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Learning from the past: The role of personal experiences in artificial stock markets

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Learning from the Past: The Role of Personal Experiences in Artificial Stock Markets

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March 3, 2024

Abstract

Recent survey evidence suggests that investors form beliefs about future stock returns by predominantly extrapolating their own experience: They overweight returns they have personally experienced while underweighting returns from earlier years and consequently expect high (low) stock market returns when they observe bullish (bearish) markets in their lifespan. Such events are difficult to reconcile with the existing models. This paper introduces a simple agent-based model for simulating artificial stock markets in which mean-variance optimizing investors have heterogeneous beliefs about future capital gains to form their expectations. Using this framework, I successfully reproduce various stylized facts from the empirical finance literature, such as underdiversification, the predictive power of the price-dividend ratio, and the autocorrelation of price changes. The experimental findings show that the most realistic market scenarios are produced when agents have a bias for recent returns. The study also established a link between underdiversification of investor portfolios and personal experiences.

JEL Classification: C63, G12, D84

Keywords: Expectations, Agent-based models (ABM), Predictability, Heterogenous beliefs, Artificial stock markets

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1 Introduction

Research on the dynamics of aggregate asset prices has aimed to explain various empirical phenomena. These include the findings on the predictability of stock market returns through the aggregate dividend-price ratio (Campbell and Shiller, 1988), the inefficiency of household decisions (Calvet et al., 2009), and other stylized facts like autocorrelation, fat tails, or volatility clustering of asset returns (Cutler et al., 1991). Both conventional and behavioral models have sought to reconcile these observations. When it comes to heterogeneous simulation models, there is extensive research on the impact of different trading strategies or the fraction of different trader types on the dynamics of aggregated asset prices. In these models, agents usually take the same data as input to form their expectations. However, studies on the impact of *individual* experiences of agents on subsequent market outcomes, are rather sparse.

This work provides a novel agent-based model (ABM) approach to explore the role of personal experiences with regard to emerging aggregated asset prices. The model aims to explicitly include the age, as well as a weighting scheme for experienced returns, and observe the consistency of this market with hypotheses from the literature above. The results show that markets populated with agents who have a stronger bias toward recent returns are more similar to various stylized facts, particularly regarding the predictive power of the dividend-price ratio and the inefficiency (underdiversification) of agent portfolios.

This study aims to contribute to the literature on behavioral finance. Motivated by the psychological evidence of Tversky and Kahneman (1973) on the role of personal experiences and availability bias, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that individual risk-taking behavior is closely related to age and personally experienced returns. For instance, individuals who have experienced higher stock market returns were more willing to participate in the stock market, had a higher willingness to take financial risk, and, conditional on participating, invested a higher proportion of their assets in stocks. They also show that individuals are strongly influenced by more recent data, which has an even stronger sensitivity in the

case of younger individuals. In a similar work, Malmendier and Nagel (2016) show that individuals also form their beliefs about future inflation based on an age-dependent updating of expectations, where young individuals update their expectations more strongly than older individuals, with a more extended data series accumulated in their lifetime. They argue that agents put more weight on realizations during their lifetimes than on other historical data. Both their studies suggest that the average consumer’s microeconomic risk-taking behavior affects the macro risk-taking, and hence aggregated asset prices.

I also extend the broader literature on artificial stock markets, heterogeneous agent models (HAMs), and ABMs (e.g., Brock and Hommes (1998) and LeBaron (2002)). These models were evolved to better understand heterogeneous beliefs and behavioral decision-making, which may change over time in financial markets. They view stock market dynamics as a result of interactions between heterogeneous traders with different behavioral rules and trading strategies. An important aspect of these models is the endogenous price mechanism and the expectation feedback. Agents’ decisions are based on predictions of endogenous variables, whose actual values are determined by collective expectations, leading to a co-evolution of beliefs and asset prices over time. HAMs can replicate market fluctuations and provide a deeper understanding of dynamic forces that drive macro outcomes. Notable developments in this area were summarized in Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006), Chiarella et al. (2009), Hommes and Wagener (2009), Lux (2009), Westerhoff et al. (2009), Chiarella et al. (2013), and Hommes (2013). HAMs are closely related to agent-based models (ABMs), which are more computationally-oriented and allow for a larger number of interacting agents in a network structure. ABMs can be very powerful for simulating and observing macro structure outcomes based on microstructure behavior.

The rest of this paper is structured the following way: The next section provides an introduction to the model and its vital characteristics, including a metric for the agents’ individual experience, the asset market, its participants, and the market clearing mechanism. Section 3 outlines the experimental design, the fixed parameters, and the flexible hyperparameters

selected to showcase the model’s capabilities. Section 4 summarizes the experimental results and reconciles various well-known stylized facts. Lastly, Section 5 concludes this work and gives a glimpse into future research.

2 Methodology

I consider a discrete-time multi-asset financial market where two groups of individuals, chartists and fundamentalists, interact to determine the prices of assets and wealth. Each agent allocates their wealth between three risky assets and one risk-free asset by maximizing myopic expected utility in every period. The key characteristic of this framework is the heterogeneity of the acting agents, who have divergent beliefs about the price change in the next period depending on their age and type. Chartists follow trend extrapolation, while fundamentalists anticipate a return to the fundamental price. Younger agents consider a shorter time window when forming their expectations. Additionally, the optimal demand for the risky asset by investors is influenced by wealth as a consequence of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility. The market price is determined by a Walrasian market clearing mechanism that adjusts market prices based on excess demand.

2.1 Agents’ experience

Agents use their personal experience to determine their expectations on important measures such as returns, dividends, and volatility. They achieve this by using a weighted average function, as explained in Malmendier and Nagel (2011). This function assigns different weights to experiences from the distant past and the recent past. Consider N agents denoted by $i = 1, 2, \dots, N_f, N_f + 1, \dots, N$ where N_f is the number of fundamentalists, N is the total number of traders and the difference $N - N_f = N_c$ represents the number of chartists. Let t be the discrete-time indicator $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$. Specifically, each individual i at time t uses a




Figure 1: Weighting functions for different values of λ for a 50-year-old individual.

personal weighted average function, which is

$$w_{i,t}(k, \lambda) = \frac{(\text{age}_{i,t} - k)^\lambda}{\sum_{k=1}^{\text{age}_{i,t}-1} (\text{age}_{i,t} - k)^\lambda}, \quad (1)$$

where the weights $w_{i,t}$ go back to the birth year and depend on the age of the individual $\text{age}_{i,t}$, the numbers of years k that have passed, and a parameter λ which controls the shape of the weighting function. The parameter λ plays an important role in this model. As shown in Figure 1, the weight function decays geometrically for $\lambda > 0$ (concave for $\lambda < 1$ and convex for $\lambda > 1$), increases for $\lambda < 0$, and for $\lambda = 0$, the weights remain constant, resulting in a simple average. According to the study conducted by Malmendier and Nagel (2011), λ typically has a non-negative value, implying that agents will give recent observations at least the same weight as very distant ones. Empirically, they find a higher weighting of recent returns with a value of about $\lambda = 1.325$. However, depending on the observed variable, this is subject to some variation.

2.2 Asset market

I consider an investment universe where agents can invest in two types of assets. The first is a risk-free asset with a perfectly elastic supply and a constant interest rate r in each time step that is exogenously given. This could be interpreted as a risk-free government bond or a bank account. The second type are three risky assets indexed by $j = 1, 2, 3$. Let $\mathbf{P}_t = [P_{1,t}, P_{2,t}, P_{3,t}]^\top$ be the 3×1 column vector of risky asset prices at time t , which will be determined endogenously within the model. Each asset has a constant dividend stream $\mathbf{D}_t = [D_{1,t}, D_{2,t}, D_{3,t}]^\top$, which is modeled as an arithmetic Brownian Motion. Asset j 's change in dividend level is described as

$$dD_{j,t} = \mu_j \cdot dt + \sigma_j \cdot d\omega_{j,t}, \quad (2)$$

where $\omega_{j,t}$ is a Wiener process, μ_j controls the expected dividend changes and σ_j its standard deviation. Both parameters μ_j and σ_j are constant over time but can be different for each asset. Let $\mathbf{r}_t = [r_{1,t}, r_{2,t}, r_{3,t}]^\top$ be the vector of risky asset rate of returns, given by

$$\mathbf{r}_t = \frac{\mathbf{P}_t + \mathbf{D}_t}{\mathbf{P}_{t-1}} - 1, \quad (3)$$

that consists of capital gains and dividend yields. Note that in (3) the fraction represents an element-wise division of each component of the vectors in the nominator and denominator. This approach of element-wise vector division is consistently applied to all vector fractions presented throughout this paper. Further, let

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{y}_t &= \frac{\mathbf{P}_t}{\mathbf{P}_{t-1}} \\ \text{and } \boldsymbol{\rho}_t &= \frac{\mathbf{D}_t}{\mathbf{P}_{t-1}} - 1 \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

be the capital gains and dividend yields, respectively, then $\mathbf{r}_t = \mathbf{y}_t + \boldsymbol{\rho}_t$. Traders' wealth is described by the scalar $W_{i,t}$ and changes depending on the sum of returns of the held assets,

that is

$$W_{i,t+1} - W_{i,t} = r(1 - \mathbf{x}_{i,t}^\top \mathbf{1})W_{i,t} + W_{i,t} \mathbf{x}_{i,t}^\top \mathbf{r}_t, \quad (5)$$

where $\mathbf{x}_{i,t}$ is the 3×1 vector that describes the wealth proportion invested in each risky asset by individual i at time t . In this study, the sum of invested wealth proportion cannot exceed one ($\|\mathbf{x}_{i,t}\|_1 \leq 1$), and short selling is permitted.

At every time step, investors follow a myopic mean-variance optimizer approach to decide the amount they want to invest in different assets. They do this by maximizing a CRRA (power) utility function. This function is defined by

$$u_{i,t}(W_{i,t+1}) = \begin{cases} 1 - \gamma \left(\frac{W}{1-\gamma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} & (\gamma \neq 1), \\ \ln(W) & (\gamma = 1). \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where u_i represents this agent's utility and γ is the parameter of relative risk aversion which is the same for all agents. The formula for the maximization of an individual investor's i expected utility is given by

$$\max_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbb{E}_{i,t}(u_{i,t}(W_{i,t+1})), \quad (7)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}$ refers to the expectations formed by agent i conditional on his information up to time t . Suppose $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\mathbf{r}_{t+1}]$ and $\Omega_{i,t}$ denote the conditional expectation and covariance matrix of returns on a risky asset in time $t + 1$. The optimal solution for portfolio weight demand is generally given by

$$\mathbf{x}_{i,t} = \left\| \frac{1}{\gamma} \Omega_{i,t}^{-1} (\mathbb{E}_{i,t}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1}) - r) \right\|_1, \quad (8)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1}) - r$ represents the vector of expected excess returns. The exact derivation for these conditional expectations differs depending on the type of trader and will be explained in the next section.

2.3 Fundamentalists

Fundamentalists are denoted by (f) and assume that risky assets have a fundamental value $\mathbf{P}^*_t = [P^*_{1,t}, P^*_{2,t}, P^*_{3,t}]^\top$, which they value according to the Gordon Growth Model. Knowing that

$$P^*_{j,t} \equiv \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(f)}(D_{j,t+\tau})}{(1+c)^\tau} \quad (9)$$

and that the expected dividend yield in $t+1$ is given by

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(f)}(D_{j,t+1}) = (1+\mu_j)D_{j,t} \quad (10)$$

one can obtain

$$P^*_{j,t} = \frac{(1+\mu_j)D_{j,t}}{c-\mu_j}, \quad (11)$$

where μ_j is the dividend growth rate and c the cost of equity capital. To estimate the return expectations of fundamentalists, I use an assumption proposed by He and Li (2007). Fundamentalists acknowledge the existence of traders who follow strategies different from theirs. They realize that in the short run, the stock price might deviate from its fundamental market value. However, they also assume that in the long run, it will eventually return to its fundamental price. Therefore, fundamentalists calculate their expectations by adding a fundamental asset price return component \mathbf{r}^*_t to a mean reversion drift component towards the fundamental price \mathbf{P}^*_t . This is expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(f)}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1}) &= \mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(f)}(\mathbf{r}^*_{t+1}) + \alpha \left(\frac{\mathbf{P}^*_t - \mathbf{P}_t}{\mathbf{P}^*_t} \right), \\ \text{where } \mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(f)}(\mathbf{r}^*_{t+1}) &= \sum_{k=1}^{\text{age}_{i,t}-1} w_{i,t}(k, \lambda) \mathbf{r}^*_{t-k}, \\ \text{and } \mathbf{r}^*_t &= \frac{\mathbf{P}^*_t + \mathbf{D}_t}{\mathbf{P}^*_{t-1}}. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

This is very similar to the expression used in Chiarella et al. (2013), but it incorporates personal experiences by using the weighting parameter $w_{i,t}$, defined in (1), instead of the real

fundamental return. The coefficient $\alpha > 0$ represents the mean reversion coefficient, which indicates how quickly they assume prices to return to the fundamental value. Intuitively, fundamentalists believe that if a risky asset is overvalued, then the expected return will have a negative sign, and vice versa with respect to the fundamental price.

Additionally, strictly following Chiarella et al. (2013), it is assumed that fundamentalists have constant beliefs about the covariance matrix of returns.

$$\begin{aligned}\Omega^{(f)} &= \Omega_0, \\ \text{with } \Omega_0 &= \text{diag}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3),\end{aligned}\tag{13}$$

where σ_j is the same as in the data-generating process for the dividends, which they are aware of.

2.4 Chartists

Chartists represented by (c) do not know the fundamental value, and expect future returns to follow the same trend as their past experiences. According to Malmendier and Nagel (2011), experienced asset returns for chartists are defined as

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(c)}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1}) = \sum_{k=1}^{\text{age}_{i,t}-1} w_{i,t}(k, \lambda) \mathbf{r}_{t-k},\tag{14}$$

where \mathbf{r}_{t-k} refers to the vector of returns in $t - k$ and $w_{i,t}$ is also defined as in (1). This specification captures the extrapolative behavior of the chartists, who expect returns to continue similarly as in the past. Again note that only returns that agent i experienced up to her personal age are considered in (14). The variance-covariance matrix of chartists is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\Omega_{c,t} &= \kappa \sum_{k=1}^{\text{age}_{i,t}-1} w_{i,t}(k, \lambda) \left(\mathbf{r}_{t-k} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(c)}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1}) \right) \left(\mathbf{r}_{t-k} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(c)}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1}) \right)^\top, \\ \kappa &= \frac{1}{1 - \sum_{k=1}^{\text{age}_{i,t}-1} w_{i,t}^2(k, \lambda)},\end{aligned}\tag{15}$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{(c)}(\mathbf{r}_{t+1})$ is the vector of expected returns from (14), and the weights used are the same as described in (1) and denoted by $w_{i,t}$. The correction term κ ensures unbiasedness, which reduces to the traditional (unbiased) sample covariance matrix if all weights are equal. For a comprehensive understanding, refer to Galassi et al. (2021) for details. Agents with positive values of λ give a higher weight to recent disturbances. Agents do not remember returns and disturbances that occurred before their birth.

2.5 Market clearing

Various mechanisms are used in the literature for clearing the market. Some prominent examples are: Forming a price via consensus belief given the average expectation of agents (Chiarella et al., 2013); a price impact function which determines how much the price changes depending on excess demand (Westerhoff et al., 2009); a central order matching mechanism, where traders set bids and asks, and post market or limit orders (Chiarella and Iori, 2002). Choosing a mechanism is a trade-off between its realism and the complexity of the mechanism. It also depends on other model features, such as the ability of agents to express a demand for asset shares. Consensus belief, for instance, is rather simple as it only requires a weighted average of the agents' price expectations. On the other hand, double-auctioneering requires exact demands for asset shares at different prices. Additionally, depending on the model purpose, some market clearing mechanisms might be more useful than others.

For this study, the Walrasian auctioneering mechanism is used, which also is a common method in the ABM literature to achieve market clearing (Brock and Hommes, 1998; Stanek and Kukacka, 2018). The decision to implement this market-clearing mechanism is motivated by twofold reasons. Firstly by the market microstructure behavior of the model, which has been tested in previous experiments. For example, reconsidering the expectation formula of fundamentalists in (12), one can see that fundamentalists can easily have negative return expectations if they think the asset is overvalued and have the urge to sell. After a correction of the price, they might have positive return expectations and trade in the other direction.

Depending on the market clearing mechanism, this can lead to price disturbances. Using a Walrasian auctioneer always requires a counterparty in order for a trade to occur. A subtler second reason for doing this is to bypass the choice regarding the precise form of a price impact function and its relationship to liquidity. As argued by e.g. Westerhoff (2004), estimating such a function can often be difficult. The exact mechanism of the Walrasian auctioneer is described as follows.

In this scenario, every agent solves an optimization problem as described in (8). They treat the market-clearing price in that period as a parameter. An investor's demand for asset shares can be calculated based on her portfolio weight demand, current wealth, and the current market price. More specifically, it is

$$\mathbf{z}_{i,t} = \frac{W_{i,t-1} \mathbf{x}_{i,t}}{\mathbf{P}_t}, \quad (16)$$

where $\mathbf{z}_{i,t}$ denotes the vector of demand for asset shares. Again note that division is performed element-wise. The auctioneer determines the excess demand at that price and has to adjust it such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \mathbf{z}_{i,t} + \sum_{i=N_f+1}^N \mathbf{z}_{i,t} = \mathbf{M} \quad (17)$$

where $\sum_i \mathbf{z}_{i,t}$ is a 3×1 vector that aggregates the demand of each investor for the risky assets, while \mathbf{M} denotes the total number of outstanding stocks in the market. This equation essentially represents the market clearing condition, which implies that at any given time, the sum of stocks held by all agents must be equal to the total available stocks in the market, i.e., \mathbf{M} . Solving this equation is equivalent to finding the root of

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \mathbf{z}_{i,t} + \sum_{i=N_f+1}^N \mathbf{z}_{i,t} - \mathbf{M} = \mathbf{0}, \quad (18)$$

which can be solved numerically. An intuitive way to explain this would be to imagine an auctioneer who keeps announcing prices until a price is found where the excess demand is

zero. This means that the total demand of agents who are willing to buy that stock is equal to the total supply of sellers. As an initial guess of the iterative root finding procedure, I take the last clearing price \mathbf{P}_{t-1} . Once the new clearing price is determined, the wealth of investors is adjusted according to

$$W_{i,t} = (1 - \mathbf{x}_{i,t}^\top \mathbf{1})W_{i,t-1}(1 + r) + W_{i,t-1}\mathbf{x}_{i,t}^\top \left(\frac{\mathbf{P}_t + \mathbf{D}_t}{\mathbf{P}_{i,t-1}} \right). \quad (19)$$

3 Experimental design

This section presents the experimental design strategy and the model parameters selected for analyzing the model framework. The idea is to investigate the impact of personal experiences on emerging stock market properties. In order to do so, the following experimental design has been developed: I apply fixed values to most of the parameters presented in the previous sections based on empirical observations or evidence from the literature. Due to the complexity, nonlinear interactions, and emergent properties of ABMs, a sensitivity analysis will be performed, where two key factors (hyperparameters) are varied in order to better understand the system’s response. For each hyperparameter combination, I use the same seed for the initialization of stochastic random numbers. This critically concerns the dividend process of (2), which is the basis of the fundamentalist’s valuation. Using the same seed makes all simulations of different hyperparameter combinations comparable to one another since they all stem from the same stream of dividends and only differ in the behavior of the acting agents. The described procedure is repeated , each time with a different seed.

To give an overview, all parameters are listed in Table 1. They are divided into three categories of fixed parameters: Simulation, market, and agent-specific. For this simulation study, weekly time steps will be used, and each year will consist of 52 weeks. A single simulation will run for 50 years, so $T = 52 \cdot 50 = 2600$ periods. The chosen values for the dividend growth rate μ_j , its standard deviation σ_j , and the risk-free rate r will be

Parameter	Description	Value
Simulation Parameters		
$1/\Delta t$	Periods per year	52 (weekly)
T	Simulation length	2600 weeks
	Dividend schedule	13 weeks (quarterly)
Annualized Market Parameters		
μ_1, μ_2, μ_3	Dividend growth rates	0.030, 0.025, 0.020
$\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3$	Dividend standard deviations	0.15, 0.10, 0.07
r	Risk-free rate	0.025
c	Cost of capital	0.065
Population Parameters		
N_f	Number of fundamentalists	10
N_c	Number of chartists	10
γ	Risk aversion	1.5
α	Mean reversion parameter	1/52
$\sum_i W_{i,0}$	Initial cash	2000
	Ages	[15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60]
Sensitivity Parameters		
θ	Age distribution	[equal, old, young] → Figure 2
λ	Experience weighting	[0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.5]

Table 1: Parameter values for the experiment

annualized by dividing by 52 and $\sqrt{52}$, respectively. Dividends are cumulated and paid out on a quarterly basis. A quarter year is indexed by q and consists of $52/4 = 13$ weeks. There will be 10 fundamentalists ($N_f = 10$) and 10 chartists ($N_c = 10$) with the same risk aversion parameter of $\gamma = 1.5$, which is a typical value for simulations of this kind. Agents will differ from each other by their age, ranging from 15 to 60. On average, these 20 agents will start with an initial cash amount of 100 (in total 2000), which may individually vary depending on the agent's proportion in the market. Investors with a higher proportion get more cash and therefore have a higher price impact. In this model framework you could also interpret it as having *more* agents of that type.

Turning to the flexible hyperparameters that vary in the sensitivity analysis, three different age distributions θ are presented in Figure 2, $\theta = equal$, $\theta = old$, and $\theta = young$.

Different scenarios are depicted through the age distribution of the agents. For instance,




Figure 2: Age distribution θ for the different scenarios

the *young* scenario includes more younger individuals, particularly those aged 15 to 30. In contrast, the *old* scenario is populated by predominantly older agents, peaking at ages 55 and 60. The other scenario *equal* exhibits a perfectly equal distributed mass. It is important to note that agents in the simulation are not assumed to get older. This decision was made to observe market behavior with a fixed age structure over the medium and long term. Introducing aging, mortality, and replacement of agents would introduce confounding factors and disrupt the intended scenarios.

The second variable hyperparameter is the weighting parameter of Malmendier and Nagel (2011), λ , which controls the shape of the weighting function that agents use to form their expectations. This function is described in (1) and shown in Figure 1. It ranges from $\lambda = 0.0$, so a perfectly flat weighting function and indicating the classic sample average, to $\lambda = 2.5$. The latter indicates a steep geometrically decaying function that puts a strong weight on recent returns.

All computations are performed in Python 3.10.8. Numerical computations use NumPy 1.24.1 (Harris et al., 2020), and most results were created using pandas 1.5.3 (The pandas development team, 2022). Econometric OLS estimations in Section 4 are performed in statsmodels 0.13.5 (Seabold and Perktold, 2010). The Walrasian auctioneering mechanism was implemented using a root finding optimizer of the SciPy 1.10.0 (Virtanen et al., 2020) toolbox. More specifically, I used the ‘hybr’ argument, which is a combination of the Powell hybrid method and a numerical Jacobian approximation with a tolerance of 10^{-5} , which was




Figure 3: Example simulation for a normal age distribution and $\lambda = 0.0$

Notes: The figure shows weekly prices (top left) and returns (bottom right) of the three simulated assets over a simulation period of $T = 2600$ (50 years). The agents' asset holdings $\mathbf{z}_{i,t}$ for each asset is shown in the three right panels.

lowered to 10^{-4} and 10^{-3} if the optimizer did not converge.

An example of the simulation outcome is illustrated in Figure 3. The time series of prices suggests that there can be phases when fundamental prices (lighter colored) and actual market prices (solid colored) can drift apart for quite some time. The returns indicate clusters of volatility. Based on the chart, it can be observed that chartists are more consistent in their stock positions, while fundamentalists can be more variable in their behavior. This can be attributed to their approach to building expectations. Chartists can depend on many years of past data, while fundamentalists strongly rely on the current fundamental value. The term 'Market Maker' indicates a long or short position, in rare cases, when the root finder does not converge during the market clearing.

4 Results

The findings of this paper are divided into four subsections that test multiple aspects of the model and compare them to the facts of empirical data. The first subsection discusses the predictive power of the price-dividend ratio. The second subsection investigates if the model is able to reproduce underdiversification of agent portfolios. The last two sections compare the autocorrelation of dividend-price ratios and market returns to the behavior in actual data. For brevity, I adopt a concise notation for the dividend-price ratio, representing it as $D_t/P_t \equiv DP_t$.

4.1 Predictive power of the dividend-price ratio

One important principle of stock markets is that the dividend-price ratio predicts future returns with a positive sign, and its predictive power is stronger over longer horizons (Campbell and Shiller, 1988). In this study, I aim to investigate whether this simulation can produce results that demonstrate the ability of the dividend-price ratio to predict future returns, especially at longer horizons. It will be particularly interesting to observe this for different population hyperparameters.

A more useful and structured way to express this evidence, suggested by Cochrane (2011), is to use log values to highlight the present value identity of three univariate regressions: A regression of future returns on the dividend-price ratio, a regression of future dividend growth on the dividend-price ratio, and a regression of the future dividend-price ratio on the current dividend-price ratio. Empirically, in the long run, the coefficients of these three regressions, $b_r^{(q)}$, $b_d^{(q)}$, and $b_{dp}^{(q)}$ roughly hold

$$1 \approx b_r^{(q)} - b_d^{(q)} + b_{dp}^{(q)}. \quad (20)$$

Moreover, in the long run, the three coefficients are roughly 1, 0 and 0, respectively, meaning that the dividend-price ratio shall forecast future returns, not its own growth and not its own future value. This forecasting property has the following intuition. A sequence of positive

dividend cash flows leads to a higher valuation of the fundamentalist’s stock price valuation. This momentum is enforced by chartists, who follow the positive trend and increase their demand for the asset which, in turn, pushes up the stock price. This chain of events leads to an overvaluation and lowers the current dividend-price ratio. Subsequent price changes are low on average. Price changes are therefore forecastable with a positive sign.

The performed regression of quarterly market returns over time t to time $t + q$ on the dividend-price ratio is

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{j=1}^q r_{t+j} &= a + b_r^{(q)} \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+q}^r, \\ \sum_{j=1}^q \Delta d_{t+j} &= a + b_d^{(q)} \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+q}^d, \\ dp_{t+q} &= a + b_{dp}^{(q)} \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+q}^{dp}, \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

where $dp_t = \log(DP_t)$, $r_t = \log(R_t)$, and $d_t = \log(D_t)$ are the log values of the markets’ dividend-price ratio, the value-weighted market return, and the sum of all market dividends, respectively. $\sum_{j=1}^q r_{t+j}$ and $\sum_{j=1}^q \Delta d_{t+j}$ are the cumulative sums from t to $t + q$ of the return price differences and the dividends. These regressions are prone to autocorrelation of the residuals up to and including $q - 1$ observations which is mechanically caused by the overlap. To address this, I report heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard error estimators of Newey and West (1987) for all regressions when significance levels are shown. The focus of this analysis is on the results of the first equation of (21), describing the predictability of returns. To draw a full picture of the results, additional results can be found in the Appendix B.

Table 2 displays this univariate regression result pairwise for all hyperparameter combinations and over several quarterly horizons. Each column shows different experienced return values (λ) from 0.0, indicating an equal weighting of all past returns, to 2.5, indicating a strong consideration of recent returns. The rows have two dimensions, showing the different age distributions as presented in Figure 2, and the quarterly lag-length q for the OLS regression, namely a quarter of a year ($q = 1$), one year ($q = 4$), two years ($q = 8$), three

Table 2: Predictive power of log dividends on future returns

θ	λ	0.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
	q					
equal	1	0.588***	0.572***	0.556***	0.541***	0.515***
	4	0.617***	0.618***	0.614***	0.609***	0.599***
	8	0.67***	0.696***	0.713***	0.725***	0.739***
	12	0.672***	0.733***	0.778***	0.812***	0.859***
	16	0.642***	0.733***	0.803***	0.858***	0.937***
old	1	0.608***	0.596***	0.582***	0.568***	0.543***
	4	0.62***	0.625***	0.623***	0.62***	0.61***
	8	0.644***	0.675***	0.695***	0.708***	0.724***
	12	0.612***	0.675***	0.722***	0.758***	0.81***
	16	0.556***	0.643***	0.714***	0.771***	0.855***
young	1	0.546***	0.533***	0.517***	0.502***	0.476***
	4	0.593***	0.597***	0.593***	0.588***	0.578***
	8	0.676***	0.703***	0.72***	0.73***	0.743***
	12	0.714***	0.777***	0.822***	0.855***	0.898***
	16	0.716***	0.811***	0.882***	0.936***	1.009***

Notes: The table reports the coefficients $b_r^{(q)}$ for univariate regressions of stock price changes from time t to time $t + q$ (in quarters), $\sum_{j=1}^q r_{t+j} = a + b_r^{(q)} \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+q}^r$. Asterisks indicate the significance level of $b_r^{(q)}$. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.

years ($q = 12$), and four years ($q = 16$).

Two clear observations can be made from Table 2. Firstly, for short terms, stock return predictability decreases as λ increases, while it increases for long horizons. For instance, in the equal age distribution, the predictability of returns drops from 0.588 to 0.515 for $q = 1$, whereas it grows from 0.642 to 0.937 for $q = 16$. This pattern is evident across all age distributions. Secondly, stock markets with older populations have better predictability of stock returns in the short run, while markets with younger populations show higher predictability for longer horizons. By comparing different rows in Table 2, we can see that for $q = 1$, the old (young) scenario reports coefficients ranging from 0.543 (0.476) to 0.608 (0.546), whereas for $q = 16$, the same coefficients range from 0.556 (0.716) to 0.855 (1.009). Younger markets have the lowest $b_r^{(q)}$ coefficient in the short run and the highest b coefficient in the long run compared to any other scenario.

The results find that when older agents engage in the market, the predictability of longer horizons becomes weaker. This is because their expectations are more persistent, and it takes longer to correct an overvaluation. Similarly, a higher value of the λ parameter leads to a quicker correction. These results are consistent with Barberis et al. (2015), who utilize a general parameter to manage the strength of recent sentiment considerations of agents.

4.2 Underdiversification

The study of Calvet et al. (2007) investigates the risk characteristics of agents using Swedish household data. They identify two main sources of inefficiency: Underdiversification ('down') and non-participation ('out'). The aim of this simulation is to provide insights into the possible sources of underdiversification, as highlighted by the authors who demonstrate a significant variation in household portfolios across different households, measured by the Sharpe ratio. This variation is lucidly presented in Figure 2 of Calvet et al. (2007, p. 726).

To examine the characteristics of the agents' portfolio mean-variance properties, I randomly sample time points t from the simulation and obtain the portfolio weights of all

chartists, denoted by $\mathbf{x}_{i,t}^{(c)}$. To reduce clutter in notation, I omit the indices and use \mathbf{x} . Using the realized returns of each simulation, I estimate the first and second moments, namely the mean $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}$ and covariance matrix $\hat{\Omega}$. The excess returns are annualized and calculated over the risk-free rate, which was set to $r = 2.5\%$ in the experiment. The individual agent portfolio mean and variance is calculated using via $r_{i,t} = \mathbf{x}^T \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}} - r$ and $\sigma_{i,t}^2 = \mathbf{x}^T \hat{\Omega} \mathbf{x}$, respectively. The market portfolio returns r_m and variance σ_r^2 is calculated using the Sharpe ratio optimal portfolio weights x^* obtained through (8). This procedure is repeated for each simulation seed used in the experiment.

I report an example of this procedure for one simulation seed in Figure 4, where agent portfolios are in the mean-standard deviation plane. The plot shows the result of one simulation seed and presents all the hyperparameter combinations separately. The figure clearly demonstrates the impact of the λ -parameter on the observations. For lower values of λ , the scatter plots show the points to be closer to each other. However, for increasing values of λ , the points start to disperse further from each other. Upon comparing the scatter plots row-wise, there difference between them is minor but visible.

To gain a better understanding of how agents diversify their portfolios, Table 3 summarizes those results for all simulated runs of the experiment. I use the same quantitative assessment as Calvet et al. (2007) to assess the losses that agents incur due to suboptimal diversification. This method involves calculating the relative Sharpe ratio loss (RSRL) by comparing an individual’s Sharpe ratio to a benchmark, which, in this case, is the market portfolio. The RSRL measures the loss that arises from imperfect diversification. It is given by

$$RSRL_i = 1 - \frac{S_i}{S_m}, \quad (22)$$

where S_i is the agents’ Sharpe ratio obtained from r_i and σ_i . S_m is the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. As a reminder, S_m is calculated separately for each simulation seed. The columns of Table 3 show several percentiles as well as the mean of all $RSRL_i$ that were obtained from all agent portfolios during the experiment. The rows indicate all combinations




Figure 4: Example scatterplot of agent portfolios

Notes: The graph shows multiple scatter plots that illustrate the mean and standard deviation of agent stock portfolio returns. Rows indicate the age distribution of a population (θ), and columns indicate the weighting parameter λ . The graph shows all chartists that come from the same randomly chosen 20 points in time of one simulation seed.

Table 3: Diversification loss RSRL

θ	percentile λ	mean	25th	50th	75th	95th	99th
equal	0.0	0.057	0.006	0.019	0.069	0.247	0.368
	0.5	0.051	0.005	0.016	0.057	0.233	0.372
	1.0	0.052	0.005	0.018	0.057	0.232	0.393
	1.5	0.055	0.007	0.021	0.06	0.241	0.421
	2.5	0.066	0.009	0.027	0.071	0.287	0.501
old	0.0	0.057	0.006	0.019	0.07	0.25	0.369
	0.5	0.052	0.005	0.016	0.058	0.238	0.378
	1.0	0.053	0.005	0.018	0.058	0.237	0.395
	1.5	0.056	0.007	0.021	0.061	0.246	0.429
	2.5	0.067	0.01	0.028	0.072	0.289	0.506
young	0.0	0.056	0.005	0.019	0.067	0.243	0.366
	0.5	0.05	0.005	0.016	0.057	0.228	0.364
	1.0	0.051	0.005	0.018	0.055	0.229	0.392
	1.5	0.054	0.007	0.02	0.058	0.238	0.415
	2.5	0.064	0.009	0.027	0.069	0.28	0.508

Notes: The table shows the mean as well as the 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th, and 99th percentile of the relative Sharpe ratio loss (RSRL) for the different age distributions and λ parameters.

of age distributions and λ -values.

The results show that agents are generally well diversified with a mean diversification loss between 5% and 7%, independent of the hyperparameter setting. Even at the 75th percentile, the diversification loss only increases slightly. Similar to the findings in Calvet et al. (2007), it is only a minority that is severely underdiversified. Looking at the 95th and 99th percentile, the RSRL reaches levels of 24% up to almost 50%. As observed in scatterplots of Figure 4, where an increase in λ was aligned with the dispersion of agent portfolios, the under-diversification also increases in λ at every percentile. This pattern makes sense because high values of λ indicate a bias for very recent asset returns, which may not be representative of the overall data-generating process.

Turning to the question of whether having more data leads to better diversification. Comparing young and old agents, it appears that having more data is not always best. Younger

agents tend to perform better when we look at the diversification loss at different percentiles. For instance, at the 75th percentile, the diversification loss of old agents ranges from 5.9% to 7.3%, while young agents experience a loss ranging from 5.7% to 6.9%. Although the difference is minor, it is noticeable across different hyperparameter combinations. Another visible pattern is that the RSRL loss is U-shaped for increasing values of λ between the 25th and 75th percentile of the diversification loss distributions. Within each hyperparameter combination, the RSRL is lowest for medium values of λ at around 0.5 to 1.5. These findings imply that having a slight preference for recent data results in better portfolio diversification, as measured by a lower diversification loss. Therefore, having more data, as in the case of the old age distribution, does not necessarily improve portfolio diversification in this artificial economy.

4.3 Autocorrelation of dividend-price ratios

Whether the behavior of price-dividend ratios in this economic simulation is similar to what is observed in empirical data will be investigated next. Studies have shown that the autocorrelation of these ratios is high at short lags and decreases to zero at longer lags (Barberis et al., 2015). To analyze this, the partial autocorrelation parameters $\phi_{q,q}$ are calculated at the same lags as in subsection 4.1 through multiple regressions. More specifically

$$\begin{aligned}
 DP_t &= \phi_{0,1} + \phi_{1,1}DP_{t-1} + \epsilon_{1t}, \\
 DP_t &= \phi_{0,4} + \phi_{1,4}DP_{t-1} + \dots + \phi_{4,4}DP_{t-4} + \epsilon_{4t}, \\
 &\dots \\
 DP_t &= \phi_{0,16} + \phi_{1,16}DP_{t-1} + \dots + \phi_{16,16}DP_{t-16} + \epsilon_{16t},
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{23}$$

where q indicates the quarters of dividend streams and $\phi_{q,q}$ is the autocorrelation parameter of DP_t at lag q . Table 4 reports the resulting partial autocorrelation parameters for the market's dividend-price ratio for different hyperparameter combinations. It shows that the

Table 4: Autocorrelation parameter $\phi_{q,q}$ of DP_t

θ	λ	0.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
	q					
equal	1	0.499	0.508	0.518	0.528	0.534
	4	0.182	0.18	0.177	0.173	0.165
	8	0.087	0.082	0.075	0.068	0.06
	12	0.055	0.047	0.04	0.035	0.027
	16	0.018	0.012	0.007	0.004	0.001
old	1	0.465	0.477	0.491	0.502	0.52
	4	0.179	0.179	0.178	0.176	0.172
	8	0.09	0.088	0.084	0.079	0.07
	12	0.06	0.056	0.051	0.046	0.036
	16	0.021	0.018	0.014	0.011	0.005
young	1	0.533	0.536	0.543	0.523	0.527
	4	0.185	0.179	0.174	0.161	0.142
	8	0.082	0.075	0.066	0.036	0.05
	12	0.046	0.038	0.031	0.026	0.007
	16	0.011	0.004	0.0	-0.001	0.002

Notes: The table reports the value of the partial autocorrelation of DP_t and DP_{t-q} at different lags, denoted by $q = 1, 4, 8, 12, 16$ (in quarters) for several value pairs of the age distribution parameter θ and the weighting parameter λ .

Table 5: Autocorrelation parameter $\phi_{l,l}$ of R_t

θ	λ	0.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
	l					
equal	1	-0.199	-0.195	-0.19	-0.186	-0.17
	4	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.003
	8	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.015
	12	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.008
	16	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
old	1	-0.203	-0.199	-0.196	-0.192	-0.186
	4	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004
	8	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012
	12	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.009
	16	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006
young	1	-0.195	-0.19	-0.184	-0.168	-0.157
	4	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
	8	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.016	-0.02
	12	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.004
	16	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.008	-0.007

Notes: The table reports the value of the partial autocorrelation of the market returns R_t and R_{t-l} at different lags, denoted by $l = 1, 4, 8, 12, 16$ (in weeks) for several value pairs of the age distribution parameter θ and the weighting parameter λ .

model is capable of reproducing the mentioned empirical facts with high autocorrelations at lag $q = 1$ and a steep decline for higher lags. It can be seen that even though it is rather minor, the decline is slower for the older population. This is due to the fact that expectations are more persistent for most agents in this population.

4.4 Autocorrelation of market returns

Empirical observations also show that stock market returns are positively autocorrelated at shorter lags and weakly negatively at longer lags (Cutler et al., 1991). To verify this behavior, a procedure similar to the previous one is employed in the model, but this time using weekly partial autocorrelations, denoted by $\phi_{l,l}$. Multiple regressions are run at lags

$l = 1, 4, 8, 12, 16$, those are

$$\begin{aligned}
R_t &= \phi_{0,1} + \phi_{1,1}R_{t-1} + \epsilon_{1t}, \\
R_t &= \phi_{0,4} + \phi_{1,4}R_{t-1} + \dots + \phi_{4,4}R_{t-4} + \epsilon_{4t}, \\
&\dots \\
R_t &= \phi_{0,16} + \phi_{1,16}R_{t-1} + \dots + \phi_{16,16}R_{t-16} + \epsilon_{16t},
\end{aligned}
\tag{24}$$

where l stands for the weeks, so that is lags of one week, one month, two months, three months, and four months. The value of $\phi_{l,l}$ is the autocorrelation parameter of R_t at lag l . The results of Table 5 report the results of these regressions. Most returns are negatively correlated, with a stronger value at lag $l = 1$. This effect is more pronounced in cases where agents are older and when λ is lower.

At longer lags, this economy exhibits similar patterns to the data. Positive price changes have a weak negative impact on predicting somewhat distant price changes. This can be explained intuitively. Positive return shocks are amplified by the behavior of chartists who cause stock prices to rise even further. However, when stock markets are overvalued, the subsequent long-term price changes are generally low, on average. The same applies in reverse.

However, in the short run, the results in Table 5 exhibit a rather different picture to the empirical evidence. Even though this might come as a surprise, there is an explanation for this behavior. Suppose again there is a positive shock on the fundamental stock price due to positive dividend news in the market at time t . This news is first traded by the fundamentalists as laid out in (12), who push the price in $t + 1$. Since most market participants, especially older ones with a low λ value, consider a much longer time series for their market expectations, this trend gets corrected to some extent in the very short run (i.e., at $t + 2$). Therefore, by design at lag $l = 1$, a price shock caused by fundamentalists predicts a negative correction induced by chartists.¹

¹As pointed out by Barberis et al. (2015), some earlier models in the literature do indeed show positive

5 Conclusion

The study introduced an agent-based simulation of an artificial stock market, where two distinct types of traders determine the prices of multiple risky assets. The model incorporates agent heterogeneity in terms of age structure and a personal bias towards considering recently experienced returns. By applying a sensitivity analysis to the model, the study aimed to gain a deeper understanding of how individual risk-taking behavior impacts emerging aggregated asset prices.

The results show that the model is able to replicate most of the well-known stylized facts of financial markets, such as the predictive power of the price-dividend ratio and the inefficiency (underdiversification) of agent portfolios. The study also confirms the findings of Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016), demonstrating that market outcomes are particularly close to empirical data when agents overweight returns from their recent personal experiences. It has been shown that in those scenarios, the market returns are most predictable in the long run. Some stylized facts become even more evident when simulating a young population of agents. Although the reasons for the underdiversification of investors' portfolios can have multiple causes, it has been highlighted that personal experiences can be one source of that. It was also interesting to see that in the presented setting of chartists and fundamentalists, the chartists were more consistent in their behavior than the fundamentalists. In many ways, therefore, the model offers a new perspective on these market phenomena.

The model is also prone to some limitations. While it is possible to reproduce the long-term autocorrelation of asset returns, as observed in the empirical data, the short-term autocorrelation was limited due to the model's design. Other limitations have created opportunities for future research. For instance, the study conducted by Calvet et al. (2007) tested for additional behavioral biases, such as non-participation or financial illiteracy, which could additionally help explain the inefficiency of agent portfolios. One way to incorporate

autocorrelations at lag 1, e.g. Barberis and Shleifer (2003). In these models, extrapolator's asset demand at time t depends on the lagged price change from $t - 2$ to time $t - 1$ instead of $t - 1$ to t . A positive price shock in $t - 1$ enters extrapolator's expectation only at time t , and leads to positive autocorrelation.

this into simulations like ours is through stronger interactions between agents e.g. through a switching mechanism of types – an approach commonly used in ABM literature. This area is a subject for future research.

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A Appendix: Time series of a simulation example




Figure 5: Example simulation with burn-in period

Notes: The figure shows weekly prices (top) and returns (bottom) of the three simulated assets over a burn-in period of 3120 weeks (60 years) and a simulation period of $T = 2600$ (50 years). Lighter lines indicate the fundamental price, while solid lines represent the actual market price.

Figure 5 is an extension to Figure 3. The vertical black line in the graph indicates the start of the actual simulation after the burn-in period (60 years). It is evident from the graph that the burn-in period is very smooth since it is governed by the data-generating process as described in (2). After that, agents trade according to the previously described Walrasian market mechanism, which leads to a more (clustered) volatile market with fat tails.

B Appendix: Additional OLS results

The following two tables show additional OLS results, namely a regression of future dividend growth $\sum_{j=1}^q \Delta d_{t+j}$ on the dividend-price ratio and a regression of the future dividend-price ratio dp_{t+q} on the current dividend-price ratio. The exact procedure follows (21).

Table 6: Predictive power of log dividends for future dividend growth

	λ	0.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
θ	q					
equal	1	0.131***	0.126***	0.12***	0.114***	0.103***
	4	0.128***	0.133***	0.133***	0.129***	0.119***
	8	0.131**	0.155***	0.168***	0.173***	0.172***
	12	0.077	0.128*	0.161**	0.181**	0.199***
	16	-0.013	0.062	0.116	0.153*	0.194**
old	1	0.134***	0.132***	0.128***	0.123***	0.114***
	4	0.118***	0.128***	0.132***	0.132***	0.129***
	8	0.097	0.128**	0.148**	0.161***	0.172***
	12	0.015	0.072	0.114	0.144*	0.179**
	16	-0.099	-0.02	0.043	0.089	0.15*
young	1	0.122***	0.116***	0.109***	0.102***	0.089***
	4	0.131***	0.133***	0.128***	0.121***	0.104***
	8	0.157***	0.174***	0.179***	0.177***	0.162***
	12	0.132*	0.173**	0.196***	0.207***	0.206***
	16	0.067	0.135	0.178**	0.204***	0.223***

Notes: The table reports the coefficients $b_d^{(q)}$ for univariate regressions of stock price changes from time t to time $t + q$ (in quarters), $\sum_{j=1}^q \Delta d_{t+j} = a + b_d^{(q)} \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+q}^d$. Asterisks indicate the significance level of $b_d^{(q)}$. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.

Table 7: Predictive power of log dividends for future dividends

θ	λ	0.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
	q					
equal	1	0.553***	0.564***	0.574***	0.584***	0.598***
	4	0.552***	0.557***	0.561***	0.563***	0.563***
	8	0.541***	0.539***	0.535***	0.53***	0.514***
	12	0.524***	0.514***	0.502***	0.487***	0.455***
	16	0.499***	0.483***	0.465***	0.445***	0.402***
old	1	0.536***	0.545***	0.556***	0.566***	0.582***
	4	0.539***	0.544***	0.55***	0.555***	0.561***
	8	0.531***	0.532***	0.534***	0.534***	0.529***
	12	0.52***	0.515***	0.511***	0.504***	0.487***
	16	0.498***	0.49***	0.481***	0.471***	0.446***
young	1	0.586***	0.594***	0.602***	0.611***	0.623***
	4	0.581***	0.58***	0.579***	0.577***	0.57***
	8	0.564***	0.553***	0.541***	0.528***	0.5***
	12	0.54***	0.518***	0.494***	0.469***	0.421***
	16	0.509***	0.479***	0.447***	0.415***	0.353***

Notes: The table reports the coefficients $b_{dp}^{(q)}$ for univariate regressions of stock price changes from time t to time $t + q$ (in quarters), $dp_{t+q} = a + b_{dp}^{(q)} \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+q}^{dp}$. Asterisks indicate the significance level of $b_{dp}^{(q)}$. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.