages, and English. In so doing, they liberate themselves from the stultifying baggage of both the government-policed and -standardized “good and correct” (*baik dan benar*) national language and ethno-local languages, which are unappealing insofar as they are framed as “traditional” and frozen in time (Djenar, Ewing, and Manns 2018; Keane 2003). Such linguistic experimentation, and the more pronounced flouting of conventional linguistic rules in the post-Suharto era, is flourishing within a broader array of youth practices that appropriate codes, style, and signifiers as found cultural objects (Luvaas 2012). Writing of similar language mixing in the Philippines, Rafael (1995, 113) suggests that Taglish furnished “the means for evading the pressures of the linguistic hierarchy, an action that at certain points broached the possibility of reconfiguring the social order.” A language that summons and mobilizes a mass audience can be turned to the purposes of mass political action, but it can also be harnessed in the service of mass consumption. A-Mild’s signature linguistic mixing suggests the voice of the commodity masquerading as the voice of political action (Rafael 1995, 117–18).

A-Mild advertisements have played a critical role in attracting consumers and setting key brand themes. The rest of this chapter is devoted to understanding how brand production labor—which takes place outside the sphere of traditional advertising—builds on the themes established across the prior decades’ commercials and explores how Sampoerna recruits, choreographs, and monitors this work. I build on Foster’s (2008) ethnography of the global soda industry, which goes beyond the relationship between ad agencies and client firms to bring together production- and consumption-centered accounts of brands and show

how brand managers seek to capture the value produced by consumers. Banks (2022) has similarly shown that US corporations use Black cultural patronage to accrue diversity capital and enlist ordinary people as “prosumers” who both consume and produce brand meaning. The examples that follow illustrate Sampoerna’s approach to identifying, recruiting, incentivizing, coordinating, and monitoring brand producers.

SALES PROMOTION GIRLS

While Sampoerna markets A-Mild as a brand associated with self-expression, creativity, independence, and spontaneity, the company aims to tightly control and regiment the speech, dress, makeup, and bodies of A-Mild’s sales promotion girls, or SPGs. As a professional title, “sales promotion girl” has negative connotations; it underscores the gendered nature of the labor, infantilizes women, and evokes the sexual objectification and age discrimination the work entails. When we met in a café, Dia and Ayu, two SPGs who had concluded an eight-month contract with Sampoerna and moved on to work for Sampoerna’s largest competitors, Djarum and Gudang Garam, told us that some firms were beginning to refer to them as brand presenters, or BPs. They found the new title to sound better, but they referred to themselves and peers by the more familiar SPG as we talked. Defending their work against detractors, they noted that they earned six million rupiah a month working four days a week, which was double what they would make as bank tellers working significantly longer hours (and still facing considerable scrutiny over their appearance and dress). Ayu was saving for a college degree.

Cigarette companies contract female SPGs and male “team leaders” through vendors rather than hiring them directly. This enables them to associate brands with a rotating crop of new, fresh, and youthful—rather than familiar and aging—faces without directly carrying out the sexist, ageist, colorist, and weight-discriminatory work of hiring and firing these workers and directly enforcing normative ideals of attractive femininity and masculinity. A social media post advertising SPG recruitment included age and physical requirements: twenty-five years old or younger, at least 163 centimeters in height, good looking, and with a “proportional” body. Most are light skinned, suggesting that pale skin color is an unstated requirement of the SPG selection process. Four SPGs typically work with one team leader who also has to be tall, slender, young, attractive, and, as one acknowledged, “maybe a bit of a playboy” (*sedikit playboy*). Akin to a sanitized pimp, the team leader benefits from the sexual attractiveness of multiple women, monitoring and controlling their interactions with men, and also potentially serves as their protector, ready to heroically insert himself into and rescue her from encounters with rude, inebriated, or ignorant customers who violate the implicit boundaries governing their interactions. The team leader plans their weekly routes, inputs data, and records SPG-customer interactions on an iPad.



FIGURE 14. A sales promotion girl closes a sale. Photo by author.

Cigarette companies dictate the clothing, hairstyle, and makeup that constitute the SPGs' brand identity. Compared to its competitors, Sampoerna applied more elaborate and stringent rules to the visual spectacle of SPGs' bodies. Sampoerna insisted on natural black rather than dyed hair, disallowed jewelry and accessories, styled them with identical hair and makeup for events, and provided their uniform down to handbags and shoes (Keds, wedges, or heels). Each brand had a dress uniform, typically reserved for night events, and a pants uniform that they mostly wore for daytime rounds. Sometimes, Dia was forced to cram her size-40 feet into painfully small and tight shoes. Male team leaders are allowed to smoke, but SPGs in uniform must not be seen smoking and are supposed to cover their uniform with jackets when eating. Their beautiful bodies were not supposed to be caught in acts of consumption (or excretion, for that matter). At events, we caught glimpses of SPGs furtively eating in cars and smoking while queuing up for public toilets, where we overheard one ask a colleague if she feared the impact of her smoking on her children.

Dia and Ayu expressed a preference for day over night shifts. Daytime venues include government offices, markets, cafés, and "hangout places" with company sponsorship, whereas night shifts often involved dark, noisy clubs. The team leader typically schedules seven daily site visits, with each workday officially starting at 9:00 a.m. and ending at 5:00 p.m., although in fact, they meet at 7:00 a.m. at the vendor's office to don uniforms and apply makeup. Except for special events, they apply their own makeup, which video tutorials instruct them should be "minimal" but sufficient to ensure a "fresh" appearance. At 8:00 a.m., they go to Sampoerna's

office, where marketing officials take attendance and brief them, and they pray together. Over a weekly recap, they relay feedback on consumer reactions to products and on which venues were bustling or quiet.

Sampoerna specifies how many packs SPGs must sell, who is a potential customer, and how interactions should unfold. SPG sales targets were typically forty-five packs a day, although at nighttime events, they may be set higher (fifty-five packs, for example). They are not supposed to sell to existing Sampoerna customers and are supposed to limit sales to two packs per customer. According to these rules, SPGs should confine themselves to recruiting new customers from the population of existing legal-aged smokers of non-Sampoerna products. This shores up cigarette executives' refrain that they are only trying to gain market share from competitors rather than recruit new smokers to replace or exceed the number who quit or die. SPGs are supposed to request identification from the "baby-faced." They practiced their scripted customer interactions via roleplaying, aiming to radiate warmth and enthusiasm (Hochschild 2012). Dia and Ayu modeled approaching a young man with a polite yet familiar "Excuse me, do you smoke?" (*Permisi, masnya merokok?*). They follow a positive response with "Which brand?" (*Merokok apa?*). If the answer is no, or if he already smokes a Sampoerna brand, they're supposed to "close" the interaction and move on. If he smokes a competitor's brand, they try to lure him into purchasing a compatible Sampoerna brand, using a special offer like a pack and lighter. If he tries and dislikes the cigarette, they sweetly respond, "Maybe you're just not used to it yet" (*Mungkin belum terbiasa Mas*). The worst customers, Dia complained, were the chatty ones who asked lots of questions then bought nothing (*diajak ngobrol, nanya-nanya aja, banyak omong tapi nggak beli*). SPGs had to memorize three important points for each brand, referred to as the key brand message. A Marlboro SPG shared that the brand was "the number one cigarette in the world; the international market leader, modern and masculine; made from choice tobacco for the smoker's enjoyment." A-Mild "is number one in Indonesia; invites you to have positive thoughts, go ahead; and if you'd like to learn more please visit goaheadpeople.com." SPGs are not allowed to take photos with customers, offer personal information (*identitas*), or upload selfies of themselves in uniform.

Not surprisingly, SPGs found ways to bend the rules governing their behavior. To achieve sales targets, SPGs might violate rules restricting to whom and how much they were allowed to sell by approaching non-smokers and selling to existing Sampoerna customers or even retailers in a pinch. Although team leaders are officially in charge of SPGs, veteran SPGs taught naïve new team leaders taking a by-the-book approach to adopt alternative strategies to meet their quotas and produce the right data. These script departures and small acts of subterfuge did not undermine Sampoerna's goal of selling cigarettes.

In addition to their contractual wages, Sampoerna used discretionary gifts and prizes to motivate SPGs and team leaders to work hard, assimilate brand knowledge, and compete with one another. Sampoerna officials quizzed them on new promotions and rewarded correct answers with prizes like T-shirts. When a

promotional program concluded, the highest performing SPG and team leader won public praise and prizes. The SPG's prize might be a bag or makeup, either of which would enhance the key value—attractiveness—she held for Sampoerna.

The brand producers described in the following sections enjoy greater apparent agency and latitude in their relations with Sampoerna than SPGs. Yet they, too, are often subject to company tracking and targets, asked to parrot key brand messages, made to compete for recognition and rewards, and gifted strategic prizes that enhance their value to Sampoerna. As influencers, many face targets and popularity indicators over which they have incomplete control, such as social media metrics (followers, visits, likes) and audience size at events they create and promote. Whereas SPGs work long hours with misleading start times, influencers are always potentially working, being active on social media, monetizing social relationships, and rendering their lives Instagrammable. SPGs do not choose the brand identity and markers they wear, but they can detach them at the end of each shift (Goffman 1959). The identity of the influencer becomes implicated in that of the cigarette brand, and Sampoerna constantly probes and assesses this identity for how it contributes to or detracts from the brand. The depersonalized and scripted nature of SPGs' work interactions also distances them from their professional speech acts, whereas influencers must try to maintain personal appeal and authenticity while also promoting company products and events. The lower-visibility forms of control to which influencers are subject, then, arguably exert more insidious effects on them and their social relations, which they are urged to constantly expand, exploit, and commodify.

THE ROCK STAR: MUSIC BANDS, SELF-BRANDING, AND MERCHANDISE

Arian Arifin, lead singer in the Jakarta-based heavy metal rock band Seringai and national key opinion leader in the eyes of Sampoerna, served as an Averbland workshop leader. At his popular workshop, participants squeezed tightly onto low benches under a large army-green tent and listened attentively as Arifin dispensed lessons on how to conform to an aesthetic of dissent and appear creative, countercultural, and rebellious while being shamelessly capitalist.

Arifin skillfully worked the crowd with his jokes and informal manner. While staff worked on starting his PowerPoint presentation, he comfortably began dispensing advice, telling his rapt audience to follow the Rolling Stones' example: "You need to be photographed smoking and drinking whiskey, even if maybe you don't actually smoke." "Don't think you can live off your music earnings alone if you're in indie, rock, or pop genres," he cautioned. "Get a real job! And, even if your fan base is limited to five hundred people, you need to maintain them."

Launching into his presentation, titled "Band's Image and Merchandising," he explained, "Bands have various images. Duran-Duran: fashion. The Cure: goth,



FIGURE 15. A rock star dispensing marketing advice to aspiring musicians. Photo by author.

alternative. The Sex Pistols: punk rock, anti-establishment. Morrissey: a dandy.” As he listed these musicians, Arifin refrained from passing judgement on them, opting instead to present their distinct identities as equal and neutral insertion points for capitalism (similarly, see Banks 2022 on corporate sponsorship of Black musical genres).

“Logos,” he continued. “Choose something that works with your music, like Kiss did.”

“Fashion! Black shirts are safe for heavy metal.” Joking about their ubiquity, he pretended to search for a friend at a concert, yelling into an imaginary mobile phone, “I’m by the stage, black T-shirt!” (Gue di panggung, baju hitam!).

“Consider your look carefully. If you’re handsome, you’re already safe” (Kalau ganteng, sudah aman). Later, when an audience member raised his hand to ask a question, Arifin told the young man, to his surprise, that he was handsome (*lu ganteng*).

“Keep your image consistent, but it can change and evolve. Pearl Jam looked better when they were younger, like a garage band; now they’re more like uncles” (*lebih Om-Om*).

Turning to merchandise, Arifin explained who the Grateful Dead were and how they sold T-shirts. The Misfits? Super capitalists (*kapitalisme banget*). “With declines in sales of music in physical format,” he counseled, “merchandise has become more important.” He did the math on potential profits from T-shirt sales, then described how his band had come up with patches, denim vests, jackets, and

colorful bandanas. “One person will buy like five bandanas. Is this capitalism? YES!!!” he roared with an evil laugh. After describing a controversy over a Seringai T-shirt criticizing the police, he observed, “If your fans think a T-shirt is forbidden, they just want it more. The same goes for mistakes in the screening process.” These strategies had apparently worked for Seringai, which had had the good fortune of having one of their T-shirts feature in the magazine *CosmoGirl*.

To ensure that the Q&A would get off to a lively start, Arifin announced that the first five people who asked questions would get a free T-shirt. After inspecting what he held in his hands—a mock tuxedo shirt emblazoned with the slogan “Change the Ordinary”—he irreverently rebuked Sampoerna for its ugly swag (“Maaf Sampoerna tapi kaos lu jelek sekali”).

As he nourished young people’s musical dreams and advised them on how to style and market themselves, tend their fan base, sell merchandise, and make use of assets like good looks, Arifin obviated the tension between rebellion and capitalism by proposing that the former serve the latter. Smoking and drinking burnish a rebellious brand image. Pissing off police sells T-shirts. Selling T-shirts and bandanas is its own form of gleeful rebellion against (outmoded and puritanical) punk and death metal values of anticapitalism and authenticity.¹⁰ Even his small act of rebellion against his sponsor—telling Sampoerna its T-shirt sucked—was nicely consistent with the transgressive persona Sampoerna cultivates for A-Mild, and thus could be not only tolerated but valued by the company.

Cigarette manufacturers take advantage of *indie fleksibel* musicians who identify as “independent” and embrace an anti-commercial DIY ethos while “flexibly” accepting cigarette brand sponsorship. Sponsored musicians defend the commodification of their cultural production and claim they maintain creative autonomy and authenticity because brands like A-Mild do not intervene into their output or decisions to air social and political views (Bagaskara 2017). Framing cigarette companies’ role as normal and positive, they insist that sponsorship helps build and promote the music scene, provides funding for tours, pays for album production, guarantees the quality of audience experience and music venues, and improves musical quality with better instruments and sound checks. Audiences, meanwhile, have grown accustomed to free or heavily sponsored and discounted music festivals (Banks 2022, 71–72). Arifin similarly reassured his youthful audience that cigarette sponsorship supported self-marketing and that neither was cause for shame or embarrassment.

THE COMMERCIAL PHOTOGRAPHER AND THE SELFIE IMPERATIVE

By encouraging youth to take photographs and post them through brand-affiliated and “independent” social media, Sampoerna worked around regulations restricting its own social media activity and associated A-Mild with a creative and informal aesthetic and attractive youth.

Yohan, a national key opinion leader with a more sedate personality than Arifin, facilitated these goals in the Averland afternoon photography workshop I attended. I hoped to pick up some useful pointers to improve my photography skills, but the workshop proved brief and geared toward controlled composition. Yohan went over lighting, styling, composition, point of interest, backdrops, cameras, and editing apps. After discussing genres and styles—minimalist, flat lay, mood, freestyle, artsy, high key, low key—Yohan announced that participants would have the opportunity to shoot photos with three models. They could post the results under the Averland hashtag on Instagram, and Yohan himself would review entries and select a winner who would receive an unspecified gift from Sampoerna.

Behind the tent, the models' handler brusquely roused them: "You can't play with your mobile phones all day. Time to get up and work!" An MC attracted to the scene joked, "You're not allowed to take the models home with you!" (*Gak boleh dibawa pulang ya!*).

Shyly at first, the mostly male budding photographers began interacting with the models, asking them to engage in various activities or assume certain postures. The exquisitely awkward and uncomfortable scenes that ensued produced Sampoerna's desired results. Averland participants posted Instagram photos with the requisite hashtags, connecting A-Mild with colorful images of attractive young people. For those not in the know, the models appear to be ordinary unpaid participants in the events. Participants also posted plenty of flat lay compositions that appeared to be inspired by Yohan's work, often incorporating cigarettes and A-Mild paraphernalia. These photos attracted many likes as well as comments in the youthful social media prose style that slides between regionally inflected and familiar Javanese, Indonesian, Jakarta slang, and English.

Encased in a spirit of learning, fun, and potential rewards, the competition concealed how Sampoerna was inducing participants to perform "aspirational labor" (Duffy 2017). They produced social media content benefiting Sampoerna in the hope that they might access more remunerative opportunities and potential acclaim via a competition win, a connection with Yohan, or a paying sponsor somewhere. The competition fostered the cruel optimism that feeds the gig economy and licenses the economic vulnerability of a large, young, and underemployed middle class who, with limited decent job prospects, get to be creative (Berlant 2011; McRobbie 2016). Averland participants' aspirational labor produces the impression of grassroots, spontaneous support for A-Mild.

The competition was consistent with Sampoerna's broader practice of encouraging photography and social media use. At its regular promotional events, Sampoerna's event organizers set up irresistible selfie walls with marketing objects and props including hashtags. Sampoerna also encourages selfie-taking by provisioning branded selfie sticks (*tongsis*, short for narcissism sticks [*tongkat narsis*]) as a promotion with the purchase of two packs of cigarettes or as part of the goody bag each participant received upon arrival in Averland.

MC, DJ, AND SPECIAL BRAND AMBASSADOR

In larger cities like Medan, Surabaya, Bandung, and Jakarta, Sampoerna hires third parties to recruit, coordinate, and monitor “special brand ambassadors.” These ambassadors, whom Sampoerna values for their coolness, creativity, and specific community links, serve as influencers and event planners. In 2016, they earned an average base pay of 3.5 million rupiah per month for the duration of their year-long contracts, at the end of which they were subject to review and potential contract renewal. Bu Tina, a marketing manager in Jakarta, explained that most Sampoerna ambassadors were in entertainment and “still college students, with a community and organization.” Sampoerna sought “social media freaks” who are “very strong in their community as online users, someone that has a lot of followers, they speak up, make comments, they are very active in social media.” Once ambassadors were under contract, a third party monitored them to see how they wielded their influence for Sampoerna. “Their conversations can be tracked. How active are they in talking about our brand? They can also see, what is the impact of that? If they put the words Soundsation or AZone [A-Mild promotional events] in the search engine they can see how frequently it is being visited, how quickly it is being discussed, how far it is connected with our brand A Mild. This technology focus fits with consumer profile, they belong to the AB [middle and upper] economic class, LA [legal age] to 24/29.”

We met Mas Marko, a DJ, MC, and former Marlboro Brand ambassador, at a McDonalds in Surabaya. He arrived at eight o'clock for our 7:00 p.m. appointment. Marko considered himself a well-known act in Surabaya. As an MC, he explained, his job was to “be the connector cable between the DJ and the audience, touching the audience and sharing their feelings.” He got out his phone and rapidly scrolled through videos of his performances, pausing to display clips of him and a female DJ in tiny shorts “pumping up” audiences in Madura, Surabaya, and Bali. He lingered on moments where the audiences went wild, showing a touch of irritation when we failed to sufficiently appreciate the heady atmosphere he had generated (*Ini pecah! Paling pecah!*).

To be selected as a special brand ambassador, candidates had to demonstrate their capacity for creativity and attracting a community. Sampoerna contacted Marko out of the blue to interview alongside fifty others, of whom eleven were eventually selected as brand ambassadors. They represented various groups: radio, entertainment, event organizers, internet, music, bikers. Sampoerna had them individually explain their “fashion and roles,” then broke them into groups and issued challenges: “Say you have twenty million rupiah. How will you create a cool event?” Marko recalled how he had responded: “I thought urban; go to the communities like DJs, dance, clubbers, soccer players, sneakers.” Sampoerna asked them to “show off your potential and creativity.” “Back then, my ideas included foam parties, glow parties. Foam parties had existed for a while, but not in Indonesia, so it

was new and cool back then” (*hits saat itu*). He had seen examples from Singapore and Riau on YouTube. “In addition to displaying creativity,” Marko added, “you need to have at least one hundred real—not Facebook—friends.” Marko didn’t hesitate to accept the offer of becoming a Marlboro ambassador, adding in English, “It’s a challenge.” At various events, he soon discovered that long-standing acquaintances were, unbeknownst to him, also ambassadors (“Lho, ternyata kamu juga!”).

Sampoerna required ambassadors to “cocreate” six events a year with the company and set audience targets, such as a minimum audience of a thousand people at a medium-sized Marlboro event. The number of friends on the guest list who attend Marlboro events is a key performance indicator (KPI). Ambassadors, event organizers, and Sampoerna staff brainstormed potential events, coming up with half-baked ideas and then discussing how to realize them. “Events require a gimmick,” Marko elaborated. “For example, sneakers. You sell them, you demonstrate how to clean them, how to put your own designs on them, how to repair them. You make the hashtag, like #wecreatesneakers.” Sampoerna also put together small Marlboro events in Surabaya nightclubs like 360, Coyote, and Foreplay that ambassadors were expected to attend and promote on their social media.¹¹ Sponsored events invariably feature SPGs and often include games with swag prizes, selfie walls, and props with marketing messages.

Marko enumerated the rote series of stages involved in event promotion, starting with a countdown. “First you upload Sampoerna’s flyer. Closer to the event, you upload and rotate video flyers. After an event there’s more work to be done—making a movie with lots of graphics and a report. If you make a good movie, people will think, ‘I wish I’d been there!’ If a video is popular, you keep using it until it’s downgraded [getting less views] and it’s time for refreshing. You use various hashtags and handles until they get saturated, like #neversaymaybe and @mbigchallenge.” By equipping ambassadors with iPads for taking selfies and producing designs, Sampoerna deprived them of potential excuses for not being active on social media such as exceeding their data quota, running out of battery charge, or breaking their mobile phone.

Third-party team leaders policed what brand ambassadors smoked. A Gudang Garam International smoker, Marko tried Marlboro but disliked the cigarette, which he found burned too fast. Ambassadors are supposed to upload photos from every meeting, and once he accidentally left his pack on the table, prompting the team to do a retake without the offending cigarettes. One team leader confiscated ambassadors’ non-Sampoerna cigarettes on multiple occasions, crushing a half-filled pack in his fist or tossing cigarettes on the ground one by one while taunting “What’s this? What’s this for (*Apa ini? Buat apa ini?*)?” Unhappy with his own smoking habit, Marko employed various tactics to try to smoke less, including buying single sticks or not carrying a lighter, so he would have to approach someone for a light.

The coolness and popularity that Sampoerna valued in Marko were laborious and always provisional achievements. While learning his craft as an MC and DJ, Marko had initially felt awkward and then ashamed of his own feelings of awkwardness (*awal kaku, tapi aku malu jadi kaku*). He was terrified of being berated, of people shouting, “Get down!” or, “Why are you up there?” (Orang suruh turun! Kenapa di situ?). He learned his trade from a close female DJ colleague, from friends, and from YouTube videos. He tried different approaches and figured out what worked with his style, when to go mic up and mic down. He learned to confidently wield English expressions: “Say what?” “Let’s go!” and “Three-two-one!” Marko’s contract ended in December 2015, but like other alumni ambassadors, he was always invited to events where, with free or reduced-price tickets, he could see the work of his “younger siblings” and enjoy free drinks. Marko roundly condemned one junior ambassador (*adik*) who was uncool (*dia nggak hits*) and held an event that attracted an anemic turnout and low KPI (*event kurang KPI*). Although he might have recalled his own self-doubts and sympathized with this ambassador, he instead displayed disdain for the youngster’s failure, contemptuously distancing himself from the spectacle of unpopularity and low KPI.

Still in his twenties, Marko described a generation gap between ambassadors and Sampoerna’s marketing staff, whom he described as being in their thirties and up. This generation gap is also code for a yawning gap in hipness, in knowing and being cool, or *hits* in Marko’s parlance. Indeed, dressed in their uniforms—beige shirts with company logos and black slacks—marketing staff often looked uptight and out-of-place at their own events. Brand ambassadors possessed something marketing staff lacked: youth, coolness, and social influence among networks of young friends. At the same time, marketing staff enjoyed job benefits and security that the youth they contracted or manipulated to promote and consume cigarettes lacked.

THE VISUAL ARTIST AS LOCAL HERO

Below national key opinion leaders like Arifin and special brand ambassadors like Marko, Sampoerna recruited regional key opinion leaders or influencers whom it anointed as “local heroes” for A-Mild marketing purposes. We met artist Mas Rizki at a Sampoerna-sponsored café in Malang. He arrived wearing a pleather jacket atop a blue-and-white striped shirt and shorts. Between his tattooed arms and long hair, which he played with constantly, he looked the part of the alternative artist. After he accepted Sampoerna’s one-year contract, his friends teased him about his new identity, hailing, “Here comes the local hero!”

Rizki insisted that his artistic work and identity were uncompromised even as he described his relationship with Sampoerna in mercenary terms as monetizing his cultural cachet and influence. Rizki divided the art world into those who produce commercial or corporate work and those who do not, identifying with

the latter. He worked with Sampoerna to “survive” (he used the English word) but saw his real artistic endeavors elsewhere. “I’m able to adjust to Sampoerna’s frequency,” Rizki explained. “Sampoerna’s tactic is to use local heroes to introduce young people to products that Sampoerna isn’t allowed to promote directly.” While under contract, Rizki invited people to Sampoerna’s events using word of mouth and social media, urging friends to attend. Local heroes sent out Sampoerna’s official event announcements and crafted their own versions as well. Sampoerna instructed them to use A-Mild’s classic black, white, and red color scheme, but he violated their rules, using black and white and ignoring their pleas to throw in occasional red accents.

Like Marko, Rizki felt that Sampoerna’s marketing staff were hopelessly uncool in contrast to himself. Whereas Marko spoke of bridging a generation gap, Rizki saw himself as a youth culture pedagogue for Sampoerna’s marketing staff who were profoundly ignorant regarding art and music. “They don’t know what’s what, so I provide recommendations and guidance, explaining how zines work, different musical genres, and their audiences. I connected Sampoerna with good bands. I introduced them to the concept of collage, with which they were unfamiliar, and suggested event ideas which proved very popular.” In his view, the cigarette industry makes the music market. “There are lots of young people who want to see this or that band. With cigarette industry support, it’s not only possible to see them in Malang, it’s even free! Because I’m close to young people, I can share their desires and dislikes with Sampoerna.” He believed—correctly—that Sampoerna staff often “stalked” him on the internet and could therefore appreciate the scale of his contributions. Out of the blue, Sampoerna gave him a turntable as a reward for his services. He felt other local heroes were passive, whereas he spoke up frequently and constructively. Nevertheless, he found it arduous to change and influence Sampoerna staff.

Once Sampoerna had attached a monetary value to his social networks and influence, Rizki also began regarding them through the lens of their pecuniary value. Rizki’s contract ended after Averland, but Sampoerna continued to inform him about promotional events and paid him to take part on a per-event basis. “Some Sampoerna events get small turnouts because Sampoerna misunderstands young people.” At this point, he said, “I’m not interested in attending Sampoerna events or mobilizing friends unless I’m paid for my services [*jasa*]. If they want a popular event, they need to offer me a contract first [*harus kontrak dulu*].” When competitor firm Gudang Garam approached him to participate in its promotional event program (Urban GiGs), he agreed, but he continued to tend his relationship with Sampoerna and hoped for a more substantial future contract. When Shahnaz asked him to meet with us, he informed Sampoerna marketing staff and requested their permission to hold the meeting, which he felt was the right thing to do.

Rizki commodified his ideas, networks, and influence for Sampoerna despite his personal reservations around the cigarette industry. He had stopped smoking

and drinking three years earlier after joining a walking hobby group and finding himself short of breath after only a few meters. On occasion, he had pulled cigarettes from the mouths of friends who had committed to quitting and tossed them in the garbage can. I asked him if, as a former smoker himself who quit for health reasons, he felt any hesitation about contributing to events that promote smoking. “Smoking is a free choice that people make,” he responded, “and people can see that I in fact do not smoke.” I asked Rizki what he knew about who owns Sampoerna, whether it’s domestic or foreign or anything beyond that. “I cannot answer that question,” he responded stiffly. “I just know the people I’m acquainted with in Sampoerna.” Rizki rhetorically salvaged his own moral and artistic integrity by reducing Sampoerna to a collection of ignorant and uncool marketers with deep pockets and a keen interest in supporting youth culture.

EVENT ORGANIZERS

Sampoerna relies on event organizers (EOs) not only to plan and execute events but also to attract audiences of the right size and demographic composition, to identify, recruit, and coordinate individuals and communities as brand ambassadors, and to perform the social media outreach that Sampoerna is forbidden by law from doing itself. Sampoerna marketing staff may be uncool, but they can contract skilled and networked event organizers who broker and sell coolness. Event organizers were the intermediaries who identified Rizki and Marko and connected them with Sampoerna. We interviewed some Sampoerna EOs in a mall food court and others in their office, the rear of which functioned as a graveyard-cum-recycling-center for marketing props. They estimated that their small firms depended on Sampoerna for 70–80 percent of their revenue.

Typically, Sampoerna decides to hold an event, determines its target audience size, then works with EOs who are supposed to propose a creative theme, mobilize a community, and find a venue. “We need to show creativity when we make tender bids, have our fingers on the pulse of the latest trends, and maintain relations with the trendsetters,” Kardi explained. To achieve target audience sizes (for example, five hundred for an “A-Zone” event), Kardi employed tricks such as inviting friends who themselves have many friends, hiring good bands, and involving students. “If we don’t work with communities, we can’t get a large enough audience.” EOs perform grunt work like obtaining permits, reserving venues, and (for larger outdoor events) hiring a *pawang* (shaman) with the supernatural ability to prevent rain. Event organizers also supply hashtags and post their own photos to social media sites after events to ensure an appealing aesthetic and the appearance of popularity.

To boost the size and activity levels around Sampoerna’s events and to ingratiate the company with youth, event organizers often invited young entrepreneurs to erect stands selling artfully arranged products at sponsored events. These entrepreneurs specialized in small-batch silkscreened T-shirts, backpacks, herbal face



FIGURE 16. Celebrating the four top Sampoerna Hijau brand ambassador communities at a promotional event. Photo by author.

masks, used clothing, cutesy foods and drinks, pomade, and more. Some wrote their Twitter handles and Facebook pages on little prop blackboards. Such DIY production makes stylish and appealing the precarious gig economy and its entrepreneurial imperative of relentless self-promotion and self-branding (Enriquez 2022; Gershon 2018; Ravenelle 2019; Rosenblat 2018).

With increasing regulations on cigarette industry marketing, event organizers concluded, “communities are the future of smoking.” Their job was to find, cultivate, and insert themselves into these communities, which were often organized around a hobby and/or commodity like a camera. To create a “food photography” event promoting Instagram use, for example, event organizers contacted relevant communities and coordinated with student activity groups and campus hobby clubs, especially those focused on photography. They also created events for young artists to play music and exhibit their work in front of the mall and were considering creating a “base camp” where artists could meet and encourage and mentor one another.

More formally, event organizers mobilized communities to promote and sell Sampoerna products through the community ambassador program, which, Kardi recalled, started around 2012. His firm had hosted a smaller number of events over

the past year but still earned significant income from managing twenty A-Mild and Sampoerna Hijau community groups, each of which had a minimum of twenty members. Sampoerna Hijau communities included farmer groups, flower sellers, and old-fashioned bicycle (*sepeda onthel*) hobbyists and sought out well-known people such as hamlet leaders. “The community ambassador program works like an SPG,” Kardi explained. “If they achieve their target sales, they get a bonus and a prize, for example a generator. We drop off the goods, and if they aren’t sold, they’re returned.” Sales targets vary, but they average roughly ten packs a day. Sampoerna teaches groups the key brand message. Kardi observed that event organizers must “keep tight tabs on their groups and interact with them frequently. If they aren’t properly maintained, there’s the danger that they might switch vendors.”

Through the work of event organizers, local communities are transformed into non-innocent sites for smoker recruitment and brand promotion, with their parameters (e.g., twenty-member minimum) shaped by cigarette company demands and their activities nudged in directions that favor industry interests, including formalization, outreach, and social media activity (Amit and Rapport 2002; Creed 2006; Joseph 2002; Rose 1999; Welker 2009; Williams 1983).

THE CAMPUS HOBBY GROUP

Sampoerna appointed Andy, a figure in the Malang college music scene, as a team leader for its community ambassador program. The company valued Andy for his connections rather than his appearance. Heavyset and homely, with missing and tarnished teeth, he did not meet the standards set for male SPG team leaders. In a campus room reserved for his hobby group, Andy smoked Marlboro Black Menthol and A-Mild, casually flicking ash on the filthy floor where we sat and chatted. A former Surya smoker, he felt obliged to switch to Sampoerna products—or at least to pretend to—once he started working for Sampoerna. He had worked with Djarum and Gudang Garam before and, like Rizki, expressed a willingness to work with whichever company would pay him. Cigarette swag and promotional debris were everywhere: a multi-charger A-Mild “CommunityPeople” cord, a discarded “Enjoy Together” (*Nikmat Rame-Rame*) decoration he had removed from a Sampoerna Hijau waist pack because it embarrassed him; a Go Ahead sticker that he had pulled off a promotional lighter and pasted on a desk, and four stickers with different potential designs for the next A-Mild Limited Edition packs stuck on a plastic tub.

Andy explained that the “Switch In” program aims to convince community members who smoke competitor brands to switch to Sampoerna products. They promoted A-Mild—“the number one progressive product in Indonesia,” he recited in rehearsed, singsong speech. Sampoerna counts a community member who buys six Sampoerna packs in a month as a brand switch. They have achieved decent success, he mused, converting three hundred out of six hundred community smokers

to A-Mild. They chose an ambassador each month who was paid 900,000 rupiah and tried to sell forty-five packs a week. I asked whether they confined themselves to non-Sampoerna smokers since it would be easier to sell packs and cartons to different buyers. “That’s true,” Andy admitted, and proceeded to lay out alternative strategies for achieving targets. “You can calculate that if you’re selling 180 a month that means you’re getting about 5,000 rupiah for each pack you sell. You could sell them faster for a cheaper price than the 18,000 rupiah retail average, which is a lot for students. You could sell them at wholesale prices or make them seem cheaper by offering the pack for 17,000, plus a lighter from which you’ve removed the ‘GoAhead’ labeling and charge 2,000 rupiah rather than the 1,000 they are supposed to go for. There are various possibilities.” Like SPGs, community ambassadors had sales targets and key brand messages, and could bend the rules without imperiling Sampoerna’s ultimate goals.

COLLEGE STUDENTS AS CHILDREN OF AVERLAND

Averland alumni, or the “children of Averland” (*anak Averland*), had various responses to their experience. Two male participants who were themselves smokers were quite ambivalent. Mas Irfan explained that some friends first approached him about participating in the competition. He had made a zine, which he showed us on his mobile phone. They proposed new ways to attract people to underappreciated tourist sites. At a “technical meeting,” he recalled, Sampoerna gave them an MOU (memorandum of understanding) and encouraged them to read it carefully before signing. He was perturbed by the provision that all competition entry ideas belonged to Sampoerna, and those who submitted them had no claim to royalties or other forms of compensation if Sampoerna decided to use them. “I looked around at my friends, but no one else seemed to have a problem with it, so I signed it and handed it over.” After the trip to Averland, he gave his swag—a hooded snap-front jacket and backpack—to his younger sibling and created artwork to cover up the Averland logo. “An event organizer later approached me about becoming a cigarette seller, like an SPG. ‘That sounds like fun [*seru*],’ I said, although in reality, I felt tired [*capai*]. I guess we’re just used to display logos,” he concluded dolefully.

By contrast, Mbak Dewi, an undergraduate education major and artist whom we met at a campus café, was uncritically supportive of Sampoerna and breathlessly thrilled by the experience. When her friends decided to enter the Averland competition, she recounted, their group was initially all young women. After learning that they required a smoker, they recruited a male member. Sampoerna interviewed them at a café, where they described their plans for putting up murals in alleys to cover vandalism and make them more inviting places. Fortunately, Sampoerna selected her group (*Alhamdulillah menang*). At the technical meeting in a Chinese restaurant, their group received a generous 200,000 rupiah

voucher—more than enough to cover their meal. They signed an MOU, but she could not recall any details.

At Averland, Dewi attended Fine Art and Fashion workshops, learning about “very contemporary” artistic techniques as well as collage; she was now trying to incorporate collage into her artwork, which had previously been more realistic. The speakers at Averland, including the Sampoerna staff, “gave me motivation, although I’m still young. I long to be like them but know I’ll have to work hard first.”

Averland also offered Dewi a peer bonding experience. On the way to Averland, the bus was very quiet (*senyap*), while the way back was more fun (*seru*). She wistfully sang a line of the song they made up, and still sing: “At Taman Dayu, we exchange ideas” (Di Taman Dayu tukar pikiran). Sampoerna created a WhatsApp group for Averland alumni who send texts like “Hey, come visit my café.” She longed to participate and see everyone again, but she was very busy in her final semester.

Dewi saw Sampoerna as a company that “greatly contributes to and benefits the community and appreciates and empowers young people.” She assumed that it was an Indonesian company. I pointed out that it was owned by a foreign firm and asked if she thought the company might harm Indonesians. “No,” she responded. “Sampoerna gave us lots of presents, more than we could have imagined. The bag, the jacket, the pocket money, the black Casio watches. And this special wooden watch! Oh, but I loved it at Averland [*aduh kerasan banget di sana*]. I had never been camping before! It was all a valuable experience.”

I returned to the question of tobacco’s toll on Indonesians. Dewi admitted that her father quit smoking a few months ago due to high blood pressure. He had smoked Surya, A-Mild, and Dji Sam Soe. Her friend’s father, she reflected, died due to something tobacco-related. “But this all comes down to the choices of smokers,” she hastened to add, “for whom smoking is like snacking [*cemilan*].” Student artists in the United States, I observed, are often critical of large companies. She gazed down at the table and drew her finger along the wood, repeating the word “criticize” (*kritik*) but not responding otherwise to my words or the pious and problematic distinction between art and commerce they implied.

STEPCHILDREN OF AVERLAND AND THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

Fatma, Shahnaz, and I felt certain the Sampoerna marketing team regarded us as unwanted stepchildren at Averland and other Sampoerna-sponsored events. If individuals are equipped with a style radar, “an embodied instrument of knowing that responds affectively to the projected coolness of those within visual distance,” mine screeched that I was profoundly uncool and out of place (Luvaas 2019, 246). Promotional settings triggered social anxieties and resurfaced dormant high school insecurities, which I quelled by recalling that I was too far outside the peer

group to even count in the social hierarchy.¹² Between my height (five feet six) and white (*bule*) racial identity, I stood out like a sore thumb. Then forty-two years old, I was roughly double the age of the company's target market, some members of which seemed to regard those in their forties as suffering from an affliction that would never visit them. Recent college graduates, my research assistants were the right age and class background, but Fatma dressed in a gender-ambiguous fashion that led the occasional SPG to do a double-take and try to figure out if she was a man to whom she should proffer cigarettes or a woman whom she should bypass. Fatma relished their confusion, but her rebellion against gender conventions somehow lacked A-Mild-style transgressive appeal. Shahnaz was more petite, easily passing as an attractive, feminine cisgender college student, but her neatly pinned veil served as a reminder of Islamic norms and piety that was not fully welcome in some of these settings. As a trio, we formed a frequent and not entirely welcome presence. We were recurring figures in event organizers' photos of Sampoerna events, but they avoided selecting images that included us in social media postings, and we likely inadvertently ruined otherwise usable images of attractive youthful fun.

Back when our appearance was a novelty, or on the occasional slow night, MCs who otherwise ignored us instead singled us out for public fun and display. Once, a gregarious female MC lobbed questions at me, holding her microphone under my nose to broadcast my responses. "Who are you? Where are you from? Do you think everyone in Malang is good and beautiful?" My panicked response to the last question was a halting "ummm, everyone . . ." (*ah, semua . . .*), which she swiftly converted to "Malang people are all sour!" (*asem semua!*) to everyone's amusement. She then insisted that Fatma and I play a game that involved blowing up balloons, billing our battle as Indonesia versus the United States (for the record, Indonesia won). MCs specialized in quick-thinking patter, wordplay, and sexual innuendo, but their humor could also be sexist or involve shaming people for their age, body size, or otherwise physically unattractive or unstylish appearance. They played on everyone's insecurities, including their own—insecurities that cigarettes are supposed to be strategically placed to resolve.¹³

Event organizers appreciated how our presence raised their audience numbers and often informed us about events, but Sampoerna marketing staff were more ambivalent. I suspect that when Edy told us we smelled like we'd been eating durian and put Fatma in a headlock at Averland, he was acting on the antipathy he and his colleagues felt toward us, picking on Fatma rather than me due to her youth, Indonesian status, and gender ambiguity, which allowed for a physical style of joking ordinarily more appropriate between men. In a subsequent and more discomfiting and humiliating encounter at a food photography event, Edy put Fatma in a headlock with one arm and covered her eyes with the other. His displays of masculine dominance took advantage of surprise and a joking quality to go unchallenged but left us retrospectively wishing we had responded differently.¹⁴ I wondered if the



FIGURE 17. An MC calls attention to artists body-painting models at a promotional event. Photo by author.

Sampoerna marketing staff's ambivalence toward us was rooted in concern that we might publish a damning account of their work or report on their performance to Sampoerna's head office or perhaps in awareness that our presence, like their own, made these events less cool and harmed rather than benefited the brand. Whatever it was—perhaps some combination of these concerns—they seemed to find little upside in our presence. Sometimes it seemed to me that they were trying too hard to project that they were having a good time with their intricate cool handshakes and laughter. On the second night at Averland, one confessed that he felt like he was getting a cold, would rather be home with his family, and had no desire whatsoever to be there. When his boss had asked him to attend, however, the obligatory response was yes. If feigning fun and enthusiasm formed a sometimes burdensome chore, at least he was rewarded with a regular paycheck, unlike influencers whose fluctuating and intermittent contracts hinged on their popularity and likes.

. . .

This chapter has moved beyond agricultural and factory labor and wage relations to examine brand production labor. The labor may not feel like much and might even seem hyperlocal, community oriented, or self-motivated and self-promoting, encompassing activities like taking a selfie still or video and uploading it to Instagram or TikTok, attending a fun event or spreading the word about it on

WhatsApp, voting on the next A-Mild Limited Edition design, or posting an image of your latest work of art for others to admire and comment on. Globally, cigarette manufacturers have invested their attention, skills, and resources into eliciting and tracking this labor and its impacts. Ever adept at turning an obstacle into an opportunity, cigarette companies not only circumvent social media restrictions but also enlist a broad swath of Indonesians—students, underemployed youth, aspiring and actual celebrities—to commit their time, labor, creative ideas, and social influence to expanding cigarette consumption. Many of them even perform this work for free or for low pay and possible prizes. Others are quite savvy about what cigarette companies want from them and monetize their influence accordingly. Yet even those who are savvy tend to be uncritical of the cigarette industry, which provides so much support to underfunded creative spheres.

Given the dearth of industry critique among most influencers, I was surprised when a “local hero” from Semarang said of Averland, “What Sampoerna is doing is terrible, right?” He had quickly struck up a conversation with me in fluent English while silk-screening my free Averland souvenir T-shirt. A grindcore musician who also ran a silkscreen shop, he said he tried to parry Sampoerna’s demands for his ideas on how to get closer to Semarang youth and keep their relationship limited and “professional,” like working the silkscreen stand at Averland. His candor may have reflected his fast-approaching release from Sampoerna sponsorship and demands; he and his American wife were moving to California soon. Smoking would be harder to quit. His go-to brand was A-Mild.

Selling Kretek

Co-opting Independent Retail

On the Indonesian island of Lombok, I spent a day in the company of Pak Arif, a cigarette marketing contractor. At one of our stops, the rather taciturn woman running a small general store pointed out that during a recent storm, the shop's Marlboro Lights advertising banner (or "sunscreens") had blown on top of the awning to which it was attached and was no longer performing its function of hailing potential smokers. Arif's stepladder was too short for the job of restoring it to its proper position. Improvising, he maneuvered his vehicle to the edge of the roof, using the stepladder to clamber onto the van. While pulling down the advertisement, he released an inevitable—and, from his precarious position, inescapable—cascade of stagnant storm water that drenched his upper body.

Similar scenes of the physical side of marketing labor—erecting, repairing, and dismantling cigarette advertising—unfold incessantly across the Indonesian archipelago. Wherever they are not subject to local bans, cigarette advertisements command a dominant position among the "forest of signs" enveloping Indonesians (Applbaum 2004, 226; Nichter et al. 2009). During their ten-minute walk to school along narrow streets in the East Javanese city of Malang, my children passed fifty-eight cigarette advertisements attached to small shops and food stalls. Indonesian NGOs have documented how tobacco companies target schools and concentrate marketing efforts around them (Yayasan Pengembangan Media Anak, Lentera Anak Indonesia, and Smoke Free Agents 2015).

Indonesia boasts around 2.4 million cigarette retailers, the majority of which are "traditional shops" (*toko tradisional*, Lian and Dorotheo 2021, 5). The company works to dominate and extract value from this retail network, which stretches across the archipelago and puts cigarettes and advertising in close proximity to Indonesians of all ages, from crowded urban neighborhoods to remote villages. Retail outlets serve as marketing infrastructure: matter that enables the movement of other

matter, an “architecture of circulation” or built network facilitating movement of cigarettes, people, and ideas (Larkin 2013, 328, 329). As the semiotic scaffolding for advertising meant to “address and constitute subjects” in their vicinity by arousing affect, yearning, and fantasy, retail outlets both incite and satisfy desires (329, 333). Chapter 5 describes how Sampoerna extracts value from a network of small-scale independent retailers via the labor of marketing staff and contractors who travel to these shops and via the Sampoerna Retail Community program, both of which involve the ongoing labor of maintaining relationships and retail infrastructure. These shops bring Indonesians into the kretek market, which is not self-standing but requires the labor of marketers to create and maintain it.

Sampoerna’s salespeople perform quotidian labor on “traditional” independent retail outlets to orient them toward company interests. This involves building relationships with shopkeepers; installing, maintaining, and removing objects from shops; and gathering knowledge from, and imparting it to, shopkeepers. The Sampoerna Retail Community program scales up this labor and the contractual obligations and entitlements of retailer members who agree to Sampoerna branding, cigarette promotional work, and makeovers that style independent outlets to resemble modern chain minimarts. These retailers remain independent insofar as they own their own space and inventory and assume responsibility for their own risks but become subject to Sampoerna’s aesthetic and behavioral criteria for achieving retail modernity.

FASHIONING INFRASTRUCTURES, FORGING MARKETS

By extending the infrastructure rubric to retail, I depart from a conventional infrastructure studies focus on large state- or corporate-managed technical systems such as capital-intensive deep-water oil drilling rigs or iconic public utilities like water and sewage systems, electric grids, and canal, rail, and road networks (Allan 2014; Anand 2017; Appel 2012; Björkman 2015; Carse 2014; Chu 2014; Gupta 2015; Harvey and Knox 2015; Schwenkel 2015; Von Schnitzler 2016). Such infrastructures readily appear as “systematic assemblages” or “governed material systems” organized by a central authority (Wilson 2016, 274). The world of Indonesian retail is, by contrast, vernacular, ad hoc, and self-built, a bricolage authored by millions of individuals through which branded and unbranded commodities of various shapes and sizes flow. But marketing professionals do perform systematic, if competing, work on this retail terrain.

Markets are neither pure abstractions nor the natural product of the human propensity to truck, barter, and exchange as Adam Smith would have it (Carrier 1997). They are fashioned, designed, and grown rather than found. Applbbaum (2004, 117) ably demonstrates this point in his far-reaching account of the

understudied marketing profession, taking on “a fundamental contradiction in liberal economic thought, namely, the inclusion of prominent and powerful, if not always visible, agents inside what is supposed to be a self-regulating system.” Marketers participate in the fiction of the self-regulating market and deny their own power to create new desires and subjective dispositions insofar as they frame their work as merely awakening latent, unconscious needs and wants that were already present within subjects (194–95). While marketing extends its grasp over the entire “provisioning system,” my focus here falls primarily on what Applbaum identifies as the “infrastructural level” of marketing work: supply and sale settings (224).

These settings have assumed increased importance for cigarette companies since the 1990s, when tighter regulations in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand curtailed their marketing practices. While one response to this restriction has been the outsourcing of marketing work to the brand producers documented in the previous chapter, tobacco control scholars have also documented another side of the global industry’s rejoinder: shifting promotional budgets from billboards, transit advertising, sponsorships, and media to the retail environment (Rooke et al. 2010). By 1996, Philip Morris, which was at the forefront of this trend, had declared the retail outlet’s interior “the primary point of communication between ourselves and our consumers” (Harper 2006, 271). The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between state attorneys general and tobacco firms in the United States left retail outlets relatively unregulated, generating fierce industry competition with “each player scrapping harder for sacred shelf space and point-of-sale signage in store—where the vast majority of tobacco marketing dollars are spent” (trade publication quoted in Feighery et al. 2003, 187). As public health campaigns have globalized tobacco restrictions, the industry has countered by globalizing its “concentrated focus on the point-of-purchase environment” (Lavack and Toth 2006, 383). Critics note that pro-smoking messages in stores normalize tobacco consumption and recruit “all shoppers regardless of age or smoking status,” prompting children to try smoking, increasing consumption among smokers, and undermining the efforts of those attempting to quit smoking (Feighery et al. 2003, 188; Reimold, Lee, and Ribisl 2022; Rooke et al. 2010, 279).

To illuminate the labor such cigarette marketing requires, I draw on insights and approaches from infrastructure studies. This scholarship’s broad concern with materiality—how the properties of asphalt, water, or metal pipes, for example, shape sensory experiences and social and political potential and vulnerabilities—invites a corollary commitment to examining infrastructure labor. Whereas infrastructure’s design and invention tends to garner the most public prestige and scholarly attention, the power and efficacy of infrastructure systems is only secured through complex, omnipresent, and skilled maintenance, restoration, and repair work (Jackson 2014, 2017; Russell and Vinsel 2016). Similarly, advertisements, however well designed, are effective only when they are visible, and visibility demands ongoing maintenance, as the opening vignette illustrates.¹ By

exploring the street life of advertisements as signs with material properties (Keane 1997), this chapter also complements ethnographies of the advertising agencies that create representations and counters the tendency to render brands metaphysical and dematerialized (Dávila 2001; Foster 2008; Manning 2010, 35; Mazzarella 2003; Shankar 2015).

Insights drawn from feminist theory are particularly germane for analyzing such marketing labor. Star and her colleagues ask *when*, not *what*, infrastructure is, insisting on its relationality and calling for attention to the organized practices and invisible forms of labor that bring it into being, as well as to the differential social effects infrastructure produces (Star and Ruhleder 1996, 113; Star and Strauss 1999). Whereas hydraulic or rail engineers may claim (at times contested) authority over pipes and tracks that “belong” to the state, marketers must daily charm their way into kiosks to emplace commodities and advertisements. They must turn attention and care practices on both persons and things, addressing their mutual vulnerability and fragility (Denis and Pontille 2015, 355). Hence, although infrastructure labor for cigarette marketers undoubtedly involves the kind of material maintenance work that Pak Arif was engaged in on the sunscreen, such work is premised on a range of less material forms of labor. Involving bodily commitment and waged emotional labor, such care practices may be everywhere while remaining functionally invisible as low-status, devalued work performed by “nonpersons” (Hochschild 2012; Star and Strauss 1999, 20). Given the prominence of care work in sales, it may be unsurprising that this profession was historically associated with feminized skills “such as courtesy and politeness, verbal dexterity, and a familiarity with decorative and stylistic aspects of objects” (Friedman 2004, 17). Care work often serves to produce positive affects—attachment, connection, happiness, or affection—but in and beyond the cigarette industry, these affects frequently serve hegemonic and violent political projects that generate value for capitalism (Murphy 2015). Care is a selective mode of attention that cherishes some objects and lives and excludes others, and in the context of kretek capitalism, choices about what to care for wreak violent consequences (see also Martin, Myers, and Viseu 2015, 627).

These feminist insights into how violence and care may be intertwined rather than opposing phenomena shape this chapter’s treatment of tobacco retail infrastructure’s harmful consequences. The infrastructure labor I chronicle here, in creating and maintaining an environment saturated with tobacco advertising, is itself a consequential form of infrastructural violence that perpetuates a lethal and addictive commodity (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012). The intimate proximity of cigarettes and cigarette advertising is a form of social and environmental injustice corresponding to an uneven distribution of life chances that is not accidental but a product of the capitalist pursuit of markets for harmful commodities in areas where consumers are least protected (Benson and Kirsch 2010; Kohrman and Benson 2011; Wilson 2016, 251). Like socially marginalized groups in the United States,

Indonesians are subject to “predatory inclusion,” targeted and overserved rather than underserved by the cigarette industry’s marketing apparatus (Apollonio and Malone 2005; Jain 2003; Taylor 2019; Wailoo 2021). In this regard, whereas infrastructural violence often takes place via malfunctioning and exclusion (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012), the retail infrastructure analyzed here functions all too well to interpellate, enlist, and include—to connect Indonesians to cigarettes.² I turn next to how these connections are forged on the “traditional” side of the architecture of cigarette circulation.

TOKO TRADISIONAL

In Indonesia, “traditional grocery retail” remains the “most important distribution channel for tobacco” according to market research firms (Euromonitor International 2017, 1; Nielsen Company 2015; Razdan, Das, and Sohoni 2013). Independent cigarette retailers range in scale from mobile street peddlers (*pedagang asongan*) and cart vendors (*pedagang kaki lima*), who are particularly vulnerable to state shakedowns and gentrification efforts, to more fixed kiosks, stalls (*warung*), shops, and well-established wholesale and retail general stores, often owned by Chinese Indonesians (Gibbings 2013; Jellinek 1976).

The term *toko tradisional* does not indicate the age of these ventures, most of which were established in response to increasing population density, disposable cash, and commodity availability since the 1970s. It exists instead in contrast to “modern” retail and can be used either pejoratively, to dismiss or shame independent shops, shopkeepers, and their clients, or positively, to mark the economic endeavors of middle- and lower-class families as something to be valued and preserved and to project the image of being a virtuous place to shop. Various features mark independent outlets as “traditional,” including their names, domestic settings, interior organization, lighting, hours, and the comportment, age, dress, and gender of those who mind them.

Independent shop names, typically in Indonesian or a regional language, index particular locations (e.g., an intersection, such as Simpang Tiga), shopkeeper identities (e.g., Bu Indra), or aspirations (e.g., Sumber Urip [source of life Jv], Sejahtera [prosperity], or Mandiri [independence]). Bu Yayuk would periodically change her shop’s name, alternating between the names of her two children so neither would be jealous. Bu Sri called hers Sumber Baru, marking it as a “new source” for her family after she gave birth to a second child and her husband landed a civil service job, allowing her to quit a pittance-paying honorary teaching position and work at home. Cigarette marketers often usher these names into formal existence by printing them on cigarette advertisements that they hang on or adjacent to shops (like the sunscreen that soaked Arif).

On busy roads and in more urban spaces, toko tradisional are sometimes purpose-built shophouses called *ruko* (a portmanteau of *rumah* [house] and *toko*

[shop]), where the bottom floor is devoted to commerce and an upper story or two are reserved for domestic life.³ More frequently, Indonesians convert porches and living rooms into shops by partially demolishing exterior walls. In rural areas where land is less constrained, they may be added on to or erected adjacent to homes.⁴ Toko tradisional alternate between open-air and sealed states, depending on whether their wooden shutters or rolling metal doors are open or shut. At night, they are often dimly and unevenly lit by a few naked bulbs.

Hours are uncertain, and cigarette sellers routinely backtrack on their routes to catch a shop that was closed on their first pass. Shops may open soon after dawn, close for slow hot afternoons or prayer, and reopen late in the day when traffic picks up. They may shut for days or weeks for religious or life-cycle events (e.g., Lebaran or family illness, death, marriage, or births). Yayuk complained that when her shop was closed, would-be customers would freely pound on her back door when they wanted something.

Inside toko tradisional, wares (especially more expensive goods, and always cigarettes) are often arranged in glass cases that are only accessible from behind the counter. Shopkeepers invest significant capital in these cases, arranging them in ways that configure interior space, segregate customers and products, enforce customer dependence on shopkeepers, and create a barrier limiting access to domestic interiors (Geertz 1963, 52, 53, 58). Some shops also sell eggs by the piece and bulk commodities such as rice and mung beans, which the shopkeeper measures with her scales and weights. Chains of coffee powder, shampoo, dishwashing liquid, and snack sachets typically dangle from ceiling joists.

Toko tradisional interactions range from expansive, gossipy conversations to mute transactions. Shopkeepers may greet customers warmly or with a wordless, expectant gaze or pointed question: "What are you looking for? What do you want to buy?" (Cari apa? Mau beli apa?). Shopkeepers are predominantly women, not infrequently attired in comfortable housedresses (*daster*) and doing without the *jilbabs* (fitted headscarves) that many don outside the home. The female-run shop fits stereotypical gender associations between petty trade and married women or widows of various social classes, although male shop proprietors and married couples running shops as a joint enterprise are not uncommon (Alexander 1987, 31). Frequently, in the shopkeeper's absence, shops are attended by less knowledgeable family members, neighbors, or friends. Gendered associations between women and trade in the marketplace are strengthened by a venture's physical location in or adjacent to the home, literally domesticating and rendering socially appropriate and unthreatening income-generating activity that can be combined with home cleaning, cooking, and child supervision (Brenner 1995; Leshkowich 2014). Women involved in commerce are often significant or principal household providers (Alexander 1987, 5). While their contributions may be rhetorically diminished as "on the side" (*sampingan*), Yayuk proudly informed me that her retail income funded her children's university degrees (Robinson 2009, 91).

Shopkeepers regard cigarettes as a significant part of their business, with reliably high turnover (*putar terus*) making up for their slender profit margins (under 10 percent of retail prices, or around five to ten cents [550 to 1,400 rupiah] per Sampoerna pack). They observe that cigarettes support overall retail traffic; customers come to buy smokes and add a snack or drink, and vice versa. Toko tradisional sell cigarettes in cartons, packs, or as single sticks (*eceran*) drawn from open packs or branded metal canisters and displays. Single-stick sales help initiate and perpetuate consumption by enabling consumers to buy cigarettes even if they are short on cash or reluctant to commit to an entire pack. Although packs are labeled with language forbidding their sale or provision to pregnant women or children under the age of eighteen, shopkeepers readily sell them to children, admitting that they serve astonishingly young customers. In a social economy where cigarettes are often given as tokens of gratitude, small retailers also allow smokers to trade in a gifted pack for a preferred brand.

RELATIONSHIP WORK

For the foot soldiers of Sampoerna's mass persuasion campaigns, a grasp of this retail context is critical to the success of the care work they perform in retail settings (Friedman 2004). Well-executed care work is a gentle mode of exploitation and coercion that is difficult to confront or reject insofar as it conforms to popular virtues such as "confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety" (Bourdieu 1977, 192). Sellers are both agents of exploitation and exploited subjects. They attempt to exercise control over retailers' time, space, behavior, and knowledge but do so from a supplicant position, dressed in uniforms that broadcast their position in the company hierarchy and wielding iPads they use for retrieving and recording information for Sampoerna and for documenting their own performance for supervisors.

Sampoerna coordinates marketing and distribution across a complex social and natural topography, deploying more in-house staff in densely populated, fiercely competitive markets like Java, while relying heavily on contractors in sparsely populated eastern islands, where the company enjoys a market share as high as 80 percent.⁵ In and around the university town of Malang, Sampoerna's marketing team regularly visits 9,236 retail outlets out of a retail universe exceeding 37,300.⁶ Fifty-seven Sampoerna sellers and their assistants start each weekday in the warehouse behind the Malang marketing office, loading plain white or branded vans with marketing materials and cigarettes packed in laundry-basket-sized plastic tubs. The modest quantity of cigarettes that sellers carry reflects their assignment: to create a retail environment maximizing Sampoerna sales rather than to directly sell cigarettes. Because Malang levies hefty taxes on vehicle advertising, plain vans are cheaper for Sampoerna and safer for sellers, who risk being robbed in outlying regions when they drive vehicles that call attention to the cash and commodities

they contain. Sellers adhere to fixed routes over a two-week cycle, visiting approximately twenty-five to thirty retailers per day. Clutching imaginary motorbike handlebars and recalling that he had visited fifty outlets a day as a seller in his early career, a manager explained that Sampoerna has reduced routes to privilege the quality rather than quantity of each seller's retailer relations. Managers routinely switch sellers' routes to encourage them to see opportunities embedded in the retail environment with fresh eyes. In 2016, only three of Sampoerna's Malang sellers were women, and these were recent hires.

On the day I accompanied seller Pak Markus and his assistant Pak Bambang in Malang, supervisor Pak Jamal came along to chaperone me and assess Markus's performance for potential promotion. Jamal and Markus were attired in black trousers and beige twill buttoned-front shirts with the company logo embroidered on the front and "SAMPOERNA" in black lettering across the back. Markus held an iPad and wore a portable device attached to a shoulder strap for calculating accounts and printing paper receipts. He had already logged fourteen years as a seller, but his promotion prospects dimmed when Jamal pointed out two problems that he appeared to have overlooked in a minimart; the lighting for an ad was out, and the cigarette shelving required repair. Tense under Jamal's scrutiny, Markus hastened to diagnose the lighting issue and sent Bambang to the van to fetch replacement plastic shelving.

Promoted from a previous "office boy" position, Bambang had been a seller's assistant for three years. Jamal loudly informed me that Bambang might rise to seller status if he completed a college degree. Bambang grinned, abashed by Jamal's dig at his stalled progress. PMI instituted the requirement that entry-level sellers possess a college degree, and the company conducts job interviews at least partly in English; while neither college degree nor English skills are necessary for the job itself, they are prerequisites for further career advancement. As a contractor, Bambang wore a more colorful black and red polo shirt and black pants and carried a small feather duster and washrag. Bambang drove the van, cleaned display cases, retrieved cigarettes, conducted minor repair work, and affixed advertisement stickers. He also put his social skills to effective use in one shop, picking up the shopkeeper's chubby toddler and encouraging his brother to chase them so Markus could administer a marketing questionnaire to the boy's mother in peace. In another, he rewarded the shopkeeper, who appeared to be in her sixties, with a warm pat on the back after she flirtatiously told Markus she missed seeing his handsome face. Such relationship work is critical for sellers whose own success and promotion prospects hinge on their ability to impart a "will to market" to shopkeepers (Applbaum 2004, 160). They often enhance the informality of interactions by using regional languages rather than Indonesian.

While driving between retail outlets in rural Lombok, marketing contractor Pak Arif, who had logged five years on the job, reflected on his humorous approach to this kind of relationship work. His boss taught him not to go straight to cigarettes

but instead to discover what was important to the shopkeeper before steering the conversation toward company interests. Elaborating, he explained that shopkeepers enjoy attention and consistent visits (*mau diperhatikan, dikunjungi, selalu silaturahmi*). Arif called “Assalamualaikum” as we approached each kiosk, uttering the polite greeting that Muslims in Indonesia normally use when entering someone’s home. He ribbed one woman over the state of her kiosk, exclaiming, “Why the mess?” (*Kok berantakan?*). She pleaded that she had been busy making snacks for Ramadan. Another shopkeeper jokingly wheedled Arif and his supervisor, Pak Bahar, about bringing her some gifts to mark Lebaran. Arif was reluctant to promise anything, but Bahar said maybe they could find her a T-shirt. She pounced, laughingly demanding, “What else?” (*Apa lagi?*).

Strikingly few independent retail outlets are untouched by cigarette advertisements, suggesting a “shortage of resistance” in response to sellers’ rewards and blandishments (Mrázek 2010, 58). An exception on a busy corner near my rental in Malang aroused my curiosity. Pak Tomo, the young owner, explained that after he completed college and took over his parents’ enterprise, he terminated their cigarette company contracts. He sold cigarettes aplenty, visiting a wholesaler as often as daily to restock his supply of cartons and three glass display cases. But he did not want companies telling him what to do, and he found their advertisements untidy. When the morning sun was at a low angle, he hung lengths of black fabric for shade instead of relying on sunscreen advertisements.

If Tomo refused cigarette marketers on political and aesthetic grounds, other shopkeepers resisted for religious and ethical reasons. Jamal recalled that after Muslim organization Muhammadiyah issued its 2010 fatwa declaring smoking haram, one retailer apologetically refused to sell or advertise cigarettes. In league with schoolchildren, anti-tobacco activists have also sought to “clean up” (*membersihkan*) and “liberate” (*membebaskan*) Indonesia’s stalls and streets from cigarette advertising. On social media, activists circulate before-and-after images of liberated shops with fresh banners, bearing the hashtag #tolakjaditarget (refuse to be a target) and declaring “Stall free of smoking ads” (*Warung bebas iklan rokok*), “Child-friendly stall without smoking ads” (*Warung ramah anak tanpa iklan rokok*), or “It’s forbidden to sell cigarettes to children” (*Dilarang menjual rokok kepada anak*). Given the limited resources of anti-tobacco organizations compared to the cigarette industry, however, the best hope for such actions is that they will serve to encourage legal bans.

While such classic expressions of intentional and principled resistance are rare, shopkeeper enthusiasm for marketers’ advertisements and interventions is also limited. Marketing interactions I observed were generally polite and amicable, but some contained ambivalent undercurrents. At a kiosk near Brawijaya University in Malang, an elderly shopkeeper obediently answered Markus’s questions but muttered that all she wanted was sufficient income and that she had no interest in pulling long hours to earn more. Markus cajoled her into buying a couple

packs of Marlboro Black Menthol, inserting one in a small display. At one stop in rural Lombok, a woman claimed she was just minding her husband's stall and that she knew nothing about it. We quickly departed, Arif explaining that he need not waste his time if she was unwilling to cooperate. Another kiosk visit was positively painful. As we approached, it was apparent that Sampoerna's display case was promoting A-Motion rather than Marlboro Reds, the current promotion. The man overseeing the kiosk grimly explained that his wife and new baby had both died shortly after childbirth; this was the first day since their deaths that he was opening the kiosk, which had been his wife's venture. Arif expressed his condolences and updated the display case. Seeing an old A-Mild advertisement covering a table outside of the store, Bahar and his driver ripped off the makeshift tablecloth and tossed it in the back of the van. Bahar explained that Sampoerna wants to prevent misappropriation of old advertisements, like people sitting on them. As we drove away, Arif remarked that the newly widowed man was in trouble. What did he know about running a kiosk?

To strengthen relations and build retailer loyalty, Sampoerna rewards higher-volume vendors with gifts and experiences such as short vacations and catered dinners with entertainment. Jamal contrasted this approach with competitors' tendency to hastily offer straightforward cash rewards. Sampoerna invited a hundred small retailers to Bali, booking upscale hotels and restaurants to give them a more lavish travel experience than that to which they would typically treat themselves. Jamal chuckled recalling the confusion of retailers who had never encountered a toilet that flushed without a water scoop and did not know how to bathe with a showerhead. Sampoerna gave the retailers temporary and controlled access to a travel experience coded as highly desirable but beyond their normal means, simultaneously underscoring their lower-class position and the limits of their class-based knowledge. To the extent that Sampoerna's group-travel program succeeded in building shopkeeper loyalty, it proved Bourdieu's (1977, 192–93) claim that the most effective symbolic violence rewards labor, time, care, attention, and *savoir faire* with durable bonds and personal memories that won't be forgotten.

KNOWLEDGE WORK

To effectively understand and shape the retail infrastructure and cigarette market, sellers produce and transmit knowledge. They identify popular gathering spots and retail outlets near malls, government offices, markets, busy intersections, and schools. Marketing managers in Malang focus special attention on an area between multiple universities they christened the "golden triangle." For sellers, strategically located retailers are attention-worthy no matter how small, humble, or shabby (Errington, Fujikura, and Gewertz 2012). A manager showing me a very disorderly shop Sampoerna was cultivating in Malang grinned proudly and pointed to the new mall across the street that would bring in traffic.



FIGURE 18. A cigarette seller enters data in his iPad while visiting a roadside vendor. Photo by author.

Sellers incessantly administer questionnaires to retailers and feed harvested information into centralized knowledge systems via data tracking software loaded on their iPads. From retailers, Sampoerna learns about company and competitor brand performance, customer identities (age, gender, occupation, class), shopping patterns, retailer hours, busy and slack times of day and night, and so on. The goal is to achieve an exquisite attunement to the market, which includes a wealth of informal and contested spaces and sidewalk activities that are nevertheless amenable to being tracked and rendered legible (Anjaria 2016; Harms 2016). At the same time, the sellers do not presume that retailers are fully trustworthy sources of information. Jamal told me retailers routinely try to curry favor with sellers by exaggerating Sampoerna's product performance. Sampoerna always crosschecks its data against intelligence purchased from marketing firm Nielsen. Sellers also use iPads to self-report, proving that they have visited sites on their routes with time-stamped photographs of barcoded company cards affixed to display cases.

Managers use market data and ethnographic observations on social practices, identities, rhythms, and calendars to fine-tune the nature, timing, geography, and duration of brand promotions. For example, Sampoerna promotes "premium" brands during Ramadan when smokers consume fewer but more expensive cigarettes. Campaigns ramp up on Madura Island during salt or tobacco harvests, when workers and their wages are easily parted. In seaside villages, Sampoerna promotes its budget hand-rolled product Sampoerna Hijau, catering to fishermen's

belief that a slow smoke will warm them during a cold night at sea. Managers note that college students can better afford A-Milds at the start of the month when their parents send pocket money and they frequent restaurants and cafés. By month's end, cash-strapped students are often limited to street food and sustain smoking habits by buying single sticks and sharing, making budget brands like Magnum more appealing.

Besides gathering knowledge from retailers and feeding it upward to managers, sellers disseminate information downward to retailers. In stark contrast to pharmaceutical drug representatives or "detail men" whose art lies in imparting (mis) information to doctors in order to generate prescriptions, cigarette sellers deploy limited product knowledge (Greene 2004; Oldani 2004). They may have opinions stemming from their own experience as smokers, but as sellers, their actionable product knowledge revolves around which competitor and Sampoerna brands are compatible. Brand-differentiating criteria are limited: "white" or clove, premium or budget, machine-rolled or hand-rolled, "low-tar, low-nicotine," or "full flavor." Evincing the close entanglement of knowledge work and relationship work, sellers work to impart understanding of rewards programs and new product launches to shopkeepers, even as the latter may be drowsy after being roused from naps or distracted by an engrossing television program, demanding children, customers, incoming deliveries, or household work in progress.

OBJECT WORK

Relationship work is also fundamentally enmeshed with the object work carried out in shops; marketers access things through persons and persons through things. The company countertop display case exemplifies this mutually constituting relationship. Sampoerna uses cigarette packs as currency to "rent" counter space from shopkeepers (retailers receive one to three packs per month depending on display size). Upon visiting a shop, marketers cleanse cases, removing dust and grime that accumulates quickly in roadside settings and expelling any competitors' cigarettes or other products and debris before arranging Sampoerna's product. Sometimes Sampoerna's own products damage the cases; Arif labored in vain to remove the iodine-colored stains that had bled from *Dji Sam Soe* soft packs into a plastic display case, making products behind the stains appear old and discolored. Wrapping the packs in clear plastic would solve the problem but detract from *Dji Sam Soe*'s image as a brand whose formula and packaging have been little altered since Sampoerna first made them. Marketers are not at liberty to arrange stock as they see fit, adhering instead to company-issued "planogram" arrangements positioning popular or heavily promoted brands at the top and relegating less popular brands to lower shelving. They replace older packs with fresh stock to ensure that customers do not buy yellowed, spotted, or stale cigarettes, and they entreat shopkeepers to allow them to position Sampoerna's display cases

more prominently, with shopkeepers often agreeing to rearrangements even when they block their view of the street. Marketers have the authority to enter shops, go behind counters, and fiddle with display cases regarded as company assets, but their broader ambition is to annex territory in adjacent display cases. Arif solicited shopkeepers' permission to affix colorful tape borders in their display cases on which he could write in marker. Sellers also hung elaborate handmade props with slogans written in Sasak, the local language on Lombok, to entice customers to sample promoted brands.

Sampoerna programs induce retailers to invest their own labor in marketing cigarettes. Working on the article of faith that consumers perceive the most prominently displayed brands as the most popular and hence desirable, Sampoerna awards points to retailers for "creative pack displays," which typically consist of large (mostly uncreative) block displays of empty packs (Lavack and Toth 2006, 379). In another promotion, retailers near Malang's major universities were awarded points and a free pack for every eight pieces of silver foil from Magnum packs they accumulated. (To accrue additional points, some retailers began giving free packs directly to customers in exchange for eight foils.) Retailers earn points for displaying Sampoerna's cigarettes in a highly visible, vertical, erect, "standing" position (*berdiri*), while laying competitor products on their side in a dormant horizontal "sleeping" position (*tidur*) or, better yet, hiding them from view. They can redeem points for shop and household goods including washing machines, televisions, and mobile phones.

Cigarette companies indirectly engage their competitors in kiosks and on empty walls, seeking to undermine their retailer ties and sometimes engaging in petty acts of sabotage. In Malang, for example, someone slashed Sampoerna banners flanking a busy road near Brawijaya University. Marketers may rip competitors' stickers off walls and replace them with their own. While stripping one wall, Arif explained to me that the competitor had seized his space, so now he would take theirs. He wanted this wall bare rather than claimed as anyone's commercial territory (*biar sama-sama kosong*). At a shop where a Djarum sunscreen had been attached such that it covered a portion of a Sampoerna sunscreen, Bahar's driver reversed the situation, mounting the stepladder to rip off the sunscreens before restapling them with Sampoerna's on top. Wearily surveying these efforts, Bahar told me that such turf battles could be circumvented by investing in more expensive advertising technologies that are harder to tamper with, such as out-of-reach advertisements on poles set perpendicular to, and thus highly visible from, the road.

Sampoerna's marketing team is under pressure to develop or copy new technologies that render advertisements highly visible (through illumination or sheer novelty), stable (safe from sabotage and natural elements), and mutable (easily rotated; Denis and Pontille 2015). The flashy branded metal public bus shelter Sampoerna constructed next to Brawijaya University exemplifies these features.



FIGURE 19. A rural shop owner's dedicated participation in Gudang Garam's Surya display competition won her a Yamaha Mio motorbike. She decorated her shop with over a thousand cigarette packs and fashioned a model of her anticipated motorbike prize out of packs. Photo by author.



FIGURE 20. Stapling a Sampoerna ad on top of competitor Djarum's ad. Photo by author.

Other new technologies appeared on Malang streets: stubby, thickly encased “totems” that illuminated cigarette advertising and shop names at night and vertical “gates” flanking busy road stretches (a Malang marketing office innovation). Cheaper, more vulnerable technologies such as sunscreens can also be shored up against wind by attaching plastic bottles filled with liquid, rocks, or sand to corner grommets.

The materials and activities required to maintain the architecture of cigarette circulation are individually trivial and cheap but collectively expensive. For example, Sampoerna pays Malang shopkeepers only 500,000 rupiah annually for pole-attached street advertisements with the shop’s name, a negligible sum compared to advertising tax expenditures (hanging a four-meter banner for just a week costs the company nearly as much in taxes).⁷ Sampoerna supervisors were sanctimonious about their adherence to the law, insisting that the company paid requisite taxes even on sticker advertisements, whereas many of their “neighbors” (*tetangga*)—a euphemism for competitors—were less scrupulous. In aggregate, the traditional architecture of cigarette circulation demands a significant and steady stream of labor, planning, training, and material resources (vehicles, gas, advertisements, display cases, and so forth) that testifies to its value for cigarette companies. Tobacco control and a changing retail environment, however, pose threats to independent retail’s capacity to accumulate value for the cigarette industry.

THE DARK MARKET AND THE MINIMART REVOLUTION

Tobacco executives in Indonesia believe they can only delay, rather than prevent, the advent of a so-called dark market for cigarettes characterized by comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship, as required by the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Signs of this emerging dark market are already visible. In 2015, then Governor Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) signed gubernatorial decrees (Pergub 1/2015 and 244/2015) prohibiting indoor and outdoor cigarette advertising in the capital city of Jakarta. There are also regency-level (*kabupaten*) movements to limit or ban advertising, as well as neighborhood declarations of smoke-free zones (*kawasan tanpa rokok*). Such restrictions have characteristically intensified the industry’s focus on independent retail. “We know that once the dark market is totally deployed in Indonesia,” Tina, a Sampoerna marketing manager in Jakarta, told me, “the retailer is the key person who can deliver our brand message to the consumer.” But the independent retailer’s future has also grown uncertain.

Large market players are leading a minimart revolution that threatens to displace independent shops. To access IMF aid in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia began loosening retail sector restrictions, gradually admitting foreign firms and allowing hypermarkets, supermarkets, malls, and department

stores to sprout across the country. While more Indonesians are buying goods from large stores, this does not signal a wholesale transition in shopping patterns. Weekly or monthly excursions to stores like Giant, Carrefour, and Hypermart often supplement rather than replace shopping in neighborhood markets and roadside stalls, and many islands have insufficient population density to even support hypermarkets. Chain minimarket and convenience stores, whose claim over the general retail market rose from 4 percent in 2000 to 22 percent in 2010, present a more significant challenge (Sirait and Ford 2014). Two companies dominate: Alfamart and Indomaret, each with over fifteen thousand owner-operated and franchised stores.⁸

Putera Sampoerna appreciated the potential of this retail distribution market, and Alfamart was 70 percent Sampoerna-owned when PMI acquired the manufacturer in 2005. However, assessing Alfamart as an unprofitable asset that fell outside the company's core business focus, PMI sold it off the following year in a bitter and emotional breakup. A decade later, Sampoerna was still trying to repair relations with Alfamart's leader, Djoko Susanto, arranging golf excursions and a visit to a hand-rolling factory that resuscitated fond, tearful memories of Susanto's time as a "blackshirt" (board members wear all-black uniforms and company pins).⁹

In 2015, 53 percent of cigarettes purchased in Indomaret and 47 percent in Alfamart were Sampoerna products, far exceeding Sampoerna's then national market share of 35 percent and demonstrating that minimart shoppers were favorably inclined toward Sampoerna-branded products.¹⁰ The striking 6 percent difference in Sampoerna's performance between the two chains is attributable to Sampoerna's command of "backwall" (behind checkout counter) space in 70 percent of Indomaret stores; it had no Alfamart backwall contract, a result of lingering ill will. Chain minimarts often feature these coveted eye-catching illuminated displays, and cigarette sales tend to be brisk. Unlike independent retailers, though, they neither advertise cigarettes outdoors nor sell them as single sticks. (Under-aged smokers may also prefer to buy cigarettes in independent shops rather than minimarts, although identification checking is lacking in both.)¹¹

Minimarts are a growing piece of the retail infrastructure that serves the *kretek* market, and an array of features mark them as "modern," in contrast to *toko tradisional*. Names like Circle K, Indomaret, and Alfamart are derived from Indonesian and English and take the national and global market as their reference points. Whereas *toko tradisional* are open-air, minimart interiors are glass encased and air-conditioned. *Toko tradisional* are often poorly lit, but minimarts are dazzlingly—almost aggressively—well lit, day and night. Minimarts also adhere closely to the daily hours posted on their front doors, remaining open through important holidays.

Besides cigarettes, most minimart products are arranged by category on open shelving that enables customers to subject commodities to visual, olfactory, and tactile inspection (sniffing, squeezing, and label-reading for expiration

and nutrition information). Basic commodities like rice are sold in sealed, factory-packaged standard sizes and weights. Whereas toko tradisional patrons must request display-case items from shopkeepers, minimart patrons are expected to behave as sovereign consumers and decision-makers. Their open shelving, more anonymous proprietorship, and extended hours render minimarts more vulnerable to shoplifting and robbery than toko tradisional. Minimarts address this risk with closed-circuit television units (CCTV), alerting potential thieves to their surveillance with front-door warnings.

Minimart workers are typically in their early twenties and unmarried, and they usually lack any ownership stake in workplaces severed from their home environments. Clad in vibrant fitted uniforms, they are required to utter standard greetings when customers enter (“Welcome to Indomaret. Enjoy your shopping!” [Selamat datang ke Indomaret. Selamat belanja!]) and exit (“Thank you, until you shop again!” [Terima kasih, sampai belanja kembali!]). Delivered with rapid-fire cheer or in a rote mumble, these greetings are often unintelligible. At the cash register, clerks urge customers to purchase additional products. Their exhortations are sometimes gender specific, with women encouraged to add phone credit or cooking oil (*Ibu mau beli pulsa? Sekalian beli minyak?*) and men coaxed to add cigarettes or a lighter, particularly if a pack is peeking out from a shirt pocket (*Bapak mau beli rokok? Beli korek sekalian?*). Chains often run promotions, such as rewards for spending over 100,000 rupiah. (Over various excursions, I earned bottled Fanta and sweetened tea, chocolate sprinkles, and flavored wafers.)

Jamal told me that some Indonesians initially felt embarrassed and out of place (*sungkan*) in minimarts, recoiling from clerks’ artificial (*kurang alami*) scripted greetings. Some were not sure how to behave, removing their shoes at the door before stepping onto interior tiles. But they adjusted swiftly enough, leaving independent shopkeepers complaining about their shrinking consumer base and Sampoerna fearing that toko tradisional would roll up their rugs (*nggulung tikar*). Discussing the death (*kematian*) of independent shops, one Malang shopkeeper told me that he wished neighborhood shops had banded together to enact local rules to prevent minimart encroachment. In response to such negative perceptions, Alfamart’s website depicts the company as “essentially a community store,” detailing a program for nurturing small and medium enterprises and entrepreneurs in areas where Alfamart stores operate with trainings and support for improving small vendors’ stalls and revitalizing home-based shops.¹² Minimarts often blur the dichotomy between traditional and modern, fostering a hybrid Indonesian-modern atmosphere by providing tables and seating, free Wi-Fi, and “traditional” food stalls on front patios to encourage customers to hang out (*nongkrong*) and consume more snacks and beverages.

Shopkeepers decry minimart customers for being so image-conscious (*gengsi*) that they are willing to fork over extra cash for the privilege of shopping in a minimart. (Prices are often but not always lower in independent retail.) My

Javanese teacher insisted instead that she frequented minimarts because she appreciated their quality control, including attention to expiration dates and an air-conditioned environment where products are not exposed to sunlight and high humidity. I learned firsthand that minimarts sometimes fall short of these ideals after buying spoiled eggs from an Alfamart and looking in vain for chocolate bars that had not liquefied among Madura minimarts experiencing air-conditioning troubles. A 2011 *Forbes* article on Alfamart's billionaire owner nevertheless trafficked in this quality-control imagery by depicting Alfamart as "leading the transition from roadside wooden shacks selling dubious goods to modern minimarts with reliable items" (Lestari 2011).

Sampoerna may no longer own a controlling share in Alfamart, but it can encourage independent shopkeepers to make their shops look and feel more like Alfamarts. Sampoerna's retail community program challenges traditional retail aesthetics and customer service norms, embracing material and behavioral changes touted as modern, superior, desirable, and progressive. The SRC program not only requires new forms of marketing labor and knowledge from cigarette sellers; it induces retailers to perform labor and commit material resources, space, and time to marketing and selling cigarettes as they modernize.

MAKING THE MODERN SRC SHOP

Sampoerna piloted the Sampoerna Retail Community (SRC) program in the Sumatran city of Medan in 2008 with fifty-seven "traditional retail partners." By 2017, Sampoerna had enrolled over ten thousand shops (Sampoerna 2018, 143). Across Indonesia's thirty-four provinces, Sampoerna now counts over 225,000 retail outlets as SRC members (Sampoerna 2023), meaning it has over 5 percent of the independent retail market under SRC contract.¹³ In 2018, Sampoerna launched the AYO application, which digitally linked SRC shops to SRC partners, wholesalers, consumers, and financing. The AYO SRC app would prove especially useful during the pandemic, allowing Sampoerna (2022, 35) to claim Indonesia's "leading retail-focused ecosystem," with 160,000 traditional outlets and over 1.2 million end consumers in 2021. The SRC program's goals are twofold: to convert SRC shops into loyal Sampoerna product advocates and to modernize them along the lines of chain convenience stores to facilitate their survival. Sampoerna paints SRC shop exteriors and interiors white with red and dark gray horizontal-stripe accents, wrapping them in sunscreens in the same color scheme emblazoned with the shop name and "SRC—Sampoerna Retail Community."¹⁴ Framed certificates mounted on the wall proclaim their sales-correlated SRC tier—silver, gold, or platinum—and exhort retailers to "Always improve your performance!" (Tingkatkan terus prestasi anda!).

Because new retail ventures are easy to open but hard to sustain, Sampoerna's teams seek new candidates for SRC membership among shops located in high-traffic areas with enterprising, committed shopkeepers. SRC shopkeepers often

run multiple side businesses including selling Muslim dress (*busana Muslim*) or services like photocopying, entertainment, catering, laundry, or dry cleaning. Near universities, renting rooms to students and youth is a popular way to earn extra income; landlords who rent exclusively to men guarantee themselves a built-in cigarette consumer base. In rural uplands, some SRC shopkeepers buy and sell forest products including cloves for the cigarette industry. Sampoerna deploys its own staff and hires consultants to work with shops to develop their business plans, which often entails expanding product offerings and annexing additional domestic space for retail purposes.

The SRC program places new demands on sellers. Over lunch at a popular university canteen, Jamal explained that Sampoerna is breaking down conventional barriers between selling and marketing, combining the two disciplines in an approach labeled “commercial” that the company piloted in Jakarta in 2012 and rolled out across Java two years later. Broadening sellers’ expertise from a conventional focus on product distribution, volume, and visibility, the program aims to convert sellers into “store consultants” or “retail ambassadors” who bring general retail and marketing knowledge to bear on outlets. Tina acknowledged that the transition was difficult, particularly for “senior sellers” who “have had their job for a long time so it’s hard to change their mindset.” Jamal estimated that sellers spend only a quarter of their time on Sampoerna products in SRC shops, using the balance to address broader challenges and opportunities. Markus and Jamal convinced a shopkeeper to switch out a mixed-item glass display for a “very premium” Snickers display that had been relegated to the floor, then sympathetically and therapeutically listened to the man’s complaints about his neighbor, a relative who had established a rival shop. Sellers’ manifold informal duties, which are not strictly related to Sampoerna products, testify to the long-term value Sampoerna places on SRC shops.

Sampoerna uses group activities, magazines, and incentive schemes to encourage SRC shopkeepers to commit labor and resources into becoming “modern” retail outlets and adopting implicit theories of modern consumer behavior and desire. Key features include easily visible price labels, attention to expiration dates, flashy running-text electronic signs, and open shelving painted bright red. Because open shelving invites not only the sovereign consumer but also the shoplifter, Sampoerna recommends installing surveillance cameras or strategically placed mirrors if shopkeepers cannot afford CCTV. Sampoerna encourages shopkeepers to progress to barcodes, computerized sales and accounting, and the modern Indonesian feature of food stalls out front. The AYO SRC app fosters shopkeeper digital literacy and product flow knowledge, and also likely yields a data trove for Sampoerna. One of the ultimate signs of having achieved retail modernity is the installation of an ATM (common in minimarts). Ideally, SRCs should function as one-stop shops where customers can access bank accounts, pay bills (electricity, internet, and cable), purchase phone credit and drinking water and cooking gas, and so on.

Buletin Sampoerna, a magazine designed for and distributed to SRC shops, is one vehicle for Sampoerna's modernization efforts. It features articles on exemplary shops with headlines like "Don't Be Afraid to Change" (Jangan Ragu untuk Berubah), shopkeeper recipes, regional philanthropic programs, and reports of activities such as a Retail Education and Development Academy (SRC Ready) held for shopkeepers in Bali. Didactic cartoons offer detailed instructions and tips on topics such as routine cleaning (create a weekly schedule, deploy wet and dry techniques), increasing profits (group items together suggestively, such as instant noodles and eggs, run special promotions, and offer customers related products, such as soap alongside shampoo, as they check out), knowing your customer (tailor product offerings to location, for example by selling stationery near campus, packaged meals near offices, or souvenirs near tourist destinations), and book-keeping (track stock and sales with separate color-coded books; record all sales and segregate business from personal finances). In the heyday of modernization theory, Geertz (1963, 53) homed in on similar shop features (regular hours, fixed prices, inventory adjustments, systematic bookkeeping, searching aggressively for customers) as indicators of Indonesia's progress toward a commercial revolution that would launch a proper firm economy and leave behind the credit-enmeshed traditional market economy. More than half a century later, the magazine seeks to bring about a similar transition.

Sampoerna also fosters peer guidance and interactions among SRC members, investing in the community side of the program so SRC members will exhort one another to work harder and innovate more. By 2022, Sampoerna had established seven thousand community associations (*paguyuban* Jv) for its 225,000 SRC shops. I attended the bimonthly gathering of the Malang chapter's SRC association on a Sunday morning in early 2016 in the home of an SRC shopkeeper. Sampoerna's managers and supervisors stayed until early afternoon, then traveled further to go pay their respects to an SRC shopkeeper who had lost a close family member, spending most of their Sunday nurturing the Sampoerna retail family and forging time with their own wives and children. Founded in late 2012, the Malang association has an elected leadership and formal vision and mission statements. Association documents promote a working culture (*budaya kerja*) that centers hospitality, tidiness, cleanliness, and care (*ramah, rapi, resik* [Jv], *rawat*; these valued traits partially overlap with the five Rs discussed in chapter 3). Specific suggestions for achieving this culture include admonitions to smile and greet customers, ask what they are looking for, and prioritize those who arrived first, to place heavier products lower on display racks and dangerous products out of reach of children, and to integrate routine cleaning into shop care from the time the shop opens until it closes in ways that do not disturb customers. The group also spearheaded specific Sampoerna-related initiatives such as, in the first quarter of 2014, not selling single sticks of competitor products, creating eye-catching single-stick displays, and using computerized methods for tracking sales and inventory.

The meeting I attended opened and closed with earsplitting entertainment furnished by our host's for-hire band, which took requests and allowed other shopkeepers to showcase their vocal prowess. At a previous meeting in the popular tourist destination of Batu, members had had the opportunity to enjoy the host's side business of paragliding. After the meeting assembled, with mostly women seated on the floor of an interior room and men occupying the tiled porch outside, the association's leadership said a blessing, led cheers ("SRC! Ya, ya, ya!"), and invited participants to sample snacks brought by a shopkeeper seeking new distributors. The association's head then addressed the shopkeepers, many of whom wore SRC-logo polo shirts, T-shirts, and jackets for the occasion. He spoke of their collective struggle to modernize, observing that minimarts are always bright (*terang*), lights blazing day and night (*lampu nyala terus*). Customers, he continued, have the right to choose the kind of store in which they want to shop. Sampoerna managers took the floor next with a PowerPoint presentation to introduce (*sosialisasi*) a new product: A-Motion, the younger sibling (*adik*) of A-Mild, the brand claiming the largest Indonesian market share. Another manager then announced that Sampoerna would raise the SRC contract fee. As applause broke out, he raised his hand, cautioning that increases would be contingent on store performance. Sampoerna would show greater appreciation for those willing to progress ("lebih berapresiasi teman-teman yang mau berubah"). Members contributed cash donations to a collection box for medical patients who could not afford health care, noting that they would also contribute prayers and expressing hopes that they might reap good fortune (*rejeki*) for their generosity.

Even with the raises, Sampoerna's 2016 annual contract fees for SRCs were paltry compared to the five- to fifty-million-rupiah offers some shopkeepers entertained from competitor firms seeking to make over their shop signage and paint. Sampoerna's annual base rate for silver SRCs was only 750,000 rupiah, with 1 million for gold stores and 1.5 million for platinum stores. In addition to contract fees, however, Sampoerna provided health insurance to one, two, or three family members depending on store status. When one shopkeeper plaintively requested capital (*modal*) rather than insurance, the manager reminded him that in the event of illness or accident (*kecelakaan drrrrr*—imitating the sound of crunching vehicles) he might suddenly require fifteen or twenty million rupiah. Spouses and children are the most valuable (*paling berharga*) thing, he insisted, so it is better to insure their health than to have an extra couple of million rupiah in your pocket. Next, it was time for door prizes and rewards for those who could correctly answer quiz questions like "Who are A-Motion's target consumers?" and "How does an SRC advance to platinum status?" Prizes included Casio calculators, Philips blenders (proffered with the remark that the recipient could sell fresh fruit drinks), a Sharp water dispenser, a Philips DVD player, and a double gas burner.

Sampoerna distributes similar goods through point programs that regulate its "gift cycle" of rewards to shopkeepers that modernize and sell high volumes

of Sampoerna's product (Oldani 2004). Shopkeepers who follow SRC guidelines can accumulate and redeem points for various home goods and shop improvement items, with platinum shops enjoying a 50 percent point discount. During an interview, Pak Agus, a gold SRC shopkeeper who had redeemed past points for a vacuum cleaner and smartphone, leafed through the rewards catalogue that included CCTV cameras, SRC-motif patio furniture, a thermos, a dinnerware set, appliances, a store renovation valued at two million rupiah, and Alfamart or Indomaret vouchers. He fondly recalled a recent two-night SRC trip to a luxury hotel in nearby Batu. Other companies offered higher sponsorship fees, but Sampoerna's commitment to long-term relationship work had its own value: Agus noted that with the higher-paying companies, you never see them again. He claimed that he was learning a lot from Sampoerna, citing how he now rotates his stock, placing newer items behind older ones on his shelves. Agus had experienced a 40 percent drop in revenue after an Indomaret opened right next door, which he claimed was a violation of rules protecting toko tradisional. He felt that Sampoerna was his best ally in his effort to stay in business. Sampoerna's paternalistic drip-feed, in-kind methods for compensating shopkeepers are time consuming, labor intensive, and fussy compared to paying a cash windfall. They serve, however, to maintain relations, develop business assets, and extract shopkeeper labor and capital investment that promotes Sampoerna and modernizes shops.

Some shopkeepers displayed extreme devotion to Sampoerna and the SRC program. Bu Endang stopped selling competitor products altogether in her platinum SRC shop near Muhammadiyah University's Malang campus. She was determined to compensate for the subsequent 40 percent decline in cigarette sales by increasing other product sales. As I approached a purpose-built cabinet filled with Sampoerna memorabilia in an alcove by the cash register, Endang flicked a switch, illuminating the cabinet's recessed lighting. She had recently opened a café, and she had nineteen rooms upstairs rented to young men and was in the process of adding seven more, ensuring a growing stream of on-site consumers. On a later visit, I found the shop walls freshly adorned with photo collages dedicated to Sampoerna. Complete with health warnings, the collages documented Endang's SRC trip to Thailand, including a photo in which Sampoerna's president, wearing a grin and a tuxedo, has an arm wrapped around her shoulders.

Sampoerna prizes shopkeepers of Endang's caliber and commitment because they are rare. A Jakarta marketing manager complained that some SRC shopkeepers were becoming more dependent than enterprising, demanding help with trivial maintenance such as broken lights or leaks. Reflecting on the mixed success of their efforts to recruit stellar SRCs, Sampoerna's president complained that he found some shopkeepers to be lacking in "gray matter." While Sampoerna seeks shopkeepers "in full throttle" life-building and project mode, it often gets people who are multiply committed, exhausted, and acquiescing to a temporality of "ongoingness, getting by, and living on" (Berlant 2007, 758–59). Consider Bu Irma,

a beleaguered-looking shopkeeper with a four-year-old son capering about madly when I met her at her silver SRC shop behind the Muhammadiyah campus. Since joining SRC, she had installed a tiled patio with chairs and a table where three young men with cigarettes, mobile phones, and messenger bags were hanging out. Sampoerna paraphernalia—large and small displays, a calendar, posters, competition brochures—colonized vertical and horizontal shop surfaces. But Irma was quick to confess to her inadequacies, saying she was not the most active or knowledgeable SRC member and pointing down the road to Agus's more mature shop. Traveling around Java, I saw a number of shops with SRC paintjobs but no sunscreen, or sunscreens with SRC lettering blocked out. Such residual evidence of broken-off relations testifies to the ongoing labor and routine attrition involved for cigarette companies in maintaining a retail infrastructure that serves their ends. The ethical, affective, and economic bonds that Sampoerna weaves with shopkeepers are, despite the company's copious efforts and expenditures, never entirely trustworthy (Bourdieu 1977, 190).

. . .

In the opening scene of this chapter, Arif was doused with stagnant water while repositioning a Marlboro advertisement. Sellers and marketers must maintain pleasant dispositions despite such petty humiliations and discomforts, swallowing their frustration when weather, shopkeepers, or competitors undo their work, smiling apologetically when superiors remark on their shortcomings. Their modest labor—comprising at once both object work and relationship work—and the modest retail settings in which it unfolds have an immodest scale and impact. Ethnographies of independent shops have analyzed significant local dynamics of community building, racial and ethnic identity, and moral surveillance but said less about how large companies may monitor and intervene in such environments (Mankekar 2002; Pine 2015; Reese 2019, 91–110; exceptions include Errington, Fujikura, and Gewertz 2012; Foster 2008; Müller 2021). Tobacco control scholars, by contrast, have closely tracked how British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, and other tobacco companies incentivize and discipline shopkeepers and emplace products and marketing materials in retail spaces in Western contexts. This chapter functions to expand the geographical scope of this research while also serving a broader anthropological project: denaturalizing the market by exposing how marketing makes markets in profound and only partially visible ways (Applbaum 2004).

Small retailers threatened by the minimart revolution have found a concerned and attentive, but also demanding, ally in their struggle to remain in business. The cigarette industry has much to offer these retailers, from a product that keeps customers coming back for more to general retail knowledge and a stream of prizes and rewards for compliant behavior. Submitting to the industry's demands for space, time, and material resources, however, significantly subjugates shopkeepers in a retail sector labeled as “independent.”

Smoking Kretek

Industry Victims and Commodity Patriots

As I walked into the small gated compound where we lived one afternoon, a car emerging from the first cul-de-sac paused. The driver, just in the process of lighting his own cigarette, held out a second one for Arman, the security guard, who hastened over as fast as his limping gait allowed. After securing the cigarette, Arman looked over to see if I'd caught the exchange, holding his little prize aloft with a grin. I cheerfully waved back, suppressing my disappointment at the evident failure of his latest quitting attempt. Similar small scenes of cigarette gifting constantly play out across Indonesia, creating solidarities and reinforcing hierarchies. More frequently used to foster masculine fraternity rather than ties between women or across genders, cigarettes in Indonesia serve as critical but non-universal tokens of exchange (Klein 1993, 152).

Another residential security guard—Lucas, who worked near my kids' school—often received cigarettes from local residents and regular passersby. Whenever a pack he was gifted was an unappealing brand but in good condition—the box not bent or crushed—he would try to exchange it for a preferred brand in a kiosk. “Given the choice,” he sighed, “I’d rather get money than cigarettes.” I asked why he supposed people gave him cigarettes rather than cash. “The problem with money,” he reflected, “is that it seems to say, ‘You are only worth this much.’ So it’s more polite to give a pack of cigarettes—say, [budget brand] Grendel that cost 8,000 rupiah—rather than 10,000 rupiah in cash, even though the cash is better.” Cash assigns too explicit a value to a person or service or relationship. It is also more socially legitimate to request a cigarette from a stranger than an equivalent amount of cash or food and more difficult for fellow smokers to turn down such requests (Graeber 2011a, 97).

Cigarette exchanges, like other forms of reciprocity, can foster social bonds, conviviality, companionable togetherness, and friendship, but they can also be

oppressive and coercive, reinforcing inequality and subordination (Bourdieu 1977). What Klein (1993, 27) describes as “the paradoxical experience of smoking tobacco with its contradictory physical effects, its poisonous taste and unpleasant pleasure” evokes the ambivalence of the gift as at once something given and, in the word’s more common German meaning today, a poison (Mauss 1990, 62–63). Building on the Māori concept of the spirit of the gift or *hau*, Mauss argued that gifted objects contain the spirit of the giver, bind giver and receiver to one another, compel counter-prestations, and actively and independently seek to return to their origin.

The ephemeral nature of cigarettes, however, curtails their individual trajectories and passage between persons. In early French and English, to consume something meant “to destroy it, make it burn up, evaporate, or waste away” (Graeber 2011b, 492). Cigarette consumption evokes these etymological roots and negative connotations. In his critique of the broadened application of “consumption” to ever more activities in contemporary scholarship and an associated neoliberal celebration of agency and creativity, Graeber called for conceptualizing consumption as an ideology as opposed to an analytical term. He rooted this ideology in Western notions of private property misconceived as a relationship between persons and objects rather than a relationship among persons whereby an individual or group claims the right to exclude all others from access to an object. This logic of sovereignty and dominion over objects finds ultimate expression in the act of destroying them. Graeber (2011b, 502) advocated conceiving “what we have been calling the ‘consumption’ sphere rather as the sphere of the production of human beings, not just as labor power but as persons, internalized nexes [*sic*] of meaningful social relations, because after all, this is what social life is actually about, the production of people (of which the production of things is simply a subordinate moment).” Tobacco fits Graeber’s restriction of the term “consumption” to objects that are destroyed through their use (e.g., food, fossil fuels), but its addictive and harmful qualities challenge the dominant role his understanding of consumption ideology accords to humans and the passive and subordinate role it assigns to objects. Scholarly insights into the lively and agentive properties of things in general (Bennett 2010), and of plants more specifically (Galvin 2018; Langwick 2018, 2021; Myers 2015, 2017), call attention to tobacco’s power to transform the material composition, capacities, desires, and identities of persons and social life writ large (Russell 2019). To treat cigarettes as mere props in human projects, as minor and inactive because they lack capacities deemed as essentially human (consciousness, intentionality, reflexivity, morality, and a sense of self), is to miss how such nonhuman objects beckon and provoke interaction (Cerulo 2009). Smokers are themselves consumed by, and often compulsively return to, cigarettes in ways that upset the ideology of destructive consumption as an expression of sovereignty and dominion over an object. Smoking and related “scandals of the appetite,” Berlant (2007, 778–79, 767) suggested, are better construed as exercises of “lateral agency” that involve “episodic intermission from personality” and “small vacations from the will,” moving “towards death and not health, and certainly not against power.”

Rather than illustrating the power of humans over objects, smoking may instead signal acceptance of an external force that dispossesses or suspends the self, will, and control (Gomart and Hennion 1999).

Graeber objected to reproducing political economy's division of the world into spheres of production and consumption, which correspond to supply and demand, to the (masculinized) alienated workplace where goods are produced and the (feminized) unalienated household where they are used and destroyed. Yet feminist and cultural theorists have highlighted how production and consumption intertwine in the gendered labor of social reproduction and the fashioning of class identities and maintenance of laboring subjects (Bourdieu 1984; Federici 2012; Miller 1998; Mintz 1986). Cigarette consumption is similarly entangled with gendered class and occupational identities, with social networking and labor maintenance.

This chapter shows how smoking, as much as not smoking, plays a profound role in making and policing social identities and in mediating forms and boundaries of belonging, membership, and inclusion, as well as rejection, stigmatization, and exclusion. Decisions about smoking are shaped by a range of factors beyond the smoker's individual control, from age, gender, and class norms to government regulations and industry saturation of public space and TV with advertising and infiltration of hobby groups and social media accounts. Smokers nevertheless tend to see themselves as individually responsible for the negative economic and health consequences of their smoking. This enables tobacco companies to avoid accountability for the harm they cause and to maintain their reputation as benefiting the nation.

THE CHILD SMOKER

In scandalized Western media treatments of Indonesian child smokers, parents often appear as ineffectual and ignorant, permissive and complicit (Welker 2021). In my research, I found parents and children negotiating their smoking status in more complex ways that reflected class-inflected notions of gender, filial, and parental propriety. Some toddlers and young children smoked their first cigarettes when their fathers gave them one as a joke, perhaps assuming that early negative experiences would inhibit future smoking (Haines-Saah 2013). In rural Java, smoking is sometimes embraced during religious rituals around circumcision, which boys typically undergo around the age of ten to twelve, with the cigarettes symbolizing adulthood and maturity and meant to aid in healing circumcision wounds (Ng, Weinehall, and Öhman 2007). For most smokers, however, early cigarettes involved hiding, deception, theft, or a breach of parental trust and expectations, conforming to the commonplace that "cigarette smoking begins under the sign of the illicit" (Klein 1993, 86).

Smokers often described their first smoking experience as physically unpleasant, accompanied by coughing (*batuk*), scratchy throats (*gatal*), dizziness (*pusing*), nausea (*mual*), and overwhelming sickness (*nggak enak, nggak enak*). To learn to smoke, the novice must withstand these discomforts and develop the social and

bodily knowledge, perceptions, and techniques for lighting and ashing cigarettes, inhaling and exhaling smoke, letting time elapse between drags, and managing their overall capacity (Hughes 2003). Part of the appeal of learning to smoke stems from the transgressive and rebellious nature of the act itself, which asserts maturity and independence from parental authority and control and aspirations for recognition and membership in broader social groups.

Smokers recounted misusing allowance money to buy cigarettes or sneaking relatives' cigarettes from packs or ashtrays. Early smoking usually unfolds in clandestine fashion, sometimes alone but often with school buddies, siblings, or cousins in bathrooms, empty buildings, fields, and vacant lots. Budi, an undergraduate student, began smoking in his second year of middle school with friends in a motorbike club that held parties and gatherings sponsored by Djarum's LA Lights. He bought cigarettes with allowance money earmarked for snacks (*uang jajan*). At twelve, a minibus driver recalled, he and his buddies began hitchhiking rides on passing trucks, saving bus money for cigarettes. A kretek nationalist leader described himself as a naughty kid who was all the more attracted to smoking because it was forbidden.

Parental discovery, disappointment, threats, and punishment often ensued. Mothers encountered evidence of their children's smoking in the form of lighters, cigarettes, or debris in backpacks or clothing pockets they emptied for laundering and the stench that clung to their children's bodies and clothing. Such discoveries often precipitated confrontations. Dion, a driver, was incensed when he discovered his teen with a half-empty pack. He crushed it, cigarettes and all, in front of his son's face. No longer trusting his son with a weekly allowance, he started dispensing a smaller daily amount, telling him he could save money or spend it as he pleased on snacks and phone cards, anything but cigarettes. His mother-in-law had tuberculosis, and multiple cousins suffered asthma, so he felt that his son should maintain the good lungs with which he was blessed. Dion himself smoked but insisted that he never once asked his own child to buy his cigarettes, and he angrily swore at a friend who had asked his son to run this errand for him. Adi, a security guard, recounted that his father beat him when he learned he was smoking in his third year of high school.

By contrast, Dedo's mother allowed him to smoke as a young child but treated his habit as an embarrassing secret and restricted where and when he smoked. He started as an eight year old, stealing his grandfather's discarded cigarettes and occasionally making off with a whole cigarette from his pack. Deciding that preventing her naughty child from smoking was futile, Dedo's mother confined him to smoking in his bedroom behind a closed and locked door. She threatened to hold his head underwater if she caught him smoking elsewhere, a threat she had made good on for other infractions and a punishment he saw as justified by his bad behavior.

Rural and working-class parents more readily accepted adolescent male children's smoking once they earned their own wages, which they could dispense

as they saw fit (Ng, Weinehall, and Öhman 2007; see also Amigó 2010; Li 2014). A minibus driver, for example, instructed his middle-school-aged son to hold off on cigarettes until he earned his own income (*tunggu ada penghasilan sendiri*). Another, who started smoking after he stopped attending school in sixth grade, said his parents did not object, because he worked as a driver's assistant (*kernet*). Faizah, a security guard, said that one day, he was surprised when his son pulled out a pack of LA Lights and suggested they smoke together. He reflected that although his son was an employed wage earner by then, he had probably secretly started earlier.

Middle-class parents, whose children typically became wage earners later in life, were often more resistant or at best grudgingly resigned to their male children's smoking. As college students, Joyo and Idris felt that their parents disliked but accepted their habit. Others who were of sufficient age to smoke and whose parents knew they smoked nevertheless felt it was disallowed or disrespectful to do so around their parents. Stefan, a judge in his early fifties, still refrained from smoking in the presence of his parents. Out of a sense of respect for social hierarchy and etiquette (*sungkan* Jv), he confined himself to smoking behind their backs and maintained the appearance of a nonsmoker. Stefan recalled that his parents had strictly forbade him from smoking, a habit his own father had quit and was angry to see his son adopt, although by that point, he was an adult earning his own money from typing work. Stefan saw this as the natural attitude of a parent to want to protect their child.

Reflecting gender differentiation in the social acceptability of smoking, daughters tended to be even more inhibited about smoking around parents. Blackwood (2010, 97, 157, 163, 175) describes how lesbian *tombois* who embraced conventional masculine normativity by smoking, drinking, and carousing with friends at night often adopted feminine gender conventions around relatives and family friends by abstaining from cigarettes. Yanti worked hard to hide her habit from her parents, using hand sanitizer and spraying her clothes with perfume to mask the odor. "They would certainly be angry if they found out. Smoking is normal for men," she explained, "but when it comes to female smokers people assume: 'That girl's bad [*buruk*].'" Fatma asked whether Yanti had ever stolen a smoke from her father. Yanti shuddered in horror at the very idea.

CONFORMING MEN AND TRANSGRESSIVE WOMEN

Noting that all his friends smoked, Budi rhetorically asked, "What kind of impression would it make if you didn't smoke?" Smoking poses health risks, but not smoking can also pose significant social risks (Nichter 2015). Masculine norms that render the act of smoking as much social necessity as personal indulgence in many circumstances undercut the notion of individual agency over cigarette habits (Reid 1985, 540).

Cigarettes are typically provided to men at social and ritual gatherings organized around neighborhood, annual calendar, and life cycle events such as weddings, births, and deaths (Ng, Weinehall, and Öhman 2007). During the busy social period that follows the tobacco harvest in Madura, people often insert wedding and engagement ceremony invitations into cigarette packs, and cigarette companies provide musical entertainment (*orkes dangdut*, *orkes Melayu*) with brand sponsorship and banners to those who purchase sufficient quantities. During Lebaran, the period after Ramadan concludes, families often greet the whirlwind of relatives and friends by setting out not only snacks but also cigarettes, which male visitors are urged to consume. Joko, a Malang cab driver, was part of a men's spiritual retreat group (*padepokan*) that integrated smoking into their Islamic religious chanting (*berzikir*), making the act of breathing more visually and sensorially manifest and evoking prayer and meditation (Klein 1993, 138). He was introduced to his chocolate-scented brand of Dunhill kreteks by his spiritual teacher and noted that you mysteriously smell the smoke's scent when you inhale but not when you exhale.

Refusing to participate in male cigarette reciprocity violates social norms and expectations. When Linda, my staunchly anti-smoking Javanese teacher, held social gatherings (*arisan*) at her house without setting out cigarettes, she faced vociferous complaints from male guests after meals that their mouths were sour ("Kecut, kecut!"). She encouraged her non-smoking husband to eschew smoke-filled interiors at neighbors' *arisan* and sit outdoors, which meant prioritizing his personal health over socializing with peers.

Beyond their role in ritual life and relations, cigarettes are a central feature of quotidian togetherness among men. Weix (1990, 93) observes that smoking eases masculine social intercourse by substituting for conversation and licensing a retreat from talk: smoking men, contemplating the taste of their cigarettes, "frequently withdraw from conversation as they smoke, as if smoking and talk are to a large extent exclusive." Because normative social interactions skew toward homosociality, men and boys are disproportionately exposed to the secondhand smoke of peers; a non-smoking college student at the Averland camp, for example, complained that secondhand smoke exposure was unavoidable when he hung out with roommates and buddies.

If smoking and exchanging cigarettes builds homosocial fraternity and signals normative masculinity, then men who don't smoke forgo access to cigarette-mediated relations of reciprocity and face questions about their status. Joko, who started later than most at the age of twenty-one, had his first cigarette at a social gathering where friends teased, "Why don't you smoke? Aren't you a man [*cowok*]?" A middle-aged minibus driver pantomimed calling the masculinity of non-smokers into question, pointing at a fellow driver and jeering, "You there, non-smoking man, must be a transvestite. Queer! Not smoking, must be a transvestite this one!" So now he starts smoking! [*Kamu itu laki-laki nggak merokok bencong kan. Banci! Nggak merokok bencong ini! Nah sekarang udah mulai merokok!*]." Those

who didn't succumb to such mockery developed go-to defensive retorts, such as pointing out that women, gay, and transgender persons could smoke, too, so the act hardly provided ironclad assurance of heteronormative, cisgender masculinity. Linda said that when her husband's friends taunted him as queer (*cemen*) for not smoking he retorted, "Impossible! I have a wife and two kids."¹

"Cigarette money" (*uang rokok*) is a commonplace, socially legitimate, and protected category of "special money" for men that further cements the association between masculinity and smoking (Zelizer 1989). In Javanese families, wives conventionally control household finances while husbands, stereotyped as incompetent at managing money, are expected to cede their income to wives, who dole out a small cigarette and snack allowance (Brenner 1995, 23). Weix (1990, 90) notes that pocket money for tobacco and betel has formed a household budget category since the late eighteenth century, with colonial and postcolonial surveys in Java finding that they constituted up to 7 percent of total expenses for all households. More recent surveys show that in households where fathers smoke, tobacco accounts for 22 percent of weekly household expenditures (World Bank 2018, 2–3). Although women give their husbands cigarette money, many deplore the health and economic consequences. One kiosk owner said she was grateful when her husband quit because smoking was like "lighting money on fire; all that's left is smoke."

Outside the home, when men receive tips and related monetary expressions of gratitude, these are also often labeled *uang rokok*, earmarking the money for personal masculine indulgences rather than the household budget. While condemning Indonesia's smoking culture (*budaya rokok*) as bad culture, a public health scholar at Airlangga University exasperatedly observed, "When men help out with wedding preparations, they get cigarettes, when they take part in gamelan performances, they get cigarettes, and even when they get money, it's called cigarette money!"

Dominant gender norms that sanction and encourage smoking among men discourage it among women. The link between smoking and hegemonic masculinity, patriarchal privilege, and entitlement is protected by framing women's smoking as a shameful breach of propriety associated with sex work or aspirations for a modern, urban, Western-influenced lifestyle (Kodriati, Pursell, and Hayati 2019). Cognizant of these stereotypes, women smokers tend to exercise caution around when, where, with whom, and which brands they smoke. As noted above, some go to great lengths to hide their smoking from close family members. Yanti found that smoking facilitated her relations with men since most smoke, but she was more hesitant to smoke around women, especially veiled women whom she presumed were more likely to judge her negatively. Rini, a radio DJ in her twenties, said she was careful about smoking in front of other people, although it was a common practice among women in her profession. She pointed to a producer whom she had just met that day and from whom she had bummed a cigarette. For women, because smoking is conflated with sexual immorality, the act is often seen

as inconsistent with religious piety and its expression in forms such as wearing a hijab (Byron et al. 2015; Handayani 2012; Rosemary 2018).

Growing up in an earlier era, Katy's cosmopolitan mother smoked and taught her to be sensitive to context in determining when it was acceptable. Katy placed two packs of Esse cigarettes beside her when we sat down to chat. Esse brands include a plethora of fruity flavors marketed to youth (honey, berry, juicy, apple-mint, grape), some of which were released by squeezing the filter (an act denoted by "pop" or "klik" branding), and available in mixed "shuffle" packs. Labeled as containing 12 mg of tar and 0.8 mg of nicotine, they exhibited conventional feminized design features with their long, thin, and white styling. After we talked for a while, Katy opened her second Esse pack to disclose its contents: three hand-rolled *Dji Sam Soe* kretek. A closeted two-brand smoker, she typically smoked a couple of hand-rolled kretek a day but felt compelled to hide the stout and heavy cigarettes in her stereotypically feminized pack.²

BRAND IDENTITIES AND INDIFFERENCE

Imron, an elderly *Dji Sam Soe* smoker and minibus driver, fastidiously insisted that he was incapable of smoking random brands, unlike his companion Farid, an ashtray (*asbak*) who would smoke whatever was on hand (*seadanya jadi*), any kind (*macam-macam*). "If you can suck it in, you can blow it out," Farid cheerfully affirmed, adding that he desired but could not afford *Dji Sam Soe*. Pulling out his black-market (*gelap*) cigarettes, he said, "I can get six of these for the cost of a single pack of *Dji Sam Soe*." He joked that cheap cigarettes like those in his possession could belong only to someone special, like himself. Between the poles of the ashtray and the committed single-brand smoker, other smokers identified as context-dependent brand smokers or, among those tied to the industry, as company loyalists who would happily choose among their employer's different brands but wouldn't venture further afield.

The ashtray willing to accept any brand is often either a starting smoker or one whose straitened financial circumstances curtail their ability to be choosy. Scholar-activist Erwan first tried smoking in elementary school but became a routine smoker in his second year of middle school. His first brand, Bentoel Remaja, was blatantly marketed to teens (*remaja* means teenager or adolescent). "I went on to smoke all the rest," he said, reciting a string of brands. Rudi, a kretek nationalist leader and erstwhile ashtray, switched a great deal (*ganti-ganti terus*) until he started coughing a lot and a friend suggested he try the cooler (*lebih dingin*) LA Menthols, which he had stuck with. Financial considerations were prominent in brand choice for Manuel, a student who frugally stubbed out and stashed his cigarette before sitting down to talk to us, then removed and relit it after our conversation concluded. Smoking about a pack or at least less than two packs a day (*tidak sampai dua pak*), he estimated his monthly cigarette expenditures at 500,000 rupiah, which strained his student budget. He liked Marlboro Reds and

occasionally A-Milds, which he found had little taste, but was on a Magnum Black streak after learning that he could exchange seven silver foil pack linings in kiosks for a free pack. Two construction workers who were chain-smoking while wrestling with rebar said their brands reflected their current fortunes. Gani smoked Surya Pro Mild (14,000 rupiah a pack) when fortune smiled on him (*kalau lagi ada rejeki*), but otherwise might choose something cheaper like BMW (7,500 rupiah a pack), the brand his younger companion was smoking. They were often gifted cigarettes, and a boss might buy them whichever brand he saw them smoking. Hendra, his companion, typically smoked two packs a day but could go through four on a cold rainy day. He was suspicious of extremely cheap cigarettes, fretting, “Who knows what they put in there?”

Single-brand smokers professed a strong attachment to the brand that they considered particularly well-suited (*cocok*) to them personally, an attitude that promotes brand fidelity and was sometimes combined with a belief that one’s brand was not harmful when smoked “in moderation” (ten to twelve cigarettes a day; Nichter and Nichter 2016). In explaining why a brand suited them, single-brand smokers often cited price and purported potency and toxicity. Various distinguishing features—linguistic, visual, tactile, olfactory, and sonic (kretek crackle when coarsely cut clove fragments ignite)—play into notions of safety and harm, tradition and modernity, masculinity and femininity, and wealth and poverty. Dion smoked one or two packs a day of Ares because, at 8,000 rupiah a pack, they were cheap and, he claimed, exclusively produced and sold in Malang. From his perspective, cigarettes kept getting more expensive, but a pack kept costing about the same as a kilo of rice.

Some smokers chose brands they believed offered better quality and safety and regarded “filtered” and “mild” brands as safer than unfiltered brands and those without mild or light descriptors. Aripin, who primarily smoked LA Lights, said he didn’t dare smoke other brands, fearing that they would pose greater health dangers. Fauzi switched from hand-rolled unfiltered to machine-rolled kretek for health reasons, but he soon found himself smoking two LA Lights sixteen-packs a day instead of one Dji Sam Soe twelve-pack. Budi started on LA Lights, switched to Magnum Blacks, but then decided they were too heavy for daily use because his stamina and breathing as a basketball player were not what they used to be. He swapped the Magnums for Dunhill Blacks, which he felt were lighter (*agak ringan sedikit*) and more appropriate for daily use. Yanti said that A-Mild suited her and pointed to the side of the pack where it showed exactly one gram of nicotine (“*satu koma nol gram nikotin*,” literally, one point zero gram nicotine), as if this were just the right amount.

Contrary to the single-brand devotee, a marketing stereotype holds that Indonesian smokers have at least two brands that they consistently buy and deploy depending on context. Some context-dependent brand smokers like Katy, as described above, are motivated by gender concerns over the impression particular brands will make on others. Joyo preferred “Inter” (Gudang Garam International,

a “full-flavor” machine-rolled kretek) but smoked white Marlboros (formerly Marlboro Lights) when he had money because they were cool (*keren*) and because Marlboro smokers appear wealthy (“Orang lagi rokok Marlboro kelihatan orang ada uang gitu”). His friend Idris smoked Marlboro Red and A-Mild, favoring A-Mild when he had a sore throat because he considered it milder. Other context-dependent brand smokers were governed more by personal preferences than outward impressions. Arik, a telecommunications employee, enjoyed Surya filtered kretek when it was cold or had just rained because they lasted a while (*lama habis*) and warmed his body (*menghangatkan tubuh*). He smoked quicker Marlboro Reds in hot weather. Lucas found Surya lighter and more appropriate in the morning, smoking heavier hand-rolled Sampoerna Hijau in the afternoon and at night. Didit, the Sampoerna master tobacco blender whose health remained sufficiently intact for him to smoke, alternated between Magnum and Dji Sam Soe and was particularly partial to the latter after dinner.

Tobacco industry-affiliated smokers frequently displayed loyalty to their employer by confining themselves to brands in that company’s portfolio. Tobacco companies often strongly encourage and sometimes coerce their employees not only to choose company brands but also to smoke in the first place. Most of Sampoerna’s marketing staff smoked and dutifully confined themselves to PMI/Sampoerna brands. One former Bentoel Biru smoker switched to Marlboro Reds when he joined Sampoerna and had more recently switched to Marlboro Lights, since he was trying to cut down (he smoked more than a pack a day and consumed quite a few during our time together despite claiming he felt unwell). Some contract suppliers also demonstrated company loyalty with their brand choices. As described in chapter 2, at the Jombang contract hand-rolled factory, female workers took home a pack of Sampoerna Hijau each week for their male kin with the cost deducted from their wages. Sampoerna’s event organizers limited themselves to Sampoerna brands in public. A Madura regional manager for Sampoerna’s tobacco leaf supplier, Sadhana, aligned his consumption with his employer, smoking Dunhills when he worked for British American Tobacco and then switching to A-Mild after being hired by Sadhana. He smoked six while screening a PowerPoint slideshow about tobacco and confessed that the brand sometimes grew boring and lost its taste (*tidak ada rasa lagi*). When this occurred, he switched temporarily to a different Sampoerna brand to recover the taste.

LABOR AND CLASS SUBJECTS

For Indonesian women, smoking is part of certain niche occupational identities—such as art, entertainment, and sex work—that themselves carry a transgressive charge. For Indonesian men, smoking is a more universal feature of class and labor relations, identities, and experience. For many, work and cigarettes are profoundly intertwined. Where indoor smoking is allowed in the workplace, gov-

ernment officials and businesspeople smoke at their desks and in meetings. Journalists, academics, and activists associate cigarettes with writing and interacting with colleagues and contacts. In the entertainment industry, musicians, DJs, and MCs typically smoke as part of their party identities. Truck and public transportation drivers alleviate their sleepiness, boredom, and traffic jam frustration with cigarettes. Driving the same route day in and day out, a minibus driver insisted, "If you don't smoke, you're sleepy! I mean, if you're holding onto the steering wheel, and don't have one of these, you're truly sleepy." Farmers and farm workers smoke while working or taking a break and claim that the smoke can ward off mosquitoes and help with the irritation of being bitten. Upland agriculturalists and fishermen who spend long hours at sea often claim that cigarettes, especially hand-rolled kretek, keep them warm in cooler temperatures.³ For low-wage day laborers and pedicab drivers short on cash, smoking can also replace meals (Weix 1990, 92), serving as a "proletarian hunger-killer" that suppresses the appetite, stimulates wakefulness and concentration, and affords a brief respite from reality (Mintz 1979, 60, 69).

Among security guards, cigarettes mediate experiences of hierarchy, solidarity, and solitude. In urban Indonesian settings, private security guards (*satpam*, *satuan pengamanan* or security units) have become ubiquitous at the entrances to residential, business, educational, and nonprofit institutions. Private security guards proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s alongside the commercialization of urban life and real estate and amid efforts by the New Order state to replace local security actors and territorial defense practices (e.g., *ronda*) with uniformed guards, surveillance strategies, and bureaucratic categories and concerns that mimicked the police (Barker 1999). Typically low paid, some hold multiple jobs, and others develop side enterprises like gardening for residents, renting property, or, in the case of our kids' school guards, matching newcomers with home rentals, domestic help, and cars for a finder's fee. Most are male, and most smoke.

For security guards, cigarettes play an important social role in building relations of reciprocity with both familiar passersby and potentially dangerous strangers. As described in the opening of this chapter, security guards often receive individual cigarettes or packs as tips from those who benefit from their service. Lucas estimated that he smoked twelve cigarettes a day, but he was unsure about the exact number because he both gave and received cigarettes. Giving cigarettes was part of his signature approach to security work: "Be nice to everyone, whether they ask for directions or a cigarette." If he heard of someone hatching a plan to carry out a theft, he informed them that this was his area (*wilayah*), and he didn't have anything to protect himself with, so they could hurt him. He attempted to convey his vulnerable position as someone trying to make a living for his family and thereby to shame them into leaving his area alone. "They usually understand," he claimed, with one would-be thief even offering him cigarettes, a gesture that alarmed him a little since he did not want them thinking he would go into league (*berkongsi*) with them.

Cigarettes not only help security guards forge and maintain social ties but also serve as reliable companions that help fill long solitary hours on the job. Commercial and residential security guard work fosters negative conditions that smoking alleviates or makes more tolerable: waiting, loneliness, sleepiness, and boredom.⁴ Monday through Saturday, Lucas worked a 5:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift followed by a 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. shift in a separate residential complex. From 4:00 to 8:00 p.m., he tried to sleep a bit at home but often found his eyes uncooperative. At work, he typically smoked when there was nothing to do, especially at night to alleviate boredom (*jenuh*). He smoked less when there was something interesting on TV. After midnight, he got some fitful sleep while staying alert to any foreign sound, and he patrolled the residential complex at 1:00, 2:00, and sometimes 3:00 a.m., knocking loudly on electric poles as he walked.⁵ Faizah, a security guard in his sixties on a street home to large and ostentatious houses with tall spiked gates interspersed with vacant lots, had smoked since he was thirteen. Whereas in his previous job as a vehicle mechanic he had smoked with friends, now he was alone much of the time, pulling eleven-hour shifts from 6:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. His job was alright when there was someone to talk to, something to do, but more often than not, he just sat around bored, “like a bird looking for a friend.” He was happier at that particular point in time because he could watch construction workers building another gargantuan home. Anton, who served as one of five security guards at a seminary, worked rolling eight-hour shifts (with 6:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m. start times). All the guards smoked, but because the school had a no-smoking policy, they tended to hide their cigarettes or smoke in their little post. On busy mornings with people coming and going, Anton did not think much about smoking, but later in the day, and especially after 8:00 p.m., boredom set in and he craved cigarettes.

Most security guards with whom I spoke wanted to quit or at least reduce their smoking. Anton, who was in his twenties, managed to stop for an entire year but then resumed after gaining ten kilograms. Lucas and Faizah, who were both middle aged, wished to cut down and were dismayed by how much they spent on cigarettes. Faizah ruminated on the cost, explaining that he normally smoked two Gudang Garam packs a day, which cost 28,000 rupiah and amounted to 840,000 rupiah in monthly expenditures. To monitor and reduce his consumption, he began stacking empty packs in his little security post window. He happily brandished yesterday’s pack, which still had seven cigarettes left, meaning he had smoked only five. Abu, one of our residential security guards, told me he had quit smoking five months earlier after being hospitalized for a week due to high blood pressure. People still offered him cigarettes, but he declined, saying that he didn’t smoke anymore, which took strong will and intention (*niat*). “It’s hard being a security guard without smoking,” he mused, “just sitting around.” He had previously smoked about two packs of Surya a day, which cost 28,000 rupiah and meant that his job, which paid 25,000 rupiah a day, did not cover his habit (*nggak nutut*).

His five children and grandchildren all agreed he should stop after he was hospitalized. A few weeks later, I saw him smoking along with a companion.

The experience of Indonesian security guards aligns with scholars' observations elsewhere concerning the ties between smoking, waiting, and subordinate social positions. In his study of welfare clients of the Argentinean state, Auyero (2011, 14–15) notes that waiting is stratified, and waiting time unequally distributed in ways that correspond with relations of power and reinforce the dependent and subordinate position of people marginalized by class, gender, and race. A smoke break is one way for those waiting to fill “dead time” in an active and self-directed or relational fashion.⁶ Jeffrey similarly describes smoking as a “timepass” activity among male low-middle-class students in India experiencing disintegrating prospects for employment and social mobility, progression to masculine adulthood, and movement into a modern era.⁷

Whereas smoking fits easily with masculine working-class identities and occupations, Stefan was acutely embarrassed by his habit, which seemed increasingly at odds with his class identity as a judge. In the past, Stefan acknowledged, smoking had facilitated social interactions (*pergaulan*) with senior judges in the Supreme Court and national high courts during collaborations on the legal curriculum and other matters in Jakarta. Peers were impressed by Stefan's close relations with senior judges (“Kok dewan pengadilan tinggi akrab sekali dengan Pak Stefan!”). Knowing one another as smokers, they performed “the code”—miming smoking—to trigger a mutual exit to a spot where each smoked his own brand. But Stefan now felt that smoking was more strongly associated with the ignorant underclass, citing minibus drivers as an example. “I have awareness. I know I can buy cigarettes, but I can't buy health.” He approved of his own shaming and marginalization among peers in Malang. “In our own environment, we must feel that we as smokers have become a minority. There are thirteen of us judges. Only one who smokes! Colleagues have said to me, ‘Why do you still smoke? It's like you're a relic from a bygone era! Someone out of the past, a primitive! [*Kayak orang purba saja! Orang jaman dulu, orang primitif!*]”

Stefan was discomfited by the collapse of class boundaries that occurred when members of the middle and upper class—those who should know better—smoked:

This is what leads to a sense of shame. Try observing yourself. Smokers in any circle tend to be filthy [*jorok*]. Unclean. They throw cigarette butts on the ground. Even though there's an ashtray right there. Even professors are like that in Indonesia if they're smokers. I'm a smoker, but I don't smoke in front of just anyone; I don't smoke in cars, buses, public transport. If someone waves away your smoke, you should show self-awareness [*tahu diri*] and step away [*menyingkir*].⁸

During four months in Australia, he learned to never smoke in public because Australians loathed it; he illustrated how they theatrically waved secondhand smoke away from their bodies (Dennis 2016). “This is what's hard,” he sighed,

“facilitating that sense of embarrassment [*memudahkan rasa malu*] with other people we encounter. This is no longer the place for smoking, this is no longer the smoking era.” Stefan saw smoking in Indonesia progressively evolving into what Keane (2014) observes it has already become in Australia: “one of the most visible social markers which differentiate the proper, restrained middle class body from the uncontrolled and excessive bodies of the underclass.”

Although he may have been unfamiliar with the tobacco control term, Stefan displayed the values associated with smoking’s “denormalization” or deliberate conversion from a mainstream, normal, and desirable activity into one that is socially unacceptable. Critical public health scholars have pointed out that denormalization discourse can stigmatize not only smoking but also smokers themselves, who in Western countries are often already marginalized by class, race, gender, sexuality, and mental health struggles (Bell and Dennis 2013; Haines-Saah 2013; Haines-Saah, Bell, and Dennis 2015). It can also stigmatize as “backward” entire countries such as Indonesia with high levels of smoking in contrast to “civilized” and “advanced” countries that have achieved low smoking rates (Welker 2021). Even as he found himself incapable of quitting (*belum bisa*), Stefan was at pains to distinguish himself from other smokers through his self-controlled, decorous approach to smoking: shallow inhales, modulated pace, distancing from non-smokers, waste disposal etiquette, and specific motivations (seeking inspiration for work or enjoyment after a meal). He animatedly described an airport encounter with a white (*bule*) woman who was a heavy smoker:

I had finished eating, and I tend to smoke after I eat. After that, I’m done. She was smoking like a locomotive. Like there was a profound anxiety there. Not quiet and relaxing. She was a “real smoker” [*perokok tulen dalam tanda petik*]. She smoked her cigarette down to the end and then lit another. I couldn’t stand ten minutes in that smoking area.⁹ She finished three cigarettes; I smoked half a cigarette. I was astonished. Such cigarettes aren’t enjoyed. I truly couldn’t enjoy smoking in the smoking area. I only smoked because it was after a meal. I smoked half a cigarette, and I put it out. I left. I couldn’t stand to sit there any longer.

Stefan repeatedly interspersed his account with imitations of the woman’s heavy, unfeminine, locomotive-like exhalations. She fit the biomedicalized rendering of the atomized addict who consumes “without pleasure, in response to a base and bodily need,” her smoking “a purely physical rather than communicative or discursive act” (Keane 2014). In countries like Australia, tobacco control has achieved considerable success in supplanting the aesthetic, cultural, and symbolic pretensions of cigarettes with the insistence that they represent nothing more than nicotine delivery devices, the fix that addicts repeatedly return to not for pleasure but to stave off withdrawal symptoms (Keane 2014). Even as Stefan distinguished himself from this abject spectacle, the specter of self-recognition clearly haunted him.

From his perspective as an industry proponent, Sunu, a kretek nationalist and lawyer, expressed concern that Indonesians were converging on Western smoking

practices. When I asked him why he smoked machine-rolled rather than hand-rolled kretek, which were more consistent with the values kretek nationalists espouse, he pinned blame on the anti-tobacco movement and the standardizing forces of globalization. Dexterously rotating his lit cigarette around in his fingers without burning himself, he explained that if you're in a closed space built for smokers, then with your first exhale of an unfiltered hand-rolled kretek, you will fill the room. He uttered the sound "dassss" to accompany an enormous imaginary cloud of smoke. Indonesians were being pushed toward the "light" cigarettes that more and more people smoke abroad because they are being forced to smoke in little smoking rooms or outside malls, and so they don't have the time to slowly smoke and enjoy their cigarettes as they traditionally did. Now they are starting to smoke fast like Europeans and Americans; he motioned with his cigarette, miming taking drags at short intervals, almost as though in fast forward. In the future, Sunu feared, smoking would become an ever more temporally and spatially circumscribed and marginalized activity. This would cause the connection between smoking and sociality that previously cemented kretek's role in the workplace to wane, and ambivalent, self-conscious smokers like Stefan could become the majority.

THE ADDICTED SMOKER

Smokers' biographies often register a shift from smoking for external appearances and as a medium of social identity and interactions to smoking for themselves (Hughes 2003). Manuel, a university student, declared, "I usually wake up, drink some water, then smoke, even before I bathe." Smoking, as security guards assert, can be a solo activity that actually fills social absences and voids. "When you're alone, you're not alone with a cigarette," a minibus driver explained, likening it to a friend (*teman*) and according it an important role in a country where there is generalized social pressure to be in human company, especially outside the home.¹⁰

When cigarettes become tightly woven into smokers' daily lives and routines, their absence can provoke a sense of distracting unease or even urgent calamity that leads the smoker to identify as an addict. Cigarettes punctuate the day and serve any number of moods and purposes: preparing for, accompanying, or concluding an activity or task, simply passing time, and pausing to reflect, celebrate, or mourn. As discussed at the outset of this chapter, the addictive qualities of tobacco sit at odds with a definition of cigarette consumption as an expression of human dominion and sovereignty over an object. Arman, a security guard, observed, "I could smoke nonstop and never be content." His rueful conviction resonates with literary depictions of cigarettes as objects whose consumption exasperates and inflames rather than satisfies and extinguishes desire.¹¹ I had long discussions about smoking with minibus (*angkot*, from *angkutan kota*) drivers at their base near my children's school; the base consisted of a bamboo platform sheltered by a roof and equipped with lighting, television, and a portable kerosene burner. While

awaiting their turn to depart for the bus terminal, they ate, drank, and smoked, watched and called to passersby, chatted and teased one another, stretched out for a nap, read snatches of newspaper, washed and repaired their vehicles, and occasionally engaged in mock fights or danced to music blasted from car stereos. They reflected on the profound embedding of cigarettes in their daily lives:

Imron: It's essential to smoke after eating and drinking coffee. If you don't smoke, you feel confused. It's addictive, it's like a narcotic. It belongs among the narcotics, especially if I've just finished drinking coffee like this. Most smokers feel this way.

Ridwan: I can cry if I don't have cigarettes. It's like heroin.

Marina: Have you ever tried to stop?

Imron: Yes! But because I saw my friends smoke, I wanted to smoke again. I stopped for about a month.

Marina: Why did you stop back then?

Imron: If you ask yourself what's the use of smoking, there isn't any, right? What's the point? There's no purpose [*Cuma iseng aja*]. And it disrupts your health. And you're throwing away money if you think about it. But, too late, you're already addicted and it's hard to get rid of it. And cigarettes are as expensive as rice.

These reflections dovetail with orthodox tobacco control discourse and with a biomedical understanding of cigarettes as addictive and smokers as addicts. In this model of addiction (*kecanduan*, *ketagihan*), *angkot* drivers underscored their own powerlessness—and the corresponding power of cigarettes—by likening their craving to a narcotic addiction.¹² Another minibus driver admitted, “Sometimes we forget our family. We who are addicted. ‘What matters is that I smoke. Whether there’s food in the house or not isn’t my problem.’ That’s addiction.”

During the month of Ramadan, fasting Muslims must abstain from smoking in addition to eating and drinking each day from before the sun rises until after it sets. Many smokers claimed that they could withstand not smoking (*bisa menahan*) due to the special purpose and intention (*niat*) that accompanied their fast, which they would break with water and food before smoking a cigarette. Dion described his smoking abstinence during Ramadan in more dramatic and less decorous terms. “I’m like a crazy person with disconnected cables! Doors that refuse to open!” He broke his fast with a drink of water quickly followed by a smoke and found he felt better after one or two cigarettes. “Eating can wait.”

Several smokers volunteered that smoking was congenially combined not only with eating and drinking but with other bodily functions as well. A former smoker recalled that a post-meal cigarette invariably sparked an urgent need to defecate. Katy explained that constipation made it hard to quit, recalling that she spent two days straight unable to go to the bathroom (*ke belakang*) during one quitting attempt. A taxi driver in his late fifties who quit his *Dji Sam Soes* after coughing

up something large and bloody still smoked a filtered cigarette when defecating, insisting that for him, the cigarette functioned not as a laxative but rather to cover the stench. Dedo was so attached to combining the two activities that if he did not have a cigarette on hand he would run to the nearest kiosk to buy more, even if the “shit was already knocking at the door.” His long bathroom retreats left his wife yelling, “Are you shitting out a rock? Why does it take so long?”

As students with limited means, Joyo and Idris intermittently experienced cigarette shortages that underscored just how addicted they were (*ketagihan banget*). Joyo explained that he tended to get dizzy and angry (*pusing terus marah-marah*) when he could not smoke then felt a sense of calm (*tenang*) once he got a hold of a cigarette. Idris erupted in pained laughter while describing the agonies of not smoking:

Idris: Without a cigarette, you feel, like, restless. Feeling anxious, you know. It's different once you have a cigarette, you're happy.

Marina: Have you ever tried to quit?

Idris: Yes, for a week, but I couldn't stand it! A whole week feeling so anxious, oh! Then, whoa, seeing other people smoke! Better to just smoke again.

Marina: Why did you want to quit?

Idris: I just didn't have any money. And I wanted to know what it felt like, for the future if I didn't smoke. Yeah, restless like that. Not enjoying life.

When she quit for six months, Yanti found that not smoking felt dull (*jenuh*) and made her mouth bitter (*pahit*) and astringent (*sepat*). A minibus driver who quit for a week said it left him sleepy and depleted of energy. Rahman, a petty government official, quit for two years but then succumbed to the relentless badgering of a close colleague who wanted his smoking companion back. Rahman regarded his enabler with a mixture of resentment and affection. He gained fifteen kilograms while not smoking, ten of which he had shed since resuming five months earlier. Planning to marry soon, he acknowledged with an anxious laugh that the health risk he most feared was impotence. (Male smokers mostly dismissed possible impacts on their virility, and a number attributed this health impact solely to menthol cigarettes.)

Although cigarettes appear as a health risk in the framework of addiction, some smokers nevertheless justify smoking on health grounds. Some accorded cigarettes the capacity to help regulate emotions, calm turbulent thoughts, and maintain mental health. Yanti framed smoking as a way to alleviate *stres* (stress).¹³ Security guard Adi explained, “When I'm alone and without a friend, I want to smoke. The cigarette is my friend. When my thoughts are going all over the place, I like to smoke.” A minibus driver reflected, “Smoking is pleasant, and not smoking can be unpleasant. Smoking calms and settles one's thoughts” (*pikiran ayem tenteram* Jv).

A kretek nationalist depicted “mild” kretek as the savior of, and “self-esteem medication” (*obat pede*, *PD percaya diri*) for, a fictionalized nineteen-year-old boutique worker who could not face other people or her job without a dose and always smoked in secret so others would not think her naughty (Ardianti 2012, 38–39). Cigarette companies tap into cultural beliefs that it is “inappropriate and dangerous to experience and/or express strong emotions,” with advertisements suggesting that smoking serves “to deflect negative emotions and to distance strong feelings” (Mimi Nichter et al. 2009, 101, 103). Scholarship on Java, Bali, and Malaysia has stressed self-control and repression of passion and strong emotions as important cultural values, particularly for adult males (Anderson 1990; Geertz 1973; Keeler 1987; Peletz 1994).¹⁴

Cigarettes often play a more complex role in diagnosing and managing physical and mental health conditions than is countenanced by public health orthodoxy. Smokers told me that cigarettes suddenly tasting wrong or bad was an early sign of impending illness. Recovering from illness was accompanied by restoration of the familiar taste and enjoyment of cigarettes. Smokers often receive—or interpret—doctors’ advice to stop smoking or cut back as encouragement to temporarily abstain or reduce until they feel better rather than to permanently quit. Smokers suffering respiratory problems like coughing, congestion, and sore throats may also temporarily or permanently switch to brands that they believe will resolve the issue.

Misinformation widely circulated by kretek nationalists and dissident scientists promoting divine kretek smoking cures also encourages smokers to doubt mainstream claims about the harmful nature of tobacco. Thousands of patients have sought treatment in clinics for conditions like cancer, often renouncing conventional biomedical treatments for “alternative” smoking cures promising to remove toxins and free radicals. These clinics sell “divine” filters that are supposed to make cigarettes healthier, which some of my interlocutors used. YouTube videos, articles, and social media extend the reach of these ideas, leading Indonesians, including a Sampoerna factory doctor I interviewed, to express doubt and uncertainty about the public health consensus on tobacco’s harmful nature. When Erwan, a scholar-activist, brought up the “healthy cigarette” (*rokok sehat*) therapy, I asked whether he really believed that cigarettes could have curative powers. “I’m unsure,” he responded.

A plan to quit in the future often legitimates ongoing smoking in the present. College students like Idris, Joyo, and Yanti anticipated quitting when they married (*patokan nikah*) or by the time they were thirty. When we met, Katy had identified her upcoming sixtieth birthday as a fresh opportunity to quit. Klein analyzes how the protagonist of Italo Svevo’s novel *La coscienza di Zeno* enters into a painfully relatable “dance of the last cigarette” as he repeatedly vows to stop smoking and fills entire walls with quit dates (personally momentous occasions like birthdays, anniversaries, graduation, numerically concordant dates, and purely random dates) that accumulate as records of his abandoned resolutions.¹⁵

Smokers had various ideas and strategies to assess and control how much they smoked. Marlboro influencer Marko, whom we met in chapter 4, sometimes limited himself to buying single sticks (*eceran*) rather than packs and deliberately left his lighter at home so he would be forced to ask someone for a light. Whereas a Telkomsel worker who smoked seven or eight cigarettes a day regarded himself as a moderate (*sedang*) smoker, student Budi saw the pack as an appropriate daily serving size. He exclaimed, "What's important is that one smokes a reasonable amount [*taraf normal*]. Don't smoke two or three packs a day!" Joyo also followed the pack-a-day rule: "For me, what matters is one day, one pack, whether it's smoked with friends or finished alone. One day, one pack. That's it." Could it be more? "It can't be more." Could it be less? "It could be less. But it's rarely less," he laughed.

When we asked smokers how much they smoked, the math did not always add up, particularly among more ambivalent smokers. Stefan told me he smoked four to five cigarettes a day, since his packs lasted three days (at this rate, his white cigarette twenty-pack should have lasted four to five days). Yanti equivocated, saying she smoked as many as six cigarettes a day, with one pack lasting her three to four days; she then acknowledged that during stressful periods, she might polish off a whole pack in one day, before concluding that she probably smoked fewer than five packs a month, probably only about three packs. Heru, a senior Sampoerna marketing manager in Jakarta, called himself a social smoker but also intimated that he could not quit, saying he would stop smoking in a heartbeat if he could, and cautioning me not to smoke under any circumstances as part of my research.

Smokers also adopted bodily techniques that they hoped would protect them from cigarettes' harmful effects. Lucas said he did not inhale like other smokers and expelled the smoke right out, "even when smoking expensive cigarettes." A professor who said he only occasionally smoked a menthol cigarette to help him write, and even then only until inspiration struck, theorized that inhaling and exhaling through the mouth was much safer than inhaling through the mouth and exhaling through the nose. He shared this wisdom with his students. When Budi tried to enroll in the police academy, the doctor who examined him assured him, "Smoking is perfectly fine provided you eat nutritious food, drink water, and exercise." Following the advice of elderly smokers, Adi tried to balance his smoking with exercise, smoking but also sweating.

Some smokers successfully quit after health scares. After an evening out with friends, Erwan coughed all night and could not stop. He kept attempting to smoke again but found that he had lost his enjoyment of cigarettes, yet it was still difficult to quit. As a scholar and activist, he spent a lot of time writing and was accustomed to having an ashtray to the right of his keyboard with a lit cigarette in it. Its absence left him disoriented, and it was tough to even get ten words out. He gradually had to learn to write without a cigarette. Seeing the specter of his own death or debility, a banker in Jakarta quit after three colleagues in their forties suffered heart attacks in short order, with two dying.

Other smokers quit cigarettes alongside larger lifestyle changes, the purging of what they saw as unhealthy activities or vices such as drugs, coffee, alcohol, and gambling. A purple-haired, asthmatic minibus driver said he was previously the number-one addict (*pecandu nomor satu*) but gave up his two-pack-a-day Dji Sam Soe habit along with card gambling. Ucup reported that his father was a heavy smoker but quit in his late thirties after deciding that smoking was haram and committing to becoming more pious (*saleh*). An assistant dean at Brawijaya University quit smoking after getting kidney stones and found that he slept much better after he stopped using coffee and cigarettes as chemical stimulants to stay awake all day. At a food stall in Yogyakarta, a fellow customer told us that in high school, he was so desperate for cigarettes that he smoked discarded ones that he picked up off the street. He showed us with his fingers that if the butts were yea long, they were still tasty; if they were shorter, they tasted nasty, but he smoked them anyway. He eventually decided that smoking was destroying his health and quit. He exercised and drank copious quantities of water to sweat and rid his body of cigarette residue. His friends mocked him for quitting, calling him queer (*bencong*), but he ignored them and sought out new, athletic friends.

Smokers sometimes looked to me for advice on whether and how they should quit. A twenty-year-old student who wanted to quit said he had kidney problems, but a friend assured him they were unrelated to smoking. After I showed him research linking smoking to kidney disease and cancer, and with encouragement from his friends, he threw his pack with its remaining cigarettes in the trash. Minibus driver Roni said he tried to eat snacks (*ngemil*) and chew candy (*ngunyah permen*) instead of smoking, but this only made the prospect of a cigarette more appealing. “So,” he asked, “do you know how to quit smoking?” My stock suggestions were obviously disappointing and unhelpful to Roni. Although tobacco control campaigns assign responsibility for tobacco harms to the tobacco industry rather than to individual smokers, the experience of these harms, the vocabulary of addiction, and the struggle to not smoke are often individualizing.

#WEAREVICTIMS

“You smokers are victims, those exposed to smoke are all the more victims, we are all victims. So stop smoking right now!” So urges the prologue of *Kita Adalah Korban* (We are victims), an eighty-page collection of victims’ stories centering on twenty-four Indonesians disabled or killed by smoking (Sidipratomo, Menayang, and Fauziy 2014). The product of a collaboration between the National Commission on Tobacco Control (Komisi Nasional Pengendalian Tembakau) and the Alliance of Indonesian Smoking Victims (Aliansi Masyarakat Korban Rokok Indonesia), *Kita Adalah Korban* is a difficult book. A foreword by the Indonesian health minister lends it public health authority, and its cultural legitimacy is enhanced by a contribution from prominent poet Taufiq Ismail, who condemns Indonesia for

not joining the FCTC, mistakenly claiming that it is one of only three countries that have not done so, and that the other two are, as “godforsaken African countries,” shameful company (11). The research team described assembling the book as a race against time, as the angel of death repeatedly claimed the lives of willing participants before interviews could take place. Mobilizing poignant details and juxtaposing photographs of bodily suffering and happier times, the book provides an archive of human tragedies meant to touch its audience in ways that charts and statistics cannot (76).

The book features a music promoter, a housewife, an interior designer, a retiree, and a prominent rock star (Donny Fattah, bassist for the band God Bless), each of whom underwent surgery after suffering heart attacks or heart failure. A taxi driver, a truck driver, and a musical-instrument maker found their bodies ravaged and their worlds diminished by lung cancer, the classic calling card of cigarette smoking (Proctor 2011, 225). A musician and a retired government official described how chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (which includes emphysema and chronic bronchitis) made them suffer and struggle for breath even when sitting still, their condition so dire that they sometimes long for death. The book features a cohort of laryngeal cancer survivors, some of whom have also featured in anti-tobacco ads and testified before the national legislative assembly, lifting their bibs to display their tracheostomies.¹⁶ They have higher survival rates than lung cancer patients, but their lives, appearance, and communicative capacities are profoundly transformed.¹⁷ A dancer who underwent breast cancer treatments, including a mastectomy, nods to additional tobacco-related cancers. Some victims’ stories were written by spouses who themselves struggled to quit, such as a musician’s widow whose spouse died of tuberculosis and lung cancer. Another woman described how husband suffered a stroke at age forty-four, falling to the floor with cigarette in hand; he survived seven years more but was able to communicate only by moving his eyelids, fingers, and toes. She herself finally managed to quit after her children threatened that they would put her in an institution if she became similarly disabled.

The claim of the book’s title—We are victims—articulates a stance that struggles for credibility against popular views of individual responsibility for smoking, echoes of which are apparent even within the book. The book and related activism and hashtags (#kitakorban, #kitaadalahkorban) frame tobacco-related disease sufferers as victims of industry and government. Promising social status, fun, and friendship, the industry, abetted by a corrupt and tax-hungry government, lures youth into trying its addictive product, or so the logic goes. Djoko Waluyo, who suffered laryngeal cancer and a tracheotomy, echoes this narrative in his contribution to the book, accusing the government of violating the national spirit by collecting tax revenues from the industry while impoverishing and sacrificing smoking victims (Sidipratomo, Menayang, and Fauziy 2014, 35–37). Adrie Subono, a music promoter who smoked his last cigarette an hour before undergoing heart surgery

to install five rings, described himself as having been enslaved (*diperbudak*) and colonized (*dijajah*) by cigarettes for forty-five years (14–16). In tobacco control discourse that frames smokers as pathologically addicted subjects, observes Keane (2002, 121), the smoker is often presented as a passive “innocent victim of evil and rapacious companies . . . while the tobacco industry fills the role of active agent of disease and death.” *Kita Adalah Korban* only partially subscribes to this view; there are victims, and then there are victims. Passive smokers with tobacco-related diseases are more profoundly victims (*jauh lebih korban*) because they suffer without having committed the sin (*tak berdosa*) of active smoking (Sidipratomo, Menayang, and Fauziy 2014, 6). Three of the four non-smoking victims who appear in the book are women—a photography store worker whose boss smoked heavily and who died of lung cancer at thirty-six; a political activist who attended numerous political party meetings in enclosed, smoke-filled, air-conditioned rooms; and a cook who developed laryngeal cancer after a decade of workplace exposure to secondhand smoke. One male non-smoker was surrounded by smokers growing up and developed laryngeal cancer at only twenty-three, which left him feeling profoundly bitter, depressed, and angry with God (66). The book treats the victim status of the secondhand smoker as pure and their tragic misfortune as complete, whereas the victimhood of the smoker is adulterated by the problem of their own agency in harming themselves and loved ones, friends, and colleagues in their vicinity. If an undertone of accusation runs through the narratives of secondhand smoke victims, guilt and regret appear in those of smokers, who rue spending millions of rupiah on cigarettes and heart surgery, liquidating family assets, cars, and land for cancer treatments, and engaging in an egotistical act that endangered those around them.

The brevity of, and similarities among, the victims’ stories suggest not only the challenges of eliciting them but also how they were redacted, reduced to haunting tropes of suffering, regret, and anger.¹⁸ They stabilize a correct subject position: the politicized victim, who by the time of their political awakening may lack the physical means and strength to speak. They edit out and proscribe other kinds of social, cultural, and individual experiences with cigarettes.¹⁹ The institutional identity of the tobacco industry victim comes with prescribed ways of speaking and acting.²⁰

The passive and negative figure of the tobacco industry victim is sometimes interrupted by a competing institutional identity: the active and positive cancer survivor.²¹ When Fatma, Shahnaz, and I met with two laryngeal cancer survivors in their homes, both offered short and evasive responses to our inquiries into their smoking past and where they felt fault might lie for their predicament, even when we explicitly asked if they blamed the industry or government. Instead, they kept returning our attention to the learning and effort demanded by life in the present and the support networks they formed with fellow disease survivors. The eighty-year-old Husni, who had undergone a tracheotomy and thirty-three rounds of radiation two decades earlier, took pride in presenting himself as a

medical miracle and the very picture of geriatric vigor. He detailed how he had learned various feats, from producing speech and laughter (a staccato *ah-ah-ah*) to bathing without water trickling down his stoma. After lots of talking, he demonstrated how he cleansed his tracheal hole by rolling up and inserting a tissue with one hand while holding a compact mirror in the other and clutching his bib in his mouth. In exposing his stoma, he performed his ingenuity rather than his suffering, and he aimed to inspire admiration rather than pity, anger, revulsion, horror, or fear as anti-tobacco messaging tends to do. This was consistent with his role in local hospitals helping laryngeal cancer patients find the courage to go through tracheotomies and recover a semblance of their normal lives. Junaidi was less upbeat but likewise more interested in present challenges than in interrogating who was responsible for his cancer and smoking past. He also taught people with tracheotomies to speak “so that they will not lose hope,” and he maintained a notebook with a list of members of a social support group. Many had died, but there was a constant influx of new members. The positive and active survivor identity helps those afflicted by laryngeal cancer to reconstitute their lives, but it also limits negative emotional expressions and critique of the tobacco industry’s structural power.

COMMODITY PATRIOTS

Among his fellow minibus drivers, Fauzi staked out an unpopular position on who bore blame for Indonesia’s large population of smokers:

Fauzi: In my opinion, the companies are to blame, and the government. If the government didn’t permit them to operate, the companies would have to close, and maybe there wouldn’t be any smoking. There wouldn’t be any. There you have it.

Rama: You know we don’t have to smoke! If the factories were closed, the Indonesian government would lose its income. Its greatest tax revenue source is cigarettes.

Fauzi (speaking with growing outrage): The government has already issued this label, words like this, “Smoking causes cancer.” Really, it should be shut. Why is it even open? Right? Shut it down, it’s already harmed enough people!

Marina: I think the companies and government deserve more blame.

Fauzi: If there were no factories, it would be impossible for us to buy cigarettes. If there are factories, we will surely buy them.

Marina: What was your reaction when you first saw the pictorial warning labels?

Fauzi: Unbelievable [*Nggak masuk akal*]. If you’re going to write something like that, then the companies should be shut. That would finish the problem. There would be no more problem.

Others remarked on this dissonance in the government's actions, requiring grotesque warning labels on cigarettes while legally allowing their sale. Anton, holding a pack with the lung cancer image, mused, "How can something that does this to people be sold?" Fauzi's views on government blame were nevertheless at odds with the mainstream perspective, embodied in Rama's comment about personal responsibility and government tax revenues.

During interviews and casual conversations, I often asked who ought to bear blame and responsibility for the negative impacts of smoking, including the premature tobacco-related deaths of over two hundred thousand Indonesians a year. Should the industry, and the government that lightly regulated it, bear blame? Many of my respondents believed that cigarettes were addictive but nevertheless saw smokers themselves as responsible for any negative consequences rather than as industry victims.

Manuel: It's the user alone.

Budi: It comes back to each individual.

Joyo: Because I smoked, whatever sickness I end up suffering is mine, my responsibility because I did this.

Idris: It's a choice, right. A choice. We already know the dangers of smoking. We've been told that if you smoke, this is what's going to happen. But I still smoke, so if I get sick, it's my own responsibility. No one else needs to be blamed.

Adi: No one ordered us to smoke! We're to blame for our own illnesses.

Hamzah: Who do you want to accuse? Because on every cigarette pack, there's a warning. It's my fault. It's your own fault for lacking the will [*keniatan*] to stop.

Yanti (pointing to the lung cancer image on her A-Mild pack): The consumer [*konsumen*] is to blame, because they've been informed [*sudah diinfokan*], so if they still kept smoking . . .

The latter comments underscore how the cigarette industry benefits from cigarette warning labels. Cigarette advertisements urge people to abandon caution and rational thought (e.g., A-Mild's "Don't Think Twice," LA Light's "Don't Quit"), yet when smokers take companies to court for their diseases, they insist that the consumer is a sovereign subject who was duly warned.

This insistence on individual agency and blame is often coupled with a defense of the industry in terms of the social benefits it purportedly generates in the form of national employment and government tax revenues (Byron et al. 2015, 5).²² Although I never raised the possibility, my interlocutors often brought up the (wildly improbable) idea of a sudden and total ban on the industry and the dire consequences that would ensue.

Ucup: If cigarettes were totally banned, there would be a lot of unemployment. That's for sure.

Rizki: The tobacco industry provides the largest sums of money to the state.

Adi: Factories can't be held accountable or closed down because they employ workers.

Arik: If the industry were shut down, people would suffer a lot of hardship.

Rama: Tobacco creates jobs for people of all classes and allows low-skill workers to advance and send their children to college. If factories halted production, unemployment would rise, and what industry would replace lost jobs?

Lucas: If no one smoked, all the factories would shut, and people would be out of work.

Public health and World Bank studies dispute these perspectives by pointing out that mechanization has already dramatically reduced tobacco-related agricultural and manufacturing employment and by claiming that the income reaped by the state and industry workers pales in comparison with expenditures on tobacco-related disease treatments and lost employment and income due to premature tobacco-related debility or death.²³ Although construction workers Gani and Hendra exclusively smoked machine-rolled brands, Hendra nevertheless asserted that if they did not smoke, their wives—both cigarette hand-rollers—would be unemployed. The view that individuals are responsible for the harms of smoking while the tobacco industry is responsible for its national benefits is a public relations triumph for cigarette companies.

. . .

In his study of modern nationalism, Benedict Anderson (2006, 7) wrote that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.” Contemplating deaths from wars fought in the name of nations, Anderson went on to analyze the arresting power of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Outside of kretek nationalist discourse, which tends to reject the harmful nature of smoking and insist that kretek support health, few smokers conceive of themselves as great patriots or heroes when they buy a pack of cigarettes. Many do, however, feel that their cigarette consumption supports an industry that contributes to government coffers and national employment, thus doing some larger good. If their sense of contributing to this larger good is more diffuse than that of the volunteer or drafted soldier, so too is the nature of their suffering and sacrifice. Kretek capitalist deaths tend to be geographically dispersed, gradual and cruddy, bearing the

hallmarks of slow violence and death, unlike the tragic and catastrophic wartime culling of youth (Berlant 2007; Nixon 2011; Povinelli 2011). Tobacco-related deaths are not memorialized as national sacrifices. There is no Tomb of the Unknown Smoker, and the coffins of those who die of tobacco-related diseases are not draped in national flags in recognition of their consumption sacrifices. The “shrunkened imaginings” of commodity nationalism nevertheless help engender “colossal sacrifices,” commodity martyrdom on a mass scale (Anderson 2006, 7).

Epilogue

Kretek Capitalism shows that the cigarette industry in Indonesia is sustained through an extraordinary amount of paid and unpaid labor on the part of employees, contractors, retailers, community groups, artists, influencers, and consumers. This is to say that the profoundly consequential relationship between Indonesians and clove cigarettes is not a simple function of the “pull of desire”; kretek producers like Sampoerna are not merely fulfilling a preexisting popular demand for cigarettes, whether that demand stems from nicotine addiction or adherence to national cultural tradition. Instead, the kretek industry actively secures the ongoing relationship between Indonesians and clove cigarettes through the “relentless push” of “predatory capitalism” (Wailoo 2021, 289) and the exploitation of labor that undergirds it. Philip Morris International’s subsidiary Sampoerna goes to great lengths to enlist and orchestrate this labor and to make it seem meaningful and fulfilling to those who perform it, even when its ultimate purpose is increasing company profits. Some of the jobs that kretek capitalism creates are stable, pay well, and offer opportunities for advancement and upward mobility in Indonesia’s difficult labor market. But a great deal of kretek capitalist labor is partial, seasonal, contract, low-paying, or unpaid. And as the industry continues to shift from labor-intensive hand-rolled to machine-rolled kretek, more kretek are being made more cheaply with less tobacco, cloves, and labor.

Kretek capitalism, then, depends on extracting value from the labor it enlists so as to produce and sell cigarettes, but it also exerts control over its expansive workforce in ways that forestall opposition and foster a broad national base of support for the industry. The games, prizes, rewards, promotion possibilities, and other incentives that Sampoerna uses to extract labor tend to direct workers’ attention to the task at hand rather than to the system that their labor serves. By setting small and short-term goals and objectives (e.g., tobacco or cigarette quality and quantity, audience numbers at promotional events, retail points, peer belonging), the industry enlists people to support and perpetuate a harm industry that

diverts land from food crops, chops down trees and releases carbon for flue-curing, maims and kills Indonesians and surrounds them with advertisements, strews toxic litter on the ground and in waterways, and deprives children of nutrition, education, and clean air.

Sampoerna remains Indonesia's largest cigarette producer, although the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent government tax policies have weakened its market position. Indonesia's cigarette market declined from almost 306 billion sticks sold in 2019 to 276 billion in 2020, rebounding and again reaching over 300 billion in 2022. Sampoerna's 32.2 percent market share in 2019, however, fell to about 28 percent from 2020 to 2022. The company's annual reports blame the stiff "headwinds" the company faces on the pandemic and the government's "double digit" (11 percent average) excise tax hikes on the largest cigarette producers and lower tax hikes on smaller producers. Indonesian smokers have been "downtrading," gravitating toward products with lower excise taxes and prices (Sampoerna 2023). Under these circumstances, Sampoerna did not dare pass the entire excise tax hike onto customers and thus experienced decreased profitability alongside its lower market share.

Sampoerna can be expected to fight tooth and nail to regain some of the market share it has lost. As we have seen, market-share battles translate into special promotional events for youth, social overtures and contracts for musicians, artists, community groups, and campus clubs, and turf wars over the hearts and minds—and the walls and display cases—of independent retailers. When cigarette companies fight for market share, they claim that they are only trying to win over existing smokers who consume competitor products. Of course, they are also always recruiting new smokers, whom the industry once categorize as replacement smokers, succeeding those who died or managed to quit.

Despite the obstacles it faces, Sampoerna has maintained a dominant position in several market sectors, including white cigarettes, "low-tar" machine-rolled kretek, and hand-rolled kretek. Moreover, under PMI, it has its sights set on leading the nascent "reduced-risk" nicotine product sector. In late 2022, the company began producing "smoke-free" HEETS tobacco products at its new \$186 million plant in Karawang, and it has been marketing these heat-rather-than-combust products (which look like stubby cigarettes) along with the IQOS device in Indonesia. Public health researchers who have examined the rise of such new products have urged skepticism toward industry claims of their revolutionary potential. The industry has assured regulators that new products are designed to facilitate smoking cessation, then aggressively marketed them to youth and created a new generation of nicotine addicts. Much like the "light" cigarette, new devices have also perpetuated nicotine addiction among "dual users" who do not fully switch to e-cigarettes but use them alongside conventional combustibles. In the United States, Juul's potent nicotine salt formula and aggressive youth marketing on social media led to an epidemic of teen vaping and addiction that inspired Altria,

Philip Morris's parent company, to acquire a 35 percent stake in the company for \$12.8 billion. Juul's value fell soon thereafter as a result of public backlash over the company's marketing tactics and a 2019 outbreak of cases of severe lung damage and over sixty deaths from vaping black-market THC pods.¹ The health impacts and chemical constituents of "smoke-free" products are also less benign than company marketing implies (Jackler 2022, 140–42).

For now, though, the reduced-risk sector remains a thin slice of the industry, especially in low- and middle-income countries like Indonesia. Sampoerna boasted in 2021 that IQOS Club Indonesia had gained sixty-five thousand registered members, but this number—which represents about 0.1 percent of the 65.7 million smokers in Indonesia—makes PMI's stated ambition of seeing "at least 30 percent of PMI's adult consumers who would otherwise continue smoking switch to PMI's smoke free products by 2025" seem ludicrously out of reach in Indonesia (Sampoerna 2022, 24, 159). Likewise, Sampoerna's two hundred IQOS outlets in 2022 hardly register in comparison to the estimated 2.4 million retailers that not only sell cigarettes but serve as scaffolding for cigarette ads and point-of-sales displays, as discussed in chapter 5 (Lian and Dorotheo 2021, 5; Sampoerna 2023).

Indonesians live neither in the fictionalized and romanticized past depicted by kretek nationalists nor in the equally imaginative and deceptive smoke-free future that the tobacco industry itself promises to deliver. They instead bear the misfortune and challenge of living with kretek capitalism as it exists in the present. In contemporary kretek capitalism, a significant share of the industry is controlled by foreign firms, kretek are mostly machine-rolled, the poorest smoke the most, and tobacco control activists struggle for influence in a context where policy decisions are shaped by patriarchal sympathy with male smokers and friendly relations between industry and government. Understanding the realities of kretek capitalism—including the labor and working conditions involved in sustaining it—is key to transforming it.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Philip Morris International's own website concedes that its primary product is addictive and releases over six thousand chemicals, many of which are implicated in cancers and cardiovascular diseases; see Philip Morris International, "Frequently Asked Questions about Cigarettes and Smoking," <https://www.pmi.com/faq-section/smoking-and-cigarettes>, accessed March 15, 2023.

2. Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, "The Toll of Tobacco in Indonesia," <https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/problem/toll-global/asia/indonesia>, accessed February 10, 2022.

3. US Food and Drug Administration, "Nicotine Is Why Tobacco Products Are Addictive," <https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/health-effects-tobacco-use/nicotine-why-tobacco-products-are-addictive>; American Cancer Society, "Why People Start Smoking and Why It's Hard to Stop," <https://www.cancer.org/healthy/stay-away-from-tobacco/why-people-start-using-tobacco.html>; Know the Risks: E-Cigarettes & Young People (website), the 2016 US Surgeon General's report on e-cigarettes, <https://e-cigarettes.surgeongeneral.gov/knowtherisks.html>, accessed January 4, 2023.

4. Mintz (1986, 15) similarly insisted that "widely variant sugar-eating habits of contemporary populations show that no ancestral predisposition . . . can adequately explain what are in fact culturally conventionalized norms, not biological imperatives."

5. The United States, Canada, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, Niger, Mauritania, Moldova, Turkey, Singapore, and the twenty-eight EU member states have introduced flavor bans that bar clove cigarette sales. Bans especially target menthol flavoring and filter capsules that release flavors when squeezed. After allegedly heavy lobbying by Sampoerna, Indonesia appealed to the WTO to overturn the US kretek ban that accompanied the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act on the grounds that it unfairly discriminated against cloves while allowing menthols. The cigarette industry lobbied for the

menthol exception, protecting a racial niche product more heavily consumed by female and Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and Asian smokers. The WTO sided with Indonesia, but the two countries settled the dispute with the kretek ban in place and the industry avoiding a blanket US ban on flavorings that would threaten its menthol market (Puig 2018). Some kretek producers have responded to bans by wrapping kretek filler in reconstituted tobacco and classifying the product as cigars.

6. Tobacco control advocates are conflicted over whether it is ever appropriate to call one of these killer commodities more dangerous than another. Some lobby for lowering allowable tar and nicotine levels, while others dismiss such approaches as capitulations to the industry myth of a safer cigarette, of which tar and nicotine numbers are deceptive artifacts.

7. Tobacco farmer groups include Aliansi Masyarakat Tembakau Indonesia, Asosiasi Petani Tembakau Indonesia, and Laskar Kretek. Asosiasi Petani Cengkeh Indonesia purportedly represents clove farmers. Smoker rights groups include Perokok Bijak (prudent smokers). There is a National Coalition to Save the Kretek (Koalisi Nasional Penyelamatan Kretek) and a National Committee for the Preservation of Kretek (Komite Nasional Pelestarian Kretek) that runs a website titled Smoking Allowed (Boleh Merokok), <https://bolehmerokok.com/>, accessed August 23, 2023).

8. The English word *clove* derives from the French *clou* (nail) and Latin *clavus*, while the Indonesian word *cengkeh* is said by some to derive from Chinese (*ting hsiang*, nail-like perfume). Folk nomenclature for cloves incorporating the meaning “nail” appears in Arabic, Persian, Tamil, Russian, Romanian, German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Catalan, Czech, Hungarian, Latvian, and Estonian (Donkin 2003, 20–21, 108–9).

9. After World War II and the Japanese invasion, Nitisemito’s business never fully recovered and ended in bankruptcy in 1955.

10. The term *Tionghoa* encompasses both first-generation immigrants (*totok*) and *peranakan* Chinese descendants with more creolized language, cuisine, dress, and kinship arrangements.

11. Bentoel was originally named after its founder, Ong Hok Liong, the son of a Bojonegoro tobacco trader who started a klobot manufacturing company in 1930 in the East Javanese city of Malang. While undertaking a pilgrimage to the tomb of sixteenth-century ascetic Mbah Djugo on the sacred mountain Gunung Kawi, he dreamed that he encountered a bentoel (cassava root) vendor, which prompted him to change his company’s name from Strootjes Fabriek Ong Hok Liong to Bentoel.

12. Oei Wie Gwan acquired the company Djarum Gramofon (gramophone needle) in 1951 and shortened its name to Djarum. Oei concentrated on selling kretek in the large and lucrative West Javanese market and used marketing tactics like screening films where the entrance fee was empty packs. After Oei died in 1963, his sons, Robert Budi Hartono and Michael Bambang Hartono, took over. They restructured the company, expanded across Java and beyond, and mechanized in 1976 (Hanusz 2000, 112, 131). Gudang Garam, which would mechanize in 1979, was founded in the East Javanese town of Kediri in 1958 by Tjoa Ing Hwie (1923–85), who migrated to the Dutch East Indies as a young child. Tjoa worked for his uncle’s kretek factory, Tjap 93, until he founded his own, taking fifty of his uncle’s employees with him. The company’s name was inspired by Tjoa’s dream about the salt warehouse (*gudang garam*) opposite Tjap 93. An image of a warehouse with two doors open, two half-open, and one closed graces Gudang Garam’s older brand packs. Gudang Garam’s popular machine-rolled brand Surya is named after Tjoa’s adopted Indonesian name, Surya Wonowidjojo.

13. Aga guided Tien Pao to start a rubber and palm oil business in Malaysia, which they closed as a result of increasing government regulation and the New Economic Policy (1971) that espouses affirmative action and economic opportunities for ethnic Malay citizens.

14. A former Sampoerna director of distribution recalled one threat mailed to Putera: a small coffin. Personal communication with author, March 2016.

15. Budget control includes identifying “cost-saving opportunities” such as eliminating eye-catching but expensive shiny packaging on a new product once it achieves a foothold in the market.

16. The auspicious number nine featured in the stock listing date (the forty-fifth anniversary of founder Liem’s release from Japanese labor camp), the stock price (1+2+6), and the number of shares sold (2+7) (Sampoerna 2007, 130).

17. “Tali Jagat Dari NU,” *Tempo*, October 20, 2002, <https://majalah.tempo.co/read/ekonomi-dan-bisnis/81765/tali-jagat-dari-nu>.

18. “PBNU Lepas Kepemilikan di Rokok Tali Jagat,” *NU Online*, February 22, 2007, <https://www.nu.or.id/warta/pbnu-lepas-kepemilikan-di-rokok-tali-jagat-FGqbx>.

19. The MTCC leader contrasted Muhammadiyah’s approach of following the Prophet Muhammed with NU’s “bottom-up” nature that encourages members to follow their *kyai* (clerics), for whom smoking was a virtual prerequisite. She disparagingly described NU’s handing out Gudang Garam goody bags at meetings and circulating claims that lungs, like meat, could be preserved by smoking and that a smoker could memorize the Quran in two years whereas a non-smoker required four years. “Where there’s smoke, there’s NU!” she scathingly remarked. Her colleagues took a more circumspect approach, and those who worked to transition farmers away from tobacco avoided the label “haram” for fear that it would alienate farmers.

20. “Nielsen: Tobacco Firms Spend RP 5.4 trillion on Ads,” *Jakarta Post*, February 2, 2018, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/02/02/nielsen-tobacco-firms-spend-rp-5-4-trillion-on-ads.html>.

21. Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, “The Toll of Tobacco in Indonesia,” <https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/problem/toll-global/asia/indonesia>, accessed February 10, 2022.

22. In the United States, higher smoking prevalence among LGBTQ people, who often start younger and find it harder to quit, is associated with multiple cancers, worsened prognoses from sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C, respiratory diseases, cardiovascular risks for those taking gender-affirming hormones, impairments such as infertility and blindness, and shorter life expectancy (Kidd, Dolezal, and Bockting 2018; Washington 2002). Cigarettes enable the queer smoker who feels unsafe and marginalized to play to gender conventions by projecting a tough and masculine identity (Sedaris 2008). Among Indonesian men who have sex with men, whether they identify as gay or straight, cigarettes mediate cheap and unthreatening initial interactions that could lead to sexual and romantic possibilities (Boellstorff 2005). The act of smoking, with its sensuous tactile, oral, and olfactory dimensions, allows for both conventional and exaggerated, subversive, and transgressive gender performances (Danesi 2008).

Cigarettes’ polysemous material and semiotic affordances lend themselves to queer purposes, but LGBTQ people have also been systematically targeted by the tobacco industry for decades. In the United States, Philip Morris deployed the hypermasculine Marlboro Man as a gay icon, and R. J. Reynolds’s infamous Project SCUM (Subculture Urban Marketing) targeted gay men and unhoused people in San Francisco (Engardio

2000). Applying instrumentally progressive tactics, the industry advertised in queer media outlets that other companies shunned, donated to queer organizations and pride parades, hired queer executives, forged legislative and political ties with the LGBTQ community, and introduced antidiscrimination bills that offered protection against sexual-orientation bias and protected smokers' rights (Apollonio and Malone 2005; Washington 2002). The cigarette industry in Indonesia appears more circumspect about supporting embattled queer activists, perhaps out of fear of alienating conservative allies. Yet it is an overwhelming presence in, and sponsor of, the café, bar, and nightclub scene that young Indonesians might frequent as they explore their sexual identities and pursue queer encounters.

23. Philip Morris International, "Our Transformation," <https://www.pmi.com/our-transformation/our-interactive-transformation>, accessed July 15, 2022.

24. Insist Press, "Membongkar Sejarah Kretek yang Telah Di-stigma," July 13, 2015, <https://insistpress.com/2015/07/13/membongkar-sejarah-kretek-yang-telah-di-stigma/>; Komunitas Kretek, "Tentang Kami," <https://komunitaskretek.or.id/tentang-kami/>, accessed December 22, 2020.

25. Komunitas Kretek, "Rekomendasi Rokok Low Tar Low Nicotine Tahun 2023, Cocok Untuk Pemula!," February 6, 2023, <https://komunitaskretek.or.id/ragam/2023/02/rekomen-dasi-rokok-low-tar-low-nicotine-tahun-2023-cocok-untuk-pemula/>.

26. Komunitas Kretek, "Kretek Bukan Rokok," February 9, 2015, <https://komunitaskretek.or.id/editorial/2015/02/kretek-bukan-rokok-2/>.

27. Komunitas Kretek, "Penghancuran Kretek oleh Philip Morris," May 26, 2014, <https://komunitaskretek.or.id/opini/2014/05/penghancuran-kretek-oleh-philip-morris/>; Philip Morris Sebuah Upaya Menghabisi Kretek, February 12, 2018, <https://komunitaskretek.or.id/editorial/2018/02/philip-morris-sebuah-upaya-menghabisi-kretek/>.

28. German company Hauni has consolidated control over the cigarette-making process by acquiring Italian tobacco processing machine maker Garbuio, French filter maker Decouflé, and German flavor maker and cigarette testing machine maker Borgwaldt. Kurt Körber founded Hauni Maschinenfabrik, which initially repaired cigarette making machines, in 1946 in Hamburg. The Hauni Group, with its tobacco identity, is under the larger Körber Group, which produces tissue, pharmaceutical, artificial intelligence, and supply chain technologies. See "Körber: From a Basement Workshop to a Global Technology Group," <https://www.koerber.com/en/we/koerber-from-a-basement-workshop-to-a-global-technology-group>; and "Körber Business Area Technologies: We Are Your Strategic Partner," <https://www.hauni.com/en/about-us/hauni-group/>, both at koerber.com, accessed June 4, 2021.

29. "Anatomy of a Cigarette," PBS, *Nova*, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/cigarette/anat_text.html, accessed May 25, 2021.

30. Proctor (2011; Cross and Proctor 2014) argues that the flue-curing process, which prevents sugar decomposition in tobacco leaves and makes smoke that is less alkaline more inhalable, was critical to the success of cigarettes. Applying sugary additives to air-cured tobacco achieves the same effect. Cigarette smoke's inhalability made it seem milder than cigar or pipe smoke, when in fact vast lung tissue exposure made cigarettes more dangerous.

31. Sampoerna was eliminating nutmeg and basil due to toxins they release when burned.

32. Hanusz (2000, 90–96, 197) discusses *saus* ingredients and flavor manufacturers and includes a recipe.

33. “Anatomy of a Cigarette.”

34. Proctor (2011, 406–17) attributes the introduction of the “light” concept to Philip Morris marketing executive James J. Morgan with the 1971 launch of Marlboro Lights. It spread to other cigarette brands, food, and beer (Philip Morris acquired Miller Beer around this time).

35. Philip Morris International, “Frequently Asked Questions about Cigarettes and Smoking.”

36. Monthly visitor numbers rose from 1,500–2,000 in 2005 to 17,000–19,000 in 2017. A *Jakarta Post* advertorial boasted, “Since 2013, House of Sampoerna has also been consistently named one of the top 10 museums in the country, with one of its more recent accolades being TripAdvisor’s Certificate of Excellence 2017” (House of Sampoerna 2017). Lonely Planet raves that the House of Sampoerna is “a fascinating place to visit” and “undoubtedly the city’s best-presented attraction . . . whatever you think about the tobacco industry” (Lonely Planet, “House of Sampoerna,” <https://www.lonelyplanet.com/indonesia/java/surabaya/attractions/house-of-sampoerna/a/poi-sig/1189671/356572>, accessed October 25, 2021). “Even nonsmokers will appreciate the architecture,” concurs Fodor’s, recommending the café as “a fine choice for a lunch in historic surroundings” (Fodor’s, “House of Sampoerna,” <https://www.fodors.com/world/asia/indonesia/things-to-do/sights/reviews/house-of-sampoerna-608728>, accessed October 25, 2021).

1. KRETEK AGRICULTURE: HIERARCHY AND SUBJUGATION

1. US tobacco production quantity from Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, “Crops and Livestock Products,” <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC>, accessed April 8, 2019; farmer number from the Census of Agriculture, US Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Services, <https://www.nass.usda.gov/AgCensus/>.

2. The librarian worked at the government research institute on tobacco and fibers in Malang (BALITTAS).

3. These figures may be inaccurate since companies are cagey about cigarette ingredients and proportions.

4. I did not carry out research among tobacco farmers in Central Java, which includes the renowned Temanggung region where cultivation is steeped in ritual and local mythology claims the crop is indigenous (Brata 2012). Temanggung tobacco is common in kretek, but I was told that Sampoerna ceased buying from the region due to its high price.

5. BAT began operating in Lombok in 1973. After research revealed Lombok’s potential, Sadhana began recruiting farmers in 1995, rapidly adding warehouses and growing its farmer roster. Robert, a Sadhana manager, claimed that in 1995, Lombok produced seven million kilograms of “crap” tobacco, a figure that rose to between fifty-three and fifty-five million kilograms of higher quality tobacco in 2009. La Niña in 2010 led many farmers to quit tobacco, and in 2015, the island produced around thirty-five million kilograms. Robert nevertheless believed that Lombok could produce eighty to ninety million kilograms of the best tobacco in Asia if farmers wanted to plant it.

6. Ovens cost ten to fifteen million rupiah.

7. Ovens can be fueled in various ways, each with their pros and cons. One farmer described kerosene as most efficient, coal as most difficult, and wood as labor-consuming because it required incessant monitoring. The government cut its subsidized kerosene program for tobacco in 2010. PMI found that kerosene left high levels of carcinogenic nitrosamine residue on the leaf when farmers used direct curing methods.

Sadhana turned to wood as a potentially renewable energy source and encouraged farmers to switch to high-efficiency “rocket” ovens, which were developed in Africa and require less fuel than standard ovens. Sadhana distributed turi (*Sesbania grandiflora*) tree seedlings to Lombok farmers, encouraging “partner farmers” to plant the fast-growing trees on 1,500 hectares (with four thousand trees planted per hectare) and along paddy field bunds with one-meter spacing. Turi trees could be harvested after two and a half years. A Sadhana representative explained that if farmers plant two thousand trees, three years later they can cut seven hundred, enough to cure one hectare of tobacco (as they grow larger, six hundred trees would suffice in the fourth year and five hundred in the fifth year). In December, farmers can plant new seedlings next to trees they plan to chop down. Farmers harvest trees in June that they plan to burn in August. Some bunds are so small that the trees struggle to grow. For Lombok farmers, the turi program brought back memories of the greening campaign (*turinisasi*) of the 1960s, when the government forced people to plant the trees.

Sadhana also secured a government concession for an industrial forest (Hutan Tana-man Industri or HTI), giving the company rights to plant and harvest trees from 3,810 hectares of forest land over a sixty-year period beginning in 2011. To manage the operation, Sadhana created a forestry department and hired forty foresters. If they could plant and harvest wood in planned six-year cycles, Sadhana hoped to become the first company that could claim that its flue-cured tobacco was sustainable. (Other leaf buyers shipped in palm oil and candlenut shells from Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Flores for flue-curing.) By 2016, Sadhana had planted 600 hectares, with an additional 350 hectares planned. After clearing and selling timber from the existing forest, the company planted *Acacia auriculiformis* (a tree indigenous to the archipelago), eucalyptus trees, and a smaller number of mahogany, sengon, and neem trees. Eucalyptus and acacia are harder woods that provide more heat than softer turi trees. Farmers who use Sadhana’s wood as part of their credit package pay basic production costs for the manual labor involved (cutting, stacking, loading, transport, and unloading wood at a timber depot). Activists claimed that the project was a land grab that displaced poor local residents without compensation from forest land they relied on for their livelihoods. Indeed, we saw some cattle grazing in the concession, which a Sadhana representative said should be expelled. Sadhana was trying to pacify local residents with modest corporate social responsibility programs and employment opportunities.

One former tobacco farmer predicted a growing environmental impact due to deforestation as farmers illegally harvested asem trees, bribing police if they got caught. “Lombok will end up bald,” he foretold. Illegally harvested wood also arrives by ferry from the eastern island of Sumbawa, with likely involvement by regional officials and military. One independent farmer received Sumbawan wood deliveries at 3:00 a.m. or 4:00 a.m.

8. Before manual cutting, (mostly female) workers roll or bundle (*gulung*) and tie leaves together. Sadhana representatives pointed out that the rolling work entails a labor expense and is a source of undesirable non-tobacco related material (NTRM), as plastic twine (*tali rafia*) is used to bundle leaves. Cutters often pull long night shifts, their hands and arms soaked in tobacco juice, and blade use or sharpening injuries are common. A government health clinic worker in Madura recounted recently stitching nasty wounds for two cutters. Mechanical cutting machines are also potentially dangerous. A farmer insisted that frequently sharpening the blades kept tobacco yellow rather than brown and fetched a higher price. At one farm, the cutting machine's door was left open and its chute removed while the machine operated and the blades revolved at full speed.

9. Sadhana's Blitar leaf-buying station worked with 1,100 contract farmers in Blitar, Malang, and Kediri regencies (*kabupaten*) and increased tobacco purchases from 300 tons in 2010 to 2,400 tons in 2015 (Sadhana presentation to Malang farmers, November 12, 2015). Adi Sampoerna began contracting with Jember farmers in 2009 and controlled 1,500 hectares by 2015, with target acreage determined in consultation with Sampoerna. In Lombok, Sadhana had seventeen hundred farmers under contract in 2016. Alliance One recruited over four hundred contract farmers in Madura over four years, using a map color-coding various companies' territory and recruiting around the edges with "farmer campaigns."

10. Philip Morris International, "Upholding Labor Rights on the Farms," <https://www.pmi.com/sustainability/good-agricultural-practices/upholding-labor-rights-on-the-farms>, accessed April 5, 2019.

11. Philip Morris International, "Designing a Smoke-Free Future," <https://www.pmi.com/who-we-are/designing-a-smoke-free-future>, accessed April 10, 2019.

12. Philip Morris International, "Products without Tobacco," <https://www.pmi.com/science-and-innovation/products-without-tobacco>, accessed April 10, 2019.

13. Robert made this point while displaying a set of "crocodile clips" that Sadhana had made for hanging leaves in flue-curing barns. Workers were supposed to attach leaves to the long metal and wooden clips rather than tying them to bamboo poles. Robert encountered the clips in Brazil, and PMI "got all excited" about using them to reduce child labor in leaf tying. Sadhana dutifully replicated the clips, but Robert believed they were too expensive to be an appropriate technology and that children could use them as well as adults, which would only reduce rather than eliminate child labor.

14. At the time of my research (2015 and 2016), one US dollar was roughly equivalent to 13,000 rupiah.

15. Cockburn and Eaton (2013, 173) detail Sadhana's ratings in terms of "reliability and performance" from A ("very reliable") to D ("not reliable, high risk of side selling") and skills from 1 ("highly skilled/innovative/early adopter") to 4 ("difficulty to adapt").

16. Leaf buying stations are often poorly marked, modest, and unassuming and attract little attention until trucks queue along the roadside during harvest. Sadhana's buying stations in Lumajang and Blitar fit this description, and Alliance One's Madura warehouse looked so decrepit that it appeared derelict, forcing the company to hang a sign on the gate stating that it was in active use and not for sale or rent. A manager explained that as an

international leaf firm, Alliance One did not have the security to invest heavily in a well-appointed warehouse like the one Sadhana established in Madura.

17. Adi Sampoerna's off-site grading program is supposed to avert such scenes by deploying a grader directly to farmers to evaluate the leaf and determine if it meets warehouse standards.

18. A Lombok farmer recalled disorderly scenes unfolding at buying stations, including a haji who had planted twenty hectares of tobacco on rented land and was acting "daring with the graders, trying to choke one!" During difficult seasons, desperate farmers who were tens or even hundreds of millions of rupiah in debt would pull out daggers and threaten graders if their bales were graded low or rejected. When this happened, other farmers would hold the man back until he cried out and released his dagger. He also observed a fistfight break out between farmers who were standing on their bales in the hot sun, jockeying for position at a temporary buying station that BAT had set up in a rented village cooperative space.

19. Gani, a Madurese trader (*bandol*), attested to such tricks, chuckling when he recalled once adding a quintal of sugar to leaves he sold. He was skeptical of graders' supposed powers of discernment and ability to distinguish Javanese from Madurese leaf and between Madurese leaves grown on paddy and those grown in mountain soil. "You can get the mountain scent," he explained, "by taking paddy field tobacco to the mountains, or spraying a mix of pineapple juice and water on the leaf." Graders often assume they know the provenance of tobacco from seeing the person selling it, he added. He pointed out another oddity: although tobacco is worth more once it has been stored, warehouses demand that it arrive freshly cured, with the smell of the knife (*bau pisau*) still on it.

20. Kluger (1996, 3) characterized tobacco as "a hard plant to love . . . demanding at every stage of its growth, sticky to the touch during hot weather, highly inviting to unsightly and voracious pests . . . [prompting] Thomas Jefferson to call it 'a culture productive of infinite wretchedness' in view of the hundreds of hours of backbreaking labor per acre that it required—and still does, despite advances in mechanization and agronomy."

21. "Middle-aged" is defined as thirty-six to sixty years old. The average age of the general population in Indonesia is twenty-eight (World Bank 2017, 25). Tobacco farming in Indonesia mirrors a national and global trend of aging smallholders, which White (2020, 8) examines as a "generation problem" stemming from commodification and land grabs, patriarchy and gerontocracy, and aging smallholders who are unwilling or financially unable to pass land on to their descendants. He attributes young people's seemingly paradoxical turn away from farming in an era of mass youth un(der)employment to structural barriers, protracted waiting for land succession, rigid anti-child labor campaigns, and formal education, which tends to downgrade farm futures and produce farming aversion, alienation, and deskilling (2020, 16). White notes that Marx condemned the abuse and exploitation of children but argued for the value of part-time work experience combined with formal education (2020, 79).

22. Clove-farming household heads are mostly male, married, and middle-aged or senior, with elementary school education or less. Based on calculations of total household income minus expenses, the World Bank estimates that over a third live in poverty (2017, 36).

23. Tobacco Atlas, “Smallholder Tobacco Farmer Profits,” <https://tobaccoatlas.org/data-visualization/smallholder-tobacco-farmer-profits/>, accessed December 13, 2020.

24. Achmad’s use of the word *black* (*hitam*) links race and class hierarchies to depict indigenous Indonesians (*pribumi*) as oppressed by Chinese. It is distinct from an identification with global Blackness such as West Papuans have recently claimed in analyzing their experiences of racial discrimination.

25. Indonesian tobacco farmers produced 126,700 tons of tobacco in 2016, less than half their 2012 output; see Statista, “Volume of Tobacco Production in Indonesia from 2011 to 2020,” <https://www.statista.com/statistics/707015/production-of-tobacco-in-indonesia/>, accessed June 28, 2021.

26. Tobacco mosaic virus is known as broccoli (*brokoli*) virus in Indonesia, an apt name that evokes the curled appearance of the afflicted plant.

27. Statista, “Volume of Tobacco Production in Indonesia from 2011 to 2020,” <https://www.statista.com/statistics/707015/production-of-tobacco-in-indonesia/>, accessed June 28, 2021.

28. US EPA Reg. No. 33688–4 and the US Federal Register on Butralin Sucker Control.

29. The reward program sometimes included returning plastic fertilizer sacks and seedbed plastic to reduce NTRM. A Sadhana representative claimed that the company convinced pesticide companies to take back empty canisters by warning them that these might otherwise fall into the wrong hands and get refilled and sold, passed off as the real stuff.

30. Some farmers feed workers while others provide wages only (*lepas*). In Malang, some female workers spoke bitterly about being hired without meals for 34,000 rupiah for a full day of work but said they did not dare seek work elsewhere. One young farmer said wages often rise by 1,000 or 2,000 rupiah after Lebaran once rumors start that another farmer has raised wages. He paid especially low wages: for a half day, 15,000 rupiah for female laborers and 17,000 rupiah for male laborers, and for a full day, 25,000 rupiah for female laborers and 30,000 for male laborers. Other Malang growers paid women and men 30,000 and 40,000 rupiah; 45,000 and 60,000; and 35,000 and 55,000, respectively (including food and cigarettes for men). Where food and drinks are included, farmer’s wives typically set out tea—plus coffee and cigarettes for male workers—and bring a hot meal as a morning break. In Jember, workers reported daily wages of 30,000 and 40,000 rupiah for women and men, respectively, without meals. In Lombok, workers earned 50,000 rupiah or more a day. One farmer said a workday lasted from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., with a break from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. In Madura, female workers were paid 50,000 rupiah per day and male laborers 60–70,000 rupiah, but the small scale of tobacco cultivation allowed many to rely on unpaid family labor and mutual assistance.

31. The younger children identified in the assessment engaged in tobacco labor after school hours (Control Union Certifications 2015).

32. *Ekspedisi Cengkeh* (Puthut 2013), which celebrates Indonesia’s clove industry, also documents child labor.

33. In 2016, pickers in East Java earned 50,000–70,000 rupiah per day, while pickers in Bali earned 100,000–125,000 rupiah per day. The harvesting season lasts for roughly two to three months, with single trees yielding thirty-five kilograms. Our efforts to observe pickers were frequently stymied because they were not working due to rain or competing obligations that they prioritized.

2. HAND-ROLLING KRETEK: CLASS AND GENDER PATERNALISM

1. “Minum Es Kacang Ijo,” Sampoerna Hijau ad, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXUnFE_Gnwc, accessed August 23, 2021.

2. Putera Sampoerna initially moved Panamas cigarette production from Bali to Java after buying the Malang factory from Philip Morris, which was eager to exit due to the declining white cigarette market.

3. Days later, the plant manager apologetically recalled my uniform, concerned that if I were seen on the street, questions could arise about Sampoerna’s employing foreign workers. I continued my work dressed in ordinary clothes plus the uniform’s apron and hat.

4. Workers previously used wooden stools that were heavier, caused splinters, and sometimes harbored insects that bit their bottoms. When I queried them about plastic stool ergonomics, managers said that after experiments with wooden and adjustable-height stools, they concluded that cheap lightweight plastic stools were superior, allowing workers to easily and accurately move them around with a knee or foot when they stood.

5. The union negotiates pay annually. Rates are close to the minimum in higher minimum wage regions such as Surabaya (close to three million rupiah a month in 2016) and sometimes significantly higher in lower minimum wage regions such as Malang (2,099,000 in 2016). Workers receive an extra 10 percent of their basic wage for full weekly attendance (*premi kehadiran*), a meal subsidy for each day of attendance (8,000 rupiah *subsidi komponen upah*), and two days extra pay each month if they do not take the menstrual leave that non-pregnant workers under forty-five are entitled to (pre-menopausal workers over the age of forty-five must demonstrate to a polyclinic nurse that they are still menstruating each month, one of my neighbors explained, after returning from doing so).

6. In the center’s entryway, lavish signs detail and promote the unit’s innovation achievements. In a back room, six workers dressed in spotless white shirts and black veils fastened with elaborate brooches test new technologies in a sterile, air-conditioned environment. Engineers record and analyze their tempo, movements, and bodily impacts using methods-time measurement to reduce workers’ movements and standardize the time required to complete tasks. Putera Sampoerna applied time motion studies and implemented a range of changes to the production line, quality control, and packaging practices after taking over the company in 1978.

7. Factory ethnographers have nuanced the Marxist concept of worker alienation by showing that some workers feel profound and personal connections to the use value of commodities they produce. Dunn (2004) shows that Polish female canning workers likened their labor to that of mothers feeding their children and disciplined one another to follow safety rules accordingly. Dudley (1994) encountered auto workers who construed themselves as artists and felt connected to drivers and passengers who used the vehicles that came off their assembly lines (see also the 2009 HBO documentary *The Last Truck: Closing of a GM Plant*). This connection between commodity producers and consumers is more troubling with cigarettes, which workers see as both a wasteful expenditure and harmful to health when their own fathers, brothers, husbands, and sons smoke.

8. One example is KUD Sumber Makmur in Ngantang, Sampoerna’s second MPS, which opened in 1994. As in many village-based cooperatives, factory workers are not necessarily member-owners.

9. In Jombang, for example, twenty-eight apprentices were present and earning between 34,000 and 49,000 rupiah per day, with higher pay as their productivity approached

target output rates. In a Yogyakarta TPO, apprentices earned only 22,500 to 29,500 per day depending on their skill level (*pemula, lanjutan, trampil, mahir*).

10. CSR activities include tree planting, volunteering (*kerja bakti*), blood donations, village cleaning (*bersih desa*), responding to natural disasters, creating information booths, providing trash bins, road repair, participating in civilian security (*ronda*), clean water programs, constructing hamlet gates, animal husbandry support, providing street lighting, donating computers to elementary schools (such direct donations were subsequently disallowed, with companies required to go through Sampoerna Foundation to make education donations), donating animals for the Day of Sacrifice (Hari Korban), and funding soccer clubs, organizations caring for people with disabilities, mosques, and orphanages. One TPO catalogued its “internal CSR” activities, including culinary training for workers (e.g., making snacks) and working with the local government to offer industrial training to the husbands of workers.

11. The factory produced the Sultan’s Kraton Dalem kretek from 2003 until 2010 but failed to turn a profit. The princesses occasionally visit the shop floor, where workers reportedly greeted them with excitement and selfie requests.

12. Those who had worked over twenty years were eligible for a 67.7 million rupiah payout plus 22 million in pension (*jaminan hari tua*).

13. The term *pekerja* has more neutral connotations, along the lines of “employee,” than *buruh*, which invokes the laborer’s class position and is more akin to proletarian.

14. Salim took credit for the earlier introduction of radios:

I could see that the workers were not as efficient or content as they might be. They would work for a bit then get up, go to the bathroom, go out. They worked from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. but did not get much done. The work was extremely boring. I thought music would help them concentrate and make it more difficult for them to talk to their neighbors. Putera refused. But at the start of 1984 they brought in a sound system and workers brought cassettes from home, and productivity increased.

15. A manager explained that the no-business rule is enshrined in the factory rule book (Peraturan Kerja Bersama) and exists in part to protect workers from being pressured to buy products sold by supervisors.

16. Some workers found the exercise routine an unwelcome interruption to pursuing quotas and were slow to stand or quick to resume their work during a seated portion of the routine. A supervisor made a point of demonstrating the correct routine in front of me one morning, wrinkling her nose sourly at my neighbors who had resumed rolling and “didn’t want to be healthy.”

17. The “three hands” philosophy and symbol—depicting three hands forming a triangle at the wrist and pointing in opposite directions—originally represented cooperative relations between manufacturers, traders, and consumers. Sampoerna (2022, 54) reformulated the philosophy in line with conventional stakeholder theory, explaining that the hands “represent key stakeholders that the Company must embrace to reach its vision and mission, namely Adult Consumers, Employees and Business Partners, and Society at Large.”

18. Exceptions would be made to this rule in the case of a new product launch or an attempt to dislodge a competitor product.

19. Sampoerna Hijau reduced its sponsorship of “hang-out places” in Jakarta from two hundred to fewer than seventy over three years. A Sampoerna Hijau-sponsored food stall owner on a busy road south of Malang said Sampoerna used to pay her 1,250,000 rupiah

a year then abruptly cut her payment to 250,000 rupiah. She vigorously protested, and the next day, Sampoerna brought her a television. The following year, she received 750,000 rupiah. She sold about 1.5 million rupiah in cigarettes a week and found A-Mild to be the most popular brand, especially among high school students.

3. MACHINE-ROLLING KRETEK: GAMIFICATION AND INDIVIDUALIZATION

1. The mud volcano buried sixteen villages and displaced over forty thousand residents. Scientists faulted oil and natural gas company Lapindo Brantas's careless drilling, but Lapindo blamed an earthquake 150 miles away and provided limited compensation to displaced victims. As part of the Bakrie Group, a family firm connected to wealthy businessman and powerful politician Aburizal Bakrie, who served at the time as welfare minister, Lapindo enjoyed government protection (Bubandt 2020; Friedlander and Wade 2018; Nuwer 2015).

2. In 2015, 8 percent of PMID's product went to Malaysia and 14 percent to other export destinations including the Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, East Timor, Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Fiji, Tonga, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire. Executing efficient brand changeovers is a paramount concern in the PMID plant—the target time for the process was thirty minutes—but less pressing on the Sampoerna side since it produced only three brands for a single market.

3. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, "Rotational Shiftwork," <https://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/ergonomics/shiftwrk.html>, accessed May 5, 2021.

4. Tobacco warehouse work is less physically brutal since tobacco is not lachrymatory and is stored in barcoded boxes that workers load and unload by forklift. Controls on hot temperatures designed to discourage the tobacco beetle also ensure more humane conditions for workers.

5. Workers can establish social or work kin relations under such challenging circumstances through alternative modes of communication and break-room interactions (Rolston 2014).

6. "Practical" is Sampoerna's translation of *ringkas*, which more conventionally refers to being brief and succinct. In Japanese, the five Ss are *seiri*, *seiton*, *seisu*, *seiketsu*, and *shitsuke*. A Sampoerna factory poster in English encouraged workers to focus on a different set of S words—"sort, systematize, sweep, standardization, self-discipline"—to be safe and avoid wasting time searching for things.

7. Prentice (2022, 43) discusses how key performance indicators became dominant evaluation tools in South Korea from the early 2000s onward but were disliked by human resources managers at the company he studied because they were subject to manipulation, did not necessarily reflect actual work, and were time consuming to develop and track.

8. A laminated page on the union office wall recorded its five core principles (*panca prasetya*): recognition of God; recognition of the national government ideology of Pancasila; recognition of the union; pledging to love their work and be honest, disciplined, and responsible; and pledging to pursue harmonious, dynamic, and just industrial relations.

9. After acquiring Sampoerna, PMI asserted control over kretek additives. According to Ishak, who oversaw kretek flavoring, before the PMI acquisition, Sampoerna had used a

range of US, UK, and German lists of allowed and banned chemicals to facilitate potential export. After the acquisition, Sampoerna took two years to reach full alignment and compliance with PMI guidelines on allowable substances and quantities. Ishak admitted that he often did not know the actual chemical composition of various flavors and additives Sampoerna uses because their suppliers wish to keep them secret. Each ingredient had to be approved by PMI's Product Regulatory Compliance (PRC) in Switzerland. "PRC tells us what we can use, in what quantity, and that's all. We don't even know what's in the kretek tip sweeteners, except in the case of *Dji Sam Soe* because we make the paper ourselves and apply the sweetener. . . . Often, PRC just tells us to stop using an ingredient, not why we should stop using it."

10. Sampoerna screened candidate test smokers on their ability to identify basic tastes (e.g., salt, sugar, citric acid), describe flavors based on smell (e.g., chocolate as dark, bitter, deliciously savory [*gurih*, akin to umami], creamy), and distinguish between different products (correctly identify which two out of three cigarettes are the same in four out of five product sets). More smokers pass than fail these tests. They are then trained to smoke in a standardized fashion, letting the first puff go, checking the second puff for aroma, and noting sensations such as harshness on the third puff.

11. The center also enrolled external, ad hoc smoker panels for product testing and engaged maintenance smokers to ensure consistent product taste. The center canvassed 125 A-Mild smokers, for example, every three months.

4. BRANDING KRETEK: INFLUENCE AND CREATIVITY IN THE GIG ECONOMY

1. The site is called the Pines and is part of the Sampoerna family's upscale Taman Dayu property development.

2. The A-Mild website goaheadpeople.com requires that users provide identification card numbers, an ostensible safeguard limiting promotional content to those over eighteen years of age and to Indonesian residents and smokers. Registrants are prompted to sign up for email or SMS promotions and updates and are encouraged, in exchange for full access to the website, "to update a personal profile, which includes selecting two favourite cigarette brands from a list of Sampoerna brands and disclosing at least one personal social media account" (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2018, 42). This personal information "enables more advanced understanding of consumer preferences, values and habits. Monitoring social media provides marketers with unequalled opportunity to understand customer values and predict future behaviour. By analysing social media big data, A brand marketers can develop highly personalized and customised communication with consumers" (Astuti, Assunta, and Freeman 2018, 47).

3. A-Motion supposedly contained a blend identical to A-Mild but in a shorter and cheaper cigarette, with the gimmick that when the smoker opens the cellophane wrap, a "surprise" pack color is revealed (bright blue, yellow, red, or black).

4. The brand-as-person trope also appears in the idea that a firm's "brand portfolio" constitutes a "family of brands." Sampoerna staff referred to brand extensions such as A-Motion and Avolution as A-Mild's younger siblings (*adik*). They had to be carefully brought into the world to ensure that they would not steal market share from their elder sibling (*kakak*).

5. Advertising ethnographies have also shown how agencies broker global/local and modern/traditional binaries and commodify racial, ethnic, linguistic, and gender difference as they represent and interpellate various demographics as model consuming subjects (Dávila 2001; Kemper 2001; Mazzarella 2003; Shankar 2015).

6. Bukan Basa Basi resembles R. J. Reynolds's Winston brand "No Bull" campaign, which was criticized for implying that the brand was additive free and carried fewer health risks than other cigarette brands (Schwartz 1997).

7. Nichter et al. (2009, 104) analyze how such advertisements "challenge the viewer to think critically" about rampant government corruption but also "encourage Indonesians to find levity in their predicament."

8. Prentice (2020) similarly analyzes how the Korean senior male manager has become a devalued, deviant figure of alterity, a negative presence and foil for young reform-minded managers.

9. One unobtrusive Sampoerna ad showed a young heterosexual couple from behind gazing back at the camera with the tagline *Mula-mula malu-malu, lama-lama mau* (Shy at first, desire grows with time). The ad implies that sexual experience is initially embarrassing but that over time, sexual desire grows, connoting, too, how one might hesitate to smoke at first but later graduate to desire. Controversy over the ad increased brand attention.

10. With the deregulation of media and recording industries in the 1990s, punk and death-metal genres flourished that rejected commercialism and embraced underclass identities that the Suharto government criminalized. As MTV Asia became available in the latter half of the decade, the "alternative" genre emerged and attracted more young, metropolitan, feminized fans who embraced aspirational consumerism, hedonism, and bourgeois identity (Baulch 2007).

11. According to Marko some of these nightclubs banned veiled women to "ensure the comfort" of regular patrons and veiled women alike.

12. Thoughts that passed through my head at these events and later made it into my fieldnotes included:

Thank god for Shahnaz and Fatma so I don't have to face this alone.

Is this like the third time in a row that I've worn the same red shirt to one of these things?

Am I the oldest person here?

Next time I've got to remember my ear plugs. Why didn't I just leave them in my purse?

I really wish they served alcoholic drinks here, clearly everyone could use some.

Eek, the MC is headed in this direction, quick, hide!! No, I'm an anthropologist, I have to seize this opportunity for the participant side of participant observation.

13. One MC spoke of how she had been "thinner and blonder" when she started working at the radio station. Another female MC was in the churn of fast fashion, constantly buying new outfits, documenting them on Instagram, and selling them lightly used.

14. Fatma joked about wearing a fake neck brace to prevent future headlocks. After the second headlock, we discussed self-defense strategies Fatma could use against Edy, and Shahnaz and I proposed coming to her aid more swiftly if it occurred again, which it did not.

5. SELLING KRETEK: CO-OPTING INDEPENDENT RETAIL

1. McDonnell (2010) shows how AIDS media in Ghana (billboards, posters, and vehicle stickers) lose their ostensible semiotic meaning, as well as their ability to reach target audiences, as weathering and public repurposing of advertisements erode the legibility of text and images and transit habits and hazards obscure ads from view. While similar vulnerabilities apply to cigarette ads, cigarette companies—unlike cash-strapped AIDS campaigners—can address them through prime and ubiquitous placement and frequent maintenance.

2. The tendency to focus on disconnect and breakdown may derive from Star's (1999) influential characterization of infrastructures as invisible before breakdown and from the spectacle of catastrophic infrastructural deterioration in the United States (e.g., Adams 2013).

3. While the shophouse is a common vernacular architectural building type in urban Southeast Asia, Kusno (2016, 52) argues that in Indonesia, it is associated with stereotypes of ethnic Chinese prioritizing economic interests and enacts "the bipolar identity of ethnic Chinese as commercial bourgeoisies (who engaged with the economy of the street) and racial minorities (living above ground as refugees from anti-Chinese violence)." Kusno analyzes how a succession of ruko styles reflect changing social, political, and economic conditions, from art deco rukos built in the 1930s to 1980s-era billboard rukos and the post-Suharto emergence of commercial enterprise and Islamic rukos.

4. Analyzing petty trade ventures in highland Sulawesi, Schrauwers (2004, 118–19) observes that from a business perspective, they appeared economically irrational due to their number, location, similar stock, long hours for marginal returns, and necessity of selling on credit. They make sense, however, within a context of surplus domestic labor and when viewed from the perspective of their proprietors as an integral part of a household budget rather than profit-seeking capitalist enterprises.

5. One Sampoerna manager explained this high market share with a cultural stereotype, claiming that Ambonese and other eastern islanders buy expensive cigarettes because they are highly image conscious, unlike the stereotypically frugal Javanese. Outside Java cigarette brand and budget ranges are also smaller, and on islands where prices for basic goods are inflated, cigarette prices can seem less exorbitant.

6. Personal communication, Sampoerna Malang sales and marketing office, December 2015.

7. Sampoerna managers told me Malang tripled its 2014 advertising tax rate, hiking cigarette advertisements by an additional 25 percent and charging 121,000 rupiah per meter per week in 2015. Rates are higher and even assessed on a daily basis in cities such as Surabaya and Jakarta, but elsewhere (e.g., Lombok), the local government does not tax such advertising.

8. There are over five hundred Circle K stores in Makassar (Sulawesi), Batam, and Bali and on Java in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya; Circle K Indonesia, "Mau punya franchise Circle K?," <https://circlekindo.com/franchise>, accessed September 5, 2023.

7-Eleven opened 190 stores in Jakarta but closed its Indonesian franchises in 2017 because they were insufficiently profitable; Reuters, "7-Eleven Indonesia—Where Popularity Wasn't Enough," June 30, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-seven-i-hldgs-indonesia/7-eleven-indonesia-where-popularity-wasnt-enough-idUSKBN19L1ZE>.

9. Paul Janelle, personal communication, March 2016.

10. Paul Janelle, personal communication, December 2015.

11. In theory, Sampoerna promotes identification checking among chain retailers through an initiative similar to the Philip Morris “We Card” program critiqued by Benson (2014, 223). I saw limited evidence of this program in action.

12. Alfamart’s engagement with traditional stores through renovations is discussed on their current website; see, Alfamart, “Pengembangan Sosial Kemasyarakatan,” <http://corporate.alfamartku.com/pengembangan-sosial-kemasyarakatan>, accessed September 5, 2023.

13. Euromonitor International (2023, 3) reported 3,935,238 retail outlets in Indonesia in 2022; 225,000 SRC shops would constitute 5.7 percent of this total.

14. These sunscreens escape taxation because they contain the company name—Sampoerna—but do not promote a specific branded product.

6. SMOKING KRETEK: INDUSTRY VICTIMS AND COMMODITY PATRIOTS

1. Boellstorff (2005) discusses how straight-presenting or “normal” men engage in same-sex sexual and romantic relations.

2. Cigarette companies have long marketed cigarettes directly and indirectly to women. The Marlboro brand was initially invented for this purpose, with early advertisements featuring chubby babies and children reminding mommy that she needed a cigarette. The long and slim styling of cigarettes was a marketing innovation of Philip Morris with Virginia Slims linking women’s smoking to feminist empowerment and liberation themes like voting rights, all the while reinforcing feminine norms of beauty and slenderness, alongside the infantilizing praise of the brand’s tagline, sung by a masculine voice, “You’ve come a long way, baby” (Toll and Ling 2005).

3. From a biomedical perspective, smoking impedes blood circulation and thus makes smokers more susceptible to cold hands and feet and to Buerger’s disease, which can lead to tissue death and infections that require amputation of digits.

4. Reed’s (2007) ethnographic account of cigarettes in a Papua New Guinea jail notes that prisoners, like wartime soldiers (Klein 1993), are defined by a state of waiting. Smoke became “king” in jail, focusing prisoners’ attention on gang sociality and membership, which was defined by tobacco sharing. A preoccupation with smoking shortened time, killed memory, and distracted prisoners from worries over the welfare of aging parents, spouses, and children.

5. Barker (1999, 108) discusses competing theories of why security guards (volunteer and paid) knock on poles in this fashion, which included signaling to residents and potential thieves that the security guard was actively patrolling, keeping residents from sleeping too deeply, and reminding them of their obligations to ensure their own security. In addition to these sonic reminders, the wafting scent of kretek smoke that often trailed behind security guards as they patrolled served as another indication of their presence and activity.

6. Graham (1987) found that low-income white British mothers caring for preschool children often used cigarette breaks as a self-directed activity to restore structure and emotional control when they were overwhelmed by the demands of caring-in-poverty. As a relatively low-cost luxury, cigarettes also helped mothers cope with other forms of self-denial and self-sacrifice, including limiting food consumption.

7. Although Dalits, higher castes, and Muslims passing cigarettes from one mouth to another represents a progressive suspension of caste ideas of pollution, Jeffrey (2010, 474) also notes a more reactionary reproduction of gender and class exclusions as young

men objectified passing women and distinguished themselves from “illiterates.” Considering food consumption in France, Bourdieu (1984, 176–80) contrasted bourgeois sobriety, concern with individual salvation, and a tendency to defer gratifications in a Benthamite calculation of present and future pleasures and pains, benefits and costs, with a more spontaneous working-class materialism and being-in-the-present or “temporal immanentism” that affirms collective solidarities and seizes rare satisfactions and good times because little was to be expected from the future.

8. Stefan’s distinction between normal smoking practices (filthy and inconsiderate) and his own (clean and responsible) is reminiscent of how the Japanese government, and partially government-owned Japan Tobacco, campaigned for “clean” smoking rather than against smoking (Gilman 2004).

9. Airport smoking areas are symbolically and experientially potent sites. With space at a premium, airports corral smokers together in a small space that fills with side-stream and exhaled smoke, which filters work to remove. Smoking areas, walled in transparent glass, convert smokers into a sort of human zoo exhibit, while those walled in more discreet frosted glass underscore smoking as a shameful act. In his smoking memoir, German author Hens (2016, 62) recalls feeling “repulsed and overjoyed” when one such “suffocation chamber” came into view as he was on a moving walkway in an airport.

10. Samporna’s advertising campaigns take up the theme of the cigarette as a friend or loyal companion (Sebayang et al. 2012). The odd and negative character of being alone in Indonesia is underscored by the query that solo individuals frequently hear: “Where’s your friend?” (*Mana teman?*). *Teman* covers broader semantic terrain than the English word *friend*, which typically indexes a non-relative with whom one shares a strongly positive and potentially intimate and durable relationship. *Teman* encompasses the latter, but it can also refer, for example, to one’s child at home with whom one performs chores or to a temporary companion or superficial acquaintance with whom one coexists in space and time, such as a new classmate toward whom one should extend hospitality (Shiraishi 1986).

11. A famous passage from Oscar Wilde’s *The Picture of Dorian Gray* describes cigarettes as “the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It is exquisite, and it leaves one unsatisfied. What more can one want?” Klein (1993, 45) remarks that cigarettes counter Freud’s pleasure principle, which

interprets pleasure on the model of need, the satisfaction of a desire results in the elimination of the desire. . . . Cigarettes, however, defy that economy of pleasure: they do not satisfy desire, they exasperate it. The more one yields to the excitation of smoking, the more deliciously, voluptuously, cruelly, and sweetly it awakens desire—it inflames what it presumes to extinguish. The perversity of this excitation consists in the fact that it never sleeps and is never extinguished; it is removed from the economy of utility in which the expenditure of energy can be calculated, according to an equation of profit and loss. Filling a lack hollows out an even greater lack that demands even more urgently to be filled.

The poet Théodore de Banville describes smoking as a “murderous pastime,” in which one gives “one’s life to a cruel, inextinguishable, and completely useless desire” (Klein 1993, 45).

12. Keane (2002, 121) observes that the medicalized “language of drug addiction is also routinely adopted in smokers’ self-presentations.” Analyzing a smoker’s narrative,

Keane points out that the “stubborn ordinariness of smoking and smokers undermines her attempts to inhabit the junkie persona” since “most smokers’ lives appear relatively autonomous, orderly, and productive” (123). The self-described junkie comes across as a normal, law-abiding, middle-class citizen who does her best by her family, work, friends, and community (125) and whose smoking lacks the “obviously life-disrupting and socially harmful consequences of other addictions” (127).

13. Jones (2004, 513) notes that the term *stres* “has become thoroughly localized into Indonesian vernacular through conveying the difficulty of urban, industrial, capitalist modes of living that are often contrasted with a perceived traditional past in which stres was less present.”

14. Cultural and gender ideals and ideologies around emotional control may be more associated with elites, often go unrealized in practice (Brenner 1995; Peletz 1994), are subject to challenge by new norms sanctioning emotional expression and violence in the context of political homophobia (Boellstorff 2004), and may lack salience in regions outside of Bali and Java (Just 1991).

15. Klein, who quit smoking in the course of writing *Cigarettes Are Sublime*, writes:

The pain of smoking is nothing compared to the enormous disquiet of having vowed to stop, a promise which smoking ‘the last cigarette’ nicely absolves. To stop, one *first* has to smoke the *last* cigarette, but the last one is yet another one. Stopping therefore means continuing to smoke. The whole paradox is here: Cigarettes are bad for me, therefore I will stop. Promising to stop creates enormous unease. I smoke the last cigarette as if I were fulfilling a vow. The vow is therefore fulfilled and the uneasiness it causes vanishes; hence the last cigarette allows me to smoke many others after that.

Klein quotes the protagonist of Italo Svevo’s novel *La coscienza di Zeno*:

I think that the cigarette has a more intense taste when it is the last. . . . The last one acquires its savor from the feeling of victory over oneself and the hope of a near future of strength and health. The others have their importance since lighting them up protests on behalf of the freedom to do what you want, and the future of strength and health does not go away, though it has moved a little further off. (1993, 98).

16. Ayo Sehat Kementerian Kesehatan RI, “Korban Dari Rokok Kanker Pita Suara,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1503N4bav8>; Komisi Nasional Pengendalian Tembakau, “Kisah Robby Penderita Kanker Laring Akibat Rokok,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXWjZC7Yvsc>, accessed September 6, 2023.

17. This bodily transformation lends itself to striking uses, including pictorial health warning labels to discourage smoking; Michael Moore’s “The Voice-Box Choir” Christmas caroling at tobacco company headquarters, CEO homes, and industry lobbyist offices (*The Awful Truth*, season 1, episode 3, 1999, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HciJF6rLBhI>, accessed September 6, 2023); and the scene of an artificially aged Andy Garcia smoking and exhaling through his tracheostomy in the Hollywood film *Dead Again* (Paramount Pictures, dir. Kenneth Branagh, 1991).

18. The interviews demanded emotionally taxing reflections on disease, suffering, disability, and death and could also be physically taxing for respondents with tracheotomies, lung cancer, and COPD. It could be difficult for interviewees to produce speech and for interviewers to understand what was said.

19. Kohrman (2007, 106) found that men suffering from tobacco-related diseases in China located the origins of their suffering in countless cigarette exchanges (*fayan*) that fostered the homosocial reciprocity that was integral to the pursuit of the good life. They resisted pinning blame on these masculine social intimacies, but their nostalgic and corporeal recollections of smoking also precluded their blaming “abstractions like government support for tobacco.” In the 2011 Current TV *Vanguard* (season 5, episode 2) documentary “Sex, Lies, and Cigarettes,” investigative journalist Christof Putzel visits lung cancer patients in a hospital ward. Their critical words (e.g., feelings of anger, critique of advertising) are translated, but when one answers a question about whether he was surprised to learn that smoking was bad for him by recollecting seeing people enjoy cigarettes, wanting to try, and finding them delicious (*enak*), his words go untranslated (<https://vimeo.com/130127962>).

20. Carr (2009) analyzes how people in drug treatment centers inhabit “the addict” identity and its associated scripts as a way to gain access to institutional resources in a process she calls anticipatory interpellation. Tobacco industry victims similarly receive honoraria from tobacco control groups in exchange for verbal and bodily testimonials to their suffering and the industry’s guilt, which affords them some minor income in the face of enormous expenses and lost employment opportunities.

21. My discussion of the victim/survivor binary draws on scholarship on cancer and domestic violence. The relentless optimism of positive thinking has particularly strong roots in the United States, but the embrace of battle metaphors and the celebration of survivorship has gained wider currency in global cancer culture (Ehrenreich 2009; Jain 2013, 30–33). This positivity resists critique and troublingly figures cancer death as failure and depression or anger as wrong emotions. Domestic violence scholarship shows how institutionally approved narratives and identities can mobilize but also constrain, creating possibilities for identification and action but also critically excluding those who did not fit with idealized victim or survivor narratives (Rothenberg 2002, 2003).

22. In a media analysis, Astuti and Freeman (2017, 5–6) recorded the following arguments among Indonesian tobacco regulation opponents (listed in order of frequency): decreasing government revenue, disadvantaging the tobacco industry, negatively impacting tobacco farmers and industry workers, succumbing to foreign interests and interference, eroding national regulation with local bylaws, harming music and sports through loss of tobacco sponsorship, harming Indonesian national heritage and identity, and harming related industries such as advertising.

23. Public health scholars estimate that Indonesia incurred economic losses near \$46 billion due to tobacco in 2015 (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, “The Toll of Tobacco in Indonesia,” <https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/problem/toll-global/asia/indonesia>, accessed February 9, 2021). This is based on estimated tobacco-related medical expenditures of 13.7 trillion rupiah, tobacco-related productivity losses of 374.1 trillion rupiah, and cigarette expenditures of 208.9 trillion rupiah.

EPILOGUE

1. Vitamin E acetate probably caused the severe lung damage; see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products,” https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html, accessed July 25, 2022.

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Indonesia is the world's second-largest cigarette market: two out of three men smoke, and clove-laced tobacco cigarettes called kretek make up 95 percent of the market. Each year, more than 250,000 Indonesians die of tobacco-related diseases. To account for the staggering success of this lethal industry, *Kretek Capitalism* examines how kretek manufacturers have adopted global tobacco technologies and enlisted Indonesians to labor on their behalf in fields and factories, at retail outlets and social gatherings, and online. The book charts how Sampoerna, a Philip Morris subsidiary, uses contracts, competitions, and gender, age, and class hierarchies to extract labor from workers, influencers, artists, students, retailers, and consumers. Critically engaging nationalist claims about the commodity's cultural heritage and the jobs it supports, Marina Welker shows how global capitalism has transformed both kretek and the labor required to make and promote it.

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