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Report

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EU power market reform toward locational pricing: Rewarding flexible consumers for resolving transmission constraints

Insights from Future Power Markets Platform workshops, 16.05.2024

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The paper is based on own research, discussions of many of the detailed questions relating to power market design with partners of the Future Power Markets platform over the last decade (https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.436553.en/projects/future_power_market_platform.html), two online round tables with US and EU power market experts reflected in many of the discussions in section five and two workshops jointly organized by Karsten Neuhoff, Franziska Klaucke, and Mats Kröger of DIW Berlin, Luis Olmos Camacho of Comillas/ES, Anthony Papavasiliou of NTUA/GR, Lisa Ryan of UCD/IE, Konstantin Staschus of StaRGET/DE, Silvia Vitiello of JRC/IT, and Christian Nabe. These workshops took place on September 21, 2023, in Madrid and December 18, 2023, in Brussels, with the aim of discussing aspects of locational marginal pricing, focusing in particular on hedging in the context of LMP, and how individual or groups of Member States could pilot locational pricing, respectively. The workshops were attended by 30 to 40 power market experts from Europe and the USA, including from academia, regulators, TSOs, consultants, IT providers and power exchanges. Several experts from the European Commission were present in an observer capacity.⁷

Unless specifically noted, the paper describes consensus or clear majority assessments from workshop participants, but also points out areas in need of further work and discussion where no clear consensus emerged or where important details are not yet resolved. For legibility and understandability of the sometimes complex arguments, this paper does not take the format of workshop minutes but of a technical report to inform the debate.

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⁷ The workshops have been held under Chatham House rule: "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed." The authors made use of the insights obtained from the workshops and integrated them by adding the references to further research and complementing with further discussions.

Summary

This paper describes analysis and arguments related to a possible step-wise introduction of locational marginal pricing - or nodal pricing - into EU wholesale electricity markets. Specifically, the context, discussion and impacts of an introduction of locational pricing in just one or a few countries, and issues of the interface with the rest of the European zonal power market are outlined.

The need to consider changes to the current European power market stems primarily from the clean energy transition and its likely effect of increasing congestion at both the transmission and distribution levels alongside surging needs for flexibility. The increased capacity of wind and solar generation, as well as electrified demand (cars, heat pumps, climate neutral basic material production) connected to the electricity grid, will almost certainly create more demand for transmission capacity than will be invested in. An increase in structural congestion across the EU seems unavoidable even when considering the impressive estimates of total grid investment of over 584 EUR bn.⁸ Structural congestion, according to EU legislation,⁹ is to be avoided by reducing the size of price zones. This creates the need to increase the granularity of zonal pricing, likely up to a grid resolution that might imply introducing nodal pricing.¹⁰ Electricity trades between zones can only take place if there is no congestion (i.e. there is available transmission capacity), therefore the more the network is congested, the less available capacity for trades. With the increasing deployment of local renewable electricity sources (RES) the congestion, already present across several EU bidding zones¹¹ is expected to further increase.¹² Defining smaller and smaller zones could be considered to avoid structural congestions.

The ongoing bidding zone review is in the process of proposing such a refined zonal definition, and the scientific debate about their optimal definition is high on the agenda in several European countries, like Germany or Belgium. It builds on the expectation that zones can be defined to be sufficiently small to adequately address structural congestion, under the assumption that such congestion is not significantly time-variant. However, if the scale of individual zones is to be reduced significantly, additional reforms need to be pursued to ensure, for example, sufficient liquidity in short-term markets within the smaller zones. In particular, this could involve (i) a shift from physically defined balancing groups, only responsible to be jointly balanced, to individual responsibility combined with financial pooling; (ii) a replacement of complex bids for portfolio-based bidding with multi-part bid formats for unit-based bidding supported by financial pooling of portfolios; and (iii) intraday auctions closer to real time. Once all these reforms have been implemented, it would then also be possible to (iv) better integrate balancing and energy markets, e.g. pursue a joint market clearing at or close to real time. The reforms, however, also require (v) enhanced cooperation or institutional integration of transmission

⁸ Grids, the missing link - An EU action plan for Grids, European Commission, COM (2023) 757 final

⁹ Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management

¹⁰ Whitepaper “[Electricity market design 2030-2050: shaping future electricity markets for a climate neutral Europe](https://synergie-projekt.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Electricity_Market_Design_2030_2050_Shaping_future_electricity_markets_for_a_climate_neutral_Europe_final.pdf)” available at: [https://synergie-projekt.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Electricity Market Design 2030 2050 Shaping future electricity markets for a climate neutral Europe final.pdf](https://synergie-projekt.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Electricity_Market_Design_2030_2050_Shaping_future_electricity_markets_for_a_climate_neutral_Europe_final.pdf) and the simulations of costs in various zonal configurations vs. nodal in Germany: “Zonal vs. Nodal pricing: an analysis of different pricing rules in the German day-ahead market” by Knorr, J., Bichler, M. and Dobos, T., 2024, available at <https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2403.09265.html>

¹¹ Already reported as a source of concern by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in *Cross-zonal capacities and the 70% margin available for cross-zonal electricity trade (MACZT)*, 2023 Market Monitoring Report, ACER

¹² JRC Science for Policy report “Redispatch and Congestion Management”, JRC137685, 2024.

Future Power Markets Platform

system operation and power exchanges that currently hold separate responsibilities: transmission system operators (TSOs) are responsible for congestion management, ancillary services, and balancing markets, while the nominated electricity market operators (NEMOs, e.g. the power exchanges PXs) are responsible for market coupling at the day-ahead stage and the continuous market trading platform and intraday auctions.

The track record of recent reforms raises concerns about whether the reform steps through the bidding zone review can be agreed and implemented in a timely manner. The current governance arrangements involving complex interactions between the EU Commission, ACER and the TSO body ENTSO-E and their respective members at national level do not help the issue.

Hence, an alternative approach to address the urgent needs of the power system warrants careful consideration: a shift to nodal pricing that would jointly address congestion and system balancing needs. The concept is internationally well established and has long been treated as a possible long-term market design solution in Europe. With the massive deployment of renewables and the importance attributed to demand side flexibility, what was a long-term future two decades ago has now become our present.

A variety of design choices are relevant for European implementation. First, institutionally the commercial capabilities of power exchanges would need to be better integrated with the operational capabilities of TSOs, in the form of strongly cooperating or merged entities. The US experience shows that it is, however, not necessary to integrate such entities to operate a nodal pricing market at EU scale, but instead national or regional scale markets and operational arrangements could remain at the center (section 5). This requires a clearly defined interface between such regions, and the US experience shows how this is viable. As the European Commission also states in its Initial Impact Assessment for the Clean Energy for all Europeans package, “theoretically, nodal pricing is the most optimal pricing system for electricity markets and networks”,¹³ however a set of questions relating to the treatment of reserves and the possible use of intraday markets or auctions in the reality of the European electricity market still remains.

In addition to the above uncertainties, a shift to nodal pricing implemented simultaneously across all EU market regions could prove rather challenging. In particular, this is due to the fact that it would require an agreement at European scale on all technical questions listed above, although each country has a concurrent decision power on the subject of energy with the European institutions. Hence, at the December workshop we explored the prospect of pilot countries or a set of countries implementing nodal pricing to provide the desired learning experience and a blueprint for wider application. Individual countries, or a set of countries, could serve as front-runners, if they were granted some derogations from specific EU energy market regulatory requirements that currently prohibit such approaches.

The report illustrates in section 1 the urgency for further reform of the market design, pushing further the provisions of the current reform (a provisional agreement on the proposal from the Commission set forth in 2023 has been reached in December 2023). In principle, transmission constraints can be better integrated into market clearing either by reducing the size of bidding zones – as investigated in the ongoing bidding zone review – or by fully reflecting transmission constraints in the auction clearing

¹³ For a review including the main references on nodal pricing in Europe please see: “Nodal Pricing in the European Internal Electricity Market”, JRC119977, 2020, see also European Commission Staff Working Document (2016)

Future Power Markets Platform

using nodal pricing. In sections 2 and 3 of this report, the basic concepts are described, and sections 4 and 5 discuss more detailed design choices, followed by an exploration of a possible implementation pathway for the transition in section 6.

This report does not address important aspects relating to price hedging (Financial Transmission Rights, renewable pool) and broader overall governance arrangements.

Contents

1. Urgency for addressing congestion in EU energy markets	5
2. Experience with zonal pricing for congestion management	7
3. Experiences with nodal pricing for congestion management	9
4. Reform steps to improve zonal pricing	12
5. Design choices to adopt nodal pricing in the European context	16
6. Introducing nodal pricing in pilot regions	18

1. Urgency for addressing congestion in EU energy markets

EU power market design has largely evolved in a time and by actors envisaging large-scale generation assets serving the needs of inflexible demand. The rapid increase of wind and solar power generation, the primary energy resources of which are unevenly distributed, and sometimes concentrated in areas that are weakly linked to the rest of the system, and the equally fast increase in connecting storage, heat pumps (electrification of heating) and electrified industrial production processes implies that the capacity of generation and load connected to the system is multiplying, and so is congestion on the system. Grid investment alone is clearly of insufficient scale and speed to address this challenge even in the most ambitious expansion scenarios¹⁴ – equally important is a reform of the market design to allow for an efficient use of demand-side flexibility and storage not only for energy balancing but also to avoid and manage congestion. Better locational price signals would result in a reduction of the overall system costs and costs to consumers, especially to those who can react to the price signals coming from the wholesale market e.g. providing flexibility services, as the role and value of demand-side flexibility in enabling cost-efficient grid utilisation and large-scale integration of renewable energy into the system has been recognised and included in a set of policy documents as part of the third energy package.¹⁵

- **Reduce huge future redispatch costs and thus network charges for consumers:** The connection capacity of wind and solar power and of electric demand for mobility, heating and clean industrial processes is a multiple of the historic grid capacity. This results in rapid increases in redispatch needs within large pricing zones, if flexible load only responds to average zonal prices. The redispatch costs are added to network charges. Therefore, local prices – from small pricing zones or down to prices at nodal resolution – are required to minimize the cost to consumers: seeing where and when the prices in the market are high or low gives a clear signal to both entrepreneurs and consumers to exploit their demand responsiveness e.g. invest in and use flexibility from electric vehicles' batteries, heat storage and intermediary product storage to allow electrified industrial processes to respond to the local and therefore also grid needs.¹⁶ The additional availability and use of flexibility to meet network needs, i.e. the positive effect on the power system and market, will be stronger the higher the divergence of prices among zones/nodes and eventually reduce system and grid costs and stimulate price convergence.
- **Realize benefits of a pan-EU energy system for consumers:** Increasing internal congestion will put pressure on transmission operators and national regulators to reduce transmission capacity that is made available for international transactions, as happened in the Svenska Krafnat case in 2010¹⁷. Furthermore, uncertainties of flow patterns within large pricing zones continue to result in uncertain loop-flows through networks of neighboring countries, the need to increase reserve margins, and thus opportunity costs of network capacity that is foregone for the market. Local pricing can address these points by allowing demand-side flexibility to contribute to effective congestion management and predictable flows – thereby enhancing the

¹⁴ JRC Science for Policy report “Redispatch and Congestion Management”, JRC137685, 2024.

¹⁵ JRC Report “Local Flexibility Markets in Europe”, JRC130070

¹⁶ Marta Victoria, Kun Zhu, Tom Brown, Gorm B. Andresen, Martin Greiner, The role of storage technologies throughout the decarbonisation of the sector-coupled European energy system, Energy Conversion and Management, Volume 201, 2019, 111977, ISSN 0196-8904, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2019.111977>.

¹⁷ See European Commission DG Competition Decision of 14 April 2010, case COMP/39.351 O Swedish Interconnectors: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:142:0028:0029:en:PDF>

capacity of the network that is available for energy transactions across the EU, including those related to energy security.

- **Bring the market closer to consumers:** To respond to the increasing scale of network congestion, regulators implement measures to curtail load at peak demand periods and create incentives for construction of behind-the-meter batteries and flexibility elements to smoothen PV feed-in. This may alienate market participants from energy markets and encourage more autarchy-oriented management of storage and flexible demand. More granular pricing can avoid the need or use of such regulation as it will be limited to address distribution-level network concerns. Thus, consumers can respond to the pricing at the relevant off-take node from the transmission network (e.g. the city electricity price). This increases the attractiveness of engaging with the (local) market rather than operating household-level or small-business energy systems that are disconnected from market signals.
- **Avoid distortions and create an EU level playing field for EU consumers:** When bidding zones are too large and include structural congestion, the large conventional electricity producers that are located in these bidding zones receive substantial payments for redispatch that is required for managing internal congestion, even at times when the prices producers are not competitive in the day-ahead or intraday market. Currently, dispatchable assets can sell power at the zonal price, even if it exceeds the real value of electricity at their location. The TSO must then centrally redispatch the system to ensure network security. This can include mandating generators in export-constrained areas not to produce, and procurement of energy at other locations. As most congestion is structural, e.g. predictable, market participants can adapt their bidding, which aggravates the issue and the redispatching costs. The redispatched generators are only charged according to their avoided variable costs (in case of regulated redispatch) or based on their offers (in case of redispatch markets) for energy not delivered, and thus can retain the profit margins from selling at the zonal price exceeding their variable costs. Sufficiently small pricing zones or nodal pricing would avoid such paradoxical results and generation would not be remunerated when it adds no value to the system. In contrast, large pricing zones increase costs for domestic consumers and profitability of generation – distorting the EU level playing field and transferring wealth from consumers to producers.
- **Reduce costs for consumers by better monitoring and mitigation of market power:** Currently, there is a risk that large companies could adjust the production schedules of generation (e.g. schedule maintenance or increase output) or schedule international transactions to escalate congestion and therefore re-dispatch needs, and then profit from the margins generators who can retain if they are dispatched down. Furthermore, the current practice of portfolio-based bidding within large **bidding zones** and the segmentation of markets for energy and different reserve products limits the ability for market surveillance and to monitor and identify the exercise of market power by companies with portfolios of conventional generation assets. The market power mitigating effect of forward contracting is also vanishing with increasing shares of wind and solar power in the system resulting in large deviations of production from contracted positions¹⁸. Therefore there are large concerns relating to market power that can be exercised in short-term markets. This can only be realistically monitored, identified, and

¹⁸ Allaz B. and J.-L. Vila (1993), "Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency", The Journal of Economic Theory, Vol(59), P.1-16

thus limited, with unit-based bidding and integration of the different market segments (timeframes) as is common practice within nodal pricing regimes.¹⁹

- **Reduce regulatory and thus investment risks to enhance renewable energy deployment and further reduce costs for consumers:** The ongoing bidding zone review, its extensive delays, and court cases related to transmission capacity-related decisions already initiated by Member States, have alerted all investors to the fact that potential zonal reconfigurations can be subject to large regulatory interference and uncertainties. It is inherently difficult to anticipate the geographical outcome and price impact of zonal reconfiguration and hence investors will apply risk mark-ups and premia and may exercise the option value of waiting for more regulatory clarity. Any desirable incentives for system-friendly locational choices will be discounted (luckily also the perverse incentive for location of additional generation in export-constrained areas from the above described redispatch situations). A clear and long-term viable decision on locational or zonal pricing is therefore urgently required. This can then also include elements that address locational risks for vulnerable consumers and investors, e.g. with a renewable energy pool that hedges the price level at the location of renewable generation and of load.

The main challenges that need to be considered and addressed in a reform are:

- While average electricity costs will decline for the majority of consumers – dependent on the location- some consumers may be concerned about cost increases. How big could these cost increases be, and how would they be addressed?
- With a lack of shared understanding of the policy options, concerns about the complexity of any such change persists. How could viable design options be clarified and communicated?
- The multitude of ongoing reform processes and policy interventions at both national and European level – including ad-hoc measures to address network congestion – occupies regulatory capacity. Should structural reforms at pan-European level be prioritized?

2. Experience with zonal pricing for congestion management

Zonal pricing has historically evolved in the European Union at a time when regulated regional monopolies were gradually opened for an increasing number of customer segments to trade with third parties. To limit the ability of vertically integrated and dominant regional players to constrain third parties from entering the market, all third parties were granted the right to trade at a common energy price within a pricing zone – typically determined by the geographical boundaries of a country. The vertically integrated players were then mandated to facilitate all the resulting transactions. After the subsequent vertical unbundling, the general principle has been maintained across the EU. Market participants are free to nominate generation and demand schedules and trade within pricing zones, and the (now vertically unbundled) TSO is mandated to centrally redispatch generation assets to address potential violations of transmission constraints.

¹⁹ Nodal pricing overall reduces the ability to exercise market power because in the joint clearing of energy and transmission, transmission capacity is allocated to deliver energy to the locations where it provides most value. A price increase that is driven by market power will result in additional energy delivered to the location. The net-demand elasticity increases and therefore incentives to exercise market power decline. Only specific locations (so-called load pockets) remain of concern and warrant suitable market power monitoring or mitigation measures (equally to the current setting of redispatching units based on regulated costs).

Congestion management as an increasing challenge

In addition to opening internal markets within EU member states (pricing zones), the liberalization of the EU energy market gradually improved cross-border trading arrangements. Historically, cross-border transactions were focused on bilateral agreements between firms and countries to provide mutual emergency assistance and bilateral long-term arrangements to meet structural energy imbalances (e.g. Italian electricity imports). With an increased diversification of energy sources, first by lifting earlier constraints on the use of natural gas for power generation, then with the increasing deployment of wind and solar power, the value of cross-border trading dramatically increased and required suitable trading arrangements. These arrangements had two objectives: First, to ensure a more flexible use of transmission capacity to contribute to efficient system operation and to enhance net-demand elasticity to mitigate market power. Second, to capture the value of scarce transmission capacity and use the congestion revenue to reduce network tariffs rather than to grant it for free to holders of long-term energy contracts or in a first-come-first-serve manner to market participants that are the quickest (largely because of a dominant position providing an information advantage). These two objectives were addressed in day-ahead markets with a gradual shift toward implicit (joint) auctions for energy and transmission capacity in day-ahead market clearing, the so-called market coupling.

With the large increase of wind and solar power generation, the previous solutions are now reaching their limits, as was pointed out in the previous section, resulting in various debates on market reform. These are summarized below.

Separate treatment of ancillary services and balancing

Currently, European TSOs are attempting to further integrate their balancing mechanisms, both for automated activation (PICASSO) and for manual activation (MARI). These approaches are, however, contrary to the idea of the joint clearing of energy and transmission under nodal pricing, and only make use of left-over transmission capacity from intraday trading, which in turn is allocating left-over capacity from day-ahead markets.²⁰ Without the ability to re-calculate available transmission capacity cross-zonal balancing will remain constrained. The inefficiency and gaming opportunities increase with increased congestion levels and smaller zones, and this set-up is hence not suitable as a basis for nodal pricing (or very small zones). Equally, the co-optimization of reserves for balancing and energy in the day-ahead market is required by the 2017 balancing regulation but implementation has not yet started. Again, co-optimization would reduce inefficiencies that provide for margins and gaming opportunities for large market participants.

Institutional independence of all actors

The EU has the strongest institutional capabilities and mandate for the integration of markets. Hence, for EU energy market integration, the development of independent power exchanges (PXs) was also prioritized, and is now reflected in an entire EU governance structure for “Nominated Electricity Market Operators (NEMOs)” which is tasked to create a Single Day-ahead Coupling (SDAC), i.e. a single pan-European cross-zonal day-ahead electricity market (<https://www.nemo-committee.eu>), with similar developments for intraday markets.

This was pursued in parallel to the unbundling of transmission system operation from vertically integrated utilities. Now transmission system operators (TSOs) in the EU are responsible for operating

²⁰ Market segmentation rather than joint clearing reduces liquidity and increase price volatility. In March 2023 Italy suspended operational participation in Picasso following extreme price volatility. <https://timera-energy.com/blog/italy-suspends-picasso-afr-platform-participation/>

balancing and ancillary services markets to procure reserve power, and for maintaining system stability and frequency close to real time. Multiple parallel processes are pursued to improve their cross-border cooperation or even facilitate the integration of this cooperation (introduction of regional control centers, joint balancing markets, etc.).

The strict separation of responsibility of some energy market segments (balancing, ancillary services) with TSOs and other market segments with NEMOs (PXs) results in inefficiencies (since, typically, energy and ancillary services are jointly provided by market participants, but auctions for both clear separately). This may explain the complexities and lack of transparency that result from attempts to find technical solutions to address the complementarities. Hence, there are strong economic and system security rationales for better integrating the commercial, system operation and governance aspects in the EU, irrespective of the question of nodal pricing.

3. Experiences with nodal pricing for congestion management

In countries like most of North America²¹, Australia, and New Zealand, which face more severe transmission constraints than most EU Member States, nodal pricing has become a common practice for market design.

Nodal pricing jointly addresses congestion and balancing

Nodal pricing regimes realize synergies by providing a mechanism to overcome the institutional and commercial separation between energy markets, congestion management, and TSO procurement of multiple balancing services.

First, the clearing algorithm of spot energy markets at the day ahead and real time considers all relevant transmission constraints. In principle, this is equivalent to flow-based market coupling, which is now implemented across the EU in the day-ahead market. The major difference is the level of granularity. Nodal pricing systems typically have the capacity to calculate individual clearing prices for each node from the transmission grid. Thus, it is ensured that the market solution is also physically viable, and the need for subsequent re-dispatch is avoided.

Second, the separate trading of energy and multiple balancing services is integrated in a real-time energy market. Real-time markets are cleared in five to ten-minute intervals to allow for an efficient and secure operation of the system, which is coordinated through the real-time price, that provides incentives for all market participants to address energy balancing and transmission needs. Thus, the segmentation of the European market in different product types for different time horizons with a variety of qualification requirements and complexities for regulatory processes and market participants is avoided. This increases transparency, liquidity, efficiency and reduces the potential for the exercise of market power. The benefits of such an integration can be realized because all transmission constraints are consistently integrated from day-ahead to real-time market clearing.²²

²¹ Currently the following markets in North America operate with a nodal pricing mechanism: PJM, <https://www.pjm.com/>, ERCOT, <https://www.ercot.com/>, CAISO, <https://www.caiso.com/Pages/default.aspx>, ISO-NE, <https://www.iso-ne.com/>, MISO, <https://www.misoenergy.org/>, Ontario, Canada, <https://www.ieso.ca/>, Alberta, Canada, <https://www.aeso.ca/>, New Zealand. <https://www.transpower.co.nz/system-operator>

²² This is not possible in the current EU zonal pricing approach. The persistence of re-dispatch in the current EU zonal pricing approach shows that day-ahead prices are not aligned with implicit or explicit shadow prices that guide the centralized dispatch by TSO to address congestion (so called re-dispatch) and balancing needs.

What would differ for market participants in case of nodal pricing?

The change in market arrangements would, obviously, be of the largest importance for the more integrated operation of TSOs and PXs. How would it affect market participants?

Forward markets: The largest volumes of energy in nodal as in zonal pricing markets are traded in forward products²³. These markets would persist also with a well-managed change to nodal pricing. The reference point for financial contracts in nodal pricing can be – as in zonal pricing – the day-ahead market clearing price. For historic reasons, the real-time market in nodal pricing regimes serves as an even more important reference point for contracting and now also helps to better reflect and hedge the value of renewables and flexibility. The confidence of all market participants in the persistence of the market design allowed power exchanges to create trading hubs for financial contracting relative to the average hub price (average price of a set of nodes in a geographical area). As a result, trading volumes over specific market sessions typically match or exceed the volumes experienced in the corresponding EU zonal pricing market sessions²⁴. The basis risk – e.g. price difference between a specific network node and the hub price – can potentially be hedged with financial transmission rights but may also remain (partially) unhedged. This is comparable to the current European situation, where the high liquidity in the German forward markets implies that market participants in some neighboring countries also hedge their forward positions on the German zonal price, accepting the remaining transmission cost risk (basis risk).

Day-ahead markets: Historically, most prominent in general perceptions are day-ahead markets. Further, with nodal pricing, market participants would continue to submit their bids to a common auction platform for the day-ahead market. The format of the bids would, however, change. Rather than submitting energy only or complex bids for an aggregated portfolio, market participants would submit multi-part bids for each of their larger assets and only aggregated bids for smaller assets and demand-side resources. The auction result would then provide financially firm results. Market participants that would subsequently produce and consume electricity corresponding to their accepted bids thus will face a firm price. Only large generators will be required to subsequently produce according to their accepted bids, others will be able to deviate but will then be exposed to the real time price for their deviations. This corresponds to the current situation in EU member states, that requires a detailed nomination of production schedules of individual assets already at the day-ahead stage, in order to ensure secure system operation.

Inconsistent pricing inhibits market integration and results in an extremely complex set of arrangements for balancing and redispatch. This well-nurtured complexity results in highly non-transparent market segmentation that reduces the efficiency of market outcomes by constraining liquidity (market participants have to pre-select where to offer their services, and thus, there is neither full optimization at the side of services provided nor at co-optimization in the auction clearing). The arrangements also constrain market access for market participants (it becomes difficult to meet product definitions in different market segments that reflect interests of incumbent generation companies in current market design rather than fundamental system needs) and constrain the use of international advisory groups that could provide insights from global experience but would typically fail to understand the highly complex national and European regulatory arrangements.

²³ Around 88% of electricity transactions take place in the forward markets, according to EFET, the association of European Federation of Energy Traders: https://efet.org/files/documents/20220216%20EFET_Insight_01_forward_trading.pdf

²⁴ See “Does nodal pricing undermine the liquidity of forward markets? In <http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Nodal-Pricing-Implementation-QA-Paper.pdf>”

The change of bidding format towards unit multi-part bids for individual assets simplifies market participation for smaller players and demand-side flexibility, because the bidding format allows them to nominate the precise capabilities of their physical assets (like start-up costs and ramping times). The current complex bidding format is more tailored to the needs of large trading and generation companies with internal pooling capabilities but does not allow for a reflection of the full intertemporal constraints of individual units.

Further, in nodal pricing regimes, market participants can decide to self-schedule if they so desire and, thus, are typically not required to participate in the day-ahead auctions. Their nominated schedules will be then be taken account of in the auction clearing – and the market participants self-scheduling for bilateral transactions are then charged (or remunerated) for the transmission costs of their scheduled flows at the nodal price difference between entry and exit point.

It should be noted that a reduction of the size of bidding zones can reduce liquidity in short-term markets, even though the impact of such reduction on liquidity is not clear yet²⁵

Intraday: In current nodal pricing regimes, for large dispatchable units, market participants can update or retain their unit-based bids after the day-ahead market. These updated bids are then used in subsequent stages of intraday market clearing. Thus, if wind- or solar producers or the market operator anticipate changes in projected wind production, then in the intraday-clearing the unit-based bids are used to identify the least cost response options for production and demand. These are then communicated to the respective units in time for the necessary actions. As the precision of wind and solar forecasts, in particular, improves during the last hours before real-time, the focus of the nodal pricing system then rests on this real-time market.

Real-time: The real-time market typically clears every 5 to 10 minutes and the clearing prices are directly communicated to all market participants. The prices provide the incentive for all market participants to contribute with their production and demand to an energy balance that complies with the transmission constraints in the system. The market clearing considers the technical constraints of units, as nominated in their unit-based bids, and the evolving demand pattern in future time periods, so as to ensure full feasibility of the market result. All deviations from accepted bids from the day-ahead market are cleared at this real time price for the corresponding node and 5-to-10-minute time slot.

All smaller users are encouraged to respond to this real-time price signal and, thus, can actively provide flexibility to the system. If large units would respond to the price signal in an ad hoc fashion, this could trigger unexpected developments in the system. Hence, they are, instead, expected to follow the results of the day-ahead clearing result and the intraday-updates that have been communicated to them. Wind and solar power producers, for example in PJM²⁶, can nominate their availability at the

²⁵ See par. 4.3 on market liquidity from Schittekatte, T, Eicke, A. “Fighting the wrong battle? A critical assessment of arguments against nodal electricity prices in the European debate”, Energy Policy, 2022 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113220>

²⁶ PJM is the electricity market of east north America, including Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia. See for reference: <https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are>

day-ahead stage, and subsequently the system operator projects their expected production and considers this in the market clearing.²⁷ Production is then remunerated at the real-time price.

The real-time market provides incentives for all market participants to contribute to system balancing. Therefore, at the 5-to-10-minute timeframe, no additional balancing market or balancing products are required (FCR – Frequency Containment Reserves and aFRR – Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves would still be needed, as are governor control and AGC – Automatic Generation Control in the USA). As the real-time price signal has the same locational granularity as the day-ahead market, and results from a market clearing fully reflect this granularity, the market result is physically feasibility and no re-dispatch is required.

Moreover, it should be noted that adopting the same market-clearing mechanism across multiple time-frames/markets would considerably remove opportunities for intertemporal gaming: producers will not have an opportunity to profit e.g. by withholding capacity from the Day-ahead or Intra-day market to then profit in the balancing market.

4. Reform steps to improve zonal pricing

Bidding zone review to better address congestion:

The scale of redispatch - which TSOs need to mandate and procure to correct for the market results reflecting day-ahead clearing that ignores network topologies within pricing zones – keeps increasing. Hence, the current market design and network codes provide for zonal reconfiguration and splitting within a so called “bidding zone review process.” The purpose is to assess if structural congestion exists and to propose a reconfiguration of bidding zones in order to ensure that market clearing does not result in structural constraints. Several criteria and time horizons should be taken into consideration within the review. Ultimately, it boils down to the question of whether zones insufficiently reflect network topology and thus market clearing results in structural congestion. Of particular relevance is the frequency and predictability of congestion. In turn, this predictability translates into frequent redispatch needs and constrains the use of demand-side flexibility to address congestion.

The bidding zone review is envisaged to address structural constraints by reducing and redefining bidding zones such that redispatch needs remaining after market clearing are no longer predictable, e.g. based on wind- and solar forecasts. However, a major concern raised by market participants is that smaller zones could result in reduced liquidity in spot markets. This may be true in the current setting of continuous intraday trading, market participants are often constrained to transact with partners within their bidding zone because (i) binding cross-zonal constraints imply that bids on the continuous intraday platform can only be matched with other bids within the same zone, and (ii) bilateral trade outside of the continuous intraday platform is inherently constrained to transactions with other partners in the same bidding zone.

To address this reduced liquidity in short-term markets and to avoid the implied operational inefficiencies, three further reform steps are required. Three unique European power market design elements need to be addressed, which have no significant current economic benefit, but their persistence can be explained by historic path dependencies; they generally favor incumbent generation and trading interests over electricity consumers.

²⁷ This is equivalent to EU TSOs, that typically operate the system based on their own wind and solar forecasts as these are more precise and comprise the necessary geographical granularity for congestion management.

Shift from physical balancing groups to financial pooling

European electricity markets have the unique feature of physical balancing groups. All generation and load of one market participant connected to one pricing zone is jointly responsible for submitting a balanced physical schedule for the bidding zone and is liable for penalty payments and potentially legal sanctions for imbalances. Physical balancing groups date back to the early days of market liberalization, when vertically integrated utilities were required to grant access to new market entrants. In the absence of any auction markets and agreed price levels for imbalance costs, market participants were required to nominate a physically balanced schedule for using the electricity grid. Vertically integrated incumbents were, in exchange, required to facilitate the corresponding transactions. The paradigm of physical balancing groups persists, even though its historic motivation is now outdated, and even though they disadvantage smaller market participants and fits particularly poorly with the needs of fluctuating renewable resources.

Thus, the experts in our workshops generally agreed that physical balancing groups should be replaced with **financial pooling**. Generation and load submit individual bids and nominations, and the entity is subsequently responsible for paying imbalance (or real-time) prices for the deviations of production or load from the accepted bid or nominated schedule instead rather than exposed to imbalance penalties.²⁸ The unit based bids result in incentive-compatible generation and load schedules that enhances the granularity and robustness of information available to TSOs, while the financial pooling across assets facilitates for market participants the same risk management as with physical balancing groups and thus would not disadvantage participants with purely competitive interests. The prerequisite for such a shift is met in the EU - established balancing markets to provide prices for calculating imbalance costs and thus providing incentives to all market participants to stay in balance.

Such a shift is particularly necessary to facilitate two developments that are necessary to maintain liquidity while reducing the size of bidding zones: a shift to multi-part bids and an increased use of intraday auctions. This shift thus has advantages independent of the introduction of nodal pricing.

Replacing complex bids at portfolio level with multi-part bids at unit level

To support trading between physical balancing groups, most EU member states developed complex bids for day-ahead energy markets. The complexity relates to the reflection of intertemporal dependencies in the bids, e.g. the ability to operate assets for a block of pre-defined time (block based). A shift to unit-based bidding for installations exceeding for example 10 MW offers multiple benefits:

- It creates a level playing field among smaller and larger players, as all can submit unit-based bidding that reflects marginal costs and the physical capabilities of their assets in a uniform clearing price auction. Standing orders can also allow smaller players without a 24/7 trading floor to participate in the market.
- It avoids the combinatorial challenge of clearing a market for complex bids – thus reducing clearing time and enhancing the reliability of the market outcome (currently it is impossible based on publicly available information to assess how close the clearing of Euphemia²⁹ is to an optimal market clearing, <https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148282>).

²⁸ See Neuhoﬀ (2015): Balancing Responsibility: What model works for Europe?
<http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125565>

²⁹ EUPHEMIA stands for EU + Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Algorithm

Future Power Markets Platform

- It improves the accuracy and reliability of information available to TSOs when making capacity calculations and thus reduces the required reserve margins. Transmission capacity can thus be used more effectively.
- It is helpful to monitor market power/market power mitigation (difficult in portfolio-based bidding), which has increased importance with high shares of renewables with less predictable output and thus higher open positions of fossil assets in short-term markets. Hence, the status quo is highly attractive for firms with a large fossil asset portfolio, but also risky as any abuse by individual traders could expose the company to penalties in the order of several percentage points of their turn-over.

Using auctions closer to real-time

The scale of transactions close to real time increases with the share of wind and solar power generation that can only partially be predicted at the day-ahead scale. According to the same logic as at the day-ahead stage, therefore, trading closer to real-time should also be shifted in auctions so as to ensure that cross-zonal transmission is allocated efficiently and scarcity rents are captured in order to reduce network tariffs for consumers.³⁰ However, so far, the use of intraday auctions is limited to the first hours of the intraday timeframe and also to few markets: most of European intraday markets (currently 24 countries, including also UK and Switzerland) use continuous trading, and only a few already implement auctions (e.g. Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Portugal). Transmission capacity that is freed up or which becomes valuable due to intraday changes in wind and solar projections, continues to be allocated during intraday on a first-come-first-serve basis, i.e. for free, and thus possibly rather inefficiently and with significant scarcity rent transfers to the largest traders with the best information and faster computer access. This again also implies possible inter-temporal gaming: traders active on both sides of one border might have an incentive to “move” trades from day-ahead, where they also have to pay for cross-border transmission capacity, to intra-day, where substantially such capacity is allocated for free.

Why are auctions not used throughout the entire intraday time-period? It is often argued that it would imply additional interruptions of continuous intraday trading to provide sufficient time for tender preparation and subsequent clearing. Continuous intraday trading is, in turn, argued to be valuable in order to allow for adjustments in positions and schedules that intraday auctions would struggle to facilitate because they (currently) only comprise energy only bids and would thus not allow generation companies to offer their full flexibility. A shift to unit-based multi-part bids would, in turn, overcome these constraints and can ensure market participants can offer their full flexibility to the auctions. Hence, auctions can be used throughout the intraday period.³¹

³⁰ See Neuhoﬀ, Ritter, Schwenen (2015): Bidding Structures and Trading Arrangements for Flexibility across EU Power Markets <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111922>

³¹ An argument advanced to constrain the use of intraday auctions was that for any auction the continuous intraday trading has to be halted for a period of about 30 minutes to allow for the preparation and clearing of the auction. This obviously raises the question what the value of uninterrupted continuous intraday trading is. Obviously, traders benefit individually if they are faster than their competitors in the intraday market and thus can monetize private information and be the first to capture transmission capacity that may be of value according to newly realized wind or solar generation patterns. For the efficiency of the overall market result, however, it does not matter if an adjustment of schedules is pursued 7 hours and 1 minute or 7 hours before real time – usually it is even irrelevant if the adjustment is delayed and only implemented 5 hours before real time. Interruptions of continuous intraday trading for the execution of intraday auctions is therefore putting at risk

Another additional reason to avoid auctions in intra-day has historically been rooted in the results calculation times of auctions: with complex bids to be merged together, the time needed to find a suitable solution (often not even optimal) is considerable, and as we move towards the real time the importance of finding right away a solution is crucial to guarantee that the TSO can take the necessary actions to keep the system in balance if needed.

The discussion illustrates that a shift to financial pooling instead of physical balancing groups would facilitate a shift to multi-part bids and the full use of intraday auctions. The clearing of intraday auctions considering energy and transmission constraints would, in turn, ensure that even with smaller pricing zones (even reduced to nodes) the full liquidity of short-term bids across the system can be considered. Thus, **the scale of bidding zones can be reduced, while maintaining liquidity.**

Synergies across reform steps

The European partners of the [Future Power Market platform \(FPM\)](#) and the workshop participants have discussed opportunities for the improvement of EU power market design toward better reflection of geographical and temporal constraints in the power market between 2013 and 2019.

As indicated above, synergies emerge between many of the reform steps, in particular.

- A shift from physical balancing groups to financial pooling facilitates unit-based bidding and enhances the quality of locational information for network operation.
- A shift to unit-based bidding improves the accuracy of market clearing and the participation of smaller players including the demand side.
- Both elements together can allow for the shift to smaller pricing zones to better address congestion and improve the participation of the demand side.
- Once pricing zones are sufficiently small to address structural congestion, it will be possible to resolve the artificial separation of energy products (traded on the PX prior to gate closure) and ancillary service and balancing products (procured by TSOs). Then, a real-time market could be jointly implemented for energy and balancing services, while jointly optimizing energy and transmission capacity. This would lead to further efficiency gains, in particular because the reduced complexity for market participants would allow for enhanced participation and facilitate a better integration with Distribution System Operators.

The individual steps were defined in the FPM discussions as reform steps rather than a revolution to facilitate the implementation of each step. The main challenge for such a gradual transition may reside in the current governance structures of decision making on grid codes. The experience from the last 10+ years illustrates how slow any progress can be, and therefore raises the question of how long it might take to implement the sequence of the outlined steps.

Once all steps have been implemented, the final outcome may be very similar to a direct shift towards nodal pricing. This is illustrated in a longer-term vision for a fully integrated European approach and its motivation is reflected in the SynErgie Whitepaper I,³² while the pathway towards such a result is summarized in the SynErgie Whitepaper II.³³

some of the benefits of big players from information asymmetries and preferential access to cross-border transmission capacity, rather than the efficiency of system operation.

³² Novirdoust e.a. 2021, Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050, <https://doi.org/10.24406/fit-n-621457>.

³³ Novirdoust e.a. 2021, Electricity market design 2030-2050: Moving towards implementation. <https://doi.org/10.24406/fit-n-640928>

5. Design choices to adopt nodal pricing in the European context: from the north American experience to the EU

The system security and economic efficiency that can be achieved with nodal pricing is widely accepted, and where it has been implemented, there is no debate on reverting to other market design choices. A set of questions of the detailed design choice are, however, of relevance for a potential implementation in the EU:

Institutional arrangements

The first implementation of nodal pricing was within regional control centers of the USA, which were responsible for the operation of power systems extending over the geographical coverage of multiple utilities and (like in the case of PJM) states. They were independent from individual utilities (hence the name independent system operator, or ISO), and gradually added the commercial capabilities to their existing technical expertise.

In the EU, the prospect of creating independent ISOs is slim, because of concerns about continuity of operation, knowledge transfer and the inherent reluctance of any institution and thus also of PX and TSO to engage in structural changes with uncertain implications for scale, type, and location of future jobs. Such risks limit the support of actors for a transition. For similar reasons, the proposal for institutional competition – e.g. power exchanges and TSOs competing for the “opportunity” to implement and host the integrated functionality – has not attracted support.

Instead, it may be more promising to consider options for an increased cooperation or even mergers to bring together the complementary capabilities of TSOs and PXs while ensuring continuity of operation and avoiding career risks so as to ensure support for an effective and timely transition.

One or several regions with nodal pricing

In many discussions on the potential implementation of nodal pricing in the EU, the political, regulatory, administrative, and commercial complexities of a one-off shift from the current market design to nodal pricing across the EU that would merge all system and market responsibility with one centralized agency is being criticized³⁴. It also raises questions about whether such a centralized entity would fairly address the interests of all member states and has sparked intriguing debates on the suitable country for its seat, and implications relating to cyber security.

But such a shift is not proposed and was not the pathway toward the implementation of nodal pricing, for example in the USA. Instead, the pragmatic North American approach, which holds many lessons for the potential use of nodal pricing in the EU, comprises the implementation of nodal pricing at the level of market regions of California (with partial extensions across the Western Interconnection), Texas, and within the Eastern Interconnection in separate market regions from NY-ISO, New-England ISO, Mid-Western ISO, PJM, and the Southwest Power Pool.

Veterans of the debates relating to nodal pricing will recall that already two decades ago nodal pricing was praised for all the attractive attributes, subject to a frequently invoked short-coming: The so-called seams issue - barriers to trade and effective congestion management coordination between nodal

³⁴ For a review of the main literature, please refer to section 4.5 “Complexity” of Schittekatte, T., Eicke, A., “Fighting the wrong battle? A critical assessment of arguments against nodal electricity prices in the European Debate”, Energy Policy, 2022.

pricing market regions. Arguably, some of the efficiency gains of nodal pricing were lost at these interfaces. At the time, little improvement seemed possible, because the ISOs responsible for each market region, arguably, had more interest in finetuning processes within their areas than in improving cooperation with others, and as they feared decision power and influence would migrate away from the respective region to some neutral location. These concerns were later resolved, as ISOs had reached through organic growth of their market regions a scale that could be operated from the staff in one control center. This largely eliminated the risk of mergers and thus provided the basis for enhanced cooperation.

In 2022, when we hosted the first online workshops with US participants to assess the costs and market design responses to the seams issue, it was intriguing that none of the experts had been involved in or were aware of any debates relating to the seams issue for many years. The big issue two decades ago had been resolved so thoroughly that it had disappeared from all economic and policy debates. This suggests, also for an EU implementation, that comprising a transmission network with similar scale of interlinkages and (so far) somewhat smaller levels of congestion, it will be possible to operate nodal prices at the market region level while further enhancing the integration of the European electricity market with well-defined interfaces between the nodal pricing regions.

Interfaces between regions with nodal pricing:

In the Eastern Interconnected system in the US, the two largest ISOs - PJM and MISO – are each formed based on political choices rather than consideration of the network topology. Hence, they are, in effect, operating the same closely meshed network. Joint congestion management has been pursued based on such systems since 2004.

- For critical interfaces it is defined how much of the capacity can be used by the local and how much by the adjacent ISO (entitlements).
- After each clearing of the real-time market by the ISOs (every five minutes) a joint shadow price for these critical interfaces is determined. Thus, in the next clearing the value of the critical interface for use by the adjacent ISO will be considered to ensure efficient use of scarce transmission capacity.
- Deviations from flows from the previous entitlements are then remunerated between the ISOs at the shadow price.

In the US southeast, no nodal pricing is implemented and, hence, the vertically integrated utilities there cooperate with PJM by defining flow entitlements on critical lines for the respective parties and then requiring that each party stays within these entitlements. For this purpose, they rely on approximate modelling for loop-flows.

Furthermore, PJM, NYISO, and ISO-NE have been trying to work together to get more visibility into each other's systems and to make exchanges more efficient.³⁵

In the Western Interconnected System in the US, the California-ISO (CAISO) implemented a full network model for the entire West to get a better sense of loop flows. With the Western Imbalance Market (WEIM), which is a real-time market, energy and transmission are now jointly cleared for most

³⁵ https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/07/2021_ncsp_pjm_nyiso_iso_ne_final.pdf

of the West, based on LMP. Resource adequacy and ancillary services decisions remain with member balancing authorities (approximately 20). A day-ahead market is under development.³⁶

The US experience shows that effective cooperation between adjacent ISOs in meshed grid systems is possible – using a largely standardized approach, the basis of which is reflected in early academic work.³⁷

The cooperation is particularly efficient, if all parties use nodal pricing with high-frequency real-time markets, as it is then possible to exchange robust shadow prices for critical interfaces that are relevant for both market areas.

Reserves

There is an ongoing debate in the US on incentivization (remuneration) of reserves. Historically, bids from sufficient conventional units were accepted to provide reserves. Generators could then ramp their production up or down in real time to ensure system security. With declining market shares of such units, like in the EU, reforms are pursued to ensure that other generation and load resources can also provide the reserves.

Intraday markets

The nodal pricing regimes so far focus on a financially firm day-ahead and real-time market clearing. The clearing from the day-ahead auction is updated multiple times during the intraday stage, to accommodate, for example, changes in wind forecasts. If such updates show the need for the start-up or shutdown of conventional units, then this is communicated (and incurred costs are paid for) to the respective units. With the increasing integration of demand-side flexibility, it needs to be assessed whether the demand side also requires updated (and financially firm) intraday clearing – as is currently provided through intraday markets in the EU. This could be achieved, for example, by translating the EU concept of intraday auctions to a nodal pricing implementation, or by considering multi-part bids from the demand side equivalently to the unit-based bids from generation in the intraday timeframe.

6. Introducing nodal pricing in pilot regions

The idea discussed in this section envisages that individual countries or groups of countries would be granted the flexibility to implement nodal pricing. They would explore effective implementation options, guided by enhanced physical or economic pressures to improve congestion management practices, and empowered by possibly less strict discussions on zonal splitting or nodal pricing than in countries like Germany (where previous governments had committed in coalition agreements to protect a single pricing zone). This would provide a blueprint, which could then also be advanced by other Member States, like other market reform initiatives which were first explored at a national level before applying at EU scale.

Motivation for front-runners

What are the opportunities and challenges for individual countries or groups of countries that may decide to implement nodal pricing as a pilot? Ultimately, countries will likely balance opportunities and challenges when deciding whether to advance such a pilot. If, from a European perspective, the learning experience and potential blueprint developed in such pilots, is considered valuable, then it

³⁶ <https://www.westerneim.com/Pages/About/default.aspx>

³⁷ Coordinating Congestion Relief across multiple regions (1999) M. Cadwalader, S. Harvey, W. Hogan, S. Pope, <https://scholar.harvard.edu/whogan/files/isoc1099r.pdf>

would be valuable to understand how EU regulation or neighboring countries could help to reduce the major challenges.

Italy has implemented both zonal prices within the country and is using nodal pricing for the real-time dispatch within the zones.³⁸ This requires the use of unit-based, multi-part bids. The implementation of nodal pricing across all time-frames would allow for a more consistent and effective implementation of intraday and balancing market clearing by addressing constraints currently imposed by EU regulatory requirements.

The main challenge reported from the Italian experience of further refinement of pricing zones relates to the question of whether it would further reduce the already insufficient retail competition, and if retailers would need to advertise their price offer in a way that is even more locationally specific. In other countries, like in Germany, the large variations of distribution grid tariffs already require such a differentiated offer, e.g. customers in any case already need to submit their location prior to obtaining an offer from a potential new retailer.

Poland has also implemented an energy market based on multi-part bids from each generation unit. They are used for a unit dispatch, which is locationally specific. In parallel, a zonal price is calculated, at which all generation and load is remunerated (unless costs of units that are dispatched centrally exceed this price, in which case their cost is covered).³⁹

To ensure secure and economic operation of the system with the increasing level of decentralized generation and flexibility load as well as to ensure fair remuneration of existing and new generation and flexibility providers, Poland had already envisaged to shift to nodal pricing for real-time market clearing, with a vision of gradually expanding the coverage towards day-ahead market. It procured the corresponding software in a competitive tender from three globally established providers of nodal pricing software engines.

The subsequent implementation challenges hold many lessons that need to be considered for a potential implementation of nodal pricing regions.

The third energy market package has established a set of requirements with the further specification of market coupling initiatives, XBID – Cross Border Intraday Market and intraday auctioning at EU scale that further delayed the integration of energy and transmission markets at intraday and real time stage. This makes it even more difficult to implement nodal pricing, which is based on the very principle of integrating energy and transmission markets.

For example, to improve cross-border balancing and coordinated re-dispatch by regional control centers, strict limitations apply for remedial actions that TSOs can pursue in national (alone) balancing markets. However, the very idea of real-time markets under nodal pricing relies on the internalization of congestion in real-time market clearing.

³⁸ Giorgia Oggioni and Cristian Lanfranconi (2015) Empirics of Intraday and Real-time Markets in Europe: Italy, <https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/handle/10419/111267>

³⁹ Tomasz Siewierski (2015) Empirics of Intraday and Real-time Markets in Europe: Poland, <https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/handle/10419/112779>

Re-defining the established nodal pricing approaches to accommodate such challenges severely complicated the implementation process in Poland. It was also virtually impossible to adjust established software and protocols to provide an interface between a real-time nodal pricing market in Poland and EU balancing market platforms.

Ultimately, Poland abandoned the first attempt to implement nodal pricing given these severe complications, the resulting delays, and the overall lack of support from the EU and its neighbors.

Another attempt to implement a nodal pricing pilot could only be useful if the country could obtain a set of derogations from the current regulatory framework prescribing a full separation of markets for energy, redispatch, and ancillary services and balancing. In the meantime, national efforts are focused on improving the security constrained unit-commitment on a day-ahead basis with a full network model.

In the **UK**, nodal pricing has been recently proposed by the regulator and government as a mechanism to ensure secure and efficient system operation. The initial intention for a short-term implementation is however not followed up. Stakeholders opposing such a development emphasized that transition risks from price changes for investors and vulnerable consumers were not adequately addressed.

Implementation would most likely be less complex in the UK, given the island nature of the grid and the recent exit from EU market coupling. This exit from many of the elements of EU market integration may also offer some lessons for the future process. For example, day-ahead market coupling is now replaced again by tenders for transmission capacity with subsequent nominations of cross-border transactions on the reserved transmission capacity. Despite such an extreme adjustment, there have been no reports on major challenges to date. The implied inefficiencies warranted further analysis.

Hence, the next steps of market design developments in the UK seem to remain open – and continuation of the technical discourse to facilitate mutual learning and to explore options for future cooperation is therefore of mutual interest.

In the discussions on **off-shore** development in the North Sea (e.g. Dutch developments or North stern island) and the Baltic Sea (e.g. Bornholm energy island), the concept of nodal pricing features prominently in the name of off-shore bidding zones, and similar questions relating to transmission access guarantees and hedging against local pricing risks emerge. Perhaps offshore could thus also serve as a pilot region and would benefit from a common arrangement for the interface with other markets. Moreover, unlike other bidding zones within the EU, offshore bidding zones are already granted a special treatment in terms of regulatory regime as granted by European Regulations.

Technical implementation of interface

Different approaches, some geared towards the coupling of nodal and zonal systems, have been discussed in the past⁴⁰ and the discussions at recent workshops suggests that further discussion is necessary in order to better understand the various trade-offs that are involved.

Joint clearing with Euphemia

In theory, one could envisage that a pilot region could implement nodal pricing and clearing within the Euphemia algorithm.

⁴⁰ J. Richstein, K. Neuhoff, N. May (2018) Europe's power system in transition: How to couple zonal and locational pricing systems? <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/184675>

In practice, however, the algorithm already seems to struggle with current requirements⁴¹ and it seems unlikely that fast implementation and robust operation are possible for the engine if it would also host a market region with nodal pricing. A transition to non-uniform pricing and dropping business pricing rules that couple the primal and dual variables would nevertheless likely be a significant step forward in overcoming this problem⁴² (). The principal issue in such a transition is not the algorithm, but the institutional resistance to such changes in bidding product specifications.

Furthermore, Euphemia is only operating at the day-ahead and intraday time-frames and would not be suitable for clearing of a real-time market that jointly clears energy/balancing and transmission capacity. This joint clearing, however, is at the core of nodal pricing as it ensures that all resources can contribute to balancing the system. To avoid gaming it is necessary to ensure the real-time market (balancing) is pursued consistently with intraday- and day-ahead timeframes. Therefore, large-scale institutional and computational developments would still be necessary for Euphemia (or a follow-up clearing algorithm and design) before it would be able to accommodate nodal pricing.

Separate clearing: Alternatively, the market clearing in the nodal pricing pilot country/region could be separate from the market clearing of market coupling in the remaining EU energy market. This would then require rules to ensure loop flows are appropriately reflected and to facilitate trade.

To address loop flows between neighboring market regions, the experience from the USA and EU provides a consistent blueprint. In the USA, whenever market regions operated by different ISOs are linked, transmission lines carrying significant (loop) flows from both regions are identified and shadow prices for their usage are used to prioritize access and remunerate mutual use (see previous discussion for more detailed information). This concept is equivalent to the concept of critical interfaces that is used for flow-based market coupling in the EU, suggesting that a common approach building on EU practices to address loop flows would be possible.

Thus, the main question remains of how to define the trading arrangements at the interfaces between a zonal and nodal market region. The question is how to avoid, that primarily market participants will export from nodes with low prices in the nodal pricing regime to neighboring countries and thus likely contribute to additional internal and possibly international congestion (if internationally relevant critical interfaces are a strong reason for the low nodal price). Three basic options can be discussed.

Pre-screening of bids or nominations: The market operator in a nodal pricing regime could be mandated to pre-screen bids or nominations to auctions in neighboring countries. Only bids or nominations that would not result in additional congestion would then be allowed. Given the complexity of the network, some congestion levels are always present and, hence, in practice, threshold levels would also need to be defined and used.

Charging for congestion costs (ex-post). Nodal pricing regimes already allow for bilateral transactions within the regime, and then expose the parties that contract and submit their transmission schedule according to the locational price difference as transmission charge. Equivalently, the incurred nodal price differences could be levied on the cross-zonal transmission. Various options to define the relevant reference points have been discussed. A challenge for such trades, albeit not unsurmountable, is that

⁴¹ See again par. 4.5 “Complexity” of the paper cited above: Schittekatte, T., Eicke, A., “Fighting the wrong battle? A critical assessment of argumenta against nodal electricity prices in the European debate”

⁴² <https://www.nemo-committee.eu/assets/files/sdac-non-uniform-pricing-explanatory-note.pdf>

the congestion costs are only fully known in real time, e.g. after the trade, imposing a certain amount of risk.

An aggregate net-export function could be calculated by the market operator of the nodal pricing regime and would be submitted to day-ahead and possibly intraday auctions in the neighboring market regions. In simplified terms, the market operator would calculate the market clearing result assuming different volumes of imports or exports from the neighboring market region. This would provide for a simple net-export function - a set of price and quantity pairs for net-exports given different price levels. This has already been proposed in the context of real-time market clearing in the MARI pan-European balancing platform,⁴³ and the topic has been investigated by Norwegian TSO Statnett.

A set of questions emerge relating to the detailed implementation of such an aggregate net export function. One challenge is to precisely reflect intertemporal dependencies, the net-export function would need to be calculated for all different combinations of export volumes in each of the 24 hours (or even shorter time periods) of a day. A pragmatic simplification is required, for example abstracting from individual unit commitment choices for market region trade. The larger the pilot region will be, the smaller is the importance of such individual unit-commitment choices. Second, in Europe some of the potential pilot countries or set of countries may have important interfaces to multiple adjacent bidding zones. This would require separate but interdependent net-export functions or the assumption of a base case and separate and independent net-export functions to be submitted to the different NEMOs in the different adjacent zones that would then be jointly cleared as part of the EU market coupling. Likely some heuristic would be required to share the quantities of the net-export function to these adjacent zones.

All three options would need to be considered for application at day-ahead, intraday, and balancing timeframes. Ultimately, the discussions suggested that it is necessary and possible to find a pragmatic solution for the day-ahead market, that is desirable but more complex to facilitate an effective market coupling between pilot regions and the rest of Europe at intraday stage, and that it may be difficult to facilitate a integration of balancing markets in the existing regime.

What is the optimal scale of a pilot region?

Under the 70% rule in the clean energy market package⁴⁴ requiring granting preferential access for cross-zonal transactions to “internal” critical interfaces, countries will benefit from implementing smaller zones or nodal pricing as this allows them to get full access to all transmission capacity. So, in principle, this would be an incentive for moving to nodal pricing (if the 70% rule will be strictly enforced without excessive derogations by 2025).

If market integration between a nodal pricing region and adjacent regions is slightly weaker than within a nodal pricing region (or even within existing zonal pricing regions), then it would be desirable to have market regions that correspond to strongly interconnected parts of the system. Interfaces of the border should reflect network connection, which may not necessarily be aligned with the geographical boundaries of countries.

⁴³ A. Papavasiliou, G. Doorman, Mette Bjørndal, Y. Langer, Guillaume Leclercq, Pierre Crucifix, Interconnection of Norway to European Balancing Platforms Using Hierarchical Balancing, 18th International Conference on the European Energy Market, 2022

⁴⁴ Clean energy for all Europeans: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-strategy/clean-energy-all-europeans-package_en

Future Power Markets Platform

In principle, this could follow the experience of the flow-based market coupling process – with an increasing number of countries implementing the approach initially only pursued in the North-West of Europe. Alternatively, developments could emerge in parallel. Such regional development could be anchored in regional coordination centers, or according to the (different) geographical scope of capacity calculation regions. Importantly, successful integration will benefit from self-selection of countries to cooperate.

[Adjustments of grid codes – to facilitate nodal pricing in pilot regions.](#)

If countries implementing nodal pricing need to comply with all current EU network and grid codes (that all follow the zonal system approach), this may impose too many restrictions. These restrictions translate into additional requirements for the implementation of nodal pricing, and these requirements increase complexity and reduce the benefits of locational pricing.

It may be desirable to adjust network and grid codes to improve the ability of pilot regions to implement nodal pricing. Options to consider are:

- The pilot region may not be required to participate in the joint balancing arrangements, to allow for real-time pricing to work effectively within the nodal pricing market region.
- Opportunities for enhanced integration at intraday stage could be created by introducing intraday auctions in zonal pricing regions not only after the day-ahead auction but throughout the entire intraday period. In contrast to continuous trading, such auctions could offer an interface to interact with auction clearing in the nodal pricing market region.

While in the third energy package and the network and grid codes developed based on this package, it was ensured that sufficient flexibility is provided for individual countries to advance locational pricing, this flexibility was apparently lost with the introduction of the 4th energy package. In particular, the artificial but mandatory differentiation between balancing actions and congestion management actions is contrary to the physical reality, which is correctly reflected in nodal pricing real-time markets, which jointly clear energy, balancing and congestion management.