Coughlin, Cletus C.; Novy, Dennis

Working Paper
Is the international border effect larger than the domestic border effect? : evidence from U.S. trade

CESifo Working Paper, No. 2853

Provided in Cooperation with:
Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Suggested Citation: Coughlin, Cletus C.; Novy, Dennis (2009) : Is the international border effect larger than the domestic border effect? : evidence from U.S. trade, CESifo Working Paper, No. 2853, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30415

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect?
Evidence from U.S. Trade

Cletus C. Coughlin
Dennis Novy

CESifo Working Paper No. 2853
Category 8: Trade Policy
November 2009

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo-group.org/wp
Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade

Abstract

Many studies have found that international borders represent large barriers to trade. But how do international borders compare to domestic border barriers? We investigate international and domestic border barriers in a unified framework. We consider a unique data set of exports from individual U.S. states to foreign countries and combine it with trade flows within and between U.S. states. After controlling for distance and country size, we find that relative to state-to-state trade, crossing an individual U.S. state’s domestic border entails a larger trade barrier than crossing the international U.S. border. This finding highlights the concentration of trade flows at the local level and the importance of factors such as informational barriers and transportation costs even for the relatively short distances associated with state-to-state trade.

JEL Code: F10, F15.
Keywords: international border effects, intranational home bias, domestic borders, gravity, trade costs.

Cletus C. Coughlin
Research Division
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
P.O. Box 442
USA – St. Louis, MO 63166-0442
coughlin@stls.frb.org

Dennis Novy
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
UK – Coventry CV4 7AL
d.novy@warwick.ac.uk

November 2009.
We are very grateful for comments by Keith Head, John Helliwell, David Jacks, Chris Meissner, Peter Neary, Krishna Pendakur, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Nikolaus Wolf, as well as seminar participants at Simon Fraser University and the Midwest Trade conference at Penn State. We are also grateful to Lesli Ott for outstanding research assistance. Novy gratefully acknowledges research support from the Economic and Social Research Council, Grant RES-000-22-3112, and support as a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
1. Introduction

In a seminal paper, McCallum (1995) found that Canadian provinces trade up to 22 times more with each other than with U.S. states. This astounding result, also known as the *international border effect*, has led to a large literature on the trade impediments associated with international borders. More recently, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) revisited the U.S.-Canadian border effect with new micro-founded estimates. Although they are able to reduce the border effect considerably, there is widespread consensus that the international border remains a large impediment to trade.\(^1\)

A parallel and somewhat smaller literature has documented that border effects also exist within a country, known as the *domestic border effect* or intranational home bias. For example, Wolf (2000) finds that trade within individual U.S. states is significantly larger than trade between U.S. states even after he controls for economic size, distance and a number of additional determinants. Likewise, Nitsch (2000) finds that domestic trade within the average European Union country is about ten times larger than trade with another EU country.\(^2\)

It is important to understand the nature of domestic and international trade barriers since they might impede the integration of markets and have negative welfare consequences. Accurately identifying the magnitudes of border effects at the domestic and international levels is a necessary step for assessing their economic significance. The contribution of this paper is to merge the two strands of literature about border effects into a unified framework. We construct a unique data set that includes three tiers of U.S. trade flows: a) trade within individual U.S. states,

---

\(^1\) Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report 74 percent as an estimate of representative international trade costs for industrialized countries (expressed as a tariff equivalent). About two-thirds of these costs can be attributed to border-related trade barriers such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The remainder represents transportation costs. Note that whilst McCallum (1995) compares trade between Canadian provinces and U.S. states to inter-provincial trade, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) add inter-state trade data, thus using an extended sample.

e.g., Minnesota-Minnesota; b) trade between U.S. states, e.g., Minnesota-Texas; and c) trade between U.S. states and foreign countries, e.g., Minnesota-Canada.

We use gravity theory to estimate the relative size of the domestic and international border effects. As is typical in the literature, the domestic border effect indicates how much a U.S. state trades with itself relative to state-to-state trade, while the international border effect indicates how much a U.S. state trades with foreign countries relative to state-to-state trade. After controlling for distance and country size, we find that relative to state-to-state trade, crossing an individual U.S. state’s domestic border entails a larger trade barrier than crossing the international U.S. border. That is, the domestic border effect is bigger than the international border effect. Put differently, our results indicate that the first few miles of shipping hurt the most. Once the domestic state has been left, trade costs still rise but not as quickly any more even if the final destination is a foreign country.

As an example, consider exports from Minnesota to Texas and Canada (see Figure 1). Although Texas and Canada have roughly the same gross domestic products, during the year 2002 Minnesota exported about twice as much to Texas as to Canada ($5.7bn vs. $2.9bn). This gap is the familiar international border effect. However, in the same year Minnesota traded over ten times as much with itself as with Texas ($69.1bn vs. $5.7bn). This gap is the domestic border effect, and it is bigger than the international gap, both in absolute and relative terms.

By using a more complete data set of trade flows, we also overcome one of the shortcomings of previous studies. Specifically, our paper addresses the potential sample selection bias that arises in domestic border effect studies that ignore international trade flows. When we estimate the domestic border effect ignoring international trade flows, we find a domestic border
effect that is smaller than the one we obtain based on the complete sample. This downward bias arises because the estimation systemically leaves out pairs with relatively low trade flows. As a result, the extent of the domestic border effect is underestimated. Conversely, there is also a sample selection bias if the international border effect is estimated ignoring trade flows within individual states. In that case, the estimation systematically leaves out observations with relatively large trade flows such that in comparison the extent of international trade flows does not seem as low as it would if trade flows within individual states were included. This leads to an underestimation of the international border effect. We overcome this problem by combining observations of the three types depicted in Figure 1.

What are the economic reasons behind the large domestic border effect? International trade economists traditionally emphasize trade barriers associated with international borders such
as tariffs, bureaucratic hurdles and informational barriers. However, beginning with Wolf (2000) and Nitsch (2000), the empirical literature has also demonstrated that borders within a country are associated with a significant trade-impeding effect.

One potential explanation is related to work by Hillberry and Hummels (2008). Based on ZIP-code level domestic U.S. trade flows, they document that trade within the United States is heavily concentrated at the local level. In particular, trade within a single ZIP code is on average three times higher than trade with partners outside the ZIP code. This concentration might be due to the prevalence of trade in intermediate goods at the local level, arguably as a result of supply chain optimization as companies seek to minimize transportation costs and suppliers co-locate with final goods producers. This high concentration of trade at the local level implies large domestic border barrier estimates. In that interpretation, the estimated domestic border effect does not reflect state border barriers per se but rather local agglomeration effects. But of course, the fact that firms cluster in areas as small as a single ZIP code is in itself indicative of trade costs associated with even relatively short distances.

As we discuss in section 5, other reasons for the strong local concentration of trade include informational and search costs, for example in the form of business, social and immigration networks, increasing returns at the local level as well as location-specific tastes. The main insight from our paper is that estimates of domestic border effects are also large when compared to international border barrier estimates.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we carefully examine the economic theory of trade in general equilibrium with trade barriers and derive our empirical estimation framework. We show that theory does not provide an a priori expectation as to the relative size of the domestic and international border effects. We thus affirm that a relatively large domestic

---

3 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for an overview.
border effect—as we find it in the data—is by no means a foregone conclusion. In section 3 we describe our data set. In section 4 we jointly estimate the international and domestic border effects so that they are directly comparable. In section 5, we discuss a number of potential explanations for our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.

2. Gravity theory and the estimation framework

2.1 Gravity theory

The seminal contribution of McCallum (1995) has led to a large number of papers that estimate border effects based on a gravity estimation framework. Gravity theory describes how trade flows are determined in general equilibrium with trade barriers. It is well-known that gravity equations can be derived from a variety of trade models (see Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 2001; Evenett and Keller, 2002). Gravity is also consistent with more recent trade theories, including the gravity framework with multilateral resistance by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the Ricardian trade model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Chaney’s (2008) extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms model as well as the heterogeneous firms model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with a linear demand system. To obtain results that are easily comparable to the previous literature on border effects, we adopt the widely used gravity framework by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Our results, however, would also be generated with other frameworks.

Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) parsimonious model rests on the Armington assumption that countries produce differentiated goods and trade is driven by consumers’ love of variety. They derive the following gravity equation for exports $x_{ij}$ from region $i$ to region $j$:

\[x_{ij} = \frac{\alpha_{i} \alpha_{j} G_{ij}}{G_{i} G_{j}}\]

---

4 See Chen and Novy (2008) for an overview.
\[ x_{ij} = \frac{y_i y_j}{y_W} \left( \frac{t_{ij}}{\Pi_i P_j} \right)^{-1} \]

where \( y_i \) and \( y_j \) denote output of regions \( i \) and \( j \), \( y_W \) denotes world output, \( t_{ij} \) is the bilateral trade cost factor (one plus the tariff equivalent), \( \Pi_i \) is the outward multilateral resistance term and \( P_j \) is the inward multilateral resistance term. The parameter \( \sigma > 1 \) is the elasticity of substitution. The bilateral trade costs \( t_{ij} \) capture a variety of trade frictions such as transportation costs, tariffs and bureaucratic barriers and they also include the border barriers.

2.2 The estimation framework

We follow McCallum (1995) and other authors by hypothesizing that trade costs \( t_{ij} \) are a loglinear function of geographic distance, \( \text{dist}_{ij} \), and a border dummy, \( \text{INTERNATIONAL}_{ij} \), which takes on the value 1 whenever regions \( i \) and \( j \) are located in different countries. In addition, we hypothesize that domestic trade costs within a region’s own territory might be systematically different from bilateral trade costs. We therefore include an ownstate dummy variable, \( \text{OWNSTATE}_{ij} \), that takes on the value 1 for \( i=j \). Our trade cost function can thus be expressed as

\[ \ln(t_{ij}) = \tilde{\beta} \text{INTERNATIONAL}_{ij} + \tilde{\gamma} \text{OWNSTATE}_{ij} + \tilde{\delta} \ln(\text{dist}_{ij}), \]

where \( \tilde{\beta} \) and \( \tilde{\gamma} \) reflect the international and the ownstate (i.e., domestic) border effects, respectively, and \( \tilde{\delta} \) is the elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance.\(^5\)

The trade cost function (2) nests the trade cost functions used by Wolf (2000), Hillberry and Hummels (2003) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) only consider trade flows within the U.S. so that an international border effect

\(^5\) As discussed by Hummels (2007), transportation cost patterns are in fact highly complex. For example, they depend on transportation modes. Trade with land neighbors (Canada and Mexico in our sample) tends to be shipped by surface modes, predominantly trucks. Other countries tend to be served by air or ocean modes. Below we present separate estimation results for Canada and Mexico, as well as results that include all foreign countries.
cannot be estimated. This corresponds to \( \tilde{\beta} = 0 \) in equation (2). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) follow McCallum’s (1995) specification that does not allow for a domestic border effect (\( \tilde{\gamma} = 0 \)).

We log-linearize equation (1) so that we obtain:

\[
(3) \quad \ln(x_{ij}) = \ln(y_i) + \ln(y_j) + (1 - \sigma) \ln(t_{ij}) + (\sigma - 1) \ln(\Pi_i P_j) + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{ij},
\]

where the logarithm of world output is captured by year dummies \( \alpha_t \) and where we add a white-noise error term \( \varepsilon_{ij} \). Substituting the trade cost function (2) yields the following estimating equation:

\[
(4) \quad \ln(x_{ij}) = \ln(y_i) + \ln(y_j) + \beta \text{INTERNATIONAL}_{ij} + \gamma \text{OWNSTATE}_{ij} + \delta \ln(d_{ij}) + (\sigma - 1) \ln(\Pi_i P_j) + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{ij},
\]

where \( \beta = (1-\sigma) \tilde{\beta}, \gamma = (1-\sigma) \tilde{\gamma} \) and \( \delta = (1-\sigma) \tilde{\delta} \). In the empirical analysis we control for multilateral resistance by fixed and random effects in various specifications.

### 2.3 Border effects in theory

The empirical literature typically finds that international borders impede trade. This corresponds to \( \beta < 0 \) in estimating equation (4). Trading within a state is typically associated with higher trade flows, corresponding to \( \gamma > 0 \). We first examine whether gravity theory allows us to predict whether the international border effect \( \beta \) is larger or smaller in absolute value than the domestic border effect \( \gamma \), i.e., whether \( |\beta| \geq |\gamma| \).

As we explain below in more detail, our data set comprises three tiers of trade flows:

a) Ownstate trade: trade flows within a U.S. state, for example within Minnesota, such that \( \text{OWNSTATE}_{ij} = 1 \) and \( \text{INTERNATIONAL}_{ij} = 0 \),
b) National trade: trade flows between two U.S. states, for example from Minnesota to Texas, such that $OWNSTATE_{ij} = INTERNATIONAL_{ij} = 0$, and

c) International trade: trade flows from a U.S. state to a foreign country, for example from Minnesota to Canada, such that $OWNSTATE_{ij} = 0$ and $INTERNATIONAL_{ij} = 1$.

The second tier is thus the omitted category in equation (4), implying that the ownstate border effect is estimated relative to the benchmark of trade between U.S. states. We choose this benchmark to obtain coefficients that are directly comparable to those in the literature (Wolf, 2000; Nitsch, 2000). Therefore, the sign and magnitude of the ownstate border effect can be gauged by comparing trade costs $t_{ii}$ within a typical U.S. state $i$ to bilateral trade costs $t_{ij}$ with another U.S. state $j$. We draw this comparison by considering their ratio $t_{ii}/t_{ij}$. Abstracting from any stochastic elements, equations (1) and (2) imply that this ratio is given by

$$\frac{t_{ii}}{t_{ij}} = \left( \frac{x_{yi}}{x_{yi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{P_i}{P_j} \frac{\exp(\tilde{\gamma})(dist_{ii})^{\tilde{\delta}}}{(dist_{ij})^{\delta}}.$$ 

Using $\tilde{\gamma} = \gamma / (1 - \sigma)$ and $\tilde{\delta} = \delta / (1 - \sigma)$ this can be rewritten as

$$\exp(\gamma) = \left( \frac{x_{yi}}{x_{yi}} \frac{P_i}{P_j} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{dist_{ii}}{dist_{ij}} \right)^{\delta}.$$ 

As a simple example, first assume the symmetric case where $y_i = y_j$, $P_i = P_j$ and $dist_{ii} = dist_{ij}$. A positive ownstate effect $\gamma > 0$ would follow only if $x_{ii}/x_{ij} > 1$. Now assume the more realistic case where bilateral distance $dist_{ij}$ exceeds domestic distance $dist_{ii}$. Given that the distance elasticity of trade is negative ($\delta < 0$), an even bigger ratio $x_{ii}/x_{ij}$ would be required to ensure $\gamma > 0$. More generally, we conclude that given the distance element of trade costs as well as the output and multilateral resistance variables, the sign and magnitude of the domestic border effect parameter $\gamma$ will primarily depend on the extent of domestic trade $x_{ii}$ relative to bilateral trade $x_{ij}$. 

---

9
As in the literature, we also use the benchmark of trade between U.S. states for estimating the international border effect. To gauge its sign and magnitude, we compare bilateral trade costs \( t_{ik} \) between a typical U.S. state \( i \) and a typical foreign country \( k \) to trade costs \( t_{ij} \) between two U.S. states. Their ratio is given by

\[
\frac{t_{ik}}{t_{ij}} = \left( \frac{x_i}{x_j} \cdot \frac{y_k}{y_j} \right)^{\sigma^{-1}} \frac{P_k}{P_j} = \frac{\exp(\beta)(\text{dist}_{ik})^\delta}{P_j} \frac{\exp(\beta)(\text{dist}_{ij})^\delta}{P_j},
\]

or

\[
\exp(\beta) = \frac{x_i}{x_j} \cdot \frac{y_j}{y_k} \left( \frac{P_j}{P_k} \right)^{\sigma^{-1}} \left( \frac{\text{dist}_{ij}}{\text{dist}_{ik}} \right)^\delta.
\]

As before, assume the simple symmetric case where \( y_k = y_j \), \( P_k = P_j \) and \( \text{dist}_{ik} = \text{dist}_{ij} \). A negative international border effect \( \beta < 0 \) would follow only if \( x_{ik}/x_{ij} < 1 \). In the more common case where international distance \( \text{dist}_{ik} \) (say, between Minnesota and Japan) exceeds inter-state distance \( \text{dist}_{ij} \) (say, between Minnesota and Texas), an even smaller ratio \( x_{ik}/x_{ij} \) would be required to ensure \( \beta < 0 \). Given distances as well as the output and multilateral resistance variables, the international border effect parameter \( \beta \) will therefore mainly depend on the extent of international trade \( x_{ik} \) relative to inter-state trade \( x_{ij} \).

Thus, equations (5) and (6) can in principle yield either sign for \( \gamma \) and \( \beta \). The fact that most empirical studies find \( \gamma > 0 \) and \( \beta < 0 \) is consistent with but by no means implied by gravity theory. Neither does gravity theory make a prediction about the absolute magnitudes of \( \beta \) and \( \gamma \). A priori we cannot infer whether \( |\beta| \gtrless |\gamma| \).
3. Data

To obtain comparable results, we use the same data sets as Wolf (2000) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for domestic trade flows within the United States. The novelty of our approach is to combine these domestic trade flows with international trade flows from individual U.S. states to the 50 largest U.S. export destinations. Thus, our data set comprises, for instance, trade flows within Minnesota, exports from Minnesota to Texas as well as exports from Minnesota to Canada. We take data quality seriously, and below we describe in detail the data sources, potential concerns and how we address these concerns.

3.1 Domestic exports: Commodity Flow Survey

For our measures of the shipments of goods within and across U.S. states, we use aggregate trade data from the Commodity Flow Survey, which is a joint effort of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and the Bureau of the Census. We use survey results from 1993, 1997, and 2002. The survey covers the origin and destination of shipments of manufacturing, mining, wholesale trade, and selected retail establishments. The survey excludes shipments in the following sectors: services, crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, farm, forestry, fishery, construction, government, and most retail. Shipments from foreign establishments are also excluded; import shipments are excluded until they reach a domestic shipper. U.S. export (i.e., trans-border) shipments are also excluded.

---

6 This survey was most recently conducted in 2007. Preliminary data are available; final data are scheduled to be available in December 2009.
7 Erlbaum and Holguin-Veras (2006) note that sample size has been a major issue. The 1993 survey collected data from 200,000 establishments and the size was subsequently reduced to 100,000 in 1997 and 50,000 in 2002. In response to complaints from the freight data users community, the sample size was increased to 100,000 in 2007.
3.2 International exports: Origin of Movement

Our data on exports by U.S. states to foreign destinations are from the Origin of Movement series. These data are compiled by the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The data in this series identify the state from which an export begins its journey to a foreign country. However, we would like to know the state in which the export was produced. Below we provide details on the Origin of Movement series and its suitability as a measure of the origin of production.

Beginning in 1987, the Origin of Movement series provides the current-year export sales, or free-alongside-ship (f.a.s.) costs if not sold, for 54 ‘states’ to 242 foreign destinations. These export sales are for merchandise sales only and do not include services exports. The 54 ‘states’ include the 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and unknown. Following Wolf (2000), we use the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Rather than all 242 destinations, we use the 50 leading export destinations for U.S. exports for 2005. We use the annual data from 1993, 1997, and 2002 for total merchandise exports.

Concerns about using the Origin of Movement series to identify the location of production are especially pertinent for agricultural and mining exports. We, however, focus on manufactured goods. Cassey (2009) has examined the issue of the coincidence of the state origin

---

8 Other studies that have used the Origin of Movement series include Smith (1999), Coughlin and Wall (2003), Coughlin (2004) and Cassey (2007).
9 The highlighted details as well as much additional information can be found in Cassey (2009).
10 In alphabetical order, these countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
11 We have also tried the data for manufacturing only (as opposed to total merchandise). The two series are very highly correlated (99 percent). The regression results are almost identical and we therefore do not report them.
of movement and the state of production for manufactured goods. The reason for restricting the focus to manufacturing is that the best source for location-based data on export production, “Exports from Manufacturing Establishments,” covers only manufacturing.

Cassey’s key finding relevant to our analysis is that overall, the Origin of Movement data is of sufficient quality to be used as the origin of the production of exports. Nonetheless, the data for specific states may not be of sufficient quality as the origin of production. These states are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. He recommends the removal of Alaska and Hawaii in particular. As we use the 48 contiguous U.S. states, our data set is consistent with this recommendation. The next two candidates for removal would be Delaware and Vermont. Cassey further highlights that the consolidation of export shipments might systematically affect the Origin of Movement estimates (relative to the origin of production). Specifically, consolidation tends to bias upward the estimates for Florida and Texas and to bias downward the estimates for Arkansas and New Mexico. As a robustness check, we drop these states from the sample (see section 4.3).

3.3 Adjustments to the trade data

Our simultaneous use of the intra-state and inter-state shipments data from the Commodity Flow Survey and the merchandise international trade data from the Origin of Movement series requires an adjustment to increase the comparability of these data sets. Such an adjustment arises because of three important differences between the data sources. First, the

---

13 For the initial work on this issue, see Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1991) and Cronovich and Gazel (1999). As Cassey’s (2009) analysis refers to manufactured goods, we note that we have also tried the Origin of Movement manufacturing data (as opposed to total merchandise) with virtually identical results.

14 The data in the “Exports from Manufacturing Establishments” is available at http://www.census.gov/mcd/exports/ but does not contain destination information, so it cannot be used for the current research project.

15 The problems for Wyoming and South Dakota are primarily in individual sectors—chemicals for Wyoming and computers in South Dakota.
merchandise international trade data measures a shipment from the source to the port of exit just once, whereas the commodity flow data likely measures a good in a shipment more than once. For example, a good may be shipped from a plant to a warehouse and, later, to a retailer. Second, goods destined for foreign countries, when they are shipped to a port of exit, are included in domestic shipments. Third, the coverage of sectors differs between the data sources. The Commodity Flow Survey includes shipments of manufactured goods, but it excludes agriculture and part of mining. Meanwhile, the merchandise trade data includes all goods.\textsuperscript{11}

Identical to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we scale down the data in the Commodity Flow Survey by the ratio of total domestic merchandise trade to total domestic shipments from the Commodity Flow Survey. Total domestic merchandise trade is approximated by gross output in the goods-producing sectors (i.e., agriculture, mining, and manufacturing) minus international merchandise exports.\textsuperscript{16} This calculation yields an adjustment factor of 0.495 for 1993, 0.508 for 1997, and 0.430 for 2002.\textsuperscript{17} Similar to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), our adjustment to the commodity flow data does not solve all the measurement problems, but it is the best feasible option.

3.4 Other data

The rest of the data used in our estimations can be characterized as well-known. For individual U.S. states we use state gross domestic product data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. For foreign countries, we use data on gross domestic product taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2007 edition).

\textsuperscript{17} The difference between our adjustment factor for 1993 and that of Anderson and van Wincoop, 0.495 vs. 0.517, is due to data revision.
We use the standard great circle distance formula to cover inter-state and international distances between capital cities in kilometers. As intra-state distance, we use the distance between the two largest cities in a state. As alternatives for intra-state distance, we also try the measure used by Wolf (2000) that weights the distance between a state’s two largest cities by their population, as well as the measure suggested by Nitsch (2000) that is based on land area. Finally, we also use a distance measure that is related to actual shipping distances, based on data for individual shipments used by Hillberry and Hummels (2003), see section 4.2 for details.

4. Empirical results

We form a balanced sample over the years 1993, 1997 and 2002. This yields 1,801 trade observations per cross-section within the U.S.\textsuperscript{18} Adding 50 foreign countries as export destinations increases the number of trade observations by 2,338 so that our sample includes 4,139 observations per cross-section, or 12,417 in total.\textsuperscript{19} Due to the data quality concerns for Alaska, Hawaii and Washington, D.C., we drop these states so that we are left with 48 contiguous states.

First, we show that our data exhibit a substantial domestic border effect, as established by Wolf (2000). In separate regressions, we also show that the data exhibit a significant international border effect, as established by McCallum (1995), but this effect weakens over time. Second, we combine the domestic U.S. trade data with the international observations. This

\textsuperscript{18} The maximum possible number of U.S. observations would be 48*48 = 2,304. The 503 missing observations are due to the fact that a number of Commodity Flow Survey estimates did not meet publication standards because of high sampling variability or poor response quality.

\textsuperscript{19} The maximum possible number of international observations would be 48*50 = 2,400. Sixty-two observations are missing mainly because exports to Malaysia were generally not reported in 1993. Only 18 of the observations not included in our sample are most likely zeros (as opposed to missing). We deem it unlikely that omitting these few zeros distorts our results.
allows us to estimate the domestic and international border effects in a joint framework and directly compare them. Finally, we carry out a number of robustness checks.

### 4.1 Domestic and international border effects estimated separately

In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 we show results that replicate the intranational home bias. As Wolf (2000), in column 1 we only use data for 1993. In column 2 we add the data for 1997 and 2002. Like Hillberry and Hummels (2003) we use exporter and importer fixed effects such that the output regressors drop out. Our estimates are virtually identical to Wolf’s baseline coefficient of 1.48 for the ownstate indicator variable. The interpretation of this coefficient is that given distance and economic size, ownstate trade is 4.4 times higher than state-to-state trade \( \exp(1.48) = 4.4 \).

Hillberry and Hummels (2003) reduce the ownstate coefficient by about a third when excluding wholesale shipments from the Commodity Flow Survey data. The reason is that wholesale shipments are predominantly local so that their removal disproportionately reduces the extent of ownstate trade.\(^\text{20}\) However, Nitsch (2000) reports higher home bias coefficients by comparing trade within European Union countries to trade between EU countries. He finds home bias coefficients in the range of 1.8 to 2.9.

In columns 3-6 we do not consider ownstate trade and instead focus on the international border effect. Motivated by the prominence of Canadian data in the border effect literature, in columns 3 and 4 we present regression results for a subsample that includes Canada as the only

\(^{20}\) We do not have access to the private-use coding of wholesale shipments and thus cannot replicate their finding with our data. However, our main result on the relative size of the domestic and international border effects would seem robust to a reduction by a third in the ownstate coefficient magnitudes (see Tables 2-4). Hillberry and Hummels (2003) further reduce the ownstate coefficient by using an alternative distance measure that is based on actual shipping distances. We refer to section 4.3 where we employ such a measure, but our main result is unchanged.
In column 3 we estimate an international border coefficient of -0.36 for the year 1993, implying that after we control for distance and economic size, exports from U.S. states to Canada are about 30 percent lower than exports to other U.S. states \((\exp(-0.36) = 0.70)\). This estimate is substantially lower than the estimate of -1.65 obtained by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The reason is that we use exports from individual U.S. states to all of Canada, whereas Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) use exports to individual Canadian provinces. Consistent with results by Hillberry and Hummels (2008), we find that using a larger geographical unit as we do in the case of Canada leads to smaller estimated border effects.22 When we pool the data over the years 1993, 1997 and 2002 in column 4, the border effect becomes insignificant, suggesting that border barriers have fallen over time.

Columns 5 and 6 include the full sample of 50 foreign countries, with country fixed effects controlling for multilateral resistance. The results on the international border effect are very similar to the Canadian subsample in columns 3 and 4. We will now revisit these findings by considering the complete sample of domestic and international trade flows.

4.2 Is the international border effect larger than the domestic border effect?

In Table 2 we estimate the domestic and international border effects jointly so that their magnitudes are directly comparable. For this purpose, we simultaneously use domestic and international trade flows, whilst continuing to use inter-state trade as the reference group as in

---

21 Since Canada is the only foreign country, the international border dummy would be perfectly collinear with a Canadian country fixed effect. We therefore use random effects in column 4 where we pool over the years 1993, 1997 and 2002.

22 As Hillberry and Hummels (2008) note, when large geographical units are used, there can be an aggregation bias if the ‘true’ underlying distances (that is, distances based on smaller geographical units) are in fact shorter. Indeed, if we use distances from individual U.S. states to the closest Canadian provinces instead of distances to the Canadian capital (Ottawa), the average distance to Canada drops to 916km from 1,658km. As a result, for column 3 of Table 1 we then obtain an international border effect estimate that more than doubles in absolute magnitude (-0.88 opposed to -0.36), with the other coefficients virtually unchanged.
Table 1. When we pool the data over the years 1993, 1997 and 2002 in columns 2 and 4, we add random effects instead of country fixed effects. The reason is that country fixed effects are perfectly collinear with the ownstate indicator variable. Exporter and importer fixed effects would also be impractical because those are perfectly collinear with the international border dummy. This arises because the foreign countries in our data set are only importers but never exporters.

Columns 1 and 2 report regression results for the Canadian subsample. The joint estimation yields substantial domestic border coefficients (1.75 and 1.78). The international border effect coefficients (-0.33 and -0.03) are very similar to the ones reported in Table 1. A test of whether the absolute values of the domestic and international border coefficients are equal, $|OWNSTATE_{ij}|=|INTERNATIONAL_{ij}|$, is clearly rejected (p-value = 0.00).

Columns 3 and 4 report results for the full sample. The ownstate coefficients are estimated to be 2.04 and 2.05, while the international coefficients are estimated to be -1.24 and -1.10. Thus, the ownstate and the international coefficients are larger in absolute magnitude than in columns 1 and 2. The hypothesis that the two border coefficients are equal is again clearly rejected (p-value = 0.00). In summary, a key finding in Table 2 is that the domestic border effect is larger than the international border effect. That is, relative to inter-state trade, crossing an individual U.S. state’s domestic border entails a larger trade barrier than crossing the international U.S. border.

A second key finding is that the joint estimation of domestic and international border effects yields substantially different estimates than when these effects are estimated separately. For example, the coefficient on $OWNSTATE_{ij}$ is 1.48 (Table 1, column 2) when estimated separately, and 2.05 (Table 2, column 4) when estimated jointly. Meanwhile, the coefficient on
"INTERNATIONAL\_ij shows an even larger change. This coefficient changes from -0.05 (Table 1, column 6) when estimated separately to -1.10 (Table 2, column 4) when estimated jointly.\(^{23}\)

Why do these differences arise? We can think of them in terms of a sample selection problem. The ownstate border regressions in Table 1 systematically leave out observations that trade the least (i.e., international observations). Thus, while trade flows within states are still very high, comparatively they appear more moderate if international observations are ignored. This imparts a downward bias, leading to an underestimated domestic border effect. By the same token, the domestic border effect is also smaller in the Canadian subsample (Table 2, columns 1 and 2) than in the full sample (Table 2, columns 3 and 4).

In a similar vein, the international border regressions in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 systematically leave out those observations that are characterized by exceptionally high trade flows (i.e., the ownstate observations). International trade flows therefore do not seem as low as they would in the complete sample that includes ownstate observations as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. This leads to a downward bias in the magnitude of the international border effect. But once the ownstate observations are added, the international border effect estimate (-1.10) is comparable to values commonly found in the literature.

4.3 Robustness

Various authors, such as Helliwell and Verdier (2001) and Head and Mayer (2009), have pointed out that the estimation of border effects is sensitive to how distance is measured. For example, if the economic distance within a U.S. state is much shorter than indicated by

\(^{23}\) Another result from Table 2 is that the international border effect for Canada is smaller in absolute size than the international border effect based on 50 export destinations. This finding is consistent with the expectation that trade costs associated with the U.S.-Canadian border should be smaller than the average trade costs associated with other countries.
conventional measures—perhaps because economic activity is highly concentrated in two nearby cities—then it might no longer be surprising if a state trades considerably more within its boundaries than with partners further away. To address this concern we employ three alternative distance measures that have been suggested in the literature.

Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 use the alternative measure for ownstate distance proposed by Wolf (2000). This measure weights the distance between a state’s two largest cities by their population. It thus better reflects heavy concentration of economic activity in relatively small areas. For example, most economic activity in Utah is concentrated around Salt Lake City such that the conventional great circle distance measure could easily overstate actual shipping distances. As expected, on average this alternative measure results in shorter ownstate distances (109 km vs. 179 km) so that it reduces the domestic border effects compared to Table 2. The coefficient on \(OWNSTATE_{ij}\) declines from 1.78 (Table 2, column 2) to 1.37 (Table 3, column 1) for the Canadian sample, and from 2.05 (Table 2, column 4) to 1.64 (Table 3, column 4) for the 50-country sample. Despite the smaller magnitudes of the domestic border effects, they are still significantly different from the absolute values of the international border estimates in columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 (the p-values are 0.00 and 0.02). Also note that compared to Table 2, the results for the international border effects in Table 3 are virtually the same. A similar observation can be made concerning the coefficients estimated for distance.

In columns 2 and 5 we employ a measure of ownstate distance that is based on land area, as proposed by Nitsch (2000). His measure is based on a hypothetical circular economy with three equal-sized cities, one in the center and the other two on opposite sides of the circle. The

---

24 For the Canadian case Helliwell and Verdier (2001) develop more sophisticated measures of within-province distance that more accurately reflect the population distribution and distances within and to rural areas. Their approach yields internal distances that are higher than usual, which would imply larger domestic border effects. But it is unknown whether this result would also obtain for ownstate distances within the U.S.
average internal distance of such an economy, and also other economies with more complex structures, can be approximated by the radius of the circle. In the data this is computed as $1/\sqrt{\pi} = 0.56$ times the square root of the area in km$^2$ and on average results in roughly similar ownstate distances (170 km vs. 179 km). Nevertheless, the ownstate dummy estimates increase slightly compared to the results in Table 2. They increase to 1.95 from 1.78 for the Canada sample and to 2.23 from 2.05 for the 50-country sample.

In columns 3 and 6 we employ a third alternative distance measure that is closer to actual shipping distances observed within the U.S. Based on private-use Commodity Flow Survey data at the ZIP code level, Hillberry and Hummels (2003, equation 4 and table 1) provide a statistical relationship between the distance measure used by Wolf (2000), an ownstate dummy and an adjacency dummy. They estimate the following equation:

$$\ln(\text{actual dist}_{ij}) = \lambda_1 \ln(\text{Wolf dist}_{ij}) + \lambda_2 \text{OWNSTATE}_{ij} + \lambda_3 \text{adjacency}_{ij} + e_{ij}$$

with $\lambda_1 = 0.821$, $\lambda_2 = -0.498$ and $\lambda_3 = -0.404$. We use these coefficients to approximate actual shipping distances within the U.S. and to Canada and Mexico, and we then use them as an explanatory variable. The resulting distances are on average considerably shorter compared to the great circle distances, both within U.S. states (18 km vs. 179 km) as well as between U.S. states and to Canada and Mexico (450 km vs. 1556 km). The distances to overseas countries are not affected. As a consequence, the ownstate coefficient in column 3 is cut substantially but its absolute size (0.69) is still significantly larger than that of the international border coefficient (-0.07). In column 6 of Table 3, both the ownstate and the international border coefficients are reduced in magnitude to 1.50 from 2.05 for the ownstate coefficient and to -0.24 from -1.10 for the international coefficient such that their absolute difference remains highly significant.
In Table 4 we conduct further robustness checks. Hillberry and Hummels (2008) document that trade is highly concentrated at the local level and that it consists to some extent of local wholesale shipments. In columns 1 and 4 we therefore concentrate on trade between locations that are not within immediate proximity to limit the potential influence of wholesale shipments. In particular, we drop all state-to-state observations that are less than 200 miles apart to check whether they distort the sample. This excludes 100 cross-sections. But the regression results are virtually the same as in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. We obtain similar results if we also drop all within-state observations less than 200 miles apart (not reported here).

As we explain in section 3.2, Cassey (2009) raises doubts whether the Origin of Movement data are sufficiently similar to the actual origin of production in the case of Delaware, Vermont, Florida, Texas, Arkansas, and New Mexico. In columns 2 and 5 we therefore drop these six states from our sample. But the regression results are overall quite similar to those in Table 2.

In columns 3 and 6 we follow Wolf (2000) in adding an adjacency dummy that takes on the value 1 whenever two states are neighboring (say, Minnesota and Wisconsin). Like Wolf (2000) we find that adding an adjacency dummy reduces the ownstate coefficient. But the domestic border effect nevertheless remains stronger in absolute value than the international border effect. However, in column 6 we can no longer reject the hypothesis that their absolute values are equal (p-value = 0.30).

Finally, in column 7 we restrict the sample to Mexico as the sole export destination. The ownstate coefficient is similar to the one for the Canadian subsample in Tables 2-4. But the international border effect is more pronounced than for Canada, suggesting larger border-related
trade costs with Mexico. Yet, the ownstate coefficient is significantly larger in absolute size than the international border coefficient.

Overall, we conclude that although the point estimates of the domestic and international border effects can change depending on which distance measure and which subsample we use, it is a robust feature of the data that the absolute magnitude of the domestic border effect exceeds that of the international border effect. Their difference is highly significant in almost all specifications.

5. Discussion

We discuss a number of potential explanations for our empirical result that the domestic border effect is comparatively large. One major explanation is related to work by Hillberry and Hummels (2008). Based on ZIP-code level domestic U.S. trade flows, they document that trade within the United States is heavily concentrated at the local level. Trade within a single ZIP code is on average three times higher than trade with partners outside the ZIP code. As a major reason they point out the co-location of producers in supply chains to exploit informational spillovers, to minimize transportation costs and to facilitate just-in-time production.25 The local concentration of trade might also be related to external economies of scale in the presence of intermediate goods and associated agglomeration effects (see Rossi-Hansberg, 2005), as well as to hub-and-spoke distribution systems and wholesale shipments (see Hillberry and Hummels, 2003). Such

25 Historically, competition on U.S. state-to-state transportation routes was heavily restricted by the Interstate Commerce Commission well into the post-World War II era, giving companies an additional incentive to co-locate (see Levinson, 2006).
spatial clustering of economic activity can lead to large domestic border barrier estimates, as we find it in our results.26

The concentration of trade at the local level is also borne out in other types of data. Using individual transactions data from online auction websites, Hortaçsu, Martínez-Jerez and Douglas (2009) find that purchases tend to be disproportionately concentrated within a short distance perimeter, with many counterparties based in the same city. Some of these purchases can be explained by their location-specific nature, for example in the case of opera tickets. But the evidence also suggests that lack of trust and direct contract enforcement in case of breach may be major reasons behind the same-city bias, which the authors subsume under ‘contracting costs.’ They also find evidence for culture and local tastes as factors that shape the local concentration of trade. For example, the same-city effect is most pronounced for local interest items such as sports memorabilia (also see Blum and Goldfarb, 2006).

Business networks and immigration patterns might also be related to strong trade flows between relatively close locations. Combes, LaFourcade and Mayer (2005) report that business and immigrant networks significantly facilitate trade within France. They cite the reduction of information costs and the diffusion of preferences as two main economic mechanisms through which networks may operate. This includes the reduction of search costs associated with matching buyers and sellers (Rauch and Casella, 2003). As an additional facilitating factor for trade, Rauch and Trindade (2002) also mention the possibility of community sanctions that could be imposed amongst members of an ethnic network. In the context of the border effect in U.S. data, Millimet and Osang (2007) find that incorporating migration flows within the U.S.

---

26 The concentration of trade at the local level might also be related to firms’ slicing up their production chains (multi-stage production and vertical specialization). Yi (2008) offers an explanation of the border effect using the vertical specialization argument in a Ricardian framework.
diminishes the estimated intranational home bias. Business and immigrant networks therefore likely play an important role in explaining the trade-reducing effect of distance.\textsuperscript{27}

Evans (2006) introduces an important dimension into the study of international border effects. In contrast to the majority of the literature that is based on aggregate data, she distinguishes between the intensive and extensive margins of trade. This is motivated by the well-established fact that only a fraction of goods produced domestically is also exported. To isolate the portion of the international border effect that is attributable to the extensive margin, she re-estimates the international border effect whilst restricting production data to those firms that actually sell abroad. Overall, she finds that each margin explains about one-half of the conventional aggregate international border effect. However, it is an open question whether this result would also obtain for the domestic border effect. Evidence by Hillberry and Hummels (2008) shows that the extensive margin within the U.S. is much more sensitive to distance than the intensive margin. The extensive margin might therefore play a relatively larger role in explaining the domestic border effect.

6. Conclusion

We collect a data set of U.S. exports that combines three types of trade flows: trade within an individual state (Minnesota-Minnesota), trade between U.S. states (Minnesota-Texas) and trade flows from an individual U.S. state to a foreign country (Minnesota-Canada). This data set allows us to jointly estimate the effect on trade of crossing the domestic state border and the effect of crossing the international border.

\textsuperscript{27} The impact of ethnic networks on exports from U.S. states has been explored recently by Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin and Wall (2008). One of their findings is that the inclusion of a common network effect reduces the negative impact of distance on exports.
While we obtain point estimates generally found in the literature, we show that the international border effect is in fact smaller than the state border effect. That is, while trading internationally is still the most costly in absolute terms, overcoming the first few miles that are associated with leaving the home state is harder than crossing the international border once the home state has been left. This result is robust to alternative distance measures and different subsamples. Our paper thus sheds new light on the relative size of border effects by highlighting trade frictions at relatively short distances that are incurred before crossing the international border. This finding is consistent with the strong concentration of trade flows at the local level, as observed in trade data that are more finely disaggregated geographically.

In addition, by using a more complete data set that involves ownstate, national and international trade flows of U.S. states, we also address the sample selection bias that arises if domestic border effect studies ignore international trade flows and if international border effect studies ignore domestic trade flows. Specifically, we find that not taking these trade flows into account leads to the underestimation of both domestic and international border effects.
References


Table 1: Domestic and international border effects, estimated separately

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>U.S. only</th>
<th>U.S. and Canada</th>
<th>U.S. and 50 countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y_i)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y_j)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(dist_ij)</td>
<td>-1.08**</td>
<td>-1.07**</td>
<td>-1.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWNSTATE_ij</td>
<td>1.46**</td>
<td>1.48**</td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| National trade (reference group) | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Ownstate trade                  | yes | yes | no  | no  | no  |
| International trade              | no  | no  | yes | yes | yes |
| Observations                    | 1,801 | 5,403 | 1,801 | 5,403 | 4,091 | 12,273 |
| Clusters                        | -- | 1,801 | -- | 1,801 | -- | 4,091 |
| Fixed effects                   | yes | yes | no  | no  | yes | yes |
| R-squared                       | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.87 | 0.87 |

Notes: The dependent variable is ln(x_ij). OLS estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered around country pairs ij. Exporter and importer fixed effects in columns 1 and 2; country fixed effects in columns 5 and 6; time-varying in columns 2 and 6; random effects in column 4. Constants and year dummies are not reported. * significant at 10% level. ** significant at 1% level.
Table 2: Domestic and international border effects, estimated jointly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>U.S. and Canada</th>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. and 50 countries</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ln(yi)</th>
<th>ln(yi)</th>
<th>ln(distij)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.96**</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>-0.94**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>0.90**</td>
<td>-0.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>-0.83**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWNSTATEij</td>
<td>1.75**</td>
<td>1.78**</td>
<td>2.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONALij</td>
<td>-0.33**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-1.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[OWNSTATEij] =</td>
<td>[INTERNATIONALij]</td>
<td>[0.00] =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National trade</th>
<th>Ownstate trade</th>
<th>International trade</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Random effects</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>12,417</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is ln(yi). OLS estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered around country pairs ij. Random effects in columns 2 and 4. Constants and year dummies are not reported. ** significant at 1% level. The numbers in brackets report p-values for the test |OWNSTATEij| = |INTERNATIONALij|. 
### Table 3: Robustness - Alternative distance measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>U.S. and Canada</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. and 50 countries</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln(yi)</td>
<td>0.92**</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(yj)</td>
<td>0.90**</td>
<td>0.91**</td>
<td>0.90**</td>
<td>0.81**</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(distij): Wolf (2000)</td>
<td>-0.89**</td>
<td>-0.80**</td>
<td>-0.80**</td>
<td>-0.76**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(distij): Nitsch (2000)</td>
<td>-0.97**</td>
<td>-1.01**</td>
<td>-0.84**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(distij): Actual shipping distance</td>
<td>-1.13**</td>
<td>-1.06**</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWNSTATEij</td>
<td>1.37**</td>
<td>1.95**</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
<td>1.64**</td>
<td>2.23**</td>
<td>1.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONALij</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-1.13**</td>
<td>-1.06**</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[OWNSTATEij] = [INTERNATIONALij]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National trade (reference group)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownstate trade</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International trade</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>12,417</td>
<td>12,417</td>
<td>12,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>4,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effects</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is ln(xij). OLS estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered around country pairs ij. Random effects in all columns. Constants and year dummies are not reported. ** significant at 1% level. The numbers in brackets report p-values for the test |OWNSTATEij| = |INTERNATIONALij|. 
Table 4: Further robustness checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>U.S. and Canada</th>
<th>U.S. and 50 countries</th>
<th>U.S. and Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distance &gt; 200 m.</td>
<td>Fewer states</td>
<td>Adjacency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y_i)</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>0.90**</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(y_j)</td>
<td>0.91**</td>
<td>0.86**</td>
<td>0.92**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(dist_{ij})</td>
<td>-0.97**</td>
<td>-0.92**</td>
<td>-0.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj_{ij}</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>1.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWNSTATE_{ij}</td>
<td>1.67**</td>
<td>1.68**</td>
<td>1.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL_{ij}</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>|OWNSTATE_{ij}| = |INTERNATIONAL_{ij}|</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is ln(x_{ij}). OLS estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered around country pairs ij. Random effects in all columns. Constants and year dummies are not reported. ** significant at 1% level. The numbers in brackets report p-values for the test \|OWNSTATE_{ij}\| = \|INTERNATIONAL_{ij}\|. Columns 1 and 4 drop all pairs of U.S. states that are less than 200 miles apart. Columns 2 and 5 drop states with inferior data quality (AR, DE, FL, NM, TX, VT), see Section 3.2. Columns 3 and 6 add an adjacency dummy that is one if two regions have a land border. Column 7 drops all other foreign countries except Mexico.
2793 Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith, Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation, September 2009


2795 Rüdiger Pethig and Frieder Kolleß, Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition, Unemployment and Losses from Capital Market Integration, September 2009

2796 Ngo Van Long, Horst Raff and Frank Stähler, Innovation and Trade with Heterogeneous Firms, September 2009

2797 Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings?, September 2009

2798 Thiess Buettner and Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an Automatic Stabilizer, September 2009

2799 Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education, September 2009

2800 Peter Friedrich, Chang Woon Nam and Janno Reiljan, Local Fiscal Equalization in Estonia: Is a Reform Necessary?, September 2009

2801 Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek, State Ownership and Control in the Czech Republic, September 2009

2802 Michael Stimmelmayr, Wage Inequality in Germany: Disentangling Demand and Supply Effects, September 2009

2803 Biswa N. Bhattacharyya, Towards a Macroprudential Surveillance and Remedial Policy Formulation System for Monitoring Financial Crisis, September 2009

2804 Margarita Katsimi, Sarantis Kalyvitis and Thomas Moutos, “Unwarranted” Wage Changes and the Return on Capital, September 2009

2805 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, Aid, Growth and Devolution, September 2009

2806 Bas Jacobs and Dirk Schindler, On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce Moral Hazard in Social Insurance, September 2009

2807 Hans Gersbach and Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Development, September 2009
2808 David E. Wildasin, Fiscal Competition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and Capital: A Comparative Dynamic Analysis, September 2009


2811 Slobodan Djajić and Michael S. Michael, Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach, October 2009

2812 Devis Geron, Social Security Incidence under Uncertainty Assessing Italian Reforms, October 2009

2813 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, Economic Nationalism and Economic Integration: The Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century, October 2009

2814 Emilia Simeonova, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Impact of Natural Disasters on Pregnancy Outcomes, October 2009

2815 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and Policy Outcomes, October 2009

2816 Sascha O. Becker, Erik Hornung and Ludger Woessmann, Catch Me If You Can: Education and Catch-up in the Industrial Revolution, October 2009

2817 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Imports, Pass-Through, and the Structure of Retail Markets, October 2009

2818 Paul De Grauwe and Daniel Gros, A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB, October 2009

2819 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Thouraya Hadj Amor and Christophe Rault, International Financial Integration and Real Exchange Rate Long-Run Dynamics in Emerging Countries: Some Panel Evidence, October 2009

2820 Saša Žiković and Randall K. Filer, Hybrid Historical Simulation VaR and ES: Performance in Developed and Emerging Markets, October 2009

2821 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, The Political Economy of Conscription, October 2009

2822 Steinar Holden and Åsa Rosén, Discrimination and Employment Protection, October 2009

2823 David G. Mayes, Banking Crisis Resolution Policy – Lessons from Recent Experience – Which elements are needed for robust and efficient crisis resolution?, October 2009
2824 Christoph A. Schaltegger, Frank Somogyi and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area, October 2009


2826 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, Worker-Specific Effects of Globalisation, October 2009

2827 Alexander Fink and Thomas Stratmann, Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints, October 2009

2828 Wolfgang Ochel and Anja Rohwer, Reduction of Employment Protection in Europe: A Comparative Fuzzy-Set Analysis, October 2009

2829 Rainald Borck and Martin Wimberson, Political Economics of Higher Education Finance, October 2009


2831 Klaus Wälde, Production Technologies in Stochastic Continuous Time Models, October 2009

2832 Biswa Bhattacharyay, Dennis Dlugosch, Benedikt Kolb, Kajal Lahiri, Irshat Mukhametov and Gernot Nerb, Early Warning System for Economic and Financial Risks in Kazakhstan, October 2009

2833 Jean-Claude Trichet, The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support, October 2009

2834 Hans Gersbach, Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication, October 2009

2835 Ansgar Belke, Gunther Schnabl and Holger Zemanek, Real Convergence, Capital Flows, and Competitiveness in Central and Eastern Europe, October 2009

2836 Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer, The Life Satisfaction Approach to Environmental Valuation, October 2009

2837 Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl, Green Serves the Dirtiest: On the Interaction between Black and Green Quotas, October 2009

2838 Katarina Keller, Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, Does Military Draft Discourage Enrollment in Higher Education? Evidence from OECD Countries, October 2009

2839 Giovanni Cespa and Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek, October 2009
2840 Jan Boone and Jan C. van Ours, Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?, October 2009

2841 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel and Stephan L. Thomsen, Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-Being of Immigrants, October 2009

2842 Andrea Weber and Christine Zulehner, Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?, November 2009

2843 Hadi Salehi Esfahani, Kamiar Mohaddes and M. Hashem Pesaran, Oil Exports and the Iranian Economy, November 2009


2845 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Burcu Erdogan and Vladimir Kuzin, Testing for Convergence in Stock Markets: A Non-Linear Factor Approach, November 2009

2846 Michèle Belot and Jan Fidrmuc, Anthropometry of Love – Height and Gender Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages, November 2009

2847 Volker Nitsch and Nikolaus Wolf, Tear Down this Wall: On the Persistence of Borders in Trade, November 2009

2848 Jan K. Brueckner and Stef Proost, Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity, November 2009


2850 Scott Alan Carson, The Relationship between Stature and Insolation: Evidence from Soldiers and Prisoners, November 2009

2851 Horst Raff and Joachim Wagner, Intra-Industry Adjustment to Import Competition: Theory and Application to the German Clothing Industry, November 2009

2852 Erkki Koskela, Impacts of Labor Taxation with Perfectly and Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets under Flexible Outsourcing, November 2009

2853 Cletus C. Coughlin and Dennis Novy, Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade, November 2009