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The EU's Competitive Advantage in the 'Clean-Energy Arms Race'

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The EU's competitive advantage in the "clean-energy arms race"*

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Abstract

The net-zero agreement on carbon emission from Paris 2015 gives a key role to fossil-free energy technologies with an expected multifold growth rate over the coming decades, when successively replacing oil, coal, and gas. In this paper, we delve into the EU's competitive advantage in the evolving trade war in clean energy, investigate European strengths and weaknesses in innovation and production, and discuss the impact of the upcoming trade war on the global warming challenge. Our results show that the EU has a strong position in innovation capabilities in the strategic net-zero technologies. However, this is not matched by production capabilities: EU has only a few firms among the leading manufacturers in net-zero technologies.

JEL: F02,O18, R10; Q50

Keywords: energy geopolitics, net-zero technologies, patents, innovation

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1 Introduction

In 2023, the European Commission proposed the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) as a part of the Green Deal strategy to promote investments in the production capacity of products that are considered to be key in meeting the EU’s climate neutrality goals. Similar to the wave of low-carbon subsidies announced in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the European governmental subsidy on strategic transition technologies is described as an explicit response to China’s dominance in the clean-energy sector.¹ According to the act, at least 40% of low-carbon technology needs should be met by manufacturing within the EU by 2030. Specifically, this target applies to a list of eight “strategic net-zero technologies”,². We examine in this paper two aspects of clean-tech development. Firstly, we look at technology development, and secondly at manufacturing production.

Our results show that while Europe has a strong international position in net-zero-energy technology development, its capacity in clean-tech manufacturing is substantially weaker.

In this paper, we conjecture that patents are a key element in the supply chain and, therefore, also important for net-zero technologies. By mapping strategic net-zero technologies to patent categories in PATSTAT, we analyze if the EU currently has a competitive advantage compared to the U.S. and China. We find that the

¹China holds at least 60% of the world’s manufacturing capacity for most mass-manufactured technologies (e.g., solar photovoltaic (PV), wind systems, and batteries) and 40% of electrolyzer manufacturing.

²Solar photovoltaic and solar thermal; onshore wind and offshore renewable energy; batteries and storage; heat pumps and geothermal energy; electrolyzers and fuel cells; biogas/biomethane; carbon capture, utilization, and storage; grid technologies; and sustainable alternative fuels technologies

EU has a significantly higher number of patents in green tech than both China and the US. In other words, a high share of innovations and developments of new technologies, related to the ones mentioned in the net-zero industry act, is already today done in the EU.

Furthermore, we examine how patents in strategic technologies are distributed among 27 countries in the European Union. This empirical exercise sheds light on whether the efforts by the European Union may benefit the development in specific countries. There is a very large heterogeneity in innovations and technology development within the EU. More specifically, Germany dominates and accounts for around two thirds of all patents in green-tech. Moreover, there are some countries with strong positions in specific industries, such as Denmark and France in energy technologies. Finally, Eastern- and South Europe have a very limited capabilities in green tech development.

The strong EU position in innovation does not correspond to production. Europe is currently a net importer in the eight net-zero energy technologies, with, for example, nearly all solar PV modules and fuel cells imported from China, whose supportive industrial policies, access to low-cost energy and materials, availability of workers, and trade policies largely explain its globally dominant manufacturing base.

Nearly half of the world's low-carbon spending took place in China in 2022. The country spent \$546 billion in 2022 on investments which included solar and wind energy, electric vehicles, and batteries. The European Union was second to China with \$180 billion in clean-energy investments, followed by the U.S. \$141

billion in investments. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief background on recent environmental policies in the EU and the US, followed by theoretical and empirical background to the research topic addressed. Section 3 presents the data, followed by the analysis of descriptive data in Section 4. The final section summarises and discusses policy implications.

2 Background and motivation

2.1 The Net Zero Industry Act

The burgeoning emphasis on green technology within Europe is prominently reflected in the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). Launched by the EU in March 2023, the NZIA mandates a significant surge in the production of clean-tech within the union. This expansion not only aspires to foster a comprehensive decarbonization of the economy but also expressly seeks to diminish the EU's reliance on foreign nations, notably China.

More pointedly, the NZIA sets an ambitious objective: to ensure that by 2030, 40 percent of the union's consumption of clean-tech is produced domestically. While setting such explicit quantitative targets might be considered unorthodox in market economies, they have been recurrently integrated into German industrial strategies in recent years, as shown by Altmeier (2019), and Zettelmeyer (2019). The act also meticulously highlights pivotal strategic industries earmarked for promotion. These encompass solar photovoltaic and solar thermal technolo-

gies, both onshore and offshore renewable energy, battery /storage solutions, heat pumps, geothermal energy modules, electrolyzers, fuel cells, sustainable biogas, and biomethane technologies, carbon capture and storage modalities, and advanced grid systems (European-Commission, 2023).

The NZIA delineates a clear strategy for amplifying production in the industries mentioned. As detailed by Tagliapietra, Veugelers and Zettelmeyer (2023), the primary methods proposed for achieving this include the acceleration of permissions and related administrative procedures. The EU has set definitive time limits for these procedures and advocates for the establishment of a singular national authority, acting as a "one-stop-shop", to oversee these projects. Furthermore, there's a significant emphasis on the coordination of private funding. The Commission's projections estimate that accomplishing the prominent target of 40 percent of green-tech being produced in the EU by 2030 demands an investment of around €92 billion. A substantial majority, approximately 80 percent, is anticipated to stem from the private sector. This will be streamlined through the "Net-Zero Europe Platform," which aims to enhance networking and leverage existing industry alliances. While public subsidies will play a role, they will primarily be sourced at the national level. The NZIA notably does not introduce new EU-level funding.

Moreover, there's a push towards revising public procurement procedures and auctions to emphasize "sustainability and resilience" criteria. Simultaneously, there's a caveat: bids proposing the use of equipment mainly sourced (at least 65 percent) from non-EU countries are slated to face disadvantages. The NZIA pro-

posal alludes to additional areas, such as regulatory sandboxes and a skills-centric agenda, but stops short of providing detailed implementation plans.

2.2 Why did the EU launch NZIA?

The NZIA, as previously discussed, is an integral component of the EU's overarching climate policy. However, it's imperative to note that the cornerstone of the union's climate approach is the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS). With its anticipated expansion in 2024, the ETS is presumed adequately equipped to achieve the emission benchmarks. While the NZIA might streamline this pursuit, it distinctly deviates from the ETS's market-centric ethos and its emphasis on escalating carbon pricing. A more salient impetus behind the EU's drive to augment clean-tech production appears to be rooted in the shifting terrains of global geopolitics and production paradigms.

High geographical and market concentrations of minerals and manufacturing have contributed to renewed discussions on the benefits and costs of imports of net-zero energy technologies. Significant events with major global consequences, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war against Ukraine, and the increased geopolitical tensions between China and other leading industrial nations raise concerns about risks with the prevailing global value chains and whether more rationalized production would provide greater security against disruptions that can lead to shortages in supply and uncertainty regarding net-zero energy technologies.

For instance, the production of critical minerals is highly geographically con-

centrated. The Democratic Republic of Congo supplies 70% of cobalt today, China provides 60% of rare earth elements (REEs), Australia accounts for 55% of lithium mining, and Indonesia has 40% of nickel. Processing of these minerals is also highly concentrated, with China being responsible for the refining of 90% of REEs and 60-70% of lithium and cobalt. In 2021, China held 40-80% of the global mass-manufacturing capacity for producing some of the key clean-energy technologies: solar PV systems 85%, electric vehicles 71%, offshore wind 70%, onshore wind 59%, fuel cell trucks 47%, electrolyzers 41%, and heat pumps 39%.³

The geopolitical discussions about the prevailing global value chains are not only about securing access to minerals, components, and products but also about markets and market shares. Battery cell manufacturing, for example, is expected to increase sixfold by 2030.

China emerges as a focal point in this discourse. The EU's reticence to rely heavily on Chinese imports subtly resonates throughout the NZIA text. Historically, China has strategically concentrated on several industries now underscored by the NZIA. For example, sectors such as these were integral to initiatives like the "Made in China" strategy unveiled in 2015 and the "Dual circulation" introduced in 2020. These prioritized sectors in China receive substantial state support, from subsidies and preferential land and capital access to protectionist measures against foreign competitors via tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Accusations from the EU and the US posited that China was not maintaining a level playing field. Consequently, the EU, under the stewardship of Angela Merkel, brokered an in-

³<https://www.visualcapitalist.com/where-are-clean-energy-technologies-manufactured/>

vestment pact with China aimed at resolving these disparities. However, the ratification process was protracted. By the time the EU was poised to validate the agreement in 2019, its perception of China had drastically soured, due in part to events in Hong Kong, mounting tensions with Taiwan, and the reported treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The resultant political climate saw the EU parliament vetoing the deal. Consequently, instead of China moderating its domestic support mechanisms, the West, including the EU and the US, has evolved to mirror aspects of China's industrial policies.

In a parallel development, the US rolled out the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), a formidable initiative targeting a reduction in greenhouse emissions by championing green-tech and renewable energy sectors. The IRA, as outlined by Kleimann, Poitiers, Sapir, Tagliapietra, Véron, Veugelers and Zettelmeyer (2023), adopts a carrot-focused approach, devoid of the punitive sticks. Unlike the ETS, it doesn't impose costs on carbon emissions but generously subsidizes a spectrum of eco-friendly production avenues, from electric vehicles and renewable energy components to carbon-neutral electricity, hydrogen, and other sustainable fuels. A salient feature of the IRA is its stipulation that subsidies are predominantly earmarked for domestically produced goods, further accentuating the "Buy American" ethos. While the European Net-Zero Industry Act aims at reducing foreign dependence outside the Union and increasing competitiveness stating that "any green trade is carried out under the principles of fair competition and open trade", the US Investment Reduction Act (IRA) has clear elements of "green protectionism". Some examples: The act will subsidize consumers thousands of dollars in

tax credits when purchasing an electric vehicle—but only when the bulk of battery components are made or assembled in North America. In addition, tax credits for low-carbon energy technologies, such as batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines, should only apply to products made within the U.S. This provision has stoked anxieties within the EU, with speculations, such as those by Holtzhausen (2023), suggesting that the IRA could catalyze a production and export decline in the EU, due to potential relocations to the US. Such apprehensions significantly contribute to the inception of the NZIA.

2.3 Opportunities and challenges

There is broad agreement in this literature that private sector innovation is critical to mitigating and adapting to climate change, and a growing body of economic research that investigates how induced technological change may stimulate innovation in renewable energy (Popp, 2019). There is also a consensus that market mechanisms alone cannot provide the socially optimal amount of clean innovation. The main issues are associated with factors such as technological spillovers, (Rodrik, 2014; Aghion and Jaravel, 2015), path dependence (Dechezleprêtre, Martin and Mohnen, 2014), and pollution as a negative externality (Gerlagh, Kvern-dokk and Rosendahl, 2009). Recently, economic theories on the role of induced innovation and directed technical change have been developed to address these market failures. A seminal paper is the endogenous growth model of directed technical change proposed by Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2012). The induced innovation hypothesis, is a central building block in this two-sector

model which allows profit-maximizing firms to decide whether to innovate in environmental technologies or in carbon-intensive technologies. If clean technologies are less developed initially, the potential for innovation is low because clean research requires substantial R&D investment to be competitive.

Technological progress is path-dependent and builds on accumulated knowledge from prior research. As the economy historically has accumulated a much smaller stock of knowledge for clean technologies, green innovations have a disadvantage in the market, and uncertainty about future returns of environmental R&D investment has been assessed to be particularly high (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2002).

Without public intervention to promote clean technology, the transition process towards a carbon-neutral world may be seriously delayed. Therefore, government intervention is necessary, and temporary taxes or subsidies can redirect innovation towards the clean sector. This is particularly important for renewable energy technologies, as the innovators typically are younger and smaller compared to other firms, and the technology is less mature, which may imply high sunk costs. Nelson and Shrimali (2014) estimate that upfront capital costs represent 84-93% of total project costs for wind, solar, and hydro energy (in comparison, 66-69% and 24-37% for coal and gas, respectively).

Hence, there are compelling economic justifications, including market failures and externalities, that support the implementation of industrial policies such as NZIA. It is also true that the empirical literature on industrial policies makes it evident that crafting these policies can be challenging, with numerous documented

failures ([reference](#)).

For instance, the effects of Chinese industrial policies on the development trajectories of the US and the EU are undeniable. However, upon delving deeper into the Chinese experience, there seems to be minimal evidence to suggest positive outcomes from the provided subsidies and support. Specifically, Branstetter, Li and Ren (2022) discovered a negative correlation between government subsidies and firm productivity. Firms that benefited from state support underperformed in comparison to their unsupported counterparts. This observation remains consistent across various forms of subsidies, including those aimed at research, innovation, and equipment upgrades. Furthermore, there's no evidence of heightened expenditures on research and development, patenting, or profitability among firms that are recipients of these subsidies, as highlighted by Branstetter and Li (2022). One plausible explanation for this could be the tendency of the government to allocate support to firms with political connections, as opposed to the most efficient ones Cheng, Fan, Hoshi and Hu (2019).

Additionally, there are specific elements in the design of the Net Zero Innovation Agenda (NZIA) that could potentially hinder its influence on clean-tech advancement (Tagliapietra et al., 2023). For example, the European Union (EU) is currently favoring particular technologies for support, instead of adopting a technology-neutral stance that prioritizes the attainment of net-zero objectives, such as reduced emissions and heightened competitiveness. This exclusionary approach renders numerous existing clean-tech solutions ineligible for assistance, and more critically, could stifle the innovation of entirely new technologies. Other

notable drawbacks include inadequate governance, insufficient attention to key areas like capital access and skilled workforce availability, and adverse impacts on the internal market's level playing field. These issues have been underscored as significant challenges that need addressing (Tagliapietra et al., 2023).

To sum up, while there is theoretical support that government intervention is necessary to break fossil-fueled growth and be able to achieve net-zero productivity, research has largely neglected the importance of different geopolitical centers conducting such intervention in global competition. This policy risks entailing "green protectionism" and cutting off existing value chains while reducing a critical dependence on a few players in the global market. Our paper is an attempt to address some possible consequences of the European Net-Zero Industry Act based mainly on patent data supplemented with manufacturing data on the company level.

3 Data

We access the PATSTAT database and examine patents in so-called strategic net-zero technologies. The mapping is based on the classification of green patents, with an additional manual screening of patent codes. For example, the solar photovoltaic and solar thermal technologies (henceforth, solar) are mapped to patent classes Y02E 10/40 to Y02E 10/60. The full mapping of strategic technologies to PATSTAT codes is shown in Table 1. We use annual data spanning from 2016 to 2019. In addition, we use aggregated patent data from OECD and miscellaneous

market data fetched from Statista.

4 Descriptive statistics and analysis

In this section, we present descriptive statistics and provide an analytic interpretation based on this information. First, we present data on the number of patents in strategic net-zero industries sorted by geographic region and country. We then continue by looking at the largest manufacturers in these sectors. We restrict the subsequent analysis to the three key strategic net-zero technologies solar energy, wind energy, and batteries.

4.1 Patent

Table 2 shows the number of patent applications over the period 2015-2019 in the eight net-zero energy technologies, that the EU has singled out to be *strategic net-zero*, distributed across Japan, EU27, U.S., China, and India. We consider patent families (a unique invention belongs to the same family regardless of whether it is protected in a single country or several countries). Several things are notable. For instance, more than half of the patents relate to battery technologies. Japan has the most patents of the five regions. But this can be explained by the high frequency of "patent blocking" and the number of patent applications without request for examination. More than a tenth of patent applications in Japan are withdrawn without requests for examination. With this in mind, EU27 has the most valid patent applications (as well as granted applications) of the five regions. Moreover,

the EU27 has nearly three times as many patent applications in strategic net-zero technologies as China, and India have very few patents in this area. Finally, if we ignore Japan because of the patent-blocking reason, EU27 is the most innovative region in the world when it comes to battery, wind, heat pump, and electrolysis technology. The table also shows that China has fewer patent applications than both the EU27 and the U.S.

Thus, our first conclusion is that the EU is a global leader with respect to innovation and the first link in the value chain for strategic net-zero energy technologies. However, we should also keep in mind that innovation is closely associated with shared knowledge, spillovers, and collaboration. OECD statistics show that almost a tenth of the EU27 environmental-related patents have a co-inventor from countries outside the union.⁴ Moreover, about 5% of the EU patents belong to companies with owners outside the EU. Even taking these considerations into account, it seems fair to say that the EU has a strong position in net-zero technology development.

We continue with a more detailed description of net-zero technology development in Table 3, which shows the number of patents in strategic net-zero industries by EU27 members. When aggregating all strategic technologies, Germany has by far the most patents. We know from the global comparison, that the EU is particularly strong in wind and also in battery innovations. Patents in wind technology are mainly held by Germany and Denmark (for a graphical illustration, see Fig B). Battery storage patents are clustered in Germany and France. In

⁴<https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=29068>

solar, the most number of patents are held in Germany, followed by France and the Netherlands. Hence, the figures reveal a great deal of country heterogeneity when it comes to technology development. There are low levels of innovation and technology development in the East European countries and also in Greece. Moreover, also notable is Italy's and Spain's low level of patents compared to Germany and France.

Hence, Germany dominates strategic energy innovations, both at the aggregate level and in different industries. Table 3 examines a slightly different issue and reveals how the member states are specialized with respect to the eight technologies. Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and Sweden have the largest share of their patents in batteries. In particular Denmark, but also Spain, have their relative innovation strength in wind technology. Countries that have their relative advantage in solar innovations include the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Ireland, and Finland.

Our second conclusion is that Germany is the EU's innovation hub with almost two-thirds of all patent applications in strategic energy technologies. Germany has more patents than any of the other EU countries in each of the eight technology areas. Other member countries are satellites outside the hub with a large degree of heterogeneity in patent size. More than 80% of the patents are concentrated in three technologies, i.e., solar, wind, and battery, and most member countries have their relative specialization in batteries or solar technology. One notable exception is Denmark with most of its patents in the wind sector.

4.2 Patents and government spending

We continue by examining if the high level of net-zero technology development is related to EU subsidies. This issue is important considering the current EU policy to increase green-tech development and production through various types of subsidies. In other words, past experience might give a sense of how successful the current policy can be expected to be.

More precisely, the figures in Table 4 show the number of patents in relation to the amount governments spend on R&D. It should be pointed out that the table's data, which comes from OECD statistics, does not weight the patents according to their relative importance (e.g., with the help of citations) or between radical and incremental patents, new and mature technology areas, etc. Moreover, the data is restricted to European member states of the OECD. Table 4 presents all environmental-related patents (ERT) in the left column and the sub-population climate-change-mitigating energy patent (CCMET) in the right column. The latter mainly captures the strategic net-zero technologies.

We are interested in whether government spending in research and development results in patents. Table 4 shows the number of environmental-related patents (ERT) as well as climate-change-mitigating energy patents (CCMET) related to energy generation, transmission, or distribution. The countries receiving the most return on investments in CCMET are Denmark and Germany. Regarding environmental-related technologies, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland have the highest R&D productivity among the EU countries. For CCMET, Denmark—with a focus on wind technology—produces the most patents

per subsidized research dollar in the energy sector.

Although the comparisons in Table 4 should be interpreted with great caution, we conclude that there are significant differences in patents per subsidized monetary unit between EU member states. There is also a tendency towards systematic differences, i.e., the richer EU countries have a higher return on public R&D support than the poorer member states.

4.3 Manufacturing

The explicit ambition of the EU's net-zero industry is to reduce the dependence on imports of strategic net-zero technology from China and to meet the U.S.'s increased protectionist policies. As previously mentioned, the net-zero Industry Act states that at least 40% of the EU's low-carbon technologies will be made within its borders by 2030. This section examines if current production matches this vision.

In the subsequent analysis, we focus on solar, wind, and battery, as they are the three main strategic technologies from the perspective of innovation, which is the point of departure for our paper. Our approach is to specifically examine the largest manufacturing companies in the three selected technologies.

Starting with solar technology, both photovoltaic and thermal, Table 5 presents the eight leading technology manufacturers by pipeline capacity in 2021. EU27 is the most innovative region in this technology, as shown above, but none of the top producers are European. Most of the largest companies are Chinese with a total pipeline capacity of 28 Gigawatt, which is double the capacity of both the leading American and Australian companies.

Next, we consider the largest companies in wind technologies. As seen above, China is lagging behind the EU and the U.S. regarding innovative capacity in this industry. However, this is not reflected in manufacturing capacity. Table 6 shows that six out of ten leading wind technology manufacturers are Chinese. However, Denmark, Germany, and Spain are also strong in manufacturing wind technology. All three countries have top-producing wind companies. Similar to all top producers of clean technology, the firms are global with a presence in various regions. The Danish company Vestas, for example, has the majority of its production sites in Europe. The manufacturing of blades, turbines, and generators is concentrated to 6 plants in Denmark and 6 plants in other European countries. But they also have 8 plants outside of Europe.⁵ The German company Siemens Gamesa has 6 production sites in Europe, compared to 10 in the rest of the world.⁶

Most batteries are produced in China, which has a 45% market share in the battery industry. India, and the U.S. combined have around 20% market share in the global battery industry ⁷. The importance of China is seen also in Table 7, which shows the largest manufacturers of batteries in the world. The largest company on the list is the Chinese company CATL, which is responsible for one-third of the production. There are also other Chinese companies among the largest ones. The rest of the companies on the list are either South Korean or Japanese.

However, it should be noted that there is a strong increase in the global manufacturing capacity of batteries. Hence, the current pattern might change. One

⁵see, <https://www.vestas.com/en/about/our-locations/production>

⁶see, <https://www.siemensgamesa.com/about-us/location-finder>

⁷www.bolddata.nl

attempt to predict future battery production is seen in Table 8, where we look at a forecast of future battery cell production in Europe. Again, the Chinese company CATL is the largest company, but there are some European companies. For instance, Northvolt is number two and bases its planned production in Sweden ⁸, and ACC has factories in France, Germany, and Italy ⁹. Hence, a tentative conclusion is that European firms are increasing the manufacturing of batteries, at least in Europe.

Our analyses reveal that wind is a technology where Europe is relatively strong measured in both innovation and manufacturing. Further investments in wind technology may increase innovation in countries like Denmark since there is domestic manufacturing and strong domestic research. Solar, on the other hand, is a technology where Europe is weak both in patents and manufacturing. For battery technology, we note that the EU is strong in patents but weak in manufacturing. We observe that new production sites are under construction, but it is likely that China will continue to dominate manufacturing in the foreseeable future.

The overall conclusion from the compilation of leading manufacturers of clean technology is that the EU's strong position in terms of technological development of strategic net-zero technologies is not reflected by the manufacturing of final products.

⁸see, <https://northvolt.com/manufacturing/#manufacturing-locations>

⁹see, <https://www.acc-emotion.com/batteries>

5 Clean-tech trade

5.1 Concluding discussion

In the EU, the policymakers have set a goal that at least 40% of strategic clean technologies should be produced domestically in 2030, supported by subsidies and regulations. This will be a main challenge considering the current low level of manufacturing in the EU.

In this paper, we have shown that the EU is a global leader with respect to innovation and the first link in the value chain for strategic net-zero energy technologies. Our second conclusion is that Germany is the EU's innovation hub with not far from two-thirds of all patent applications in strategic energy technologies. The study also reveals a substantial heterogeneity among the EU member states in research productivity related to R&D subsidies. The pattern shows that the richer EU countries have a higher return on public R&D support than the poorer member states. We also discover that the EU's strong position in terms of technological development of strategic net-zero technologies is not reflected by an advanced international position to manufacture the finished products.

The overall conclusion from our analysis is that the EU will continue to be heavily dependent on a small number of global manufacturing companies, a significant proportion of which are Chinese, in order to have a rapid transition to a carbon-free energy supply. Although the development towards increasingly local and regional trade patterns can be justified by safeguarding supply links and domestic production, in the short and perhaps medium term it cannot replace the

advantages of a global trade system.

Our paper studies patent data for strategic net-zero technologies and investigates if the EU currently has a competitive advantage compared to the U.S. and China. This is important since patents are a key element in the value chain and, therefore, essential for net-zero technologies. We find that the EU has the most patents and can be seen as a global leader with respect to innovation. This, however, stands in contrast to the Union's weak position in manufacturing.

Moreover, we analyze how patents in strategic technologies are distributed among 27 countries in the European Union. Germany is the EU's innovation hub with little less than two-third of all patent applications in strategic energy technologies. Other member countries are satellites outside the hub with a large degree of heterogeneity in the number of patents. Denmark and France seem relatively successful in developing energy technologies, whereas countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain are considerably weaker.

We analyze solar, wind, and battery technologies since more than 80% of the patents are concentrated in these technologies. Worth mentioning is Denmark's strong position in wind technology. Denmark alone has more patents than China and the U.S. combined. Also, Danish firms manufacture a substantial amount of blades, turbines, and generators. Although the EU has a sizeable number of patents in solar and battery, the manufacturing of these two technologies is dominated by Asia in general and China in particular.

We argue that innovation is an essential aspect of the value chain and important for future technological leadership. We conclude that some EU countries are

well-positioned to have strong innovation capabilities in strategic net-zero technologies. Further investments may strengthen both manufacturing and innovation in these countries. However, it is also possible that other countries solely will be used as production sites for foreign and global companies. This will yield short-term benefits in terms of job creation and more robust supply lines, but it will not necessarily improve the long-run competitiveness.

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A Tables

Table 1: Mapping

	Techology	PATSTAT
1	Solar photovoltaic and solar thermal	Y02E 10/40 - 10/60
2	Onshore wind and offshore renewable	Y02E 10/70
3	Battery/storage	Y02E 60/10 + Y02E 60/32
4	Heat pumps and geothermal energy	Y02E 10/10 + F24 H 4/00
5	Electrolysers and fuel cells	Y02E 60/50 + Y02E 60/36
6	Sustainable biogas/biomethane	Y02E 50/00
7	Carbon capture and storage (CCS)	Y02E 20/18
8	Grid	Y02E 40/70

Notes: Mapping is based on strategic net-zero technology and PATSTAT codes and is done by the authors

Table 2: Number of patents by region and strategic net-zero industry

	Solar	Wind	Battery	Heat Pump	Electrolysis	Biogas	CCS	Grid	Sum:
Japan	3,503	461	12,763	149	3,163	219	44	201	20,503
EU 27	2,904	3,589	7,765	176	2,118	950	21	54	17,577
U.S.	3,704	1,283	6,240	118	1,664	1,212	70	187	14,478
China	2,247	264	3,215	34	161	74	2	29	6,026
India	28	12	46	0	13	27	0	0	126
Sum:	12,386	5,609	30,029	477	7,119	2,482	137	471	58,710

Notes: The table shows the number of patents in the technologies defined in Table 1 for different regions. Data is aggregated over the period 2016-2019 and based on PATSTAT.

Table 3: Number of patents by EU country and strategic net-zero industry

	Solar	Wind	Battery	Heat pump	Electrolyses	Biogas	CCS	Grid	Sum:
Austria	93	43	143	3	93	26	1	1	403
Belgium	55	50	218	10	20	18	0	2	373
Germany	1,511	1,550	5,905	73	1,599	221	20	24	10,893
Denmark	35	1,348	68	7	63	162	0	4	1,687
Estonia	6	4	4	0	0	1	0	0	15
Spain	157	196	52	2	17	39	1	2	466
Finland	53	23	83	10	24	81	2	1	277
France	362	100	873	23	137	127	2	7	1,631
Greece	3	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	8
Ireland	35	9	15	0	8	6	0	7	80
Italy	182	36	138	14	27	54	1	2	454
Latvia	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Luxembourg	15	9	16	0	0	4	1	0	45
Lithuania	0	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	8
Netherlands	203	136	106	7	94	136	1	1	684
Poland	73	17	18	1	3	17	1	0	130
Portugal	21	3	3	1	6	1	0	0	35
Sweden	93	52	117	21	25	47	1	3	359
Slovenia	2	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	8
Slovak Republic	4	4	0	3	0	8	0	0	19
Sum	2,904	3,589	7,767	176	2,118	948	31	54	17,577

Notes: The table shows the number of patents in the technologies defined in Table 1 for different European countries. Data is aggregated over the period 2016-2019 and based on PATSTAT.

Table 4: Green patents per unit of government spending

Country	ERT Patents/unit government R&D	CCMET patents/unit public R&D
Austria	2.72	1.14
Belgium	2.05	1.6
Denmark	3.43	5.93
Estonia	1.4	0.76
Finland	1.58	0.94
France	0.76	0.76
Germany	1.44	1.89
Greece	0.17	-
Hungary	0.51	1.2
Ireland	2.13	0.65
Italy	0.8	0.75
Latvia	0.2	-
Lithuania	0.5	-
Luxemburg	1.16	-
Netherlands	2.15	0.9
Poland	0.5	0.53
Portugal	0.39	0.57
Slovak Republic	0.93	2.97
Slovenia	0.63	-
Spain	0.45	1.31
Sweden	1.79	1.15

Notes: The table is based on OECD data. The table shows the number of patents per dollar spent in environmental related patents (ERT) and the sub-population climate-change-mitigating energy patent (CCMET)

Table 5: Leading solar technology manufacturers 2021, by pipeline capacity

Company	GW
First Solar Inc (U.S.)	14.8
5B Australia Pty Ltd (Australia)	14.0
JinkoSolar Holding Co Ltd (China)	9.7
LONGi Green Technology Co Ltd (China)	7.4
Canadian Solar Inc (Canada)	6.8
JA Solar Technology Co Ltd (China)	5.6
Trina Solar Co Ltd (China)	2.9
Risen Energy Co Ltd (China)	2.3

Notes: Financial Times, March 2023 (via Statista id 513150)

Table 6: Global commissioned capacity of major wind companies 2021

Company	GW
Vestas (Denmark)	15.2
Goldwind (China)	12.04
Siemens Gamesa (Spain)	8.64
Envision (China)	8.46
GE (USA)	8.30
Windey (China)	7.71
Ming Yang (China)	7.53
Nordex (Germany)	6.80
Shanghai Electric (China)	5.34
Dongfang Electric (China)	1.46

Notes: BloombergNEF, March 2022 (via Statista id 516028)

Table 7: Largest battery manufacturers

Company	Note
CATL (China)	responsible for 96.7 GWh of the planet's total of 296.8 GWh
LG (S. Korea)	
Panasonic (Japan)	alone responsible for Teslas production
BYD (China)	
Samsung SDI (S. Korea)	
SKI (S. Korea)	
CALB (China)	
Grepow (China)	
AESC (Japan)	joint venture between Nissan, NEC and Tokin Corporation
EVE (China)	

Notes: the table is based on: <https://history-computer.com/10-largest-and-most-important-battery-companies-in-the-world/>)

Table 8: Projected battery cell production Europe 2030, by company

Company	GW
CATL (China)	140
Freyr (Norway)	98
Northvolt (Germany)	94
LG Chem (South Korea)	93
Tesla (USA)	93
ACC (France)	92
Volkswagen Group (Germany)	90

Notes: Transport and Environment, March 2023, Statista id: 1375189)

B Figures




Figure 1: Number of solar patents by country from 2016 to 2019, log-scale




Figure 2: Number of wind patents by country from 2016 to 2019, log-scale




Figure 3: Number of battery patents by country from 2016 to 2019, log-scale