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Keep it simple: Central bank communication and asset prices

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Keep it Simple: Central Bank Communication and Asset Prices

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Keep it Simple: Central Bank Communication and Asset Prices ^{*}

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Abstract

This paper studies the impact of different types and styles of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) communication on asset prices (stock prices, gilt yields and interest rate futures) from 1999-2023. We extend MPC communication to include MPC speeches and find MPC speeches to be an important driver of asset prices. We also show that complex and ambiguous communication leads to greater asset price volatility than simple and clear communication. Central banks that want to avoid generating volatility in financial markets should keep it simple. Our results suggest that by ignoring the type and style of monetary policy communication, the previous literature has disregarded an important source of variation in asset prices.

JEL Classification: E52, E58, G12


Keywords: Monetary policy, central bank communication, high-frequency data

1 Introduction

Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England (BoE) at the time, participated in a policy panel at the ECB Forum on Central Banking on 28 June 2017. He discussed the potential need to remove monetary stimulus from the economy, as sterling's sharp fall following the EU referendum pushed the Bank's inflation projections above target. Markets immediately reacted. The UK stock market declined and gilt yields jumped, as Figure 1 illustrates. This financial market reaction was larger than the reaction following some BoE interest rate announcements, though it was not outsized in historical comparison. Importantly, it was driven by what the BoE *said*, rather than by what it *did*.

^{*}*The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Vanguard Group. We would like to thank Robert Czech, Refet Gürkaynak, Iryna Kaminska, Ales Koutny, Eric Swanson, Michael McMahon and participants at the workshop on Non-Linearities in Macro Conference, in London on 15 May 2023, for their comments and suggestions.*

Figure 1: Mark Carney at the ECB Forum on Central banking



Note: The graph on the left shows the FTSE All-Share, as an index, and the graph on the right shows the 5y gilt yield, in percent. Mark Carney’s panel discussion started at 2.30pm UK local time. Data from 2pm to 4.30pm UK local time on June 28, 2017.

Source: Refinitiv.

In this paper, we investigate to what extent this observation holds more generally. We study the importance of different types and styles of monetary policy communication for asset prices using high frequency data. We focus on the UK and the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). We consider three types of monetary policy communication: MPC announcements; MPC press conferences¹; and MPC members’ monetary policy speeches - including speeches by the Governor.

A key contribution of this paper is that we extend MPC communications to include MPC speeches. We find speeches to be an important driver of asset prices. In particular, speeches appear to have a larger effect on the long end of the yield curve than announcements or press conferences. This is line with results for the US by Swanson (2023) who finds Fed Chair speeches are more important than FOMC² announcements. Intuitively, this result supports the hypothesis that changes to the MPC’s thinking and policy stance are communicated via speeches ahead of their interest rate decision. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to analyse the effects of MPC speeches on asset prices using high-frequency data in the UK.

We follow Gürkaynak et al. (2005) in how we summarise MPC communication. We construct a novel data set for the UK that captures the high-frequency changes in major asset prices in a narrow window bracketing each of the three types of monetary policy communication events from 1999 to 2023, e.g. a 30-minutes window for MPC announcements is used. We use intraday

¹Press conferences are associated with the publication of the Monetary Policy Report (MPR), four times per year. The MPR replaced the Inflation Report (IR) from November 2019.

²The FOMC refers to the Federal Open Market Committee which is part of the Federal Reserve System. It holds eight regularly scheduled meetings each year. At these meetings, the FOMC reviews economic and financial conditions and determines the appropriate stance of monetary policy in the US.

data because this allows us to better identify the changes in asset prices due to monetary policy rather than other market moving events³. Following [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#), we summarise monetary policy communication with two dimensions, or factors. These factors have a structural interpretation. The first factor ("target factor") is defined as the surprise change in short-term interest rates. The second factor ("path factor") corresponds to changes in future interest rates out to a horizon of one year that are independent of changes in short-term interest rates. We then measure the effects of these two factors on asset prices using a high-frequency event-study analysis. The basic premise in this literature is that financial markets are efficient, and expectations about future monetary policy actions are already priced in. When there is a new monetary policy event, markets may receive new information about the stance of future policy. If they do, then this 'monetary policy surprise' will be captured in asset price moves in the window around the monetary policy event.

The second contribution of this paper is to explore the style of central bank communication. In particular, we seek to understand how simple (or clear) versus complex (or ambiguous) communication affects asset prices. We find that asset price volatility rises following complex communication. The intuition is that simple communication leaves people on the same page about the stance of future policy; there is limited ambiguity. Such consensus gives rise to fewer trade ideas and therefore lower volatility in asset prices. Instead, when communication is complex, this gives rise to different interpretations about where next for monetary policy. Some may interpret the communication as hawkish, and others as dovish. Such disagreement of views gives rise to different investment theses, on which many market participants may trade. Those differing trade ideas is what we postulate produces greater volatility in asset prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to investigate this aspect of central bank communication.

We classify communication into simple and complex styles using the [Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level](#) score. This is a widely used measure of readability, and is defined as the US school grade level needed to comprehend a written text. We classify communication as complex if one needs a higher level of education or years of schooling to understand it.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. Section 3 explains the construction of our data set, including how we summarise the two factors of monetary policy. Section 4 presents our results, and section 5 concludes.

³However, in ten instances we had to make adjustments or drop the observations entirely to account for important other macro releases. See [Appendix A](#) for more details.

2 Literature Review

A large and growing literature has focused on the financial market reaction to monetary policy announcements using high-frequency data. This high-frequency approach was pioneered by [Cook and Hahn \(1989\)](#), [Kuttner \(2001\)](#) and [Cochrane and Piazzesi \(2002\)](#).

In a seminal contribution, [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#) construct changes in Federal funds and Eurodollar futures in a tight window around FOMC meetings. They show that the information in these high-frequency yields can be summarised by two factors: (1) a target factor related to the current monetary policy of the Federal Reserve and (2) a path factor that is related to the future stance of policy. They show that the path factor has a significant impact on longer-term Treasury yields.

[Swanson \(2021\)](#) extends this analysis to include the Great Recession and the period of unconventional monetary policy. He shows that there are additional dimensions of monetary policy (relating to large scale asset purchases and forward guidance) over this longer sample related to unconventional monetary policy. These are found to have a significant impact on the long end of the yield curve, exchange rates and corporate bond spreads.

Relying on a high-frequency identification approach, too, [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2018\)](#) present estimates of monetary non-neutrality. They show that information effects - central bank announcements affecting beliefs not only about monetary policy but also about other economic fundamentals - play an important role in the overall causal effect of monetary policy shocks.

In a recent contribution [Swanson \(2023\)](#) argues that by focusing on changes in yields around FOMC meetings, existing studies ignore some monetary policy events that may be important in terms of communicating the stance of monetary policy. In particular, he shows that asset prices such as long-maturity yields and the S&P500 change by a larger amount around speeches and congressional testimony by the Fed chair when compared to FOMC meetings.⁴ Similarly, the regression results in [Bauer and Swanson \(2022\)](#) show that changes in measures of monetary policy around speeches by the Fed Chair have a larger effect on 10 and 30-year yields. [Istrefi et al. \(2022\)](#) present similar results for the euro area and show that remarks by ECB presidents are as important as meetings in terms of the effect on EONIA rates.

There is a large and growing literature that explores how the style of central bank communication affects asset prices. For example [Hansen et al. \(2019\)](#) study the Bank of England's Inflation Report using machine learning. They show that communication about uncertainty can explain the reaction of future interest rate expectations more easily.

⁴[Swanson \(2023\)](#) builds on an earlier literature that used lower frequency data to examine the role of Fed communication. For example [Kohn and Sack \(2003\)](#) show that FOMC statements and the testimony of the Fed Chairman have an important impact on asset price volatility. [Ehrmann and Fratzscher \(2007\)](#) classify statements of the FED, the Bank of England and the ECB in terms of the signal regarding tightness of policy and perceived economic outlook. They find that communication affects yields at short and medium horizons significantly.

Our paper is closely related to [Swanson \(2023\)](#), [Istrefi et al. \(2022\)](#) and [Hansen et al. \(2019\)](#). However, we extend these analyses along two important dimensions. First, we consider how the impact of announcements regarding current *and* future monetary policy on asset prices differs across different types of policy events. Second, we investigate the role played by the complexity of the policy communication event.⁵

3 Data and Methodology

3.1 Data

We catalog the dates and times of every MPC announcement, press conference and speech between September 1999 and April 2023. Dates and times of these three types of events are collected from Bloomberg. The sample is conditional on (a) the event taking place during market open; (b) non-missing asset price data in the window around each event; and (c) speeches must be about monetary policy and deemed significant by markets, and thus reported in the Financial Times newspaper. These selection criteria lead to a sample of 438 monetary policy events. Please refer to [Appendix A](#) for details.

The MPC interest rate announcement currently takes place eight times a year. A public written statement is issued on the Bank of England website at 12pm⁶. Our sample spans 260 announcements, 256 take place during market open. After further adjustments for overlap with other macro news, or if some data is not available, we end up with 248 MPC announcements in our sample. The sample drops to 244 for the analysis on simple versus complex communication, as it requires written text which is not always available.

Previous studies have bundled press conferences and announcements together. But since this paper is about the type of communication, we believe there is merit in investigating their role separately. The press conference begins with a short verbal statement from the Governor, followed by questions from the press. The Governor answers most of these, but can choose to pass them on to the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy or the Chief Economist. Our time period spans 94 press conferences. Similar to above, we have to make adjustments for the simple versus complex analysis, as we are not able to find a transcript of the press conference prior to 2006. Since August 2015, the press conference starts at 12.30pm, 30 minutes after the MPC announcement. It occurs four times a year, in February, May, August and November. In these months the MPC also publishes a Monetary Policy Report. The report includes the

⁵[Gerko and Rey \(2017\)](#) and [Cesa-Bianchi et al. \(2020\)](#) use high-frequency changes in Sterling future rates around MPC meetings to derive measures of monetary policy shocks for the UK. However, these studies only focus on the current stance of monetary policy.

⁶Until 2017 the MPC announcement took place on a monthly basis, also at 12pm.

MPC’s medium-term projections for inflation and GDP growth. Prior to August 2015⁷, the press conferences took place one week after the MPC announcement at 10.30am, which was also 30 minutes after the publication of the Inflation Report (Figure 2).

Finally, MPC members often give public speeches that contain significant information about the stance and direction of monetary policy. From 1999–2023, the MPC delivered 851 speeches, including 194 speeches by the Governor. The time of speech is not available for all speeches, and some speeches were delivered after market close, for example after dinner. These factors reduce the sample of MPC speeches to 362. Controlling for speeches that are solely on monetary policy lead to a further drop in sample size to 220. For example, the MPC often give speeches about financial stability, central bank digital currency, Brexit or climate change. To identify speeches that contain new information about monetary policy, we follow Swanson (2023) and select only those speeches that appear in the market commentary of the Financial Times. This results in 96 MPC speeches. In this paper we extend the sample of speeches from Governor to all nine MPC members because the number of monetary policy speeches delivered by solely the Governor which meet the conditions above is too low (see Appendix A).

We measure asset price changes in a narrow window of time surrounding each of the three types of events above. The window needs to be narrow enough to exclude other macro economic data releases that might move asset prices⁸, which is illustrated in Figure 2.

For MPC announcements, we use a 30-minute window, as in Gürkaynak et al. (2005). The window starts 10 minutes before the announcement and ends 20 minutes after. We follow Swanson (2023) for measuring asset price changes around press conferences and speeches. For MPC speeches, we use a 120-minute window, beginning 15 minutes before the start of the speech and ending 1 hour and 45 minutes after. Press conferences last for about one hour, so we use a 90-minute window around it. The window starts just before the press conference and ends 90 minutes after. The longer windows around speeches and press conferences reflect the fact that these events are longer to deliver, and will likely take market participants longer to digest.


We follow Kaminska and Mumtaz (2022) and take the change in the median asset value by comparing the value in the 10 minute period just before, and just after the window. We take the median to reduce bias from outlier observations.

To examine asset price volatility around simple versus complex monetary policy events, we use the same financial market data in the same windows around the monetary policy events. The only difference is that we now focus on changes in volatility. This means that we compare the standard deviation of asset prices in the 10 minutes before and the 10 minutes after the

⁷From August 2015, the MPC announcement and MPR *publication* both occur at 12pm, four times a year. This makes it impossible to identify the asset price response of announcements separately from the MPR publication. But we can still examine the impact of the MPR *press conference*, because it begins just outside of the tight window over which we measure asset price moves for announcements.

⁸Nevertheless, in ten instances we had to make adjustments or drop the observations entirely to account for important other macro releases. See Appendix A for more details.

Figure 2: The time window around the monetary policy events



Note: The MPC press conference takes place four times a year in Feb, May, Aug and Nov. Between 1999 and the end of July 2015 press conferences took place on the Wednesday in the week after the MPC announcement. From August 2015, the press conference took place on the same day as the MPC announcement. Speeches take place at various times across the day, the illustration above serves as an example.

Source: Bloomberg and Bank of England.

monetary policy event (same window over which we calculate the median of asset prices). We then go on to investigate what might explain the change in asset price volatility.

Our intraday (tick-level) asset price data is from Refinitiv. To capture market expectations of the policy rate in the short-term, we look at the 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month sterling futures curve. These data are based on LIBOR out to September 2021 and on SONIA thereafter. As is well-known, LIBOR carries a higher risk premium than SONIA. However, the contracts based on SONIA were not available at an intra-day frequency pre-2008; and even after 2008 intra-day liquidity was poor relative to LIBOR⁹. Following Swanson (2023), we consider moves in the 1-, 2-, 5- and 10-year gilt yields. For stock prices we use the FTSE All-Share, and for the exchange rate we use the 3-month forward GBP/USD exchange rate.

To assess whether communication is simple versus complex, we use the Flesch-Kincaid ease of readability test scores. These are widely used and tested (the US army, for instance, uses it to

⁹All four contracts are available since September 1999, which determines the start date of our sample.

test the readability of their training manuals). They are designed to measure how difficult it is to understand a passage in English. There are two tests: the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease, and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. The two measures use the same core measures (total words, sentences and syllables), but they have different weighting factors. In this paper we focus on the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level, which captures the equivalent US grade level needed to understand the MPC communication. It is calculated as follows:

$$0.39 * \frac{\text{total words}}{\text{total sentences}} + 11.8 * \frac{\text{total syllables}}{\text{total words}} - 15.59$$

A grade level of 10 implies that 10 years of schooling are needed to understand a particular text. This would be equivalent to someone who is aged 15-16.

It is worth noting that the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score, despite being used in many professions, may have some limitations. For example, the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level is higher for sentences that contain a lot of words, or words that contain a lot of syllables - but the text could still be easily understood. Whenever the economy is hit by large or new types of shocks, it can create a more challenging macro environment in which to set policy. In such situations central banks may have to analyse complex new problems, deal with new concepts and use new models and data. For example during lockdown, policymakers had to understand epidemiology and analyse high-frequency data such as traffic flows. In other words, a complex macro environment can result in complex central bank communication. Whatever the underlying reason, this paper assumes that a high Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score will be a good proxy for complex and ambiguous monetary policy communication.

3.2 Construction of the Two Factors

We follow the methodology of [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#) to summarise the dimensions of monetary policy. The intuition behind the methodology is as follows: At any point in time financial markets are efficient. They fully price in expectations of future monetary policy. When a new monetary policy event takes place, it may offer new information. Sometimes the monetary event is in line with market expectations, so asset prices do not move or move only marginally. However, sometimes there is new information - a 'monetary policy surprise'. These are captured by the asset price changes over the relevant window illustrated in [Figure 2](#).


Relying on the rank test of [Cragg and Donald \(1997\)](#), we test whether these monetary policy surprises are adequately captured by a single factor. We find they are not. Instead we find that two factors are required (see [Appendix B](#) for details). This implies that one factor alone is not sufficient to adequately describe the response of asset prices to monetary policy events.

We estimate these two factors using the standard method of principal components. We use the set of four sterling futures (3m, 6, 9m, and 1y) that characterise the expected path of Bank Rate over the upcoming year. The two factors explain 98% of the variation, but do not yet have

a structural interpretation. As in [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#) we perform a rotation of both factors to yield two new factors which are still orthogonal and explain the same fraction as the previous two factors did. The first factor, is interpreted as the "target" factor - and captures news about the direction of short-term monetary policy - that is policy over the next three months. The second factor or "path" factor corresponds to changes in future interest rates out to a horizon of one year that are independent of changes in short-term rates. Please refer to [Appendix B](#) for a detailed description of the methodology.

Figure 3 shows the target and path factors for our full data set (MPC announcements, press conferences and speeches) from 1999 to 2023. For instance, on 6 November 2008 the Bank shocked the country by slashing rates from 4.5% to 3%, the largest cut it has made since it was granted independence in 1997. This negative surprise is captured by a large negative target factor, because this announcement represented a surprise change in short-term interest rates. By contrast, the path factor appears less important, as that particular announcement was less about communication about the future path of monetary policy, but rather the immediate near-term interest rate decision.

Figure 3: The target and path factor



Note: The graphs shows the target and path factors for each monetary policy event (sample = 438) in our data set, in basis points, and from 1999 to 2023.
Source: Refinitiv.

To facilitate an easier interpretation of both factors, we normalise the scale of the target factor such that it moves 1:1 with the 3m sterling future rate. This implies that a change of 1bps in the target factor corresponds to a surprise change of 1bps in 3m-ahead market expectations for Bank Rate. Additionally, we normalise the scale of the path factor so that the effect of the path factor on the 1y-ahead sterling future contract is the same as the effect of the target factor on the 1y-ahead sterling future rate.

4 Results

4.1 The Effect of Speeches on Asset prices

4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics

Each row of Table 1 considers one of the three types of monetary policy events: MPC announcements, MPC press conferences and MPC speeches. Each column considers one of the financial assets described above, and each entry shows the average (absolute) change in the asset price in the narrow window around the monetary policy event. These are unconditional changes, meaning that the average (absolute) change is taken over the entire sample of monetary events that span the period 1999-2023.

Table 1: Mean absolute change in asset prices per monetary policy event

	N	3m <i>bps</i>	6m <i>bps</i>	9m <i>bps</i>	12m <i>bps</i>	1y gilt <i>bps</i>	2y gilt <i>bps</i>	5y gilt <i>bps</i>	10y gilt <i>bps</i>	FTSE %	£/USD %
MPC announcement	248	2.57	2.73	2.85	2.80	2.60	2.33	2.26	2.02	0.17	7.68
MPC press conference	94	1.54	2.75	3.62	4.14	3.13	3.19	3.10	2.39	0.23	3.48
MPC speeches	96	0.53	0.84	1.23	1.36	1.64	1.54	1.63	1.75	0.27	3.11

Note: N is the number of observations. 3m, 6m, 9m, and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract, 1y, 2y, 5y, 10y refer to the respective gilt yield, FTSE is the FTSE All-Share Index and GBP/USD is the 3m forward exchange rate between sterling and the dollar. The table shows the mean (absolute) change in basis points for sterling future rates and gilt yields, and in percent for the FTSE all-share and the GBP / USD 3m forward exchange rate, around each type of monetary policy event. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 248 MPC announcements, 94 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches. MPC speeches include speeches by the Governor.
Source: Refinitiv.


To take an example, following all the MPC announcements in our sample, the average (absolute) change in the 2-year gilt yield has been 2.33 basis points. This is lower than the average change of 3.19 basis points that follow a MPC press conference. Speeches have a smaller effect on the 2-year gilt yield of 1.54 basis points. These numbers are small, but in line with what the literature has found.

Looking across the table a pattern does emerge, for almost every asset class. Press conferences give rise to the largest unconditional change in asset prices over the narrow time window. This might be because the press conference is a high-profile press briefing that is followed closely by markets. The Governor opens with a statement explaining the MPC’s decision alongside the latest economic projections for inflation and growth. It ends with a live question and answer session. For the FTSE All-Share, speeches have a marginally larger impact than announcements and press conferences ¹⁰.

The relative magnitude of asset price moves following UK MPC speeches are smaller (less important) than what [Swanson \(2023\)](#) finds for Fed chair speeches in the US. There are a number

¹⁰[Hansen et al. \(2019\)](#) study the content of the Monetary Policy Report and show that its discussion of uncertainty influences asset price moves.

Figure 4: Importance of MPC speeches vs. MPC press conferences and MPC announcements for different asset classes



Note: The graphs shows the 3-year rolling average, in basis points, of the absolute change of the rate of the 1-year ahead sterling future contract and 2y gilt yield around each type of monetary policy event. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 248 MPC announcements, 94 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches. Source: Refinitiv.

of possible explanations for this difference: the Fed chair speaks more frequently; the Fed chair is more influential given the US is the world’s largest economy with the largest financial sector; the Fed communication strategy is different; or the wider UK sample of all MPC members may have diluted the UK results. Additionally, there is certainly a market view that the Fed prefers not to surprise markets on announcement days and prefers to communicate their view via other channels, including speeches. This preference may hold for the Bank of England too. Widening the sample of speeches in the UK to all MPC members was motivated to increase the sample of observations for speeches. But doing so may have diluted the UK result if there are too many voices saying too many different things - the so called ‘cacophony of voices’ (Powell (2016)).

Figure 4 shows the importance of press conferences, announcements and speeches on asset price changes over time. The left panel shows the 3-year rolling average change in asset prices that relate to each type of monetary policy event for the 12-month sterling futures. The right panel shows the same change in asset prices but for the 2-year gilt yield. The chart shows that the absolute and relative importance of different monetary policy events changes over time. Press conferences were the most important driver of asset price changes around the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Since then its importance has declined. Since 2017, MPC announcements have emerged as the most important driver of asset price changes. The unconditional change in asset prices for speeches is generally smaller than for announcements and press conferences, reflecting what we observed in Table 1.

4.1.2 Regression Results

The previous descriptive statistics in Table 1 and Figure 4 prove helpful in understanding how asset prices move around a monetary policy communication event. Even though we found that there is a smaller variation in asset prices around speeches than announcements or press conferences, we show below that speeches are very informative about the path of future monetary policy.

Let's start by estimating how monetary policy surprises, summarised by the target and path factor, affect asset prices. We estimate the following equation

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Z_{1t} + \beta_2 Z_{2t} + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

ΔY_t denotes the change in asset prices over the windows described in Figure 2, and Z_{1t} and Z_{2t} denote the target and path factor, respectively.

Table 2 shows the regression results on the aggregate sample which includes all three types of monetary policy events. Each row represents a separate regression which includes a constant, the target factor and the path factor. The dependent variable is shown in the first column. For all asset prices, the target and path factor are statistically significant. This is consistent with previous UK studies (e.g. Kaminska and Mumtaz (2022) and (Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2020)) which found that monetary policy surprises (as captured by the target and path factor) are important drivers of asset prices in the UK.

Specifically, an upside surprise to near-term rates (an increase in the target factor) of 1 basis point will increase market expectations for Bank Rate 6 months out (the 6m sterling future contract) by 1.13 basis points, and the 5y gilt yield by 0.49 basis points. A positive surprise on the future stance of monetary policy of 1 basis point - the path factor - will increase the 6m-ahead sterling future contract by 0.39 basis points, and the 5y gilt yield by 0.58 basis points. The path factor is found to have a larger impact on the 5y and 10y gilt yield than the target factor. One contribution of this paper is to show that the effects of the path factor on asset prices increase for the wider sample that includes MPC speeches.

We therefore now analyse whether speeches contain additional information about monetary policy. We are particularly interested in whether speeches add additional value over and above announcements and press conferences

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Z_{1t} + \beta_2 Z_{2t} + \beta_3 D_t + \beta_4 D_t Z_{1t} + \beta_5 D_t Z_{2t} + \epsilon \quad (2)$$

D_t is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the event is a speech, and takes the value zero if the event is an announcement or press conference.

Table 3 shows that speeches are important in moving gilt yields above and beyond press conferences and announcements: the dummy interaction terms are statistically significant. In-

Table 2: Full Sample: High-frequency OLS regression

	Constant	Target	Path	R2
3M	-0.26***	1.00***	0.00	0.99
6M	-0.43***	1.13***	0.39***	0.98
9M	-0.50***	1.06***	0.71***	0.99
1Y	-0.60***	0.92***	0.92***	0.98
1Y gilt	-0.34***	0.75***	0.54***	0.71
2Y gilt	-0.37***	0.66***	0.61***	0.76
5Y gilt	-0.28***	0.49***	0.58***	0.62
10Y gilt	-0.11	0.28***	0.48***	0.41
FTSE	-0.006	-0.03***	-0.01***	0.16
£/USD	0.36	-1.14	0.86***	0.07

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 1 on the full sample (N=438). The dependent variable is the change in the asset price listed in column 1 over the narrow window around the monetary policy event. Each row represents a separate regression. 3m, 6m, 9m and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract. 1y, 2y, 5y and 10y gilt refer to the respective gilt yield. FTSE is the FTSE All-Share Index and £/USD is the 3m forward GBP to USD exchange rate. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 248 MPC announcements, 94 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches.

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

Source: Refinitiv.

tuitively, this could be the case if changes to views on the monetary policy stance are communicated via speeches ahead of the interest rate decision. Moreover, speeches are more ad-hoc - they do not follow a regular schedule like announcements and press conferences - and have more scope to surprise markets.

Additionally, speeches that are about the future path of monetary policy seem to be especially important in driving the long-end of the yield curve (compared to the shorter-end). The path interaction term is positive and statistically significant for 5 and 10 year gilt yields (at the 5% level). This might be the case as speeches provide more information about the future path of monetary policy (e.g. if a speech is about the supply side of the economy or the neutral rate of interest), while monetary policy announcements are more about shorter-term rate decisions. The target interaction term, on the other hand, is significantly negative for the shorter-end of the yield curve. As speeches are likely to provide more information about the future path of monetary policy, including speeches in our data set appears to weaken the role of the target factor.

These results imply that by ignoring one type of MPC communication - MPC speeches - the previous literature has disregarded an important source of variation in asset prices.

Table 3: Speeches add value: High-frequency OLS regression

	Constant	Target	Path	Dummy	Target * Dummy	Path * Dummy	R2
3M	-0.27***	0.99***	-0.001	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.99
6M	-0.41***	1.13***	0.40***	-0.07	-0.07	-0.02	0.98
9M	-0.50***	1.06***	0.71***	-0.01	0.05	-0.003	0.99
1Y	-0.61***	0.91***	0.91***	0.04	-0.009	0.01	0.98
1Y gilt	-0.26***	0.76***	0.55***	-0.18	-1.03***	0.12	0.72
2Y gilt	-0.34***	0.67***	0.60***	-0.12	-0.63***	0.23*	0.77
5Y gilt	-0.25**	0.49***	0.57***	-0.27	-0.36	0.30**	0.62
10Y gilt	-0.07	0.28***	0.47***	-0.42	-0.09	0.35***	0.41
FTSE	0.002	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01	-0.07	-0.007	0.16
£/USD	0.1	-1.13	0.87**	1.43	-0.67	-0.29	0.06

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 2 on the full sample (N=438). The dependent variable is the change in the asset price, listed in column 1, over the narrow window around the monetary policy event. Each row represents a separate regression. The dummy variable D = 1 for speeches, and 0 otherwise. 3m, 6m, 9m and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract. 1y, 2y, 5y and 10y gilt refer to the respective gilt yield. FTSE is the FTSE All-Share Index and £/USD is the 3m forward GBP to USD exchange rate. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 248 MPC announcements, 94 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches.

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

Source: Refinitiv.

4.2 Simple vs Complex Communication

Turning now to how asset prices move following different styles of communication - simple and complex.

4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics

We begin by defining what we mean by simple versus complex communication. We do that with the aid of the Flesch-Kincaid grade level score. We run a textual analysis for each monetary policy event to generate a score. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4a.

MPC announcements have the lowest score. The average score of an MPC announcement is 8.4 years, which means that someone with a US school grade level of about 8 years should be able to understand MPC announcements. Press conferences have an average score of 11.0 years, while it is a little higher for MPC speeches. MPC speeches have the greatest variation in scores. This is unsurprising, as the complexity of speeches will inevitably vary by the audience (a business community versus a technical audience), and may also vary by MPC member style.

A jump in communication scores is visible from 2015 in Figure 4b. That arises because the Bank changed its communication strategy from August 2015. Following its interest rate announcement, it started to publish a Monetary Policy Summary. This document is longer and

contains more information than the previously published MPC News Release”¹¹.

We define simple vs complex communication in an ad-hoc way. We divide the full sample of monetary policy events into three buckets based on the distribution of Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level score. The bucket with the highest grade level scores is defined as complex communication; the bucket with the lowest grade level scores is defined as simple communication; and the bucket that falls in the middle of the distribution of scores is ignored (Figure 4b).

As noted earlier, we believe a high Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level score is a good proxy for complex central bank communication, that leaves market participants less certain about the path of future policy. The underlying source of complex communication is multi-faceted. It could arise from the central bank having to convey complex concepts and uncertainty about the economic outlook. Or it could just be that the central bank fails to communicate well. Our hypothesis is that the different facets of complexity are likely to be correlated. In other words, when the MPC are trying to convey a complex concept, they end up using complex language.

A specific example might be useful. The February 2023 press conference was classified as complex by our approach. FT reporting summed it up as - “The results were rather messy.” During the press conference, the Bank said it had raised rates by 50bps, despite its new inflation projection falling well below target within a year. Such projections typically point to no change in rates. So why the rate hike of 50bps? The Governor justified the rate hike as an insurance policy against the possibility that events may not unfold as the baseline view of the inflation projections showed. Instead, they raised rates in response to the upside risks to their inflation forecasts. This communication left market participants uncertain about the conceptual thinking behind the MPC’s decision. Market participants left the press conference with different interpretations about the outlook for the economy and rates. Some took it as the Bank “signals an end to hikes” while others were not so sure.


¹¹Please refer to Appendix A for the major chronological changes to the MPC communication strategy since its independence in 1997.

Table 4: It takes around 11 years of education to understand MPC communication

(a) Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level score descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD
MPC announcements	8.4	1.4
MPC press conferences	11.0	1.0
MPC speeches	11.3	1.7
US FOMC statement	16.0	
US press conference answers	8.0	
The Economist	11.0	
Elvis songs	6.0	

(b) Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level score over time



Note: SD refers to standard deviation. The outlier observation of 25 years represents the MPC meeting at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic on 19 March 2020. Source: For MPC announcements, press conferences and speeches, we use the Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level calculation on WebFX and written text provided by the Bank of England. Sample is from September 1999 to April 2023. Transcripts for press conferences are currently only available on the Bank's website from 2006. For US FOMC statements and US press conference answers, we rely on Figure 2 from [Pooter \(2021\)](#). Sample is from January 2011 to December 2021. For The Economist and Elvis songs, we use the calculations provided by [Haldane \(2021\)](#). Sample is from 1982 to 2016.

4.2.2 Regression Results

A priori we have no reason to expect complex communication to have a different impact on asset prices levels than simple communication. Indeed, that is what we find in the data. Table 5 models complex communication as a dummy variable. As before, each row is a separate regression for the dependent variable listed in the first column. The complex communication dummy interaction terms for the target and path factors are mostly insignificant. The 9-month sterling interest rate futures is significant, but the coefficient is too small for it to have any meaningful difference. In other words, complex communication is not associated with larger changes in asset prices.

Table 5: Complex communication is not associated with larger changes in asset prices

	Constant	Target Factor	Path Factor	Dummy	Target * Dummy	Path * Dummy	R2
3M	-0.24***	0.99***	-0.004	-0.05	0.03	0.007	0.99
6M	-0.47***	1.11***	0.39***	0.08	-0.05	-0.01	0.98
9M	-0.51***	1.03***	0.70***	0.03	-0.02***	0.007	0.99
1Y	-0.51***	0.90***	0.91***	-0.06	0.04*	0.002	0.99
1Y	-0.36***	0.76***	0.52***	0.09	-0.25	0.11	0.69
2Y	-0.34***	0.63***	0.59***	-0.05	-0.07	0.12	0.75
5Y	-0.23*	0.47***	0.55***	-0.05	-0.03	0.16	0.61
10Y	-0.03	0.25***	0.47***	-0.08	0.05	0.10	0.41
FTSE	0.002	-0.02***	-0.006	-0.03	-0.02*	-0.02*	0.17
GBP/USD	0.45	0.07	0.76*	0.15	-3.22	0.45	0.10

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 2. The dependent variable is the change in the asset price, listed in column 1, over the narrow window around the monetary policy event. Each row represents a separate regression. The dummy variable $D = 1$ if communication is complex, and 0 otherwise. 3m, 6m, 9m, and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract. 1y, 2y, 5y and 10y refer to the respective gilt yield. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 244 MPC announcements and 69 MPC press conferences and 96 speeches.

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

Source: Refinitiv.

A large literature argues that simple - clear and transparent - communication by central banks will give rise to lower uncertainty about the path of future interest rates¹². Lower uncertainty is generally measured by a lower variance or standard deviation. Building on this view we propose the following novel idea, that we later test in the data.

Our hypothesis is that complex or ambiguous communication (be it an announcement, press conference or speech), leaves market participants uncertain about the future direction of monetary policy. Some may interpret it as dovish, others as hawkish. Participants use the new information they receive from the monetary policy event to adjust existing trade positions or undertake new trades. Our thesis is that following complex communication, there are more trade

¹²See, for instance, Casiraghi and Perez (2022)

ideas than following simple communication and this generates volatility in asset prices. To test this hypothesis, we compute the standard deviation of the asset price in the 10 minutes before and after different monetary policy events, using the same windows as before (see Figure 2). We then investigate whether changes in the standard deviation of asset prices can be explained by monetary policy surprises as captured by the target and path factors.

In other words, we estimate the following equation:


$$\Delta SD(Y_t) = \alpha + \beta_1 Z_{1t} + \beta_2 Z_{2t} + \beta_3 D_t + \beta_4 DZ_{1t} + \beta_5 DZ_{2t} + \epsilon \quad (3)$$

As above, Z_1 and Z_2 refer to the target and path factor, respectively. The only difference is that the dependent variable is now the change in the standard deviation of asset prices, $SD(Y_t)$, over the relevant window. D_t is equal to one if communication is complex, and zero otherwise.

Let us now test our hypothesis. Does the volatility of asset prices rise by more following complex communication, as we have argued? Figure 6 shows these results in the form of an illustrative chart. The solid vertical line is drawn to depict the monetary policy event. On the left we normalise the change in the standard deviation of the asset price to zero. On the right hand side of the vertical line we plot the change in the standard deviation of four different asset prices. A clear pattern emerges. The volatility of asset prices rises by more after complex communication events than it does after simple communication events. For example, the standard deviation of the 10y gilt yield rises following a monetary policy communication event, but rises more if communication is complex (0.066) versus simple (0.021).

Table 6 shows the results more formally in a regression. As before each row represents a different regression and complex communication is modelled as a dummy variable. The path interaction factor is significant and positive for 1y and 2y gilt yields. Complex communication seems to increase the volatility of medium-term gilt yields.

Figure 5: Change in standard deviation in gilt yields around monetary policy event



Note: The chart shows the change in the standard deviation (SD) of gilt yields at different maturities in the narrow window around a monetary policy event. We classify communication as simple vs complex based on the Flesh-Kincaid Grade Level scores. Communication that falls into the top third of the score distribution is classified as complex. The bottom third of the score distribution is classified as simple.

Source: Refinitiv.

Table 6: Complex communication is associated with more volatility in medium-term gilt yields

	Constant	Target Factor	Path Factor	Dummy	Target * Dummy	Path * Dummy	R2
3M	0.0006	1.00***	-0.0002	-0.008	-0.02	0.0009	0.92
6M	-0.04***	0.53***	0.10***	0.01	0.09	-0.005	0.54
9M	-0.01	0.39***	0.17***	0.01	-0.12*	0.009	0.67
1Y	-0.01	0.21***	0.22***	-0.02	0.05	-0.005	0.72
1Y gilt	0.07*	-0.43***	-0.12***	-0.03	0.49	0.16**	0.04
2Y gilt	0.12***	-0.05	-0.11***	-0.03	-0.15	0.15***	0.05
5Y gilt	0.05***	-0.21***	-0.04	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.05
10Y gilt	0.03***	-0.09***	-0.03**	0.02	-0.003	0.03*	0.05
FTSE	0.09	-34.0	-10.0	8.3	73.8	8.0	0.02
GBP/USD	3.29*	-29.0*	-4.6*	-0.61	25.0	4.8*	0.09

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 3. The dependent variable is the change in the standard deviation of the asset price listed in column 1 in the narrow window around the monetary policy event. Each row represents a separate regression. The dummy variable $D = 1$ if communication is complex, and 0 otherwise. 3m, 6m, 9m, and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract. 1y, 2y, 5y and 10y refer to the respective gilt yield. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 244 MPC announcements and 69 MPC press conferences and 96 speeches. For robustness, please refer to Table 15 for regression results on a subsample ending (but excluding) August 2015.

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

Source: Refinitiv.

5 Conclusion

This paper is about the power of central bank communication. We construct a novel data set of high-frequency monetary policy surprises in the UK which includes different types of MPC communication. We show that the type and complexity of communication matters. We argue that by not taking these dimensions of communication into account the previous literature has ignored this important source of variation in asset prices from UK monetary policy.

A modern central bank communicates with market participants in many different ways. In this paper, we explore three different types of monetary policy events - MPC announcements, press conferences and speeches. We find that the absolute and relative importance of different monetary events on asset prices changes over time; their importance rises in times of macroeconomic stress, such as during the Global Financial Crisis and the pandemic-era inflation.

MPC speeches are found to be an important determinant of UK asset prices. But they generate smaller moves in asset prices than US Fed chair speeches. We believe this difference can be explained by institutional differences between the two countries. We find that MPC speeches are more important drivers of longer dated bond yields than MPC announcements and press conferences. We show that this is because MPC speeches contain useful additional information about the future path of monetary policy.

The language used by central banks matters. In this paper we introduce a novel way to explore how simple vs complex central bank communication affects asset prices. We find that complex communication is generally followed by larger asset price volatility. We believe this is because complex communication leaves market participants with ambiguity about the future direction of monetary policy. Different interpretations about where next for monetary policy is likely to show up in different trading ideas or positions. That shows up in the data as greater volatility in asset prices. Central banks that want to avoid generating volatility in financial markets should keep their language simple.

The underlying relationship between the type of monetary policy communication and the response of asset prices is complicated. The source of complex communication could be a poor choice of words and lack of clarity. But it could also be a challenging economic environment: that would make it harder to forecast where the economy is heading and complicate the appropriate policy response. For example, when the economy was hit by unprecedented shocks, like the pandemic and war in Ukraine, central banks had to work with new concepts and data to determine the best course for policy. It is plausible that a complex macro environment makes it harder to communicate in a clear and simple way. Complex communication could also be the result of conflict among the monetary policy committee: it may be hard to convey the differences of view in a simple way. Our paper cannot identify the root cause of higher asset price volatility following complex communication - these are topics for future research.

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6 Appendix

A Data

A.1 Monetary policy events

There are three types of monetary policy communication in the data set. We retrieve the dates of each from the Bank of England official website, and the start times of each from Bloomberg.

- MPC Announcements: We use a 30-minute window around each announcement, see [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#).
- MPC Press Conferences: We use a 90-minute window around each press conference, see [Swanson \(2023\)](#).
- MPC Speeches: We use a 2-hour window around each speech, see [Swanson \(2023\)](#).

We make multiple adjustments to the data set, see Table 7. Firstly, we use the first to fourth sterling future contracts for the factor estimation. However, these series are only starting to become available from June 1999. We start our data set from September 1999 given these data availability constraints. Secondly, we adjust for the time of the speech. The start times for speeches were not always available on Bloomberg, or the speech took place outside of market open. Fourth, many of the speeches were on topics unrelated to monetary policy. For instance, the MPC sometimes gives speeches on diversity, central bank digital currencies or climate change. To identify those speeches that did indeed contain information on monetary policy, we only selected the monetary policy related speeches that were relevant enough to be mentioned in the Financial Times. And lastly, we have to make some adjustments to the time windows or even drop some events if there is overlap with other macro releases such as a US CPI release.

Table 7: Monetary policy events in our data set

	Sample Sep 1999 to Apr 2023	... time available on BBG	... during market open	... on monetary policy	... in FT	... data available or drop due to overlap with other news	Written text available (only applies to simple vs. complex analysis)
MPC announcements	260	260	256	-	-	248	244
MPC press conferences	94	94	94	-	-	94	69
MPC speeches incl. Governor <i>[Governor]</i>	851 <i>194</i>	626 <i>139</i>	362 <i>61</i>	220 <i>16</i>	101 <i>8</i>	96 <i>6</i>	96 <i>6</i>
Total						438	409

Note: *Please note that the MPC meeting decision was announced at 7am on four days in our sample, outside of market opening hours, during the Covid-19 pandemic; on 11 March, 7 May, 6 August and 5 November 2020. Source: Bank of England, Bloomberg and Financial Times.

The Bank also made multiple changes to their communication strategy since its independence. The major ones are shown in Table 8. Key changes include so called "Super Thursday". From August 2015, the Bank decided it will release its decision on interest rates (the MPC Summary), the MPC Meeting Minutes, and the Inflation Report (later called Monetary Policy Report) at 12pm on the same day. Previously, minutes were usually released two weeks after the MPC announcement, and the MPR press conference took place a week later at 10:30am. The MPC Summary also became a little longer with more information (typically 1-2 pages) compared to the previous "News Release" (typically half a page). Other changes include a decrease in the frequency of meetings from twelve to eight times a year in 2017, and the renaming of the Inflation Report (IR) to Monetary Policy Report (MPR) in 2019.

Table 8: Changes to Bank of England communication since its independence

Date	Time line
1997 (May)	BoE Independence MPC policy announcement on the first Thursday of the month MPC Meeting Minutes published six weeks after the policy meeting at 9.30am Inflation Report (IR) published on a quarterly basis (Feb, May, Aug and Nov), on the Wednesday in the week after the policy meeting, at 10.00am
1998 (Oct)	MPC Minutes published, with a shorter lag, on the Wednesday of the second week after the policy meeting at 9.30am
2000 (Jan)	MPC announcement available as a "News Release" online
2006 (Feb)	Transcript of press conference becomes available online
2015 (Aug)	Monetary Policy Summary replaces the MPC announcement ("News Release") "Super Thursday": Monetary Policy Summary, MPC Minutes and IR all start being published on the same day IR publication start time changed from 10:00am to 12:00pm Press conference time changed from 10:30am to 12.30pm
2017 (Feb)	MPC meeting frequency changed from twelve to eight times a year
2019 (Nov)	Inflation Report (IR) becomes Monetary Policy Report (MPR)


Note: The table shows the major changes to BoE communication. Source: Bank of England.

A.2 Asset prices

Our sample period is from September 1999 to April 2023. We compute the changes in the narrow window around the monetary policy event for the following asset prices:

- 1, 2, 3, 4th quarter ahead sterling futures. These are settled based on the 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) out to September 2021. A better alternative would be a contract settled on the Sterling Overnight Index Swap (SONIA) as it carries a lower risk premium than LIBOR. However, these contracts are only becoming available from 2008 which is why the data is not always available in those early years. From September 2021 we use the ones settled on SONIA.
- 1y, 2y, 5y and 10y gilt yields.
- (log of) FTSE All-Share
- (log of) 3-month forward GBP/USD exchange rate.

Figure 6: Daily monetary surprises



Note: Daily monetary policy surprise computed as the change in the 3-month sterling future contract in the narrow window around each monetary policy event. 438 data points, including 248 MPC announcements, 94 press conferences and 96 speeches.

Source: Refinitiv.

B Factor Model Rank Test and Factor Estimation

B.1 Testing the Number of Factors

We need to test how many dimensions are required, in our data set, to adequately characterise monetary policy events. We follow the notation and estimation of [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#).

Let X denote the $T \times k$ matrix with rows corresponding to monetary policy events (announcements, press conferences and speeches), columns corresponding to asset prices, and the elements of X corresponding to the change in the respective asset price in a narrow window around the monetary policy event.

$$X = F\Lambda + \eta$$

F is a $T \times n$ matrix of unobserved factors (with $k < n$), Λ is a $k \times n$ matrix of factor loadings, and η is a $T \times n$ matrix of white noise disturbances. We wish to know how many factors (columns of F) are required to adequately describe X .

In our case, X is a matrix of 438 rows corresponding to monetary policy announcements, press conferences and speeches, and four columns corresponding to the 1, 2, 3, 4th sterling future contracts with one year or less to maturity.

Following [Gürkaynak et al. \(2005\)](#), we rely on the matrix rank test of [Cragg and Donald \(1997\)](#) to test for the number of factors. The null hypothesis that X can be described by k_0 factors can be tested against the alternative hypothesis that X is described by $k > k_0$ factors.

We can reject the null hypothesis that X can be described by 0 and 1 factors. Combined with the large fraction in the variation in X that can be explained by the first two factors (see next section) we conclude that 2 factors can adequately describe monetary policy events in our data set.

Table 9: Tests of number of factors characterizing monetary policy announcements

H0: # of factors	Minimum distance	Chi-Degrees of Freedom	P-value	# of observations
0	52.1929	6	0.000	438
1	9.3326	2	0.009	438

Note: Test is from [Cragg and Donald \(1997\)](#) and tests the null hypothesis of N_{H0} factors against the alternative of $N > N_{H0}$. Sample is from September 1999 to April 2023, with 238 MPC announcements, 94 press conferences and 96 MPC speeches, including speeches by the Governor.

B.2 Factor Estimation

We estimate the unobserved factor matrix F using the standard method of principal component analysis applied to the matrix X . As mentioned above, matrix X in our case is 438×4 , where the columns represent the 1-4th sterling future contracts, while the rows correspond to the monetary policy events (248 announcements, 94 press conferences and 96 speeches).

The PCA gives us the two unobserved factors, F1 and F2. The first two factors explain 96% of the variation in Z.

To allow for a more structural interpretation of these unobserved factors, we rotate them so that the first factor corresponds to the surprise component of short-term interest rates, and the second factor corresponds to news on the future path of monetary policy out to a horizon of one year, that is independent of the first factor. In other words, we define a 438 x 2 matrix by

$$Z = FU$$

where U is defined as

$$\begin{bmatrix} \alpha_1 & \beta_1 \\ \alpha_2 & \beta_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

U is uniquely identified by four restrictions:

- The columns of U are normalised to have unit length, which normalises Z1 and Z2 to have unit variance.
- The new factors Z1 and Z2 should remain orthogonal to each other.

$$E(Z_1 Z_2) = \alpha_1 \beta_1 + \alpha_2 \beta_2 = 0$$

- Z2 does not influence the 3m sterling future contract. Let γ_1 and γ_2 denote the (known) loadings of the 3m sterling future contract on F1 and F2 (the unrotated factors from the PCA), respectively. Since

$$F_1 = \frac{1}{\alpha_1 \beta_2 - \alpha_2 \beta_1} [\beta_2 Z_1 - \alpha_2 Z_2]$$

$$F_2 = \frac{1}{\alpha_1 \beta_2 - \alpha_2 \beta_1} [\alpha_1 Z_2 - \beta_1 Z_1]$$


- The fourth restriction follows from the above equations

$$\gamma_2 \alpha_1 - \gamma_1 \alpha_2 = 0$$

It can then be solved for the unique matrix U that satisfies these restrictions. Lastly, we rescale Z1 so that it moves 1:1 with the rate on the 3m sterling future contract. And we rescale Z2 such that it has the same magnitude effect on the 1y ahead sterling future contract as Z1 has on that rate.

C Target and Path factor

Here we provide some descriptive statistics for the target and path factor. The average change in the target and path factor, over our sample period, is zero. This is as expected; while some monetary policy events do surprise on the upside and some on the downside, on average they sum to zero across our data set. The target factor has a slightly larger standard deviation than the path factor.



(c) Descriptive statistics

	Target	Path
Mean	0.00	0.00
Median	0.25	0.37
Standard Deviation	4.00	3.48
IQR	1.61	2.35

(d) Scatterplot of target and path factor



Note: Factors are in basis points. Sample is from September 1999 to April 2023, with 248 announcements, 94 press conferences and 96 speeches. Source: Refinitiv.

D Press conferences, asset prices and monetary policy

We would like to analyse whether the asset price moves following press conferences can be explained by news about monetary policy. Table 10 shows that in contrast to speeches (Table 3), the changes in asset prices that occur around press conferences do not seem to be related to news about monetary policy. In this table speeches are included with announcements in the base category, and may be diluting these results. But when we run the same regression on a partial sample excluding speeches, we get similar results (Table 11). This confirms our previous finding that speeches contain important information about the future path of monetary policy, above and beyond the effects of announcements or press conferences.

Table 10: Regression on full sample

	Constant	Target	Path	Dummy	Target * Dummy	Path * Dummy	R2
6M	-0.46***	1.14***	0.42***	0.06	0.02	-0.06	0.98
1Y	-0.58***	0.91***	0.90***	-0.05	-0.01	0.04	0.99
2Y	-0.33***	0.68***	0.61***	-0.23	-0.15	0.02	0.77
5Y	-0.29***	0.51***	0.62***	-0.05	-0.18*	-0.03	0.62
10Y	-0.16	0.32***	0.54***	0.06	-0.23**	-0.06	0.41
FTSE	0.003	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.03	-0.006	0.01	0.16

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 2 on the full sample (N=438) in the narrow window around the monetary policy event. The dummy variable D = 1 if press conference, and 0 if announcement or speech. 6m and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract, 2y, 5y, 10y refer to the respective gilt yield and FTSE is the FTSE All-Share Index. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 248 MPC announcements, 94 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches. Source: Refinitiv.

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

Table 11: Regression on partial sample

	Constant	Target	Path	Dummy	Target * Dummy	Path * Dummy	R2
6M Sterling future	-0.60***	1.13***	0.42***	0.05	0.02	-0.07*	0.98
1Y Sterling future	-0.82***	0.90***	0.89***	-0.05	-0.13	0.04	0.99
2Y Gilt yield	-0.43***	0.67***	0.60***	-0.28	-0.16	0.02	0.79
5Y Gilt yield	-0.38***	0.51***	0.60***	-0.09	-0.17*	-0.01	0.63
10Y Gilt yield	-0.21	0.31***	0.51***	0.0006	-0.24**	-0.03	0.42
FTSE All-Share	0.02*	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.04	-0.006	0.01	0.23

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 2 on a partial sample of only announcements and press conferences (N=342). The dependent variable is the change in the asset price, listed in column 1, in the narrow window around the monetary policy event. The dummy variable D = 1 if press conference, and 0 if announcement. 6m and 1y refer to the rate on the sterling future contract, 2y, 5y, 10y refer to the respective gilt yield and FTSE is the FTSE All-Share Index. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 248 MPC announcements and 94 MPC press conferences. Source: Refinitiv.

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

E Simple vs complex communication

Table 12 shows how our full sample is split into simple (bottom third), complex (top third) and the remaining third.

Table 12: The number of observations in each bucket

	Simple	Middle	Complex	Obs. Total
Announcement	138 (100%)	42 (31%)	64 (47%)	244
Press conference	0 (0%)	44 (33%)	25 (18%)	69
Speech	0 (0%)	49 (36%)	47 (35%)	96
	138	135	136	409

Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to percentages that sum to 100 across the columns. Please note that the column totals are not exactly one third each as there are duplicate values. The number of observations for press conferences drops in this table compared to Table 7 due to the absence of online press conference transcripts prior to January 2006. Source: Flesh-Kincaid WebFX and Bank of England.

Table 13 shows the mean (absolute) change for different asset classes around a monetary policy event for simple and complex communication. It shows that for all except for the shortest maturity sterling contracts, the (absolute) change in asset prices is larger if communication is complex compared to simple. However, as we found in Table 5, this difference is not statistically significant.

Table 14 shows the mean change in the standard deviation for different asset classes around a monetary policy event for simple and complex communication. It shows that for gilt yields, the change in the standard deviation of asset prices is larger if communication is complex compared to if it is simple. As Table 6 showed, this difference is significant for the shorter end of the yield curve.

Table 15 shows the results of regression 3 for a sub sample until (but excluding) August 2015. The purpose of this table is to explore how sensitive our results are to changes in the timing and format of MPC communication in July 2015. It is when the Bank began to release the MPC Summary, Minutes and MPR all on the same Thursday, called "Super Thursday" (see Appendix A for more detail). The Table shows that our results hold in this shorter sample, but are stronger in the full sample. In other words complex communication gives rise to increased volatility in asset prices.

Table 13: Mean (absolute) change for different asset classes around monetary policy event

	3M	6M	9M	12M	1Y gilt	2Y gilt	5Y gilt	10Y gilt	FTSE	£/USD
	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	<i>bps</i>	%	%
Complex	1.63	2.33	2.79	3.12	2.78	2.81	2.88	2.57	0.29	6.35
Simple	1.78	1.46	1.53	1.41	1.50	1.15	1.01	0.97	0.11	3.70

Note: The table shows the mean (absolute) change of different asset classes in a narrow window around simple and complex communication events. 3m, 6m, 9m, and 12m refer to the change in the rate on the respective sterling future contract (in basis points), 1y, 2y, 5y, 10y refer to the change in the respective gilt yield (in basis points), FTSE refers to the percentage change in the FTSE All-Share Index and £/USD refers to the percentage change in the 3-month forward exchange rate between sterling and the dollar. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 244 MPC announcements, 69 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches.

Source: Refinitiv.

Table 14: Mean change in volatility for different asset classes around monetary policy event

	3M	6M	9M	1Y	1Y gilt	2Y gilt	5Ygilt	10Y gilt	FTSE	£/USD
Complex	0.00	-0.04	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.07	9.72	2.63
Simple	0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	-5.90	1.10

Note: The table shows the mean change in the standard deviation of different asset classes in a narrow window around simple and complex communication events. 3m, 6m, 9m, and 12m refer to the standard deviation change in the rate on the respective sterling future contract, 1y, 2y, 5y, 10y refer to the standard deviation change in the respective gilt yield, FTSE refers to the standard deviation change in the FTSE All-Share Index and £/USD refers to the standard deviation change in the 3-month forward exchange rate between sterling and the dollar. Sample: September 1999 to April 2023, including 244 MPC announcements, 69 MPC press conferences and 96 MPC speeches.

Source: Refinitiv.

Table 15: High-frequency regressions pre-August 2015

	Constant	Target Factor	Path Factor	Dummy	Target *	Path *
					Dummy	Dummy
1Y	0.08*	-0.47***	-0.12***	-0.13	0.64	0.15
2Y	0.14***	-0.06	-0.12***	-0.12*	-0.19	0.11**
5Y	0.06***	-0.24***	-0.04*	-0.02	0.18	0.001
10Y	0.04***	-0.11***	-0.04***	-0.05	0.06	0.007

Note: The table shows the regression output from specification 3 in the narrow window around the monetary policy event for a subsample until (but excluding) August 2015. The dependent variable in the change in the standard deviation of the asset price listed in column 1. Each row represents a separate regression. The dummy variable D = 1 if communication is complex, and 0 otherwise. 1y, 2y, 5y and 10y refer to the respective gilt yield. Sample: September 1999 to July 2015 (N = 258)

HAC standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. See text for details.

Source: Refinitiv.

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