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Market liquidity: an introduction for practitioners

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Market Liquidity:
An Introduction for Practitioners

by Christian Schäffler and Christian Schmaltz

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Market Liquidity: An Introduction for Practitioners

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Abstract

This working paper surveys theoretical and empirical work about market liquidity and market liquidity risk. It addresses interested practitioners as well as students who want to gain a quick overview about the latest progress in research in market liquidity.

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1 Introduction

In theory, securities can always be traded at their fundamental value: every agent is able to calculate the fundamental value and all agents obtain the same value as they use the same information and the true model. Hence, market value and fundamental value coincide.

The stock market turmoil in the middle of September 2008 is a good example that real markets behave differently:

The stock market turmoil of September 15th provides evidence that market liquidity might be fragile under certain circumstances. That day showed that a market collapse is possible. We take that turmoil as motivation to survey the literature with respect to market liquidity and market liquidity risk.

The trigger of the crash has been the sub prime crisis with the effects of a decimation of the financial sector, since August 2007. The consequence was the bankruptcy of two out of five independent US-investment banks. The insolvency of Lehman Brothers and the absence of U.S. Government intervention were the headline of that trading day. As a consequence, one was able to observe drastic but temporary price changes across many asset classes.

On that day, the DAX lost 2.7% in the end after a short-term loss of 4.7%. The main losses were in the financial sector, e.g. Commerzbank lost 16% and ended with a 3.9% loss. Temporarily the decline in prices at the bank stock HBOS was 30%. The temporal effect of this decline in prices is illustrated in figure 1.

Figure 1: DAX 2009-09-15
But not only the stock market registered losses. Commodities did, too. Base metals lost up to 8% and the oil price went down too 7$ per barrel. Meanwhile futures on U.S. government bonds went down by 2 basis points. This has been the highest boost since 20 years. Additionally, the Itraxx Crossover Index which points out the credit default insurance costs of a portfolio of European firms jumped up to 613 points. The fixing on the last trading day was 543 points. This example shows the typical characteristics of market liquidity. The high oscillation in the stock market (e.g. Commerzbank) is an evidence for the relation between market liquidity and the volatility. Furthermore, the example illustrates a phenomenon called flight to quality: Which was proved by the highest go down on the U.S. Bond future. In addition the temporary losses are commonality across securities. This is reflected in the market down of oil, commodities and the whole stock market. It can be observe, that the problems in the financial sector sent out a wave to the whole market, with all it’s segments. These example show, that market liquidity is an actual problem for all market participants.

Although the average market liquidity has substantially improved in the last decade, its fragility (Market Liquidity Risk) has been increased by the convergence of investors’ behavior.\(^1\) The interest of researchers has therefore seen a conceptual shift from market liquidity to market liquidity risk.

Although market liquidity has been identified as a research topic\(^2\) early on, it is only recently that practitioners have been sensitized for that topic.

What can go wrong if practitioners use models that assume perfectly liquid markets?

- **Transaction Costs**
  The accuracy gain in valuation of models that propose continuous rebalancing could be easily offset by transaction costs that are neglected in the model. Dynamic strategies that are optimal in the model world are no longer optimal in the real world. The most obvious transaction costs are bid-ask-spreads.

- **Substantial Rebalancing Losses**
  Rebalancing might only be favourable in a ceteris paribus environment. However, if other large players follow the same strategy (or need) (not ceteris paribus), rebalancing might turn out to be costly.

- **Diversification across asset classes**
  Market Liquidity can be a systematic phenomenon: it often affects a whole market segment or even several markets. But there still might be diversification effects nevertheless as selling investors have to be invested somewhere: apart from many assets that collapse, some assets might experience a price push (like government bonds) as investors ’herd’ to them (‘flight to quality’).\(^3\) These assets can be considered as liquidity substitutes as they are not held for yield pickup reasons.

\(^1\)[Persaud, 2003, p. XVI]  
\(^2\)E.g. [Fisher, 1959] reports that US Corporate Bond spreads bear a liquidity risk premium.  
\(^3\)Gibson and Mougeot, p. 157 f.
1 INTRODUCTION

- Misleading Pricing
  Cash Flows with different liquidity levels have different prices (‘price impact of liquidity’). Smaller stocks that are less liquid require higher risk premia than larger, liquid stocks. Observed corporate bond spreads are much higher than the default premium that is predicted by credit-sensitive models.

- Imperfect Hedges
  Positions that are theoretically hedged based on market models with perfect liquidity are still unhedged against market liquidity risk. Therefore, asset pricing models with perfect liquid markets implys fallacious hedges.

In models that do not account for liquidity and liquidity risk, all these components would be summarised as model risk leading to higher P&L-volatility. Therefore, it is necessary to create an awareness for market liquidity and its risk potential in practice. We consider this survey a contribution towards this goal: we provide a model overview and report empirical findings about the characteristics and pricing impact of market liquidity. As the market liquidity literature has seen a dynamic growth, we are not able to claim completeness. However, we do not consider completeness as a necessary condition for an introductory paper.

The survey is structured as follows: the first section presents stylised facts about market liquidity. In the second section, we discuss models that derive these facts endogenously. Within the third section, we report findings from empirical work. The fourth section concludes.

4[Amihud et al., 2005, p.303]
2 Market Liquidity Models

2.1 Overview

The setup of market mechanisms and their implications for pricing are systematically analysed in the market microstructure literature. Other more detailed model surveys can be found in [O'Hara, 1995], [O'Hara, 2001] and [Biais et al., 2005].

The characteristics of market liquidity are as follows:

- Existence of bid-ask spreads
  Models of perfect capital markets\(^5\) are incompatible with observable bid-ask spreads.

- Evaporation of market liquidity
  Violent temporary price movements can be observed that cannot be explained by fundamentals only (e.g. Russian/LTCM-crisis in 1998). During these market turmoil, it is difficult and costly to sell assets. However, these price movements are only temporary and reverse some days later.

- Comovement of asset liquidity
  Often, temporary price movements affect a whole market segment or even several markets. There might be 'market liquidity' risk, i.e. a systemic component in asset liquidity.

- Flight to quality
  Liquidity crises have an asymmetric profile: apart from many assets that collapse, some assets might experience a price push (like government bonds) as investors 'herd' to them ('flight to quality')\(^6\).

A multitude of models exist to replicate these observable patterns. The first models aimed at explaining low market liquidity levels visible by transaction costs and/or low trading volumes. In more recent models the focus shifted from the market liquidity level towards market liquidity volatility.

In this survey, we include the models given in table 2. We consider these models having been decisive in the past or promising for future research. The keywords can be interpreted as 'model category' describing the principal factor that drives market liquidity in the model.

The distinction 'Market Maker' versus 'any other agent' is made to indicate which agent type drives market liquidity with its decisions. The economic key role of Market Makers is the provision of market liquidity. Indeed, in normal market circumstances they provide market liquidity. They might however not be willing to provide unlimited market liquidity. More realistically, there might be circumstances in which they suspend their liquidity provision or even absorb liquidity. The reasons why their provision might be limited are chosen as 'keyword'. Within the section 'any other agent', the existence of Market Makers is not a necessary condition. In these models, Market Makers do not occur at all or only for 'technical' model constraints.

\(^5\)[Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2007, p. 19]
\(^6\)Gibson and Mougeot, p. 157 ff.
We also indicate model particularities to make it easier for the reader to distinguish models.

### 2.2 Inventory Risk

Inventory risk is the price risk that Market Makers have to bear for the time that they run open positions, i.e. they bought more than they sold or vice versa. A Market Maker is a (central) intermediary between supply and demand. If there is a volume or time mismatch, Market Makers run open positions. [Grossman and Miller, 1988] is based on the following key assumptions:

1. Time mismatch between supply (t1) and demand (t2)
2. Limited absorption capacity of Market Makers (finite risk-bearing capacity)
3. Risk-averse Market Makers (demand a risk premium for inventory risk)
4. Operating costs (to endogenize number of Market Makers = long-term liquidity level)

The particularity of [Grossman and Miller, 1988] is that they describe the short-term market liquidity (the number of Market Makers is given) and the long-term (average) market liquidity (the number of Market Makers is endogenized). The short-term liquidity, i.e. the price discount that a seller has to accept to sell immediately, is determined by the risk premium for the inventory risk (price risk of the inventory). The risk premium is increasing in the volatility of the underlying, the risk aversion of sellers and the size of the liquidity shock. The risk premium decreases in the number
of Market Makers as the price risk is shared across more parties, but the number of Market Makers can not adjust immediately. In the long-run, the number of Market Makers is endogenous, determined by the operating costs resulting from monitoring trades, equipment and availability. Hence, the long-run, average market liquidity is determined by the operating costs of Market Makers.

2.3 Inventory Cost

We decided to separate inventory cost and inventory risk to emphasize that inventory risk refers to a risk premium, whereas inventory cost are not based on a risk premium. [Stoll, 1978] includes the short-term operating costs (order costs and insider information cost) and adds holding costs. Holding costs are the monetary equivalent of a utility reduction that results from a suboptimal portfolio allocation. It is assumed that the Market Maker has an optimal portfolio mix (= risk/return-ratio) based on its expectations and preferences. By buying/selling inventory, his position deviates from the optimal portfolio resulting in an inferior utility level. The loss in utility is converted into a money equivalent via the holding costs (function). The liquidity measure modelled in [Stoll, 1978] is the bid-ask spread. The Market Maker uses the bid-ask spread to encourage transactions that rebalance his portfolio back to the optimal position. Thus, he reduces its holding costs. As the deviation from the optimal portfolio does not necessarily result from a higher risk position, but could also result from a smaller risk position or just the same risk at a lower return, the rationale ‘inventory costs’ is somewhat different than the previous section ‘inventory risk’. In the rationale ‘inventory risk’, liquidity was only affected by the riskiness and risk-aversion of Market Makers. The risk/return-profile was not modelled. As [Stoll, 1978] is based on the individual preferences of the Market Maker, the model provides an explanation why bid-ask-spreads vary across assets when they are quoted by different Market Makers.

2.4 Information Asymmetries

[Glosten and Milgrom, 1985] argue that the bid-ask spread results when Market Makers trade with insiders. Their model assumes that investors have seen private signals that are unobservable to Market Makers. Hence, sales are triggered due to the knowledge that the price is going to decrease, whereas purchases are driven by the conviction that prices are going to increase. The Market Maker anticipates the price movements: he sells for a higher and buys for a lower price than the price with symmetric information. Without these price corrections, he would suffer from systematic losses and would be forced to exit the market. As the trades reveal information, spreads tend to decline with each trade. The bid-ask spreads widen, if the insider information becomes better or the number of insiders increases.

In [Kyle, 1985], Market Makers have only a passive function. The model is a sequential auction model, i.e. noise traders determine their quantities first and insiders learn about the ex post liquidation value of the asset afterwards. Insiders determine

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7 Insiders are private investors.
8 Less noise, more value impact.
their quantity to trade, whereas they must make rational conjectures about market liquidity variables (measured by tightness, depth, resiliency) to choose optimal quantities to trade. In the sequential set up, tightness is an increasing function in how quickly a position has to be turned. Depth increases in the number of noise traders and resiliency is only established by insiders.\footnote{p. 1331. As noise traders would not drive the price anywhere, but fluctuating around its current level.}

2.5 Trading Options

Trading options refer to \cite{Duffie2005} promoting the idea that Market Makers set bid-ask spreads depending on their outside-options (inter dealer market), the outside-options of the investors (other Market Makers, other investors) and their own bargaining power. It follows that in equilibrium, bid- and ask-prices are not around the fair price (inter dealer market price), but below as they are the fair price minus an illiquidity discount. The bid-ask spread widens in the bargaining power of the Market Maker and narrows in case of the investor to find another investor or Market Maker. In a set up with sophisticated and non-sophisticated\footnote{‘Sophisticated’: investors have better access to Market Makers.} investors, sophisticated ones obtain better quotes due to their better outside-options with other Market Makers.

2.6 Funding Constraints

The channel 'funding constraints' of market participants has attracted broad attention. The rationale is as follows: given a capital/ funding/ margin requirement that tightens in downside markets, agents are forced to sell further to meet their margin requirements, thus further depressing the market price etc. (if they have price impact).

Market Makers are meant to provide market liquidity, i.e. to buy when others sell. However, if Market Makers are funding constraint as well, they might not be able to provide market liquidity: They cannot buy or even have to sell as well if their funding capacity shrinks.

This road has been explored by \cite{Brunnermeier2006}. They observe that the activities of traders are partly self-financing by borrowing against the securities (collateral). However, to protect themselves against defaults, borrowers do not fund the full market value, but that reduced by a margin (haircut). The margin needs to be equity-funded in form of capital and long-term borrowings. A demand shock on investors consumption leads to a supply shock of shares as investors would like to liquidate their security positions. Market prices can be stabilized if traders are able to absorb the excess supply of securities. However, their ability to do so might be constrained, if they do not have enough capital to enter new positions or there is a risk that they will not be able to produce it during the life of the trade (funding constraint becomes binding). The capital shortage might result from sustained losses, reduction in short-term borrowing or margin increase (because security volatility increases). The model contains two amplification mechanisms:

1. Liquidity spiral
Due to the decline in funding, traders provide less market liquidity which means even more deteriorated market prices which again reduce funding capacity of traders.

2. Loss spiral
   If the trader already holds a position in the deteriorating asset, he is incentivized to sell in order to meet his funding problems. By bidding at the same side as the investors, he does not provide but absorb market liquidity which leads to further losses in his position triggering further sales.

The model replicates the following market liquidity characteristics:

1. Market liquidity is related to volatility
2. Flight to quality
3. Commonality across securities
4. Market liquidity dries up in market downturns

The following models do not rely on the failure of Market Makers activities. They are situated on markets without Market Makers.

[Shleifer and Vishny, 1992] analyse the price behavior of assets that are little fungible and redeployable (specialized assets). Specialised assets are only useful for other industry-insiders. Yet, in case of an industry-wide earnings shock, an agent would like to sell his specialized asset. Due to the systemic character of the shock, other industry-insiders might be funding-constraint to buy or even willing to sell, too. Hence, there is a large excess supply within the industry. Only industry-outsiders without funding constraints (‘Deep Pocket Outsiders’) could absorb this imbalance. The liquidation price to outsiders is far below the prices to insiders due to information asymmetries: outsiders do not know how to value the asset properly and thus fear an overestimation. They anticipate the overestimation by negotiating a large discount. The second interpretation for the illiquidity discount is the occurrence of agency costs as the outsiders hire a specialist to act for them. Apart from the private costs for the seller, there are social costs of illiquidity as outsiders are not the best users of the assets.

[Krishnamurthy, 2003] focus on the idea that shocks in market liquidity are often observable in economic downturns. Their departure point is the observation that assets (as machines) often have a double function: in the production process they serve as input. For borrowers they serve as collateral. The collateral value determines the debt capacity of the company which determines the production. Hence, these assets link production and financial sphere. By consequence, economic shocks may propagate via the collateral channel to the financial sphere. An economic downturn (demand shock) leads to a decline of the collateral value (=liquidation value) as potential buyers (competitors) are likely to be in cash distress as well\footnote{Here Krishnamurthy adopts the same logic as [Shleifer and Vishny, 1992].}. The declined collateral value leads to a decline in debt capacity which reduces production level which intern reduces collateral value.
2.7 Predatory Trading

Predatory trading is the strategic selling against another distressed financial agent who is usually forced to unwind positions. The literature stream ‘Predatory Trading’ assumes that the position unwinding has a market price impact. Hence, it abates the market price. It is furthermore assumed that the composition of the positions are known. By consequence, the coming trades of the distressed agents are known (or very probable) and other large agents could speculate against them by further deteriorating the prices (going short immediately and going long when prices have been depressed even more). Predators are often Market Makers / arbitrageurs that provide liquidity under normal market circumstances. However, by their predatory behaviour they absorb liquidity.

[Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005] base this on the following assumptions:

1. (Key) There are large traders with price impact (price function is convex in quantity). Hence, they act strategically, i.e. they take into account the price impact of their decisions.

2. (Key) Positions of large traders are limited.

3. Strategic traders are exposed to random financial distress. Once hit, they have to liquidate their position. As liquidating at once is not optimal because of its price impact, the distressed agent liquidates gradually. These trades can be predicted by predators.

4. There are long-term price-taking traders that do not attempt to profit from short-term price fluctuations.

5. Liquidation strategy of distressed traders is known ((i) It’s known who is in distress, (ii) like (i) + position size). As there is only one risky asset, there are no doubts which assets are held by the distressed agent.

Within the model, predating leads to substantial illiquidity (price deviation from fundamental price). The most fiercest predating occurs with a single predator. The more predators are bidding, the less dramatic is the price impact, as the deviation from collusion is profitable and there are no credible punishment mechanisms (they buy too early). The model replicates the following pattern:

1. Price overshothing (driven by liquidity, not by fundamentals).

2. Selling market attracts sellers.

3. The less predators, the fierce the predation. Many predators do not trust each other as deviation from collusion is profitable and there are no credible punishment mechanisms.

4. Predatory trading makes liquidation excessively expensive. The excess liquidation costs are predators’ profit.

5. Possible spill overs of forced liquidation to other traders.
6. Possible spill over to other markets as all positions of a trader have to be liqui-
dated.

Another model that studies 'Predatory Trading' is [Attari et al., 2005]. It is sim-
ilar in its structure as it makes assumptions about traders with price impact that
are exposed to a liquidity shock. The positions and financial conditions [distressed/
healthy] of traders are also known. By contrast, the strategic trader does not observe
the liquidity shock. This reduces the predictability of the actions of the distressed
trader and introduces interval solutions.

Instead of expliciting the pricing function, [Attari et al., 2005] focus on the funding
constraint: It depends on market prices and shrinks agents’ financial freedom in
downsize-markets (when agents need liquidity most).

In contrast to [Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005], they do not analyse the impact of
several strategic traders but concentrate on one single distressed and one strategic
traders. The model distinguishes three regimes: (i) unconstrained, (ii) precarious and
(iii) distressed arbitrageurs. An unconstrained arbitrageur has enough flexibility to
answer strategically (adjust quantities). Hence, the strategic trader does not trade.

A precarious trader does not have an alternative out to fully liquidate its position and
to exit the market. The strategic trader sells short as well and goes long when prices
are far below fundamental value. The actions of a distressed trader (intermediary
case) are as follows: for a low initial debt level, he is going to buy assets to maintain
market prices. Hence, the strategic trader sells assets. For a high debt level, the
arbitrageur will immediately liquidate the position. In consequence, the strategic
trader buys. On an intermediary debt level, the strategic trader abstains from trading
as he is uncertain about the decision of the arbitrageur: the arbitrageur might buy to
maintain the price level or might liquidate. As the size of the liquidity shock is not
known, the both actions are possible. [Attari et al., 2005] examine that the strategic
trader might lend to the distressed trader prior to the first trading round, in order
to relax his capital constraint. Thus, the upcoming actions of the distressed trader
become more predictable (he is going to buy to maintain the price level). Concluding,
it can be stated that [Attari et al., 2005] provide a rationale why financially distressed
agents might cause an excessive price deterioration. Furthermore they motivate why
a lending might be beneficial in some scenarios.

2.8 Productivity

The category 'Productivity' departs from the observation that liquidity is low in
economic downturns (recessions), i.e. comoves with fundamentals. A possible link
between a fundamental variable (productivity) and market liquidity is explored by
[Eisfeldt, 2004]. In [Eisfeldt, 2004] we do not find a typical market microstructure
model as the model employed assumes price taking agents and simultaneous trades.
It does not 'know' Market Makers: the only agents are investors that invest in t0
into risky projects that payoff in t2. In t1, investors obtain a private information
whether their projects fail (low-quality project) or succeed (high-quality project).
Instead of waiting till the project payoff is regularly paid (t2), agents might transfer
the future payoff into t1 by issuing claims. A high number of issued claims reflects
high market liquidity. The objective of anticipated consumption is one motivation
to issue claims\textsuperscript{12}. Another objective to issue claims is the transfer of the project risk to other agents. As the agents already know about the success or failure of their projects, they attempt to sell the bad projects. In bad times (productivity is low), there are little attractive investment opportunities. Hence, investors have little motivation to invest large amounts. They prefer to store their wealth in a riskless storage technology. It follows that their current income and risk exposure is small. The main reason to issue claims is the project quality: issues are intended to transfer bad projects to other agents. Low market prices reflect that the quality of available claims is low. Hence, issuing high-quality claims for the consumption argument, i.e. to transfer $t_2$-consumption to $t_1$ requires a large discount. A large discount signifies low market liquidity. By contrast, if productivity is positively shocked, agents invest larger amounts in risky projects in $t_0$. The main motivation in $t_1$ to issue claims is now the consumption and risk argument. Consumption, not low project quality, is the main driver to issue claims. Hence, the market prices go up and the premium to consume $t_2$-income already in $t_1$ is lower. Hence, market liquidity is higher. Therefore, in [Eisfeldt, 2004] market liquidity is driven by a fundamental: productivity.

2.9 Self-fulfilling Beliefs

In the section ‘Self-fulfilling Beliefs’ we discuss how agents drive the economy with their expectations. Their individual actions are utility-maximizing, but their combine actions may lead to liquidity crises. It is based on the observation that market prices (liquidity) might deteriorate without a visible trigger (e.g. macroeconomical shock). In these models there are no fundamental shocks, but only shocks in expectations [Chowdhry and Nanda, 1998] or liquidity probability [Bernado and Welch, 2004].

[Bernado and Welch, 2004] propose the idea that small changes in the likelihood of future liquidity shocks may lead to an immediate liquidity shock\textsuperscript{13}. They model the inherent short-term instability of markets. The instability mechanism of the model is an incentive for investors to liquidate first. Similar to a bank run, investors ′run′ the market and trigger sales ′waves′. Their model is based on the two crucial assumptions, that (i) order execution is not perfectly sequential and that (ii) the Market Maker-sector is risk-averse and cannot expand immediately (limited absorption capacity). In a sequential order system, orders are executed according to their arrival and investors know the prices at which they are executed. Non-sequential investors do not know at what prices their orders are executed. During market turmoils, orders that arrive only minutes apart could be executed at substantially different prices. To guarantee that massive sales deteriorate prices, a second assumption is needed: prices deteriorate because of the limited absorption capacity of the Market Maker segment as inventory risk increases, leading to higher liquidation costs. Hence, there is an incentive to liquidate first. The incentive is the destabilizing element and amplification mechanism of the model.

The trigger of a liquidity crisis is a small shift in the probability of future liquidity shocks: if an investor is hit by a liquidity shock, he has to unwind positions. As

\textsuperscript{12}Agents are assumed to have a utility function where smooth consumption maximizes utility.

\textsuperscript{13}In analogy to the ′bank run′-model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they call their model ′market run′-model.
stated, it is advantageous to liquidate first, if there is a risk that an investor will be hit by such a shock. Hence, investors 'run' the market. As a special example of a liquidity shock, the authors use the fear of a margin call. To introduce the recovery process of market liquidity it is assumed that some investors learn that the current price drops are liquidity (temporary price change) and not fundamentally (permanent price change) driven. Hence, they start being Market Makers and providing market liquidity by buying assets at a low level. This is a delayed relaxation of assumption (ii).

In [Chowdhry and Nanda, 1998] market liquidity turns out to be high if investors expect it to be high (and vice versa). Their framework is based on two types of investors: risk-averse and risk-neutral investors. Both groups have the same endowment (capital), whereas risk-neutral investors can borrow additional funds under the condition that their own capital accounts for at least margin [%] of the portfolio value (margin rule). The leverage combined with a fixed margin rule ensures that its investment capacity shrinks (extends) the more prices drop (rise). This is the amplification mechanism.

Investors can invest in t0 in a risk-free and a risky investment that both pay off at t2. At t1 investors can rebalance their quantities of risky and risk-free assets according to current market prices and their preferences. The market price is determined by the fraction of risky assets that is held by risk-averse investors, as they demand a premium (discount from fundamental value), while risk-neutral investors do not demand a risk-premium. It turns out that the equilibrium price at t0 is deterministic, but that there are multiple equilibria possible for t1. The t1 equilibrium price is substantially lower or higher than the t1 price. Depending on the beliefs of risk-averse investors, market prices rise or decline. If they believe that prices go up, they start buying risky assets which marginally raises prices. A small price rise implies a more than proportional additional borrowing enabling further purchases and further price rises ... This is a self-sustaining process. The belief of rising prices leads to a transfer of risky assets from risk-averse to risk-neutral (leveraged) investors. Risk-averse investors end up holding a small quantity of risky assets which leads to a high market price. If leveraged investors fear a price drop, they start selling risky assets which will substantially shrink their investment capacity via the margin channel and lead to the situation where risk-averse investors hold many risky assets, demanding a high risk premium and resulting in a low equilibrium market price.

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14The authors show that it is sufficient to have two groups with two different aversion levels. Risk-neutral and risk-averse as the two extremities are not necessary
3 Empirical Evidence of Market Liquidity

3.1 Overview

A broad range of empirical studies on market liquidity have been undertaken. This field of liquidity research profits from good data availability. The empirical research in market liquidity can be grouped into three categories:

1. Liquidity Measures
   How can market liquidity be measured?

2. Characteristics of Market Liquidity
   This research branch focuses on the statistical properties of market liquidity like time-variation, co-movement and asymmetry (Flight to Quality).

3. Impact of Market Liquidity on Asset Pricing
   This research branch analyses the existence and properties of liquidity risk premia.

The first question that an empirical survey has to tackle is how market liquidity can be measured. The first theoretical models described observable micromarket liquidity measures as bid-ask spread or trading volume. However, it is questionable whether they capture the rich properties (temporary, time-varying, co-movement, etc.) of market liquidity. The second generation of theoretic models interpreted liquidity as the price deviation of market prices from fundamental value. Unfortunately, the fundamental value is not observable. Therefore, empiricists had to use proxies. Market liquidity has several dimensions and therefore it is not surprising that no consensus about an optimal liquidity measure has been reached so far. The choice of the liquidity measure rather depends on the objective of the study and the analysed asset class. Each article motivates its measure choice. In order to improve the understanding, we show a list with market liquidity measures that has been compiled by [Sarr and Lybek, 2002] in the next section.

The study of the characteristics is important in order to define benchmarks to models: good models replicate a maximum of empirical characteristics.

The majority of pricing models assume perfectly liquid markets. However, a refined pricing is necessary as many bond and stock pricing models systematically predict smaller risk premia than are observable\(^\text{15}\). Biased prices lead to imperfect hedges which might induce future losses or additional hedging costs.

Within the studies that analyse the pricing impact of market liquidity, we distinguish between bonds and stocks. As the future cash flows of bonds are known (in contrast to stocks) their expected (current) yields are observable. By contrast, expected equity yields are unknown. They have to be estimated based on historical returns. Due to this fundamental methodological difference, we discuss papers about bond and stock market liquidity separately.

Figure 3 is an overview of the papers that we will discuss in the empirical section.

\(^{15}\)See for bonds: [Elton et al., 2001], [Teixeira, 2005]. See also [Eom et al., 2004] though they find that structural models underpredict high-grade, and overpredict low-grade spreads. See for equities: [Mehra and Prescott, 1985]


3.2 Measures of Market Liquidity

As [Sarr and Lybek, 2002] point out, market liquidity, i.e. the costs and time to convert an asset into legal tender, has several dimensions:

1. Tightness
   Tightness refers to low (explicit and implicit) transaction costs.

2. immediacy
   Immediacy refers to the speed at which orders are executed and settled.

3. Depth
   Depth refers to the existence of abundant orders.

4. Breadth
   Breadth refers to the fact that numerous and large (volume) orders have only a minimal price impact.

5. Resiliency
   Resiliency refers to the speed at which new orders flow into the market to correct order imbalances. Because order imbalances tend to move prices away from fundamental values, for a given permanent change, transitory changes should be minimal in resilient markets.

As market liquidity is not directly observable and has several dimensions, it is clear that it cannot be captured by a single measure. Furthermore, the available data does not exactly correspond to the aforementioned dimensions. [Sarr and Lybek, 2002] provide a list of market liquidity measures. They categorize liquidity measures as follows:

1. Transaction Cost Measures
   Transaction Cost Measures are directly linked to tightness and indirectly linked to breadth and resiliency as high transaction costs reduces breadth and resiliency.
   A typical representation of this category is the bid-ask-spread as it considers nearly all of the explicit and implicit transaction costs.

16 See [Amihud et al., 2005].
2. Volume-based Measures

Volume-based Measures particularly reflect breadth. A typical example is the Turnover Rate (TR) of an asset. The TR measures how many times the outstanding volume of an asset changes hands in a certain period. It is formalized as:

$$ TR = \frac{\sum P_i \cdot Q_i}{S \cdot P} $$

where:

- $P_i, Q_i$: price and trading volume of i\textsuperscript{th} trade
- $S$: outstanding stock of asset
- $P$: average price of i trades

A high turnover rate indicates high liquidity. To capture both trading activities and price volatility, the Hui-Heubel Liquidity Ratio for d days ($L_{HH}^d$) has been proposed:

$$ L_{HH}^d = \frac{(P_{\text{max}} - P_{\text{min}})/P_{\text{min}}}{V/(S \cdot \overline{P})} $$

where:

- $P_{\text{max}}, P_{\text{min}}$: highest/lowest price within last d days
- $V$: total dollar volume traded over last d days
- $S$: number of outstanding instruments
- $\overline{P}$: average closing price over last d days

A high $L_{HH}^d$ (i.e. small trading volume accompanied with high price fluctuations) represents low liquidity.

3. Price-based Measures

Price-based measures seek to measure the proportions between temporary and permanent price movements and capture the resiliency-dimension of market liquidity. An example is the Market-Efficiency-Coefficient (MEC):

$$ MEC = \frac{\text{Var}(R_t)}{T \cdot \text{Var}(r_t)} $$

where:

- $\text{Var}(R_t)$: variance of long-term log-returns
- $\text{Var}(r_t)$: variance of short-term log-returns
- $T$: number of short periods in each longer period

An MEC close, but slightly below of one represents resilient markets. Low liquidity is indicated by an MEC substantially lower than one.

4. Market-Impact Measures

These measures describe the impact of trading volume on prices (returns) and
capture market breadth. An example is the market-adjusted Liquidity:

\[ R_i = \alpha + \beta R_m + u_i \]

where:

- \( R_i \): daily return of ith stock
- \( R_m \): daily market return
- \( \beta, u_i \): systematic risk, asset-specific risk

\[ u_i^2 = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 V_i + \epsilon_i \]

where:

- \( u_i^2 \): squared residuals from previous regression
- \( V_i \): daily percentage change in volume traded
- \( \epsilon_i \): residuals (variation explained by omitted factors)

The price-impact of trading volume is captured by \( \gamma_2 \). The lower the impact, the higher the market liquidity of asset \( i \).

5. Other Econometric Techniques

The trading volume could be split up into expected (modelled) and unexpected trading volume. High price movements induced by unexpected trading activities indicate low liquidity referring to the market breadth. The expected trading volume could be proxied by ARMA or Garch-models\footnote{Garch: autoregressive volatility}.

[Amihud, 2002] introduced a measure that is based on data (volume, prices) that is commonly available in the majority of financial markets (in contrast to fine microstructure variables).

In order to capture the illiquidity of stock \( i \) in year \( y \), the following measure has been proposed:

\[ \text{Illiq}_{iy} = \frac{1}{D_{iy}} \sum_{i=1}^{D_{iy}} \frac{|R_{iyd}|}{VolD_{iyd}} \]

being:

- \( D_{iy} \): number of days with data available in year \( y \)
- \( R_{iyd} \): return of stock \( i \) at day \( d \) in year \( y \)
- \( VolD_{iyd} \): trading volume related to \( R_{iyd} \)

Here, illiquidity reflects market breadth and is large if high price fluctuations (high returns) are associated with small trading volumes.
3.3 Characteristics of Market Liquidity

[Chordia et al., 2000] pose the question how much of the fluctuations in stock market liquidity is systematic (common) and how much is idiosyncratic. This question is important in order to identify the sources of liquidity fluctuations and the propagation mechanism of market crashes. Furthermore, it is crucial for asset pricing as only systematic, undiversifiable risk is priced. If market liquidity risk turns out to be non-diversifiable, a risk premium has to be demanded. [Chordia et al., 2000] use a data sample comprising stock price data of 1.169 stocks listed at the New York Stock Exchange.\(^{18}\) They use traditional market microstructure liquidity measures:

1. Quoted bid-ask-spread and variations (effective spread, proportional quoted and effective spread)
2. Trading volume (number of shares traded)

They calculate the liquidity variables on stock as well as on market level. To obtain the part of stock liquidity that is explained by market liquidity (systematic fraction), they regress the individual quantities on the market quantities.

1. A substantial fraction of stocks’ liquidity (on NYSE) changes are of systemic nature. Liquidity is measured with traditional microeconomic liquidity measures as bid-asks-spreads and depth.
2. There are some indications, that the source of aggregate liquidity fluctuations are due to asymmetric information and inventory risk.

[Chordia et al., 2005] are interested in the question how much of the systematic liquidity fluctuations within one asset class (stocks) is systematic across asset classes (bonds, stocks). Their data sample is composed of daily trading data of treasury notes (on-the-run, 10y maturity) and NYSE-stocks covering the period June 1991-Dec 1998. To measure market liquidity the authors chose the following metrics for both bond and stock markets:

1. Bid-Ask Spread\(^{19}\)
2. Trading Volume\(^{20}\)
3. Imbalance\(^{21}\)

After extracting seasonalities in the liquidity series, the authors compute the correlations between return (price) volatilities and liquidity measures within and across markets. It turns out that bond and stock volatility the same as bond and stock liquidity (bid-ask-spreads) exhibit some common movements. Furthermore, within each

\(^{18}\)The sample comprises 29,655,629 transactions resulting from 1.169 stocks and 254 trading days in 1992.
\(^{19}\)Daily time-weighted average quoted bid-ask spread obtained as the difference between the best bid and the best ask per $100 par value.
\(^{20}\)Posted bid and ask depth in $, averaged over the trading day.
\(^{21}\)Dollar value of buys minus dollar values of sells each day divided by absolute dollar sum of buys and sells.
market, parts of volatility and liquidity move together. As correlations only reveal univariate relationships and no causalities, they set up a Vector-Autoregressive Process where all variables\textsuperscript{22} are explained by their own history, the history of the other variables and some idiosyncratic shocks. The analysis of the correlations between the innovations of the VAR-model provides evidence that (i) unexpected price drops (decreasing return) lead to lower liquidity (higher bid-ask spreads) and (ii) bond and stock market liquidity are driven by a common source, but liquidity shocks in one market do not trigger liquidity shocks in another market. After having stated that there might be common shocks that drive liquidity in stock and bond markets, the authors want to identify these (macro) factors. As ad hoc-factors they choose:

1. A proxy that measures the loosening/ tightening of monetary policy\textsuperscript{23}
2. A variable capturing the shock in the target FED-rate\textsuperscript{24}
3. A proxy measuring the selling and purchasing activities of money market mutual funds\textsuperscript{25}

It turns out that monetary policy has a modest link with financial market liquidity that is only significant in crisis times. By contrast, money market mutual funds flows can be used to forecast stock and bond market liquidity.

The study provides evidence of:

1. Seasonalities
   Market liquidity exhibits seasonalities.\textsuperscript{26}

2. Relation between Liquidity and Price Volatility
   Liquidity and volatility shocks are positive and significantly correlated across markets. But liquidity shocks in one market do not trigger liquidity shocks in another. Therefore, an exogenous risk factor common to both markets might be present.

3. Systemic Risk Factors
   Unexpected changes in monetary policy and flows of money market mutual funds can be used to forecast market liquidity. However, the monetary policy impact is only measurable in the stock market and during crises.

4. Persistence in Liquidity
   Today’s illiquidity shock predicts future illiquidity (illiquidity is autoregressive) raising required returns (pricing impact) and lower today’s prices.

\textbf{[Chordia et al., 2002]} analyses the interdependencies between order imbalances\textsuperscript{27}, market liquidity and market returns. Order imbalances can be thought of as a proxy

\textsuperscript{22}Liquidity, volatility, imbalances and returns of both stock and bond market.
\textsuperscript{23}Net borrowed reserves (NBR) = Required reserves (borrowing from the Fed’s-discount window) - amount that FED is willing to supply
\textsuperscript{24}Actual target fund rate - rate expected by the market
\textsuperscript{25}Imbalances of buying minus selling volume
\textsuperscript{26}Friday is the day of lowest liquidity. July to September have higher liquidity
\textsuperscript{27}Excess selling - or buying orders
3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MARKET LIQUIDITY

for market resiliency, as order imbalances are quickly compensated in resilient markets. Liquidity is proxied by the bid-ask-spread. The decision for the market level is motivated by the argument that aggregate data are unlikely to be exhibited as private information. The behaviour of Market Makers in certain assets might be driven by private information (see 2.4). By contrast, inventory models of Market Makers (see 2.3) predict reducing market liquidity (widen spreads) if order imbalances are large. Their data set comprises trade data from stocks belonging to the S&P500-index covering the period 1988-1998. Their regressions lead to the following results:

1. Persistence
   Market Order Imbalances are persistent up to at least five days\(^28\).

2. Order Imbalances - Return Relation
   Excess buys (sells) appear up to three days after a market decline (advance).

3. Market Liquidity - Order Imbalance Relation
   Current market liquidity is reduced (spreads widen), if order imbalances increase. This result conforms to inventory-based models à la [Stoll, 1978]. Next day’s market liquidity is independent on today’s order imbalances, but it is negatively affected if the market declines today.

4. Market Return - Order Imbalance
   Market prices reverse after large selling-days, but continue to rise after net buying days.

5. Price Volatility - Order Imbalance
   Order imbalance contains information beyond pure volume and has a significant impact on contemporaneous price volatility, but does not predict tomorrow’s volatility.

3.4 Pricing of Market Liquidity Risk

The literature about the price effect of liquidity has been very dynamic during the last decade. Another valuable survey about liquidity effects and asset prices is [Amihud et al., 2005]. Their survey is structured along asset classes. We follow the same structure starting with bond markets.

Bond Markets  [Buraschi and Menini, 2002] focus on the repo market. A repo is the most important form of collateralized lending. The collateral protects the lender against default risk. However, if the collateral has to be liquidated as the borrower defaulted, the lender is exposed to a liquidity risk. The authors start from the observation that the repo rate of Treasury bonds can vary substantially. They want to know whether the difference in repo rates result from varying liquidity degradation of the collateral securities. The authors use daily closing rates from March 1996 to October 1998 of the German Government bond repo market. Similar to the term structure of interest rates, a term structure of repo spreads for repos of different maturities (up to three months) can be established and the spreads for term-repos

\(^{28}\)Market returns do not exhibit any significant autocorrelation.

21
(analogous to forward rates) can be derived. They analyze whether the implied rates for term-repos reflect the expectations of the market for future spot repo spreads (analogous to expectation hypothesis). It turns out that the expectation hypothesis is strongly rejected. To analyze whether the special repo spread is a priced risk factor, a GARCH-in-Mean model is set up. The authors obtain the following results:

1. The repo market prices liquidity risk of the collaterals
   On average 25% of the total repo spread constitute a liquidity risk premium to compensate for the risk that liquidation conditions of the collateral might adversely change.

2. The liquidity premium is time-varying.

[Daz and Navarro, 2002] ask whether the spread of Spanish Corporate Bonds contains a premium for market liquidity risk. Their sample consists of Spanish corporate bonds covering the time frame January 1993 to December 1997. Their departure point is the observation that the yield spreads of corporate bonds in their sample are decreasing in maturity. This is conforms to previous studies where bonds of ‘speculative grade’ have been analysed and only default risk has been taken into account. However, their data sample also contained investment-grade bonds. Previous studies suggest that the spread curve of high-grade bonds increases, not decreases in maturity. Hence, the authors presume that there must be another factor determining the yield spread that dominates the default component and is decreasing in maturity. They test whether the unknown component could be a liquidity premium. As the same Spanish Government bonds are traded in two markets with different liquidities, they take the yield difference of the same security between the two markets as liquidity premium. Subsequently, they regress the liquidity premia on factors such as maturity. It turns out that the liquidity premium is decreasing in maturity. Afterwards, they regress Corporate Bond spreads on factors that are assumed to explain the default component of the spread. Also, term to maturity is introduced whereas now it captures the net effect of term to maturity after controlling for factors that are assumed to explain liquidity and default component. It turns out that the net effect is positive, i.e. yield spreads are increasing in maturity. As the liquidity component is decreasing in maturity, the change must be due to the default component. Hence, the fraction of yield spread that is due to pure default risk is increasing in maturity which is now in line with the above mentionned studies. The study provides evidence that:

1. Liquidity premium is one component in the spread of Spanish Corporate bonds.

2. Liquidity Premium is decreasing in maturity.

3. Default premium is increasing in maturity (for investment grade bonds).

[Longstaff et al., 2005] analyse the size and determining factors of the non-default component of US corporate bonds. They depart from the observation that observed corporate bond spreads are higher than predicted by credit-sensitive valuation models.

See [Sarig and Warga, 1989], [Fons, 1994], [Fridson and Garman, 1998], [Helwege and Turner, 1999], [Bohn, 1999], [He et al., ated], [Trück et al., 2004]
Hence, they presume that there might be another spread component that is due to another risk. They pose the question if the second component might be due to liquidity risk. Their sample comprises weekly bond and Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia of 68 US firms between March 2001 to Oct 2002. In order to put their econometric model on a sound theoretical basis, they set up a reduced-form valuation model that consistently prices both CDS and Corporate bonds. The risk adjusted discount rate in the model consists of the risk-free rate, a credit risk premium and a liquidity risk premium. The liquidity risk premium is set to zero for CDS as the authors argue that CDS are contracts and not securities. Hence, they always have perfect liquidity. The model is calibrated against CDS-premia and corporate bond prices. To extract the non-default component of an individual corporate bond, they calculate the theoretical price of that corporate bond (same maturity, same coupon, same default risk) with liquidity premium set to zero. This is the fair price if the bond was perfectly liquid. The yield difference between actual and perfectly liquid corporate bond represents the non-default component. The default component is obtained as bond spread minus non-default component. Having extracted time-series of non-default components for each bond, the authors analysed if the component is linked to liquidity. They presume that the component can be split into a firm-specific and a market-wide part. The firm-specific part is obtained by averaging across time, keeping the cross-sectional variation. The market-wide part is obtained by averaging across firms, keeping the variation across time. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the bond-specific part of the non-default component is indeed related to individual bond illiquidity proxied by (large) bid-ask-spreads, (small) outstanding principal amount, (long) maturities and (low) ratings. The regression on market-wide factors reveals that the market-wide part of the non-default component is affected by the market liquidity of Government bonds and the fund in-/ outflows in money market mutual funds. If the non-default component is interpreted as liquidity risk premium, its increase reflects an increase in market liquidity in the corporate bond segment. Government bonds and money market mutual funds are investments that compete with corporate bonds. An increase in liquidity or volume of these markets means that investors shift funds away from the corporate segment. Decreasing market liquidity in Corporate Bonds is the consequence. The study provides evidence that:

1. There is a substantial non-default component in US Corporate bond spreads.
2. The non-default component is related to liquidity factors. This holds for the bond-specific fraction, not as for the systematic fraction of the component.

[de Jong and Driessen, 2005] study the existence and size of a liquidity premium in US Corporate bond spreads. Their sample comprises monthly index data of US Corporate Bonds between 1993-2002 and data from European Corporate Bonds covering the period August 2000 till December 2004 for a robustness check. To focus on the systematic spread component, they use bond index data instead of individual bond data. To control for other factors that might impact bond spreads such as maturity and credit rating, they group their bond data according to these variables. The authors proceed as follows: first, they assume (ad hoc) factors that proxy market and liquidity risk of stock and/ or bond market. Market risk is captured by the excess return on the US equity market and by the Volatility Index VIX that measures
the expected 30-day risk-neutral volatility as implied by S&P500-option prices. For stock market liquidity, they decide for the illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002) (see section 3.2). In order to measure the liquidity of the bond market, the average bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds is used. Second, corporate bond spreads (of an index) are regressed on market and liquidity risk factors. For each risk factor, sensitivities (betas) are obtained. It turns out that spreads are positively affected by market risk and market liquidity of equity- and Treasury bond-markets. The fact that stock liquidity also affects bond returns conforms to the finding of [Chordia et al., 2005] that finds co-movement in market liquidity in bond and stock market. The betas only document an exposure to a certain risk factor. To verify whether the exposure is priced, expected returns$^{30}$ have to be regressed on betas. In this regression, the betas of the first step are the factors and the resulting factor loadings are the risk premia. It turns out that investors require higher expected returns for bonds with high liquidity exposure which suggests the existence of a liquidity risk premium. Its size for long-term investment grade bonds is around 0.45%, whereas speculative grade bonds bear a liquidity risk premium of about 1%. The study provides evidence that:

1. Corporate bonds are exposed to liquidity risk.
2. The lower the rating, the higher the liquidity exposure of the bonds.
3. Market liquidity risk is priced.
   The liquidity exposure is priced: around 0.45% for long-term investment grade, 1% for long-term speculative grade bonds.
4. The results also hold for European bonds. However, liquidity exposure and premia are smaller.
5. Implied stock market volatility does not drive corporate bond spreads.$^{31}$

**Stock Markets**  [Amihud, 2002] tests (a) whether stock market illiquidity is priced and (b) whether illiquidity shocks affect current stock prices. The data sample comprises monthly price and trading volume data of NYSE-traded stocks, covering the period from 1963-1997. The measure to capture the illiquidity of stock $i$ in year $y$ is defined as (See section 3.2):

$$I\text{lliq}_{iy} = \frac{1}{D_{iy}} \sum_{i=1}^{D_{iy}} \frac{|R_{iyd}|}{Vol_{iyd}}$$

with:

$D_{iy}$: number of days with data available in year $y$

$R_{iyd}$: return of stock $i$ at day $d$ in year $y$

$Vol_{iyd}$: trading volume related to $R_{iyd}$

$^{30}$Expected corporate bond returns are calculated using a bond pricing model.

$^{31}$Which is in line with [Chordia et al., 2005] who state that stock volatility affects stock liquidity and bond volatility affects bond liquidity. However, for the combination (bond liquidity and stock volatility) (as assumed here), [Chordia et al., 2005] do not find evidence either.
Illiquidity reflects market breadth and is large if high price fluctuations (high returns) are associated with small trading volumes. The regressions of stock returns on (1) illiquidity, (2) size, (3) market risk, (4) total risk, (5) dividend yield, (6) past stock returns of the last 100 days and (7) returns of the remaining period yield a significant positive relation between illiquidity and expected returns. Hence, there is strong evidence that illiquidity is priced. Regressing excess return (over risk-free T-Bills) on expected and unexpected market illiquidity leads to the following findings:

1. Expected market illiquidity increases the expected risk premium (excess return).
2. Unexpected illiquidity should raise expected returns for the next year and depress current stock prices.

Furthermore, they tested whether the illiquidity patterns are more pronounced with small (illiquid) stocks than with large (liquid) stocks. For that purpose, the same model is estimated with size-ranked portfolio returns. It turns out that the two derived relations are more pronounced with small stocks. The study provides evidence that:

1. Stock market illiquidity is priced.
2. Illiquidity risk (unexpected market illiquidity) depresses current stock prices.
3. Illiquidity primarily affects stocks of small companies.

[Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003] ask the question if investors in stocks require a liquidity premium for the risk that liquidity of the stock suddenly deteriorates. For their analyses, they use daily market returns and volumes from the American Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq, covering the period from October 1962 to December 1999. In a first step, the authors set up a stock liquidity measure. As liquidity measure they choose the sensitivity of stock’s excess returns to large temporary price movements: it is assumed that illiquid securities show ‘overshooting’, i.e. their prices reverse (correct) after days of high trading volumes. The daily liquidity measure is averaged to a monthly measure and averaged across stocks to obtain a marketwide liquidity measure. In a second step, they extract the unexpected component of the liquidity measure in order to obtain the monthly marketwide liquidity risk. The third step consists of regressing individual monthly stock returns on Fama-French risk factors plus the liquidity risk factor. In the fourth step, stocks are sorted by their liquidity exposure (measured in beta) at the beginning of each year and are grouped to ten portfolios per year. The portfolio liquidity exposures are increasing. The portfolio construction is necessary to diversify away from stock-specific liquidity patterns. In the fifth step, portfolio returns are regressed on several models (CAPM, Fama-French, Fama-French+Momentum), but without the liquidity risk factor. An omitted risk factor leads to an intercept. These intercepts should increase in the impact of that factor to the explained variable. It turns out that the intercept (alpha) is significant and increasing in the liquidity exposure of the portfolio. This holds for all tested model configurations. Over the total period, the portfolio with a high liquidity exposure earns on average 7.5% more than the portfolio with a low liquidity exposure. The study provides evidence that:
1. Marketwide liquidity risk is priced in the US-stock market. Marketwide liquidity risk is measured as the price recovery after a violent price drop averaged across stocks.

2. Stocks with a high exposure to fluctuations in market liquidity earn a higher return on average (7.5%) than stocks with a low market liquidity exposure after controlling for other risk factors as size, market return, momentum and value.

[Gibson and Mougeot, 2004] address the question if market liquidity risk is priced in US stocks. In order to focus on the systematic and long-run impact of market liquidity risk on stock returns, the authors do not use individual stock data but index data. Their sample consists of monthly excess returns of the S&P500-index and the number of shares traded between January 1973 and December 1997. Their liquidity measure is the monthly relative change in trading volume, standardized by the number of index constituent stocks. A monthly measure is chosen to account for the long-term character. As they chose a liquidity and not an illiquidity measure, they expect a discount (negative risk premium) for this measure instead of a risk premium. Their general econometric model is a bivariate Garch(1,1)-in-mean process, i.e. they assume that (a) expected returns are explained by market risk (variance of market excess returns) and liquidity risk (covariance of market access returns with liquidity measure) and (b) relative changes in market liquidity are assumed to ‘be explained’ by an exogenous shock. In both processes a constant is included to control for further imperfections. The heteroscedasticity of the processes results from the fact that the variance-covariance matrix is a stochastic process itself, explained by a constant as well as innovations and its value of the previous period. Several models are tested (constant market and liquidity premia, constant market, but time-varying liquidity premium) providing evidence that the liquidity premium is always negative and significant. Its size heavily depends on the model specifications. The study provides evidence that:

1. Market liquidity affects expected stock returns, i.e. is a priced risk factor.
2. Size of the premium depends on model specifications.
3. Neglecting the market liquidity risk premium leads to too high returns due to market price risk.

[Acharya and Pedersen, 2005] analyse if low liquidity and liquidity risk (volatility in liquidity) is priced on the US stock market. Their sample comprises daily returns and volume data of all common stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX, covering around 37 years (July 1962 to December 1999). To put their econometric analysis on a sound theoretical basis, they set up a liquidity-adjusted CAPM. They obtain three types of liquidity risk that is priced within the model:

1. Co-movement of asset’s liquidity with markets liquidity ($cov_i(c_{it+1}, c_{Mt+1})$): This is the risk that security i becomes illiquid just when the market becomes illiquid. Investors require an additional premium for that risk.

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34 Number of monthly traded shares in the S&P500 index
35 Excess return generating process
36 Varying between 5.789% and 16.40%
2. Co-movement of asset’s return with market liquidity (\(\text{cov}_{t}(r_{t+1}, c_{t+1}^M)\)):

The covariance is positive, if asset returns increase in times that a market’s illiquidity raises. Investors accept a premium discount (\(-\)) for securities with rising prices if market liquidity dries up.

3. Co-movement of asset’s liquidity with market returns (\(\text{cov}_{t}(c_{t+1}, r_{t+1}^M)\)):

For securities that show a decreasing illiquidity when market returns (prices) are going down, investors require a lower premium. In a ‘Flight to quality’ event some assets become more liquid in a down-market.

Apart from the liquidity volatility (liquidity risk), investors in the model also require a premium as compensation for the liquidity level which is proxied by the expected illiquidity costs.

To confront the model with reality, they have to test if these liquidity betas significantly differ from zero. The first step is the choice of a proxy to measure market liquidity. Instead of a liquidity measure, the authors chose an illiquidity measure as proposed by Amihud (2002): The monthly illiquidity of a security is proxied with the average of the daily ratios of the return to the dollar volume traded. Therefore a security is illiquid, if it has high price fluctuations (high returns) for small trading volume.

The second step is the construction of portfolios to reduce idiosyncracies. Portfolio construction reduces the cross-sectional dimension (up to one, if all stocks are aggregated into a single portfolio). As for pricing, cross-sectional analyses have to be computed at the end the authors construct 25 portfolios. With 25 items, a future cross-sectional regression is possible. For the portfolio construction, the individual stocks are ordered according to the target variable. Here, test portfolios of two target variables are constructed: (i) illiquidity and (ii) illiquidity risk\(^{37}\). Each year, the stocks are ordered according to their annual illiquidity and illiquidity volatility and grouped into 25 portfolios. The third step consists of calculating the monthly returns and illiquidities on the portfolio level, obtaining time series of returns and illiquidities.

In the fourth step, the unexpected component of portfolio illiquidity and returns are extracted assuming an AR(2)-process for illiquidity and returns respectively. In the fifth step portfolio return innovations are regressed on illiquidity innovations as well as on market portfolio return innovations to obtain betas for each risk factor\(^{38}\). It turns out that illiquid securities (high average illiquidity costs) have also high illiquidity risk (all three betas are large) and are of small size, have low turnovers and volatile returns. Liquid assets have low liquidity risk (flight to quality is justified). After having measured the exposure to liquidity risk (the betas), the authors analyze if the exposures are priced, i.e. if the betas enter in expected returns with a risk premium different to zero. This can be performed by a cross-sectional regression (across portfolios) of the average portfolio on the betas. The risk premia obtained are the estimated factor loadings. It turns out that the different types of liquidity risk are priced:

1. Co-movement of asset’s liquidity with markets liquidity: risk premium 0.08 p.a.

\(^{37}\)Illiquidity: Illiquidity Measure, (2) Illiquidity Risk: Standard deviation of (1)
\(^{38}\)Regressions on innovations rather than on observable returns/ illiquidity: see [Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, p. 391, description on Table 1].
2. Co-movement of asset’s return with market liquidity: risk premium 0.16% p.a.

3. Co-movement of asset’s liquidity with market returns: 0.82% p.a.

Liquidity risk is therefore priced: the overall effect on expected returns amounts up to 1.1% per year. Investors require the highest discount for assets which market liquidity increases in down-markets. Hence, quality securities that investors herd in times of crisis bear a significant discount. The same is true for the opposite: high premia are required for low-quality securities in down markets. The pricing effect of liquidity level (expected liquidity costs $E(c_t^*)$) amounts to 3.5%.

The study provides evidence that:

1. Market Liquidity Risk has three components in a liquidity-adjusted CAPM (not an evidence, but assumption).

2. Liquidity level is priced.

3. All three types of liquidity risk are priced, whereas the highest risk premium is paid for securities that have high liquidity in market downturns.

4. Illiquid securities bear the highest liquidity risk (volatility in liquidity), providing evidence of a ‘flight to quality’.

5. Illiquidity is persistent, i.e. illiquid (liquid) months are succeeded by illiquid (liquid) months. Thus, liquidity and illiquidity do not change drastically.
4 Conclusion

This paper gave a short review about recent academic developments in the field of market liquidity (risk). We reviewed both theoretical and empirical achievements. The model section presented market microstructure models that explained the following phenomena:

1. Bid-ask Spread (Market Liquidity)
   The sources of the bid-ask spread are as follows:
   - Market Maker’s Inventory Risk
   - Market Maker’s Inventory Costs
   - Market Makers trading with Insiders
   - Trading Options of Market Makers and Market Participants

2. Sudden Vanishing of Market Liquidity (Market Liquidity Risk)
   The following sources of market liquidity crises have been considered:
   - Funding Constraints
   - Predatory Trading
   - Recessions
   - Self-fulfilling Beliefs

The first question addressed within the empirical section, was one about the right liquidity measure. We presented a selection of frequently used measures. However, it was emphasized that no single measure can capture the different dimensions of market liquidity. The measure has to be chosen depending on the focus of the study and on the data availability.

The second question concerned the statistical characteristics of market liquidity. It has been documented that market liquidity has a systematic component and is persistent\(^ {39} \). Furthermore, market liquidity co-moves across markets and shows seasonalties.

The third question discussed was if market liquidity and market liquidity risk is priced. As the methodologies between stocks and bonds differ considerably, the pricing question has been analysed for bonds and stocks separately. It has been reported that there is strong evidence that both market liquidity and its risk are priced for bonds and stocks. The results of the empirical pricing studies are summarised in Table 4. It reports liquidity measures used within the studies (L) and the findings. The fact that market liquidity risk is priced has been expected as it has been identified as a non-diversifiable, systematic risk factor.

The next challenge is the incorporation of market liquidity in pricing models. This is important for stock and bond pricing, but also important for leveraged instruments like options whose prices are affected by their own market liquidity and the liquidity of their underlyings.

A next step would be the hedging of market liquidity risk. A pure market liquidity

\(^{39}\)Persistance means that liquid (illiquid) days are followed by liquid (illiquid) days.
exposure can be obtained by combined long and short position of the same instrument where one is perfectly liquid and the other one has limited market liquidity. An example is a long position in a floating-rate corporate bond with a bought CDS and a shortened floating-rate Government Bond of the same maturity and coupon scheme.
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