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Equipping Immigrants: Migration Flows and Capital Movements

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Equipping Immigrants: Migration Flows and Capital Movements

Fabian Lange and Douglas Gollin

Equipping Immigrants: Migration Flows and Capital Movements

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Non-Technical Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which migration-related capital flows can explain the variation in investment rates and current and capital account imbalances across OECD countries. Migrants must be equipped with machines, and the resulting demands for capital are likely, all else being equal, to generate cross-border flows of capital. We analyze and test the empirical predictions of a simple model with endogenous capital and labor flows. This model allows for exogenous variation in the supply of migrant labor as well as in local production conditions. Empirically, the observed correlations in investment rates, capital and labor flows can best be explained by an inelastic supply of migrant labor and large exogenous variation in local production conditions over time compared to the exogenous variation in the supply of migrant labor. We then examine how much the increase in net migration rates contributed to the increase in the US current account deficit since 1960. Between 1960 and 2000, the US current account declined by about 4% of annual GDP. The increase in migration contributed about 1% of GDP to this decline.

JEL Classification: F21, F22.

Equipping Immigrants:

Migration Flows and Capital Movements

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Equipping Immigrants:

Migration Flows and Capital Movements in Small Open Economies

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the extent to which migration-related capital flows can explain the variation in investment rates and current and capital account imbalances across OECD countries. Migrants must be equipped with machines, and the resulting demands for capital are likely, all else being equal, to generate cross-border flows of capital. We analyze and test the empirical predictions of a simple model with endogenous capital and labor flows. This model allows for exogenous variation in the supply of migrant labor as well as in local production conditions. Empirically, the observed correlations in investment rates, capital and labor flows can best be explained by an inelastic supply of migrant labor and large exogenous variation in local production conditions over time compared to the exogenous variation in the supply of migrant labor. We then examine how much the increase in net migration rates contributed to the increase in the US current account deficit since 1960. Between 1960 and 2000, the US current account declined by about 4% of annual GDP. The increase in migration contributed about 1% of GDP to this decline.


1. Introduction

Economists who study how production inputs flow across borders tend to be divided into two groups: those that study the flows of capital and machinery and those that study human migrations. There are of course good reasons to study capital flows and human migrations separately. The discussion of exchange rate mechanisms and trading regimes does not usually benefit in either clarity or insight if its scope is widened to include the determinants of human migrations. In turn, whether a country has a fixed or freely floating exchange rate is probably less relevant for determining human migrations than are immigration policies and local labor market conditions.

Nevertheless, capital and labor flows are conceptually linked through the production function. Both capital flows and labor migrations represent movements of production inputs, and both capital flows and labor migrations are jointly affected by changing production conditions. In addition, the productivity of capital is at least partially determined by the labor supply in a location; thus migrations can cause capital flows. Conversely, the supply of capital determines the productivity of labor and exogenous increases in capital can raise the incentives to migrate.

In this paper, we argue that the link between migrations and capital flows (and therefore trade balances) is quantitatively important. Neglecting this link, researchers will omit an empirically relevant factor that helps explain observed movements of labor and capital across countries and over time. The recent experience of Spain illustrates this point in a simple way. Figure 1 shows how the share of investment in GDP, the current account deficit and the migration rate in Spain evolved since the early 1990s. Since the mid 1990s,

fixed investment and the current account deficit rose at the same time that net migration rates climbed to unprecedented levels. A researcher who ignores the interactions between capital and labor flows will omit a crucial component of the recent Spanish experience.



The Spanish experience suggests that capital flows and migrations may be linked in an important way. It is not clear, however, whether we can generalize from the experience of this particular country to a more general relationship between capital and labor flows.

In this paper, we ask to what extent the link between capital and labor flows is a general property of small open economies. First, we pose the question in the context of a simple overlapping generations model of capital flows and migrations.¹ Our OLG economy

¹ Our analysis is closely related to Hatton and Williamson (1996) who have analyzed capital needs in the face of demographic changes in a conceptual framework that has many of the same components as does our model. Hatton and Williamson (1996) have focused on variation in labor supply induced by variation in fertility and the demographic transition and found that demographic variation contributes significantly to the observed patterns in international capital flows and investment rates.

is built around a simple, parsimonious set of standard assumptions. For this reason the basic forces at play in the model are extremely transparent. Furthermore, the predictions of the model will likely be similar to those generated by more complex and comprehensive representations of the economy.²

We are primarily interested in how exogenous changes in the supply of migrant labor affect the demand for capital in an economy. The model predicts that exogenous increases in the supply of migrants and total factor productivity (TFP) growth will both raise investment and generate capital inflows (implying current account deficits). The model generates predictions not only for the sign, but also for the magnitude of this relation. We find considerable support, both qualitatively and quantitatively for these predictions of the model using OLS regressions of the investment rates and current accounts on the migration and TFP-growth rates.³

However, we are concerned that both labor and capital flows respond to variation over time in production conditions, so that labor flows are therefore endogenous in the regressions described above. We therefore explicitly model how exogenous variations in production conditions affect the demand for capital and labor. In this model, both investment and labor are endogenous. We derive how the variances and covariances of TFP-growth, investment rates, and migration rates depend on the main parameters of the model.

We instead focus on migration rates primarily because of empirical reasons. In Spain as in other developed countries, the short-run changes in the size of the population induced by changing migration rates are much larger than those induced by variations in fertility rates or mortality. Surges in migration rates can lead population sizes to increase rapidly and therefore lend themselves to empirically investigate the impact of demographic changes on capital needs and consequently the current account balance.

² An example of a more complex economy build to reproduce the conditions of the Spanish economy is (Izquierdo, Jimeno, and Riojas 2007). Their representation of the Spanish economy is meant to reproduce a variety of features of the Spanish economy but delivers a relationship between the current account balance and migration flows that is very similar to the one generated by our simpler model economy.

³ In a recent paper, Ortega and Peri (2009) use a gravity model to construct instruments for the supply of migrants using economic conditions in sending countries. This gravity model is based on a model of migration choice across multiple destinations developed by Grogger and Hansen (2008). Ortega and Peri report results for investment rates that are consistent with our empirical findings.

We proceed to estimate the crucial parameters of the model: (i) the elasticity of the supply of migrant labor, (ii) the variation in TFP-growth and (iii) the exogenous variation in net migration rates. We find that net migrations are very inelastic – temporary variations in production conditions do not induce large contemporaneous flows of migrant labor. We also find that the exogenous variation in the supply of migrant labor to OECD countries over time is large. Within countries - over time, the standard deviation in the exogenous component of migration is about 0.2% of the resident population. This contrasts with a net (legal) migration rate into the US of about 0.4% around the year 2000. Finally, we find that the variation in TFP across time within countries has a standard deviation of about 0.5% annually.

Our results indicate that for most OECD countries, migration rates vary primarily because of changes in exogenous factors, rather than because of variation in local labor market conditions in the receiving countries.⁴ Investment rates, by contrast, are determined above all by variation in production conditions. The exogenous variation in migration rates contributes only 10-20% to the overall time-variation in investment rates. However, even though we attribute that investment rates vary primarily because TFP-growth varies over time, we also find that exogenous changes in migration rates can have a large impact on investment rates. A 0.1% increase in net migration rates does generate an increase in investment as a fraction of GDP of about 0.25%. If this additional capital is not financed through local savings, then the current account will decline by a similar amount.

In a final quantitative exercise, we consider the US experience in the last half century. The evolution of the US current account balance has been widely discussed in the press and

⁴ Overall however, the extremely large differences in wages and production conditions between the developing and the developed world are large enough to drive the observed migration flows from the developing to the developed world, even if migration rates are relatively inelastic. In other words, migration is driven overwhelmingly by differences in income levels across countries; next to differences of this magnitude, the fairly minor variation in productivity within rich countries has a second-order effect, at best, on migration rates.

in policy circles, both nationally and globally. We ask how much of the observed increase in the current account balance over the last fifty years can plausibly be explained by migration during the same period. For this purpose we treat the observed increase in net migration rates as exogenous. We then simulate the counterfactual current account deficit that would have been observed if net migration rates had remained constant. We find that up to 25% of the increase in the current account deficit can be explained by the increase in migration rates.

Overall, we believe that this study further strengthens the case to consider demographic factors in the study of investment needs and current account balances.

2. Migrations and Capital Flows in Small Open Economies.

In this section, we develop an analytic framework to guide the empirical work. To begin, we model a world in which migrations are exogenous and capital flows freely across borders. (We will later relax the assumption of exogeneity.) A calibrated version of the model produces a first quantitative estimate of the causal effect of exogenous migrations on investment rates, on capital flows, and consequently on current accounts. The model also provides an econometric specification on which we will base our empirical work, presented in later sections. This specification links growth in TFP, migration rates, and population growth rates (net of migration) to investment rates as well as current accounts.

Having analyzed the model with exogenous migration rates, we then endogenize migration flows and consider what the model predicts for the second moments of TFP-growth, migrations, and investment if migration flows respond to variation in economic conditions. In this formulation, there is exogenous variation in TFP. Migration rates vary both endogenously in response to this exogenous variation in TFP and because we allow for exogenous shifters in the supply of migrants. Based on this model of a small open economy

with endogenous migration and investment, we derive the variance-covariance matrix of investment rates, TFP and migration rates as a matrix-function of the fundamental parameters of the model.

Population Dynamics

We consider a straightforward overlapping generations model in which individuals live for three periods of equal length: youth, middle age, and old age. Each cohort is indexed by its birth year, and in period t the cohorts born in t , $t - 1$, and $t - 2$ are alive simultaneously. As a notational convention, we will use the date subscripts to refer to the birth-cohort; the subscript j will index the country; and we will use superscripts to refer to the age of an individual. Variables for a child are superscripted with 0; the middle aged carry a superscript of 1, and the elderly have a superscript of 2. For example, $n_{t,j}^0$ represents the size of the cohort t and country j during youth, $n_{t,j}^1$ represents the size of this cohort during middle age and $n_{t,j}^2$ during old age.

In tracking the population dynamics of this economy, we allow for both fertility and migration. Between youth and middle-age, an additional $m_{t,j} > -1$ migrants arrive for each individual of cohort t already in the country. Thus, $n_{t,j}^1 = n_{t,j}^0 (1 + m_{t,j})$.⁵ Let the fertility rate be $f > 0$, such that each individual has $1 + f$ children. We assume here that migrants are of working age when they arrive, and that they migrate before reproducing. For simplicity,

⁵For simplicity, we assume that there is no mortality until the end of each individual's natural lifespan.

we also assume that once they arrive in the destination country they adopt the same fertility as the resident population.⁶ The growth rate of the middle age population is therefore:

$$\frac{n_{t+1,j}^1}{n_{t,j}^1} = (1 + f_{j,t})(1 + m_{j,t+1}) \approx 1 + f_{j,t} + m_{j,t+1} > 0$$

The Life-Cycle of Income, Consumption and Savings

Individuals make economically relevant decisions about labor supply, consumption and savings during their middle age. At t , the middle aged (i.e. cohort $t - 1$) supply one unit of labor inelastically to the labor market and earn $w_{t,j}$. The old do not work. The middle aged allocate their income between own consumption, consumption for their children, and savings for old age. They provide $c_{t+1,j}^0$ units of consumption for each of their children, consume $c_{t,j}^1$ themselves, and save to provide $c_{t,j}^2$ units of consumption for old age.

Preferences over consumption in different generations are given by:

$$U(c_{t,j}^0, c_{t+1,j}^1, c_{t,j}^2) = \ln c_{t,j}^1 + \rho(f_{t,j}) \ln c_{t+1,j}^0 + \beta \ln c_{t,j}^2$$

Individuals are altruistic towards their children and therefore preferences are written over both own consumption in middle and old age and over the consumption of children. The altruistic weight function $\rho(f)$ on children's' consumption is positive and increasing. In addition, $\rho(0) = 0$.

Individuals can borrow against their own income but not against their children's incomes.

⁶Considerable empirical evidence suggests that migrants often display fertility behavior that is partway between the prevalent patterns in their countries of origin and their countries of destination. For simplicity, we abstract from this pattern.

$$(1) \quad (1 + f_{t,j})c_{t+1,j}^0 + c_{t,j}^1 + \frac{1}{1+r_t}c_{t,j}^2 = w_{t,j}$$

All economies are small in the sense that they face elastic capital supply functions at the world interest r_t .⁷

We solve the first-order conditions together with the budget constraint to get consumption levels across generations:

$$\begin{aligned} c_{t+1,j}^0 &= w_{t,j} \frac{\rho(f_{t,j})}{1 + f_{t,j}} \frac{1}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})} \\ c_{t,j}^1 &= w_{t,j} \frac{1}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})} \\ c_{t,j}^2 &= w_{t,j} \frac{(1+r)\beta}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})} \end{aligned}$$

Production

The production technology is Cobb-Douglas:

$$(2) \quad Y_{t,j} = A_{t,j} K_{t,j}^\alpha n_{t,j}^{1-\alpha}$$

Capital depreciates at rate δ and the law of motion of capital is therefore:

$$K_{t+1,j} = (1 - \delta)K_{t,j} + I_{t,j}$$

Countries differ in five characteristics: the population size $n_{t,j}$, the technology parameters $A_{t,j}$ and $A_{t+1,j}$, and the parameters $m_{t+1,j}$ and $f_{t,j}$ which describe population growth due to migration

⁷ We do not have a source of aggregate (world-wide) fluctuations and will therefore treat the interest rate as a constant for the remainder of the paper.

and fertility, respectively. Let the distribution of countries with respect to these parameters be $G(n, A, A', m, f)$. The support of this distribution is $R^+ \times R^+ \times R^+ \times (-1, \infty) \times (-1, \infty)$.

Markets clear, and labor and capital are paid their marginal products. Standard algebra allows us to solve for the ratio of capital to GDP, which will play an important role in determining the strength of the relation between investment and migration rates:

$$\frac{k_{t,j}}{y_{t,j}} = \frac{\alpha}{r}$$

Small letters k and y denote per-worker quantities.

National Accounting

We can now aggregate the individual level variables on savings and investments to obtain aggregate net savings (S-I). Standard accounting identities relate the aggregate net savings rate to the balance of payment (BoP) consisting of net factor payments to foreigners (B) and net exports NX :

$$S - I = B + NX$$

Gross investment equals the change in capital stock plus the replacement of depreciated capital. Equation (3) expresses investment as a ratio of GDP:⁸

⁸ Using $\frac{k_{t+1,j}}{k_{t,j}} = \left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \frac{r_t}{r_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = \left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$ where the last equality follows from the assumption that the world interest rate is constant.

$$\begin{aligned}
 (3) \quad \frac{I_{t,j}}{n_{t,j}^1 y_{t,j}} &= \frac{K_{t+1,j} - (1-\delta)K_{t,j}}{n_{t,j}^1 y_{t,j}} \\
 &= \frac{k_{t+1,j}}{k_{t,j}} \frac{k_{t,j}}{y_{t,j}} \frac{n_{t+1,j}^1}{n_{t,j}^1} - (1-\delta) \frac{k_{t,j}}{y_{t,j}} \\
 &= \frac{\alpha}{r} \left(\frac{k_{t+1,j}}{k_{t,j}} \frac{n_{t+1,j}^1}{n_{t,j}^1} - (1-\delta) \right) = \frac{\alpha}{r} \left(\left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (1 + f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) - (1-\delta) \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

This equation relating the investment rate to growth in TFP and in the population is the central equation of our analysis.

In addition to investment (eq. 3), we also need to determine domestic savings to derive the current account balance. Total savings equals labor income today, net of the consumption of children and the middle aged today. Consumption of the old is financed out of capital income:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (4) \quad \frac{S_{t,j}}{n_{t,j}^1 y_{t,j}} &= \frac{w_{t,j} - c_{t,j}^1 - (1 + f_{t,j})c_{t+1,j}^0}{y_{t,j}} \\
 &= \frac{w_{t,j} - w_{t,j} \frac{1}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})} - (1 + f_{t,j})w_{t,j} \frac{\rho(f_{t,j})}{1 + f_{t,j}} \frac{1}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})}}{y_{t,j}} \\
 &= (1 - \alpha) \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})}
 \end{aligned}$$

Combining and simplifying delivers the following expression for excess savings (the capital account) as a ratio of GDP:

$$(5) \quad \frac{S_{t,j} - I_{t,j}}{n_{t,j}^1 y_{t,j}} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)\beta}{1 + \beta + \rho(f_{t,j})} - \frac{\alpha}{r} \left(\left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (1 + f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) - (1 - \delta) \right)$$

Our main empirical specifications are (almost) directly based on equations (3) and (5) linking investment and current account balances to TFP and population growth.

Finally, for completeness, note that we already imposed the condition that consumers' budget constraints must hold and that all of output is paid to the factors of production. Together these ensure that goods markets within the country clear.⁹

The problem simplifies further if we assume that the distribution G is constant over time and that therefore interest rates are constant. This delivers:

$$(6) \quad \frac{S_{t,j} - I_{t,j}}{n_{t,j}^1 y_{t,j}} = \frac{(1-\alpha)\beta}{1+\beta+\rho(f_{t,j})} - \frac{\alpha}{r} \left(\left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (1 + f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) - (1-\delta) \right)$$

Equations (3) and (4) show how investments and savings depend on migration, fertility and TFP-growth across countries and time. Equations (5) and (6) then use the expression for savings and investment to determine the relation between our variables of interest and the current account balance. Overall, these equations provide a simple account of how investment needs and consequently the current account balance are related to migration, fertility, and TFP-growth.

Fertility and Migration

Equation (3) is the core equation in our analysis and shows how population growth – whether caused by migration or fertility – is related to investment needs. As is evident from

⁹ To close the model impose that the world market for investment goods clears by integrating over the distribution $G_t(n, A_t, A_{t+1}, m, f)$:

$$\int n_{t,j}^1 y_{t,j} \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\beta}{1+\beta+\rho(f_{t,j})} - \frac{\alpha}{r} \left(\left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (1 + f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) - (1-\delta) \right) \right) dG_t = 0$$

the equation, population growth from either source raises the investment needs of the economy in the same way. Migration and fertility differ, however, in how they affect the current account. In our model, fertility lowers savings rates – whereas migration does not. Countries with high fertility rates have low savings rates because altruistic parents with many children substitute consumption of children for old age consumption and therefore save less. Thus, while migration and fertility-induced growth in the work force has the same impact on investment rates, fertility induced growth will have a larger impact on the current account balance than will migration-induced changes.¹⁰

The Multiplier Relating Migrations and Capital Demand

This OLG economy provides a first indication on the quantitative relevance of migrations in determining capital flows. The investment equation (3) shows that variation in migration rates will be translated into variations of investment via the multiplier $\frac{\alpha}{r} \frac{k_{t+1,j}}{k_{t,j}}$. In

a stationary world, with constant interest rates and productivity this multiplier reduces to $\frac{\alpha}{r}$,

which, in steady state, equals the ratio of capital to output $\frac{k}{y}$.

A typical value for the capital-output ratio found in the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Manuelli and Seshadri, 2007) is 2.5, implying that a one percentage point exogenous increase

¹⁰In a similar conceptual framework, Hatton and Williamson (1996) analyze how demographic changes in the size of the working age population affect capital flows. Our paper extends this analysis and focuses on migrations. In OECD countries, birth rates typically change slowly over time, and variations in birth rates affect the size of the labor force only with a delay of several decades. By contrast, migration rates often vary substantially within reasonably short periods of time and have a more immediate impact on the size of the work force. Relative to birth rates, migration episodes arguably offer better opportunities for empirical identification of the relationship between investment rates and the growth of the workforce in developed countries.

in migration rates will cause an increase in total investment needs of about 2.5 percentage points of GDP.¹¹

This provides a first indication of how much historically observed variations in migration rates can affect investment rates and current account balances. Historically, migration rates typically vary by less than 1 percentage point over medium length horizons. Only during exceptional periods (such as the last decade in Spain) have net migration rates exceeded 1% per annum. In the US during the second half of the 20th century, net migration rates have fluctuated between 0.1 and 0.5 percentage points. Fluctuations in this range can however account for a substantial fraction of the variation in investment needs and current account balances observed over time.

Endogenous Migrations

So far we have only allowed for exogenous variation in migration rates. However, the empirical evidence available to us stems from observational data on a panel of OECD-countries. These countries experience changes in migrations rates over time, some of which are exogenous. These countries also experience changes in production conditions over time and these changes in production conditions will induce endogenous flows of migrants. To allow for this possibility, we now allow migration rates to respond to changes in local wages induced by variation in local production conditions.

To keep the analysis tractable, we postulate that the supply of migrant labor is of constant elasticity:

$$(7) \quad N_{t,j} = \Psi_{t,j}^N w_{t,j}^{\theta_N}$$

¹¹ With a capital share on the production function of 0.35, this corresponds to a gross interest rate (including compensation for depreciation) of about 0.14.

The parameter $\Psi_{t,j}^N$ summarizes exogenous factors that affect the supply of migrant labor to a location j at time t . Such factors can include rules governing immigration, but also economic condition in sending countries.¹²

The supply function (7) and the input demand functions solve for the market clearing quantities of K and N :

$$(8) \quad N_{t,j} = \Psi_{t,j}^N \Phi_N A_{t,j}^{\frac{\theta_N}{1-\alpha}} \quad \text{with } \Phi_N = \left((1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \right)^{\theta_N}$$

$$(9) \quad K_{t,j} = \Psi_{t,j}^N \Phi_K A_{t,j}^{\frac{1+\theta_N}{1-\alpha}} \quad \text{with } \Phi_K = \Phi_N \left(\frac{\alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

These and equation (3) deliver the (gross) investment rate and the growth of the labor force as:

$$(10) \quad \tilde{i}_{t,j} = i_{t,j} + \frac{\alpha}{r} (1-\delta) = \frac{\alpha}{r} \left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{1+\theta_N}{1-\alpha}} \frac{\Psi_{t+1,j}^N}{\Psi_{t,j}^N}$$

$$(11) \quad \tilde{m}_{t,j} = 1 + m_{t,j} = \left(\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{\theta_N}{1-\alpha}} \frac{\Psi_{t+1,j}^N}{\Psi_{t,j}^N}$$

Denoting $\frac{A_{t+1,j}}{A_{t,j}} = 1 + a_{t,j}$, taking logs on eqs (10) and (11), and using the standard log

approximation, we get:

$$(12) \quad \log(\tilde{m}_{t,j}) \approx \frac{\theta_N}{1-\alpha} a_{t,j} + \log \left(\frac{\Psi_{j,t+1}}{\Psi_{t,j}} \right)$$

¹² See Ortega and Peri (2009).

$$(13) \quad \log(\tilde{i}_{t,j}) \approx \left(\frac{1 + \theta_N}{1 - \alpha} \right) a_{t,j} + \log \left(\frac{\Psi_{j,t+1}}{\Psi_{t,j}} \right)$$

Equations (12) and (13) show how investment and migration rates¹³ depend on changes in local production conditions and supply of migrants. We can think of the first term in eq (12) as the “pull”-factor of determining migration rates and the second as the “push factor”¹⁴.

The above relations specify the relation between investment rates, migrations and TFP-growth as functions of log-growth in TFP as well as the push-factors driving the supply of migrant labor. These random variables, which each capture a different source of variation in the data are a_t and $\psi_t = \log \left(\frac{\Psi_{j,t+1}}{\Psi_{t,j}} \right)$. The variable a_t will be observed, but the variable ψ_t is latent.

If we assume that a_t and ψ_t are uncorrelated, then we arrive at the following second moments for log investment, migration and TFP:

$$(14) \quad V(\log(\tilde{i}_{t,j})) = \left(\frac{1 + \theta_N}{1 - \alpha} \right)^2 V(a_t) + V(\psi_t)$$

$$(15) \quad V(\log(\tilde{m}_{t,j})) = \left(\frac{\theta_N}{1 - \alpha} \right)^2 V(a_t) + V(\psi_t)$$

¹³ For the empirical work, it is important to keep in mind that $\tilde{i}_{t,t}$, is not observed

directly. To obtain $\tilde{i}_{t,t}$, one needs to adjust the observable net investment rate $i_{t,j}$ as shown in equation (11):

$i_{t,j} + \frac{\alpha}{r}(1 - \delta)$. Similarly one needs to make the adjustment in eq. 12 ($\tilde{m}_{t,j} = 1 + m_{t,j}$) to the reported net migration rates $m_{t,j}$.

¹⁴ In our analysis, the push factors remain unspecified. Ortega and Peri (2009) by contrast examine the determinants of migration in a gravity model that allows them to generate instruments for these push factors using economic and social conditions in “sending countries”. The data requirements for estimating gravity models include having data on bilateral migration flows, which restricts the sample and the time-period that Ortega and Peri (2009) can consider. Their analysis is based on 14 OECD countries (a subset of our sample over the shorter time-period 1980-2005. Interestingly, their results on investment (they also study employment and productivity) are largely consistent with our results.

$$(16) \quad V(a_t) = V(a_t)$$

$$(17) \quad \text{Cov}(\log(\tilde{i}_{t,j}), \log(\tilde{m}_{t,j})) = \frac{\theta_N(1+\theta_N)}{(1-\alpha)^2} V(a_t) + V(\psi_t)$$

$$(18) \quad \text{Cov}(\log(\tilde{i}_{t,j}), \log(\dot{a}_{t,j})) = \frac{1+\theta_N}{1-\alpha} V(a_t)$$

$$(19) \quad \text{Cov}(\log(\tilde{m}_{t,j}), \log(\dot{a}_{t,j})) = \frac{\theta_N}{1-\alpha} V(a_t)$$

We calibrate the parameter α using the observed share of capital in national income to equal 0.35. This leaves us with six moments (eqs. (15)-(19)) to identify three parameters: $(V(a), V(\psi), \theta_N)$.¹⁵ We are over-identified.

In this Section, we have first considered a model with exogenous variation in migration rates and TFP-growth and derived a specification of the conditional mean function of investment rates that allows us to estimate how investment rates and current accounts depend on exogenous migration rates and variation in TFP-growth. Concern about the endogeneity of migrations lead us to formulate a model with endogenous migration rates that we can estimate using the full set of second moments on migration rates, investment rates, and TFP-growth. We will now consider the empirical evidence on both the regression specification for the model with exogenous migrations and on the model with endogenous migrations.

For this purpose, we will discuss in the next Section the available data from a panel of OECD countries covering the period between 1970 and 2004. We will then lay out the empirical evidence in the same manner as we developed the theoretical model, starting with

¹⁵ In addition, we get a set of additional set of testable restrictions because (V_A, V_ψ, θ_N) are positive.

the regression evidence on model with exogenous migrations and then moving to estimate the parameters of the model with endogenous migrations.

Equations (3) and (5) generate predictions for regressions of investment rates on net migration rates and a suitable power transformation of TFP-growth. According to eq. (3) and (5) the regression coefficients on both migration rates and the transformation of TFP are estimates of the causal impact of migration on investment rates and are predicted by the model to be equal to $\frac{\alpha}{r}$, which in turn equals the capital-output ratio in steady state. As we will show, the estimates from the regression model both quantitatively and qualitatively conform to the predictions of the model.

Having considered the regression evidence, we examine the matrix of second moments in migration rates, investment and TFP to estimate and test the model allowing for endogenous migration. We find that migration rates are inelastic; international labor flows are not responding in a large manner to production conditions in the receiving countries. We also find that there is significant variation in the exogenous supply of migrants to receiving countries, maybe due to variation in how immigration is regulated in receiving countries or because production conditions in sending countries are varying over time (see Ortega and Peri (2009) and Grogger and Hansen (2008) for studies of the push factors determining migration flows). We also find that variation in TFP-growth rates account for the majority of the variation in investment rates and current account flows within countries, over time. Nevertheless, migrations account for a non-negligible component to the variation in investment rates and current accounts.

3. Data: A Panel of OECD Countries

In this Section, we describe the data we use to estimate the parameters and test the restrictions imposed by the model. Our analysis is based on a panel of OECD countries between 1970 and 2004. All data-sources are publicly available and widely used in the literature. We exclude from the panel the former communist countries because we only have data for short periods for these countries. We drop South Korea and Mexico, because we lack data on migration rates for these countries. This leaves us with 24 economies over 34 years.

We obtain net migration rates from the OECD statistical fact-books for years 1970 to 2004.¹⁶ For the USA, we use statistical yearbooks¹⁷ to obtain a longer time-series of net migration rates covering the 1955-2004 period. Importantly, these data do not include illegal immigration, which are likely to make up a significant component of US immigration in recent years. Native population growth rates are calculated (as total population growth less net immigration) rates and are likewise based on OECD data. The native population growth rate provides a rough proxy for natural growth of the labor force.

The data on investment rates and current account balances are taken from the Penn World Tables, release 6.1. The TFP-growth rate was retrieved from the United Nations Development Organization (UNIDO) and is only available for the time-period 1974-2000.

¹⁶ The data lacks an observation of net migration rates from Greece for 1972. We interpolate this number as the average of the 1971 and 1973 observations.

¹⁷ Years: 1972,1979,1981,2000,2007.

TABLE 2: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES IN OECD

Country	Year Range	Current Account % of GDP	Investment % of GDP	Pop. Growth % ¹	Net Migr. Rate % of Pop	ΔTFP (in %)	Share in OECD GDP
Australia	1970-2003	-3.70 (1.72)	25.78 (1.85)	0.78 (0.22)	0.55 (0.20)	0.73 (2.06)	0.02
Austria	1970-2004	-0.74 (1.60)	25.80 (2.14)	0.06 (0.23)	0.22 (0.31)	1.18 (1.86)	0.01
Belgium	1970-2000	2.49 (2.83)	23.85 (2.24)	0.13 (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)	1.12 (1.93)	0.01
Canada	1970-2004	-0.96 (2.04)	24.95 (1.56)	0.63 (0.32)	0.51 (0.31)	0.37 (2.56)	0.03
Denmark	1970-2004	0.17 (3.27)	23.91 (2.97)	0.14 (0.19)	0.13 (0.13)	0.52 (2.36)	0.01
Finland	1970-2004	-0.00 (4.34)	29.95 (6.42)	0.35 (0.17)	0.03 (0.18)	1.48 (3.27)	0.01
France	1970-2004	0.62 (1.76)	24.82 (2.06)	0.39 (0.09)	0.12 (0.07)	0.82 (1.61)	0.06
Germany	1970-2003	-0.73 (1.70)	26.41 (3.54)	-0.22 (0.32)	0.38 (0.44)	Missing	0.09
Greece	1970-2003	-4.59 (2.40)	26.55 (6.70)	0.34 (0.36)	0.35 (0.39)	0.82 (3.22)	0.01
Iceland	1970-2004	-3.14 (3.38)	26.11 (5.05)	1.10 (0.36)	-0.04 (0.32)	1.37 (3.20)	0.00
Ireland	1970-2003	-3.71 (5.21)	23.28 (3.83)	0.87 (0.27)	0.09 (0.56)	2.37 (2.91)	0.00
Italy	1970-2003	-0.01 (1.80)	24.85 (3.41)	0.09 (0.34)	0.13 (0.22)	1.28 (2.04)	0.06
Japan	1970-2000	1.85 (1.39)	34.13 (2.52)	0.65 (0.40)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.99 (2.05)	0.13

Luxembourg	1970-2004	6.71 (9.15)	26.29 (2.51)	0.20 (0.37)	0.68 (0.43)	2.29 (3.55)	0.00
Netherlands	1970-2004	4.18 (1.98)	24.35 (3.20)	0.39 (0.19)	0.25 (0.14)	0.90 (1.58)	0.02
New Zealand	1970-2004	-4.69 (2.72)	22.76 (2.60)	1.03 (0.49)	0.01 (0.58)	-0.13 (2.70)	0.00
Norway	1970-2004	2.73 (7.00)	30.49 (6.09)	0.34 (0.15)	0.17 (0.10)	1.39 (1.79)	0.01
Portugal	1970-2004	-10.21 (3.98)	23.09 (3.16)	0.42 (0.85)	0.13 (0.90)	1.45 (3.11)	0.01
Spain	1970-2003	-1.69 (1.81)	25.17 (2.37)	0.49 (0.41)	0.20 (0.41)	0.97 (2.77)	0.03
Sweden	1970-2004	1.65 (2.95)	22.38 (2.64)	0.13 (0.16)	0.21 (0.17)	0.69 (2.15)	0.01
Switzerland	1970-2004	7.67 (3.21)	29.95 (2.95)	0.26 (0.39)	0.22 (0.40)	-0.02 (2.78)	0.01
Turkey	1973-2004	-2.47 (2.10)	15.75 (4.42)	1.84 (0.44)	0.15 (0.15)	0.26 (3.46)	0.01
UK	1970-2002	-0.91 (1.71)	19.10 (1.44)	0.18 (0.09)	0.06 (0.11)	0.92 (2.07)	0.06
USA	1970-2003	-1.54 (1.26)	20.85 (1.59)	0.72 (0.07)	0.32 (0.12)	0.64 (2.21)	0.36

1 The population growth rate is measured net of the migration rate.

Table 2 summarizes the data by country and shows that investment rates, current account balances, population growth rates, net migration rates and the TFP-growth rates vary widely across countries. A cursory look at the data suggests that the average differences in these variables are not systematically related across countries and this cursory look is confirmed in our regression analysis. There are clearly large differences in investment rates and current account balances across countries that are not related to migration and population growth rates.

In our empirical work, we control for these differences using year and country fixed effects. We therefore analyze variation within countries over time. Table 3 displays summary statistics for the residuals from regressions of the variables of interest on year and country effects. By construction, the means of these variables are zero and the interest here is on the variation of these variables.

TABLE 3 DISPERSION STATISTICS IN RESIDUALIZED VARIABLES OF INTEREST

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Current Account % of gdp</i>	<i>Investment % of gdp</i>	<i>Pop. Growth (in %)</i>	<i>Net Migration (in %)</i>	Δ TFP (in %)
Standard Deviations	1.59	2.04	0.20	0.16	1.60
Min, Max	-22.42, 14.93	-9.23, 14.18	-2.90, 1.59	-1.67, 3.78	-9.66, 8.97

The statistics displayed are generated on residuals from a regression of the variables of interest on a full set of year and country dummies.

The observed variation in investment rates and current accounts is substantially larger than that in net migration rates and population growth net of migration and of about the same order of magnitude as the variation in TFP-growth.

We are now in a position to start confronting the model developed in Section 2 with empirical evidence.

Section 4 The Empirical Relation between Migration Rates, TFP Growth, Investment, and Current Accounts.

We begin the empirical analysis by estimating a slight modification of eq (3), which, for convenience, we restate here:

$$i_{t,j} = \frac{\alpha}{r} \left((1 + a_{t,j})^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (1 + f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) - (1 - \delta) \right)$$

Since $a_{t,j}$ is observed and α is calibrated, we can substitute $1 + \tilde{a}_{t,j}$ for $(1 + a_{t,j})^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$, where

$\tilde{a}_{t,j}$ is an adjusted TFP-growth rate that can be treated as an observed variable. This adjusted

TFP-growth rate $\tilde{a}_{t,j}$ will be distributed tightly around 0, because TFP-growth itself is

clustered around 0. We find that $\tilde{a}_{t,j}$ has a mean of 0.012 with a standard deviation 0.035.

The smallest and largest observed values of $\tilde{a}_{t,j}$ are -0.158 and 0.154 respectively.

Rewrite eq (3) to read:

$$(20) \quad i_{t,j} = \frac{\alpha}{r} (\tilde{a}_{t,j} + f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) + \tilde{a}_{t,j} (f_{t,j} + m_{t+1,j}) + \frac{\alpha}{r} \delta$$

The second term in equation (20) is two orders of magnitude smaller than the first term. We will therefore employ the following approximation as our empirical specification:

$$(21) \quad i_{t,j} = \text{const} + \beta_1 \tilde{a}_{t,j} + \beta_2 f_{t,j} + \beta_3 m_{t+1,j} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

From eq. (20) we have the prediction that $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \frac{\alpha}{r}$. The value of

$\frac{\alpha}{r}$ depends on the interest rate. This interest rate is a risky return on capital gross of depreciation. If we take historical stock-market returns between 5-7.5% as the cost of capital, set depreciation rates between 5-10% and use a share of capital of 0.35, then $\frac{\alpha}{r}$ is predicted to lie between 2 and 3.5. An alternative way to calibrate $\frac{\alpha}{r}$ is to set $\frac{\alpha}{r}$ equal to the capital-output ratio, because $\frac{\alpha}{r} \frac{k_{t+1,j}}{k_{t,j}} \approx \frac{\alpha}{r} = \frac{k_{t,j}}{y_{t,j}}$. The macroeconomic literature typically sets the capital-output ratio to about 2.5. Either way, we predict all three coefficients in equation (21) to be identical and between 2 and 3.5.

TABLE 5: INVESTMENT, POPULATION GROWTH AND TFP IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1970-2000

	(1) GDP-weighted	(2) GDP-weighted	(3) GDP-weighted	(4) Raw-Data	(5) Restricted data	(6) – 5 Year Averages	(7) – 5 Year Aver. (restricted)
Net Migration Rates	2.80 [0.63]***	2.05 [0.56]***	1.40 [0.62]**	1.39 [0.47]***	3.44 [0.92]***	1.98 [1.78]	1.16 [0.25]***
Natural Population Growth Rates	3.37 [0.57]***	1.46 [0.64]**		1.21 [0.61]**	2.02 [0.92]**	3.57 [1.38]**	1.16 [0.25]***
Δ TFP	0.27 [0.04]***	0.23 [0.03]***		0.17 [0.03]***	0.22 [0.04]***	1.02 [0.23]***	1.16 [0.25]***
Country-Time trend		Yes		Yes	Yes		
Observations	710	710	821	710	339	137	137
R-squared	0.89	0.94	0.83	0.85	0.92	0.89	0.88

All specifications include year and country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Columns 1-3 on data weighted with GDP. Column 4 on the raw data (up to 2005) and column 5 on data excluding countries with less than 1% of GDP as well as excluding the US.

Columns 6 and 7 report results using 5 year averages of the independent variables. For these specifications, the years of analysis are limited to 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 to avoid overlap in the periods of analysis. Column 7 restricts the coefficients on the main independent variables to be identical; this restriction can not be rejected at any conventional level. The F-statistic is 1.70 (df. 2, 106).

Much of the regression evidence, displayed in Table 5, supports these predictions. The table presents results from regressions of investment share in gdp on net migration rates, population growth net of migration, and the adjusted TFP-growth rate. All specifications include year and country fixed effects and columns (2), (4), and (5) also include country-specific time-trends.

The results from OLS specifications estimated on annual data (1)-(5) are all roughly consistent with each other. Net migration and natural population growth have sizeable impacts on investment shares with estimates ranging between 1.39 and 3.44 for net migration rates and 1.21 and 3.37 for the natural population growth rate.¹⁸ Our point estimates from the demographic variables are therefore consistent with the plausible range for $\frac{\alpha}{r}$ based on the calibrated macro-economic values. This is a striking result.

The model also predicts that the coefficient on TFP-growth should be equal to the coefficients on the demographic variables. Instead, we observe in columns (1)-(5) that the coefficient on adjusted TFP-growth is much smaller than the coefficients on the net migration rate or on the natural population growth rate. Even though the estimated TFP-coefficients are of the right sign, they are much smaller than the 2-3.5 range predicted by the model.

We believe that we find much smaller coefficients on the adjusted TFP-growth rate because our model unduly restricts the timing of the adjustment in investment. The specifications in column 1-5 are estimated on annual data and thus assume that all adjustments to the capital stock in response to adjusted TFP-growth or migration occur

¹⁸ In all of these specifications, we can not reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on migration and other population growth are of the same magnitude.

almost instantaneously. The model presented in Section 2 does in fact not impose any frictions, and these specifications are therefore appropriate for this model. A more realistic model would however account for adjustment costs and thus for delayed impacts of migration rates or TFP-growth on investment.

It exceeds the scope of this paper and the quality of the data to fully model the frictions present in the investment process, but we can empirically investigate the role of adjustment lags. For this purpose, we first regressed investment rates on lags in TFP-growth rates as well as on the other independent variables. And, indeed we found¹⁹ that lags in TFP-growth rates did affect current investment rates significantly, with the size of the coefficients on lagged TFP-growth rates declining steadily for about 5-8 years.

Another approach is to enlarge the definition of a time-period. Column 6 displays results from widening the horizon of the analysis. We averaged the main independent variables over 5 lagged years and regressed investment shares on these averages (as well as the year and country fixed effects).²⁰ The coefficients on the averaged net migration and natural population growth rates are of the same magnitude as those reported for annual data in columns 1-5. The main difference is in the estimate of the effect of the adjusted TFP-growth rate. The coefficient estimate is now significantly larger. The estimates obtained in this manner imply that a 1% increase in TFP will over the course of 5 years lead to a 1% increase in total investment.

A first glance, it might seem puzzling that the coefficient estimates on the adjusted TFP-growth rate are relatively sensitive to the horizon consider, while those on the natural

¹⁹ These results are not reported in Table 5, but are available from the authors upon request.

²⁰ In order to avoid overlapping 5 year periods to artificially inflate the standard errors, we restricted the analysis to non-overlapping 5 year periods, estimating the specification in the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.

population growth rate and the net migration rate do not change as we expand the time-horizon. The time-series properties of the independent variables account for this pattern. Net migration rates and natural population growth are relatively persistent variables, with auto-correlations of 0.74 and 0.87 respectively. By contrast, the auto-correlation between growth in adjusted TFP-growth is only 0.23 implying that across more than 2 periods, TFP-growth is essentially uncorrelated. Thus, annual net migration rates and annual population growth rates capture a lot of the information on net migration rates and population growth rates over the last 5 years, while annual TFP-growth rates do not. For this reason, the coefficient estimates on averaged TFP-growth are much more sensitive to lengthening the horizon of analysis, than are the estimates on the net migration rates or the population growth rates.

In column 7, we impose the restriction implied by the model that the coefficients on TFP-growth, net migration and population growth rates are identical. We fail to reject this restriction at any conventional level; the F-statistic (df: 2, 106) is 1.70 with a p-value of 0.1868. The restricted coefficient estimate is 1.16, below the predicted range of 2-3.5, but not dramatically so.

Overall, we believe that the results from the investment equation are roughly consistent with the basic model, qualitatively and quantitatively. The result that the coefficient estimates on net migration are not just of the right sign, but indeed of exactly the magnitude predicted by standard calibration exercises is, to our mind, a stunning finding.

Table 6 repeats the analysis of Table 5 using the current account balance instead of investment rates. The structure of the table is the same as that of Table 5. Again, we find that the sign and size of the estimated coefficients on net migration rates and natural population growth are consistent with the predicted coefficients from the model. The estimates in Table

6 from the demographic variables are consistent with the model: an increase in the work-force increases the demand for capital by an amount equal to the per-capita amount of capital employed in the economy and this demand for capital is not met locally, but rather through importing capital from abroad.

Again, we find much smaller impacts of the adjusted TFP-growth – indeed they are even smaller than those reported in table 5. We do however not find that the size of the TFP-estimates increases if we extend the time-horizon of the analysis. At this point, we can only speculate why TFP-growth do not affect the current account balance significantly, even at the 5 year horizon. Current account balances are, by construction, the difference between domestic savings and investments. Variation in TFP-growth is likely to affect savings at the same time as investments, because TFP-growth affects permanent income. Models with life-cycle consumption decisions might very well generate off-setting responses in savings as TFP-growth varies because individuals spread the consumption response over their entire life-cycle. Our model does allow for a consumption-savings decision, but this consumption decision only captures intergenerational transfers of consumption. The model is simply not rich enough to consider the impact of TFP-growth on consumption patterns over the life-cycle. Nevertheless, we would expect that any TFP-growth should lead to increased investment to equalize the marginal products of capital in the world market. This prediction of the model is – because consumption and production decisions are separated – independent of the particular formulation of the savings decision and the empirical findings in table 5, columns 6 and 7 (and to a lesser extend cols 1-5) indeed support this prediction of the model.

TABLE 6: CURRENT ACCOUNTS, POPULATION GROWTH AND TFP IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1970-2000

	(1) GDP-weighted	(2) GDP-weighted	(3) GDP-weighted	(4) Raw-Data	(5) Restricted data	(6) – 5 Year Averages	(7) – 5 Year Aver. (restricted)
Net Migration Rates	-2.23 [0.39]***	-1.52 [0.46]***	-0.39 [0.39]	-1.14 [0.47]**	-2.72 [0.65]***	-4.3 [1.56]***	-0.22 [0.18]
Natural Population Growth Rates	-1.99 [0.38]***	-0.92 [0.55]*		0.01 [0.56]	-2.32 [0.66]***	-2.99 [0.95]***	-0.22 [0.18]
Δ TFP	-0.08 [0.03]***	-0.07 [0.03]**		0.03 [0.03]	-0.08 [0.03]**	-0.01 [0.16]	-0.22 [0.18]
Country-Time trend	Yes			Yes	Yes		
Observations	710	710	821	710	339	137	137
R-squared	0.65	0.74	0.58	0.78	0.79	0.65	0.60

All specifications include year and country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns 1-3 on data weighted with GDP. Column 4 on the raw data (up to 2005) and column 5 on data excluding countries with less than 1% of GDP as well as excluding the US. Columns 6 and 7 report results using 5 year averages of the independent variables. For these specifications, the years of analysis are limited to 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 to avoid overlap in the periods of analysis. Column 7 restricts the coefficients on the main independent variables to be identical; this restriction is rejected at the 0.01 percent level with an F-statistic of 7.71 (df. 2, 106).

Empirically our results are consistent with the notion that at least some of the increased demand for capital associated with fluctuations in migration and natural population growth rates are met by importing capital from abroad. Migration rates and natural population growth rates are consistently negatively correlated with the current account balances. This relationship is however not as robust as the relation documented in Table 5. This should not be surprising, since the variation in investment rates will only translate into equivalent variation in the current account balance if we assume that economies are sufficiently open that all capital needs are met by importing capital, rather than through domestic savings.

Having examined the conditional mean functions, we now turn to analyze matrix of the second moments and use these to estimate the parameters of the model with endogenous migrations. The parameters of this model that need to be estimated are the elasticity of migrations to local economic conditions, the variance of TFP-growth and the variance of net migration rates. Equations (14)-(19) show how these parameters are related to the observed covariances in (log)-investment rates, migration rates, and TFP-growth rates. Using the 5-year averaged time-series, we show the correlation matrix in table 7. On the diagonal we display the standard deviations of log investment, migration, and TFP-growth rates and on the off-diagonal we show the correlations between these variables.

TABLE 7: STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRELATIONS OF LOG(GROSS INVESTMENT RATES), LOG(1 + NET MIGRATION RATES) , AND LOG(TFP GROWTH) (5 YEAR AVERAGES)

	Investment Rates	Net Migration Rates	Total Factor Productivity
Investment rates	0.0081		
Net migration rate	0.087	0.0010	
Total Factor Productivity Growth	0.455	0.119	0.0066

Table 8 reports the parameters obtained by fitting the moments in table 7 using minimum distance and equations (14)-(19). Row 1 shows the unrestricted point estimates for the 3 parameters of interest. The point estimate of θ_N is essentially zero. There is no evidence in the data that temporary TFP-growth attracts large labor migration. Instead, the data is probably best summarized by observing as saying that migration rates are quite inelastic with respect to variation in TFP. The upper-boundary of a 95%-CI around the point estimate for θ_N is 0.08, suggesting that a 10% increase in wages only raises labor supply (through migration) by about 1%.²¹

The model only allows for two sources of variation in migration, the endogenous response to wage growth and the exogenous variation in the supply of migrant. We find little evidence for the former and therefore the relatively sizeable variation in migration rates documented in table 7 needs to be generated by exogenous variation in the supply of migrant labor. Indeed, we find variation in the exogenous supply of labor that is larger than what is needed to fit the observed variance in migration rates. The parameter estimates documented below generate a predicted standard deviation of migration rates of about 0.2% of the total population, twice

²¹ Because the theory predicts that migration rates should be positively related to wages, we also estimate the model while restricting θ_N to be weakly positive. We report results for this case in row 2.

the observed standard deviation of 0.1% in net migration rates (within countries over time). We also find a sizeable degree of variation in TFP-growth. The standard deviation in TFP-growth can of course be directly measured in the data, and our estimates are close, even if not exactly equal to the direct measure. The estimates differ from the standard deviation of TFP-growth observed in the data, because the model is over-identified.

TABLE 8: ESTIMATES OF ENDOGENOUS MIGRATION MODEL PARAMETERS USING 2ND ORDER MOMENTS OF MIGRATION AND INVESTMENT RATES

	<i>Wage Elasticity of Migration (θ_N)</i>	<i>Std of TFP-Growth (Std(a))</i>	<i>Std of Migration Supply (Std(ψ))</i>
(1) Unrestricted	-0.068 (0.073)	0.0053 (0.0018)	0.0022 (0.0025)
(2) Restricting $\theta_N \geq 0$	0 (.)	0.0050 (0.0019)	0.0015 (0.0036)

Overall, the parameter estimates from the endogenous migration model suggest that most variation in migration rates observed in OECD countries is exogenous, maybe because regulations governing immigration or economic conditions in sending countries vary over time. We do find that TFP-growth varies substantially over time and is responsible for much of the variation in investment rates. One way to see this is to use the estimated parameters to decompose the predicted variation in investment rates. If we use the estimates for Std(a) and Std(ψ) reported in row 1 of table 8 and impose a share of capital of 0.35 as well as an inelastic supply of labor, then we obtain from equation (14) a predicted variance in annual investment rates of about 1.45% per year. Only about 1/6 of this variance in investment rates can be explained by migration rates, with the remainder due to TFP-growth.

In summary, the evidence from the conditional mean functions as well as from the 2nd moments of investment rates, migration rates and TFP-growth suggests that migration rates and investment rates and international capital flows are linked. The empirical correlations between investment rates and migration rates, natural population growth and TFP-growth quantitatively and qualitatively support the predictions of a simple (and therefore hopefully robust) model. The estimated parameters of the model however also suggest that much of the variation in investment rates occurs in response to variation in TFP-growth, rather than migration rates.

Having examined the empirical evidence, we now consider an application that has drawn considerable attention over the last few decades. This is we ask, how much of the large growth in deficit in the current account that was observed in the US over the last 40 years can be attributed to growth in net migration rates.


Section 4: An Empirical Application: The US experience since 1960.

Does the increase in immigration into the US explain a large share of the observed deterioration of the current account and increase in the investment rate that was observed in the US over the last 50 years? We believe that immigration has indeed contributed to the decline of the US current account and to the increase in the rate of investment that is evident in US data over the last 50 years. By no means, however, does it explain the entire variation observed over this time-period.

To begin, we examine the data on US investment rates and the current account balance from 1960 to 2004. The trends in investment as a share of GDP and of the current

account²² are displayed in the two panels of Figure 2. Figure 2 also displays the trend components for both time-series obtained by filtering the data.²³

Figure 2




Between 1960 and 2004, the share of investment in US GDP has increased by about 5 percentage points and at the same time the current account deficit has increased by an equivalent amount. These trends were however not uniform as is evident by the substantial variation of the detrended time-series as well as in the trend line. Around 1990, for example, the trend towards an increasing share of investment and higher current account deficits was

²² Penn World Tables v.6.2

²³ Hodrick-Prescott using a smoothness parameter of 100.

temporarily interrupted. Overall however, during the period between 1960 and 2004 investment rates and current account deficits were both increasing by substantial amounts.

Figure 3: Net Migration Rate as Share of US Population: 1960-2004



During the same time-period, the US experienced a sustained increase in net migration rates. As Figure 3 documents, the net migration rate in the US fluctuated around or just below 0.2 percent throughout the 1960s and 1970s, started to increase towards the end of the 1970s, and reached about 0.4 percentage points between 2000-2004.²⁴

How much did the increase in the net migration rate contribute to the trends in investment rates and current account balances? To answer this question we interpret the increase in the net migration rate as exogenous and assume that the capital supply to the US is elastic at the world interest rate. We then apply the calibrated value of $\frac{\alpha}{r} = 2.5$ to the net

²⁴ This increase in the net migration rates is likely understated by Figure 3, since the data from the statistical abstracts captures illegal migration only imperfectly.

migration rate to generate a counterfactual investment and current account series. This series corresponds to the increase in the investment share of GDP and the current account balance that would have pertained if the net migration rate would have remained at its 1960 level.

In Table 9, we summarize the long run increases in the investment rates and current account balance both observed and under the counterfactual assumption that net migration rates had remained at their 1960 values. We have split the data into two time-periods, the 1960-1980 and the 1980-2000 period. The total changes are obtained by summing across these two time-periods

TABLE 9 US CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, INVESTMENT AND MIGRATION RATES

	<i>1960</i>	<i>$\Delta(1960-1980)$</i>	<i>$\Delta(1980-2000)$</i>	<i>Total</i>
Net Migration Rate (% of Pop.)	0.18	0.11	0.28	0.39
Investment Share (% of GDP)	18.99	1.52	5.17	6.69
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)	0.59	-1.32	-2.68	-4.00
Migration Contribution	-	0.275	0.7	0.975

Shown are the initial values of migration rates, investment share and current account balance for 1960 as well as the 1960-1980 and 1980-2000 values in those measures. Furthermore, we show the contribution of the migration component to these changes. This contribution is positive for the investment rate and negative for the change in the current account balance.

Clearly, the increase in net migration rates does not represent the main driver in the increase in investment rates or current account deficits. Its contribution is however not insignificant. Our calculations suggest that about 15% (0.975 out of 6.69%-points) of the increase in the investment rate since 1960 and about 25% (0.975 out of 4%-points) of the increase in the current account deficit can be attributed to the increase in net migration rates over the same time-period.

Section 5 Conclusion

Capital and labor flows are related phenomena and reinforce each other. In this paper, we used a simple conceptual framework to assess the causal impact of labor migrations on investment rates. This allows us to answer the question of how much investment rates would increase if the supply of migrants to an economy increased by 1 percentage point. The simple framework developed in this paper accounts both quantitatively and qualitatively for much of the time-series variation in investment rates, migration rates, TFP-growth, and international capital flows and it indeed suggests that migration flows can significantly affect investment rates and international capital flows.

This is illustrated by the US experience over the last 50 years. During the last half-century, capital investments as a share of GDP rose by almost 7 percentage points and the US has become a major importer of both labor and capital. Towards the end of the period considered, the US current account stood at about 3.5% of GDP annually. Our counterfactual analysis assumes that the increase in the net migration rate is exogenous and then asks how much of the increase in investments and capital inputs can be explained by the increase in immigration. We find that 15 - 25% of the overall increase in investment rates and the current account deficit can be explained by the increase in net migration rates.

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