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Working Paper

Regional desired degree of autonomy

IU Discussion Papers - Business & Management, No. 12 (October 2024)

Provided in Cooperation with:

IU International University of Applied Sciences

Suggested Citation: Brandtjen, Roland (2024) : Regional desired degree of autonomy, IU Discussion Papers - Business & Management, No. 12 (October 2024), IU Internationale Hochschule, Erfurt

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<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/304402>

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Regional desired Degree of Autonomy

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IU Discussion Papers, Reihe: Wirtschaft, Vol. 4, No. 12 (OCT 2024)

ISSN-Nummer: 2750-0683

Website: <https://www.iu.de/forschung/publikationen/>

Regional desired Degree of Autonomy

Roland Brandtjen

ABSTRACT:

Mostly it is the politicians who became known at international level and in the media on the topic of regional desired degree of Autonomy. But what do the inhabitants of the regions want? Firstly it will be clarified what is meant by “region”. There was a choice between complete independence, more autonomy, maintaining the current status or less autonomy and more centralisation. In which regions do most survey participants choose which option and why? To answer them, data of the German Bundesländer, the Regions of France and Italy, the autonomous communities and cities of Spain, the British constituency countries and Cornwall, as well as Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Åland, the Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and Gibraltar.

This paper attempts to examine and fill a scientific gap on this topic by means of the comparison of economic data with results of adapted quantitative surveys. From 2019 and 2023, these surveys have been conducted in all mentioned regions. They are analysed by descriptive statistics. Correlation between regional language use and regional wealth, meaning of regional language use for the population and regional prosperity as well as the meaning of own unique culture for the regional population are calculated and interpreted.

The paper concludes with a Conclusion, the bibliography and an annex.

KEYWORDS:

European Regions, Independence, Autonomy, Centralisation, Quantitative Survey

AUTHOR



Prof. Dr Roland Brandtjen is professor at IU international University GmbH. As a European Studies scholar, his expertise lies in collective identities and their influence on politics. His focus is on the European integration process of regions of Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK, as well as all recognised micronations of Europe in relation to the concept of independence. He has studied and worked in Europe at home and abroad. He completed his doctorate at the RWTH in Aachen.

Introduction

There are many regions in Europe and the world that are known for their struggle for independence. Less is known about the regions that do not want statehood but are in favour of more autonomy. Almost nothing is known about regions that are satisfied with their current level of autonomy. Are there any regions that might even demand less autonomy and more centralisation?

Mostly it is the politicians who become known at international level and in the media on these issues. But these are individuals. What does the population of the individual region think about this? This paper attempts to find out what the participants in a survey conducted in 85 European regions – belonging to or affiliated with Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – think about this topic. What degree of autonomy do you they want for their regions? your region? The aim of this study is to provide a status of the desired degree of autonomy of the participants and to find a few possible explanations for the results. It does not promote a political concept.

The challenge with this question is the different ways in which a region's autonomy is currently organised. Therefore, the term region must first be explained. Then an attempt is made to present the 4 different degrees of autonomy and what they would theoretically mean for the region as a result. The methodology of data collection is then explained. Descriptive statistics was chosen as the data analysis method. The data is presented, correlated with the data from previous publications, and a conclusion is drawn. This paper concludes with the bibliography and the appendix including the survey questions in the respective languages of the regions.

Region – an unclear concept

Unfortunately, there is no universally agreed definition of a region. It is classified as a multidisciplinary concept because every scientific view and even each single country in Europe delineate regions themselves and often differently. (Tauras, 1997) Considering a very broad approach, a region corresponds to a coherent subunit, characterized by certain attributes, of an entire space. (Sinz, 1995; Schmidt M. G., 2010) The possibility of identifying a region as such depends on the approach of the area of which it is the subunit. Therefore, the classification into subnational or transnational units appears. (Dose, 2011)

Besides this, regions can be defined by the number of determined attributes. They can be either single feature or multiple feature regions, involving the description of one or more attributes to delineate them. (Schobben, 2004) Such attributes could be geographical, cultural, economic, political and/or social. This shows how easy it is to argue and fight about the concept of what is a region and what is not. (Dose, 2011) In the following, first the European definition and then the national definitions are presented.

EUROPEAN DEFINITION

Political actors have made several declarations over time about regions, which are not legally binding, but which help to understand the difficulty of this concept. The Council of Europe has defined a region as a human community in a territorial unit of a country. This community is united by historical, cultural, geographical or economic homogeneity or a combination of these. (Gerdes, 1999) The European Parliament declared regions as clear geographical territories – or a conjunction of them – with elements

which unite their respective citizens in a cultural, social and economic way including their will to strengthen and develop that region. (Föhn, 2003) And the Assembly of European Regions (2015) has stated that “[t]he term ‘Region’ covers in principle local authorities immediately below the level of central government, with a political power of representation embodied by an elected regional Assembly”.

Eurostat – the European Statistical Office – created in the 1970s the NUTS terminology (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) which divides all EU member states into statistical areas of three or more different levels with population as the main criterion – other criteria have generally been neglected. (European Union, 2003) Each member state is divided into NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions. According to its population size and its administrative system, a member state could consist of geographically concordant NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions. NUTS 0 matches the entire member states territory regardless of the population. (Eurostat, European Commission, 2012) Figure 1 shows the general population criteria to clarify the differences between the NUTS levels. Administrative subunits need to be composed of at least 3 million and a maximum of 7 million inhabitants to be ranked as NUTS 1. NUTS 2 areas are administrative subunits with from 800,000 to 3 million citizens. Finally, the population size of NUTS 3 subunits is between 150,000 and 800,000 people. (Eurostat, European Commission, 2012; 2011) From the beginning of the 1970s it was only used unofficially by Eurostat. However, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers incorporated the NUTS definition into regulation 1059/2003 (Brasche, 2008) even though this does not legally define the notion of a region.

This research understands a region as being an administrative subunit of a larger geographical area. In the upcoming chapter the different inner state definition will be explained.

Figure 1: General population criteria for NUTS (Eurostat, European Commission, 2012; 2011)

| Level | Minimum | Maximum |
|---------------|---------|---------|
| NUTS 1 | 3 mio | 7 mio |
| NUTS 2 | 800 000 | 3 mio |
| NUTS 3 | 150 000 | 800 000 |

DIFFERENT INNER STATE DEFINITION

The organisation of the different administrative regions, which in one way or another belong to Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, is very diverse. To clarify the differences between the regions, the concepts of a federal state, an (autonomous) region or community, constituent countries, crown dependencies and non-self-governing territories are used.

FEDERAL STATES

Federal states, such as in Germany, Austria, Mexico or Brazil, are separate states - with their own state institutions and constitutions as well as their own territory and population - that have voluntarily joined together in a federation and have transferred state competences to the federal level, which forms its own state. As they are separate states according to the 3-element theory, they also have the so-called

“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”; the competence to create competences. Theoretically it includes also the voluntarily withdrawal from the federal state. In the case of Germany, the federal German constitutional text states that federal law supersedes state law, although the competences and policy areas are clearly divided between the federal and state levels. The federal states therefore retain their sovereignty. In contrast, the states in a federation of states, such as the Commonwealth of Nations, do not transfer sovereignty to the federation. Modern approaches to international organization, however, seem to erode the clear distinction between both concepts by embracing certain attributes which lie outside the traditional conception of a classical federation of states. (Ipsen, 2004; Herdegen, 2006; Griller, 2005; Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Kunig, 2010; Hailbronner & Kau, 2010)

(AUTONOMOUS) REGIONS OR COMMUNITIES

The notion of an autonomous region is made up of two main considerations: a region and autonomy. Regions are subunits of a larger area. Autonomy, however, is explained indirectly by the ascription of sovereignty to a political system. In the sense of self-determination, autonomy describes the right of a political system to self-organization. According to international law, autonomy lies in the power to enact a binding decision of the public authority on its people throughout the state’s territory without any submissive relationship to an external authority. (Holtmann, 2000; Schmidt M. G., 2010) In other words, an autonomous region describes the population and its identity and where regional governments perform certain acts of self-governance. In this context, it is easy to recognise that autonomy can take different forms. Traditionally, however, autonomous regions are separated from federal states, as the federal states do not lose their autonomy, whereas autonomous regions do not. (Gruner & Woyke, 2007; Holtmann, 2000) Europe is full of examples of autonomous regions with different types of sovereign power: the Val d’Aosta in Italy, the Åland islands in Finland, Galicia in Spain, the Holy Mountain of Athos in Greece or Vojvodina in Serbia. (Gruner & Woyke, 2007; Ålands lagting, 2008; Vlada Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine, 2009; Mount Athos Infos . gr - Stelios Lageris, 2009)

France is made up of 5 different territorial authorities, each with its own defined powers; municipalities, departments, regions, *collectivities* with special status (merger of departments and regions) and overseas *collectivities*. France consists of 18 regions, of which 14 are normal regions and 4 are *collectivities* with special status: Corsica, French Guiana, Martinique and Mayotte. In general, regions consist of various departments, which in turn consist of municipalities. There is no legal vertical hierarchical connection between them, which means that regions are not above departments. The latter even have more powers than regions. Even if they have their own responsibilities, they mostly consist of executive legislation. Thus, the French regions have a very low degree of autonomy. (Grillmayer, 2016; Gruner & Woyke, 2007)

The regions in Italy are part of the Italian state and were created based on the Italian constitution. They are not all legally equal and have the same competences. There are regions with a normal statute and autonomous regions with a special statute. The respective statutes are also called regional constitutions but are not in the legal sense. They are regional laws that are subject to a referendum in the region and can be declared invalid by the Italian state via the Constitutional Court. The competences of the regions are defined in the Italian constitution. Normal statutes therefore only contain organisational provisions. Special statutes regulate competences in the areas of legislation and administration and the respective financial constitution. Legislation in the special area must be

financed by the region itself. Furthermore, regions with a special statute have the rights of a region with a normal statute. A special case is the Trentino-Alto Adige region, which has its own constitutional competences but consists of two autonomous provinces: Trentino and South Tyrol (Bolzano). The latter have each assumed the competences of the region and are therefore equal to other regions with a special statute. (Bergner, 2008; Ferrandi & Pallaver, 2007; Gruner & Woyke, 2007) Thus one can speak of autonomous regions for regions with a normal statute as well as regions with a special statute. All of them have a certain degree of autonomy, at least far more than French regions, and do not have statehood.

Spain, on the other hand, is divided into autonomous communities and autonomous cities. The Autonomous Communities are not constitutionally autonomous, as their statutes, and their amendments, require the approval of the Spanish Parliament as a whole, and therefore do not have statehood. Although their competences are laid down in the Spanish Constitution, each autonomous community is free to assume these competences. This leads to great inequality in the autonomy statutes. The autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla are not autonomous communities, as their autonomy statutes can be amended by the Spanish state without the involvement of their own parliaments and do not have legislative powers comparable to those of the autonomous communities. A special feature of the autonomous communities and cities is that in some of them there is more or less a sense of nationality associated with the region. Therefore, some regions have more autonomy than others for cultural, historical and social reasons. (Börzel, 2002; Moreno Fernández, 1997; Cortes Generales, 2011) The Val d'Aran (Aran Valley) plays a special role here. It is part of the autonomous region of Catalunya. Due to its own linguistic, cultural and historical peculiarities, Catalunya has transferred some of its legislative competences to the Val d'Aran by law and shared others. Thus, even though it is not recognised by the Spanish state, it is a special diminished form of autonomous community. (Brandtjen, The Valley and the Rock: Europeanized Separatism and Iberian Micro-Nations, 2021)

CONSTITUENT COUNTRIES

Constituent Countries are defined as any country that is a subdivision of a larger sovereign state. It is most often used in reference to the countries within the realm of the United Kingdom, of Denmark and of the Netherlands. Unlike federal countries, power between constituent countries may not be spread out evenly, with one of them usually holding the capital and government. (Cornago Prieto, 2013; Nijman, Muller, & de Blij, 2016) For this paper, only the constituent countries of the realm of Denmark and the UK are highlighted.

The UK consists of 4 constituent countries: England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The International Organisation for Standardisation refers to England, Scotland and Wales as "Countries", but Northern Ireland as a "Province". Their country code includes, as part of the UK, the UK prefix. (ISO, 2020; ISO/TC 46, 2022; ISO, 2015) The special position of the constituent countries is also reflected in the three different jurisdictions and decentralised parliaments. In the United Kingdom there are 3 jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Due to historical events, the separate Northern Ireland and Scottish jurisdictions were guaranteed when the United Kingdom was formed in its current form. They therefore have their own legal systems, histories and origins. Wales, on the other hand, does not have its own jurisdiction. English laws therefore apply to England and Wales together.

As a result of the devolution process in the United Kingdom, Wales has also been given legislative powers, although these must be in line with English legal doctrines. Welsh law also only applies in Wales. In addition, as part of the devolution process, each country except England has its own devolved parliament, all of which are subordinate to the parliament of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Westminster Parliament. The latter was created from the Parliament of England when the United Kingdom was founded. (Collier, 2001; Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003; White & Willock, 2007; Dickson, 2005; Slapper & Kelly, 2016; Ireland, 2015) Finally, the special status of Cornwall must be emphasised. It is not a constituent country in its own right but part of England. Cornwall currently has the status of a Unitary Authority, but with the Cornwall Devolution Deal of 2015 and 2023, some powers were transferred from the England to the Cornwall Council. Furthermore, there has long been a movement and a dispute over the constitutional status of Cornwall. This means that Cornwall, similar to the Val d'Aran, has a special diminished autonomous status in line with Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. (Department for Levelling up, Housing & Communities; Cornwall Council, 2023; Harnes, 2020)

The kingdom of Denmark consists of 3 parts, whose relationship to each other is called "the unity of the realm". These parts are the European Denmark, also called Denmark proper, and the 2 autonomous regions: the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Unlike the countries of the United Kingdom, the Faroe Islands and Greenland have their own country code without the Danish prefix and are therefore listed internationally as countries. (ISO/TC 46, 2011; 2018; ; ISO, 2015) The Faroe Islands have had a certain degree of autonomy within the Kingdom of Denmark since 1948 and Greenland since 1979. Over time, they have taken over more and more competences from the Danish state. This takeover is reflected in their own legislation in these areas and their financing. In return, the Danish government gives an annual subsidy to the Faroe Islands and Greenland to cover the costs of these policy areas. Both can mainly cover internal areas. Laws relating to relations with other states, or laws covering the whole Kingdom of Denmark, are not possible. The *Højesteret* (Supreme Court) in Copenhagen is also the supreme court for the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Defence policy also remains within the Kingdom of Denmark as a whole. Despite this restriction, the international importance of both autonomous regions has increased considerably. Due to their status as equal partners within the Kingdom, foreign policy is conducted in agreement with or with the authorisation of Denmark. Both regions therefore have either their own membership or associate member status in international organisations. (Sølvará, 2003; Kočí & Baar, 2021; Brandtjen, 2019; Cook, Faeroe Islands, 2001; Nannestad, 2004)

CROWN DEPENDENCIES

The Crown Dependencies of the British Crown are a speciality. These are the Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Bailiwick of Guernsey (the latter two are also known as the Channel Islands). Historically, political autonomy for the crown dependencies has never been granted through a specific legal act or ceremony. The Channel Islands are a relic of the duchy of Normandy and the Isle of Man is the relic of the Norwegian kingdom of the Hebrides with its lordship transferred to the English crown. Therefore, they have never legally belonged to the UK but rather to the British crown as so-called crown dependencies. (Göbel & Storkebaum, 1995; Cook, Channel Islands, 2001; Cook, Isle of Man, 2001) Very rarely Westminster laws are applicable to the crown dependencies but only after consultation with their authorities. The UK Government is solely for defence and international representation. The latter means that the UK will not act internationally on behalf of the Crown Dependencies without prior

consultation. The British monarch is head of state of the UK, some Commonwealth member states and of each crown dependency. Their sovereignty remains at the level of individual parliaments. However, most of the legislation of the Isle of Man or of each Bailiwick has to receive the approval of the “King in Council, in effect, the Privy Council in London. (Ministry of Justice (UK), 2011; Brandtjen, 2019; Brandtjen, The impact of Brexit on the identity of small British-European nations, 2022) The Crown Dependency thus represents a kind of historical precursor to a sovereign state. Its autonomy is far-reaching and yet limited to a certain extent.

NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Non-Self-Governing Territories are those “whose people have not yet attained full measure of self-government”. In 1946, the UN listed 74 territories of which 17 are still currently on that list. Today the administrative powers of those territories number just four: France, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. For international legal and political science, the status of Gibraltar is clear. The UN has declared Gibraltar to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The UK Parliament has, in the case of Gibraltar, theoretically, unlimited legislative power, which in practice it exercises only in areas reserved to the UK and not those devolved to Gibraltar without its consent (UK Parliament, 2019; United Nations, 2020; Pilkington, 2001). In 2006, Gibraltar held a referendum about whether to have a Gibraltarian constitution. The result was that 60.24% of the respondents voted for this constitutional text. However, this is not a constitution leading to full independence for Gibraltar. Great Britain remains with power over Gibraltar’s defence policy, foreign policy, internal security and general governance. Gibraltar became therefore “a self-governing community [...], at least as far as internal affairs are concerned.” (Gibraltar parliament, 2006; Archer, 2006) Due to Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, if Great Britain wishes to give up its sovereignty over Gibraltar, the UK has to offer this sovereignty to the Spanish crown first. Arguments over Gibraltar’s status varies on the party of interest; The Spanish government argues that by the Treaty of Utrecht, Gibraltar remains a British colony. The Gibraltarians argue they are not living in a British colony because almost all Spaniards left the territory after the occupation of the Rock in 1704. They moved to a city a few kilometres inside Spain, called San Roque. This makes the people of Gibraltar descendants of immigrating groups, from different places, mostly Great Britain. (del Valle Gálvez, 2013; Gold, 2005; Archer, 2006; Oda Ángel, 2019) This shows that even the extent of autonomy and the resulting status of a region can depend on international or intergovernmental assessments. Gibraltar has far-reaching autonomy, perhaps even more than the constituent countries or autonomous regions of Spain, Italy or France, but is not recognised as such internationally.

Degree of Autonomy – what does that include?

After explaining the different national structures, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the degree of autonomy. According to self-determination theory, a degree of autonomy is described as the subjectively perceived internal share of regulation. (Ryan & Deci, 2000) This paper focuses on the resulting extremes, complete independence and more centralisation or integration into the individual hegemonic state, and their intermediate stages, autonomy and current status.

INDEPENDENCE

To define full independence, the Three Elements theory is predominantly used in international law and international political science. It asserts that an independent state exists if it possesses all of the following three elements: national territory, people and state power. (Schmidt M. G., 2010; Wahl, 2005; Schmidt R. , 2008; Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Friese, 2011; Griller, 2005) In 1933, it was legally articulated at the Seventh International Conference of American States. The Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Montevideo states: “the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” (Yale Law School, 1933; Klieger, 2013) In this context, the convention added marketability to the conventional Three Elements theory. Considering the growing importance of international recognition – particularly through the UN system – it can almost be considered a fifth criterion. (Friese, 2011; Herdegen, 2006)

NATIONAL TERRITORY

National territory is defined and is distinguishable from other states. (Schmidt M. G., 2010) It embraces the airspace, the coastal and territorial waters in an adjoining zone of 12 nautical miles. (Herdegen, 2006; Schmidt R. , 2008) The territory does not need to be contiguous and includes all exclaves. It must be a natural part of a continental shelf. (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003) It is important for such geographical location to have a foundation built on a common legal order and at least the existence of an indisputable core area. Therefore, borders do not have to be defined, by for instance any international contract, but need to be consistent. These borders should be considered as restrictions of legal order rather than geographical limits. (Ipsen, 2004; Friese, 2011; Hailbronner & Kau, 2010; Griller, 2005) Concerning the size of a territory, there is no minimum requirement to fulfil this criterion. (Duursma, 1996)

THE CONSTITUENT PEOPLE

The constituent people are the totality of the people in a state bound by its legal powers. (Schmidt R. , 2008) The group needs to be connected under those legal powers on a continuous basis. “Continuing basis” means that the populace is able to persist. (Friese, 2011; Herdegen, 2006) Furthermore they need to possess an effective link to the state, even though characteristics like ethnicity, religion and language are not considered. (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Hailbronner & Kau, 2010; Griller, 2005) The pure aggregation of people under a common legal order is sufficient for the mentioned effective link. (Ipsen, 2004) Legally speaking this link is recognizable by official citizenship – but not necessarily a common sense of identity. (Hailbronner & Kau, 2010) Regarding the size of population, no minimum is imposed. (Duursma, 1996)

STATE POWER

State power is defined as the coercive power – enabled by its own legislation – of a state towards its citizens. (Schmidt M. G., 2010) The structure of the separation of powers into the executive, judiciary and legislature is only its organisational concept - in other words, democracies are characterised by a strict separation of powers. The more the power is divided, the more democratic the system. (Schmidt

R. , 2008) State power is apportioned differently: power over its citizens present within the state territory, but who can also be outside it (personal sovereignty), and territorial sovereignty, including exclusive legal power over citizens, foreigners and property on the state's territory. (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003) The key features of state power are sovereignty, legitimacy and marketability. (Friese, 2011; Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Hailbronner & Kau, 2010; Schmidt M. G., 2010; Schmidt R. , 2008; Hägel, 2006)

INNER AND OUTER SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty operates in two different directions: the inner and the outer. (Schmidt M. G., 2010; Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Chandler, 2010; Schmidt R. , 2008; Herdegen, 2006; Hägel, 2006) Inner sovereignty describes the independence to create and to administrate over one's own system, i.e. to create one's own constitutional text, or rule on internal matters. Outer sovereignty, on the other hand, stands for the power to act independently and autonomously on the international scene. (Chandler, 2010; Schmidt R. , 2008) In other words: "Sovereignty is he who decides on exceptions". (Kahn, 2011) The 'who' does not refer to one specific political institution, but might be represented by several according to multi-level governance. (Auel, 2011)

Focusing on the idea of inner sovereignty – particularly in democratic systems – this depends largely upon the political identity of the citizens. The establishment and legitimization of a government hinge on this collective identity (Henders, 2010) – which links the Three Elements theory to the concept of nations and nationalism. (Mandry, 2009; Henders, 2010)

Regarding outer sovereignty, the constitutive theory should be mentioned. This asserts that international recognition is essential for a state. This theory has not yet achieved full scientific acceptance because it does not take into account any other conditions; if all criteria of the Three Elements theory are fulfilled, there is no binding force for one state to recognize another one as such, (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003; Herdegen, 2006) even though to be a legitimate state or at least to obtain international legal personality it should be recognized by international actors – such as the EU. (Breuss, 2011)

MARKETABILITY

Marketability is often confused with outer sovereignty. Sovereignty is focused on independence or an autonomous power to act. Marketability, however, centres on the *ability* to act. It has already been mentioned regarding the convention of Montevideo and is not adequately defined. The question arises as to what extent the reasons for refraining from diplomatic relations, which are mainly based on limited resources, lead to the denial of statehood. Thus, it again becomes a question of independence and sufficient sovereignty. (Friese, 2011; Herdegen, 2006)

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is also often mixed up with inner sovereignty. According to the definition of statehood in the Three Elements theory, legitimacy is not important. (Herdegen, 2006) Inner sovereignty is the legitimization of establishing and maintaining a government. Legitimacy, however, identifies political identity with regard to a political action. Legitimacy is the acceptance by the people of any form of

governance. (Mandry, 2009; Henders, 2010) It represents, among other mechanisms, a way to create a political identity among citizens, which might happen thanks to a specific incident. (Nohlen, 2011) Therefore, legitimacy links the criterion 'people' with the criterion 'state power' and furthermore the Three Elements theory with a sense of identity felt by inhabitants.

AUTONOMY VS. STATUS QUO

In the sense of self-determination, autonomy describes the right of a political system to self-organization. According to international law, autonomy lies in the power to enact a binding decision of the public authority on its people throughout the state's territory without any submissive relationship to an external authority. (Holtmann, 2000; Schmidt M. G., 2010)

Sovereignty and autonomy – even though closely related – are not the same concept. Sovereignty represents a clear legal term. (Lorenzmeier & Rohde, 2003) National sovereignty can be lost by transferring it to international organizations. Autonomy, however, on the international scene stands for the ability to choose and follow particular courses of action and the will to face the consequences of decisions taken – for example, becoming part of the EU, and gaining certain commercial advantages by losing some sovereignty. (Goldmann, 2001)

Intrastate autonomy defines the ability and capacity of an institution or group to self-rule on their own legal relationships. The latter is mainly expressed for the purpose of protecting minorities. Minority territorial autonomy represents, first of all, the permission to engage in self-rule on cultural policies, so the minority identity is protected, although further internal and external policy-making rights may already have granted this autonomy. This kind of autonomy is not only an expression of ethnic separation but is also an organizational structure of intrastate cooperation and interdependence. (Henders, 2010; Holtmann, 2000) Depending on the national organisation, the degree of autonomy or other factors, i.e. depending on the historical circumstances, autonomous regions can therefore be named differently: an autonomous region, an autonomous country, a land, an autonomous government, a canton, an autonomous republic, etc. (Colomer, 2007) The origin or reasons for the creation of autonomous regions are numerous: times of constitutional rupture during – or as an outcome of – wars or regime change, the aftermath of peace talks or constitutional reforms or even by elections of a new parliament. (Henders, 2010)

As previously reported, the definition of the degree of autonomy is the subjectively perceived internal share of regulation. (Ryan & Deci, 2000) The term subjective is important here. Due to the different forms of autonomy already mentioned, the subjectively perceived autonomy can be lower than the actual status quo. Thus, more autonomy can be desired while rejecting full independence, even if more autonomy would in reality lead to full independence.

CENTRALISATION VS DECENTRALISATION

Centralisation is understood as the grouping of similar or identical tasks, competencies and responsibilities or of entire organisational units into a central office. This primarily includes planning, decision-making and control of strategies and policies. The opposite is decentralisation. Centralisation is always preceded by decentralisation, which is reversed. (Bleicher, 1980)

Decentralisation therefore refers to measures aimed at promoting subsidiarity within centralised and hierarchically organised states. Decentralisation takes place in 3 phases: administrative, executive and legislative decentralisation. Administrative decentralisation involves the transfer of administrative tasks to regional level, while decision-making powers remain at national level. At this stage, the regionally created levels are merely executive bodies of the responsible central ministries. In the case of executive decentralisation, parts of the administration are also transferred from the state to the sub-state level. The latter fulfils these tasks independently and is not an extended arm of a central institution. Finally, in the case of legislative decentralisation, the legislature at state level transfers legislative powers to a regional parliament. The centralisation process, on the other hand, runs in reverse. (Holtmann, 2000; Schmidt V. A., 2007; Schmidt M. G., 2010)

The advantage of centralisation is that the responsibilities and tasks within the central governing body are clearly defined, which makes decision-making very direct and clear. In addition, the central authority has a great "comprehensive interest" in the welfare of the state it governs, as it benefits from any increase in the wealth and/or power of the state. In this sense, the incentives of the state and the ruler are aligned. (Olson, 2013; Schmidt V. A., 2007; Holtmann, 2000) A disadvantage of centralisation is the risk that decisions may be misunderstood when passed on, as subordinate departments have no decision-making power, and an efficient and well-organised top department is required. In addition, delays in the transmission of work information can lead to administrative inefficiencies. Similarly, attention and support among departments or cities may not be balanced. This may lead to significant discrepancies in economic and information resources between the centre and other localities. This in turn may lead to exclusion of local and provincial level actors from the prevailing system of governance. This limits the ability of the central government to hold the authority accountable (with the risk of corruption), mediate disputes or design effective policies that require local knowledge and expertise. (Shleifer & Vishny, 2002; Sawyer, 2004)

For a region, centralisation therefore means a transfer of powers to the higher level. This of course contradicts the autonomy and independence movements.

Data and Method

The data reported here, were conducted in all regions (administrative regions such as federal states) in the states of France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as the autonomous territories of the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, the Faroe Islands, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Åland Islands, and Greenland. For this purpose, quantitative research was offered in the form of individualised quantitative online-based surveys in the respective languages of the regions. By means of virtual snowball sampling, these surveys were promoted via social media of Facebook and X (former: Twitter) and given to the population of the target group. For this purpose, relevant hashtags of the respective regions were set, regional media (e.g. TV Melilla in the Autonomous City of Melilla) were contacted and disseminated in region-related interest groups (e.g. FALE in Normandy or OSCEC in Extremadura).

This type of sampling serves to find participants in e.g., hard-to-reach groups of people. A person in such a group who participates in the survey gives the questionnaires to other people in their network or arranges participation in the survey. It can increase the representativeness of the results by the diffusion of the survey into the corresponding group of participants. (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004;

Atkinson & Flint, 2001) Challenges of a virtual snowball sampling might be the community bias, the lack of definite knowledge as to whether or not the sample is an accurate reading of the target population and that the target population might not always have access to the Internet. (Baltar & Brunet, 2012; Häder, 2006)

The surveys in the autonomous territories take place annually from January to March, in the European small states from February to March, in the UK from March to April, in Germany from May to June, in France from June to July, in Italy from July to August and in Spain from August to September. The surveys of the autonomous territories were launched in 2019. The Spanish polls were published for the first time in 2020. In the UK and Italy, the polls were launched in 2021 and in Germany and France in 2022. In 2023 the surveys of each small European state were started. They are totally anonymous and fulfil the requirements of the GDPR. All surveys were offered in the official state language as well as in co-official, recognised, regional and minority languages where possible. To avoid misunderstandings, the surveys were translated by official translators. Thus, it was offered in about 70 languages.

The transfer of the results to the population still needs to be clarified. Due to the subject matter and the nature of the sampling, there are more men than women among the participants in all regions. In all regions, on the other hand, very few (less than 1%) have indicated that they do not belong to the binary gender groups. The age groups between 30 and 49 are most strongly represented in all regions. Younger and older groups are underrepresented. On average, participants have at least vocational training or higher. academics are overrepresented. Only the income groups of all regions are evenly distributed.

The final challenge to the data is that a region is defined the same in all countries. Thus, a region is a federal state in Germany and an autonomous city or community in Spain. In the United Kingdom, however, the constituent countries and Cornwall (because of its cultural and historical distinctiveness) have been defined as regions. In Italy and France, on the other hand, regions are legally defined. Particularities such as the region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, which exists de jure but has relatively little de facto relevance for the population, have not been considered here. However, it is also confirmed that the regions in France were restructured in 2015. This reorganisation has come under great criticism from some of the participants.

The participants of the respective regions were asked which of the 4 basic options they were in favour of; complete independence of the respective region, more autonomy for the respective region (but in association with the current state), no change by maintaining the status quo or less independence and more centralisation in the respective current state. For the first two options, there were further selection variants modified by sub-regions in corresponding regions. For example, in the French region of Grand Est, it was not only possible to vote in favour of independence or more autonomy for this region, but also in favour of independence or more autonomy for Lorraine, Alsace or the Champagne-Ardenne region. For reasons of simplification and comparability, this article summarises the independence options of a region and its more autonomy options. No statement can therefore be made about the sub-regions and their desire for independence or more autonomy.

In order to find explanatory approaches for the results, these are correlated with the data from the publications on "(Minority-) Language as an economic factor for prosperity?" and "Europe vs EU -What extent does their synonymy have?" (Brandtjen, 2024; 2024) More specifically, it states that the data relate to the regional economic level, the number of languages spoken in the region, the reported

language use, the average scores on European identity, the image of the EU and the importance of the regional language and regional culture.

The individual Data of each year in each region can be found in the annex.

DESIRED DEGREE OF AUTONOMY

At the beginning of the data analysis, an overview of the average most desired option in all regions is shown graphically in Figure 2. Participants from 49 regions favoured the option for more autonomy on average over the years. On average, however, participants from 21 regions were in favour of maintaining the current autonomy status. This therefore represents the second most widespread desire for autonomy. Only 10 regions favoured complete independence. Most participants from only 5 regions wanted less autonomy and more centralisation over the course of the year. This degree of autonomy is therefore the least represented preference, but also shows the existence of this preference.




Figure 2: Majority choices / Average results of Data from 2019 - 2023 (own interpretation)

Participants from the regions of Bavaria, Catalonia, Sardinia, the Faroe Islands, the Balearic Islands, Navarre, Scotland, Euskadi (the Basque Country), Wales, and Sicily favoured full independence for their region on average. This means that none of the French regions, only one in 16 of the German federal states and one of the autonomous European micronations, but 2 out of 20 Italian regions, 2 out of 5 regions in the United Kingdom and even 4 out of 19 Spanish regions have this wish. Spanish regions are therefore overrepresented.

On the other hand, the majority of Calabria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Campania, Molise and Saxony-Anhalt want less autonomy and more centralisation. It is striking that only German federal states and Italian regions favour this degree of autonomy on average.

Most participants from 11 of the 16 German federal states, 4 of the 18 French regions, 5 of the 20 Italian regions and only one Spanish autonomous community favoured the current status. German federal

states are clearly overrepresented here. On the other hand, the majority of the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, the northern Italian regions, the autonomous European micro-nations, England, Cornwall and Northern Ireland, as well as the majority of the French regions are in favour of more autonomy.

A closer look shows the average results of each option. Figure 3 shows the percentage averages for choosing full independence. According to this, only 3 regions show more than 50% support for statehood: Catalonia with an average of 76.25%, Scotland with an average of 65.98% and Sardinia with an average of 51.02% of participants. 18 other regions show an average of more than 25% approval for this level of autonomy. The Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta with an average of 1.08% and Melilla with an average of 0.33% have the least approval.




Figure 3: I am in Favour of full independence / Average results of Data from 2019 - 2023 (own interpretation)

Bavaria leads the list of German federal states with an average of 27.56% of participants in favour. Lower Saxony shows the least approval with an average of 4.68% of participants. Among the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, Catalonia leads with 76.96% and Euskadi with 48.96% of participants. Ceuta and Melilla are at the bottom of the list. Corsica leads the French regions with an average of 33.32% and Brittany with an average of 24.6% of participants. The regions with the lowest average support for statehood in France are La Réunion with 2.57% and Centre-Val de Loire with 2.82%. In Italy, an average of 51.02% of Sardinian and 37.14% of Trentino-South Tyrolean participants want their respective regions to be independent. Molise with an average of 2.25% and Umbria with an average of 2.41% of participants support full independence for their region. In the United Kingdom, support for full independence is shown as follows: Scotland with an average of 65.98%, Wales with an average of 46.73%, Cornwall with an average of 24.17%, England with an average of 13.62% and Northern Ireland with an average of 9.11% of participants. Among the European autonomous micro-nations, 6 out of 8 show an average of at least 28.7% and a maximum of 49.98% of participants support

statehood. Only Gibraltar with an average of 14.71% and Åland with an average of 12.12% of participants show a low level of support for full independence.

It is striking that each state has at least one region with a relatively high level of support for statehood, albeit to varying degrees. The average results for this desired degree of autonomy are not surprising in regions with prominent independence movements, such as Catalonia, Scotland, Corsica or Sardinia. Results from other regions, such as Bavaria, Andalusia, the Valencian Community, the Balearic Islands and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, are surprisingly strong. It may be an indication that even if there are no strong independence movements in these regions, it is an acceptable option for the population. It is also striking that regions that are geographically outside the European continent are very much in favour of complete independence. One possible, but speculative, explanation may be their awareness of the consequences of statehood. Financial and political support from the European Union as well as from their respective states would be lost in a turbulent world. Gibraltar is a special case, as there is little support for independence in the survey due to the conflicts with Spain, although the desire for this is quite high. (Brandtjen, 2021) Finally, it is also noticeable that the German federal states, which have a relatively high degree of autonomy compared to the other regions, and the French regions, which have a relatively low degree of autonomy compared to the other regions, are on average less in favour of complete regional independence.

A closer look at the average results of the desire for more autonomy is shown in Figure 4. According to this, 14 regions have more than an average of 50% of participants with this wish. In contrast, 76 of 85 regions show an average support for this with more than an average of 25% of participants. The highest level of support is in French Guiana with an average of 63.54% and in Northern Ireland with 62.06%. On average, the fewest participants chose more autonomy for their region in Catalonia with 13.4% and Scotland with 7.26%.




Figure 4: I am in Favour of more autonomy / Average results of the Data from 2019 -2023 (own interpretation)

In 10 of 16 German federal states, more than an average of 25% of participants want more autonomy. Saxony has the most supporters with 32.12% and Baden-Württemberg with 31.08% of participants. Hesse with an average of 19.12% and Berlin with an average of 20.42%, on the other hand, show the least support among participants. Among the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, only Euskadi with an average of 24.19% and Catalonia with an average of 13.4% of participants show less than 25% support. The greatest support for more autonomy is in Castilla y León with an average of 56.39% and Ceuta with an average of 55.61% of participants. Asturias also has an average of 50.02%, with more than half of the participants in favour. In contrast, all French regions show an average of more than 25% of participants with a preference for more autonomy. This preference is lowest in the Île-de-France region with an average of 29.66% and Centre-Val de Loire with an average of 33.22% of participants. The desire for more autonomy appears to be greatest in French Guiana with an average of 63.54% and Guadeloupe with an average of 57.42% of participants. Overall, 8 out of 18 French regions show an average of more than 50% of participants in favour of more autonomy. In contrast, not one of the Italian regions shows an average of 50% or more of participants in favour. The regions of Veneto and Emilia-Romagna have the largest proportion of supporters, with an average of 49.5% and an average of 48.55% respectively. In contrast, the lowest proportion of those in favour of more autonomy can be seen in Lazio with an average of 22.05% and in Umbria with an average of 25.08%. Apart from Scotland with an average of 7.26%, all other regions in the United Kingdom have an average of more than 25%: Northern Ireland with an average of 62.06%, Cornwall with an average of 53.73%, England with an average of 39.18% and Wales with an average of 25.09% of participants. Finally, in the group of European autonomous micro-nations, the lowest average proportion of those in favour is in the Faroe Islands at 32.47%. This proportion is highest on average in Åland with 58.33% and in Gibraltar with 49.4%.

Overall, the desire for more autonomy for one's own region is very clear. The European autonomous micro-nations and the regions that are geographically located outside Europe are particularly conspicuous. On average, they have the largest proportion of participants calling for more autonomy. Once again, this seems to be an argument in favour of awareness of the consequences of complete independence. However, this remains speculative. When looking at the more centralised states, it is noticeable that the hegemonic regions tend to be less pronounced than their neighbouring regions. Similarly, the regions with prominent independence movements, Catalonia, Euskadi and Scotland, show a very low desire for more autonomy. In the case of Catalonia and Euskadi, this is due to the high distribution of option shares. In both cases, the desire for more autonomy remains in 2nd place. This is not the case in Scotland. One speculative explanation for this would be that the desire for complete independence is opposed to the desire for less autonomy here.

A closer look at the average results regarding the desire to maintain the current status in Figure 5 shows that only the German federal states and French regions are among the top 10 regions with the most supporters. Île-de-France with an average of 54.76%, the Centre-Val de Loire with an average of 53.19% and Lower Saxony with an average of 52.13% of participants have the highest number of supporters. This proportion is lowest in Catalonia with an average of 3.99% and in Galicia with an average of 6.77%.

Among the German federal states, the average percentage of participants in favour is always above 25%. Bavaria represents the federal state with the lowest percentage, with an average of 25.26%. Lower Saxony is the leader with 52.13%. Among the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, there are

only 3 that have an average of more than 25% of participants supporting the current status: the Comunidad de Madrid with an average of 34.39%, Melilla with an average of 27.43% and La Rioja with an average of 27.35%. Catalonia has the lowest percentage with an average of 3.99% and Galicia with an average of 6.77% of participants. Similar to the German federal states, the percentage of participants in favour of the current status is high in the French regions. 13 out of 18 regions have an average percentage of more than 25%. As already mentioned, the top regions are Île-de-France with an average of 54.76% and Centre-Val de Loire with an average of 53.19%. The bottom of the list in France is Corsica with an average of 12.38% and Brittany with an average of 16.2%. 8 of the 20 Italian regions have a support rate of over 25%. Lazio with an average of 38.88% and Umbria with an average of 38.08% of their participants lead the Italian regions in terms of support for the current status. Sardinia with an average of 7.54% and Veneto with an average of 8.48% of their participants have the lowest share in this case. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, only England has an average share of more than 25% of participants in favour of the current status, namely 27.23%. Cornwall with an average of 17.77% and Northern Ireland with an average of 10.96% form the middle field. The proportion is lowest in Scotland with an average of 8.25% and Wales with an average of 8.11%. Finally, it is striking that among the European autonomous micro-nations only the British Crown Dependencies have an average proportion of their participants in favour of the current status of more than 25%: Bailiwick of Jersey with an average of 27.9%, Bailiwick of Guernsey with an average of 25.7% and the Isle of Man with an average of 25.13%. This proportion is lowest among the autonomous parts of the Danish Kingdom with an average of 15.75% of participants in the Faroe Islands and with an average of 18.34% in Greenland.




Figure 5: I am in Favour of maintaining the status quo / Average results of the Data from 2019 - 2023 (own interpretation)

Similar to previous degrees of autonomy, it is noticeable here that on average the hegemonic regions, if present, have a higher proportion of participants in favour of the current status than their neighbouring countries. In Germany, France and central Italy in particular, the current status does not

appear to be perceived as negatively. In 11 of 16 German federal states, in 4 of 18 French regions, in 5 of 20 Italian regions and in the autonomous community of Madrid, this degree of autonomy takes first place among their participants. Among the regions that are not geographically located in Europe, there is disagreement on this point. It seems that for many island regions, northern and southern Italy, most of Spain and the European micro-nations and all regions of the United Kingdom, except England, the current status is not satisfactory for the participants or other degrees of autonomy are favoured. The reasons for this are very different in the regions. One speculative reason for Brittany and the Grand Est region could be dissatisfaction with the regional reform of 2015. In the United Kingdom, this could be a sign of England's hegemonic position. Note the fact that England does not have its own devolved parliament and yet has greater approval of the current situation.

Figure 6 presents a closer look at the average results on the desire for less autonomy and more centralisation for the own region. The highest level of agreement was in Molise with an average of 50.82% and in Calabria with an average of 39.82% of participants in favour. In total, there were 25 regions out of the 85 surveyed that had an average approval rating of more than 25%. 10 of these are Italian regions, 10 are German federal states and 5 are Spanish autonomous communities and cities. The lowest percentage of approval among their participants is in Corsica with an average of 1.84%, in Brittany with an average of 2.02% and in the Faroe Islands with an average of 2.24%. Similarly, 25 of the 85 regions surveyed have an average approval rate of less autonomy and more centralisation among their participants of less than 10%. These include 12 French regions, 4 Italian regions, the Crown Dependencies, Aland and the Faroe Islands, 3 Spanish autonomous communities and Cornwall.




Figure 6: I am in Favour of more centralization and less autonomy / Average results of the Data from 2019 - 2023 (own interpretation)

Of the 10 German federal states with an average of more than 25% of participants in favour of less autonomy and more centralisation, Saxony-Anhalt and Berlin are the frontrunners with an average of 37.31% and 36.03% respectively. It is striking that, with the exception of Mecklenburg-Western

Pomerania, all East German states are among these 10 regions. The lowest proportion of participants in favour is in Baden-Württemberg with an average of 17.27% and Schleswig-Holstein with an average of 17.98%. Among the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, Melilla tops the list with an average of 34.9% and the Autonomous Community of Madrid with an average of 29.78% of their participants. At the bottom of the list are Galicia with an average of 4.07% and Catalonia with 5.53% of their participants who are in favour of less autonomy and more centralization. The French regions, on the other hand, show less support on average. The region with the highest proportion of supporters among its participants is Mayotte with an average of 20% and Martinique with an average of 18.62%. In addition to the already mentioned low results in Corsica and Brittany, Normandy also has relatively few participants with a preference for less autonomy and more centralization with an average of 3.38%. In Italy, the regions with the highest support are Molise and Calabria, as already mentioned. Likewise, there are 4 Italian regions that have an average of less than 10% approval among their participants: Veneto with an average of 9.14%, Sardinia with an average of 6.66%, Friuli-Venezia Giulia with an average of 6.54% and Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol with an average of 4.64%. In the United Kingdom, Wales, the British territory with an overall support for full independence, leads the list with an average of 20%, closely followed by England with an average of 19.9%. Scotland with an average of 18.5% and Northern Ireland with an average of 17.57% of their participants form the middle field. Finally, Cornwall shows the least support for less autonomy and more centralization with an average of 4.29%. When looking at the European autonomous micro-nations, Gibraltar with an average of 16.32% and Greenland with an average of 11.61% show the highest level of support among their participants. The Crown Dependencies, Isle of Man with an average of 5.44%, the Bailiwick of Jersey with an average of 5.31% and the Bailiwick of Guernsey with an average of 2.68%, and the Faroe Islands with an average of 2.24% of their participants support less autonomy and more centralization the least.

The results in France are striking. It almost seems as if the low autonomy of the regions in a centralised state like France leads the participants to a very low proportion of less autonomy and more centralisation. However, this is only a speculative assumption. The results of the federal states, especially those in eastern Germany, are also surprising. With their history of political centralisation and sometimes nostalgic memories, the participants' desire for less autonomy and more centralisation could lead to this. This is also a purely speculative attempt at an explanation.

Finally, Figure 7 shows the sum of the average results for the desire for full independence and more autonomy. Over the years, the majority of participants favoured at least more autonomy up to full independence, i.e. 69.41% (59 out of 85 regions) of all regions surveyed. In the calculated combination of more autonomy and full independence, participants from 50 of the 85 regions surveyed were on average overwhelmingly in favour of one of the two options. Catalonia tops the list with an average of 90.36% of participants in favour. The combination of the two options is least favoured in Lazio with an average of 24.63%.

In Germany, the combination is most favoured in Bavaria with 53.94% of respondents in favour. The values are lowest in Berlin with a combined 25.16% and Lower Saxony with 25.55% combined approval. The average combined approval rating in Germany is 35.21%. Among the Spanish autonomous communities and cities, the combined average is 63.21%. This is partly due to the fact that 15 of the 19 regions have combined values of full independence and more autonomy of over 50%. Only in Castilla la Mancha, with 46.81%, Region de Murcia, with combined 46.39%, in Melilla, with 37.48%, and the

Comunidad de Madrid, with combined 35.58%, is this combination in the minority. Even among the French regions, these combined results are above 50% in the majority of regions (12 out of 18). The highest combined support is in Corsica, with 85.33%, and Brittany, with 81.42%. The regions with the lowest combined scores are Centre-Val de Loire, with 36.04%, and Île-de-France, with 33.59%. On average, the combined vote in favour of full independence and more autonomy in France is 58.19%. In comparison, the Italian regions show an average of 51.51% combined support for full independence or more autonomy. The leaders in Italy are Sardinia with 85.84% and Veneto with 82.41%. 10 out of 20 Italian regions have a combined score of more than 50%. The lowest combined approval rating is in Lazio. In contrast, all of the UK regions surveyed have a combined support for full independence and more autonomy of more than 50%. Their average is 69.39%. Cornwall, with 77.9%, Scotland, with 73.25%, Wales, with 71.82% and Northern Ireland with 71.17% show very high combined values here. The lowest combined support for statehood or increased autonomy is in England at 52.8%, which is still quite high. However, the average combined approval is highest among the autonomous European micro-nations at 70.52%. The lowest combined figure is in Gibraltar at 64.11%. The Faroe Islands, on the other hand, are the frontrunner in this group with a combined approval rating of 82.45%.




Figure 7: Full Independence and More Autonomy summed up / Average results of Data from 2019 - 2023 (own interpretation)

In general, it appears that all regions except Germany, central Italy and the hegemonic regions favour at least more autonomy. Nevertheless, it is also evident that in all regions, albeit in small numbers, there are groups in favour of statehood and less autonomy. Reasons for this can only be given speculatively and would have to be analysed in more detail.

EXPLANATORY APPROACHES:

This section provides general explanations for the overall results. It should be noted that the process of developing a desire for a certain degree of autonomy is very complex and cannot be answered

conclusively. Under this condition, this chapter only considers the correlations with results and averages already presented in previous publications. For reasons of simplification, a more detailed analysis of the grouping according to state affiliation is not carried out. All data correspond to the average values for the years 2019 to 2023. The selected correlations to the desired degree of autonomy are the degree of prosperity, the number of languages, the daily use of regional languages and dialects, the symbolic power of one's own regional language, the symbolic power of one's own regional culture, the degree of European identity and finally the image of the EU.

Figure 8 shows the scatter diagram, the trend line and the measure of determination in the correlation between the degree of prosperity and the desired degree of autonomy. There is a weak positive correlation between the results for the desired complete independence (of +0.21203324) and the results for maintaining the status quo (of +0.154943551) and the degree of prosperity. In contrast, there is a weak negative correlation between the desire for more autonomy and the level of prosperity, with an R value of -0.246830892, and between the desire for less autonomy and more centralisation, with an R value of -0.208460102. This means that participants in a more prosperous region would like either complete independence or more centralisation. The poorer a region is, the more likely participants are to want more autonomy or more centralization. The correlations are slightly higher for the desire for complete independence or for more autonomy. Thus, the level of prosperity influences the desired level of autonomy. However, it is generally not easy to predict exactly what level of autonomy is desired.




Figure 8: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of Degree of Prosperity vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

If we look at the number of languages in the regions, the highest value is 5 for the sake of simplicity and means that at least 5 languages are spoken in a region. One language means that only the hegemonic language or the official language is registered in the region. With this restriction, Figure 9 shows the respective scatter diagram, trend lines and determinants of the number of languages for the respective desired degree of autonomy. In relation to the number of languages, R values of +0.230134841 are

shown for the desire for complete independence and +0.20240198 for the desire for more autonomy, each of which corresponds to a weak positive correlation. In contrast, weak negative correlations are shown for the desired retention of the current status and the desire for more centralization, with respective R values of -0.269970147 and -0.250221498. In general, it can be said that the more languages are spoken in a region, the more likely the participants are to want at least more autonomy or even complete independence. The desire for no change or for less autonomy and more centralization appears more likely among the participants when fewer different languages are spoken in a region.




Figure 9: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of Number of Languages vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

The number of languages is more of a linguistic consideration. A more social consideration, on the other hand, is shown in the information on regional language or dialect use. It should be mentioned that in some region's dialects are also viewed as independent languages by the population, even if this is not the case from a linguistic point of view. Figure 10 shows the scatter diagrams, trend lines and determination measures in the relationship between the stated daily use of regional languages and dialects and the desired degree of autonomy. There is a strong positive correlation between the desire for complete independence and linguistic use, with an R value of +0.588635766. The more a participant uses a regional language or dialect on a daily basis, the more likely it is that this participant supports complete independence for the respective region. There is an equally strong, albeit negative, correlation between linguistic use and the desire to maintain the current status, with an R value of -0.535967019. This means that it is very likely that a participant will support the current status if he or she uses the regional language peculiarities less. There is also a connection between language use and the desire for more centralization with an R value of -0.286673447, i.e. a weak negative correlation. This means that the desire for more centralization and less autonomy is slightly more likely if participants use the regional language peculiarities less on a daily basis. In contrast, the correlation between language use and the desire for more autonomy with an R value of +0.021040211 (rounded +0.0) shows

virtually no or only a minimal connection. The desire for more autonomy therefore appears to be barely influenced by the daily use of a regional language or dialect.



Figure 10: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of stated daily Use of regional Languages or Dialects vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

Even if the use of regional linguistic peculiarities has an influence on the desired level of autonomy, it is questionable to what extent these linguistic peculiarities relate to the regions themselves. Therefore, Figure 11 shows the scatter diagrams, trend lines and measures of determination of the relationships between the desired level of autonomy and one's own language as an important regional symbol. The desire for complete independence has a strong positive correlation with the linguistic regional symbol with an R value of +0.654257586. If participants therefore see their own language as an important symbol of identification for the region, the stated desire for complete independence is very likely to increase. There are weak negative correlations with the linguistic symbolic power on the one hand for the desire for more autonomy with an R value of -0.17048525 and on the other hand for the desire for less autonomy and more centralization with an R value of -0.281131215. In contrast, there is a moderate negative correlation with the desire to maintain the current status with an R-value of -0.433446959. One could say that the less the linguistic peculiarities have a regional symbolic power for the participants, the more likely it is that they would desire a degree of autonomy other than independence, with the current status being favoured most strongly, albeit moderately. It seems that language in particular has a great importance for the desire for complete independence in general.



Figure 11: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of Own Regional Language as most important regional symbol vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

Language is often seen as part of the concept of culture. It is therefore important to compare the data on the regional symbolic power of one's own regional culture with the desired degree of autonomy. Figure 12 therefore shows the scatter diagrams, trend lines and coefficients of determination for these data values. It is noticeable that relationships show a weak correlation. The desire for complete independence or for more autonomy in connection with the regional symbolic power of one's own culture shows almost no or very weak correlations, with respective R values of -0.018518117 and $+0.04940123$. This would mean that the desire for independence hardly or very slightly decreases if one's own regional culture has more symbolic power. In contrast, the desire for more autonomy would hardly or very slightly increase if one's own regional culture has more symbolic power. There is a weak correlation with the desire to maintain the status quo with an R value of -0.194422947 , which means that the stronger the symbolic power of one's own regional culture, the less the desire to maintain the current status. On the other hand, the weak correlation with the desire for less autonomy and more centralization is positive with an R value of $+0.1990486302$. The more one's own culture is perceived as an important regional symbol, the greater the desire for more centralization.



Figure 12: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of Own Regional Culture as most important regional symbol vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

If we move from the regional perspective to the supranational level, the first thing to do is to compare the desired degree of autonomy with the stated European identity. Figure 13 shows the scatter plots, trend lines and determinants of these values. There is a moderately positive correlation between European identity and the desire for less autonomy and more centralization with an R value of +0.383769938. This means that the more participants in a region identify themselves as European, the higher the desired level of autonomy. All other levels of autonomy have a weak negative correlation with European identity. The desire for full independence has an R value of -0.048726592, the desire for more autonomy -0.249699615 and the desire to maintain the current status has an R value of -0.039345774. Since these values are very low for maintaining the status and complete independence, it can hardly be assumed that there is a connection here. With regard to the R-value of the desire for more autonomy, however, one can assume that the more participants in a region identify themselves as European, the lower the desire for more autonomy for that region.



Figure 13: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of stated European identity vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

Finally, Figure 14 shows the scatter plots, trend lines and determinants of the image of the EU in comparison to the desired level of autonomy. The R value in relation to the desire for less autonomy and more centralization shows a weak positive correlation of +0.297522308. This means that the more participants in a region identify the EU as something positive, the greater the desire for more centralization. The situation is different for the other options for the level of autonomy; they all show a weak negative correlation. The R values in relation to complete independence at -0.046624892 and in relation to more autonomy at -0.066168195 are so low that there is hardly any or only a very slight negative correlation. The R value in relation to the desire to maintain the current status at -0.142908974 is somewhat clearer. It states that the more participants in a region see the EU as something positive, the less desire there is to maintain the current status. Not surprisingly, the correlations with the image of the EU are quite similar to those with European identity. After all, the associated article showed that the values correlated positively (see (Brandtjen, Europe vs. EU - What extent does their synonymy have?, 2024)).




Figure 14: Scatter Plots, Trend lines and Measures of Determination of stated European identity vs. desired Degree of Autonomy (own interpretation according to (Brandtjen, 2024))

Conclusion

This study shows the results in 85 European regions regarding the desired degree of autonomy. The very term "region" is complex and not uniformly defined. Broadly understood, a region is a sub-unit of a larger whole. At European level, the NUTS classification is used for the definition. However, at national level, the legally defined spectrum of a region is quite broad, ranging from federal states to (autonomous) regions, crown dependencies, autonomous communities and constituent countries. What they have in common is that they are not fully independent under international law, even if the respective autonomy is quite differently endowed. fully independent means that they are a state according to the 3-element theory, with a territory, a people and (internal and external) sovereignty. The latter is often limited. Thus, most regions have a kind of autonomy. This term means that one is given a kind of legal decision-making power. This is usually demanded and granted in cultural matters. As part of a decentralisation process, more autonomy and thus decision-making power is transferred from the higher level to the regions. The opposite process would be centralisation.

The data presented here was obtained through online-based surveys between 2019-2023. For reasons of simplification, mean values were formed and any individual options for degrees of autonomy were summarised in 4 groups: desire for complete independence, desire for more autonomy, desire to maintain the current status and desire for less autonomy and more centralisation.

The data showed that there was an average number of participants in favour of each of these options in each region. The main findings were that in 10 regions the majority wanted full independence, in 49 regions the majority wanted more autonomy, in 21 regions the majority wanted the status quo and in 5 regions the majority wanted less autonomy and more centralisation. A majority does not necessarily

mean an absolute majority, but at least a simple majority. The desire for complete independence was not surprising in the regions known for it (Catalonia, Scotland, the Basque Country, Sardinia and Sicily). The majority support for statehood among the participants from Bavaria, Wales and Navarre, on the other hand, was not expected. Likewise, the relatively high values, although not majority, in Andalusia, Val d'Aosta, Cantabria, the Valencian Community and the Balearic Islands were difficult to predict from the literature.

In the majority of regions, the desire for more autonomy is winning. Even in regions with a different majority preference, this desire has also received relatively high approval. This is clear in all regions of the United Kingdom, Spain, France, northern Italy, southern and eastern Germany, and all European autonomous micro-nations. In the regions of Catalonia, Scotland, and the Basque Country, which are known for their independence movements, support for more autonomy was relatively low.

Most respondents were in favour of the current status of the northern German states, central Italy and central France (in a strip from Normandy to Burgundy-Franche-Comté). There were relatively high levels of approval among participants from all French regions and all German federal states. If one compares the relatively low level of autonomy of the French regions with the relatively high level of autonomy of the German states, the relatively similar results in favour of maintaining the current status of autonomy are surprising. There is also a difference between the hegemonic regions of a state and its periphery. In centralist states in particular, the current status appears to be more desirable in the hegemonic regions.

Combining the results regarding the desire for more autonomy and complete independence, one can see a clear result in all regions. Germany as well as the hegemonic regions of France, Spain and Italy and south-central Italy have a tendency to maintain the current status or more centralization. All others, especially regions in the United Kingdom and the European autonomous micro-nations, at least want more autonomy.

If one correlates the data on the desired degree of autonomy with the prosperity scale, the number of languages in a region, the indicated use of regional languages and dialects, the symbolic power of regional languages and dialects as well as regional culture, the extent of European identity and the image of the EU, some small explanatory approaches emerge.

Participants in a more prosperous region would like either complete independence or more centralisation. The poorer a region is, the more likely participants are to want more autonomy or more centralization. The correlations are slightly higher for the desire for complete independence or for more autonomy. Thus, the level of prosperity influences the desired level of autonomy. However, it is generally not easy to predict exactly what level of autonomy is desired.

In general, it can be said that the more languages are spoken in a region, the more likely the participants are to want at least more autonomy or even complete independence. The desire for no change or for less autonomy and more centralization appears more likely among the participants when fewer different languages are spoken in a region. The more a participant uses a regional language or dialect on a daily basis, the more likely it is that this participant supports complete independence for the respective region. In contrast, it is very likely that a participant will support the current status if he or

she uses the regional linguistic characteristics less. The desire for more centralisation and less autonomy is somewhat more likely if the participants use the regional linguistic characteristics less in everyday life. Finally, the desire for more autonomy therefore appears to be barely influenced by the daily use of a regional language or dialect

If the participants see their own language as an important symbol of identification for the region, it is very likely that the declared desire for complete independence will increase. The less the linguistic peculiarities have a regional symbolic power for the participants, the more likely it is that they would desire a degree of autonomy other than independence, with the current status being favoured most strongly, albeit moderately

The desire for independence hardly or very slightly decreases if one's own regional culture has more symbolic power. In contrast, the desire for more autonomy would hardly or very slightly increase if one's own regional culture has more symbolic power. It also shows that the stronger the symbolic power of one's own regional culture, the less desire there is to maintain the current status. On the other hand, it became clear that the more one's own culture is perceived as an important regional symbol, the greater the desire for more centralisation.

A comparison with the results on European identity shows that the more participants in a region identify themselves as European, the higher the desired level of autonomy. It also shows that the more participants in a region identify themselves as European, the lower the desire for more autonomy for that region.

The correlations between the desired degree of autonomy and the image of the EU do not differ greatly from the correlations with European identity. This is not surprising, as the associated article has shown that the values correlate positively. The result shows that the more participants in a region see the EU as something positive, the greater the desire for more centralisation. Similarly, the more participants in a region see the EU as something positive, the lower the desire to maintain the current status.

As with all research, these results are not conclusive statements due to the great complexity of opinion-forming on the subject. The data must also be considered in light of the research limitations. Due to the data collection methodology, the representativeness is not conclusively clarified. Online-based surveys could attract participants with more interest in the research topic, which could bias the results in a particular direction. In relation to the contexts of the other data, no national differentiation is found and therefore only shows a general picture. This could be differentiated upon closer examination.

It is clear that more research and differentiated considerations are necessary if one wants to explain exactly how the results came about.

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Annex:

I AM IN FAVOUR OF ...

QUESTION AND ANSWER ITEMS IN EACH LANGUAGE

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| ALBANIAN | Unë jam ... | pro pavarësisë së plotë | për më shumë autonomi | ... pro ruajtjes së status quo-së | ... për më pak autonomi dhe më shumë centralizim |
| ALSATIAN | Ëch bìn fer... | d'total Ùnàbhàngichkei t | meh Äutonomie | bliwe wie's ìsch | wennjer Äutonomie ùn meh Zantràlisierung |
| ARAGONESE | Soi a favor de ... | plena independenzia | más autonomía | mantenendo ro status quo | menos autonomía y más zentralizaziòn |
| ARANESE | Sò a favor de ... | plea independència | mès autonomia | en tot mantier eth status quo | mens autonomia e mès centralizaciòn |
| ARPETAN | Je su por ... | la plèna endèpendence | més d'òtonomie | maintenir lo statut quo | muens d'òtonomie et mès de centralisacion |
| ASTURIAN | Toi a favor de ... | independencia dafechu | más autonomía | caltener el status quo | menos autonomía y más centralisaciòn |
| BALEAR CATALAN | Estic a favor de... | sa plena independència | més autonomia | mantenir s'estat quo | menys autonomia i més centralització |
| BARESE | Sun a faveur de... | La libbertà totale | Cchiù autonomia | Mantènere u status quo | Meno autonomia e cchiù centralizaziune |
| BASQUE | Babesten dut... | erabateko independetzia | autonomia gehiago | status quo-ari eustea | autonomia gutxiago eta zentralizazio gehiago |
| BOURGIGNON | J'sus en faveur d... | la frène indépance | pùs d'âtonomie | garder l'biscuit comme ya djà | moìns d'âtonomie é pus d'centralisation |

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|
| BRETON | Me zo a-du gant ... | an dizalc’hiezh penn-da-benn | muioc’h a emrenerezh | derc’hel d’ar stad zo | nebeutoc’h a emrenerezh ha muioc’h a greizennañ |
| CASTILLIAN (SPANISH) | Estoy a favor de ... | plena independencia | más autonomía | manteniendo el status quo | menos autonomía y más centralización |
| CATALAN | Estic a favor de... | la plena independència | més autonomia | mantenir l'statu quo | menys autonomia i més centralització |
| CORNISH | Yth ov vy rag ... | nserghogeth leun | moy a omrewl | gwitha an status quo | le a omrewl ha moy a gresennans |
| CORSICAN | Sò per ... | a piena indipendenza | più autonomia | mantene u statu quo | menu autunumia è più centralisazione |
| CROATIAN | Ja sam za ... | puna neovisnost | veća autonomija | zadržati status quo | manje autonomije i više centralizacije |
| DANISH | Jeg går ind for ... | fuldstændige uafhængighed | mere autonomi | Beholdelse af status quo | Mindre autonomi og mere centralisation |
| DORIC SCOTS | I am in favour o... | the full independence | mair autonomy | keepin the status quo | less autonomy an mair centralization |
| DUTCH | Ik ben voor... | de volledige onafhankelijkheid | meer autonomie | behoud van de status quo | minder autonomie en meer centralisatie |
| EMILIAN | Sò a fàvor de ... | la pèna indipendèza | Pi autonomia | Maintèn lò status quo | Men autonomia e pi centràlisaziùn |
| ENGLISH | I am in favour of ... | the full independence | more autonomy | keeping the status quo | less autonomy and more centralization |
| EONAVIAN | Tou a favor de... | independencia dafeito | máis autonomía | manter el status quo | menos autonomía y más centralización |
| EXTRE-MADURIAN | Estó a favol de... | endependencia prena | mas autonomía | mantuviendu el status quo | menos autonomía i más centramientu |

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|---|---|---|
| FAETANO / CELLESE | Me s'é d'accòrde pe... | la 'ndepennénze | mé de autunumì | mantenije lu "status quo" | mé púue de autónómije |
| FALA | Estou a favor de... | plena independencia | mais autonomia | mantendu o status quo | menus autonomía y mais centralizaciõ |
| FAROESE | Eg eri fyri ... | fult sjálvræði | Meira sjálvræði | Varðveita verandi støðu | Minni sjálvræði og meira sameining |
| FINNISH | Kannatan... | täyttä itsenäisyyttä | itsehallinnon lisäämistä | nykytilanteen säilyttämistä | vähemmän itsehallintoa ja enemmän integroitumista |
| FRENCH | Je suis pour ... | la pleine indépendance | plus d'autonomie | maintenir le statut quo | moins d'autonomie et plus de centralisation |
| FRIULIAN | O soi a pro di ... | la indipendence plene | plui autonomie | mantignì il status quo | mancul autonomie e plui centralizazion |
| GALICIAN | Estou a favor de ... | plena independencia | máis autonomía | manter a situación actual | menos autonomía e máis centralización |
| GALLO LANGUAGE | Je ses pour : | qe ... seje a son pain gagnant | qe ... come ole ét mézè seraet aotonome | qe 'la resteraet coment qe c'ét astoure | meins d'aonomie e pus fôt de mitanizézon |
| GALLO-ITALIC OF SICILY | Suogn favorevole a ... | la indipendenza cumpleta | chjù autonomia | dascer li causi cam son ara | chjù pach autonomi e chjussei centralizzazione |
| GALLURESE | Socu in faóri di ... | la piena indippindènzia | più autonomia | mantinè lu status quo | di mancu autonomia e più centralizzazioni |
| GERMAN | Ich bin für ... | die volle Unabhängigkeit | mehr Autonomie | das Beibehalten des Status Quo | weniger Autonomie und mehr Zentralisierung |
| GREEK | Είμαι υπέρ της ... | πλήρης ανεξαρτησία | περισσότερη αυτονομία | διατήρηση του status quo | λιγότερη αυτονομία και περισσότερο συγκεντρωτισμό |

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| GREENLANDIC | Salliuttippar a ... | kalaallit nunaanni kiffaanngissuse qarluinnarneq | kalaallit nunaanni naalakkersui soqarneruler neq | attassiinnarneq status quo-kkunnik | nammineq naalakkersuisoqarneq annikinnerusoq aammalu qallunaanut ilaanerulerneq |
| GUERNSEY NORMAN FRENCH | J'sis pour .. | entchière indépendance | pus d'libertaï | Gardaï l'affaire coume alle est | Mouoïns d'libertaï et pus d'entrêge |
| IRISH | Táim i bhfabhar... | neamhspleáchas iomlán | níos mó neamhspleáchais | an status quo a choinneáil | á mé i bhfabhar níos lú neamhspleáchais agus níos mó láraithe |
| ITALIAN | Sono a favore di ... | la piena indipendenza | più autonomia | mantenere lo status quo | meno autonomia e più centralizzazione |
| LADIN | lö sun por... | l'independènza plëna | na majera autonomia | mantigní le status quo | de manco autonomia y deplü zentralisaziun |
| LIGURIAN | Son à favô de... | a piña independensa | ciù autonomia | mantegnî a scituaçion comm'a l'é oua | meno autonomia e ciù çentralizzaçion |
| LOMBARD | Sont in favor de... | la piena indipendenza | plussee autonomia | mantegnir el status quo | men autonomia e plussee centralizazion |
| LORRAIN | Je seus po... | l'indèpendance complète | pus' d'autonomie | maint'ni lo status quo | Moins d'autonomie et pus' de centralisâtion |
| LORRAINE FRANCONIAN | Ich sénn for... | de voll Unabhängigkeet | meh Autonomie | de Statu Quo behalen | chjù pach autonomi e chjussei centralizzazione |
| LOW SAXON (LOW GERMAN) | Ik bün för... | de vulle Unafhangigheid | mehr Autonomie | den Status Quo bibehollen | minner Autonomie un mehr Zentralisatschoon |

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| LOWER SORBIAN | Som za ... | potnu njewótwisnosť | wěcej awtonomije | wobchowanje statusa Quo | mjenjej awtonomije a wěcej centralizacije |
| LUXEM-BOURGISH | Ech si fir ... | déi voll Onofhängegkeet | méi Autonomie | de Status Quo behalen | manner Autonomie a méi Zentraliséierung |
| MANX GAELIC | Ta mee ayns foayr jeh ... | slane seyrsnys | Tooilley hene-reill | freayll y status quo | hene-reill sloo as co-chorpaghey smoo |
| MÒCHENO | I pin oa'ne ver... | s volle selberstea' | mearer autonomi | lòng òlls abia as ist | minder autonomi ont mear centralisazion |
| NEAPOLITAN | Dico sì a... | 'a ll' indipennenza | Cchiù llibertà | mantenno 'e ccose comme stanno | cchiù ppoca libbertà e cchiù pputere centrale |
| NORMAN FRENCH | Je sies pour... | la pllene désahoqu-aunche | pus d'âtonoumîn | mantenin le statut quo | mens d'âtonoumîn et pus de chentralisatioun |
| NORTH FRISIAN | Ik san för ... | at fol ünufhingighaid | muar autoonoomii | at behualen faan a status quo. | muar autoonoomii un maner Tsentraalsiaring. |
| OCCITAN | Soi en favor de ... | plea independéncia | mai autonomia | en mantenent lo status quo | mens autonomia e mai centralisación |
| PICARD | J' sus pour... | l'indépindince intièrre | puque d'autonomie | tout laicher comme ch'est | moinsse d'autonomie et puque de cintralisation |
| PIEMONTESE | Mi i son d'acòrdi con... | la pien-a indipendensa | pì d'autonomia | manten-e ël status quo | meno autonomia e pì ëd centralisassion |
| POITEVIN-SAINTONGEAIS | I sé pr ... | la plléne émancipaciun | màe d'émancipaciun | ménteni den l'état actuàu | moén d'émancipaciun é màe de ragrouajhe |
| PORTUGUESE | Sou a favor de ... | total independência | mais autonomia | manutenção do status quo | menos autonomia e mais centralização |

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| RÉUNION CREOLE FRENCH | Mwin lé pou... | in lindépendanse total | in plüs gran lotonomi | rèste konm i lé | dimünié lotonomi, ogmante la santralizasyon |
| ROMAGNOL | A so a favòur da . . . | la gônfa indipendenza | più autonomia | mantnì lo status quo | minùura autonomia e più centralizaziùn |
| SARDINIAN | Sunt in favore de ... | sa prena indipendèntzia | prus autonomia | mantènnere su status quo | prus pagu autonomia e prus centralizzazione |
| SATERLAND FRISIAN | lek bän foar ... | ju fulle Uunouhongeg-aid | moor Autonomie | aal so läite, as dät is | minner Autonomie un moor Säntrualisierenge |
| SCOTS | Ah am supportin o ... | the fu independence | mair autonomie | keepin the wey things are | less autonomie an mair centralisation |
| SCOTTISH GAELIC | Táim i bhfabhar... | làn neo-eisimeileachd | barrachd neo-eisimeileachd | a 'cumail an status quo | nas lugha de neo-eisimeileachd agus barrachd meadhanachadh |
| SICILIAN | Sugnu a favuri di... | a nnipennenza china | chiù autonomia | teniri u statu quo | menu autonomia e chiù centralizzazzioni |
| SLOVENE | Zavzemam se za ... | popolna neodvisnost | več avtonomije | ohraniti status quo | manj avtonomije in več centralizacije |
| SWEDISH | Jag är för ... | fullständiga självständighet | mer självstyre | att behålla status quo | mindre självstyre och mer integration |
| TABARCHINO | Sun à favù de... | a piña indipendensa | ciü autunumìa | mantegnù u "status quo" | ménu autunumìa e ciü centralizasiun |
| ULSTER SCOTS | I am supportin o ... | the fu independence | mair autonomie | keepin the wey things are | less autonomie an mair centralisation |
| UPPER SORBIAN | Sym za ... | potnu njewotwisnosć | wjace awtonomije | to dale wjesć statusa quo | mjenje awtonomiju a wjace Zentralisierung |
| VALENCIAN | Estic a favor de... | plena independència | més autonomia | mantenir l'estatu quo | menys autonomia i més centralització |

| LANGUAGE | I AM IN FAVOUR OF ... | FULL INDEPENDENCE | MORE AUTONOMY | STATUS QUO | LESS AUTONOMY |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--|
| VENETIAN | A son favorévote a ... | ła piena indipendensa | pì autonomia | mantenjer el status quo | manco autonomia e pì sentralizacion |
| WALSER GERMAN (FORMAZZA) | Äs getmär göt... | di gantz Friiheit | mee Autonomi | der Statu quo phaltä | ménner Autonomi un mee Tschentralizatjoo |
| WALSER GERMAN (ISSIME) | Bin d’ackuart mit ... | la piena indipendenza | più autonomia | mantenere lo status quo | meno autonomia e più centralizzazione |
| WELSH | Rwyf o blaid ... | annibyniaeth lawn | mwy o ymreolaeth | cadw'r status quo | llai o ymreolaeth a mwy o ganoli |

DATA – I AM IN FAVOUR OF FULL INDEPENDENCE

| FULL INDEPENDENCE | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ABRUZZO | 3,9% | | | 4,9% | 3,7% | 3,2% |
| ALAND | 12,1% | | | 13,3% | 10,4% | 12,7% |
| ANDALUCIA | 13,1% | | 10,4% | 17,3% | 13,3% | 11% |
| ARAGON | 20,8% | | 15,5% | 26,5% | 19,3% | 21,8% |
| ASTURIAS | 19,7% | | 14,4% | 24,8% | 16,8% | 22,6% |
| AUVERGNE-RHÔNE-ALPES | 9,4% | | | | 9,2% | 9,5% |
| BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG | 8,5% | | | | 7,6% | 9,5% |
| BASILICATA | 6,5% | | | 5,6% | 7,2% | 6,7% |
| BAYERN | 27,6% | | | | 29,1% | 26,1% |
| BERLIN | 4,7% | | | | 3,6% | 5,9% |
| BOURGOGNE-FRANCHE-COMTÉ | 10,9% | | | | 9,8% | 11,9% |
| BRANDENBURG | 7,9% | | | | 11,6% | 4,2% |
| BREMEN | 4,7% | | | | 5,3% | 4,2% |
| BRETAGNE | 24,6% | | | | 24,2% | 25,0% |
| CALABRIA | 16,0% | | | 6,6% | 4,0% | 37,4% |
| CAMPANIA | 9,8% | | | 10,3% | 6,7% | 12,4% |
| CANTABRIA | 12,9% | | 8,5% | 15,2% | 7,2% | 20,7% |
| CASTILLA LA MANCHA | 4,6% | | 4,2% | 5,2% | 6,8% | 2,3% |
| CASTILLA Y LEON | 11,1% | | 6,9% | 13,8% | 11,7% | 12,1% |
| CATALUNYA | 77,0% | | 77,9% | 74,2% | 71,4% | 84,3% |
| CENTRE-VAL DE LOIRE | 2,8% | | | | 2,6% | 3,0% |
| CEUTA | 1,1% | | 1,7% | 2,6% | 0,0% | 0,0% |
| COMUNIDAD DE MADRID | 6,5% | | 5,7% | 4,6% | 6,9% | 8,7% |
| COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA | 34,5% | | 35,0% | 40,5% | 30,7% | 31,7% |
| CORNWALL | 24,2% | | | 26,5% | 20,0% | 26,0% |
| CORSE | 33,3% | | | | 33,3% | 33,3% |
| EMILIA-ROMAGNA | 7,5% | | | 8,6% | 5,6% | 8,4% |
| ENGLAND | 13,6% | | | 15,3% | 13,6% | 12,0% |
| EUSKADI | 49,0% | | 6,9% | 60,1% | 61,8% | 67,0% |
| EXTREMADURA | 8,0% | | 7,2% | 8,4% | 5,2% | 11,1% |
| FAROE ISLANDS | 50,0% | 46,4% | 42,2% | 52,7% | 52,3% | 56,3% |

| FULL INDEPENDENCE | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA | 27,4% | | | 31,1% | 22,5% | 28,5% |
| GALICIA | 42,4% | | 40,4% | 52,1% | 37,8% | 39,4% |
| GIBRALTAR | 14,7% | 11,1% | 11,9% | 17,1% | 12,9% | 20,5% |
| GRAND EST | 20,3% | | | | 25,8% | 14,9% |
| GREENLAND | 28,7% | | | 18,0% | 29,9% | 38,2% |
| GUADELOUPE | 10,7% | | | | 10,3% | 11,1% |
| GUERNSEY | 35,1% | | | 34,2% | 43,9% | 27,2% |
| GUYANE | 8,5% | | | | 5,1% | 11,9% |
| HAMBURG | 5,0% | | | | 6,7% | 3,3% |
| HAUTS-DE-FRANCE | 11,9% | | | | 9,3% | 14,6% |
| HESSEN | 7,2% | | | | 7,6% | 6,8% |
| ÎLE-DE-FRANCE | 3,9% | | | | 4,1% | 3,8% |
| ISLAS BALEARES | 41,5% | | 42,7% | 39,3% | 42,3% | 41,6% |
| ISLAS CANARIAS | 23,8% | | 19,3% | 29,5% | 24,3% | 22,1% |
| ISLE OF MAN | 33,0% | 36,6% | 34,2% | 36,0% | 29,2% | 28,9% |
| JERSEY | 32,7% | | | 35,2% | 29,3% | 33,6% |
| LA RÉUNION | 2,6% | | | | 2,8% | 2,3% |
| LA RIOJA | 5,2% | | 5,7% | 6,0% | 8,9% | 0,0% |
| LAZIO | 2,6% | | | 4,2% | 0,9% | 2,6% |
| LIGURIA | 11,3% | | | 11,5% | 9,1% | 13,3% |
| LOMBARDIA | 22,1% | | | 18,3% | 21,1% | 26,9% |
| MARCHE | 2,8% | | | 2,3% | 2,7% | 3,4% |
| MARTINIQUE | 6,8% | | | | 6,9% | 6,7% |
| MAYOTTE | 9,1% | | | | 4,0% | 14,3% |
| MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN | 16,6% | | | | 20,7% | 12,5% |
| MELILLA | 0,3% | | 1,3% | 0,0% | 0,0% | 0,0% |
| MOLISE | 2,3% | | | 2,1% | 3,1% | 1,6% |
| NAVARRA | 40,9% | | 40,2% | 50,2% | 37,0% | 36,1% |
| NIEDERSACHSEN | 4,7% | | | | 5,5% | 3,9% |
| NORDRHEIN-WESTPHALEN | 5,3% | | | | 5,6% | 5,1% |
| NORMANDIE | 4,5% | | | | 7,5% | 1,5% |
| NORTHERN IRELAND | 9,1% | | | 8,9% | 11,5% | 6,9% |
| NOUVELLE-AQUITAINE | 13,2% | | | | 13,6% | 12,8% |

| FULL INDEPENDENCE | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| OCCITANIE | 15,2% | | | | 20,4% | 10,0% |
| PAYS DE LA LOIRE | 10,9% | | | | 8,7% | 13,0% |
| PIEMONTE | 12,0% | | | 9,9% | 11,8% | 14,2% |
| PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D'AZUR | 12,4% | | | | 11,7% | 13,2% |
| PUGLIA | 3,8% | | | 2,9% | 3,0% | 5,6% |
| REGION DE MURCIA | 6,6% | | 5,3% | 4,1% | 6,4% | 10,5% |
| RHEINLAND-PFALZ | 14,2% | | | | 18,6% | 9,9% |
| SAARLAND | 13,9% | | | | 8,2% | 19,7% |
| SACHSEN | 13,7% | | | | 14,8% | 12,7% |
| SACHSEN-ANHALT | 5,5% | | | | 4,2% | 6,8% |
| SARDINIA | 51,0% | | | 49,7% | 47,9% | 55,5% |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | 6,9% | | | | 8,3% | 5,5% |
| SCOTLAND | 66,0% | | | 60,9% | 66,2% | 70,8% |
| SICILIA | 36,8% | | | 36,4% | 35,3% | 38,8% |
| THÜRINGEN | 8,5% | | | | 6,3% | 10,8% |
| TOSCANA | 8,7% | | | 8,6% | 10,4% | 7,1% |
| TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE | 37,1% | | | 38,2% | 32,0% | 41,2% |
| UMBRIA | 2,4% | | | 3,4% | 2,5% | 1,3% |
| VAL D'AOSTA | 26,4% | | | 24,3% | 24,6% | 30,3% |
| VENETO | 32,9% | | | 34,9% | 29,7% | 34,1% |
| WALES | 46,7% | | | 54,7% | 47,7% | 37,8% |

DATA – I AM IN FAVOUR OF MORE AUTONOMY

| MORE AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-----------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ABRUZZO | 29,4% | | | 22,5% | 31,4% | 34,4% |
| ALAND | 58,3% | | | 57,0% | 60,4% | 57,6% |
| ANDALUCIA | 43,8% | | 45,2% | 41,2% | 42,4% | 46% |
| ARAGON | 48,1% | | 52,2% | 46,6% | 42,7% | 51,0% |
| ASTURIAS | 50,0% | | 50,5% | 48,4% | 48,4% | 52,8% |
| AUVERGNE-RHÔNE-ALPES | 50,7% | | | | 53,7% | 47,6% |
| BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG | 31,1% | | | | 33,7% | 28,5% |
| BASILICATA | 42,1% | | | 37,3% | 42,3% | 46,7% |

| MORE AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| BAYERN | 27,3% | | | | 22,8% | 31,9% |
| BERLIN | 20,4% | | | | 23,2% | 17,6% |
| BOURGOGNE-FRANCHE-COMTÉ | 37,8% | | | | 44,7% | 31,0% |
| BRANDENBURG | 29,8% | | | | 30,0% | 29,6% |
| BREMEN | 25,1% | | | | 21,1% | 29,2% |
| BRETAGNE | 56,8% | | | | 55,3% | 58,3% |
| CALABRIA | 25,1% | | | 31,3% | 28,5% | 15,5% |
| CAMPANIA | 29,5% | | | 29,6% | 30,4% | 28,5% |
| CANTABRIA | 40,8% | | 44,9% | 47,7% | 33,7% | 36,8% |
| CASTILLA LA MANCHA | 42,2% | | 35,5% | 33,2% | 50,0% | 50,0% |
| CASTILLA Y LEON | 56,4% | | 36,5% | 63,4% | 60,5% | 65,2% |
| CATALUNYA | 13,4% | | 14,5% | 12,7% | 15,6% | 10,8% |
| CENTRE-VAL DE LOIRE | 33,2% | | | | 31,6% | 34,8% |
| CEUTA | 55,6% | | 51,1% | 60,5% | 65,4% | 45,5% |
| COMUNIDAD DE MADRID | 29,1% | | 30,7% | 24,9% | 32,0% | 28,8% |
| COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA | 40,8% | | 39,8% | 37,8% | 40,7% | 45,0% |
| CORNWALL | 53,7% | | | 49,5% | 56,4% | 55,3% |
| CORSE | 52,0% | | | | 55,3% | 48,7% |
| EMILIA-ROMAGNA | 48,5% | | | 41,6% | 49,5% | 54,5% |
| ENGLAND | 39,2% | | | 38,4% | 37,5% | 41,6% |
| EUSKADI | 24,2% | | 36,5% | 26,4% | 13,3% | 20,5% |
| EXTREMADURA | 47,0% | | 46,1% | 48,9% | 48,7% | 44,4% |
| FAROE ISLANDS | 32,5% | 37,1% | 38,6% | 29,9% | 34,9% | 21,8% |
| FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA | 44,4% | | | 40,1% | 48,0% | 45,2% |
| GALICIA | 46,2% | | 45,6% | 36,8% | 47,4% | 55,0% |
| GIBRALTAR | 49,4% | 54,9% | 50,0% | 51,3% | 43,5% | 47,3% |
| GRAND EST | 55,3% | | | | 52,1% | 58,5% |
| GREENLAND | 41,0% | | | 49,4% | 38,8% | 34,8% |
| GUADELOUPE | 57,4% | | | | 66,7% | 48,1% |
| GUERNSEY | 36,5% | | | 40,3% | 28,8% | 40,4% |
| GUYANE | 63,5% | | | | 62,8% | 64,3% |
| HAMBURG | 25,0% | | | | 23,3% | 26,7% |
| HAUTS-DE-FRANCE | 42,1% | | | | 36,3% | 47,9% |

| MORE AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| HESSEN | 19,1% | | | | 17,7% | 20,5% |
| ÎLE-DE-FRANCE | 29,7% | | | | 32,9% | 26,4% |
| ISLAS BALEARES | 37,8% | | 37,0% | 36,3% | 39,5% | 38,2% |
| ISLAS CANARIAS | 47,5% | | 52,6% | 40,3% | 46,5% | 50,4% |
| ISLE OF MAN | 35,6% | 33,1% | 33,9% | 38,1% | 38,1% | 34,7% |
| JERSEY | 34,1% | | | 31,2% | 32,6% | 38,4% |
| LA RÉUNION | 45,8% | | | | 45,1% | 46,5% |
| LA RIOJA | 48,7% | | 50,8% | 38,8% | 42,7% | 62,5% |
| LAZIO | 22,1% | | | 18,8% | 26,3% | 21,1% |
| LIGURIA | 41,5% | | | 37,8% | 46,1% | 40,7% |
| LOMBARDIA | 40,3% | | | 42,6% | 37,6% | 40,8% |
| MARCHE | 28,8% | | | 25,8% | 24,7% | 36,0% |
| MARTINIQUE | 50,8% | | | | 48,3% | 53,3% |
| MAYOTTE | 39,4% | | | | 36,0% | 42,9% |
| MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN | 28,2% | | | | 34,5% | 21,9% |
| MELILLA | 37,2% | | 42,0% | 33,3% | 33,3% | 40,0% |
| MOLISE | 25,6% | | | 20,2% | 28,5% | 28,1% |
| NAVARRA | 35,3% | | 33,8% | 29,3% | 41,2% | 36,8% |
| NIEDERSACHSEN | 20,9% | | | | 23,3% | 18,4% |
| NORDRHEIN-WESTPHALEN | 27,5% | | | | 31,5% | 23,5% |
| NORMANDIE | 43,3% | | | | 41,1% | 45,5% |
| NORTHERN IRELAND | 62,1% | | | 59,9% | 58,6% | 67,7% |
| NOUVELLE-AQUITAINE | 52,4% | | | | 47,3% | 57,4% |
| OCCITANIE | 40,7% | | | | 42,9% | 38,6% |
| PAYS DE LA LOIRE | 44,2% | | | | 27,6% | 60,9% |
| PIEMONTE | 42,6% | | | 39,0% | 40,6% | 48,3% |
| PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D'AZUR | 41,2% | | | | 41,7% | 40,8% |
| PUGLIA | 30,2% | | | 31,6% | 27,2% | 31,8% |
| REGION DE MURCIA | 39,8% | | 36,7% | 32,5% | 46,6% | 43,4% |
| RHEINLAND-PFALZ | 25,2% | | | | 23,3% | 27,2% |
| SAARLAND | 26,4% | | | | 26,5% | 26,2% |
| SACHSEN | 32,1% | | | | 34,1% | 30,2% |
| SACHSEN-ANHALT | 21,8% | | | | 20,8% | 22,7% |

| MORE AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|----------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| SARDINIA | 34,8% | | | 36,3% | 35,4% | 32,8% |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | 25,1% | | | | 23,6% | 26,6% |
| SCOTLAND | 7,3% | | | 7,1% | 5,1% | 9,6% |
| SICILIA | 25,7% | | | 27,3% | 26,9% | 23,0% |
| THÜRINGEN | 23,2% | | | | 23,4% | 23,0% |
| TOSCANA | 36,9% | | | 35,3% | 36,4% | 39,0% |
| TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE | 37,8% | | | 36,4% | 38,8% | 38,2% |
| UMBRIA | 25,1% | | | 26,7% | 28,8% | 19,7% |
| VAL D'AOSTA | 46,7% | | | 42,9% | 53,8% | 43,4% |
| VENETO | 49,5% | | | 47,6% | 52,6% | 48,3% |
| WALES | 25,1% | | | 22,1% | 23,9% | 29,3% |

DATA – I AM IN FAVOUR OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

| STATUS QUO | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ABRUZZO | 35,0% | | | 33,0% | 37,7% | 34,4% |
| ALAND | 20,9% | | | 20,3% | 20,9% | 21,5% |
| ANDALUCIA | 21,9% | | 20,6% | 20,1% | 22,9% | 24% |
| ARAGON | 15,5% | | 17,8% | 12,9% | 19,3% | 11,9% |
| ASTURIAS | 14,6% | | 19,1% | 14,5% | 14,5% | 10,3% |
| AUVERGNE-RHÔNE-ALPES | 34,0% | | | | 34,7% | 33,3% |
| BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG | 43,1% | | | | 40,2% | 46,0% |
| BASILICATA | 21,3% | | | 25,4% | 21,8% | 16,7% |
| BAYERN | 25,3% | | | | 26,6% | 23,9% |
| BERLIN | 37,9% | | | | 46,4% | 29,4% |
| BOURGOGNE-FRANCHE-COMTÉ | 38,1% | | | | 35,7% | 40,5% |
| BRANDENBURG | 35,8% | | | | 35,0% | 36,6% |
| BREMEN | 37,7% | | | | 42,1% | 33,3% |
| BRETAGNE | 16,2% | | | | 17,4% | 15,0% |
| CALABRIA | 18,8% | | | 14,5% | 29,8% | 12,1% |
| CAMPANIA | 28,3% | | | 23,9% | 31,7% | 29,2% |
| CANTABRIA | 24,7% | | 26,1% | 18,1% | 30,4% | 24,1% |
| CASTILLA LA MANCHA | 23,5% | | 28,3% | 25,6% | 17,9% | 22,1% |

| STATUS QUO | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| CASTILLA Y LEON | 12,6% | | 22,9% | 7,3% | 10,4% | 9,8% |
| CATALUNYA | 4,0% | | 3,8% | 4,1% | 5,9% | 2,2% |
| CENTRE-VAL DE LOIRE | 53,2% | | | | 57,9% | 48,5% |
| CEUTA | 18,2% | | 18,4% | 15,8% | 11,5% | 27,3% |
| COMUNIDAD DE MADRID | 34,4% | | 32,3% | 39,9% | 34,6% | 30,8% |
| COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA | 11,6% | | 13,2% | 8,7% | 16,3% | 8,3% |
| CORNWALL | 17,8% | | | 18,1% | 21,4% | 13,8% |
| CORSE | 12,4% | | | | 8,1% | 16,7% |
| EMILIA-ROMAGNA | 31,7% | | | 33,0% | 34,8% | 27,3% |
| ENGLAND | 27,2% | | | 29,7% | 27,6% | 24,4% |
| EUSKADI | 12,1% | | 22,9% | 8,9% | 9,7% | 7,0% |
| EXTREMADURA | 22,9% | | 23,1% | 18,8% | 25,1% | 24,7% |
| FAROE ISLANDS | 15,7% | 12,6% | 15,9% | 15,6% | 12,8% | 21,8% |
| FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA | 21,6% | | | 20,7% | 24,7% | 19,3% |
| GALICIA | 6,8% | | 9,0% | 6,4% | 7,1% | 4,6% |
| GIBRALTAR | 19,5% | 21,6% | 18,7% | 18,2% | 21,0% | 17,9% |
| GRAND EST | 18,1% | | | | 16,0% | 20,2% |
| GREENLAND | 18,3% | | | 18,0% | 22,4% | 14,6% |
| GUADELOUPE | 25,6% | | | | 17,9% | 33,3% |
| GUERNSEY | 25,7% | | | 22,2% | 24,2% | 30,7% |
| GUYANE | 18,0% | | | | 21,8% | 14,3% |
| HAMBURG | 44,2% | | | | 46,7% | 41,7% |
| HAUTS-DE-FRANCE | 34,3% | | | | 37,3% | 31,3% |
| HESSEN | 46,6% | | | | 49,4% | 43,8% |
| ÎLE-DE-FRANCE | 54,8% | | | | 54,8% | 54,7% |
| ISLAS BALEARES | 10,5% | | 10,9% | 13,1% | 8,0% | 10,1% |
| ISLAS CANARIAS | 17,7% | | 20,7% | 19,5% | 14,8% | 15,9% |
| ISLE OF MAN | 25,1% | 25,6% | 26,0% | 22,4% | 28,7% | 23,0% |
| JERSEY | 27,9% | | | 29,2% | 32,6% | 21,9% |
| LA RÉUNION | 44,2% | | | | 46,5% | 41,9% |
| LA RIOJA | 27,4% | | 28,5% | 31,9% | 29,0% | 20,0% |
| LAZIO | 38,9% | | | 45,0% | 34,8% | 36,8% |
| LIGURIA | 24,1% | | | 23,0% | 28,0% | 21,2% |

| STATUS QUO | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| LOMBARDIA | 17,7% | | | 16,0% | 22,7% | 14,3% |
| MARCHE | 37,4% | | | 39,4% | 41,4% | 31,5% |
| MARTINIQUE | 23,8% | | | | 27,6% | 20,0% |
| MAYOTTE | 31,4% | | | | 20,0% | 42,9% |
| MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN | 32,6% | | | | 22,4% | 42,7% |
| MELILLA | 27,4% | | 26,8% | 33,3% | 29,6% | 20,0% |
| MOLISE | 21,4% | | | 24,5% | 20,8% | 18,8% |
| NAVARRA | 16,2% | | 17,1% | 16,0% | 15,3% | 16,5% |
| NIEDERSACHSEN | 52,1% | | | | 47,9% | 56,3% |
| NORDRHEIN-WESTPHALEN | 40,8% | | | | 40,7% | 40,8% |
| NORMANDIE | 48,8% | | | | 47,7% | 50,0% |
| NORTHERN IRELAND | 11,0% | | | 13,5% | 8,6% | 10,8% |
| NOUVELLE-AQUITAINE | 28,1% | | | | 32,7% | 23,4% |
| OCCITANIE | 36,7% | | | | 32,0% | 41,4% |
| PAYS DE LA LOIRE | 37,2% | | | | 52,8% | 21,7% |
| PIEMONTE | 24,8% | | | 26,6% | 25,7% | 22,2% |
| PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D'AZUR | 37,6% | | | | 38,3% | 36,8% |
| PUGLIA | 38,1% | | | 33,8% | 41,1% | 39,3% |
| REGION DE MURCIA | 23,8% | | 25,0% | 25,9% | 24,5% | 19,7% |
| RHEINLAND-PFALZ | 29,6% | | | | 20,9% | 38,3% |
| SAARLAND | 37,0% | | | | 42,9% | 31,1% |
| SACHSEN | 29,0% | | | | 23,9% | 34,1% |
| SACHSEN-ANHALT | 34,4% | | | | 31,3% | 37,5% |
| SARDINIA | 7,5% | | | 7,4% | 9,1% | 6,1% |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | 50,0% | | | | 48,6% | 51,4% |
| SCOTLAND | 8,2% | | | 9,1% | 7,9% | 7,7% |
| SICILIA | 11,7% | | | 10,0% | 14,2% | 10,9% |
| THÜRINGEN | 37,5% | | | | 34,4% | 40,5% |
| TOSCANA | 31,4% | | | 28,6% | 37,0% | 28,6% |
| TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE | 20,5% | | | 20,7% | 24,8% | 16,1% |
| UMBRIA | 38,1% | | | 36,4% | 42,3% | 35,5% |
| VAL D'AOSTA | 16,8% | | | 16,4% | 15,8% | 18,2% |
| VENETO | 8,5% | | | 7,6% | 11,0% | 6,8% |

| STATUS QUO | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| WALES | 8,1% | | | 8,0% | 9,0% | 7,3% |

DATA – I AM IN FAVOUR OF MORE CENTRALIZATION AND LESS AUTONOMY

| LESS AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ABRUZZO | 31,6% | | | 39,6% | 27,2% | 28,0% |
| ALAND | 8,3% | | | 9,3% | 7,4% | 8,2% |
| ANDALUCIA | 21,2% | | 23,7% | 21,4% | 21,2% | 18,5% |
| ARAGON | 15,6% | | 14,4% | 14,0% | 18,7% | 15,3% |
| ASTURIAS | 13,7% | | 15,8% | 12,4% | 12,4% | 14,3% |
| AUVERGNE-RHÔNE-ALPES | 6,0% | | | | 2,5% | 9,5% |
| BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG | 17,3% | | | | 18,5% | 16,1% |
| BASILICATA | 30,2% | | | 31,7% | 28,8% | 30,0% |
| BAYERN | 19,2% | | | | 20,3% | 18,1% |
| BERLIN | 36,0% | | | | 25,0% | 47,1% |
| BOURGOGNE-FRANCHE-COMTÉ | 12,8% | | | | 8,9% | 16,7% |
| BRANDENBURG | 26,4% | | | | 23,3% | 29,6% |
| BREMEN | 32,5% | | | | 31,6% | 33,3% |
| BRETAGNE | 2,0% | | | | 3,2% | 0,8% |
| CALABRIA | 39,8% | | | 46,7% | 37,7% | 35,1% |
| CAMPANIA | 32,4% | | | 36,1% | 31,3% | 29,9% |
| CANTABRIA | 21,6% | | 20,3% | 19,0% | 28,7% | 18,4% |
| CASTILLA LA MANCHA | 29,4% | | 31,8% | 35,6% | 24,7% | 25,6% |
| CASTILLA Y LEON | 19,5% | | 32,7% | 15,2% | 17,1% | 12,9% |
| CATALUNYA | 5,5% | | 3,8% | 8,8% | 6,8% | 2,7% |
| CENTRE-VAL DE LOIRE | 10,8% | | | | 7,9% | 13,6% |
| CEUTA | 25,0% | | 28,7% | 21,1% | 23,1% | 27,3% |
| COMUNIDAD DE MADRID | 29,8% | | 31,2% | 30,1% | 26,1% | 31,7% |
| COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA | 12,2% | | 11,9% | 13,0% | 12,2% | 11,5% |
| CORNWALL | 4,3% | | | 5,9% | 2,1% | 4,9% |
| CORSE | 1,8% | | | | 2,4% | 1,3% |
| EMILIA-ROMAGNA | 12,2% | | | 16,8% | 10,2% | 9,7% |
| ENGLAND | 19,9% | | | 16,3% | 21,4% | 22,0% |

| LESS AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| EUSKADI | 12,7% | | 32,7% | 4,3% | 8,2% | 5,4% |
| EXTREMADURA | 22,0% | | 23,6% | 23,9% | 20,9% | 19,8% |
| FAROE ISLANDS | 2,2% | 4,0% | 3,1% | 1,8% | 0,0% | 2,3% |
| FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA | 6,5% | | | 7,8% | 4,8% | 7,0% |
| GALICIA | 4,1% | | 4,9% | 4,7% | 5,7% | 1,0% |
| GIBRALTAR | 16,3% | 12,3% | 19,0% | 13,4% | 22,6% | 14,3% |
| GRAND EST | 6,0% | | | | 5,6% | 6,4% |
| GREENLAND | 11,6% | | | 14,6% | 9,0% | 11,2% |
| GUADELOUPE | 6,3% | | | | 5,1% | 7,4% |
| GUERNSEY | 2,7% | | | 3,3% | 3,0% | 1,8% |
| GUYANE | 9,9% | | | | 10,3% | 9,5% |
| HAMBURG | 25,8% | | | | 23,3% | 28,3% |
| HAUTS-DE-FRANCE | 11,6% | | | | 16,9% | 6,3% |
| HESSEN | 27,0% | | | | 25,3% | 28,8% |
| ÎLE-DE-FRANCE | 11,6% | | | | 8,2% | 15,1% |
| ISLAS BALEARES | 10,2% | | 9,1% | 11,3% | 10,3% | 10,1% |
| ISLAS CANARIAS | 11,0% | | 7,4% | 10,8% | 14,4% | 11,5% |
| ISLE OF MAN | 5,4% | 4,7% | 5,9% | 3,5% | 4,0% | 9,1% |
| JERSEY | 5,3% | | | 4,4% | 5,4% | 6,2% |
| LA RÉUNION | 7,5% | | | | 5,6% | 9,3% |
| LA RIOJA | 18,5% | | 14,7% | 22,4% | 19,4% | 17,5% |
| LAZIO | 36,4% | | | 31,9% | 37,9% | 39,5% |
| LIGURIA | 23,1% | | | 27,7% | 16,9% | 24,8% |
| LOMBARDIA | 19,8% | | | 23,1% | 18,5% | 17,9% |
| MARCHE | 30,9% | | | 32,4% | 31,2% | 29,2% |
| MARTINIQUE | 18,6% | | | | 17,2% | 20,0% |
| MAYOTTE | 20,0% | | | | 40,0% | 0,0% |
| MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN | 21,8% | | | | 20,7% | 22,9% |
| MELILLA | 34,9% | | 29,3% | 33,3% | 37,0% | 40,0% |
| MOLISE | 50,8% | | | 53,2% | 47,7% | 51,6% |
| NAVARRA | 7,6% | | 8,7% | 4,6% | 6,5% | 10,5% |
| NIEDERSACHSEN | 22,3% | | | | 23,3% | 21,4% |
| NORDRHEIN-WESTPHALEN | 25,5% | | | | 20,4% | 30,6% |

| LESS AUTONOMY | AVERAGE | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| NORMANDIE | 3,4% | | | | 3,7% | 3,0% |
| NORTHERN IRELAND | 17,6% | | | 17,4% | 20,7% | 14,6% |
| NOUVELLE-AQUITAINE | 5,3% | | | | 6,4% | 4,3% |
| OCCITANIE | 7,4% | | | | 4,8% | 10,0% |
| PAYS DE LA LOIRE | 7,7% | | | | 11,0% | 4,3% |
| PIEMONTE | 20,6% | | | 24,6% | 21,9% | 15,3% |
| PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D'AZUR | 8,8% | | | | 8,3% | 9,2% |
| PUGLIA | 27,9% | | | 31,6% | 28,7% | 23,4% |
| REGION DE MURCIA | 29,1% | | 32,8% | 37,5% | 22,5% | 23,7% |
| RHEINLAND-PFALZ | 31,0% | | | | 37,2% | 24,7% |
| SAARLAND | 22,7% | | | | 22,4% | 23,0% |
| SACHSEN | 25,1% | | | | 27,3% | 23,0% |
| SACHSEN-ANHALT | 37,3% | | | | 41,7% | 33,0% |
| SARDINIA | 6,7% | | | 6,7% | 7,6% | 5,7% |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | 18,0% | | | | 19,4% | 16,5% |
| SCOTLAND | 18,5% | | | 22,9% | 20,8% | 11,8% |
| SICILIA | 25,7% | | | 26,4% | 23,5% | 27,3% |
| THÜRINGEN | 30,8% | | | | 35,9% | 25,7% |
| TOSCANA | 23,0% | | | 27,4% | 16,2% | 25,3% |
| TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE | 4,6% | | | 5,0% | 4,4% | 4,5% |
| UMBRIA | 34,4% | | | 33,5% | 26,4% | 43,4% |
| VAL D'AOSTA | 10,1% | | | 16,4% | 5,8% | 8,1% |
| VENETO | 9,1% | | | 9,9% | 6,8% | 10,7% |
| WALES | 20,0% | | | 15,0% | 19,4% | 25,6% |