

Şaşmaz, Aytuğ; Yagci, Alper H.; Ziblatt, Daniel

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How Voters Respond to Presidential Assaults on Checks and Balances: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Turkey

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How Voters Respond to Presidential Assaults on Checks and Balances: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Turkey

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SECTION 1: Powers of the Turkish Parliament before and after the Constitutional Amendment

The assessment below is based on Fish and Kroenig's (2009) Parliamentary Powers Index. The assessment before 2017 referendum is taken directly from their Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey. The assessment after 2017 referendum is done by Sasmaz, with assistance from a constitutional law expert.

Table A.1

Component	Before 2017 referendum	After the 2017 referendum
INFLUENCE OVER EXECUTIVE	7 out of 9	0 out of 9
The legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, can impeach the president or replace the prime minister.	YES	NO
Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of the legislature.	YES	NO
The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings with executive branch officials testifying before the legislature or its committees are regularly held.	YES	NO
The legislature can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the executive.	YES	NO
The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion (the military, organs of law enforcement, intelligence services, and the secret police).	NO	NO
The legislature appoints the prime minister.	NO	NO
The legislature's approval is required to confirm the appointment of ministers; or the legislature itself appoints ministers.	YES	NO
The country lacks a presidency entirely or there is a presidency, but the president is elected by the legislature.	YES	NO
The legislature can vote no confidence in the government.	YES	NO
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY	8 out of 9	4 out of 9
The legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive.	YES	NO
Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature before it takes effect; that is, the executive lacks decree power.	YES	NO
Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or essentially veto-proof; that is, the executive lacks veto power, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a majority in the legislature.	YES	NO
The legislature's laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review.	NO	NO
The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions; the executive lacks gatekeeping authority.	YES	NO

Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks the power to impound funds appropriated by the legislature.	YES	YES
The legislature controls the resources that finance its own internal operation and provide for the perquisites of its own members.	YES	YES
Members of the legislature are immune from arrest and/or criminal prosecution.	YES	YES
All members of the legislature are elected; the executive lacks the power to appoint any members of the legislature.	YES	YES
SPECIFIED POWERS	4 out of 8	5 out of 8
The legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, can change the Constitution.	NO	NO
The legislature's approval is necessary for the declaration of war.	YES	YES
The legislature's approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries.	YES	YES
The legislature has the power to grant amnesty.	YES	YES
The legislature has the power of pardon.	YES	YES
The legislature reviews and has the right to reject appointments to the judiciary; or the legislature itself appoints members of the judiciary.	NO	YES
The chairman of the central bank is appointed by the legislature.	NO	NO
The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media.	NO	NO
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY	6 out of 6	6 out of 6
The legislature is regularly in session.	YES	YES
Each legislator has a personal secretary.	YES	YES
Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial staff member with policy expertise.	YES	YES
Legislators are eligible for re-election without any restriction.	YES	YES
A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough position that legislators are generally interested in and seek re-election.	YES	YES
The re-election of incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members.	YES	YES
TOTAL	25 out of 32 (78%)	15 out of 32 (47%)

SECTION 2: The Weakening Effect of the Treatment as the Questionnaire Progresses

If fewer respondents linked the treatment to the questions following the decree power question, we should observe a *weakening* effect of the treatment as the questionnaire progresses. We tested this empirical implication with the models in which we observe strongest effects of the treatment, i.e., in which the social distance (affective polarization) is a moderator of the treatment effect. For both yea-sayers and nay-sayers, we observe the strongest treatment effect with respondents who report high levels of social distance to the other political camp. If our assumption about how the respondents reacted to the treatment (gradually fewer respondents linked questions following the decree power question to the poll results we cited in the treatments), then we should observe gradually weaker coefficients on the interaction term between treatment and social distance. Our empirical explorations suggest this is indeed the case, to a large extent and both for initial yea- and nay-sayers.

To see how the coefficient and standard error for the interaction term changes as the questionnaire progresses for the initial yea-sayers see Table A2.1. To see how the marginal effect of the treatment changes for the group that reports highest levels of social distance among initial yea-sayers as the questionnaire progresses see Figure A2.1.

To see how the coefficient and standard error for the interaction term changes as the questionnaire progresses for the initial nay-sayers see Table A2.2. To see how the marginal effect of the treatment changes for the group that reports highest levels of social distance among initial nay-sayers as the questionnaire progresses see Figure A2.2.

Table A2.1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Decree power	Budget power	Partisan president	No return to parl. system
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment: Incumbent Loses	-0.235 (0.268)	0.102 (0.200)	-0.083 (0.260)	-0.381 (0.333)
Social distance	0.039 (0.047)	0.059* (0.033)	0.021 (0.044)	0.058 (0.063)
Will vote for the incumbent	1.554*** (0.323)	1.876*** (0.334)	2.206*** (0.277)	2.164*** (0.297)
Issue knowledge	0.430** (0.205)	0.799*** (0.189)	0.410** (0.195)	0.194 (0.257)
Rightism	0.126 (0.121)	-0.006 (0.100)	0.199* (0.106)	0.264** (0.117)
Interaction: Treatment * Social distance	-0.187*** (0.059)	-0.072* (0.043)	0.028 (0.054)	0.004 (0.077)
Constant	-1.020* (0.553)	-2.363*** (0.496)	-1.649*** (0.534)	-1.189** (0.551)
Observations	900	926	943	933
Log Likelihood	-491.117	-600.134	-391.036	-306.634
Pseudo R-sq.	0.101	0.063	0.121	0.139

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustering-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.

Figure A2.1: Marginal effect of the treatment for the group that reports highest levels of social distance among initial yea-sayers





Table A2.2

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Decree power	Budget power	Partisan president	No return to parl. system
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment: Incumbent loses	-0.097 (0.433)	-0.600 (0.650)	-1.345** (0.546)	-0.196 (0.581)
Social distance	-0.098 (0.070)	-0.059 (0.083)	-0.140* (0.081)	-0.049 (0.100)
Will vote for incumbent	1.994*** (0.485)	1.888*** (0.690)	2.242*** (0.476)	2.311*** (0.580)
Issue knowledge	-0.660** (0.333)	-0.081 (0.466)	0.884 (0.558)	-0.826** (0.393)
Rightism	-0.031 (0.116)	0.006 (0.144)	0.219* (0.117)	0.252* (0.138)
Interaction: Treatment * Social distance	0.198** (0.092)	0.175 (0.135)	0.220* (0.113)	0.107 (0.124)
Constant	-1.616*** (0.465)	-2.859*** (0.550)	-3.163*** (0.658)	-2.480*** (0.694)
Observations	638	640	649	632
Log Likelihood	-212.176	-124.495	-161.539	-153.159
Pseudo R-sq.	0.065	0.042	0.108	0.098

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustering-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.

Figure A2.2: Marginal effect of the treatment for the group that reports highest levels of social distance among initial nay-sayers



SECTION 3: Variation in Post-Incumbent Economic Anxiety Among Initial Yea-Sayers and Nay-Sayers

Since yea-sayers tend to be pro-incumbent voters and nay-sayers tend to be opposition, it may be asked whether their levels of post-incumbent economic anxiety is simply an artefact of partisanship, with no variation. As Table A.3 shows this is not the case. Even though, as expected, yea-sayers have higher post-incumbent economic anxiety, both camps display enough internal variation in this regard for this variable to serve as a moderator.

Table A.3

Post-incumbent economic anxiety	Initial yea-sayers	Initial nay-sayers	Total
-2	53 (5.2%)	161 (23.7%)	214
-1	145 (14.2%)	219 (32.3%)	364
0	127 (12.5%)	94 (13.9%)	221
1	319 (31.3%)	118 (17.4%)	428
2	384 (37.7%)	86 (12.7%)	470
Total	1,019 (100%)	678 (100%)	1,697

SECTION 4: A Different Measurement of Partisan Polarization as a Motivating Factor of Elastic Support for Executive Aggrandizement

As an alternative to social distance as a measurement of affective polarization, we also explored whether a more classical measurement, distance between the in-party feeling and out-party feeling in a feeling thermometer, is also associated with opportunistically elastic support for executive aggrandizement (Iyengar et al. 2019). For the sake of simplicity, we call this latter measure “partisan distance.” In the survey, we asked each respondent how close/distant they feel to each one of the main political parties. Based on these responses, we measured partisan distance as the gap between the distance to the main party in the other camp and the party one feels closest to. For people who feel closest to the government parties (Justice and Development, and Nationalist Movement) the distant party was coded as Republican People’s Party. For people who feel closest to opposition parties (RPP, Peoples’ Democracy, Good Party, Felicity Party), the distant party was coded as the Justice and Development Party. Partisan distance measure ranges from 1 to 5, and the mean is 4.4 (median is 5), suggesting a very high degree of partisan distance in Turkey. The correlation with social distance variable is, on the other hand, quite low: 0.07. This suggests that social distance is still relatively less common among the respondents, and there are people who score low on social distance even though they score high on partisan distance. 57% of respondents who scored highest on partisan distance scored less than or equal to the median of the social distance measure. When this measure of affective polarization, partisan distance, is interacted with the treatment, both substantial and statistical significance of the interaction effect shrink (see results in the table below). In other words, feeling distant to parties in the other camp is less of a source of elastic support for executive aggrandizement, whereas affective polarization in the form of social distance, is much more likely to be associated with this democracy-eroding behavioral tendency.

Table A.4

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Decree power			
	Initial yea-sayers (1)	Initial yea-sayers (2)	Initial nay-sayers (3)	Initial nay-sayers (4)
Treatment: Incumbent loses	-0.258 (0.675)	-0.519 (0.753)	-0.032 (0.807)	0.301 (0.888)
Partisan distance	0.443** (0.114)	0.137 (0.142)	-0.379** (0.151)	-0.349** (0.160)
Will vote for the incumbent		1.351*** (0.345)		1.852*** (0.482)
Issue knowledge		0.460** (0.210)		-0.523 (0.328)
Rightism		0.137 (0.115)		-0.035 (0.122)
Interaction: Treatment * Partisan distance	-0.124 (0.145)	-0.102 (0.161)	0.167 (0.193)	0.110 (0.206)
Constant	-0.705 (0.524)	-1.367** (0.665)	-0.781 (0.633)	-0.587 (0.835)
Observations	950	915	685	646
Log Likelihood	-548.354	-506.842	-239.164	-213.351
Pseudo R-sq.	0.049	0.083	0.031	0.072

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustering-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.

SECTION 5: Do Social Distance and Post-Incumbent Economic Anxiety Measure the Same Thing?

It could be argued that, in a highly polarized environment like Turkey, post-incumbent economic anxiety and social distance (as a form of affective polarization) are highly correlated, and our two potential moderators of the treatment effect get at the same thing, i.e. siding with or being against the incumbent leader and government. If this was the case, we should expect a high positive correlation between post-incumbent economic anxiety and affective polarization among the initial yea-sayers, and a high negative correlation among the initial nay-sayers. Yet, the observed correlations are 0.07 and -0.01, respectively, suggesting that these two variables are two different constructs. Also, these two constructs have different demographic correlates both among initial yea-sayers and initial nay-sayers. Please Table A.5.1 for these results.

Moreover, the substantial and statistical significance of the interaction effects do not change when these two moderator variables are added to the model simultaneously. Please see Table A.5.2 for these results. This finding suggests that post-incumbent economic anxiety and affective polarization play independent roles in motivating elastic support for executive aggrandizement.

Table A.5.1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Initial yea-sayers		Initial nay-sayers	
	Social distance	Post-incumbent economic anxiety	Social distance	Post-incumbent economic anxiety
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	0.006 (0.008)	0.002 (0.003)	0.020** (0.009)	-0.003 (0.004)
Male	-0.264 (0.210)	0.041 (0.081)	-0.066 (0.239)	0.019 (0.109)
Education level	-0.117 (0.091)	-0.135*** (0.035)	-0.160* (0.095)	-0.042 (0.043)
Household income	0.053 (0.037)	0.016 (0.014)	0.016 (0.039)	0.004 (0.018)
Sunni	0.361 (0.547)	0.891*** (0.204)	-0.841*** (0.257)	-0.559*** (0.116)
Kurdish	0.769*** (0.275)	0.151 (0.108)	0.881*** (0.298)	-0.424*** (0.135)
Constant	3.326*** (0.796)	0.120 (0.303)	4.138** (0.651)	0.381 (0.294)
Observations	971	950	638	614
R ²	0.016	0.047	0.047	0.053
Adjusted R ²	0.010	0.041	0.038	0.044
Residual Std. Error	3.142 (df = 964)	1.205 (df = 943)	2.972 (df = 631)	1.326 (df = 607)
F Statistic	2.597** (df = 6; 964)	7.724*** (df = 6; 943)	5.166*** (df = 6; 631)	5.665*** (df = 6; 607)

Note: * denotes p-value < 0.1, ** denotes p-value < 0.05 and *** denotes p-value < 0.01. Normal standard errors are presented in parentheses.

Table A.5.2

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Decree power			
	Initial yea- sayers (1)	Initial yea- sayers (2)	Initial nay- sayers (3)	Initial nay- sayers (4)
Treatment: Incumbent loses	0.153 (0.283)	-0.007 (0.300)	-0.415 (0.444)	-0.265 (0.479)
Social distance	0.048 (0.047)	0.047 (0.049)	-0.136* (0.074)	-0.096 (0.075)
Post-incumbent economic anxiety	0.265** (0.104)	0.096 (0.111)	0.386*** (0.128)	0.328** (0.133)
Will vote for the incumbent		1.571*** (0.345)		2.168*** (0.513)
Issue knowledge		0.519** (0.218)		-0.748** (0.346)
Rightism		0.182 (0.127)		-0.089 (0.128)
Interaction: Treatment * Social distance	-0.181*** (0.059)	-0.194*** (0.063)	0.241** (0.097)	0.225** (0.097)
Interaction: Treatment * Post-incumbent economic anxiety	-0.329*** (0.124)	-0.269** (0.135)	-0.188 (0.158)	-0.142 (0.178)
Constant	0.924*** (0.207)	-1.452** (0.584)	-1.782*** (0.294)	-1.356*** (0.463)
Observations	894	868	639	602
Log Likelihood	-512.082	-466.833	-219.662	-196.586
Pseudo R-sq.	0.055	0.109	0.049	0.092

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustering-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.

SECTION 6: Public Opinion Polling Results during the Survey Fielding Period

Table A6.1

Fielding Period	Polling Company	Sample Size	Erdogan's predicted vote share (%)	Ince's predicted vote share (%)	Source webpage (Date of last access: March 29 2020)
14–20 Jun 2018	OPTİMAR	2,100	51.6	28	https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201806211033965217-optimar-secim-anket/
17–19 Jun 2018	ORC	4,250	52.7	29.2	http://orcarastirma.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/24-HAZ%C4%B0RAN-M%C4%B0LLETVEK%C4%B0L%C4%B0-GENEL-SE%C3%87%C4%B0M%C4%B0-VE-CUMHURBA%C5%9EKANLI%C4%9EI-SE%C3%87%C4%B0M%C4%B0-SE%C3%87MEN-TERC%C4%B0HLER%C4%B0-ARA%C5%9ETIRMASI.pdf
16–17 Jun 2018	Gezici	1,812	48.2	29.1	http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/1003723/iste_secime_3_gun_kala_yayinlanan_son_anket.html
13 Jun 18	Plus Mayak	unknown	45.8	28.9	http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/foto/foto_galeri/996822/1/iste_son_arastirma_Hangi_ittifak_kac_vekil_cikaracak_il_il_detaylar_ortaya_cikti.html
13 Jun 18	AKAM	2,460	44.5	29	https://web.archive.org/web/20180613185952/https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Dfld7r9X0AAi-zl.jpg
6–13 Jun 2018	REMRES	5,674	43.6	29.5	https://web.archive.org/web/20180613215042/http://www.remres.com.tr/filemanager/files/haziran%202.pdf
9–10 Jun 2018	Konda	2,721	51.9	28	https://konda.com.tr/tr/duyuru/kondanin-abonelerine-gonderdigi-bilgi-notu-21-haziran-2018/
8–11 Jun 2018	Mediar	2,410	48	29.9	https://web.archive.org/web/20180613190130/https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/mediar-arastirma-dan-secim-anketi-akp-cogunlugu-kaybediyor-219319.html
7–11 Jun 2018	Foresight	500	50.8	30.1	http://www.mynet.com/24-haziran-secimleri-icin-son-anket-bloomberg-ten-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-onde-ama-surpriz-olabilir-110104191166

SECTION 7: Potential Reasons of Underreporting of Nay And Their Implications for Our Findings

One of the potential limitations of our study is the underreporting of initial “No” votes in the survey: In the Istanbul province, official referendum results were 48.6 percent (Yes) vs. 51.4 percent (No), whereas in our survey, among people who did respond to that specific question and who said that they voted, we observe 59.6 percent (Yes) vs. 40.4 percent (No). Some explanations of this difference and their implications for our findings are as follows:

1. Strategic misreporting: In an increasingly authoritarian country like Turkey, some strategic misreporting can be expected: People who want their true preference to remain private and who do not trust our interviewers might have reported voting “Yes,” even though they had voted “No” in the referendum. With the data we have, we cannot estimate the extent of such strategic misreporting. For our findings, strategic misreporting could introduce a bias if these respondents *also* strategically misreport their updated institutional preference that we ask at the end of the experiment. This is unlikely since it is not clear how a dishonest reporting of updated institutional preferences may serve to signal oneself as a government supporter. It is reasonable to assume that such “intentional double strategic misreporting” should be extremely rare among our respondents. Our finding on affective polarization as a motivator of opportunistic change in institutional preference supports this claim.
2. Unintentional misreporting: Some of our respondents might have misremembered how they voted in the referendum, as we held the survey one year after. In this case, some people who did not have a very strong preference but eventually voted “No” may have reported “Yes” to our survey. This is also unlikely as the flow of unintentional misreporting should have been mutual from No to Yes and from Yes to No. Even if this was the case, the implications of unintentional misreporting would be minimal for our findings, because people who are likely to change their institutional preferences opportunistically are those with a strong social distance to opposition supporters, i.e. those who are also likely to have strong preferences about super-presidentialism.
3. Response bias: Under this scenario, people who voted “No” were systematically less likely to respond to our survey. This is much more likely than strategic misreporting, as people who do not want to disclose their preferences would refuse responding to a survey rather than lying about some of their preferences and past behavior. This scenario also finds evidence when we regress the reported “No” vote at Istanbul sub-provincial districts on the actual “No” vote in the same districts: The constant in the regression result is approximately -0.13 while the coefficient on the actual vote is 1.07. In other words, the regression predicts that in each district the reported “No” votes were smaller than the actual “No” vote. Considering that the correlation at the sub-provincial district level between actual “No” vote and reported “No” vote is more than 0.7, we suggest that the most likely explanation of underreporting of “No” votes is non-response bias of “No” voters. This explanation has no implications for our findings for the initial “Yes” voters, and would suggest that our findings for the “No” voters reflect the minimum tendency among those voters to change their institutional preference opportunistically.

SECTION 8: Alternative Categorizations of Rival Camps

Below are analyses run according to recalled vote in the previous election and vote intention in the upcoming presidential elections, rather than the vote in 2017 referendum. Both models, lead to very similar results with the paper’s Table 2: A sizable group of people in the pro-government camp updates their preference on the decree power, and a smaller but still sizable group in the anti-government camp also does the same. This is due to the fact that these results are driven by the most polarized people in these camps, and they remain within the same camp in all three ways of differentiating (vote in the referendum, vote in 2015 parliamentary elections, vote intention in the 2018 presidential elections) the sample.

Table A8.1: Re-running the main analyses based on vote in 2015 parliamentary elections

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Decree power		Budget power		System endorsement		Partisan president		No return to parl. system	
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>logistic</i>		<i>ordered logistic</i>		<i>logistic</i>		<i>logistic</i>	
Voted in 2015 elections	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.
Treatment: Incumbent loses	-0.894*** (0.185)	0.644** (0.304)	-0.154 (0.137)	0.188 (0.327)	-0.049 (0.160)	0.106 (0.249)	-0.081 (0.183)	-0.216 (0.264)	-0.263 (0.205)	-0.037 (0.359)
Will vote for incumbent	2.366*** (0.314)	2.089*** (0.596)	2.901*** (0.402)	1.886*** (0.710)	3.243*** (0.215)	2.282*** (0.462)	3.226*** (0.293)	2.042*** (0.687)	3.042*** (0.258)	2.247*** (0.682)
Issue knowledge	0.460** (0.225)	-0.660 (0.408)	0.593*** (0.184)	0.340 (0.551)	-0.348 (0.214)	-0.110 (0.340)	0.160 (0.219)	0.811 (0.615)	-0.071 (0.273)	-0.925* (0.484)
Rightism	0.146 (0.105)	0.311** (0.151)	0.042 (0.107)	0.237 (0.169)	0.697*** (0.087)	0.685*** (0.125)	0.282** (0.125)	0.534*** (0.174)	0.237* (0.121)	0.427** (0.173)
Constant	-1.865*** (0.479)	-2.431*** (0.523)	-3.209*** (0.521)	-3.624*** (0.752)			-2.733*** (0.560)	-4.025*** (0.761)	-1.675*** (0.506)	-2.634*** (0.694)
Observations	947	515	970	522	1,015	525	998	525	978	516
Log Likelihood	-514.732	-178.155	-585.403	-119.916	-663.127	-292.656	-400.055	-143.365	-346.834	-126.294
Pseudo R-sq.	0.161	0.096	0.129	0.066	0.266	0.129	0.289	0.120	0.288	0.133

Note: * denotes p-value < 0.1, ** denotes p-value < 0.05 and *** denotes p-value < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors (at the neighborhood level) are presented in brackets, except for models for the dependent variable 'System endorsement,' in which normal standard errors are presented.

Table A8.2: Re-running the main analyses based on vote intention in 2018 parliamentary elections

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Decree power		Budget power		System endorsement		Partisan president		No return to parl. system	
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>logistic</i>		<i>ordered logistic</i>		<i>logistic</i>		<i>logistic</i>	
Vote intention in 2018 pres. elections	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.	Pro-gov.	Pro-opp.
Treatment: Incumbent loses	-1.024*** (0.194)	0.747*** (0.243)	-0.192 (0.131)	0.028 (0.305)	-0.071 (0.173)	0.185 (0.210)	-0.038 (0.190)	-0.253 (0.211)	-0.309 (0.235)	0.088 (0.315)
Issue knowledge	0.570*** (0.202)	-0.694** (0.304)	0.697*** (0.168)	-0.186 (0.436)	0.173 (0.209)	-0.459* (0.262)	0.455** (0.201)	0.396 (0.444)	0.324 (0.255)	-0.950** (0.403)
Rightism	0.208* (0.119)	0.192** (0.093)	0.129 (0.100)	0.025 (0.121)	0.796*** (0.095)	0.655*** (0.077)	0.386*** (0.108)	0.226** (0.108)	0.440*** (0.114)	0.274** (0.125)
Constant	0.152 (0.628)	-2.243*** (0.403)	-0.847* (0.481)	-2.808*** (0.568)			-0.293 (0.499)	-3.132*** (0.510)	0.171 (0.555)	-2.437*** (0.626)
Observations	896	668	923	673	963	681	945	678	929	665
Log Likelihood	-500.277	-235.642	-624.787	-137.447			-386.018	-185.439	-291.921	-163.287
Pseudo R-sq.	0.052	0.037	0.017	0.001	0.061	0.087	0.022	0.016	0.027	0.039

Note: * denotes p-value < 0.1, ** denotes p-value < 0.05 and *** denotes p-value < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors (at the neighborhood level) are presented in brackets, except for models for the dependent variable 'System endorsement,' in which normal standard errors are presented.

SECTION 9: Why Induced Expectation of Incumbent Loss Reduces Support for Partisan Presidency among Some Nay-Sayers

This phenomenon is mostly associated with the preferences of the part of the nay-sayers that are relatively right-wing. In other words, there are people who did not endorse an authoritarian presidential system when they were asked in a referendum, but who, once the system was put in place, are less opposed to Erdogan leading such a system rather than a relatively left-wing candidate like CHP’s Ince or HDP’s Demirtas. The logistic regression below run on the nay-sayers shows that while rightism is associated with a preference for executive presidency, the induced expectation of Erdogan loss reduces this association, as seen in the negative interaction effect. In fact, when this is taken into account, no negative independent effect of the treatment on the outcome remains.

Table A9.1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Partisan president
Treatment: Incumbent loses	0.280 (0.569)
Rightism	0.333*** (0.120)
Will vote for the incumbent	2.201*** (0.480)
Issue knowledge	0.836 (0.539)
Rightism	-0.430* (0.258)
Treatmment * Rightism	-3.838*** (0.582)
Observations	667
Log Likelihood	-166.753
Pseudo R-sq.	0.099
<i>Note:</i>	* denotes p-value < 0.1, ** denotes p-value < 0.05 and *** denotes p-value < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors (at the neighborhood level) are presented in parentheses.

SECTION 10: Interaction of the Treatment with the Prior Expectation Variable

Prior to the randomized information treatment, the respondents were also asked about their expectation about who is likely to win the election, with 5-level response scale ranging from Erdogan highly likely to win to Erdogan highly likely to lose. Data on these prior expectations shed some light to the effectiveness of the treatment. Table A10.1 reveals that the effect of the treatment (“incumbent loss” information) is strongest on those with a contrary prior expectation, among the yea-sayers. We do not observe the same kind of prior belief-based differentiation among the nay-sayers though, presumably because that group includes relatively few people with a prior belief in an Erdogan win and all observed effects are smaller for that group, making it harder to observe interactions.

Table A10.1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Support for decree power	
	(Yea-sayers)	(Nay-sayers)
Treatment: Incumbent loses	-0.253 (0.372)	0.709** (0.281)
Prior expectation: Incumbent win	0.697*** (0.179)	0.282 (0.180)
Will vote for the incumbent	1.036*** (0.327)	1.719*** (0.485)
Issue knowledge	0.535** (0.216)	-0.610* (0.350)
Rightism	0.070 (0.120)	-0.006 (0.113)
Treatment * Prior expectation	-0.513** (0.215)	-0.111 (0.211)
Constant	-1.282** (0.558)	-1.907*** (0.450)
Observations	913	629
Log Likelihood	-498.944	-214.428
Pseudo R-sq.	0.097	0.067
<i>Note:</i>	* denotes p-value < 0.1, ** denotes p-value < 0.05 and *** denotes p-value < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors (at the neighborhood level) are presented in parentheses.	

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