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Policy Objective of Military Intervention and Public Attitudes: A Conjoint Experiment from US and Turkey

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A-I: Example conjoint comparison for the Turkish sample

Dünyanın farklı yerlerindeki iki farklı uluslararası kriz karşısında, Türk hükümeti yurtdışına asker gönderme konusunda toplanmış durumda. Her iki olası operasyonun detayları aşağıdaki gibidir.

	A Operasyonu	B Operasyonu
Askeri operasyonun amacı	A ülkesi, Türkiye'nin dostu olan komşu bir ülkeye asker gönderdi. Askeri operasyon asker gönderilen bölgedeki çoğu kadın ve çocuklardan oluşan sivil halkı korumak amacıyla gerçekleştirilecek.	B ülkesi, Türkiye'nin dostu olan komşu bir ülkeye asker gönderdi. Askeri operasyon bu ülkedeki saldırgan hükümeti devirmek amacıyla gerçekleştirilecek.
Operasyon düzenlenecek ülkenin rejimi	Yarı demokrasi	Yarı demokrasi
Operasyon düzenlenecek ülkenin dini	Ağırlıklı olarak Hıristiyan	Ağırlıklı olarak Hıristiyan
Operasyon düzenlenecek ülkenin askeri gücü	Zayıf	Güçlü
Operasyonu destekleyenler	Hükümet artı muhalefet partileri	Hükümet artı Birleşmiş Milletler
Operasyona katılacaklar	Hem kara hem hava kuvvetleri	Hava kuvvetleri

Sizce Türkiye hangi kriz için askeri birlik göndermelidir?

A Operasyonu B Operasyonu

Table A-II: Study Variables

Variable/min-max	M	SD	Variable Explanation
Age	US: 41.70 Turkey: 33.42	US: 12.26 Turkey: 9.51	
Education	US: 3.96 Turkey: 5.24	US: 1.06 Turkey: 1.89	US: from 1=No formal education, to 6=Master's/PhD Turkey: from 1=No formal education, to 9=Master's/PhD
Gender	US: 0.49 Turkey: 0.50	US: 0.50 Turkey: 0.50	0=female, 1=male
Ideology	US: 4.76 Turkey: 6.38	US: 2.70 Turkey: 2.80	From 1=Extreme left-wing, to 10=Extreme right-wing
US/Turkey should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflicts with other nations	US: 2.86 Turkey:3.68	US: 1.21 Turkey: 1.16	From 1=strongly disagree, to 5=strongly agree
It is essential for the US/Turkey to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger and terrorism.	US: 4.06 Turkey:3.54	US: 1.08 Turkey: 1.07	
Generally, the more influence the US/Turkey has on other nations, the better off other countries would be.	US: 2.84 Turkey: 3.31	US: 1.12 Turkey: 1.04	
Despite all the talk about a new world order, military strength and the will to use it is still the best measure of a country's greatness.	US: 2.51 Turkey: 3.56	US: 1.29 Turkey: 1.19	
Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it's better for us to strike first.	US: 2.08 Turkey:3.23	US: 1.09 Turkey: 1.15	
The US/Turkey could learn a lot by following the example of other countries.	US: 3.38 Turkey:3.63	US: 1.13 Turkey: 1.04	

Table A-III- Unadjusted Marginal Means of Conjoint Treatments

VARIABLES	(1) US	(2) Turkey
IPC	0.355 (0.01)	0.404 (0.01)
FPR	0.469 (0.01)	0.428 (0.01)
Peace	0.558 (0.01)	0.539 (0.01)
Humanitarian	0.620 (0.01)	0.625 (0.01)
Only government	0.406 (0.01)	0.459 (0.01)
Gov.plus NATO	0.566 (0.01)	0.510 (0.01)
Gov.plus UN	0.550 (0.01)	0.529 (0.01)
Gov.plus opposition	0.480 (0.01)	0.503 (0.01)
Authoritarian	0.504 (0.01)	0.524 (0.01)
Democracy	0.500 (0.01)	0.490 (0.01)
Partial Democracy	0.497 (0.01)	0.487 (0.01)
Buddhist	0.488 (0.01)	0.447 (0.01)
Muslim	0.524 (0.01)	0.587 (0.01)
Christian	0.487 (0.01)	0.470 (0.01)
Ground troops only	0.462 (0.01)	0.469 (0.01)
Air force only	0.539 (0.01)	0.500 (0.01)
Ground plus air	0.499 (0.01)	0.531 (0.01)
Strong	0.488 (0.00)	0.496 (0.00)
Weak	0.512 (0.00)	0.504 (0.00)
Observations	17,880	12,024

Table A-IV- Effect of International and Domestic Support across Operation Types

VARIABLES	(1) US	(1) Turkey
FPR	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Peace	0.17*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)
Humanitarian	0.23*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)
Gov.plus NATO	0.13*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Gov.plus UN	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Gov.plus opposition	0.07** (0.02)	0.05† (0.03)
FPR X Gov.plus NATO	0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)
FPR X Gov.plus UN	0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
FPR X Gov.plus opposition	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
Peace X Gov.plus NATO	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Peace X Gov.plus UN	0.08** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Peace X Gov.plus opposition	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Humanitarian X Gov.plus NATO	0.05† (0.03)	-0.06† (0.03)
Humanitarian X Gov.plus UN	0.07* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Humanitarian X Gov.plus opposition	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Democracy	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Partial democracy	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)
Christian	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Muslim	0.04*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)
Air force only	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Ground plus air	0.04*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
weak	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.22*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)
Observations	17,880	12,024
R-squared	0.063	0.053

Reference categories: IPC, government only, authoritarian, Buddhist, ground troops only, strong military power. Standard errors are robust clustered at the respondent level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1

Table A-V Effect of Target Regime across Operation Types

VARIABLES	(1) US	(1) Turkey
FPR	0.12*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Peace	0.17*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)
Humanitarian	0.26*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)
Democracy	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
Partial democracy	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
FPR X Democracy	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
FPR X Partial democracy	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Peace X Democracy	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Peace X Partial democracy	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
Humanitarian X Democracy	0.07** (0.03)	0.05† (0.03)
Humanitarian X Partial democracy	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05† (0.03)
Gov.plus NATO	0.16*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Gov.plus UN	0.14*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Gov.plus opposition	0.07*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Christian	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Muslim	0.04*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)
Air force only	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Ground plus air	0.04*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
weak	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.21*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.02)
Observations	17,880	12,024
R-squared	0.063	0.053

Reference categories: IPC, government only, authoritarian, Buddhist, ground troops only, strong military power. Standard errors are robust clustered at the respondent level *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1


Table-A-VI- Main model with Bonferroni corrections for multiplicity

VARIABLES	(1) US	(2) TR
FPR	0.11*** (0.01)	0.02† (0.01)
Peace	0.20*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
Humanitarian	0.27*** (0.01)	0.22*** (0.01)
Gov.plus NATO	0.16*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Gov.plus UN	0.14*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Gov.plus opposition	0.07*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Democracy	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Partial Democracy	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)
Christian	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Muslim	0.04*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)
Air force only	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Ground plus air	0.04*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Weak	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.20*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)
Observations	17,880	12,024
R-squared	0.062	0.052

Robust standard errors in parentheses


*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure A-VII Effect of Respondent Ideology across Operation Types



Note: The x-axis presents the predictive margins of principal policy objective on the dependent variable, for right- and left-wing voters, in the US (left panel) and Turkey (right panel).

Figure A-VIII- Effect of Partisanship across Operation Types



Note: The x-axis presents the predictive margins of principal policy objective on the dependent variable, for Democrat and Republican Party partisans in the US.

A-IX- Effects of Foreign Policy Dispositions across Operation Types

To explore the role of individual foreign policy orientation on support for the various types of military interventions, I constructed latent predispositions on foreign policy by employing exploratory factor analysis on a battery of survey items selected from military assertiveness and internationalism/isolationism scales proposed by Herrmann et al. (1999). Table A-IXa below lists the survey questions, each measured on a 5-points Likert scale, and the factor analysis results. Factor loadings retain two factors with high load, namely with Eigenvalues over 1. The defining component of factor1 is a greater degree of willingness to follow unilateral foreign policy actions and marked by a hawkish stance to reach foreign policy objectives. Categorically, this factor taps into what Herrmann et al. define as ‘military assertiveness’, associated with an “inclination [...] of defending national interests abroad” through “militant and assertive strategies” (1994, 554). Conversely, the second factor is conceptualized by accommodativeness and active cooperation with other countries to address common problems and greater willingness to utilize international institutions tapping into internationalism.

Table A-IX-a: Foreign Policy Dispositions – Factor analysis results


Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
US/Turkey should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflicts with other nations	0.70	-0.17
It is essential for the US/Turkey to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger and terrorism.	-0.06	0.83
Generally, the more influence the US/Turkey has on other nations, the better off other countries would be.	0.75	0.04
Despite all the talk about a new world order, military strength and the will to use it is still the best measure of a country’s greatness.	0.82	-0.16
Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it’s better for us to strike first.	0.79	-0.07
The US/Turkey could learn a lot by following the example of other countries.	-0.12	0.75
Eigenvalue	2.37	1.31
Total variance explained %	40	22

Note: Extraction using Principal Components Analysis; orthogonal varimax rotation

Figures A-IXb and A-IXc report the average marginal effects of assertiveness and accommodativeness on the outcome variable. The findings show that the effect of militant

assertiveness is pronounced across all four types of military action in the US and two in Turkey. As in the case of ideology and partisanship, its greatest effects are observed on IPC and peace operations in both countries. Substantially, each unit increase in militant assertiveness increases support for IPC by 3.7 percent in the US and 2.7 percent in Turkey, and reduces support for peace operations by 4.0 percent and 1.8 percent, in US and Turkey, respectively. Those with assertive disposition in the US are also significantly more likely to support FPR operations by 2.6 and less likely to support humanitarian operations by 2.8 percent. In comparison, the effect of accommodativeness is much subtler, and only present in the US. Expectedly, those who score higher on this scale are significantly more approving of peace operations (1.5 points in the US, p-value=0.039) and humanitarian interventions (1.3 points, p-value=0.073), and less favorable of IPC operations (1.3 points, p-value=0.068).


Figure- A-IX-b: Average Marginal Effects of Militant Assertiveness across PPO



Note: The x-axis presents the average marginal effects of militant assertiveness for different operation types, in the US (left panel) and Turkey (right panel).

Figure- A-IX-c: Average Marginal Effects of Accommodativeness across PPO

Average Marginal Effects of Accommodativeness across PPO




Note: The x-axis presents the average marginal effects of accommodativeness for different operation types, in the US (left panel) and Turkey (right panel).

In the case selection section, I argued that respondents would be expected to be less sensitive to IO cues in Turkey, partly because the overall approval rates of IOs in Turkey are considerably lower than in other countries, and unlike major powers, Turkey lacks institutionalized power to control IO's decision-making processes. The subgroup analysis on the moderating role of foreign policy values also allows us to investigate whether those more appreciative of international cooperation in general are more sensitive to IO endorsement of military interventions. With this empirical objective, I introduce another interaction term between individual accommodativeness and the treatment on IO endorsement and test its effect on support for the use of force. The results in Figure A-IXd report that in the US those who score high on the accommodativeness scale are significantly more inclined to favor operations endorsed by the UN, and oppose unilateral operations, a finding in line with the theoretical underpinning of the scale. For the Turkish sample, by contrast, the interaction term fails to attain any statistical significance, meaning that those who generally are more favorable toward international cooperation and accommodativeness are not necessarily more supportive of operations endorsed by the UN or NATO. While this finding confirms our

theoretical expectation on the lower sensitivity toward the IO cues among the Turkish respondents, the fact that even those who otherwise are supportive of international cooperation remain relatively unmoved in response to UN or NATO endorsement is also suggestive that the backlash against these major IOs is prevalent across the value spectrum, and requires further context-specific investigations.

Figure- A-IX-d: Average Marginal Effects of Accommodativeness across IO endorsement



Note: The x-axis presents the average marginal effects of accommodativeness for different values of internal and external support for the use of force, in the US (left panel) and Turkey (right panel).