

Dukalskis, Alexander; Furstenberg, Saipira; Hellmeier, Sebastian; Scales, Redmond

Article — Published Version

The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Provided in Cooperation with:

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Suggested Citation: Dukalskis, Alexander; Furstenberg, Saipira; Hellmeier, Sebastian; Scales, Redmond (2023) : The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression, Journal of Conflict Resolution, ISSN 1552-8766, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, Iss. OnlineFirst, pp. 1-29,
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188896>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295126>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

**Appendix for “The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns
and Transnational Repression”**

Forthcoming in the Journal of Conflict Resolution

**Alexander Dukalskis
Saipira Furstenberg
Sebastian Hellmeier
Redmond Scales**

Replication data available at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WIXVLJ>

July 3, 2023

Appendix




Figure A.1: Frequency of transnational repression events by target group. Data source: Dukalskis (2021)




Figure A.2: Distribution of the number of TR events in the dataset by Dukalskis (2021).




Figure A.3: Additional results. Different dependent variables (targets and TR type), model specification as in Model 2.




Figure A.4: Results for component indicators of V-Dem's civil liberties index (v2x_civlib). Some indicators were inverted to match the indicator label and facilitate the interpretation.




Figure A.5: Five smallest and largest fixed effects (country and year) in Model 2.

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4
Domestic repression	1.24*** (0.23)	0.99*** (0.28)	1.06*** (0.28)	−0.31 (0.56)
Polity score		−0.13 (0.11)	−0.12 (0.11)	−0.14 (0.10)
Elections		0.10 (0.34)	0.10 (0.35)	0.23 (0.38)
Leader tenure (log)		−0.45* (0.22)	−0.43 (0.22)	−0.67* (0.28)
Military dimension index		−0.56 (1.22)	−0.50 (1.24)	−1.60 (1.29)
Party dimension index		0.29 (1.52)	0.25 (1.52)	0.31 (1.43)
Population (log)		−0.53 (2.25)	−0.66 (2.28)	−1.65 (2.52)
GDP per capita (log)		−0.81 (0.51)	−0.82 (0.52)	−1.12* (0.55)
State capacity index		0.24*** (0.06)	0.12 (0.23)	0.26*** (0.07)
Repression x State capacity			0.02 (0.03)	
Diplomatic representation				−0.39 (0.55)
Repression x Diplomatic representation				0.19** (0.07)
pseudo.r.squared	0.47	0.43	0.43	0.44
nobs	857	549	549	541
AIC	639.27	485.45	487.17	476.78
BIC	929.23	735.31	741.34	734.39
Log Likelihood	−258.63	−184.72	−184.58	−178.39

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.1$

Table A.1: Robustness tests I. Main regression models using the *fixest* package in R.

	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8
	Logit	Poisson	NegBin	OLS
Domestic repression	0.99*** (0.25)	0.61* (0.28)	0.79*** (0.22)	0.84*** (0.17)
Polity score	−0.13 (0.12)	−0.08 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)
Elections	0.10 (0.41)	−0.54 (0.29)	−0.08 (0.25)	−0.66 (0.34)
Leader tenure (log)	−0.45 (0.24)	−0.32** (0.10)	−0.34* (0.14)	−0.23 (0.15)
Military dimension index	−0.56 (1.14)	−0.11 (1.46)	−0.84 (1.17)	0.73* (0.34)
Party dimension index	0.29 (1.75)	−0.96 (1.81)	0.69 (1.35)	0.09 (0.54)
Population (log)	−0.53 (2.07)	1.97 (3.23)	3.33* (1.59)	−0.35 (1.97)
GDP per capita (log)	−0.81 (0.42)	−0.15 (0.56)	−0.00 (0.32)	−0.01 (0.51)
State capacity index	0.24*** (0.07)	0.13* (0.06)	0.15** (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
Theta			0.71*** (0.12)	
Pseudo R ²	0.43	0.53	0.22	0.21
Observations	549	549	549	731
AIC	485.45	1518.78	1150.95	3880.26
BIC	735.31	1768.65	1400.82	4178.90
Log Likelihood	−184.72	−701.39	−517.48	−1875.13

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.1$

Table A.2: Robustness tests II. Main Model (Model 2) with different model specifications. Robust standard errors according to Newey and West (1987).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Domestic repression	0.93*** (0.23)	0.94*** (0.23)	0.94*** (0.22)	0.96*** (0.23)	0.92*** (0.23)	0.83** (0.26)
Polity score	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.10 (0.08)
Elections		−0.16 (0.26)	−0.17 (0.26)	−0.19 (0.26)	−0.20 (0.27)	0.09 (0.29)
Leader tenure (log)			−0.17 (0.15)	−0.18 (0.15)	−0.15 (0.16)	−0.37* (0.18)
Military dimension index				0.73 (1.16)	0.89 (1.18)	−0.35 (1.32)
Party dimension index				−0.83 (1.18)	−0.44 (1.20)	0.28 (1.34)
Population (log)					0.18 (1.78)	−0.78 (2.18)
GDP per capita (log)					−0.13 (0.32)	−0.66* (0.38)
State capacity index						0.20*** (0.05)
Deviance (Null)	977.75	977.75	977.75	977.75	915.58	747.39
df.null	848	848	848	848	819	730
Log Likelihood	−260.15	−259.99	−259.36	−258.97	−246.52	−191.51
AIC	644.30	645.99	646.71	649.93	627.04	513.02
BIC	938.44	944.86	950.33	963.04	942.56	811.65
Deviance	520.30	519.99	518.71	517.93	493.04	383.02
DF Resid.	787	786	785	783	753	666
nobs	849	849	849	849	820	731

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.1$

Table A.3: Robustness tests III. Stepwise inclusion of control variables.