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Productive planning in an unstable country: The case of Argentina (2019–2023)

Daniel Schteingart

Introduction

During the period 2019–2023, Argentina was governed by a coalition of different factions of Peronism, a party that traditionally made state-led industrialization part of its narrative. In this context, there was a prioritization of the productive development and industrial policy agenda, which increased its resources compared to the previous government (2015–2019), whose orientation had been more economically liberal.

The idea behind the push for productive policy was that changing the productive structure is one of the great engines of economic development, and that macroeconomic stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure high growth rates that reduce poverty and create prosperous and inclusive societies. Transforming the productive matrix, aiming for higher levels of complexity, productivity, innovation, and generation of foreign currency and employment, thus became a priority of public policy (Ministry of Productive Development 2020).

During those years, I had the opportunity to be part of the technical teams of the Ministry of Productive Development, the agency responsible for executing the main axes of the productive policy. First, between 2020 and 2022, I served as director of the Center for Studies on Production XXI (CEP-XXI) and then as coordinator of the *Argentina Productiva 2030* Plan

(2022–2023). This initiative aimed to build a systematized and modern roadmap for Argentina's productive development. The Plan (hereinafter, PAP2030) was published in March 2023 but was not fully implemented. The main reason was instability, both macroeconomic and political, something that has been a common denominator in Argentina's long-term history.

In this piece, I seek to analyze the main challenges and achievements derived from the design and the truncated implementation of the Plan. In this way, I aim to identify lessons that can improve the execution of productive policy in developing countries.

The structure is as follows: The first section briefly reviews the political context in which PAP2030 was developed. In the second, the main aspects of the productive policy of the period are described, and in the third, PAP2030 is analyzed, including its genesis, design, and the main obstacles and limitations that existed. Finally, the conclusions are presented, detailing some lessons learned from the period.

General political context

At the end of 2019, Argentina underwent a political shift for the second time in four years. The government of Mauricio Macri (liberal center-right and mostly anti-Peronist), which had lost its chance of re-election after the severe economic crisis of 2018–2019, handed over to Peronism, which had ruled between 2003 and 2015. The new government emerged from the union of a large part of the Peronist party, which had been divided since the beginning of the decade. Three leaders stood out in this coalition: Alberto Fernández (elected president), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (hereinafter CFK, elected vice president) and Sergio Massa (elected as President of the Chamber of Deputies). CFK was the main figure of Peronism, having governed between 2007 and 2015, continuing the legacy of her husband Néstor Kirchner who had done so between 2003 and 2007 and had initiated a shift from the neoliberalism of the 1990s to a progressive center-left. Despite Alberto Fernández being appointed president, the bulk of the power was retained by CFK, the leader who proposed him to head the government.

The new government took office with the promise of repairing the social and productive indicators that had deteriorated during the previous government.¹ Shortly after the new administration began, there was a shift towards a productive policy that became more protectionist. Additionally, it involved greater resources for financing programs and credits to the industrial sector. Consequently, this productive policy bore more resemblance to the 2003–2015

period than to that of 2015–2019. However, the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic a few months after the start of the new government forced a reorientation of public policy, more towards avoiding further damage to the productive matrix than expanding productive capacities. In this context, the state implemented a set of policies that included financial support for companies and individuals, successfully preserving both the productive capacities and household incomes (Etchemendy et al. 2021).

From 2021, although the pandemic was in retreat and the economy in clear recovery, the internal cohesion of the government was severely strained. The defeat of the ruling party in the legislative elections of that year led to a significant political crisis, with growing tensions between the president and vice president, which ultimately undermined both inter- and intra-ministerial management and coordination as well as presidential authority. At the same time, the political crisis prompted successive cabinet changes, including the key ones in the Ministry of Productive Development and Ministry of Economy, which changed twice in 2022. The political internals only stabilized when Sergio Massa – the third “shareholder” of the government coalition and outside the rivalry between Alberto Fernández and CFK – moved to the Ministry of Economy in that year, absorbing the functions of several ministries and gaining notable power within the government. However, the new administration failed to straighten out the growing macroeconomic imbalances, which were also exacerbated by one of the worst droughts in Argentine history in 2023. The inability to improve social indicators – a result of an economic stagnation of more than a decade and rising inflation – led to defeat in the 2023 presidential elections, where a libertarian far-right outsider economist, Javier Milei, was elected president.

Productive policy

Following the presidential change in 2019, Matías Kulfas, a developmentalist Peronist economist close to Alberto Fernández, assumed the role of Minister of Productive Development. He had been a public official during the Kirchner administrations but had later criticized some of their economic measures. The new administration substantially increased funding for implementing productive policies, aiming to strengthen and modernize existing sectors and create new ones.²

The bulk of the increase in funding for productive policy was explained by two instruments: the Guarantee Fund (FOGAR) and the Productive Development Fund (FONDEP). The former was intended to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, while the latter subsidized interest rate and non-repayable contribu-

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tions (subsidies) to the productive sector, mainly industrial. At the same time, shortly after the beginning of the administration, there was a considerable shift in the external trade policy through increased use of non-automatic import licenses, which rose from about 15% of imports to 30%. The aim was to recover local manufacturing production (which had been greatly hit during Macri's government), thereby generating employment and saving foreign exchange in sectors such as automotive, agricultural machinery, household appliances, textiles, clothing, and footwear, among others. In most of these cases, the objective of increasing production and employment compared to 2019 levels was achieved, although at the expense of higher-than-average price increases.³

In parallel, new focal points of productive policy, which had previously received little attention in Argentina, began to be prioritized. This included industry 4.0, the knowledge economy, and productive opportunities derived from the energy transition, such as the development of electric mobility or green hydrogen. Also emphasized was the development of new sectors outside the conventional agenda, such as medicinal cannabis. This shift led to the drafting of bills intended to incentivize the growth of sectors like these. However, due to internal conflicts within the government, only the bills pertaining to cannabis and the knowledge economy were approved in Parliament. On the other hand, the Ministry created programs to promote the 4.0 paradigm and green production, culminating in the launch of the Productive Development Plan 4.0 and the Green Productive Development Plan in 2021.

In 2022, disputes within the government led to two changes of authorities in the Ministry of Productive Development, which was also downgraded to a

secretariat and absorbed by the Ministry of Economy. Despite maintaining the general conceptual belief that productive policy is essential for structural change, the reduction in funding, the loss of specialized technical staff, and increasing macroeconomic imbalances significantly hampered its effectiveness.⁴

The Argentina Productive 2030 Plan

The previous steps

The proliferation of initiatives to support the productive sector following the change of administration in 2019 was not initially accompanied by comprehensive long-term development planning, which would have maximized their coherence and systematization. The main reason for this lack was not a deficit of political will or long-term vision. On one hand, it was due to the lack of institutional capabilities for productive planning within the Argentine state. On the other, it stemmed from Peronism's inability, while outside of government, to achieve programmatic coherence among its different factions regarding a development model. Additionally, there were challenges in assembling technical teams and securing sufficient resources to develop a productive plan in preparation for a return to power.⁵

During the post–World War II period, Argentina managed to build a state bureaucracy specialized in productive planning. This policy survived recurrent institutional disruptions. A prime example was the National Council for Development (CONADE), established in 1961, which possessed significant bureaucratic capacities and influence in public policy design until the early 1970s (Jáuregui 2014). However, these capacities were dismantled in the last quarter of the 20th century as Argentina transitioned towards a more deregulated economy.

In the period from 2003 to 2015, there was a resurgence of interest in productive planning, leading to the development of several plans, including the Strategic Industrial Plan 2020, created in 2011. However, while a technical staff was formed, rotation, instability, and identification with a particular political administration hindered the establishment of a stable, career-focused professional bureaucracy in productive policy. This was clearly evident after the change of government in 2015, when numerous specialists who had been part of the design and implementation of productive policy left the public sector, either voluntarily or because they were dismissed. A similar situation occurred during the 2015–2019 period, in which a technical staff was formed for productive matters but

many of its members left the public sector in 2019, either because they were politically identified with the outgoing government or due to the uncertainty produced by the political transition to the new government. This volatility in the technical staff was amplified by a phenomenon that became increasingly recurrent in certain areas of the Argentine state: the fragility of working conditions. This was evidenced by the existence of fixed-term contracts and the strong erosion of real wages during 2018–2019.

In this context, the incoming administration in 2019 set out to gradually create the conditions for developing a productive plan. Shortly after the government began, two areas were established within the Ministry of Productive Development: the Council for Structural Change (CCE, in the Spanish acronym) and the Center for Studies on Production XXI (CEP-XXI).

The main goal of the CCE was to debate the direction of Argentina's productive structure and to redesign productive policy to guide it towards that destination. This involved general discussions on the direction with various participants (national and provincial public officials, private sector, etc.) and several specific studies, some of which led to legislative proposals or programs.⁶ Renowned academics were convened for this purpose.⁷ The management of the CCE was carried out by technicians who joined the Ministry in 2019, many of whom had experience in designing productive policy prior to 2015.

The discussion on the future direction of Argentina's productive structure involved addressing agendas that had been relatively under-explored in the country at that time, such as medicinal cannabis, the knowledge economy, green hydrogen, electromobility, aquaculture, bio-inputs, biological pharmaceuticals, clinical trials, mining suppliers, energy efficiency, the 4.0 paradigm (and its uses in agriculture, industry, and tourism), venture capital, or healthier food production. On the other hand, certain industrial promotion regimes were thoroughly debated with the aim of reforming their most harmful incentives.⁸

Meanwhile, the creation of CEP-XXI was the reason I joined the administration in 2020. This center was preceded by the Center for Studies on Production (CEP), established in the 1990s, which had been a training ground for specialists in productive policy during the 2000s. These specialists played an important role in the design and implementation of industrial policy during the 2011–2015 period. After the change of government in 2015, the CEP ceased to exist and was absorbed by the Secretariat of Productive Transformation.

During my time at CEP-XXI, my goal was to create a space for applied research within the public sector that was innovative, had its own “brand,” influ-

enced public policy design and public discourse, and thus became a place for training and attracting young talent.⁹ Two authors who had greatly influenced my previous experience as an academic specializing in economic development played a significant role in shaping this idea: Peter Evans (1996), with the importance of building professionalized bureaucracies with corporate identity as key to increasing state capacities, and Mariana Mazzucato (2014), with her view that attracting talent around specific missions is crucial for the public sector to do innovative things.

To achieve this goal, I prioritized three lines of action: (a) developing new databases on productive issues to improve decision-making in both the public and private sectors (for example, through comprehensive georeferencing of all the firms in Argentina); (b) conducting detailed monitoring of the productive situation; and (c) carrying out academic research on Argentina's productive structure, covering certain areas of vacancy in the Argentine public debate and of interest to the Ministry's agenda (such as the multiplier effects of different productive sectors, the relationship between the economic cycle and formal employment, university degrees demanded by companies, existing gender gaps within industrial branches, or new global trends in industrial policy and planning, among others).

The experiences of the CCE and CEP-XXI allowed for rapid institutional learning and capacity building throughout 2020 and 2021, without which it would have been impossible to take the next step: the development of a productive plan.

From the genesis to the design of the Plan

Two documents acted as precursors to PAP2030, helping to formalize the Ministry's perspective on the productive agenda. In October 2020, the Ministry introduced a conceptual document.¹⁰ It systematized the major challenges of Argentine development, analyzed key global trends in productive policy, and outlined ten consensuses to steer productive policy in the 21st century. These included the centrality of exports for generating foreign currency, the idea that without macroeconomic stability it is very difficult for productive policy to be effective, and the need to pay attention to new topics in productive policy that had traditionally been overlooked (such as environmental and gender issues). The second report, published in August 2021,¹¹ was more extensive and programmatic than the previous one, seeking to systematize and give a narrative coherence to the different productive policies being promoted by the Ministry, and to outline some strategic agendas for the following two years, such as the 4.0 paradigm and green production.

PAP2030 began to take shape towards the end of 2021. The first question to be defined was how to structure the Plan, whether to divide it into sectoral chapters as in the past or in another way. Inspired by Mariana Mazzucato's idea of "missions" (2021), we opted for the latter. It seemed much more powerful and innovative to create a narrative of productive policy in service of broadly solving social problems (poverty, inequalities, health, labor informality, environmental damage, national defense, etc.), where collaboration between productive sectors is key. At the same time, we found it stimulating to adapt Mazzucato's approach – originally conceived for developed countries – to the challenges of an economically unstable and developing country like Argentina.

Ultimately, 11 "productive missions" were proposed around different topics (Ministry of Economy 2023). The first, considered a particular priority, was to double exports by 2030 to address the recurring problems of foreign currency shortages, considered one of the main causes of macroeconomic instability. Doubling exports would allow generating foreign currency for the economy to grow by 4% annually (and 30% per capita cumulatively), which in turn was consistent with increasing registered salaried employment in the private sector by a third and reducing poverty by half. To analyze the feasibility of doubling exports, detailed work was carried out on the export potential of 34 productive complexes, identifying a particularly dynamic future in non-renewable natural resources (hydrocarbons and mining, mostly copper and lithium). This involved recognizing the potential of extractive industries in development and debating the idea, quite established in progressive circles, that the exploitation of natural resources is inherently "extractivist" and therefore a curse for development.

The other 10 missions focused on a variety of topics: just environmental transition based on the promotion of clean energy value chains and circular economy; health security through the promotion of health industries; the future of mobility based on the reconfiguration of the automotive industry; modernization of the equipment of the armed forces by enhancing national technological capabilities in defense industries; the adaptation of agriculture to 21st-century challenges such as climate change and new demands for healthy and sustainable food; digitalization of production and promotion of the knowledge economy; development of Argentine mining potential while seeking to reduce environmental impacts and existing socio-environmental conflicts; modernization and formalization of employment in traditional manufacturing industries (such as textiles, footwear, leather, plastics, etc.); generation of productive linkages based on the primary sector; and the development of sus-

tainable tourism through the promotion of nature tourism. In almost all the missions, gender and environmental dimensions were incorporated as cross-cutting factors, something that had not been done in past productive plans. Regarding the latter point, the proliferation of several socio-environmental conflicts between 2019 and 2021 around mining, oil & gas, and agro-industrial projects led to particular attention being paid to the issue and to updating ideas around productive development.

In March 2022, the broad guidelines for the PAP2030 missions were unveiled. To develop detailed technical content for each mission, a working group was established, consisting of teams from CEP-XXI and CCE. This group collaborated with external consultants, each with expertise in the specific areas addressed by the Plan. A common *modus operandi* was defined for the missions: all would have one or two coordinators leading teams of about 5 to 10 people of varying seniority, with regular progress reports. A common structure was also established: all had to contain a diagnosis of the problem at the global and local levels, a survey of existing public policies in other countries and in Argentina, policy guidelines, and quantitative goals for 2030. It was considered a priority to conduct interviews and meetings with members of the private sector (chambers, companies, and unions), public officials, and other specialists to validate diagnoses, policy guidelines, and some of the goals. It was also proposed to hold 30 open federal forums across the country's 24 jurisdictions throughout 2022, to ensure the process was federal and participative.

Finally, in March 2023, 12 comprehensive documents detailing the content of the Plan were published: the 11 missions plus an integrative document for all of them. These documents provided an updated, in-depth, unprecedented, and systematized analysis of the country's main productive issues, including more than 500 policy guidelines and over 200 quantitative goals for 2030 (covering production, employment, exports, productivity, environmental footprint, gender, etc.). This represented a significant effort in systematizing information and establishing baselines.

Obstacles and limitations

While the design of the Plan was successfully completed, there were serious obstacles that significantly limited its transformative potential.

Firstly, the design of PAP2030 was greatly affected by the existing conflicts within the governing coalition. The resignation of Minister Kulfas in June 2022 following a confrontation with the vice president negatively impacted the process, as it opened a period of

several months of uncertainty regarding the availability of resources to finance and complete the Plan. This led to the diminishing and attrition of the technical staff. Although Kulfas' successors supported the Plan's continuation, priorities shifted towards containing the growing macroeconomic imbalances and managing the complex political situation of a government that was weak at that stage. In this context, it was decided to design the Plan with a low profile, leading to the suspension of the open federal forums. While dialogues with private sector technicians and officials from other departments continued, they were conducted discreetly. Thus, the Plan was limited in its political validation with society and power actors, such as governors, legislators, businessmen, unions, and high-level officials.

Internal disputes, government fatigue, and repeated cabinet changes throughout 2022 also hindered coordination among various areas of the Executive Branch, such as Productive Development, Macroeconomic Programming, Foreign Affairs, Energy, Health, Labor, Culture, Transport, Science and Technology, Interior, and Environment. The arrival of Sergio Massa to the Ministry of Economy marked a political turning point for the government, managing to appease many of the previous internal disputes. His management brought significant improvements in coordination between technical areas, preventing major contradictions among different sectors of the government where differences in approach might exist.¹² However, valuable time and the opportunity to co-create the missions from the beginning were lost. On a positive note, the high level of coordination achieved with the Ministry of Tourism and Sports and the Ministry of Defense is worth mentioning, with whom the respective missions on sustainable tourism and defense industries were jointly developed. This was partly possible because, at the beginning of the Plan's development, there was a fluid political relationship with the ministers of these areas.

Related to the aforementioned issues, another challenge faced by the Plan was linked to the institutional structure of the government. *Argentina Productiva 2030* wasn't the sole strategic initiative under Alberto Fernández's administration. Similar efforts were undertaken by the Ministry of Science and Technology with its scientific-technological plan (also mission-based in the Mazzucato style, albeit with variations), the Ministry of Public Works with its infrastructure plan, and the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development with its climate change adaptation and mitigation plan. Although there was communication among representatives of these various initiatives, the absence of a centralized entity – similar to CONADE's past role – to unify and lead ef-

forts for consistency, coordination, and integration in government planning was a notable shortfall.

An additional point is that the process of constructing the Plan did not allow for the consolidation of a stable, professionalized bureaucracy within the Ministry. Many of the technical teams that worked on PAP2030 moved to other jobs as the design phase neared completion or after the final documents were presented in 2023. This made it difficult for the Ministry to retain in-house the capabilities that had been built. The main reason for the high mobility of technical staff was the low prospect of stability in a tumultuous government with frequent cabinet changes, nearing the end of its term, where employment contracts were also temporary. In addition, many of the specialists who participated in the Plan's design were external consultants with other jobs that guaranteed a much higher income than working full-time in the Argentine state.

The bureaucratic fragility and high mobility of specialized staff are structural characteristics of the Argentine state. For this reason, shortly after the design of PAP2030 began, the creation of a decentralized agency to establish an institutional structure similar to CONADE was considered. The goal was to strengthen, in the long term, the state capacities developed through the CCE, CEP-XXI, and PAP2030. A decree was drafted to establish this new structure; however, ministerial changes that began shortly after the initiative was launched caused this idea to lose momentum.

Although the Plan's design process required the prior construction of technical capacities, there were also some limitations that could have been resolved with a more extended period of institutional learning. For example, the Plan formulated multiple policy guidelines with a certain level of detail, but it did not reach the final stage of drafting and writing legislation or new programs. Another limitation was the lack of prioritization, hierarchization, sequencing over time, costing, and requirements for the necessary capacities to implement the mentioned policy guidelines. Therefore, in certain aspects, PAP2030 can be considered more as a comprehensive and modern strategy for productive development in Argentina than as a concrete action plan.

Final considerations: Lessons learned

For those of us coming from academia, transitioning to public management is a challenge where knowledge and beliefs are often reformulated. This happens because the design and implementation of public policies are often quite different from what one imagines

based on literature, and also because public management exposes us to a myriad of practical lessons impossible to acquire through academic research. In this sense, a primary lesson from the PAP2030 experience is that while the best literature on planning and productive policy can serve as a general guide for action, the practical knowledge of how the state operates daily – in aspects such as financial resource availability, the actual capabilities of the people who run it, building trust, negotiating with other officials and the private sector, power relations between different political groups, etc. – is a crucial complement to designing and implementing effective policies.

But the PAP2030 experience offers several other important lessons. Firstly, although planning in an unstable country can be frustrating, this process can generate valuable legacies, as even the attempt to plan builds capacities and knowledge that endure over time. In the case of Argentina, a comprehensive, updated, and unprecedented diagnosis of the country's productive issues was achieved, along with potential solutions from a public policy perspective and realistic endpoints that can be reached in the not-so-distant future. Planning, even if not fully realized as imagined, also provides the opportunity to set future agendas and contribute solid foundations for debate, improving public policies and discourse on the country's developmental future. Another valuable legacy of attempting to plan is the formation of specialized technical staff, who are then better equipped to conceive and manage productive policies.

An important lesson from PAP2030 is that development planning must be coordinated at the highest level of government, through an agency acting as a *primus inter pares*, generating greater articulation and coherence among the different state departments that often plan public policies without adequate coordination. This would make planning stronger in its design and execution. Another lesson is the crucial importance of political leadership (including high-ranking officials, legislators, governors, business chambers, and unions, among others) demanding, debating, and getting involved in the content of a plan. Without this commitment, there is a risk that the roadmap created is perceived more as a technical-academic document, or worse, as the plan of a particular minister rather than as an effective tool for transforming reality.

Finally, despite all the limitations exposed, and with the certainty that PAP2030 will not continue its course following the radical shift in government orientation after the 2023 elections, we believe the balance is very positive. For the first time in a long while, a productive roadmap was conceived from a “progressive developmentalist” perspective that is modern, comprehensive, and realistic for Argentine develop-

ment in the 21st century. It revisits many points of traditional productive policy (the importance of structural change, territorial development, or generating employment and foreign currency) while incorporating new agendas (such as environmental and gender issues) and acknowledging that Argentina's productive reality is very different from the past, in terms of which sectors are most capable of driving such structural change.¹³ Additionally, there was a great effort to apply in a country like Argentina ideas currently in vogue in developed countries, such as Mazzucato's "missions"

or green development. Moreover, beyond the chronic rotation of technical staff, I believe that the experience of CEP-XXI and CCE first, and PAP2030 later, has built a critical mass of professionals with knowledge of productive development who are now in a much better position to think about the country's productive future than a few years ago. For those of us who believe that productive development is one of the major causes of economic and social development, that is an encouraging perspective.

Endnotes

- 1 For instance, between the end of 2015 and the end of 2019, economic activity decreased by 3.9%, the number of formal companies in the economy fell by 5%, real wages in the formal private sector dropped by 15%, and income poverty rose from 27% to 35% (Schteingart and Tavošnanska 2022).
- 2 According to data from the Ministry of Economy, public expenditure related with "Industry" (which encompasses a large part of the productive development policies) increased from 0.10% of GDP in 2018–2019 to 0.44% in 2020–2021, the highest figure since the early 1980s.
- 3 As an example, according to Argentina's automotive makers association (ADEFA), in 2022 automotive production was 71% higher than in 2019. In terms of prices, according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from INDEC, between 2019 and 2022, vehicle prices rose 46% above the general level. In clothing, this increase was 52%; in footwear, it was 29%.
- 4 For instance, between August 2022 and October 2023, industrial production was on average 2.6% lower than in June 2022, the month marking the onset of cabinet changes.
- 5 Additionally, concern for macroeconomic issues occupied much of the focus, yet even in this aspect, Fernández's government failed to develop a clear and agreed-upon strategy among its various factions.
- 6 For instance, the work of the CCE led to the draft legislation for the promotion of medicinal cannabis and industrial hemp, the reform of the capital goods promotion regime, and the initial design of an initiative to increase the number of computer programmers, known as "Argentina Programa."
- 7 For example, Jorge Katz, a highly renowned academic in Latin America, initially presided over the CCE.
- 8 Within such regimes, the Tierra del Fuego regime and the capital goods regime are noteworthy examples. The former, being the costliest of all Argentine industrial policies and set to expire in 2023, was initially targeted for reform. However, due to pressure from beneficiary firms and the provincial government, it was ultimately extended for at least another 15 years in 2021. A significant development was the creation of a fund where beneficiary companies allocate a portion of their turnover to diversify the economic matrix of Tierra del Fuego. Meanwhile, the latter regime underwent reform in 2022 in agreement with the industrialists in the capital goods sector.
- 9 Almost the entire staff of CEP-XXI (which exceeded 30 people by 2022) was under 40 years old.
- 10 "El desarrollo productivo en la Argentina pospandemia. Hacia una visión compartida sobre el desarrollo económico de largo plazo y el cambio estructural" (Productive development in post-pandemic Argentina: towards a shared vision on long-term economic development and structural change).
- 11 "Estrategia y acciones para el desarrollo productivo, 2020–2023" (Strategy and actions for productive development, 2020–2023).
- 12 For instance, in coordinating the Plan, we aimed to validate all documents with other relevant departments of the national government (e.g., the health security mission with teams from the Ministry of Health, the just environmental transition with the energy department, etc.). However, validating documents is not the same as co-creating them, which requires a much higher level of coordination.
- 13 For example, in the past, sectors like mining and unconventional hydrocarbons weren't seen as particularly strategic, as the global energy transition and the Vaca Muerta deposit were not yet realities.

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