

Kim, Jessica; Fallon, Kathleen M.

Article — Published Version

Making Women Visible: How Gender Quotas Shape Global Attitudes toward Women in Politics

Politics & Gender

Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Suggested Citation: Kim, Jessica; Fallon, Kathleen M. (2023) : Making Women Visible: How Gender Quotas Shape Global Attitudes toward Women in Politics, *Politics & Gender*, ISSN 1743-9248, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. 19, Iss. 4, pp. 981-1006, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X23000089>

This Version is available at:
<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289866>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>

Appendix 1: Country-Waves by Quota Category

Weak Candidate: Brazil (5,6), China (6), France (5), Indonesia (5), Romania (5), South Korea (3,4), Uzbekistan (6), Venezuela (4)

Weak Reserved: Bangladesh (3,4), Jordan (5), Morocco (5,6)

Robust Candidate: Argentina (3,4,5,6) Armenia (6), Ecuador (6), Kyrgyzstan (6), Mexico (5,6), Peru (3,4,5), Serbia (5), Slovenia (6), South Korea (5,6), Spain (6), Uruguay (6)

Robust Reserved: Iraq (6), Jordan (6), Pakistan (6), Rwanda (5,6), Tanzania (4), Uganda (4)

No Quotas: Albania (3,4), Algeria (4,6), Armenia (3), Australia (3,5,6), Azerbaijan (3,6), Belarus (3,6), Brazil (3), Bulgaria (3,5), Burkina Faso (5), Canada (4,5), Chile (3,4,5,6), China (3,5), Colombia (3,5,6), Cyprus (5,6), Czech Rep. (3), Dominican Rep. (3), Egypt (4,5), El Salvador, (3) Estonia (3,6), Ethiopia (5), Finland (3,5), Georgia (3,5,6), Germany (3,5,6), Ghana (5,6), Guatemala (5), Haiti (6), Hungary (3,5), India (3,4,5,6), Indonesia (4), Iran (4,5), Italy (5), Japan (4,5,6), Jordan (4), Kazakhstan (6), Kyrgyzstan (4), Latvia (3), Lebanon (6), Libya (6), Lithuania (3), Macedonia (3,4), Malaysia (5,6), Mali(5), Mexico (3,4), Moldova (3,4,5), Morocco (4), Netherlands (5,6), New Zealand (3,5,6), Nigeria (3,4,6), Norway (3,5), Pakistan (3,4), Peru (3), Philippines (3,4,6), Poland (3,5,6), Romania (3,6), Russia (3,5,6), Saudi Arabia (4), Singapore (4,6), Slovakia(3), Slovenia (3,5), South Africa (3,4,5,6), Sweden (3,5,6), Switzerland (5), Thailand (5,6), Trinidad and Tobago (5,6,) Tunisia (6), Turkey (3,4,5,6), Ukraine (3,5,6), United Kingdom (5), United States (3,4,5,6), Uruguay(3,5), Venezuela (3), Vietnam (4,5), Yemen(6), Zambia(6), Zimbabwe (4,6)

Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	1.000														
2	0.013	1.000													
3	0.203	0.069	1.000												
4	0.015	0.252	0.135	1.000											
5	-0.050	0.160	0.101	0.27	1.000										
6	-0.027	0.082	-0.004	0.131	0.167	1.000									
7	0.043	-0.199	-0.133	-0.339	-0.205	0.014	1.000								
8	-0.004	0.052	-0.143	0.065	-0.343	0.098	-0.008	1.000							
9	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006	0.003	0.002	1.000						
10	0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.016	-0.019	0.002	0.003	0.089	1.000					
11	0.002	-0.024	-0.001	-0.024	0.011	0.002	0.032	0.027	-0.021	0.049	1.000				
12	0.002	0.002	-0.006	-0.004	0.002	0.014	-0.001	-0.005	-0.069	-0.006	0.280	1.000			
13	0.004	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.012	-0.036	0.010	-0.003	-0.048	0.004	0.263	0.210	1.000		
14	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.004	-0.017	-0.011	-0.006	-0.006	0.020	0.227	0.013	-0.070	-0.041	1.000	
15	0.027	-0.117	-0.031	-0.182	-0.892	-0.269	-0.170	0.202	-0.015	-0.026	-0.050	-0.023	-0.025	-0.020	1.000

Variables: (1) Weak Candidate, (2) Weak Reserved, (3) Robust Candidate, (4) Robust Reserved (5) GDP per Capita (6) Soviet (7) Women's Representation (8) Democracy (9) Female (10) Education (11) Muslim (12) Christian (13) Orthodox (14) Age (15) Constant

Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics for All Independent Variables

Variable	Description	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max
<u>Quota Measures</u>					
Quotas	Categorical measure capturing different quota forms				
Weak Candidate	Category for weak candidate quotas	0.056	0.230	0	1
Weak Reserved	Category for weak reserved quotas	0.024	0.154	0	1
Robust Candidate	Category for robust candidate quotas	0.086	0.280	0	1
Robust Reserved	Category for robust reserved quotas	0.034	0.180	0	1
<u>National-Level Controls</u>					
GDP per capita (logged)	Gross domestic product divided by the midyear population count, measured in current US dollars	8.298	1.454	5.09	11.11
Soviet	Dummy variable for post-soviet nations	0.144	0.351	0	1
Women's Representation (square root)	Percentage of female parliamentarians in the legislature	3.646	1.425	0	7.503
Democracy	A regime governance spectrum of autocracy to democracy	4.961	5.647	-10	10
<u>Individual-Level Controls</u>					
Female	Dummy variable for respondent's gender	0.516	0.5	0	1
Education	Ordinal measure of highest level of education completed	2.836	1.212	1	5
Religion	Categorical measure of religious domination				
Muslim	Captures Muslim respondents	0.241	0.428	0	1
Christian	Captures Christian respondents	0.398	0.490	0	1
Orthodox	Captures Orthodox respondents	0.103	0.304	0	1
Age	Respondent's age in years	40.879	16.025	18	99
<u>Interactions</u>					
Quotas X Democracy	Interactions between quota categories and democracy				
Weak Candidate X Democracy		0.229	1.866	-9	9
Weak Reserved X Democracy		0.008	0.849	-6	6
Robust Candidate X Democracy		0.620	2.135	0	10
Robust Reserved X Democracy		-0.032	0.679	-4	6
Quotas X Female	Interactions between quota categories and gender				

Weak Candidate X Female	0.03	0.17	0	1
Weak Reserved X Female	0.011	0.106	0	1
Robust Candidate X Female	0.045	0.207	0	1
Robust Reserved X Female	0.016	0.126	0	1

Appendix 4: Robustness Checks, subsamples

Subjects Expressing:	Traditional Gender Values (4a)	Traditional Gender Values (4b)	Traditional Gender Values (4c)	Political Disinterest (4d)
Quotas				
Weak Candidate	1.138 (0.171)	0.998 (0.183)	1.082 (0.165)	1.029 (0.145)
Weak Reserved	1.126 (0.283)	1.205 (0.331)	0.989 (0.253)	1.016 (0.244)
Robust Candidate	1.425** (0.193)	0.931 (0.290)	1.384* (0.189)	1.374* (0.175)
Robust Reserved	0.619* (0.144)	0.637+ (0.148)	0.682 (0.161)	0.530** (0.119)
Democracy	-	1.020+ (0.012)	-	-
Female	-	-	1.759** (0.023)	-
Quotas X Democracy Interactions				
Weak Candidate X Democracy	-	1.030 (0.024)	-	-
Weak Reserved X Democracy	-	1.009 (0.055)	-	-
Robust Candidate X Democracy	-	1.060 (0.041)	-	-
Robust Reserved X Democracy	-	0.921+ (0.046)	-	-
Quotas X Female Interactions				
Weak Candidate X Female	-	-	1.102*	-

			(0.052)	
Weak Reserved X Female	-	-	1.279** (0.112)	-
Robust Candidate X Female	-	-	1.061 (0.044)	-
Robust Reserved X Female	-	-	0.833* (0.063)	-
Observations	151,202	151,202	151,202	151,202
Countries	87	87	87	87
Country-Waves	186	186	186	186

Notes: + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$ (two tailed test).

The first number for each variable represents the odds ratio; the second is the standard error.

Full set of (consistent) controls excluded for simplicity.

Appendix 5: Alternate Democracy Measure (Freedom House)

	5a	5b
Quotas		
Weak Candidate	1.065 (0.143)	0.639 (0.238)
Weak Reserved	0.951 (0.221)	0.911 (2.086)
Robust Candidate	1.420** (0.165)	1.104 (0.400)
Robust Reserved	0.564** (0.123)	1.283 (1.489)
Democracy	1.122** (0.037)	1.107** (0.039)
Quotas X Democracy Interactions		
Weak Candidate X Democracy	-	1.114 (0.081)
Weak Reserved X Democracy	-	1.024 (0.636)
Robust Candidate X Democracy	-	1.051 (0.069)
Robust Reserved X Democracy	-	0.759 (0.284)
Observations	255,567	255,567
Countries	89	89
Country-Waves	190	190

+ p <.10, * p <.05, ** p<.01 (two tailed test).

The first number is the odds ratio; the second is the standard error.

Full set of (consistent) controls excluded for simplicity.